

COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE LIAISONING AGENCY
DOCUMENTS SECTION

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S. G. S. RECORDS STAFF
ROLL No. 6

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COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE
LIQUIDATING AGENCY
DOCUMENT SECTION
APO 757 U.S. ARMY

START & END
TARGET

ROLL NO. 6

THIS REEL CONTAINS MATERIAL
CLASSIFIED AT THE TIME OF
FILMING AS

TOP SECRET

FOR CURRENT CLASSIFICATION
CONSULT CUSTODIAN OF
THIS FILM

Recorder #1

NEW FOLDER

BEGINS

091.412

PROPAGANDA

VOL: 1

SECRET

SHAEF

SECRET

FWPC/5466

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : 21ST ARMY GROUP TO DE BEER TO POWELL TO
CLARK: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP: SIXTH ARMY GROUP:
FOR INFO : AND SHAEF REAR:
FROM : SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED SCAMF, FROM MCCLURE
REF NO : S-73240 CITE: SHFWD

Discussion with NEVILLE, POWELL and G-2
First Army reinforce our December 30th Guidance.

1. We must expect further German offensive action in BASTOGNE sector, in MOWSCHAU AACHEN area and possibly HOLLAND.
2. We should assume in propaganda that we must wait for Germans to exhaust themselves before we launch a major blow.
3. German prisoners taken on First and Third Army sectors already sagging after early elation. Even SS units are not what they were in NORMANDY. Not all participants in operation GREIF enthusiastic. Heaviest German casualties caused by lack of training. Follows Directive.
 1. Continue to commit Germans to capture LIEGE and VERDUN. Add ANTWERP which is widely recognised by Prisoners of War as objective.
 2. Do not state or suggest that the German offensive has reached its climax or been finally stopped.

END OUT 23

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- 1 -

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REF ID

: S-73240

1 JANUARY 1945

3. On special request PW First UNITED STATES Army avoid detailed place name descriptions of fighting. These greatly assist Germans in the bulge. Many are ignorant of the situation and rely on BBC CALAIS. For this reason leaflet maps in troop newspaper must never show troop dispositions.

4. Hint that German soldier should look over shoulder at lines of communication especially railways into bulge. These are seriously threatened by air attacks. Do not assert that Air Forces have already completely isolated Germans in the bulge.

5. Stress strongly that numbers of Germans are surrendering. Continue avoid discussion American ferocity. We are trying to obtain approval for voice of BRAEF re operation GREIF submitted by PW First UNITED STATES Army through 21st Army Group. Until this is released keep off the subject.

ORIGINATOR : FWD AUTHENTICATION: J. G. OUTWILLIG, CAPT.
INFORMATION : 303
G-2
G-3

SAC TOW 23 1 JAN 1945 1203A WDH/jap REF NO: S-73240
TOW: 311340H

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- 2 -

SECRET

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

466

INCOMING MESSAGE

THE 444 254 1038

SIGNAL 318731
 TOR 312032A DEC
 VLR 312040A DEC

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : EXPORT MAIN FROM DEWILDE
TO : FWD SHARE MAIN FOR SCOLUSE
REF NO : FFW 122 31 December 1954.

Polynomial in PW Distance

Main development is increasing weight being brought to bear against Third Army thrust including transfer of armour from northern flank. SOCHFORT captured by own troops. 2 Pz Div badly battered in fighting to northern succeeding receptors. Pocket of surrounded enemy at BILFOP, BUCAL being mopped up.

Otherwise nothing to report.

ACTION : FWD
INFOGIB-106 : SGS
G-2
G-3
FWD
AG RECORDS

[illegible]

SNC IN 1827 31 Dec 4 2057A DWR/1 REF NO: PDW 122

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COPY NO.

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242

PROPAGANDA TREATMENT.

We should concentrate

1. On the fact that the German gamble has been frustrated, and
2. On Germany's strategic plight as a result;

while holding in abeyance any talk of the strategic Allied reply. More specifically we should:

1. Make known by all means in our power to the German soldier the true state of the battle.
2. Bring home to the German civilians the terrible losses inflicted upon their army in the present battle, and direct their attention to the effect of this on the subsequent possibilities of continuing the war after its conclusion, and on Germany's future after final defeat.
3. Remind the German soldier remorselessly of the objectives announced, the promises made, and the false statements issued by their leaders, and draw comparisons with the actual situation. Tell him of the far more cautious Nazi propaganda at home.
4. Inform the German soldier of the condition of Germany's real resources in reserves of men, tanks, guns, fuel and other material.
5. Inform the German soldier of the true state of affairs in the Reich, i.e. manpower, transport, food, health, housing, Party tyranny, public discontent, etc., showing this as the real motive for Rundstedt's gamble.
6. Make known to the German civilians (and foreign workers in Germany) the objectives announced, promises made, and false statements issued to the troops, but not to them.
7. Make known to the German civilians (and foreign workers) the true situation, and contrast with the above.
8. Encourage, by judicious reporting of happenings in areas of Germany close behind the front and under Allied control, the anti-war and anti-Regime and the pro-Allied feeling among German civilians.

Furthermore, we should be on the lookout for materials to show the sanctity of German propaganda - since news of the failure of the German thrust will unavoidably cause resentment against the German news sources which have built it up.

The following open admission that German propaganda deliberately lies to deceive the enemy should be read, since it deceives the German people too. A document appended to NSFO directives issued by Army Group B on 24 October says, "Should we really have said in 1941 'The Atlantic Wall is very weak; only a few divisions are needed to over-run it; we expect to take Paris very quickly?'... 'German propaganda is a weapon of war... In war propaganda sometimes speaks more to the enemy than to one's own people.' Propaganda on the strength of the Atlantic wall was justified because 'it thus contributed to the fact that the date of invasion was continually postponed by the enemy'".

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These expressions would be unlikely to strengthen belief in present German propaganda about new weapons, reserves, or any of the factors from which hope is derived. [PWS/GSS Intelligence, December 17.]

They should get into action once as all of you and of our poor young men must." (12 AG Intelligence.)

WORKERS VERSUS NAZIS.

A PW, who is a resident of the city of Bremen and last saw his hometown during October of this year, was present during a fight that took place between Party members and RR employees in an air raid shelter. The shelter had been especially built to protect the families of RR workers. Local Party members took a fancy to it and, as with everything else, decided to take over. When the RR men came down with their relatives, most of the available space was already occupied by the Nazis. The infuriated RR workers tore into the Party men, and a rousing brawl ensued. A few soldiers who happened to be there were called upon to stop the fight. This they did, after taking a few pokes at the local fuhrers themselves.

Information has now been received of a new anti-Nazi workers' organization in the Reichland. It is called "The Red Eagle". Both German and foreign workers are members. They engage in sabotage and anti-Nazi propaganda. (SHAEP Intelligence, Main Edition, December 22.)

A confidential document written by the Director of the Reich Labour Service says, "Although the majority of foreign workers are loyal, terror attacks, not only by individuals and small groups but by organized large groups, are increasing. The men are trying to get weapons by ambush and burglary. These groups are systematically trying to harm the Reich by assembling mobility forces, by making hitlerite docile workers to slow down work, by threatening them with severe punishment if they do not follow directives, and by attacking foreigners friendly to the Reich. The security of the Reich demands close watch on them".

THE GERMAN POLICE.

Reports from neutral sources say that the German police force has been drastically reduced by the demands of the armed forces. This applies even to the Security Police and Gestapo.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

Though now is not the time to develop this theme in a big way, an item or two should be given now and then. This is the kind of thing that is valuable even now:

The Burgomaster appointed by Military Government at Markstein in a letter to MG announced that the land of evacuated peasants was being worked by those who had remained. Should the evacuated peasant return, the man who had worked in his fields would receive half of the harvest. Should the evacuated peasant fail to return, the man who had worked his land would receive the whole harvest. - The greatest part of the harvest has been gathered. Winter sowing of rye and wheat has taken place so that the sowing can be completed in the spring. - Because the Nazis took most of the cattle, the farmers have only one cow and a few calves left apiece. They turn in their milk so that children under 8 years of age can receive 1 liter per day; children from 8 to 10 and old people receive 1 liter. For himself and his family the farmer retains the eggs of one chicken per person. For each additional chicken he must turn in 60 eggs per year for distribution among the community.

AUSTRIA.

With the Russians at Budapest, people in Germany will be interested in news of Austria even in these days. So will

- 6 -

Austrians on the western Front.

Instructions for factory guards in Vienna are devoted to guarding against subversive activities among factory workers. The guards in the shops are placed near workers, particularly foreigners. Unknown persons in the factories are to be watched for, and reported. The guards are forbidden to discuss factory matters outside the plant; if an unknown person outside tries to pump them, he is to be immediately arrested. Workers without a factory pass or attempts of foreign workers to propagandize among the factory employees will be reported. German workers should be instructed to keep foreigners at a distance. Guards should watch for suspicions of sabotage or espionage, subversive propaganda through foreigners or Germans, incitement to passive resistance, confidential relations between foreigners and Germans, receipt and forwarding of letters or parcels for foreigners, loss of secret documents and offenses against the rule of silence about factory matters.

ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Erigadier General U. S. A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Distribution:

P & D.I.

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SHAFF

REF 5336

0911412

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : SEVENTH USF ARMY GROUP, TO DE BRD. TWENTH ARMY GROUP IN COMB, SIXTH ARMY GROUP TO CLARK

FROM INFO : SHAFF M. A.

FROM : SHAFF M. A., FROM WOLFE, SIGNED SCALF

REF NO : 8-7287 CITE: SHPD

Following daily guidance.

Continued loss of objective reporting Allied attacks.

Many soldiers in GRAMMIS area on left wing of 5th Pz Army in small strength and can be treated as isolated attack by 5th Pz Army to do their part. When frustrated use in other way as STG have also let the WEHRMACHT down.

Report of 1st Airborne Headquarters Allied (reconnaissance force) to do some figures on GERMAN manpower and material losses in past future.

ORIGINAL : PVE

AUTHENTICATION: J. C. GUTHRIE, Captain

COPIES : 10
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29 DEC 1945 1638h

JOH/jg

REF NO: 8-7287

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SHAEF

PWFO/05259

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : 21 AG TO DE BIER, 12 AG TO POWELL, 6 AG TO CLARK
FOR INFO : PWD SHAEF REAR
FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM MCCLURE SIGNED SCATF
REFNO : S-72832 CITE: SHFMD

Daily Guidance.

1. Give special stress to German losses suffered in current offensive.
2. While not giving the net impression that the Allied fullscale counterattack has begun give full play to news from Allied sources of local Allied attacks.
3. For your information strong Allied stopper now established along MAAS to German Westward thrust. Can assume in propaganda that Germans will try 1 more powerful northwestward thrust which we are confident we can frustrate.
4. Continue committing Germans to making a successful drive to LIEGE, without which their terrible sacrifices are in vain.

ORIGINATOR : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: J G GUNWILLIG
Capt

SNC OUT 3838 29 Dec 1944 0404A DMP/jes REFNO: S-72832
FOO: 281315A

9 13

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UAGH

POO 271910A DECEMBER

SHAEF 259/27

FOR 272252 DECEMBER

ecg, 272306 DECEMBER

SECRET

EXCERPT

PRO : CAPOR MAIN FROM REVILLE
FC : PWD SHAEF MAIN FOR NOCLURE
REF AL : PTW -M 27 DECEMBER 1944

Ref para 572445, ctd 25 Dec.
G-3 deception informed.

6-7344 is SMC OUT 3453, 26/12/44, MID.

ACTION : MID
INTERPRETATION : SGS
G-3
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 4396 27 DEC 44 0315A HSE/aa MTF NO: PTW-01

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL PMO/05196

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : 21 ARMY GROUP TO DE BEER, 12 ARMY GROUP TO POWELL,
6 ARMY GROUP TO CLARK

FOR INFO : FWD SHAEF REAR

FROM : SHAEF BAKH, FROM MCCLURE SIGNED SCAEF

REF NO : 8-72676 CITE: SHFWD

Here are main points discussion of situation at
SHAEF Policy Board this afternoon, Deputy Chief of Staff presiding.

1. Comma RUNDSTEDT very strongly in taking
LIEGE as primary objective, VERDUN as secondary objective. Build
up LIEGE as nodal point Allied lines of communication. RUNDSTEDT's
offensive has failed unless LIEGE falls.

2. Give news of slow up German advance without
undue emotion. Don't commit us to immediate dramatic counteraction.

3. Continue to play down our air offensive. If
Weather holds it will bring big returns. But don't commit us
in advance.

4. Continue to attribute responsibility offensive
to RUNDSTEDT. G-2 and PMO agreed to this this afternoon. Dis-
regard today's press release on this subject.

5. Continue to play down American ferocity
against German units in American uniforms. Remember our primary
objective is to induce surrender. Special press release on
operation CHIEF is being prepared.

Follows routine directive points.

1. We should assume cautiously main tactical
leaflet for next fortnight will be RACHRICHTEN. At present
RACHRICHTEN printing sufficient only for five and a half out of

END OUT 3686

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REF NO. 8-72676

-2-

28 December 1944

available fifteen planes. Urgently suggest temporary increased printing. We are ready to use up large percentage our news print quota for next six weeks in next fortnight to achieve maximum HACHICHI circulation when it is needed most. Would appreciate earliest reply from KOREA.

2. Reference our 4494 of December 16 suggest postponement project leaflet printing of 12 AG Weekly News sheets. Also postponement JUNCAN, WILSON's project Prisoners of War newspapers.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: J.G. GUTHILLIG,
CAPTAIN

INFORMATION : SCS
G-2
PRD
G-3
SUMMARY
AG HACHICHI

DMC OUT 3030

28 Dec 44

0358A

DWR/lp

REF NO: 8-72676
TOO: 2719001

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SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : 21ST ARMY GROUP TO DE BEER TO POWELL
TO CLARK: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP: SIXTH ARMY
GROUP:

FROM : SHAEF MAIN, FROM NOCLARK SIGNED SCAEF

REF NO : S-72506 CITE: SHPWD

Directive 1. Do NOT give the impression the German counter offensive is over. There is more to come aimed to justify his losses. RUNSTEDT must take LIEGE.

2. Do NOT suggest our positive counter measures have yet begun either on the North or South.

3. Try NOT to over-balance your news with bulk build-up air offensive. Cannot give the impression more air activity can stop Germans or substitute for counter action on the ground.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: J.G. GUTTWILLIG, CAPT. MAC.

REPRODUCTION : SGS
AG RECORDS

26 DEC 1944 1826A HMK/jdp REF NO: S-72506
TOD: 261340A

SECRET

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SECRET

REF N: 199 1412

26 DEC.

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

MFC/05087

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : 12 ARMY GROUP TO POWELL
 FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM MCCLURG, SIGNED BOAST
 REF NO : S-72444

Northern Army Group reports honoring safe conduct passes dubious because of enemy deceptions and massacres of Allied prisoners. It was told further use of safe conducts was matter local decision. Request recommendation based on your area.

ORIGINATOR: PWD AUTHENTICATION: J. G. OUTWILLER
 Captain
 INFORMATION: GCS
 G-2
 G-3
 G-1
 SUMMARY
 AG RECORDS

ENC (UP) 5452 26 Dec. 1944 05564 DWR/rob Ref. No: S-72444
 TO: 0517304

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL ZNYC 05086

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

TO : 21 ARMY GROUP TO CEMEXR
FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM MCCLURE, SIGNED SCARF
REF NO : 3-72445 CITE: SHAFD
Your VW-76 dated December 24.

Further use of safe conducts must be local decision. Keep us posted. Third Army opinion also asked and will be sent you. Have you asked G-3 deception about paragraph 3? If not have them warn G-3 SHAF that we shall approach them.

VW-76 1st SMD IN 8522, 24/12/44, FWD

ORIGINATOR: FWD AUTHENTICATION: J. E. GUTHRIE
INFORMATION: SCS Captain
G-3
AG RECORDS

SMD 000 3255 26 Dec. 1944 0556A DNR/rob Ref. No: 3-72445
TCO: 251730A

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SECRET

THIS MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

GROUP NO 5

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SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : 21 AG, 12 AG, 6 AG, TO DE BRIS, TO FORAL,
TO CLARGE

FROM : STAFF MAIN SIGNED SCRF

REF NO : S-72353

Follows directive:

1. Commit RUNDSTEDT to objectives LINGE for
DEFENSE army KAMER and of VERDUN for MONTLUPPEL. These
German prisoner talk as Christmas objectives. Suggest we
extend to New Year.

2. 21 and 12 Army Groups should begin
consideration leaflet targets in breakthrough area. Please
achieve these at once. Also when you think leafletting should
commence. We propose straight dropping troop newspaper
Tuesday night unless you advise against.

3. Avoid most carefully committed successful
counter action. Avoid commitment to closing gap or cutting
off German armored divisions. In view fluid situation
and German capacity opportunist exploitation weak spots
we regard all such speculation as premature. We are still
on the defensive all along the whole front except for
counter action southern sector breakthrough area. Hence
but view HALE commentary over optimistic in tone.

Strongly suggest no buildup in White
propaganda of American ferocity against German troops in
American uniforms. No hunt plan for excellent opportunities
for taking prisoners of war later on. Stress on this theme
will only deter surrenders.

OF ORIGINATOR : FCB AUTHENTICATION: W. GURFELL,
1st. COLONEL

INFORMATION : SCS
AG RECORDS

REF OUT 2361 20 Dec 44 2250A HEN/acs REF NO: S-72353
FOO: 21-230A

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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

INFO

TOP 241900A DED

SHAEP 1133/24
TER 242136 DED
EXB - 242202

SECRET

SP. PRIORITY

FROM : EXFOR MAIN P AND PW
TO : SHAEP MAIN FWD FOR ECCLURE
REF NO : FFW 76 : 21 DECEMBER 1944 :

Following is PW guidance.

1. So great change in situation. Must reckon with probability enemy will spread further. Enemy now regrouping and has resources for another punch.

2. Request review policy use safe conducts. First Army so increased enemy deception in Allied uniforms and possession of prisoners that honoring safe conduct in doubt.

3. Recommend preparation white and black plan for use at later date to secure maximum confusion among enemy troops. Suggest NACHRICHTEN SOLDATEN-SENDERWET ATLANTIC suitable media false black name information.

ADDITION : PW
INCORPORATION : SCS
AG RECORDS

ALL INFORMATION
IS UNCLASSIFIED

SMC IN 8522 24 DEC '44 2310A HPR/40 REF NO: FFW 76

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THE MESSAGE IS REQUIRED

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 Dec. 1944

TO: GENERAL MORGAN
2. GENERAL SMITH

For approval.

S/ C.L.B.

Chief of Staff

We spoke about this one which I commend to your favourable attention.

You will note that the execution of this scheme involves deceiving our own people to a certain extent, and therefore involves a certain amount of risk on the Home Front.

Personally I am all for taking this risk if and when the appropriate moment arrives.

S/ F. S. MORGAN

29/12

Handwritten: 31 December 1944

TO: P.W. D.
Brig. Gen. McClure


C/S has approved as changed.

S/ C. L. Burgess

31 Dec. '44

APPROVED (handwritten - "As changed")

S/ W. L. Smith



COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

1. DISTRIBUTION.

2. SUPPLEMENT HEADQUARTERS AND THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Combat Leaflets.

DATE 23 December 1944.

Number each page or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the entire width of sheet for long appendices.

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	PAO SHAF (MAIN)	Secty. Gen: Staff. SHAF (MAIN).	23 Dec. 1944.	1. Enclosed is a selection of Current Combat Leaflets now being used on the Western Front. <i>File</i> <i>Alan H. Magary</i> ALAN H. MAGARY. 1st Lt. USMC.

091-412

23 DEC.

6 23

CONFIDENTIAL
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

FILE NO. PWP 000.77

22 December 1944

GUIDANCE NOTES FOR OUTPUT IN GERMAN FOR THE WEEK
DECEMBER 22 - JANUARY 1

(Note: Though intended primarily for German output, all material in this paper which is not side-lined for background only should be given good coverage in the languages of important groups of foreign workers in the Reich.)

APPRECIATION.

The German counter-offensive, though possibly of psychological value to Hitler from a very short-term point of view, must ultimately work in favour of our psychological warfare if we keep shooting away at our chosen targets without shifting our aim or range.

In some respects even while the counter-offensive continues we are presented with better opportunities than before it began. For example, there is greater chance for German (or non-German) soldiers in the Wehrmacht to desert or "get taken prisoner", there must be heavier German casualties and expenditure of material, and for very many people in Germany the thought, that this do-or-die effort can only prolong the war without in any way altering its outcome, must render the authorities who order it not more popular but more hated.

ACTION INDICATED.

Emphasis in a matter-of-fact way, without any trace of over-insistence or anxiety, that this is, as Rundstedt said, a desperate final effort, which at the very most can delay our victory, and not, as the Nazis may think, create circumstances in which they can escape defeat. Show it as a defensive time-winning move militarily, with a purely political aim strategical one which will be defeated by Allied solidarity and resolution at great cost to Germany in the manpower and material resources she will need for rehabilitation. At the same time play up the exalted ambitions of the offensive and what the troops were led to expect of it.

Show that the counter-offensive does not alter any of the facts to which we are accustomed to draw attention, e.g.:

1. German shortage of fighting manpower as illustrated by call-up of untrained Volksturm, industrial difficulties, increased reliance on foreign workers, etc.
2. German transport chaos due to wearing out of material, shortage of lubricants and liquid fuel, and lack of skilled manpower, as well as bombing.
3. German food difficulties to transport chaos, loss of formerly exploited territories, and manpower shortage.
4. German health dangers.
5. German youth's incipient revolts against regimentation.
6. German civilians' war-weariness and resentment at such measures as forced evacuation.
7. The effects of evacuation and scorched earth on the future prospects of the people in the areas involved, on those in the receiving areas, and on the nation as a whole.
8. The potential unreliability of such elements as regular police, railwaymen, peasants and miners.

At the same time we should continue to do all in our power to increase the strength and solidarity of the anti-war and anti-Himmler elements, and to point the contrast between life under the Himmler rule of terror and increasing chaos, and life under the firm but fair rule of Military Government with its promise of law and order and a reasonable chance for self-rehabilitation and, above all, freedom from the all pervading tyranny of a corrupt Party.

In short, current themes should retain their priority and simply be fitted in with the slightly changed circumstances, so that the German counter-offensive either strengthens the antagonism to the regime of those who realise that it is just another senseless sacrifice, or, when it is halted, produces a profound reaction against the regime among those whose hopes are raised by it.

Nevertheless, commentaries on the military situation will, contrary to expectations, be once again necessary. In addition to points in the Appreciation at the start of this paper, here are some lines:

1. No harm is done by admitting that the Allies were surprised by the locality in which the attack occurred, although not by the intention behind it. The German High Command's decision to commit to a costly and decisive action the last first-class troops which it possesses might be expected by the German High Command to postpone for a time the retribution coming to the Nazi criminals, but inevitably this action must render Germany's ultimate prostration through loss of manpower more complete than it would otherwise have been.

2. This final desperate lashing-out proves realisation by the regime of these facts:

- a. German civilian will to resist the Allies was so fast becoming translated into will to resist the regime that something had to be done to switch public attention from internal conditions and to counter the conviction that the future held only a series of forced evacuations, S.S. plunderings, etc. Nazi threats to Germans who work with us, and rumours of their execution by "patriots" show how disturbed the regime is by the way in which Germans under Military Government are behaving.
- b. The danger of widespread strike action by foreign workers and even German workers had become so grave with the Allies pushing steadily towards the Rhine and Ruhr, that it was essential to demonstrate in a spectacular way that the Allied advance was not so relentlessly inevitable as it appeared.
- c. That it is open to question whether plans for prolonged guerilla and underground resistance in Germany could be carried out. Otherwise the S.S. - the very elements needed to lead the German Maquis - would not have been expended in a regular military offensive.

3. The last hope of finding reserves to cope with forthcoming Soviet offensives has gone with the committal of so many elite troops in the West.

4. This gamble has the same motives as Ludendorff's in March 1918, though it has less chance of success. A feeble affair, it is the utmost the Germans can now do, and must have the same consequences as the 1918 failure. (Use Ludendorff quotes.) It has also much in common with the great Kurak offensive in the summer of 1943. In that attack, too, all the best troops and armour were used. Its failure was followed by the tremendous German retreats in the East.

5. If all anti-Nazis everywhere, in and out of Germany, do

their best against Hitler Germany, this last gamble can be made a means of shortening the war and not, as the Nazis intend, of lengthening it. Failure now by the United Nations peoples, the foreigners in the Reich, and the anti-Nazi in Germany will mean that the ordeal will be prolonged and reconstruction delayed.

In all news and comment on the German offensive the actual developments should be handled with the utmost frankness, without apologies, evasions or glosses on hard military facts, but our record, our accurate predictions when things were really black for us in earlier years, and the credit we have acquired enable us to combine with candid reporting an analysis of the motives for, and consequences of, the German offensive, which will be deeply depressing for our foes, stimulating for our friends, and convincing for all.

We should now draw heavily on our credit balance in taking the gilt off the Nazi gingerbread by exposing some unpleasant aspects of the offensive from the German point of view. What we cannot afford to do is to squander our credit balance by hushing up hard military facts when they seem unpleasant from our point of view.

THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, THE WEHRMACHT AND THE CIVILIANS.

Full use should be made of every item which shows that this German attack is a last fling, to which the regime wishes the German army and people to attach high hopes.

For instance:

Documents in Allied hands reveal that the Wehrmacht was sent into action not only with a special order from Rundstedt declaring that this was a final effort on which all depended, but that there were similar orders from Lodel and Manteuffel. These documents also indicate that an attempt was made to bring Hitler to the fore again while Hitler remained in the background for this special occasion. References are made in the documents to addresses by Hitler to the troops on December 11 and 12. When or where these talks, of a do-or-die nature, were given is not known, and there is no real evidence that they ever were actually given by Hitler himself. But evidently it was desired to make the troops believe that he had come out of retirement, where he was supposed to have been planning the offensive.

This was part of an intensive propaganda campaign to the army, which began long before the attack was launched. At a meeting of divisional commanders in November it was stated that it was impossible to supply the divisions already engaged with fresh troops, as all available men were going to the Volksgrenadier divisions, which were to form an assault army (Stoosarmee).

This army, it was stated, would be equipped with new secret weapons, and with it the High Command hoped to drive the Allies out of France. Most of the Volksgrenadier divisions would be thrown into a single large-scale counter-offensive at the end of December, which would be aimed at Paris and the Channel. Aircraft were being held in reserve for this. The divisional commanders were told, and the High Command hoped to achieve a large-scale break-through.

Prisoners taken since the German offensive was launched confirm that they were encouraged to hold the highest hopes of a complete reversal of the situation in the West. Some of them, however, state that they were sceptical from the first, and welcomed the attack only because it gave them a better chance of getting taken prisoner without obviously deserting. One prisoner stated that German units were sent into action in American uniform with transport bearing the Allied white star. He said the men in these units were anxious about the results to themselves of these tactics, should they be taken prisoner. They were also

indeed were.

It is learnt from prisoners that many S.S. divisions have been committed in this attack. One soldier, whose family have been maltreated by the S.S. during forced evacuation, expressed pleasure that nearly all the S.S. are now out of German rear areas and up at the front, and that with luck, as he put it, not many of them would be left after this battle.

In order to prepare the blow, the German troops on the northern sector of the American First Army front and on the American Ninth Army front were ruthlessly sacrificed last month. Deprived of armour, which was nearly all sent up from reserve into the area of the coming counter-offensive, and of all fresh and well-equipped troops, which were also concentrated there, the German units charged with defending the Dueren area were subjected to very heavy losses. Two divisions were cut to pieces. In both divisions the German High Command committed second- and third-rate troops, in order to save the panzers and good infantry for their impending offensive. Cooks, drivers, clerks and other similar personnel were thrown in.

A German officer said, when captured, that it was a shame the way the division was thrown away. A score of prisoners said that they had been betrayed by their leaders. They had been told, before being sent into action, that they were being taken out of the line for rest. Then, the next day, they had been thrown into battle on a new sector. They were, they said, simply used as cannon-fodder. With them were replacements just out of hospital and not properly recovered; of 15 prisoners from a G.A.F. Fortress Battalion, more than half were over 50. "We ought to be in an old age institution, not at the front", they said.

From innumerable interrogations of prisoners taken on the Dueren sector of the front it is now clear that the OKW deliberately sent ill-trained, old and unfit men to die there, so that they could concentrate their fresh divisions and their armour for the present offensive.

In the same way, south of the area of the present offensive, in the Saarbruecken area, inferior troops were used for the same reason - including a number of very young Volksturm. Some were only 12 or 13 years old. One unit of V.S. on the American Third Army front did not even wear armbands. They were clothed in all types of uniforms, taken from postmen, railwaymen and police, and dyed green.

Volksturm prisoners seem to have few illusions about their role as cannon-fodder to delay the Allied armies' advance towards Cologne, Saarbruecken and Karlsruhe, while the elite troops are used in a last desperate offensive. One Volksturmster said: "The Nazis will wait until the Volksturm bleeds itself to death, as they are trembling for their lives" ("Die werden das Ausbluten des Volksturms erwarten, da sie um ihr Leben zittern.")

Wehrmacht prisoners in this sector have expressed the view that Hitler hopes to use the V.S. against the Wehrmacht, should the latter prove recalcitrant, but think it is more likely that the V.S. will one day turn their weapons against the regime.

THE GERMAN POLICE

While hanging on desperately on either flank of the area chosen for the offensive, the OKW has been using increasing numbers of police in the firing line. In some cases the results have been bad. The Trier police force was recently committed to battle near Dillingen. Not one policeman had been informed exactly why he had been sent there, or had received any battle training. They were all put in forward bunkers, where they were captured.

Himmler is rapidly doing away with the Schutzpolizei as a distinct force, and absorbing them into the armed forces, on much the same, though not so favoured, footing as the Waffen S.S. As from January 1 the pay of all police - except plain-clothes, criminal and administrative police - will be the same as that of the armed forces. The decree announcing this says that this is because police units are operating with units of the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S. with increasing frequency at the fronts, and even at home the duties of police and troops are becoming identical. A German policeman in Allied hands, when asked his opinion of this decree, said it seemed to him that it could only mean that Himmler was going to use the police as front-line troops against the Allies, and the troops as police against the German people.

Evidence of Himmler's dissatisfaction with the zeal of the ordinary police in helping his special agents to dragoon the German people is to be found in the news that he has supplemented his directives for the enforcement of the registration of evacuees. It is learnt that many Germans are evading registration with the Labour Offices and even with the Food Offices, and that the police have been failing to notify this evasion.

Prominent among those failing to register and receiving police protection in many cases are juveniles, who appear to be absenting themselves increasingly from Hitler Youth parades. The German Press has had to issue reminders that by a decree of the Reich Youth Leader all boys and girls must attend an annual parade for the express purpose of registering jointly with the Hitler Youth and with the Food Office. Reckless youth are threatened with the withdrawal of food cards for failure to attend the parades and secure a certificate of attendance to produce at the Food Office. In spite of this, it seems that there are thousands of German boys and girls between 10 and 18 who have not attended and yet contrive to get food somehow.

There is evidence that compulsory labour service is even more unpopular, if possible, among German girls of under 20 than with the older women. One 18-year-old girl from Cologne, daughter of an officer wounded in the last war, expressed violent criticism of the labour service when interviewed by Allied interrogators. She said, "The girls in the labour service forget all that they learnt at home, and one has to watch one's step or one will fall into hell". This girl is an interesting type. In spite of her Nazi upbringing, she has a completely international outlook. She said she was neither proud nor ashamed to be a German, adding "It is all the same to me whether a man is American, British, Belgian or German, so long as he has a good character".

THE GERMAN RAILWAYS.

Much new information has become available concerning the chaotic conditions of the German railway service.

Owing to transport failures, distribution of coal, food and other essential commodities is breaking down. For example, at Gelsenkirchen, the greatest coal-mining town in Europe and centre of the Ruhr coalfields, coal cannot even be supplied in the surrounding areas of North Westphalia. Evacuees have been told they must put up with wood and peat. In Necklinghausen, nearby, it was stated on December 2 that the coal situation demanded the greatest economy and there was no hope of improvement for several months.

In one typical week recently the number of railway wagons carrying coal which left the Ruhr area daily was only 2,000, comparing with a normal daily figure of 6,000. Of those 2,000 only 400 got to their destination. The rest were held up by breakdowns due to the worn-out condition of locomotives and rolling-stock, lack of skill or sabotage on the part of the many foreigners employed on the trains, and

by the unwillingness of even the German personnel to take the trains through Allied air attacks. Many wagons were destroyed by bombs en route, nevertheless.

It is now learnt that on November 26 the Reichsbahn coal reserve was only sufficient for 48 hours, while in the Berlin area the entire war industry, with the exception of the Blohm and Voorn factory and one machine works, was brought to a standstill for lack of coal.

The practice of overloading freight cars has been now carried to extreme lengths, cars designed to carry a limit of 15 tons being loaded now with 16 or even 17 tons. Overhaul of locomotives has been cut down drastically, due to the shortage of them. Normally locomotives are called in for cleaning and a general check-up every 15 days. Now they are going five or six weeks without any attention at all, with the result that they use more coal, develop less power, and wear out faster.

According to an important official in one of the big A location marshalling yards, bad lubricating oil, faulty replacement parts, and the use of overworked and under-trained personnel is causing many breakdowns. Many locomotives and wagons are being cannibalised in order to find spare parts for others. At the end of November in the yard where this man worked there were 85 locomotives, of which 15 were awaiting repair and 15 others were unusable.

As a result of these conditions the failure to deliver mail is becoming chronic. In Essen letters are being delivered only three times a week. The National Zeitung of Duisburg recently complained that a letter from a town only 80 kilometres away had reached it only after a delay of days, adding "We could have walked the distance several times in the period during which the letter was on its way". The paper adds that this could easily be improved if the authorities would use women called up for war work, sent away and now unemployed.

In many large cities the delivery of mail to individual boxes and houses and collection of outgoing mail from street boxes has been suspended, not only because of shortages of postal personnel, but because of the desire to discourage the sending of letters, and thus relieve the strain on the railways. In Hamburg and Kassel incoming mail is dumped in various buildings and no attempt is made to inform people that there is mail for them. People wishing to send letters have to take them to the post office themselves, as no collections are made from boxes either in the street or in buildings.

In addition to transport chaos, another reason for this is the desire of the Nazis to prevent the troops learning of conditions at home.

GERMAN FOOD POSITION.

Transport trouble is an important, but not the only, cause of the serious food situation developing in the Reich, which is almost bound to lead to ration cuts next year. It is learnt from farmers in areas of Western Germany under Allied occupation that it is almost impossible to obtain transportation for potatoes and other foodstuffs. Nazi officials have told farmers that they must do all they can to make their districts self-sufficient by increasing their potato acreage and cutting down the number of pigs, in order that the potatoes shall be available for human consumption.

The farmers have also been told to increase the production of those vegetables which Germany had hitherto been importing from the occupied countries in the West. At the same time, however, they have been informed that fertiliser supplies must be cut down and the nitrogen ration is now under 20 per cent the pre-war level. They have been ordered to make up the

deficiency by growing green manure and using farmyard manure and compost, but they have not the labour required for such extra work. Soon there will be an even greater shortage, as farmers have got to release many of the men they have got for timber-cutting, to provide substitute fuel for road transport, for which ever less oil is available.

The German Army is now increasingly using producer gas vehicles, and great quantities of wood are needed to keep them going. So great is the demand that prolonged storage of wood for drying purposes has been forbidden. At present a lot of wet wood is being used and this leads to an inadequate generation of gas and the generation of excessive acid, which damages the generator. The situation is serious, for already incursions have been made into stocks of dry firewood - leaving the German citizen, who cannot get coal, without fuel for heating or cooking. Stocks of wood and charcoal taken from France are now exhausted. It would have been quite simple to fit a water-superheater to the producer gas generator, had the authorities thought of it soon enough, but now German industry is hard put to it to produce other essential things without having to burn out many tons of thousands of water-superheaters. Now the danger to the German Army's mobility is grave.

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL LABOUR.

From prisoners of war and from German civilians until recently in close touch with German industry fresh information has been secured concerning the stripping of factories of their skilled men for the front. Recently General Gremm, staff member of the Wehrkreis VI, set as the slogan for German industry "The most important job of a German to-day is to serve in the front line", and in the Western Wehrkreis vital industries have been more and more depleted of their labour. It is impossible to replace skilled men, since technical instructors are also being called up and there is no-one to train replacements.

Lazy industrialists, anticipating even increased demands on them, are hoarding labour by issuing unauthorized manpower regulations and juggling with priority numbers.

The Nazi manpower controls have not been able to cope with the large-scale falsification by employers trying to get workers to keep their factories going.

One industrialist interviewed in occupied Germany said, "If, added to all the other labour troubles, a series of big strikes by foreign workers were to break out, the juggling of manpower between army, war industry and civilian demands will break down and lead to a grave crisis in the Government and industry, which might precipitate the fall of the Third Reich".

The Nazi's fear of the decisive power wielded potentially by the millions of foreign workers is shown by a great increase in the propaganda directed to them. The number of papers published for them is being increased, and 70 French collaborationist journalists, who came from France, are working on papers for the French foreign workers.

HEALTH OF GERMAN.

Overworked, badly housed and clothed, unhealthily if adequately fed, short of medical supplies and doctors, the German civilian population is liable to a number of dangerous epidemics, which it would be foolish to bring to the proportion of widespread epidemics in other countries.

One report on the situation says:

"Diphtheria and 'Luesische Krankheit' are spreading rapidly, especially in areas free from air raids where most of the bombed-out people are quartered. Illness is especially prevalent in

the Black Forest, Bavaria, Austria and the Tyrol. Medicines are wholly lacking. The few doctors are quite insufficient."

In Dortmund there is spotted typhus. At a recent meeting of Town Councillors the Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Caesar, declared that, owing to the landing together of so many people in unhealthy conditions and to the presence of so great a number of foreign workers, there was a constant danger of serious epidemics. Diphtheria and scarlet fever were on the increase, he said, and were being encouraged by people crowding together in air raid shelters. Paratyphoid and dysentery, the doctor said, were well inland, but there were many cases of spotted typhus. This had been caused by German camp employees from Eastern Germany and spread from the townspeople.

The police last month ordered the complete evacuation and walling-up of the centre of the town for health reasons.

Diabetes is on the increase in the Reich, and the insulin supply is only 20 per cent of the much swollen normal needs. An excessively starchy diet and the lack of fats and albumen are responsible for the increase of diabetes.

FORCED EVACUATION.

It is learnt that, when the Nazis tried to force the people of Saarlautern to evacuate, they met with bitter resistance. The Gestapo threatened to use tear gas against them. Wehrmacht troops were ordered to search for people in hiding, but many soldiers told families to stay where they were without fear of being reported to the Nazi authorities.

Nevertheless, large numbers of citizens were torn from their homes, and an eyewitness of the departure of the last train, on November 28, described these homeless people as a pitiful herd of men, women and children, prodded along the way to the station by the S.S. and Gestapo. Besides those evacuated by rail, many were driven over the bridge to the left bank of the Saar, regardless of military hazards. Some civilians, who stayed behind, said that the Nazis drive civilians on to the roads in order to hamper the American advance. These people said that they made up their minds to evade evacuation at all costs when they saw the wretched procession of townspeople setting out on their futile pilgrimage into the unknown.

Among those who stayed behind were many farmers, who complied ostensibly with the order to leave, but lay low. Most of them managed to save as much as 60 per cent of their cattle by various means.

In Linbach, near Saarlautern, which is still in German hands, the people had not yet been ordered to leave a week ago. One of the villagers, who escaped into the American lines, said that the people were resolved not to leave after seeing the painful lot of the evacuees from Saarlautern, many of whom had come to Linbach and were in a dreadful state. The evacuees were living in deplorable conditions in Linbach, sleeping in barns, often on straw, and finding little to eat. These people had not been told by the Party where to go when driven out of Saarlautern. They were all determined not to move any further east, but to stay and wait for the Americans.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

The Nazis have become so disturbed at the way in which Germans in Allied-occupied areas are collaborating with the Military Government that they are issuing threats that such people will be executed by the Nazi underground movement. They are also spreading rumours that such assassinations have actually taken place.

"The Diplomkaufmann Fritz Koebel of Aachen was found in the neighbourhood of Aachen with his head riddled with bullets. A hand-written label attached to the corpse said 'Let this be a warning to all. This is the fate of traitors who have dealings with the enemy. We shall get them all. The Avengers of German Honour!'.
*

"According to a Swiss newspaper, the Koelnische Zeitung announced as a rumour that a secret Fekko court of German patriots had sentenced to death and executed a Burgomaster from the Aachen area for having sold out. It had here put out virtually the same item as the previous one. There is no confirmation whatsoever of these rumours, which are obviously intended to deter Germans from helping the Allies.

A lot of good new material on life under Military Government has become available. This will be sent out as soon as possible despatches for use when the situation warrants it.

THE CLERGY.

It is now known that Dachau is to a great extent given over for use as a concentration camp for the clergy. One of the more recent victims is the pastor of Ailforweiler, near Zweibruecken. He was arrested for saying, from his pulpit "If you join the Army now, you surely prolong the war".

ROBERT A. MOCHLIS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Distribution:

P & D. 1.

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

Y 281

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

LAGE

TOS 121958A DSC

SHAEP X-112/82
TOR 221958A DSC
VT 222020A DSC

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM

: EXFOR MAIN

TO

: SHAEP MAIN PWD FOR GSCLOHE

REF NO

: PFW 54 22 December 1944

PW GUIDANCE

After 1 week of German counter-offensive started by RUMSBERT to be final effort, allies position gives cause some confidence. Germans have failed reach any strategic objectives. Strongly urge Continental Services EHC ABSIE do not use 48 hour delayed guidance place notes, as these being out of date undermine credibility of news. Suggest should continue make general statements.

Suggest procedure leaflet following lines: 1. German counter-offensive has failed. 2. First official statement of German position should be placed in detail by British. 3. Contrast promises with achievements. Avoid 1918 parallel or AWMARINE parallel at present. Suggest leaflet should be short large type-face factual. Grateful if draft could be brought up by DICKSON.

ACTION

: PWD

INFORMATION

: SCS
AC RECORDS

CNC IN 7650

22 Dec 44

2129A

JOB/PWT

Ref No: PFW 54

6

33

SECRET

COPY NO. 6

A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SCS - SHAEP File No. 6297-102

SCS REC.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

V file
X 201 1st copy
Y 201 1st copy

21 December, 1944

SHAFT/17249/2/1/Op(G)
GCI/091,412,3/Op(G)

SUBJECT: Operation 'MATCHBOX'

TO : Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

The plan for black radio Operation 'MATCHBOX' is concurred. It is understood that you will forward the plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval before initiating it.

ACC REVIEW
15 Dec.

/s/ J.F.M. WHITELEY
for H.R. BULL,
Major General, GSC,
AG of S, G-3.

21 DEC

TOP SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SHAFF PWPC/04658

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : FWD REAR TO HARARI, RADIO LUXEMBOURG TO
HALE, 12TH ARMY GROUP TO POWELL, 21ST
ARMY GROUP TO DE BEER, 6TH ARMY GROUP TO
CLARKE

FROM : SHAFF MAIN, FROM MCCLURE, SIGNED SCAFF

REF NO : S-71704

CITE: SHPWD

Line of yesterday's directive, reference 04592,
remains unchanged. Do not hesitate to play up REINFORCED
counter offensive as major all out effort. The bigger we
blow it up now the bigger our returns will be later on.

Do not permit the offensive to put us off our
stride. All usual radio leaflet themes should be maintained
unchanged including "stay put" campaign to German civilians
and foreign workers.

For your background information very little
of the area occupied by us has been overrun in the German
counter offensive.

We propose to hold off leaflet attack on German
troops engaged in offensive until its momentum has halted.
Then concentrated leaflet campaign should begin. Psychological
Warfare 12th Army Group should give the word for this and
period on the line to be taken will be required. We need
this as soon as possible.

Meanwhile we continue leaflet concentration on
other sectors of the front.

ORIGINATOR : PWB AUTHENTICATION: J.G. GUTWILLIG,
CAPTAIN

INFORMATION : SGS
AS RECORDS

END OCT 2722 20 DEC 1940 1744A JOB/htv REF NO: S-71704
ZOO: 191530A

6

3.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

PWPO/04562

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : PW SHAEF REAR LEAFLET SECTION TO HOLDSTOCK
FOR GAREY
FROM : SHAEF MAIN, FROM MCCLARK, SIGNED SCAP
REF NO : 71300 DATE: 011440

Confirming telephone conversation no leaflets
as Nachrichten to be dropped in area of German counter-offensive.
Concentrate everything on flanks and other sectors.

ORIGINATOR : PW
INFORMATION : SCG

AUTHENTICATION: J.G. GUTWILLIG,
CAPTAIN

SHAEF SCG File No. 234712

27/EC

SCG OUT 2405 18 Dec 44 17400 UDR/DPSC Ref No: 71300
TOO: 187430A

CONFIDENTIAL

6 36

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KC

TOP SECRET

*File
201 Bull
1201 Belts*

MAIN HEADQUARTERS

GRI/EKEC/

15 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operation "MATCHBOX"

MEMO FOR: A. C. of S., G-3

1. G-2 Division regards this operation as sound in conception, so far as the enemy is concerned. It is believed, however, that the operation is best adapted for the exploitation of low enemy morale rather than the creation of such a condition. Accordingly, it is believed that to be effective the operation should be initiated only when enemy morale shows signs of cracking, either as the result of internal conditions or in direct consequence of military defeat.

For the A. C. of S., G-2

T. J. BETTS
Brigadier General, GSC
D/A. C. of S., G-2

*see memo
21 Dec.
W. H. C. to C. H.*

15 DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

1/6 1000-76 2827-1
1000-76 2827-1
1000-76 2827-1

Handwritten: *Handwritten note: 10/10/10*

ARMY FORCE

DATE 11/01/2009 11:04

DATE 11/01/2009 11:04

DATE 11/01/2009 11:04

Robert A. McClure
 1000 14th St. N.W.,
 Washington, D.C. 20004, and Gardner-Whitcomb, Inc.,
 1000 14th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004.

Copy. MS. A.

10
 11
 12
 13

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UUUU

FOU 132200Z DEC

SHAEF 222-223/13
FOR 132018Z DEC
MSG 132200Z

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : PWB ADVANCED HQ AMI

TO FOR ACTION : PWB AFHQ, PWB SHAEF MAIN, PWB HARI, CMI
WASHINGTON, CAS WASHINGTON, PWB LONDON,
PWB CAIRO

REF NO : 21212, 13 NOVEMBER 1944

CABLE NO. 28.

The following released for information only
by GSC Hq AMI.

Latest enemy leaflets fired on Eighth Army
front intended for British soldiers are entirely concerned
with attempt to divide Allies and sow suspicion.

General assertion that RUSSIA intends
bringing "all EUROPE under Bolshevik rule when BRITAIN and
AMERICA will be fully occupied in the PACIFIC. This they
want to accomplish with the help of a Bolshevik GERMANY and
powerful Communist Groups in the liberated countries. STALIN
plans to make use of the German Army and German industries
and therefore does not want that industries should be smashed
to pieces."

The next objective is the elimination of
the British Empire "by powerful Bolshevik Bloc" hence
fulfilling the political will of LENIN - "When the European
peoples will tear themselves to pieces and devour each other
in a new world war of immense proportion then our time has
come."

END IN 455A

6 38

SECRET

COPY NO.

5

291/117
13 DEC

SECRET

Ref No. 2112, 13 Dec 1944

OSAF 222-223/13

This statement of ANIF is printed on another leaflet with by side with a statement by CHURCHILL made in 1940 "Of all the tyrannies in history the Bolshevik is the worst despotism and the most degreding. It is complete rubbish to say that it is not far worse than German militarism." Cartoon shows British and German soldier fighting each other on heap of corpses and skulls while vulture with head of Stalin looks down from top of a barren tree.

Yet another leaflet shows Bolshevisation of Russia with red arrows as arms of octopus. Assertion is made of note "In case GERMANY should lose the war, there would be no other way left for her than Bolshevism."

News leaflet attempts to dispense the general dislike of Bolshevism by the ordinary Briton and the presence of a strong labour party. Leaflet suggests that Russia is adopting a different long term policy adapting herself to the British outlook by planting communism within the empire, looking for the weak points and peoples "Who are not Englishmen and have not got same power of resistance against communism". Bolshevism was not to work in countries where British capital was invested eg. BALHARS - Bolshevism is reaping fruits of victory. Thus the conclusion ENGLAND's place lies in GERMANY, every blow directed at GERMANY is falling back on ENGLAND. GERMANY too has her post war plans.

ACTION: RND
INFORMATION: SRS ✓
3-2
40 RECORDS



SAC IN 4554 13 Dec. 1944 23201 OSAF/rot Ref. No: 21212

FWP/2620

RESTRICTED

Chief, Research and Intelligence Division, War Relocation Authority

9 December 1944

1. Chief, War Relocation Authority
P.O. Box 1676
Seattle, Washington

2. This is the first official reaction from the
Executive Committee of the War Relocation Authority
regarding the Japanese American Citizens League
and its activities in the United States.

3. The Executive Committee of the War Relocation Authority
has been informed of the Japanese American Citizens League
and its activities in the United States.

4. Chief, Research and Intelligence Division,
War Relocation Authority,
P.O. Box 1676, Seattle, Washington.

5. Enclosed for the Chief, Research and Intelligence Division,
War Relocation Authority, are three copies of a report
dated December 1, 1944, and captioned "The Japanese American
Citizens League and its activities in the United States."

Very respectfully,
[Signature]

691.112

9 DEC

PWP/2527

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

DATE 7 Jun 1964

1. *Phragmites australis* (Cav.) Trin. ex Steud.

number each row or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly. Draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long answers.

No.	From	Poss to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	Sale F MIL Sole F	ECG C-11 <i>[Signature]</i>	7 Dec 1964	<p>"<i>See</i>"</p> <p>... of the ... in a copy of the ... had been ... for German ... "The ... of the ... Liberation."</p> <p><i>Robert M. Allen</i> <i>Director, ...</i> <i>... Division.</i></p>
2.				

041, 41, 2

CONFIDENTIAL

File

*Spec report to DCS
Code for info.*

AB/AL/SA-2
(C) AB/AL/SA-2

6th December, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Deputy Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Anglo-American Relations

With reference to your letter of the 13th November, 1944, on the above subject, the matter was taken up with Ninth Air Force to whom the original report had been addressed.

2. It is reported that two different types of enemy propaganda leaflets were found near ARVET on 19th October, 1944, and a third type was found near there on 22nd October, 1944.

3. The minutes of the meeting referred to in your letter show the definite statement that the propaganda had been traced to enemy agents and collaborators but, when pressed for details, Ninth Air Force now states that "no personnel are able to identify the enemy agents and collaborators who may have been responsible for the distribution". It appears therefore that the suggestion of an organized campaign of propaganda behind our lines was an assumption by Ninth Air Force.

4. The Ninth Air Force goes on to state that "the investigation of incidents in the ARVET area have developed ramifications. Their shadows have reached civil officials and influential civilians". This statement is, as you see, also somewhat vague. Investigations are continuing and I will inform you if anything of value is forthcoming.

R. W. D. STUBBS
Major-General
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

091,417

WDEC

4 December 1944

Subject: German leaflet for German troops and civilians in the West:
"Too many believe in "liberation" by the Americans; in reality they will be starved and put into concentration camps as hostages, etc."

German Text: (Translation of the text)

*See also that other
McClure to Morgan*

INHALT DER GESICHT

VORWORT DES VERFASSERS:

Glaubst auch du an das Märchen vom "freien" Engländer und Amerikaner, der mit dem Koffer oder Koffer voll Schokolade und Keks in die "befreiten" deutschen Dörfer einziehen soll, der zum Nachmittagskaffee bei seinen deutschen Quartierherren seine Verpflegung selbst mitbringt, der sitzend und bescheiden bei uns einrückt, nur um - wie der amerikanische Präsident sagt - das deutsche Volk wieder in die Reihen der "friedliebenden" Völker zurückzuführen?

"Da kann ja nichts geschehen, denn ich lobe ja im Westen und Kueche - gegebenenfalls - in die "sichere Obhut" der amerikanischen Besatzung."

Ob du es glaubst oder nicht, es gibt auch unter uns noch einige, die so denken.

WENN DU DIE WAHRHEIT SAGEN, KRIEGST DU SAGEN, WAS DU GEGEHEN UND ERLEBT HAST:

Yankos u. Juden sind im deutschen Grenzgebiet am Werk!

So masslos wie ihr Kontinent, so masslos sind die Amerikaner in ihrer Raube und in ihrem Hass!

Mit dem Amerikaner kommt der Jude, der Franzose und der Belgier, wie einst im Jahre 1918, die ihren Hasegeln gegen das deutsche Volk und ihrer Glor nach deutschem Land keine Schranken auferlegen.

Sie zerstören als "Bambolackmacher" unsere Städte.

Sie verheeren masslos unsere Dörfer an der Grenze.

Sie schneiden, wie durch Zeugen bestätigt, unsere Frauen und Mädchen.

Sie treiben deutsche Frauen und Kinder als Kuechelfang zum Schutz gegen das deutsche Feuer vor sich her.

Sie beschlagnahmen alle Lebensmittel und sagen gleichzeitig der Bevölkerung, dass sie sich selbst versorgen muss.

Der Hunger droht auf deutschem Boden!

Die deutschen Schulen sind gesperrt.

Die Gerichtsbarkeit wird von amerikanischen Offizieren uebernommen.

Die Verwaltung ist in den Händen antideutscher Elemente.

Die englische Sprache wird als Amtssprache eingefuehrt.

Das deutsche nationale Leben soll ausgerottet werden!

In deutschen Dörfern wuchsen volkreiche Stundgerichte.

Die Kontrolle aller Vermoegenswerte, aller Renten- und Sparkassenguthaben ist angeordnet.

Die Zwangsabwertung der Reichsmark und die zwangsweise Einfuehrung der amerikanischen Militaermark bedeuten Enteignung und wirtschaftlichen Ruin.

"Personen im besetzten Gebiet haben sofort und ohne irgendwelche Fragen zu stellen, allen Befehlen der militaerischen Verwaltung nachzukommen", heisst es in einer der ersten Anordnungen.

Das ist der Freibrief fuer jegliche Art unmenschlicher Willkuer!

Alle Zivilisten vom 12. bis 60. Lebensjahr werden zur Vorbereitung der angekueundigten Deportation deutscher Arbeitskraefte registriert. Das Laeten der Kirchenglocken und das Singen deutscher Lieder gilt als Demonstration und ist verboten.

- 1 -
F R E I

F R E I

Die Konzentrationslager füllten sich mit deutschen Frauen, Kindern und Greisen, die als Geiseln in Haft genommen worden.

Das ist das wahre Gesicht des Feindes im Westen, das ist die amerikanische "Befreiung".

Soldiers! Comrades!

Den Vursichtigen und Kleinmütigen, den Opportunisten, die aus eigener Schwäche und Falschheit von dem "fairen" Gegner schwatzen, wollen wir zurufen:

FREIERRSCHAF IST TYRANNEI!

AMERIKANISCH-ENGLISCHES BESATZTUM HEISST HUNGER, NOT UND GEDRUCK!
Sie führt zum Bolschewismus und damit zur Vernichtung von uns allen.

SOWEIT WIR UND IRO ES NICHT MOGLICH,
weil wir erkannt haben und entschlossen sind, aus dieser Erkenntnis heraus zu handeln:

Die geballte Kraft der Nation ist unüberwindlich und unbesiegbar, wenn du und ich, wenn wir alle an diese Kraft glauben, fuer den Sieg unserer Waffen kämpfen und arbeiten, mit totaler Hingabe und mit allen Mitteln.

Der Gegner will unsere totale Vernichtung - wir setzen ihm den totalen Widerstandswillen entgegen.

MIT DER FUEHRER UND DER GEHEIMEN NATION DURCH
KAMPF ZUM SIEG!

Translation:

THEIR TRUE FACE

COMRADES IN THE WEST!

Do you also believe in that fairy tale of the "fair" Englishman and American, who is supposed to enter the "liberated" German villages in trucks and tanks loaded with chocolate and biscuits; who brings along his own rations to the tables of the German families with whom he is quartered; who marches in, correct and modest, solely - as the American president declares - to lead the German people back again into the ranks of the "freedom-loving" nations?

"Nothing can happen because I live in the West and - should the occasion arise - I will come under the "safe protection" of the American occupation".

Whether you believe this or not, there are those Americans, who do think this way.

YOU MUST TELL THE TRUTH, COMRADE, YOU MUST TELL THE TRUTH THAT YOU HAVE SEEN AND EXPERIENCED:

Yankees and Jews are at work in the German frontier territory

As limitless as their continent, so limitless are the Americans in their revenge and hatred!

With the American comes the Jew, the Frenchman and the Belgian, as once in 1918... with a lust for vengeance and greed for German soil which knows no bounds.

They destroy our towns with their criminal bombings.

They senselessly burn our villages on the frontier.

They violate our women and young girls, as has been proven by witnesses.

They drive German women and children before them as cover against the German fire.

They seize all the food stores and tell the population at the same time that they must fend for themselves

- 2 -

F R E I

FRANK

EMPIRE INHABITS THOSE ON STARS EAST!

German schools are closed.

Legal justice has been taken over by American officers.

Administration is in the hands of anti-German elements.

English has been introduced as the official language.

GERMAN VILLAGES ARE BEING DESTROYED:

In German villages where resistance is still being taken ruthlessly taking place.

All property, bank and savings accounts are controlled.

The forcible destruction of the Reich - and introduction of the American military system is appropriation and economic ruin.

"Everyone in occupied territory must immediately, and without question, comply with all orders of the military administration so runs one of the first orders.

THEY ARE THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WEST:

All civilians must be prepared to stand by the government in preparation for the possible occupation of German lands. Ringing of church bells and the singing of German songs is considered as a demonstration and is therefore forbidden.

Concentration camps are provided with German boys, children and old people who are to be kept in the camps.

That is the true face of the enemy in the West: that is the American "liberation".

Soldiers! Comrades!

To the short-sighted and faint-hearted, to the opportunists, who out of their own weakness and cowardice babble about the "fair" enemy we say:

✓ FOREIGN DOMINATION IS TYRANNY!

✓ ANTI-SEMITISM IS CONSPIRACY AGAINST JUSTICE, TRUTH AND GOOD!

✓ IT LEADS TO BOLSHIEVISM AND IN THE LONG RUN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF US ALL.

IT CANNOT AND WILL NOT COME TO THIS.

because we see the horror and are determined to act accordingly:

The united strength of a nation cannot be overcome and is unconquerable. When you and I, when we all believe in this strength, and struggle and work for the victory of our weapons with the last ounce of devotion and with every means within our power.

The enemy wishes our total destruction - we answer him with our total resistance.

✓ ON TO VICTORY! THROUGH OBSTACLES WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS!

FRANK

RESTRICTED

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

SHARF 217/29
TOR 291748A NOV
EWB - 291832

230 291630A NOV

R E S T R I C T E D

P R I O R I T Y

FROM : EXFOR MAIN P AND PW
TO FOR ACTION : SHAHF MAIN G-3
FOR INFO : PRD SHAHF (MAIN)
REF NO : PPW 958 : 29 NOVEMBER 1944 :

Your 8-68528 of 261840A.

We agree press headlines far too optimistic and have for past week taken all possible action here to counteract this, including drawing attention PRD SHAREP to the question. We have complete cooperation all correspondents here, many of whom have wired in protest to their editors during past 8 days. Succeeded in getting debunking article published in Daily Mirror but with remainder of press we have had no success.

We suggest only further action possible is for PRD SMARF to take this up very strongly with MOI LONDON.

3 68528 is SMC OUT 7468, 26/11/44, G-3

ACTION : 4-3

INFORMATION : SGS PRD
G-2 PWD
COM ZONE AG RECORDS

SNU IK 10277 29 Nov 44 1850A JOB/ppm Ref No: PPW 958

R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

COPY NO

THE VARIOUS OF AN EXACT COPY OF THE MESSAGE IS FURNISHED

SECRET

PWPC/02838

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : F & PW 12 A.G. FOR CROSSMAN TO FITZGERALD
POWELL FOR COLE

FOR INFO : PWD BEAR

FROM : SHAEF MAIN, FROM MCCLURE SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : 3-68397

Reference your PWPC 02708.

Directive dated 19th November gives SHAEF
Policy line on SIBERIA Campaign in paragraph 6.

Meanwhile we are seeking to obtain from
highest political level necessary information on Allied
intentions regarding demobilisation German Army and return
German prisoners.

Unlikeliest ■ shall either obtain information
required or use it in propaganda if obtained.

Suggest you explain confidentially to DICKSON
this is ticklish high politics and stress necessity avoid any
commitment of American Government.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: RAYMOND K. FRIED,
MAJOR, S. C.

INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 7350 26 NOV '44 0305A HFK/ra REF NO: 3-68397
T00: 251000A

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SECRET

COPY NO. 1

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Political Office

V 201 5.88
X 201 Smith

November 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief of Staff, SHAEF

The American Legation at Bern communicated to the Department of State several summaries of German intelligence received late as the second in November. This intelligence follows orthodox lines:

1. The sacrifice of German lives is justified because it will mean the weakening of the attacking nations thus the survival of Germany;
2. The operations for the Allies will be so costly that they will be well to discuss peace terms (this follows closely the German line which preceded the landings in France);
3. The usual attempt to continue to play off the Western allies against the Soviet Union, particular stress being laid upon the supposed difference between Russian air bombings of "military targets" and Anglo-American "terror" attacks;
4. It is better for the German soldier to be on a conquered battlefield than to survive in a conquered Germany.

The Morgenthau-Vansittart "threats" against Germany continued to be played up and there is still much talk of anti-Nazi elements. However, the Legation stresses that the latter reports very often originate with anti-Nazis who are anxious to prove the reality of resistance movements inside the Reich.

The Legation has increasing reports to the effect that fake anti-Nazis are being sent abroad to infiltrate into anti-Nazi circles in other countries.

Robert Fell

Chas. P. D. H., L.S.

Noted
124 NOV 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

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707/1856

SUPREMACY PARTIES
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET

LWP 0.1.412

10 November, 1944.

Summary of Previous Psychological Warfare Directives
and Instructions for Reference.

565-SHAFF File No.

071712

1. INSTRUCTIONS AND ADVICE TO HOSTILE CIVIL, AND ARMED FORCES

- In order to achieve uniformity, these will be issued by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. either in a "Voice of S.H.Q." or "Voice of Military Government" or in a leaflet. The shape and format should not impose such limitations as to make it impossible to have the use of a strict and uniform and of local significance; and then only by leaflet and printed message. All instructions issued over Radio Broadcasting must be coordinated with S.H.Q.
- Appendix 'A' gives the current list of instructions in current S.H.Q. leaflets, and current P.W. and A.S.I. output.
- In order to ensure and carry out these instructions, Army Groups should send in suggestions to S.H.Q. based on intelligence at their disposal.
- There is now sufficient evidence available to state that, of the German population who disobeyed the "Last Evacuation Orders" and "Last Orders", a considerable number were influenced by the instructions, and associated them with the name of General Eisenhower. It is important to exhibit this to the full, associating General Eisenhower's name as often as possible with such instructions and with leaflets dealing with life under Military Government. The name of the Supreme Commander should be used as often as possible in references. Efforts are being made to obtain from the Army of the Standard photograph of the Supreme Commander. No other photograph should be used.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
TO: By authority of C.A.L.
By: *Am. 3. 10*
Date: 26 AUG 1945

2. PROPAGANDA AND -RISKS OF U.S.

- Appendix 'B' contains a new "Voice of S.H.Q.". This supersedes all current instructions. These should not be used in future.
- S-1 has ruled that in all propaganda directed to foreign workers it should be perfectly clear that Prisoners of War are not being released.
- Our propaganda to foreign workers has as its aim their subversion and not a further increase in resistance. Such propaganda if even implicitly suggested to prisoners of war, might very easily be taken as violating the Geneva Convention.
- For the above reason, wherever possible prisoners of war should be explicitly excluded from propaganda addressed to foreign workers.

3. SEPARATION AND DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY

- The question has been raised as to the responsibility as between S.H.Q. on the one hand, and the Army Groups and Units on the other, for propaganda and tactical limits. The Division of responsibility is as follows:

6

50

19 Nov

(1) SHARP has the main responsibility for strategic leaflets addressed both to soldiers and to civilians. If SHARP undertakes to do a tactical leaflet specifically addressed to a German Unit or related to a tactical operation, it only does so in coordination with the Army Group in question.

(2) Army Groups have the main responsibility for tactical propaganda. Circumstances, however, frequently arise where it is tactically necessary to produce leaflets on strategic themes. When units and Army Groups, however, produce leaflets on strategic themes, these leaflets must be strictly confined within the limits of SHARP directives and should, where possible, follow the line set in the SHARP leaflets.

b. It is clearly desirable that the greatest interchange of ideas possible should take place between SHARP, Army Groups and Units. There is no copyright in leaflets.

4. USE OF GERMAN CIVILIANS ASSISTING THE ALLIES.

In view of the German fear of reprisals against those who assist the Allies, it is absolutely essential that we should not use the names of such persons either in leaflet or radio propaganda. In particular, when photographs of life under Military Government are used, the captions should NEVER contain the names of the persons photographed, if the photograph in any way suggests that they are assisting the Allies.

5. MAKING GOOD U.S. REPORTS.

There is evidence that in some sectors of the front German soldiers are scared of American Negro and French Colonial troops, and that German propaganda is using this fear to stimulate a fight to the end.

In general, it is useless to try to counter this fear. Leaflets and broadcasts which attempt to tell German soldiers on this point are likely merely to stimulate consciousness of the problem. Unless there are overwhelming tactical reasons to the contrary, this subject must be left completely alone.

6. VISIONS OF STALIN.

Ref S- 68971 25 Nov.

a. Reports from first hand informants that this is the slogan of a new propaganda campaign to raise German fighting morale. After an initial introduction, it has been found that there is nothing particularly valuable to be said on this subject in court unit propaganda. Counter-propaganda of any sort on this subject is likely to be regarded as a serious affront to the mind of the front soldier.

b. SHARP is undertaking a research investigation to discover how widespread this slogan is in the East of Siberia among German civilians and soldiers.

7. NO SHARP OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

Some time ago it was noticed to over-print standard prisoner of war leaflets with a statement that prisoners of war are no longer shipped overseas.

Investigations in several sectors have shown that this over-print has not aroused the slightest interest. It has also been used by Nazi propagandists as evidence that the Soviet Union is lying. However, a large

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-3-

number of prisoners have expressed disappointment at missing the opportunity of visiting the New World.

All such over-prints should in future be omitted. On the other hand, the theme of life in Canada in the U.S.A. and Canada, which was allotted to Japan, should not be repeated, since the other German soldiers are afraid this will delay their return home.

6. VIETNAM

- a. Several suggestions have been received that counter-propaganda should be carried out against the German 'V' propaganda. It is the view of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF that such propaganda, which is purely defensive, is unnecessary at this stage of the war. However, any and all news to 'V' troops in front propaganda must be limited to the broad line that they cannot assist Germany in the war, or be of assistance to the German fighting soldier.
- b. Although it is now possible to give the Germans some facts about V-1, such facts will be completely ineffective now that their hopes are pinned on V-2.

For the above reasons, Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF advises that, unless there are special local tactical reasons to the contrary, no effort should be wasted in countering German 'V' propaganda. No facts are to be carried to the Germans V-2, or all other than those given in official British statements.

9. RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

To meet the demand for verbiage of 6 Army Group, DG-27 has been reprinted. However, the official statement of the Russian government gives us the text for a far better leaflet. A new Russian leaflet is currently in preparation by Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF in close cooperation with the War Department Representation of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Russian High Command for the Repatriation of Soviet Citizens in Western Europe. The text will be supplied to Army Groups and Divisions as soon as it is available.

10. SURRENDER INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM OUR OWN TROOPS

A report by Captain Hart on an inquiry into the surrender of German troops as seen by the American Infantry has been circulated by the GAC Intelligence Section to Army Groups and Divisions. This report should be carefully studied by radio and leaflet writers. Where possible radio and leaflet writers themselves should conduct similar investigations and send back their results to Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF.

Robert H. McCull

ROBERT H. MCCULL

Brigadier General, G.S.C.

Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION - as directed.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

2. 21 Army Group (3).
2 copies to E.O.C. 2nd Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
2. 12 Army Group (3).
3 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 2nd Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 3rd Army.
2. 6 Army Group (3).
3 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 2nd Army.
2. 5 Army Group (3).
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2. 4 Army Group (3).
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3 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
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2. 1 Army Group (3).
3 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 2nd Army.
2. 0 Army Group (3).
3 copies to E.O.C. 1st Army.
2 copies to E.O.C. 2nd Army.

For Information:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF (1) ✓
Political Advisors (3)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
G-5 (1)
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS TO GERMAN CIVILIANS

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL GERMAN CIVILIANS.


- (a) Talk to soldiers going to the front, coming home on leave or billeted in your house and tell them that you do not want to continue a lost war.
- (b) Counteract the Nazi lies about alleged British and American brutality, - lies which are merely intended to induce you to fight on.
- (c) Prepare black lists of Nazi war criminals and of all those who have been responsible for atrocities against non-Germans or Germans.
- (d) Assist foreign workers, German soldiers who are deserting and all victims of Nazi oppression. Give them shelter. Directly the Allies arrive, hand them over to Military Government officials.
- (e) Receive and follow the instruction given to German civilians in the name of General Eisenhower by radio (BBC, APSIN and Radio Luxembourg) and by means of leaflets.

2. RESISTANCE TO COMPELSED EVACUATION.

- (a) Evade compulsory evacuation by all possible ways of hiding (in houses, cellars, near-by woods etc.), and of collective or individual resistance.
- (b) Protect your property against the Nazi scorched earth policy.
- (c) Organise fellow-citizens in order to protect your property against looting by retreating German armies or fleeing Nazis.

3. ACTION ON APPROACH OF ALLIED ARMIES.

- (a) At the right moment organise fellow-citizens to enforce your will on the local Wehrmacht commander in favour of a surrender of your town or village and against Party orders to sacrifice all in a last-ditch-battle.
- (b) Actively resist any attempts to strip your home district of food and other essentials.



/OVER

C

Appendix A Continued

-2-

- NOTE: 1. In broadcasts as well as leaflets these instructions should be implemented wherever possible by concrete and detailed accounts of successful action on these lines.
2. The instruction on taking cover against bombing is superseded. No instructions should be given on this subject until further notice.

2. If you have taken refuge in an air raid shelter in your town or village, remain quietly there until the mopping up is completed. Do not bother the fighting soldiers; they have plenty to do.

3. Once the battle has passed by it will be more than ever necessary for you to keep clear of all roads and areas by which Allied troops and supplies are coming forward. Military Government officers will follow quickly behind the leading troops and will set up offices in towns and villages at which you will receive instructions as to how you will be looked after and fed. But do not all go to these offices — send only your group leader, who should if possible, speak English. The rest of you should remain in your groups and await his return.

4. Your representative should report that his group awaits instructions. He will be told by the Military Government official precisely what the group should do.

5. When the time comes, each of you will be interviewed by a Military Government official designated to look after you and begin the arrangements for your return home. Have your papers and credentials ready if possible. You will understand that the Allied Armies will have to take security measures to prevent German agents slipping through the lines disguised as Allied nationals. It will, therefore, save time if you have your papers and credentials ready. But even if you have no papers you will be looked after.

6. When you are interviewed by the Military Government official, you will be given a postcard which you can send to your relations telling them that you are safe under the protection of the Allied Armies. These postcards will be sent off immediately after you have filled them in. When possible, if you desire it, the message on the postcard will also be transmitted to your relations by radio.

These are your instructions on what to do when the Allied Armies arrive.

Now, here are your instructions on what to do after the Allied Armies have advanced beyond your town or village.

1. If you are ready to volunteer to work for the Allied Armies while you are waiting to be sent home, there will be work of the very greatest importance to be done. Every volunteer from among you will be needed.

2. Once their credentials have been checked, volunteers will be given work as soon as possible. They will be paid at the highest current German wage for the category of workers to which they belong. Their rations will be assured by the military authorities.

3. Remember that those who volunteer to work for the Allied Armies will not be thereby prevented from returning home. It will be clearly recognized by the military authorities that they have only volunteered to work during the time when the arrangements are being made for their return home.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

4. If you are not fit or able to work you will be looked after by the military authorities until it is possible to move you back into your home country. When you reach the frontiers of your home country, your own national authorities will then arrange for your journey home.

5. Do not, therefore, attempt to make your own way back home. If foreign workers in unorganized masses stream along the lines of communication of the Allied Armies they will hinder the Allied advance and also expose themselves to the gravest danger. Moreover, you will be stopped by the military authorities. The confusion created will only postpone your organized repatriation, which the military authorities are now planning in consultation with your own national authorities.

Let me sum up these instructions in brief:

1. Before the Allied Armies arrive, go into hiding, take shelter and stay quiet till the final mopping up has been completed.
2. When the Allied Armies arrive, report to the Military Government officials.
3. While you are waiting to return home, be ready, if possible, to volunteer for urgent emergency work to help the Allied Armies.
4. On no account try to make your own way home along the Allied lines of communication.

The Supreme Commander instructs me to say that he is confident that you will carry out these instructions faithfully. Thereby you will accelerate both the defeat of Germany and your own return home.

The above instructions do not in any way alter the orders you are receiving and will continue to receive regarding the action you are to take against your enemy, Germany. These orders come to you by other and secret means.

Lastly, the Supreme Commander orders me to say that these instructions apply only to Foreign Workers and not to Allied prisoners of war.

That is the end of these special instructions issued at the order of the Supreme Commander and addressed to workers in Germany whose countries are at war with Germany and who work in the Ruhr, the Rheinisch-Westphalian industrial area and the Rhineland.

These instructions are transmitted to you by radio and also by leaflet. The Supreme Commander will be issuing further instructions to you. So listen regularly to the radio and look out for leaflets addressed to you in your own language."

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 647
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.8
PSYCHOLOGY - 900 Series

$$\frac{1}{\text{R}(\text{C}_{\text{C}}/\text{I})}$$

16 January 1944

Psychological Health and Well-being of Refugees and Asylum Seekers

The following directive represents the attitude of the British and United States Governments towards the German people and Government and will govern all propaganda activity concerning the future of Germany, whether addressed to German or non-German audiences. It signifies the Supreme Commander's directive given to JCS. 12.3. of 28 September, 1944.

This must follow the line set by President Roosevelt's speech on 12 October, 1944, in which he made clear the following policy:

- to participating or colluding with the Nazis, the least shared
of which control - open or secret - of governmental
instruments will be contested. Stern parliament for all
those responsible for the war and its brutal conduct.

- (2) Germany to be deprived of every element of military power or potential military power.

allied with Nazi, one of the most vicious, the German people did learn to love truth, justice and peace and will earn their way back into the fellowship of law-abiding nations.

We bring no charge against the German race. God cannot have eternally condemned any race: witness the many laws of citizenship, laws of peace and freedom, the law of German ancestry.

- (5) No enslavement of the human people - human slavery being against all the principles of the United Nations.

On the basis of the above points, Allied propaganda should emphasize these facts:

- (1) Germany's post-war condition and hopes of recovery depend not so much on the Allied policy towards an occupied Reich as on the degree of destruction of Germany's resources resulting from the prolongation or curtailment of the war, i.e. not capitulation, but continued resistance threatens the frustration or even destruction of the German nation.
- (2) The Nazis, who started the war to gratify their lust for power and are continuing it to postpone their own annihilation, are responsible for all that Germany has already suffered, is suffering and will suffer in the war and after it.

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- (3) The Germans themselves can curtail their ordeal, avert national prostration ~~and~~ destruction, ~~and~~ the period of acute distress and exhaustion and accelerate the entry of Germany into a repeated place among the family of nations by refusing to fight and work to prolong the Nazis' war, refusing to be accomplices in the Nazis' crimes against foreign workers and prisoners in the Reich, refusing to destroy their own property and resources as the Nazis demand, refusing to take part in guerrilla operations or underground resistance and by obeying the Military Government established in occupied Germany by the Allies.
- (4) Military Government will root out all Nazi and militarist elements and organizations and punish severely all guilty of war crimes, or of carrying out or aiding resistance to the occupation forces. Law-abiding German citizens and their families will be assured conditions in which they will be able to live and work without molestation and by keeping going or restarting essential services and key consumer goods industries (notably agriculture) to defeat the Nazis' attempt to plunge a defeated Germany into chaos.
- (5) Military Government will end political persecution, spying and informing, arbitrary and illegal acts of repression, regimentation and all other Nazi practices. It will protect all administrative officials who cooperate with the Allied authorities in the true interest of Germany. It will give every assistance to law-abiding Germans in committing and destroying Nazi outlaws.

c. METHODS OF PROPAGANDA

- (1) Not overt propaganda, but authoritative announcement of our intentions should be the basis of our output. There must be no appeals and it must be made clear that German cooperation or non-cooperation with Military Government is a question on which depends the well-being and future prospects of the Germans themselves and is a matter of relatively incidental importance to the Allies. All propaganda points should be put across factually, in the form of statements of policy, news, announcements, and objective commentaries and explanations.
- (2) Full publicity should be given to Military Government proclamations and decrees as these are released, news of the punishment of criminals and hostile elements, clashes between law-abiding Germans and Nazi outlaws, the restoration of order and the fair administration of justice, economic and financial rehabilitation, administrative cooperation by Germans, the return of religious freedom, the preservation of cultural and historical objects, the restoration of secure family life, etc. In reporting of this kind colourful, descriptive material is desirable, provided no sentimentality creeps in.

d. MATERIAL AVAILABLE

- (1) The implementation of this directive should start without delay. Material is already available in the shape of fourteen short statements by a spokesman ■

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- 51

ROBERT A. McCLELLAN

Major General, U.S.A.,

For Action:

2) see 2.1.4, D1 Army Group (6)

$$A^p \in L^p(\mathbb{R}^n, W_{\infty}^{2,p}) \quad \text{for any } p \in (1, \infty).$$

C of L., 6 Army Group, for P.O. (6)

W.D. Sullivan & Co., Luxembourg (6:1 for K.C.-and Det.)

O.S.S. Scine Base Section (3: Attention Mr. Howard Baldwin).

P. H. W. Bear (15: 1 to AD Country, Mr. Delmer).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Surgeon Headquarters, A.M.C. (3)

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$$G_2 = \{1\}$$
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676 122

Share military secrets to China.

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(Col. 11ide).

81 14 79 99 Dkxjg[5m | 3)

RECEIVED (1)

1997

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SECRET ✓

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

FWP/02249

091.412

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : P & PW, 21 ARMY GROUP FOR [REDACTED]
FOR INFO : HQ 8TH AIR FORCE, PWD SHAEF [REDACTED] FOR GAREY
FROM : SHAEF MAIN, FROM MCCLURE FROM KAUFMAN [REDACTED] SCAEF
REF NO : S-67253 CITE: SHPW

Your PFW 897 dated 16 November,

Drops were executed by plane having operational difficulty. Plane picked DUNKIRK as target of opportunity. Will try to insure DUNKIRK not used as target of opportunity in future. We are scheduling only NACHRICHTEN for [REDACTED] until otherwise requested by you.

PFW 897 is SMC IN 5463, 16/11/44, PWD

ACTION : PWD AUTHENTICATION: J.G. GUTWILLIG
CAPTAIN
INFORMATION : SGS
AO RECORDS

SMC OUT 6186 18 Nov 44 0309A DWR/lp REF NO: S-67253
FOO: 171200A

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO. 5

SECRET

SHAFF

SECRET

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UAG:

TOO 161235A NOV

SHAFF 112/16
TOR 161310A NOV
DWC 161340A NOV

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : EXFOR MAIN
 TO FOR ACTION : FWD SHAFF MAIN FOR KAUFMAN
 FOR INFO : HQ 8 AIR FORCE, FWD/SHAFF REAR FOR GAREY
 REF. NO : PFW.897, 16 NOVEMBER 1944.

Combined Anglo-American Leaflet report
 CR/R/12 dated 13th Nov states 320,000 WG18 "What to do to
 resist evacuation" and 240,000 WG19 "Post War Period"
 dropped on DUNKIRK night 9/10 Nov. WG18 totally unsuitable
 this target and neither leaflet drop asked for by this H.Q.

Urgently request explanation of mistake assum-
 ing this drop made in error. If drop deliberate repeat
 our previous requirement nothing except MACHRIGHTEN to be
 dropped by you DUNKIRK unless requested by us. This re-
 quirement result of agreement this H.Q. and First Canadian
 Army and is based on future operational plans as well as
 available Intelligence.

Grateful earliest confirmation by signal.

ACTION : FWD
 INFORMATION : SUSPENSE
 SCS
 AG RECORDS

See S-47253
 17 Nov.

SNC IN 5463 16 Nov 44 1405A EBB/djm Ref No: PFW 897

6

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SECRET

COPY NO.

5

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

SCS-SHAFF File No. 091417

16 Nov.

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SECRET

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED INFORMATION DIVISION
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET

CPH/JS

AMP 300.6

14 November, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
AMP 300.6.

7007/1674-1

1. POLICY.

Western Front Operations.

The following directive has been issued by the Supreme Commander:

1. The treatment of Western front operations in propaganda will be guided by the following general directives:

a. A.G. CROSSING. (Not for use in propaganda).

Propaganda should be based on the assumptions:

- (1) That the decision to cross the Rhine will be soon.
- (2) That a major breakthrough will not occur until after the Rhine has been crossed.

Since these assumptions may be belied by events, they should not be made explicit in propaganda. But they should be used as the basis for the treatment of war news until further notice.

b. GERMANS.

(1) Operations.

- a. Treat the news of advances factually. Do not blow up minor operations or give tactical successes strategic significance.
- b. Treat the prolongation of the war into a sixth winter as the final crime of the Nazis against their own people.
- c. Stress the effect of the combined strategic and tactical air war in the sixth war winter.

(2) German Civilians.

- a. German civilians should be urged to prevent the destruction of their homes by displaying 'scorched earth' orders. Special attention should be paid to the industrial workers of the Ruhr and the Danzig.
- b. All German civilians in Western Germany should be advised to avoid Nazi evacuation plans.
- c. Every chance of favorably contrasting the occupied with the unoccupied area of Germany should be exploited.

(3) Foreign Workers in Germany.

- a. The campaign to organize foreign workers throughout Germany for passive resistance should continue unchanged.

6 - 64

CLASSIFIED BY CHANGED
TO
By: [Signature]
Date: [Signature]

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-2-

- b. Instructions to foreign workers on their tasks when the Allied Forces approach should be carefully geared to our advance. They will be issued, as the need arises, by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

P & M.V., 21 Army Group (6);
P & M.V., 12 Army Group (3);
C. of S., 6 Army Group, for P.O.C. (6);
Radio Luxembourg (6: 1 for H.Q., 25 Det.);
O.S.S. School Base Station (3: Attention of Howard Baldwin);
P.O.C. Rear (1): 1 to 21st Country, 1st. Bolmar).

For Information:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. (1)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
T.O. (2: 1 to Liaison, Branch)
C. of S. Liaison Branch to 21st US (1)
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
060/1552

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE .

SUBJECT: Corporate Law, Contracts, Torts, etc.

DATE 13 November 1964

Handwritten note at bottom: "In each column, signed laplaly, draw a line across the page. It will appear as if you are writing for many months."

<small>Caution: Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda</small>			
No.	From	Pass to	Date HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	Chief KAC CHIEF	C/R CHIEF	13 Nov 1944 Attached is copy of "URGENT WARTIME TRAVELERS" for your information. <div style="text-align: center;">  Robert H. McClure, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief, Psychological Warfare Division. </div>
	1 Incl. As stated.		

SHAF. AGO FORM NO. 11 Revised 5 Feb. 1943

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

17th November 1944

TO: Assistant Dir. of Insp., G-2.

64-1016

Sal Manno
to D. C.
Strong to
D. C. of S.

204

PWP-75-248

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 12

10 November 1944

TO : G-3, S.H.A.E.F.

SUBJECT : POLICY AND METHODS OF BLACK PROPAGANDA AGAINST GERMANY.

A. DEFINITIONS.

1. The essential feature of black propaganda is the effort to conceal its source. "Black" does not merely mean dirty, underhand, secret, pornographic or unofficial, although all these epithets apply to it in one way or another. Black means that the German mind is approached through a deception and through elaborately sustained fictions, calculated to throw it off its guard and to appeal to selfish, disloyal, individualist motives in the individual.
2. The second outstanding feature of black propaganda is that it is conducted in secret and therefore can be, and is, disavowed. When the Miss Minister complained to the Foreign Office that Germans were being encouraged to desert to his country by the propaganda of SOLDATENSTUNTER CHAIBS, the Foreign Office were obliged to disavow responsibility for this pirate programme.
3. The main difference between the black technique and white, official, truth-telling technique is best illustrated as follows: White propaganda achieves results by saying to the Germans: "We, the S.H.A.E.F. in Luxembourg, tell you not to obey the Nazi evacuation orders". Black propaganda also achieves results by reporting that numerous persons have refused to evacuate and have successfully got away with their disobedience by this or that ruse. White presents an official view on behalf of the "enemy" and sticks to the ascertained facts; Black invents the facts, spreads rumours through news and tries to rationalise all the furtive misgivings and remnants of individualism in the "dirty dog" inside every German. Black can even mobilise patriotic motives against the evacuation order.
4. Black propaganda can also stage stunts. At any time, given the intelligence, the psychological moment and the technical facilities black propaganda can put out a wireless programme, or a leaflet or a series of rumours or a single sensational broadcast, in which the first intention is to deceive. Alarmed and confused behaviour will be caused in the enemy not only by the nature of the news but also by the fact that it appears to come from an authoritative source. The deception, and therefore also the security surrounding the operation, are of the first importance.
5. For a successful, bold and comprehensive black operation, such as has never yet been attempted, it is necessary to deceive foe and friend alike. The deceit must be allowed to work on official propaganda and Allied newspapers, without any indication that they are being fooled. For example, if by an intruder operation it is announced on an official German wireless channel that Hitler is dead, it is necessary for the success of the deception that the world press and our white propaganda carry the news as from a German source, German denials must be disregarded and many important persons left in the dark.
6. The effort of skill and organisation needed to maintain such a deception for any time is great. Slight mistakes in details and current language, careless handling, technical hitches will give away eventually a sustained programme or a series of leaflets. But it is possible to do covert, unofficial propaganda in which no serious attempt is made to maintain the pretence of "inside Germany" though every effort is made to maintain a German approach

TOP SECRET

to the news and comment, to maintain perfection of technique and the illusion of "being German" in the mind of the listener or reader. This type of propaganda has been christened "grey" and it is to the grey category that belong SO. TENDER CALAIS and the daily newspaper for the troops. Both are run by a unit responsible for genuine black output.

7. Generally speaking, the pure black technique has been kept up our sleeves, so far as wireless is concerned. But a large number of forged documents and subversive leaflets of ostensibly German origin have been distributed with success. These have been "swallowed" by the neutral press and by the Allied press quoting it. There are important possibilities of black propaganda "stunts" by wireless left open to us, and even greater possibilities by leaflet and forged papers. In the latter type of work the propaganda agencies operate with and through S.O.E. and O.S.S. with whom plans of production and distribution are drawn up.

8. One important reminder must be given before passing on to description of the media and methods of black and grey propaganda. It is advisable only to a limited extent to say black things that cannot be said on white. Both types of propaganda work under the P.W.D. directive for policy so far as operations against Germany are concerned. Moreover, the Russian and French Governments are able to D/F black stations and to identify their country of origin. Any political line on black, diverging sharply from the white line, would be noted by our Allies. On the other hand, a quick, sensational operation by wireless could not be detected by them unless repeated at regular intervals.

To assist military operations by softening the spirit of resistance among German fighting men and civilians, by encouraging motives of local and individual self-interest at the expense of national and Party loyalties, and by stimulating action in conflict with German military interests.

MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA.

1. WIRELESS.

- a) SOLDATENSENDER WEST (formerly SOLDATENSENDER CALAIS/ATLANTIC) broadcasts nightly for 12 hours a continuous programme of news from the war fronts and from inside Germany, with talks and special news for the Services and records of jazz and light music. The programme goes out on the medium-wave transmitter ASPIDISTRA of exceptional power and also on short wave transmitters. It has a widespread and established audience in the German fighting services and among German civilians. Accurate and exclusive news, inside information based on intelligence, half truths and fictions are used in combination to achieve subversive effect.
- b) OPPOSITION S.S. STATION. This broadcasts intermittently on short wave. It purports to present the point of view of an opposition movement within the Waffen S.S. which is active in Germany.
- c) CHRIST THE KING STATION broadcasts nightly four half-hour programmes of serious music, interspersed with prayers, sermons, readings from the Bible and reflections. The station presents a priest expressing an Austrian Catholic point of view, opposed to Godless National Socialism, with the object of rationalising on religious grounds non-cooperation with the German war effort.
- d) other programmes in preparation.

TOP SECRET

2. NEWSPAPER

With the [] and comment adapted from the material provided for SOLDATEN'SENDER WEST, a four-page illustrated newspaper for the German troops (NACHRICHTEN FÜR DIE TRUPPE) is produced nightly between midnight and 0600. This is dropped within the next [] hours in special leaflet bombs over selected targets in and behind the German lines. Whenever possible, the newspaper is also dropped in daylight [] targets inside Germany or behind the German lines. The daily distribution aimed at in coming weeks is two million. Targets are selected in consultation with S.H.A.E.F. and the Army Groups.

3. LEAFLETS.

hitherto

- a) Balloons despatched from the United Kingdom (but shortly to be despatched from Belgium) and agents operating behind the enemy lines are used to distribute in the German front line and inside Germany subversive leaflets of ostensibly German origin, counterfeit documents, stickers with agitatory slogans and handbooks giving instructions on malingering, desertion and other forms of defeatist behaviour. Some black leaflets [] in preparation [] distribution are described briefly below.
- b) The latest black leaflet operation is to counterfeit "GOETTER" leaflets which have been dropped by German aircraft to their own troops in the West. These leaflets purport to answer questions asked by front soldiers. The answers are given in a forceful, dramatic style, calling on the men to show a do-or-die spirit. The counterfeit leaflets being distributed by Allied aircraft are written in the same style but include subversive suggestions that desertion has become easier, that soldiers and N.C.O.'s are shooting their officers and getting away with it, and that it [] the High Command's intention to scorch every foot of German earth.
- c) Small leaflets bearing defeatist slogans which look like the work of organised movements inside Germany have been stuck up on walls and hearthings behind the German lines.
- d) In various pocket disguises such as [] Protestant hymn books, diaries for the soldier, military handbooks and song books, expert [] detailed instructions on malingering and desertion have been widely distributed.
- e) In envelopes made up to resemble Party propaganda handouts [] disseminate among the troops in [] West Wall area desertion kits consisting of forged passes, discharge sheets and travel vouchers enabling soldiers to travel home.
- f) In Norway and in parts of the Western Front instructions on desertion [] been distributed. These bear a small red circle suggesting the existence of [] organisation to help deserters.

4. COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS.

Forged ration cards, leave passes and other material likely to strain and confuse the German police and administrative machinery [] distributed in Germany. Counterfeits of German publications for the troops similar to our [] ABGA have been circulated. Further posters, stickers and handbills are in preparation.

5. RUMOURS.

All the media mentioned carry rumours of an operational kind. They will increasingly be circulated by agents and civilians.

E. INTELLIGENCE.

- 1) Naval, military and air intelligence for use in black operations is obtained through liaison officers or through direct contact with Service Departments, S.H.A.E.F. and Army Groups. The method and form of use are discussed with officers of Operations and Intelligence Divisions.

TOP SECRET

ii) Political and economic intelligence is collected from [redacted] agencies, from the German [redacted] and by intelligent deduction from German news and propaganda.

iii) Friendly German Ps/W collaborate as members of the propaganda units [redacted] providing guidance on language, procedure, local background, personalities.

F. POLICY.

i) During and since operation OVERLORD the main task of black propaganda [redacted] been to concentrate [redacted] attention of the German soldier [redacted] the enemy within (Party authorities) rather than [redacted] the enemy without. It [redacted] emphasised throughout the military disasters in the East; the growing [redacted] of [redacted] war production under stress of bombing, blockade and unnecessary sail-up; the impotence of the German Air Force over the battlefield and the homeland, the breakdown of authority, in particular police authority, and the consequently increasing ease with which the law can safely be defied.

ii) Policy may be divided into long-term and short-term policies.

a) Long-term planning is based on fundamental assumptions about the behaviour which it is wished to stimulate in German fighting men and civilians [redacted] both sexes. [redacted] directive is applied through a number of themes which appear persistently in the handling of day-to-day [redacted] and comment. Through news items and stories there is the constant suggestion that those in authority both at the front and in Germany behave in selfish, defeatist and inefficient ways and get away with it. Through news and comment in talks and articles there is a constant effort to present excuses for inefficiency, faint-heartedness and alarmist talk, evasion of discipline and responsibility, substitution of personal and family loyalties for devotion to Party and State. Inequality of sacrifice as between the ordinary man and the privileged Party bureaucracy is a leading theme.

The military situation of the last two months, with a German army standing [redacted] its own frontier in proximity to civilian influences has enabled particular attention to be given to the interplay of civilian and military factors.

b) Short-term planning aims firstly at supporting current and impending military operations; secondly, at stimulating and exploiting crises inside Germany (Army v. Party, Army v. SS); thirdly at preparing a state of mind in the German public likely to enhance the demoralising effect of some operation of which [redacted] have advance knowledge. Thus when we were told that Americans would shortly be bombing Germany from Russian bases we ran a campaign showing how German industry was being moved to "safe" Eastern areas.

iii) Deception and confusion in the German General Staff can be created because of the unique status of SOLDATENRUFGER WET, which is known by the enemy to be exceptionally well-informed and at the same time misleading. Moreover, [redacted] an unofficial station, disowned by His Majesty's Government, it can make military and political statements the authenticity of which can be judged by the Germans only with great difficulty. For example, if our wireless programmes suggest that the Super-Fortress B. 29 is to be used against Germany, German Intelligence has the choice of two interpretations; either there is no intention to use those aircraft against Germany and our propaganda is bluffing; or it is intended to use them and our propaganda has been instructed to create preliminary anxiety in the German public.

iv) In consultation with G.2 and G.3 S.R.A.E.F. plans have been made to exploit imminent military operations in the West. Quick and extensive [redacted] in these operations would offer to black propaganda the opportunity to spread alarming military news, rumours and confusing instructions to thickly populated districts of Germany in the path of an Allied advance. If P.W.D. is advised that a winter campaign is to be expected, propaganda will be directed [redacted] before according to the principles described in Para. F (ii) above.

TOP SECRET

G. FUTURE OPERATIONS.

1. The main effort of black propaganda will be devoted to presenting, distorting and interpreting day to day news from the fronts and from inside Germany, following the general directives given by P.W.D. and other divisions of S.H.A.E.F. According to the opportunities offered by military operations, special leaflet and wireless projects will be undertaken in cooperation with S.O.E. and O.S.S. Possible methods and objectives are outlined below.

2. Objectives will be:

- a) To stimulate among German fighting men and special occupational groups of civilians ways of thinking and behaving which should assist the work of G.4 and G.5., as the Allied advance into Germany makes progress. Special targets are the miners of the Ruhr, farmers, petty officials, priests, and women with families.
- b) To discourage evacuation, execution of a scorched earth policy and the movement of supplies away from the threatened areas of western Germany.
- c) To encourage contact and cooperation between fighting men and civilians now frowned on by the military authorities - for such purposes as desertion resistance to Party orders, hoarding and other defeatist activities.
- d) To combat through counterfeit documents and news German official resistance propaganda to troops and civilians e.g. the Scorpion leaflets now being dropped on their troops.
- e) To provide bogus evidence through agents and by use of balloons of the existence of opposition groups inside Germany.
- f) To increase the strain on the German police system by supporting such special operations as BRADDOCKS, and the propaganda campaign on foreign workers.
- g) To support any military or special operations with newsworthy or devices by creating expectancy by exploiting their initial effects through rumours.

H. CONCLUSION

Black propaganda operates above all by presenting and interpreting the daily news in a subversive manner. It can enhance the effect of important military operations by increasing their shock and surprise effect on the German public. By the use of leaflets and agents, and by joint operations with S.O.E. and O.S.S. it can help to spread subversive ideas and material. It can support the operations of the armed forces and special agencies if its contribution is considered in the early stages of planning. But black propaganda cannot on its own achieve decisive effects except in some sensational news operation against the enemy in which it is agreed that friend and foe alike shall be deceived.

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

DISTRIBUTION:

G.3 S.H.A.E.F.
Brig. Gen. McClure
Mr. Gochman
German Section

6 72

Copy No.

1 Spec. Ops Section
2 O.S.S., Washington
3 P.I.D. (Maj. General
4 Brooks)
Files
G/S
D.C.S.

Copy No.

5 & 6
7
8
9 & 10
11
12

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : JMD 2245 P&W, 21 AG P&W, 12 AG P&W,
5 AG, HALE RADIO LUXEMBOURG

FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM NOCLURE SIGNED COAEF

REF NO : 8-69616 CITE: SHPW

Came arisen First United States Army Area where German civilian has been arrested for sheltering two German deserters. Defense is German civilian was unable notify American Commanding Officer since battle still proceeding. Defense also cites leaflet WO 11 which advises German civilians give help protection and shelter German deserters foreign workers and opponent of the War Persecuted by REGIM. This also broadcast BBC.

In our view the incident does not invalidate first rate propaganda line but proves necessity inserting in such instructions that German civilian must immediately report to Allied Armies all fugitives they have harboured.

Action required:

1. BBC ABSIE should revise radio instructions based on SHAEF Guidance dated September 18. They should add to these instructions "Give help protection and shelter deserters foreign workers and persecuted opponents of REGIM. Directly Allied troops arrive notify Allied Authorities of presence of such persons. This will be required of you by the Military Authorities. In your own interest therefore and in that of the refugees you are sheltering, report their presence immediately."

SMC OUT 2540

8 73

Page -1-

SECRET

COPY NO.

X 233,7
X 200,77233,7
200,77

1 NOV

63

SECRET

REF NO: S-65616

Page -2-

6 NOVEMBER 44

2. Army Groups to ensure that all leaflets creating this theme make similar insertions.

3. In general in drafting leaflets addressed to civilians behind enemy lines remember possible effects of instructions given for conduct in one set of circumstances upon situation after Military Government has been imposed.

ORIGINATOR : FWD
INFORMATION : SCS
 G-3
 G-2
 AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: RAYMOND K. FRIED
MAJOR, SC

COORDINATED WITH: G-3

300 OUT 4540 6 NOV 44 0036A

HWK/jl

REF NO: S-65616
TOU : 0415304

SECRET

6 74



J. Ce *cont* 1290

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Report from W. H. on effect of insects.

DATE 4 November 1944

number each item or column separately, fill in each column, aligned vertically, draw a line across the sheet, use entire width of sheet for long answers.

sheet, use entire sheet or blank for copy			
No.	From	Pass to	Date
HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?			
1.	Chief P&D BRANK	DOES STAFF	4 Nov 44
<p>The attached report from 11th Army Group on the results of leaflet droppings is sent for your information.</p> <p>(14)</p> <p>ROBERT A. McCLELLAN, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.</p>			
<p>1. Incl. 12 AG-memo 30 Oct 44</p> <p>30/10/44</p>			

Manuscript accepted Nov. 1. Received in Feb. 1944)

(CLASSIFICATION)

SGS
STAFF
The
No. 671.777

April 4

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

~~SECRET~~

1306

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXHIBITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

~~SECRET~~

GR6a/JS

Ref. 300.6

4 November, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
Memorandum - No. 1

1. Foreign.

Guidance Note on German Civilians Charged with Sheltering
Deserters (see A.E.F. cable of 4 November, 1944).

A German civilian recently arrested on this charge has pleaded (1) Allied radio and leaflet instructions to shelter deserters, foreign workers and Nazi-persecuted opponents of the war; (2) his inability to inform the U.S. commander of the deserters' presence, because the battle was still in progress.

The following points require attention:

- a. G-3 Staff advises that the present propaganda line should remain unchanged - namely, to encourage German civilians to give refuge to escaping foreign workers and German deserters.
- b. In order to clear the matter up, BBC and AGO will immediately broadcast a set of civilian instructions including an advice to harbor foreign workers and deserters and hand them over.
- c. All leaflets on this line should be pulped which do not contain a warning to civilians that they must hand over refugees at once to the Allied military authorities, both for their own sakes and for that of the refugees.
- d. It is not advisable to use this line as a major theme so long as the battle remains static. Its use should be reserved for a breakthrough.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO <u>SECRET</u>
By authority of <u>CAIDA</u>
By <u>EWB/JS</u>
Date <u>11 Nov 44</u>

In general, leaflet writers drafting texts intended for German civilians behind the line should consider how the instructions they give will affect the situation when military Government is imposed.

Robert A. McGowan
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION - See overleaf

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

P & P.W., 21 Army Group (3)
P & P.W., 12 Army Group (3).
C of S., 6 Army Group, for P.W.O. (3).
P.W.D., S.H.A.E.F., Luxembourg (3: 1 for M.O.,
P.W.D. Det.)
C.B.S. Seine Base Section (3: Attention Mr.
Howard Baldwin).

For Information:

A.U.D. Rear (6: 1 to P.I.D. Country, Mr. Delmer)
Deputy Chief of Staff, S.H.A.E.F.
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-5 (1)
RD (2: 1 to Planning Branch)
SWAMP Military Mission to FRANCE (8: 1 to G-3
Ops B.Col. Wilde)
" " " " BELGIUM (1)
" " " " NETHERLANDS (1)

SECRET

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO: *See below* Date *1 Nov 44*

*Regret that I
cannot approve of this.
It is a little outside
the position of dignity
of the Supreme Commander.*

*Suggest poster be made
without picture of
Gen Eisenhower.*

S/W.B.S.

6 78

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PWP 415

1 1944

SUBJECT: Poster for Distribution in Belgium.

TO : Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

I. DISCUSSION.

Belgian Ministry for information has a request through the Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. Mission (BELGIUM) for distribution of a poster thanking the Belgian people for their to the Allied cause. It proposed that the poster carry a photograph of the Supreme Commander and a reproduction of his signature. would seem advisable to agree to this proposal, although to do might virtually commit the Supreme Commander to giving similar permission in the event of a similar request being received from the French or the Dutch.

At TAB A a letter from Chief of Mission (BELGIUM).

At TAB B is a draft of proposed poster.

II. RECOMMENDATION

That the Supreme Commander be asked to sanction the draft poster at TAB B to permit the reproduction of his signature on it.

III. CONCURRENCE.



/s/ ROBERT A. McCLURE,

/t/ A. McCLURE,

Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

6 79

R

COPY

PHOTO

A LA POPULATION BELGE

■ GRAND MERCI ■ VOTRE

COURAGE ET VOTRE APPUI

VOS INNOMBRABLES ACTES D'HEROISME

ONT BIEN SERVI NOTRE CAUSE

■ MARCHONS, VERS

LA VICTOIRE ■

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
PUBLICITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
APO 655

x 2.1. Pennell
091.412
322-01 PW 23

PW/1290

30 October 1944

MEMORANDUM TO : Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Main,
Attention : Crossman and Kaufmann.
SUBJECT : Leaflets

1. Reference memo as above, dated 6 October 1944.
2. PW reports indicate great improvement in percentage of prisoners who have seen leaflets and that leaflets produced at all levels have had a profound effect.
3. The statement in WG 11 "GIVE HELP, PROTECTION AND SHELTER" to all fugitives of the Wehrmacht, foreign workers and all opponents of the war persecuted by the regime" is currently causing our forces some embarrassment. German civilians who have sheltered axis soldiers are using it as a defense in military governments courts.
4. PW interrogations during the last 10 days indicate that morale of enemy troops is shaken to the point where mind of the Wehrmacht soldier is more receptive to our leaflets than at any time in our experience.
5. Here are random extracts from the Daily Summary of Intelligence, prepared by this Headquarters, showing concrete results from Leaflets efforts on our front :

14 Oct 44

A PW taken by the IX Corps reports that surrender passes (Leaflets ZG 61) are being sold by German soldiers on the Third Army Front. He says that all men are eager to get them.

15 Oct. 44

A number of PWs reported that the Passierachlein and Geneva Convention leaflets (ZG 61) had helped convince them of the advisability of desertion. ZG 45 (Eine Minute) and ZG 56 (To German HCO's) were singled out for praise. Two PWs were carrying the pamphlet "Krankheit rettet" (Sickness saves) their persons - "Just in case."

30 Oct 44

2nd 6

15

10/10/44

6

81

Several PWs from Metz reported that they had seen Frontpost. The sport news [redacted] especially well liked, according to one PW. PWs reported that leaflets were passed from [redacted] to another before being turned in.

17 Oct. 1944

One PW from Aachen said that there had not been enough safe conduct leaflets to go around. He was under the misapprehension that each Passierschein is valid only for [redacted] PW. He stated that the prohibition for reading leaflets was acting as an incentive among the soldiers.

19 Oct. 1944

PWs reported that the PWB leaflet containing the text of the Aachen ultimatum had influenced them to desert. One, a prusso-phobe Bavarian, decided to desert after reading this leaflet, took a Viennese comrade along, persuaded 11 others to join, marched to U.S. lines waving the leaflets and white flags and finally broadcast appeals over our public address system to remaining comrades.

21 Oct. 1944

Again the Passierschein was praised [redacted] being our best leaflet. PWs had seen ZG 45, ZG 54, ZG 72 K. They were particularly impressed by the statement that courage cannot fight against material. PW who had seen Frontpost near Metz said that although men laughed at the paper, they really were impressed by the fact that there was [redacted] withheld from them by their own superiors.

A captured officer stated that troops are no longer forbidden to read leaflets; instead officers have been instructed to read them to their men and to refute them point by point in an effort to "turn weakness into strength"

For the P & PW Officer, 12th AG

C.R. POWELL
Colonel AUS
Asst. for PW

*X to McClellan
X to Morgan*
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division PWP-547

15 October

SUBJECT: News Digest

TO: Lt. Gen. Sir F.E. Morgan, K.C.B.
Deputy Chief of Staff, S.H.A.E.F.

pages marked in attached News
Digest show the need for our Counter Propaganda
line, "What does Military Government of Occupa-
tion mean to the German civilian."

Call
ROBERT A. McCLELLAN,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

Encl. 2 Digests
AS

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Mission (Belgium)

12 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Posters.

To : SHAEP Main

From : Major-General G.W.E.J. Erskine, CB., DSO,
Chief of Mission.

It has been suggested by the Belgian Ministry for information that it would have a very beneficial effect on Belgian morale if a poster on the lines of the attached could be displayed in Belgium.

The Supreme Commander's message to the Resistance Movement was much appreciated, but it is felt that a poster such as this would be welcomed by the numerous other sections of the Population who played their part for the Allies, not only during the Liberation but during the German occupation.

If the Supreme Commander would be prepared to sanction this poster the Public Relations Branch of this Mission have already a suitable photograph for putting on the top, and a photostatic reproduction of his signature used for the message to the Resistance Movements.

/s/ G.W.E.J. ERSKINE, CB., DSO.,
Major-General,
Commanding.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO
By authority of CALA
By <i>Rm</i>
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

12 OCT

the Quebec Conference, which Sir John and his colleagues and representatives personally discussed with the All-Party Committee of the Kewin. After the British Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Cresswell, declared the work meeting in Ottawa as the continuation of the work of the U.S.A. is represented by the Anglo-American Minister. It may be assumed that the Commission on the Quebec Conference, the results of which have just been presented to the world in a report, will play a part in the Ottawa talks. The presence of high British officials suggests that similar questions will also be discussed, although it is likely that additional problems will be the main topics.

There was something about the speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference. It was a surprise because it was a speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference. It was a surprise because it was a speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference.

The speech was a surprise to Moscow because it was a speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference. It was a surprise because it was a speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference. It was a surprise because it was a speech which was not only a surprise to Moscow but also a surprise to the press conference.

Dumbarton Oaks: Secret Agreement
 A22. DVO. 91044 (12.30) The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end.

A22. DVO. 91044 (12.30) The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end.

The Post-War Security Plan
 A22. DVO. 91044 (12.30) The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks have come to an end.

Further evidence on Dumbarton Oaks: see H1.

INTERNAL COUNCILS

Depth of the Western Front

B1. Keltische Zeitung, 4.10.44. An editorial appeared in the Keltische Zeitung, 4.10.44. An editorial appeared in the Keltische Zeitung, 4.10.44. An editorial appeared in the Keltische Zeitung, 4.10.44.

The West is not a land of peace and quiet. The West is not a land of peace and quiet. The West is not a land of peace and quiet. The West is not a land of peace and quiet. The West is not a land of peace and quiet.

The Front Line Approaches Our Westmark

B2. Seidmberg, Berlin, 10.10.44. The front line approaches our Westmark. The front line approaches our Westmark. The front line approaches our Westmark. The front line approaches our Westmark. The front line approaches our Westmark.

should be welcomed by us as a delivery from his hands. But he shall not achieve this aim. The end on which we live in Germany and shall remain as

In the Face of Danger

The Keltische Zeitung, 10.10.44. There is a danger in our mother tongue which will not only harm us but also harm many people. There is a danger in our mother tongue which will not only harm us but also harm many people.

But what about the important personal affairs which we cannot see because of the danger? Dear friends, in this matter nothing is as important as the danger. In a war of this kind, the consequences of a single day must be seen in the light of the danger. In a war of this kind, the consequences of a single day must be seen in the light of the danger.

Informative Newspapers

B3. Schilling, Berlin, 10.10.44. The informative newspapers. The informative newspapers. The informative newspapers. The informative newspapers. The informative newspapers.

19

16

instead of one and in this way making 230,000 RM in excess profits.

—Zahlungsbilanz-Regulativs.

Q12. ELIZABETH [1217] Stole the goods which are in doubt and she is not a thief after the standard or what other criteria and should not be lost during the attack enjoy the special protection and the law is a supplementary order says that the lower administrative authorities concerned will determine which seized goods should be delivered and collected so that the owners may recover them there. Goods delivered after the attack are only treated as lost properly for insurance in respect of a reward for the finder and submission of the goods to the delivery makes an express application of the law close.

A12. ELIZABETH leads to the assumption that the articles were lost and that she found them and that they were lost not by reason of an act of theft.

Sentences for Economic Offenses—

RAS Lubecker Zeitung, 23.4.44 (in not quote). The Schwab-Bienert Court has sentenced Frau Erika Immen of Lubeck to two years' penal servitude and a fine of 2,000 RM for harboring acts against eggs and brood purposes near Glindebach and thus selling them at excessive prices in Hamburg markets in Lubeck. Her excessive profits of 600 RM were confiscated.

859 Der Predigtstuhl, Dresden, 30.4.44 ich sei
geboten. The Dresden Spiritual Court has sentenced
the Deacon Johannes Friedrich Rehnitz Johannes
Schön, aged 41, born in Elsdorf, to six years' penal
servitude and a fine of 100000 Loh. His excess crimes
have been enumerated and his has been prohibited
from carrying on his trade for five years because from
1942 to 1943 he sold ten million raffle tickets to other
4000 dealers, taking 10% wholesale profit margin.

—Religious Criticism

DOS. National Zeitung, East, 20/4/47. The speaker, Konrad Schisch, of Aachen, East, discussed the military and political situation with a guest, making an attempt to persuade his listeners's confidence and loyalty to him. He maliciously and ideologically caricatured the West and the Soviet leadership, surmising that he as an old Social Democrat knew something about politics. The West Observer has expressed his opinion in his monthly magazine for the Volkswirtschaftsberatung and politics, and says he also thinks it is not difficult. The speaker had only one line consideration when passing arguments.

Allocation of German agricultural machinery in
Czechia: no CoE

Bulgarian commenting on how Germany malnourished her troops in South Eastern Europe, see Ch.

Harvest Thanksgiving in West Poland and Upper Silesia: see ONS-25.

Geburtstagskalendarium im Upper Siluria; 2te Aufl.

Muchagiam de zu distigist between Germans and Austrians: see De

Swedish rumors of new German revolt? see D74.
Swedish firm plans financial aid to Germany.

1872

Dutch warblers in Germany fell for Hellmuth: see FB.
Dutch refugees had cold comfort by Germany: see

German evacuation of Italy: conflicting reports: 166

Reprinted by permission of the publisher in *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1964; 191:1251-1252.

New from Atlanta: 440.74

Dominated and Occupied Territories

HUNGARY

Random Access for TSPs

[illegible]

Russian strategy in the Balkans: see C30 and 53.
 Russian supply routes: see C32.

Reluctance from Turkey is still

[illegible]

—Panic and Confusion

423. 13. Meggyarok, 28.4.48 (4): not quoted. We warmly welcome any efforts to solve smaller problems affecting villagers. We feel, however, that not only those for whom it would be easier to remain behind, but also people who are rightly directly not induced by exaggerated, are hazardous to leave for 'Hungary' and the western districts.

the western districts. They have taken a good social notice. It will be bigger for instance, if all postal and railway officials, employees and employees left their posts; the police, administrators and employees engaged at the first breath of war. Naturally it is difficult to explain in the present situation why it is better to work for the country, to be taken into the information from the enemy and to be not far from the frontiers. The interests of the state of employees naturally influence greatly and must influence these interests while elements are in effect that the present situation of these who are in the present situation is a stage of these who are in the present situation. Anyone who knows his post should be allowed.

13. U. Nagarsang, 26104 (not quoted). The position of the refugees from Transylvania who are now in Budapest is far from satisfactory. Many of them are sleeping in railway coaches near bombed districts, and are waiting rooms with no windows. Most of the children are ill because of the lack of sanitation in their environment, and they are also inadequately housed. Up to September 20th, more than 2000 refugees had arrived in Budapest alone.

President George's Health Not Confirmed

2. Kippelenberg, J.B.A. He reported, on information contained in the ROOSENBOM (CUB) newspaper, which Mayor Bello, that the Commander of a certain formation of the Spanish frontier guards, the Deputy Chief of Police, had died the death of a hero in Cade country, etc. (Note: Newspaper is well known and trusted.)

1. 2000 年 10 月 1 日起实施

On September 20, 1944, Zoltan Huzvath, an engine driver and Moser Nagy a fireman, died the victim of a bomb while on duty.

A Fair Warmer than Finland's

C7. Est. 8/20/92, 23.9.42 (no post queries). In an editorial headed "Russia's Tragedy" Lajos Marcschalok writes: "What fate would befall us if even the Finns should be saved, if there is no mercy for them? What would happen to us Hungarians who, as a result of vile propaganda, have lost their 'brotherly' part of the popularity of the Finns? Shame was frivolously and completely abandoned. What would happen to our nation then?"

Five Acres for a Tank

17. *Ruggell Magnetronide*, 28.8.33. An editorial reads: The Government has decided to stop five acres of land in every soldier's estate as a reward for his 1918-1919 life. All C.I.F.'s have three acres but those who have been awarded the Victoria Cross have five acres. A nation is only strong if it is brave. The Government's action shows the aim of preventing the Hungarian nation from being weak. These five acres are awarded to a present or past soldier as a reward. The Hungarian soldiers who face the iron-clad enemy, thus defying death, are rewarded with heroic deeds for territorial rewards. The Hungarian needs an encouragement.

Country's Annual

CN. Monaghan, 2004d, 406, 407, 410, 411. "The extraction of a 'hottie' is violent!" The theme is not the same in their Andean or the Thika texts. A parallel to all 'hottie' work is of all works of political and religious life to be models of self-carriage. They should value, fully join the fighting formations of the Atroch. They should demonstrate even to the poorest Thimari that they have a common future, and that all Thimari are separated from 'hotties'. The Atroch is a false reason for the country's political problems. The Atroch is a weak reason for the country's problems, the direction of its spiritual life towards authority and authority.

"Shand, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649,

Volunteers for the National Guard

* CIO Massaging Home Service (in Humanist, 3.11.64, p.15) A1 Birmingham at 11.00 between 18 and 41

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Chc. Chutwong, 1984, speaking with the lugubrious "Maumun" intonation of her own ethnicity, noted which came the news of the day, the various pro-democracy rallies and, approximately, at the bottom of the King. Then came a question of the first anniversary mark by the NDC as the anniversary of the day, in which the tall, thin, dark-skinned, "Burmese" looking man, had a "Burmese" accent. She

[illegible]

Improved speech has been of importance and was again shown in the stage of going to St. Petersburg, between the two meetings. Now 40 years old, but in full commanding voice and having fluency of speech for the sake of the day when foreign relations should show one to express ideas, emotions and honest thoughts without any hindrance.

"By the will of a sound King who set his coronation
has proved to what extent his was identified among
with the interests of the nation. He was so truly
loving and generous the state, of her own choice

It is essential in a democracy that each citizen should fully be enabled to take part in the decisions which affect his personal and permanent interests and that the fundamental approval of a nation's affairs has been made through the majority of its members and of a people that has even participated in favor for the interests of others and for the personal development of the nation.

"These are not every day's that are awaiting us. By our 21st birthday we may perhaps have discovered the right of living in a real home in Europe and in peace. We will have to leave it to God to tell the future of the children of the Yehuda Agency and to establish the rule of tranquillity; we shall have many schools to build, many hearts to warm, many and various things to do."

"In the future we must have what we lacked so much in the past: a consciousness of the national fabric, a deep understanding of ourselves as a people, a sense of our place in the public life of our country, a firm moral basis in our private lives, a sense of responsibility for the life and a sincere determination to participate in the life of our people in all the things that are going on in the world."

[illegible]

"Working with the realities of our country, we will strengthen our friendship as long as the people honestly and honestly maintain their peace, freedom, justice and national independence. We will continue to work for the betterment of our country, unity and peace all the members of our country."

"We need such the all-around aid of American steel
plants and must be for us the beginning of a new era
for our country. We shall place our newspaper in the
service and will help with all our working power to
foster a new and free country." -

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

[illegible][illegible]

4.31 The following are the 1994-1995

Spillover from Romania: A expanding steel delivery schedule applies to the Romanian firms; were industrial production expressed in a broadened by the radiated Romania. The decline of war industry has been traced back to factories who held important. Romania has industry built. The Romanian right economic measures to combat these shortages in production of aluminum as the reason for a decline in production. The Soviet heavy industry has been gradually been stopped. Romania has been threatened under Communist influence. It is probable that these so-called "satellites" will not be sending their part of position but also maintaining the status quo. The steadily increasing winter and source of the steel-making plants, while water returned by the Soviet Union.

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(27) *Algebra Rudin* (pencil review)

1931. *Atterhuesen (Hain) forest, 10 miles N. of Berlin.* The type of Greek appearance that on some Saturdays, October 1, a new landscape of pine needles appears in an orchard. It is considered that the number of the days involved is not strictly constant, but is found in groups of consecutive lighting of a different color, green, and red.

^a General summary of the products of Tissue and Nucleolar, see A24-84, A25-84.

of the Librarians' Net

Report from National Liberation Front: -

[illegible]

In the Samodrigi, in the border stretch of Ishlandia 6111 (111° 21' E, 65° 54' N), six dead animals, an empty wolf den and several wolf tracks were found. The dead animals were found in the north-eastern part of the island. The dead animals were found in the north-eastern part of the island. The dead animals were found in the north-eastern part of the island.

[illegible][illegible]

In Minneapolis, our wife contacted Matekova, Johnley and Lijana Sijala and are evaluating to purchase the factory in Finland. Thus the German firm of non-membership joined Fred, Antti-Juana and Juhana was cut. They still intended to use it to generate from Kovero, Matkova and Samuli Anttoni. The

In Romania, after extensive training, 20 units participated in Katusya and are fighting near Orlovsk. 250 Germans were wiped out in a day.

In Kosovo, Clever and Womin, one in the Vojvodina, are now fighting their regular attacks on enemy concentrations.

—Cross Reports.
 CBT. Cross News Agency via Casco, 9:38:44 (13:00)
 Operators in the area of Repolenta-Ploemba-Viru

vities were continuing around the place. In the area of Baidya and Khatyapin, the enemy was driven from the heights east and west of the line grid 600. Operations south of Jangia are continuing. Fighting in the area of Bikhavadi is in progress. On the island of Brak, the enemy tank concentration was successfully annihilated. In the remaining territory, there was no important activity.

[illegible]

In the area between Saja and Kosiinjim, the remaining enemy groups are being chopped up. An [?]'s company drove the [?]s away near Boluga. In the area between Kangle and the Kama there was [?]

In the area south-west of Bloem a fighting group of 100 men was driven off and heavy losses were inflicted on it. First Airforce and main appreciable losses were suffered on the part of the First Airforce. The fighting in the area of Benkevoe continues. On the Atlantic coast there was

4.25 Christ Reids, A

special order. The Rajahmats has passed a decree on the formation of the First Chhota Assam District (Sundaridistrict) which will be composed of members of all branches of the Armed Forces; it will be established within a fortnight. The Rajahmats has appointed a member of the United Army to be a Commander of the Regiment and to be Commander of the new Division.

[illegible]

The Kadi Army has now moved to the "periphery" of the country, and it is necessary to know that the "periphery" is not the "border" of the country, but the "border" of the "periphery" of the country. The Kadi Army has now moved to the "periphery" of the country, and it is necessary to know that the "periphery" is not the "border" of the country, but the "border" of the "periphery" of the country.

"The approach of the front is the final act of this confidence which we have always maintained in the delivery of Europe under the leadership of Churchill. It is the same U.S., the defence of Cuneo. Today, life is granted even by those who settled before. They no longer ask: 'When will the Germans get Berlin?' They only ask: 'How many German divisions have moved up to our eastern borders?' So they increasingly give more proof to the confidence."

.. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 104

Ähnlichkeit in Höhe, Länge d'Interaktion!

conclusion, perhaps not "the best of all worlds" in the best of worlds, is our AGO.

Учредитель: Издательство «Наше будущее»

[illegible]

Abstract

[illegible]

4. Conclusions in North Norway

The German *Volkssturm* in North Norway while still in the process of development through the frames of the German High Seas, a relatively large number of completely converted non-Germans, i.e. Poles, Czechs, etc. They joined the German occupying troops - have their status in reserve war blood (20) in the reserve detachment in North Finland. These troops, which have been under fire for the first time from the German side, are being sent to the front. According to the German press, the German *Volkssturm* in North Norway is not large. Later continuous reports from the German press that they are being increasingly made on their arrival. The German troops need

1

are a small fraction of the 150,000 inmates at all of the state's schools.

Work by us, licensed Surgeons

The situation in Norway is worse than ever. The

I do not understand why the British still waste money on the "Turpin." I saw her in 1963 with a big hole of at least 14 in in her side. It was big enough for two Red-bellies to pass through. It is even bigger now.

possible to repair such damage with 100% success.

4.2.2.2. *Bladder cancer*

OF JOURNAL

pathological for the β_1 distribution, and the β_1 distribution is not a good fit for the data.

The Long Arm of the Law

But what if international report, 12,044 "following and by means of a unique story, has been led from Rittenberg? One of the prominent "Socialists to the defense, the third man, a Londoner, of Rittenberg has been arrested on suspicion of a cotton swindle and drunken; ferry. He was the driver of a truck in the swindle in Rittenberg's Florida. A truck driver was discovered for was attending a meeting of the course in Spain, was the American who

of police sent the order for his arrest. The chief of police, but this order was stopped by the acting Police President, of Oslo, Sjøtvedt, who announced that it was impossible to arrest a third man. The Hanshus police and the police inspector in the vicinity of Huseby, were in a National Socialist spirit, and under the law. The head of the third school, however, refused to hand him over, but that did not help. He was finally handed over and taken to Huseby, where he is now detained. Huseby has about 30,000 living persons and helped all his Party friends with bread and beer. Approximately three tons of food and 2,000 loaves are involved.

Price Director's Liberal Spirits Allowance

D11. For Fagbergelund (underground paper), 8/144. Since late 1933 a law was found dead drunk in a gutter in Oslo and was taken to Rindestadon police station. His identity card showed that he was Carl Huseby, Price Director. Huseby revealed and he has 15 bottles of spirits to match for each commercial purpose. Of these he drinks half a bottle a day himself; the rest is for generalization. (See Paper 152, 7/10 D1)

A Gas Family

D12. For Fagbergelund (underground paper), 8/144. The new design of the "Nazi" has, and a girl, is entirely a National Socialist product and obviously should be boycotted. The living part is played by the family, who after a definite divorce case married the National Socialist, Sjøtvedt, who was a teacher. The marriage lasted for two months, after which the girl's independence forced it to end. She then married a man, who was a teacher, and she has since then been a teacher. She has since then been a teacher. She has since then been a teacher.

Norman's Disappearance in Huseby

D13. Huseby, 1/144. Two men from Oslo working in Huseby, Norway, went missing on October 10. In Huseby, Norway, and have not yet returned. People searched for them on October 11 and 12, but no trace was found. The men were named Norman and Huseby. Norman was 30 years old and Huseby was 35 years old.

Agricultural Labour Law

D14. Huseby, 1/144. Two men from Oslo working in Huseby, Norway, went missing on October 10. In Huseby, Norway, and have not yet returned. People searched for them on October 11 and 12, but no trace was found. The men were named Norman and Huseby. Norman was 30 years old and Huseby was 35 years old.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D15. Huseby, 1/144. Two men from Oslo working in Huseby, Norway, went missing on October 10. In Huseby, Norway, and have not yet returned. People searched for them on October 11 and 12, but no trace was found. The men were named Norman and Huseby. Norman was 30 years old and Huseby was 35 years old.

DENMARK

Arrests

D16. DPT, 8/144. During the weekend the Gestapo have been very active in Denmark. In Copenhagen the Gestapo arrested the premises known as "Sjælland" to arrest the Gestapo. The Gestapo arrested the premises known as "Sjælland" to arrest the Gestapo. The Gestapo arrested the premises known as "Sjælland" to arrest the Gestapo.

During the weekend the Gestapo have been very active in Denmark. In Copenhagen the Gestapo arrested the premises known as "Sjælland" to arrest the Gestapo. The Gestapo arrested the premises known as "Sjælland" to arrest the Gestapo.

German Propaganda for New Strides

D17. DPT, 8/144. As part of their campaign in Denmark to prevent new strikes the Germans have accused the Danish Communist Party of being the cause of the strikes. The Germans have accused the Danish Communist Party of being the cause of the strikes. The Germans have accused the Danish Communist Party of being the cause of the strikes.

—and Invasion

D18. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Treatment of Prisoners

D19. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Holst Trunk Explosion: Details

D20. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D21. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D22. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—Explosives Discovered

D23. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—German Harassment

D24. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Railway Guard Corps Formed

D25. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—Salvage Continues

D26. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D27. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Senseless Killing: Murders

D28. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D29. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D30. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D31. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D32. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—Increase in Sexual Offences

D33. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

Searches made on last night of wine in Scandinavian wine. D34. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—Trunk Murder

D35. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

—Commenced by a German Soldier

D36. DPT, 8/144. The Gestapo have ordered the municipalities in Denmark to prepare lists of the number of houses in the respective municipalities and have stated that these houses will be requisitioned in case of invasion.

German order. There is no one in the post, but the fact of the official German statement did not mean in itself a declaration of war. It was a mere statement of the fact that the German government had decided to take the step of declaring war on the Soviet Union.

Second Attempt on Motor Repair Shop

On 10th March, 1944, a second attempt was made to burn down the motor repair shop in the city of Moscow. The fire was caused by a bomb which was thrown into the shop by a person who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

Major "Schulenburg" in Berlin

On 10th March, 1944, Major "Schulenburg" was seen in Berlin. He was seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

Good Relations in Red Russia

On 10th March, 1944, good relations were seen in Red Russia. The relations were seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

When they suddenly discovered that the German officers were still in the shop, they were surprised. They were surprised because they had thought that the German officers had left the shop. They were surprised because they had thought that the German officers had left the shop.

in the city of Moscow. The fire was caused by a bomb which was thrown into the shop by a person who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

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Threatened Among the Finns

On 10th March, 1944, threatened among the Finns. The threatened among the Finns was seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

Editor's Last Words

On 10th March, 1944, the editor's last words were seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

more freely mentioned that in any other place in Europe.

It appears, however, at times that the Germans are in a state of nervousness. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British.

German Plan

On 10th March, 1944, the German plan was seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

German plan in Denmark was seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

FINLAND

Finland in Helsinki. All in all, the article showed that the Germans are in a state of nervousness.

On 10th March, 1944, the article showed that the Germans are in a state of nervousness. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British.

Objective and positive foundations for this already existing state of mind must be found. They must be found in the state of mind of the German people.

Russian Counter

On 10th March, 1944, the Russian counter was seen in the company of a German officer who was seen to enter the shop. The bomb exploded and caused a fire which spread to the other shops in the street. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade.

On 10th March, 1944, the article showed that the Germans are in a state of nervousness. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British. They are nervous because they are afraid of the British.

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61 150

122

of circumstances. There will be no opportunity of separating the physically and the spirit from the rest. It will be necessary to act on a more businesslike manner.

Neutrality in Practice

On the evening of September 7, 1944, reports in a paper in the Netherlands in a quiet town of a German plane flying over the town of Rotterdam. When the plane was seen, the German plane flew through the town of Rotterdam. The German plane was seen to be flying over the town of Rotterdam. The German plane was seen to be flying over the town of Rotterdam. The German plane was seen to be flying over the town of Rotterdam.

German statement see A30

A New German Report

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Closer Contacts with Norway

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Swedish Firm Accused of Selling Germany

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BELGIUM

New Flemish SS Division

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SS Division "Flamanders" (Vlaanderen) is to be formed in all the SS-territories. The members of the SS-territories in other formations. The members of the SS-territories in other formations. The members of the SS-territories in other formations. The members of the SS-territories in other formations.

Belgian's view on a bridgehead in Belgium see A31

HOLLAND

Railway Station Bomb Attack on Endless German Lines

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Allies Should Have Spared Holland

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It was known that the declaration of war of the former Dutch Government against Japan occurred in London. The Dutch Government declared war on Japan. The Dutch Government declared war on Japan. The Dutch Government declared war on Japan.

Terrorists to be Shot on Captives

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The Execution of Amble

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France

in the Belfori Region

Dr. Family Doctor, Stockholm, 5.10.68. The situation is increasingly tense in the Danks family. Dr. Family Doctor has been having headaches in the Danks family. All come from all in the city. The situation is increasingly tense in the Danks family. Dr. Family Doctor has been having headaches in the Danks family. All come from all in the city. The situation is increasingly tense in the Danks family. Dr. Family Doctor has been having headaches in the Danks family. All come from all in the city.

[illegible]

German soldiers and German agents, reportedly arrived from Chhatwalah, Pindhar and Naray, and attacked the village where they seized 14 hostages aged between 16 and 40. Under a young guard, these were led to the neighbouring village of Chhotahar. The

The episode unfolded in a village on the east of the church, a large stone meadow. The British positioned themselves before the German officers, crying for mercy. Others ran for the safety of the church. The German plenipotentiary, "Maximilian" Pelletier, tried to calm the British down. He said he was not interested in their lives. The Germans killed the men for words, ordered to be drawn up in lines to advance and finally shot. The British were left lying on the ground, some of them with their hands raised. The officer commanding the reaction, Gustav Thun, stepped on the bodies of the shot soldiers. The young woman, while the German leader spoke, the British were still lying on the ground, some of them with their hands raised. The German plenipotentiary, "Maximilian" Pelletier, tried to calm the British down. He said he was not interested in their lives. The Germans killed the men for words, ordered to be drawn up in lines to advance and finally shot. The British were left lying on the ground, some of them with their hands raised. The officer commanding the reaction, Gustav Thun, stepped on the bodies of the shot soldiers. The young woman, while the German leader spoke, the British were still lying on the ground, some of them with their hands raised.

[illegible]

ALSACE AND LORRAINE

Rigid π n Structures

RE INFO for Bureau, 10.10.34 (12.30). After the Cathedral had been severely hit during a previous bomb attack on 27 September, two of the oldest Sisters, Mother Superior, Mother of St Joseph and St John, were victims of the latest attack.

Records of change on Kachig River 439 1997

Italy

LATEST COMMENT

Paula and Valentin: How do you like it?

U.S. - British Mutual Relations in the 1940's - The 1940's
 U.S. - In contrast to the 1930's, American and British relations which was a failure, having been born and having died in August last, without the least triumphant claims which usually accompany all the worldly displays of the Anglo-American bond. This refers to the Conference between the American and British for long-war world reorganization, which came to an end without having acquired a single thing, because the difficulties were so great, quite apart from the principal difficulty which consists of the irreducible fact that in the war

They said: "The radical had kept Azerbaijan of the
Independent and good for some of the people in
Europe."

The 30 speakers were invited, including 12 Muslims, but evaluating the Munich Conference becomes a vast task, as simply exchanging of points of view, or comparing and contrasting, is not enough. The Munich Conference was a war—was constructed by a political maneuvering of conferences of which the object was to fail to reveal that at its core the problems of the world, independent of the Munich Conference, were the same. The conference was the self-deception, which made international policy "the fact that the lack of the spirit and the political policy" was the only thing that was not the same. The Munich Conference was a war—was constructed by a political maneuvering of conferences of which the object was to fail to reveal that at its core the problems of the world, independent of the Munich Conference, were the same. The conference was the self-deception, which made international policy "the fact that the lack of the spirit and the political policy" was the only thing that was not the same.

Large gatherings of the various races, which led to the failure of the Birmingham City Conference, also, after which he observed that one of the purposes which inspired it was the fact it was for Africa, which offered the Italian solution to an international security in order that it should be way in expected, whereby them for the interest of the world as a whole.

* "The use of a proposed 'writing' Group, 'within the Conference' mentioned in paragraph 2, is a serious, and complete, breach of it is always a good reason for the withdrawal of a negotiator by other people. It is always to be made use of. Thus, while the Group's committee proposed in 1952, that because of the 'unfavourable and dangerous content, it does up a large part of the agenda, that of least value from the secret changes of the United Nations, has only been the continuous action, that is to say, the only one."

In this regard, Sforza said the confederacy, however, differs from all the other groups in their aggressive attitude and their determined role as a political player. The issue at hand, such as the change for example, will be cast and decided, questioned and ruled, but the confederacy may not pass through it to be an obvious winner, or saving the smallest benefits of their constituents and the fewest

"It had to be our lot, as all people to suffer from this anti-theft of freedom, no-betwene suffering from

more rich, and is, by constant friendly relations with groups of different kind, happy, united, Virginia displayed they had not another phrase of whom to share with the experience of two days, a piece of the first and perfecting work of men here will have to wait until the future. Only the distant transference of an African phrase could faithfully present their shameful ignorance for ever.

"One certainly always appears not proud and confident but anxious, the certainty of victory. 'Feeling' it, pieces all the same the elements of these men's victory. The German's victory. Later, he may tell the Germans that the country was taken 1932, 1933, 1934. And he will return to us by means of facts that he does not like our territory and admires our dignity and power. Let us therefore begin by doing to body their deed, and only consider that, who is after, must allow their own."

Re-examining Review of War Situation

[illegible][illegible]

On the evening of the summer offensive at Verdun, the German Army was launched with unprecedented violence. The ferocity of the resistance of the German Army and its stiffening during the first assault of the Somme was most powerful, as much so that only by the employment of very large reinforcements and all available resources did the French Command have to relinquish the initiative in these operations.

At Arras, after the fierce resistance lasted for more than two months in the United Normandy front during the breakthrough at Arras, and the O.K.W. did not think it likely, definitely to accept battle with

44

by the bank. The two great periods between and after July 1933, 1938, are noted as follows in the course of Mussolini and of Fascism."

Black Market Extends to Currency and Housing

1810. *York Mail*, 3/10/44. The black market appears to have taken its place in the initial course of things. Nothing seems to have escaped it and even the selling of apartments has come into its sphere. The amount now a shortage of houses of large dimensions has been noticed. This has also been the case with prices of medium and small dwellings, but in this case with far more serious results.

The matter was touched by the issue of circular cheques which, however, often resulted in discussions and shows of a peculiar nature between buyer and seller, as to their responsibility for the loss of the cheque and has not proved satisfactory because of the shortage of notes of five denominations. It would not be surprising if this situation had indicated a new form of speculation.

lies on the part of the small retailer such as the newspaper vendor, who is prepared to change a cheque for five or ten lire notes in return for a brokerage fee of 2%.

It also appears to be established that branch customers of the Istituto Bancario Italiano have been approached by their Head Office to pay a similar brokerage fee so long as they can obtain a sufficient number of notes of the denomination which are required by firms for their weekly pay envelopes.

As regards the speculation in apartments, much as of a more serious nature. By paying a sum over and above the real price, it is possible to obtain a new apartment or one vacated by a refugee family which has not been notified to the authorities concerned. The result of this is that the prices in search of an apartment have had the experience of being offered a three roomer that provided he is prepared to hand over the Italian 100,000,000 to the man who prepared the plan.

1574

NEWS DIGEST

No. 1574 (E. H. Series)

10th October 1944

This Digest is designed to collect into a form convenient for propaganda purposes information recently received about enemy and enemy-occupied countries. It is prepared under official auspices and all the material in it may be published subject to Censorship regulations and no responsibility of the [REDACTED] The words "do not quote" preceding an item indicate that though the text of the [REDACTED] may be published, no mention may be made of the source. A list of papers whose names may be quoted can be obtained from the editor.

Cryptic and requests for extra copies should be addressed in writing to the Editor, Box No. 2, West Central District Office, New Oxford St., W.C.1.

The Digest does not normally include information about areas, or from sources, under Allied control. Accordingly, as enemy control ceases in any area, the Section dealing with that area will be curtailed or omitted. Any exceptions will be purely temporary.

Germany

LATEST COMMENT

Final Assault on the West

A1. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/10/44 (1459). In the opinion of a German military commentator, the general offensive against the jaws of the fortress of France which began on September 1st, 1944, was a success. The success, however, is not in itself a decisive victory, but it is a step towards the final assault on the West.

The intermediate phase in the battles on the western front which was started by the GCR's decision to go over to the offensive after the breakthrough at Arras, is now over. The Germans, after withdrawing to the inner line, made use of this phase to build up better and shorter defensive positions as well as quick supply communications, whereas the Allies had to employ their resources and to establish a wide supply network. Within the walls of the Fortress of Germany, the people in the lightning war used for the realization of total mobilization.

In the opinion of this spokesman, it is certain that the German position, in spite of the years of war, are fighting with unprecedented courage. Undoubtedly this is partly due to the fact that they are now fighting for German soil. Eisenhower's determination and the necessity for the Allies, particularly the Soviets, to encircle the war before the winter, will be broken by the iron resistance of the German front in the east, west, and south.

A2. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/10/44, quotes the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as saying: "The final assault will not wait until the spring before demanding the great offensive in the west which would not only destroy the last remnants of the German army but also the last remnants of the German people. The German people will have to make a last stand in the shortest possible time; hence in all circumstances it must be accepted that the Allies will launch the final assault on Germany in October or November through the western coastline of the Germans. There will, however, be no question as far as the final offensive, as the fighting at present is taking place in the final stages of the battle on the Western front. The fighting positions in Holland and before the West are disadvantageous to the Allies and are much better than their positions two or three weeks ago."

Aachen: "A Major Attack"

A1. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/10/44 (1459). The first reports: While in Flanders and Holland and on the entire western front the fighting has for some considerable time been largely confined to local importance, in spite of all the ferocity and fierceness and the large quantities of material both sides are employing, the fighting in the area north of Aachen is gradually assuming the character of a large-scale attack.

A2. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/10/44 (1459). The first American attack in the Aachen area did not bring the planned breakthrough. Instead, the stubborn defence of German pillboxes and fortifications reduced the offensive to a war of metres around small houses.

three days. It would be pointed out that in contrast to the Candidates of Hitler whom the majority of voters fled disgustedly and fearlessly the Fourth Candidates are completely depressed and uninterested and the real Hitler a good impression by auditory.

1011 d'Armonville, Passadena

All 10,000 men, women, children, in view of the difficult conditions, which is growing, daily, the climate is gradually losing their ability to survive in the cold. According to statistics made by British soldiers captured near Amiens a quarter of the troops on the enemy side believe in a quarter of the year "the only thing which seems certain is" war of the Dnieper said, "is the inevitable prospect of loss, suffering in the winter."

ALL THIS, for example, H. J. (2174) As can be seen from the statement of Tim Walker, an American officer who is now a prisoner in German hands, the Allied High Command realize that its present objective in the West has failed. The officer said: "Our hope of winning the Ruhr at the same speed with which we moved France is dwindling more and more in face of the little German resistance. Our Governments declare that we would be able to capture the West Christmas if home now seems rather doubtful, to say the least."

Amir de noy 494100 12000

221 Transmittal Slip For Mail, 7-10-49 18133

Walter Lutz writes: "Between recent German troops that are replacing our own in Germany's frontiers and the fact that they are very popular with the Americans, there are therefore now very special gifts to be made. In addition, every German immigrant soldier brings some personal belongings with these 'treasures'. A deal will result. Our German troops have indeed a sufficient amount of the Berlin police. New law must be sufficient in relation to the German troops under their different places how the things and how they will be the other way. The German reconnaissance will be with valuable material" is their own

221-106-100

by "People's" Government. It is...

1-22. The authors of the 1942 Hill et al. study were aware of one of the seriously misunderstood aspects of the data in the Hill et al. paper. It is difficult to find the paper and the point that they wish to make is somewhat obscure. They are asserting in a letter, dated 1942, that the need for the existence of the "Hill et al. study."

[illegible]

B

[illegible]

to clear a track through. That is the significant conclusion regarding the Bolshevik large-scale offensive from which it is known that its impetus does not come from outside.

[illegible]

The Thruway Is Stalled

AFS, DAF and EAFOS, 9/14/44 (1034) and reports the Soviet large scale offensive on the liberation of Leningrad (Krasnodar) and Leningrad (Leningrad) was continued yesterday with a large number of fresh formations. It is stated ground COY outside Mamel, while the division on Leningrad was stopped by counter-attacks.

According to the author, the "Soviet" and "American" styles of the 1950s are not only different, but also "opposite" in their approach to the human figure. The Soviet style is described as "stiff" and "mechanical," while the American style is described as "flexible" and "dynamic." The author also notes that the Soviet style is "more conservative" and "less experimental" than the American style.

River Convergence

149. Transportation in Germany for European, Middle East, North African and Far Eastern troops. The town and harbor of Riga, as well as its wide network of roads, are crowded with the remains of German troops and their equipment. The remains of the German troops are in possession of the Russian troops. A large proportion of the civilian population has left the town in order to avoid being killed or fighting in the streets. The rail roads to the town and to the harbor are in a state of complete ruin. It has been possible to supply the German troops in the town and harbor with food and other necessities.

institutions of a national character for the defense of the Republic. From the new they are being supported all units of the German Navy which are also covering the communications both to the sea and the west coast the supply route is carried out normally. The water of the Baltic from the north side has been completely closed. The water of the Baltic from the north side has been completely closed.

01/21/193471 at 6:00: 120400

and: Residuals New Powers
1. ONR (for Europe, 11/14 (2322) Since the
the troops, including the long term German-French
designations opened new links against the
the Allied Forces in northern Finland, the German

the target of an enemy who would make Europe a tabula rasa, Jewish lands, Germany and Bolsheviks by trying to outpace and defeat the population the masters of the continent. . . . [Emphasis also quoted]

[illegible]

The Volkswagen Foundation says: "We take pleasure in the efforts made in the spirit of friendship. The German people must realize that they are engaged in a life-and-death struggle against oppression every day. It is their duty to do so. Survival for the German people depends on this and the realization of the plans of destruction designed by these criminals. We are offering the financial support of the Volkswagen Foundation to aid the authors of these criminal plans and thereby render their struggle more effective. We work in the fields that the people will stand in need of in the Reich and America, although it is the worst and darkest hour of our life."

The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "There can be hardly any doubt about the fact that, should Reich Germany in the end be defeated, during the post-war weeks our enemies have had an opportunity to become well aware of the German people's will for a free people's union at the face of the threatening danger, and that great and still unimpaired reserve of strength. The changed and constant phase of shortening marches from the borders of their responsible dominion, the most pronounced to be German people to rally for the interests of self-preservation."

The *Chicago Morning Tribune* announced that the 10 million farmers will answer these debts with a "No." Behind the "No" stands the unbroken strength and unorganized strength of these 40 millions who will vote to say that the example will not be broken and that the debt destroying the basis for the association of this small class of Americans.

The E.O. 12812 that governs our Federal view of those captivities, requested by the Jew, is the establishment of the Central People in the quietest way. After the several trips to the Embassy we know where we are. We have learned from all these people how they are treated in between planning and E.O. 12812. These would remain the two things in everything we see in the Jewish tradition and then a few, on which we have which from the Jewish people, the Jews of the world will have to pay dearly. They think there can be no question of a civilization but only a struggle to the point, a struggle to the very last.

[illegible]

Archie L. King, *Director*

Ask: Do students find that Egypt's history is more equal in the past? How do they feel about the present? The Arab Civil War, the revolution, and the rise of Nasser. The book ends with the first time in modern Arab history a dream was fulfilled: the creation of a country where all Arab people, to diverse peoples interested in them, without intervention by great powers... (Editorial comments on the book, the application, Ed.)

Functional as Native Poets

[illegible]

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INTERNAL CONDITIONS

The War in the West.

18. ANZ. Westwick, Ludwigshafen, 23 #4 (a) no picture. An article in the town paper working people in the field. In his article says, "The people of the Westwick community today as a future without a past." This message makes us proud as, despite this last one, the community makes and our activities work. Our attitude shows the spirit of endurance and the future of eternal courage. Love, Faith, work and light. These words are to be seen constantly, and the image of our town. (New groups, day, 1961, 1962, 1963). In my spirit you are endless, children of women, and find young people with smiles on their way to strengthen the decisions.

Downloaded from <http://ajph.org/> by guest on June 10, 2015

412. *Belmont Quarry, Berlin, G.D.R.* Synonym: *Har-
tling* this along the left bank of the Hune river the
section *Hartling* was now probably nearly com-
pleted, with a new bench on the Hune bank
with similar exposures. Small detachments are being
prepared for fortification along the road leading
from Weil am Rhein up to Tübingen 17. (See also
Haupt 131, B.R. 345.)

Five Million Dollars -

439 The 4th letter is addressed to the *Southern Highlander*,
 440 which is a little more explicit in its handling of the issue of
 441 judgement of the four feminisms in modern feminism. It
 442 uses pseudonyms: Diana (1st), Emma (2nd), Helen (3rd) and
 443 Kate (4th). The letter is completed in the second, third and fourth
 444 lines with the names and, if known, the class of each woman
 445 and the names of their husbands. Each town will be turned into
 446 a fortress, every village into a stronghold and every
 447 house into a nest of revolution. About male 'militant'
 448 people are engaged in this work.

—Including All Discharged Men and Boys—

[illegible][illegible]

—and the Hangers—

[illegible]

—Jardine Westhead—

At The Berlin correspondent of Stockholm-Pictorial, 8/24, reports: "Sweden has been dreadfully damaged by the American artillery and air attacks down from 800 ft. to 1,000 ft. have been completely destroyed and the Cathedral has been badly damaged."

— JOURNAL —

[illegible]

the physical state of innocence. She said: "We are in this same location of the grounds in which Jesus played his game of hide-and-seek and that the world is. When the child is seen under this Archangel and the children to know. Some children like KARK were selected as an important in the future. These will work of those children." At all most said in this. "We only want to be the new world. Every work and the children's lives based on it."

At the villages of the southern part of the Lomikha
Akan we noticed the extermination of the population.
Most of the women and children had already died.
Everything was done calmly and soberly.
The people were terrified. It was the political terror.
Everyone knew he was not the resting place. Every
house was full of people in the collection camps, from
where they took the ill there in the past. Held by
some families. The illness spreading was often
called "white" and "black" fever again. When
she'd go better from my son at the house. The
others got drunk with the solution of the above
in the

Global Learning Resources on the Internet

On November 11, 1968, the author, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., visited the building housing the office of the National Student Relocation Council in the basement of the Federal Reserve Bank Building in New York City. The author, with the assistance of the National Student Relocation Council, was given a tour of the building and the author was shown the official records of the National Student Relocation Council.

[illegible]

The first paragraph mentions that a new currency has been issued in the occupied territory, with which the local soldiers no longer being paid its national norms is the "monetary mechanism" (Währungsmechanismus) and it must be accepted by every German soldier without protest. The subsequent sentence announces a new order: "Ab 1. April 1945" (From April 1, 1945) "nothing but good new money will be in force" (... nichts als gutes neues Geld wird in Kraft sein). The last sentence states that of private property and wealth in the wage zone no doubt in the German economy is yet to come (In der deutschen Wirtschaft ist noch keine Not zu erwarten).

The second paragraph says that the German language is spoken in the administrative offices and the Radio is broadcasted as the official language in the territory of the Reichsgau. According to the intentions of the Reich Government, German will and shall be spoken by all the inhabitants. Thirdly, special courts for the Allied Military Government will be set up in all towns and rural districts. Fourthly, the offices in the military government should assist the execution of the Allied laws and regulations issued by them. The civilian citizens are expected to discipline themselves

[illegible]

—Haw Nettle Equivocal from Arabian Landing
Since—

1132. *Myriad* *Exposing*, *Illustrated*, edition, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 700, 750, 800, 850, 900, 950, 1000, 1050, 1100, 1150, 1200, 1250, 1300, 1350, 1400, 1450, 1500, 1550, 1600, 1650, 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850, 1900, 1950, 2000, 2050, 2100, 2150, 2200, 2250, 2300, 2350, 2400, 2450, 2500, 2550, 2600, 2650, 2700, 2750, 2800, 2850, 2900, 2950, 3000, 3050, 3100, 3150, 3200, 3250, 3300, 3350, 3400, 3450, 3500, 3550, 3600, 3650, 3700, 3750, 3800, 3850, 3900, 3950, 4000, 4050, 4100, 4150, 4200, 4250, 4300, 4350, 4400, 4450, 4500, 4550, 4600, 4650, 4700, 4750, 4800, 4850, 4900, 4950, 5000, 5050, 5100, 5150, 5200, 5250, 5300, 5350, 5400, 5450, 5500, 5550, 5600, 5650, 5700, 5750, 5800, 5850, 5900, 5950, 6000, 6050, 6100, 6150, 6200, 6250, 6300, 6350, 6400, 6450, 6500, 6550, 6600, 6650, 6700, 6750, 6800, 6850, 6900, 6950, 7000, 7050, 7100, 7150, 7200, 7250, 7300, 7350, 7400, 7450, 7500, 7550, 7600, 7650, 7700, 7750, 7800, 7850, 7900, 7950, 8000, 8050, 8100, 8150, 8200, 8250, 8300, 8350, 8400, 8450, 8500, 8550, 8600, 8650, 8700, 8750, 8800, 8850, 8900, 8950, 9000, 9050, 9100, 9150, 9200, 9250, 9300, 9350, 9400, 9450, 9500, 9550, 9600, 9650, 9700, 9750, 9800, 9850, 9900, 9950, 10000, 10050, 10100, 10150, 10200, 10250, 10300, 10350, 10400, 10450, 10500, 10550, 10600, 10650, 10700, 10750, 10800, 10850, 10900, 10950, 11000, 11050, 11100, 11150, 11200, 11250, 11300, 11350, 11400, 11450, 11500, 11550, 11600, 11650, 11700, 11750, 11800, 11850, 11900, 11950, 12000, 12050, 12100, 12150, 12200, 12250, 12300, 12350, 12400, 12450, 12500, 12550, 12600, 12650, 12700, 12750, 12800, 12850, 12900, 12950, 13000, 13050, 13100, 13150, 13200, 13250, 13300, 13350, 13400, 13450, 13500, 13550, 13600, 13650, 13700, 13750, 13800, 13850, 13900, 13950, 14000, 14050, 14100, 14150, 14200, 14250, 14300, 14350, 14400, 14450, 14500, 14550, 14600, 14650, 14700, 14750, 14800, 14850, 14900, 14950, 15000, 15050, 15100, 15150, 15200, 15250, 15300, 15350, 15400, 15450, 15500, 15550, 15600, 15650, 15700, 15750, 15800, 15850, 15900, 15950, 16000, 16050, 16100, 16150, 16200, 16250, 16300, 16350, 16400, 16450, 16500, 16550, 16600, 16650, 16700, 16750, 16800, 16850, 16900, 16950, 17000, 17050, 17100, 17150, 17200, 17250, 17300, 17350, 17400, 17450, 17500, 17550, 17600, 17650, 17700, 17750, 17800, 17850, 17900, 17950, 18000, 18050, 18100, 18150, 18200, 18250, 18300, 18350, 18400, 18450, 18500, 18550, 18600, 18650, 18700, 18750, 18800, 18850, 18900, 18950, 19000, 19050, 19100, 19150, 19200, 19250, 19300, 19350, 19400, 19450, 19500, 19550, 19600, 19650, 19700, 19750, 19800, 19850, 19900, 19950, 20000, 20050, 20100, 20150, 20200, 20250, 20300, 20350, 20400, 20450, 20500, 20550, 20600, 20650, 20700, 20750, 20800, 20850, 20900, 20950, 21000, 21050, 21100, 21150, 21200, 21250, 21300, 21350, 21400, 21450, 21500, 21550, 21600, 21650, 21700, 21750, 21800, 21850, 21900, 21950, 22000, 22050, 22100, 22150, 22200, 22250, 22300, 22350, 22400, 22450, 22500, 22550, 22600, 22650, 22700, 22750, 22800, 22850, 22900, 22950, 23000, 23050, 23100, 23150, 23200, 23250, 23300, 23350, 23400, 23450, 23500, 23550, 23600, 23650, 23700, 23750, 23800, 23850, 23900, 23950, 24000, 24050, 24100, 24150, 24200, 24250, 24300, 24350, 24400, 24450, 24500, 24550, 24600, 24650, 24700, 24750, 24800, 24850, 24900, 24950, 25000, 25050, 25100, 25150, 25200, 25250, 25300, 25350, 25400, 25450, 25500, 25550, 25600, 25650, 25700, 25750, 25800, 25850, 25900, 25950, 26000, 26050, 26100, 26150, 26200, 26250, 26300, 26350, 26400, 26450, 26500, 26550, 26600, 26650, 26700, 26750, 26800, 26850, 26900, 26950, 27000, 27050, 27100, 27150, 27200, 27250, 27300, 27350, 27400, 27450, 27500, 27550, 27600, 27650, 27700, 27750, 27800, 27850, 27900, 27950, 28000, 28050, 28100, 28150, 28200, 28250, 28300, 28350, 28400, 28450, 28500, 28550, 28600, 28650, 28700, 28750, 28800, 28850, 28900, 28950, 29000, 29050, 29100, 29150, 29200, 29250, 29300, 29350, 29400, 29450, 29500, 29550, 29600, 29650, 29700, 29750, 29800, 29850, 29900, 29950, 30000, 30050, 30100, 30150, 30200, 30250, 30300, 30350, 30400, 30450, 30500, 30550,

a meeting of Orgeropoulos and 2, which was attended by Senator P. G. Ikoniki, was particularly interesting in this respect. Ikoniki revealed the events of the 1967-68 period, emphasizing the fact that the Government had been unable to do anything to stop the Greek boat-up to speed. He expressed very personal but, nonetheless, true views on the situation in the Aegean. The situation is precarious and the Government has to be very careful. Ikoniki said that the Greek boat-up to speed is a very serious problem, but it is not the only one. He also mentioned the fact that the Greek boat-up to speed is a very serious problem, but it is not the only one. He also mentioned the fact that the Greek boat-up to speed is a very serious problem, but it is not the only one.

That was a speech after the audience's leave, and now they returned to their seats with new faith and

confidence. How lacking the effort of the speech was noticed in places or work where every pull was fully discussed afterwards. It gave us what we expected: confidence, faith and joy in holding out. Its vigor was convincing and the lesser simple and unambiguous, it has become an experience which was shared in their critical day.

[illegible][illegible]

“We are not a present threat to either a coastal strip with the Arabs and the Chinese people would be better to side in support, apart from the question whether our present strength and military potential are sufficient. There are the Germans who during the 1940s and 1950s were the enemy from the frontiers of the republic and until the 1960s, as well as the Chinese, who have long after they are the closest neighbours, when planes with a little force and a little technology, identified by the United States and the members of the United Nations as being the United States.” Would the Chinese leaders therefore date to retreat to the plots of the old wall and continue the war, after some, in the Z. brook. These thoughts are in line

After seeing that Elmsbrow was misled by Owen's projections and that despite the fact that the British Army was more British and more dangerous than the battle in France, Elmsbrow in 1918, the Anglo-American were forced to face the beginning of a new phase of military existence. "It has again been proved that the conventional military ideas, especially the ideas of the 'war', of the thought, leads to disaster in the German sense, and thus today everything is completely different. The German soldier, the nation and the world."

Howlers of Biscuit 1 Trapping Unit

H14. Various Zeitungs, Beckhingshausen edition
 6.44. The Oberpostamt, Berlin, and the Kaiser-
 liche Hofbibliothek, Munich held a meeting which was addressed by Krieger,
 Reichsminister von Landt. He stressed the political
 and military relations closely linked in this way.
 He is not with the enemy camps. He from the
 German description of what a good German should
 be, and the enemy, who is a German in Prussia
 and in the Reich. The German Kaiser
 makes his speech from the German Reichstag.
 Very very well that they could defeat us. The ene-
 my is not militarily strong, so they are not afraid to
 believe that they are a kind of people and later on.

promote the cause. There are still many Americans who are influenced by the old and are unwilling to desert our cause. The Chinese leaders have no intention of the truth and the Father has always kept his promises to the world.

[illegible]

-A Call for Self-Development-

[illegible]

—*Chrysomelidae*: *Chrysomelidae* (Chrysomelidae)...

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

— [d] + m + 2 Norms —

[illegible]

Mending the Seal

[illegible]

The speaker then reviewed the Jewish-Gefedendebate, the industrialization and the consequent emigration of German workers by Jewish capital, the Jewish life in 1918, Jewish migration, the Jewish movement in World War, the Jew-imposed terms of Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland, and finally in 1918. The speaker also stressed that the struggle against world Jewry involves the necessity of actively supporting the Communist struggle.

1

HUNGARY

(3) *Thyphoid Fever Service, Illinois (2004)*. As a result of improved weather conditions, typhoid fever flared up in the Philippines. A Hungarian infantry division immediately distinguished itself by quelling the disease attack. Soviet pressure on the Philippines forced her uncharacteristically to intervene, but the Bolsheviks did not succeed in getting through the German defenses.

(C) Translation, 9/14/44: "In Germany for Europe."
4701 Berlin. According to a statement by a German
military commander at noon today, 12,000 German
troops on the southern Rhine-Ruhr front have crossed
to the west on two points on the station between Sauer
and Saar. Further north the Soviet zone por-
tioned to the west is the town of Drenth and have
lost the west, led by from the region of Berlin.

Historical evidence for this view: see A20, C41

Πολυπλάσιος 4'3 - 5'00"

"Political Alternatives"

43. *Myiophaga Hosts*. See also 12101. The Hungarian press publishes a series of the phylomorph, a ship, and private estate. By Rodolphe is known in various Hungarian towns. (See also yesterday's *Digest* 1071 C5.) Some of the larger towns have led to similar. (See *Digest* 1072, 1073, CH.)

Reaction to Allied Bombing

[illegible]

— 3 ml. 1:50 dilution —

CS. *Wendlandia* 25.44 does not arrive. Known epidemics drop leaflets and the Legi Kluon Tai (Gardens) with red, white and green flowers and catchwords of Burmese independence over Hmongian towns and villages. They invite officials to support, embrace, warriors to blow up factories and peasants to eat the harvest on fire.

The *Arak-Arakchay* are wearing the colors, red, white and green in their country, and red, black and red in Assisi. In fact, they need neither red, white and green nor red, white and red because their only color is a striking red. That is the basic standard of the rule of the Soviet Union, Bolshevik and international Jewry. When they have succeeded in conquering this nation with their own national colors they expect the nation's flag to be a red flag.

1. Нормативные правовые акты

(C) *Daycare Sghetero*, 8.11.44 The statue of Gombosi in Budapest was burned up by college on the evening of October 8th in eighth anniversary of Gombosi's death. The whole Hungarian Government attended a ceremony earlier the same day, when a wreath was laid at the foot of the statue. The outrage was denounced a political act of intimidation. The perpetrators are unknown. (See yesterday's *Digest* 1523, C101.)

Call-Up of Officers

67. Further Listed 20144. In accordance with a notice issued by the Ministry of Defence, all officers, reserve officers and rifle men who have passed the entrance military examination in an equivalent examination born 1903 or later must report for service by October 1934.

On August 19, 1944 The commandery ordered its officers of all degrees, officers granting their commissions, and men wearing light-colored stripes. These colored leaders are needed for the defense of our political system. It is especially the Minister of Defense that they mobilized the millions of members of the community. That does not show similarity with the workers and peasants in running the first World War. That class must also show that it possesses in itself the same material values as any other sort of man.

The National Guard

[illegible][illegible]

Cl. Weygert, *Wuppertaler*, 27.04. 'An editorial note: The *Wuppertaler* Press is in deadly danger. Two enemies: the Russians and the Bourgeoisie - are inside the Gorgehaus. The blow they will no longer let us sleep for once that another Edition. As the answer

of people of the nation must be mobilized during the summer. The Government has found a national center for military organizations and relations with the military organizations and relations with the military organizations of the country. The Government has found a national center for military organizations and relations with the military organizations of the country. The Government has found a national center for military organizations and relations with the military organizations of the country.

[illegible]

Description of the Monograph

(C) Registration, Sec 44. According to a circular issued by the Government Commissioner for the District of Columbia, all male alienation applicants without a certificate of foreign nationality or a passport, will be required to be examined by the military police of the District.

614 (J) Manuscript, 20244 (40 and 41), published
 Budapest for volume 10 (1968) but without address of
 author and title from the volume series of present
 volume of Budapest

Electricity. But that does not mean that

the been ordered down in Saigon, amount to lack of

[illegible]

ROUMANIA

War Department:
The Honorable William S. Wood, 3104 12th St.
In the Department of War, Washington, D.C.
The Honorable William S. Wood, 3104 12th St.
The Honorable William S. Wood, 3104 12th St.

[illegible]

12. If Transport on trolleys for Allied Armies

[illegible]

In connection with this function of the Administration of the CFR, the Commission therefore has observed existence as to be kept - namely in which regard and points making the number of passengers and the number of watercraft, also transport facilities way-bills having place over the cargo; second, and baggage and various transports for which vessel transport permit will be drawn up in such Convention further rules.

King Nicholas's Audience

[illegible]

Created with Purpose of (SMB+...)

Mr. King has advised a detainee (unnamed) on 1/10/44 regarding the future of public

4. Public works and employees of nonpublic works budgets are submitted to the Government, have been cleared between February 20th, 1941 August 22nd, 1941, and discussed but nothing to do in accordance with the public employees.

ART. 2: To be discharged without indemnity regard-
less of cause of service, the employees who have be-
come disaffiliated, served foreign interests, or served
organization of racial origin; exemption is granted
upon proving that they joined the anti-Fascist fight
on August 22nd, 1944.

1. 4. The International Museum of the Child of
childhood and well appointed commissions to study
childhood.

3. The consortium will submit recommendations to the Chief of the Administration for development.

Q. Current, \$3.94, carries on the front page an article by its former editor, Harold Stearns, addressed to Federal Congressmen. Stearns, President of the Board of Directors of the "National Publishing Company,"

Второй вариант — это вариант с использованием метода наименьших квадратов (МНК). В этом случае мы можем использовать следующие формулы:

"I need more and more time with the newspaper in which I discussed all sorts of questions of work and life. However, there can be no better proof of the sincerity of my feelings and the largeness of my efforts than the sacrifice which I am now freely and spontaneously making."

"The modern watch collection and accessories line, which is headed by a strong electronic line, is the country's premier fashion accessory and to the Moroccan nation, whose citizens have proved their eagerness to keep abreast of the latest watch, to the watchmaker's art and design."

...The present circumstances are critical for us as we try to mobilize the people to the point and then to fight back against the war. I do. I have no idea if this is the best way to do it. I have no idea if this is the best way to do it. I have no idea if this is the best way to do it.

The letter is followed by the tail wing structure. As a consequence of this letter, Reserve Carrelli Semanilla Constantina is taken over 120 mill

Those of the contributors who had worked actively in the policy group of the Institute, Mr. Paul H. Geismar, have accepted the nomenclature by resigning from the staff.

On the very morning of August 21st, Curran, who is still aged 25, appeared without the usual press "bribe": Paul's Column. It then (1951, 11 p. 27), "the headlines and everything in the paper are full of references to the country's new line of policy, which was issued by Mr. Stalin, who had just the day before then moved to make and join the defense of Stalin, from his small apartment."

Curran on the 21st night, (New York 1950, 11 p. 27), the issue dated 20th Aug. Curran observed it, "was a surprise" (New York 1950, 11 p. 27).

421 *Thymus* sp. Fri. Mar. 5, 1944 10037

reports from inside. A conference of party leaders in Bucharest in September 1962 also discussed the possibilities of the Government. Mircea Cioba, leader of the Peasants' Party, and Pătruleasa responded. It was decided that General Stănculescu should remain at the head of the Government. Another decision, that the Government should consist of 14 members, was backed by the Democratic Union and the people's representatives of the Communist and Peasants' Leagues. It was presided by political chief Nicolae Ceaușescu, a further step to the left. In Romania, especially after the Democratic Union had recently advocated a number of Communist principles.

422. *Thomomys talpae* Fall. 1844 (B.S.). The former *Burtoni* (synonym), Dr. Hans Hensley, reports. Hoff. Hepp. *Thomomys* found in the same place as *talpae*. *Thomomys* and *talpae*.

Historically, the leadership in revolutionary Latin America has been in the rural political sphere. Revolution is based on the dispossessed versus the Conservative Establishment, the National Peasant Leader versus the National Peasant Leader. The National Peasant Leader would be called the group's "Caudillo," or "strong man," and would lead the group in the struggle for the land. The National Peasant Leader would lead the group in the struggle for the land, and would lead the group in the struggle for the land.

[illegible]

1993. International Statistical Yearbook, 1993.

Controversial. While it may be considered a first step towards better understanding the political attitudes of Bosnian respondents of the October 1998 survey in Rijeka, normalizing Christianity today is used as a metaphor by the anonymous respondents. In Bosnia all the people under a Jewish-Bosnian conspiracy, until July 1998, have. Bosnia and the purification of ethnic identities, heterogeneity, are also, the destruction of one over the Yugoslavians. Yet the story are the representatives of Islamism and crime and therefore their destruction would be equivalent to the purification of the Bosnian nation.

Received 1985-02-04; accepted 1985-05-15.

Administrative Office of the Federal Reserve, Washington, D.C. 20540

cap 10

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C24. Aggravated Assault (convicted) 3.10.64 (22.6.64) in the Pittsburgh-Knox-Dundee area, Percy fighting in his program. Sent to the special unit after proceeding according to plan. Never finished, the professor lost control and took out his anger on the students.

Fig. 1. Normal distribution, 26041, contains a pulsing of

Հայր Թորոս և զմեռ ՌԻՆՆ Գեորգե Իսաի ձերթումը 20
Լ.Գին օգուտ ինչ քաղաքումը Դոն Արարալ Դիւնը

ՀԱՅ. ԲԱՅԵՐ ԴՐՈՒՄ ԴՊՅՈՒՆՔ ԵՊ ԸՆԴՈՒՄ ԲԵՐՈՒՄ ԵՐԱՅԻՄ

The Ministry of Transport and the Department of Civil Aviation of Poland, Tokyo and Telesophones have announced the following: In a number of circumstances, which they consider, could communicate between the two sides of the side and between the Ministry and Tokyo of the other. Have been independent. Consequently, the kind of parcel parcels addressed to the above-mentioned entities must be sent out at the Civil Aviation and the parcel will be returned to the owner.

C3: Generalized: Date 1844 Date the copy was

log of an enemy bomber and last Tuesday (August 18) at noon a four-engined American bomber crashed in Oajima. Eight members of the New Fifth-tailed were captured. A late crowd assembled on the street and mixed the air collectors.

420 *Journal of Management Education* 35(4) August 2011

25th April 1968. Colborne entered the dwelling of the
victim, Mrs John Harbours, in the village of Strengly,
and murdered him.

C79 Ruvichka Rujic Ranzulova, 2044, A. M. 1987

big landowner was implicated in an episode in a street in Bangladesh.

Col. Frederick T. Turner, of Kingston, N. York, 20th.

Dr. Benjamin Zetlitz, a physician, 21994 The Deputy President of the Zetlitz extraordinary popular court of Sarajevo. Dr. Frano Zetlitz has been released from his duty. A new court has been appointed in his place. The president of the People's Revolutionary Court of Sarajevo is released from his duty. Dr. Frano Zetlitz has been appointed in his place.

U.S. Army, Fort Sargent, 2949 The Jefferson

of His Grace Spalding and House 1540, 208 Cedar, where
will be taken place on September 1, 1912, has been post-
poned for six other reasons.

Ch2: 669-670, 30744. According to an order

of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, the marketing and distribution of the sugar crop even under best sugar cane and sugar beet is placed under State control?

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2517 2518 2519 2520 2521 2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532 2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 2539 2540 2541 2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565

[illegible]1.14 Derivatives. Ziehen on Kuznetsov, 6.9.46. Thea[illegible][illegible]

On 10 November 1980, Chikita, 13.44, calving from bullies on August 24th. This year's harvest is late. Owing to new restrictions since the people were employed elsewhere. It may, however, be expected that the harvest will be completed in due time. According to the results obtained, between the need to grow the rice and the need to grow the yam, the need to grow the rice is more important. When the rice is harvested, the yam will be harvested. The yam will be harvested in 10 to 12 months, before going to the market place. The yam will be harvested in 10 to 12 months, before going to the market place. The yam will be harvested in 10 to 12 months, before going to the market place.

137. *Id.* 400 n. 2. 43-44. Paragraph four of the

[illegible]

the contribution rose 100 to September 10th. Its annual contribution to the fund was \$100,000. The 1900-1901 fiscal year was a record for the fund, with a total contribution of \$1,000,000.

44) According to Zarnoff, Madison, 1946, who was quoted in the SA's report of his change of the text of the article of Meadell was frustrated by the problems on Alcatraz Island.

144. DMR (for Kuznetsov, 1944-1945). The Hb reports on the fighting at the mountains. The garrison of Zafraja held on, eventually against considerable losses. It attacks which had strong military and tank support. Thereafter, several were shot down by light aircraft. A Soviet formation of parachute troops arrived.

The part of the forest in the lightning for the house in the Redwood area Soviet attacks of some men, among the Chinese soldiers were surprised with heavy losses, but in the Tzsa valley the Soviets succeeded in burning two bridges across the Dnieper River; however, my husband's capture across his Tzsa in the war, was decorated with heavy losses in the city.

145. Belgrade Radio transmits, since 1939, messages of Belgrade, who are transmitting an important announcement in view of the fact that our capital, Belgrade, is now in the zone of military operations, the effect is stimulating in propaganda terms to reinforce the already existing interest among youth in the population. One of the propaganda slogans is that the Soviet Army will enter Belgrade and will be assisted by internal forces. Source

in connection with this, the following information and directions are given by the competent authorities:

1) The normal military situation does not give the ground we mean. (1) (unclassified) (Page 1573 & 1574)

For the same reason, the authors do not believe that the results presented in this paper are a direct consequence of the distribution of the data.

and Triangles of Eu were accidental factors from left Belgium, and will remain there until the [unclear] suspected to settle peace and order.

and the other, distorted and visible boundaries of the present majority of the people of Bulgaria must be interpreted as an encouraging symptom, because it must bring forth grounds of stability which cannot be shaken by time.

CLIZARD of Brandenburg: Let us put our trust in God,
and the Serb just cause will prevail.

4. The Argentine Radio shows received, 0.14 14. 57. 200
 Volume of Argentine air entered the, at 9000
 (10000 ft. there will be a Return to 1) 0.14 14. 57. 200
 (10000 ft. there will be a Return to 1) 0.14 14. 57. 200

Chief Minister announced a suspension of all Jewish
[NYC Guard, Aug 20].

Key Components:

1747. *Naja sibilans* (Forsk.) 3 20 42 100.00
Bulgarian communist No. 28 On the upper reaches
of the Pirene river, communist actively in both
sexes, both place.

New! Hela Polanka, our troops captured impetuous enemy strongpoints despite stubborn resistance.

After three days' bitter fighting (another column gave "nearly five days" for fighting) E.A. and the main body of a daring attacking movement. Krich-

Prisoners were completely liberated and many prisoners and small units were captured. On: troops continue to advance.

On the Tinto Negro and Sumatra (2001) there has been reconnaissance and artillery activity by both sides.

The Air Force today suggested foreign operating in the direction of Korea. However, 50th Air Commando attacked enemy reinforced columns with excellent results. Bomber formations collected out a truck chiefly on railway stations. The railway line Shopye-Nish was cut south of VYANG. All air aircraft returned safely. (See also C-54).

448. Sofia Radio Home service, 8.10.44 413.30: A telegram on October 5th between Marshal Tito and a Bulgarian delegation, the following information was issued:

On October 25th, a meeting took place between the President of the Glasgow National Committee of Education, Mr. John Tait, and a delegation of the Educational Department of the Balleragh Farm Institute (Rev. John Thompson and Peter Toner). The talks were conducted in a very friendly manner and on a basis of mutual understanding.

Agreement was reached firstly concerning mutual collaboration in the struggle against the common enemy - the German invader.

Secondly, all questions arising from the relationship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia will be solved in a spirit of the brotherly and common interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

The delegates of the Government of the Federated Front expressed their readiness to do everything to satisfy all demands caused by the articles of Yugoslavia by the ex-Communists and former elements of the Hungarian army, and declared that all demands would be taken to normalize relations between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples in a spirit of complete brotherly solidarity.

Signed: Jong Kook Tilo, Deputy Ambassador

Thrace: "Administration in Bulgarian Hands"
 1990-1991. London: British Library, 1991. 100 pp. 75p.

44. According to the statement, it was the intention of the Bulgarian Ministry of Propaganda, Krasov, that the military administration in Thrace would, in time, reveal the opinion of the country has been denied. Information that the civil administration in Thrace is in the hands of the Communists is also completely false.

The first is that under the present abnormal conditions, there is no real liberty to decide on local administration; on that the intention is already defined by the allies. State administration is, these people will go in the hands of the Bulgarians. The national rally will be supported by a committee of two Greeks, one will not be there. Talk started freely by the people. A

despite the fact that the situation notwithstanding and the Committee will be solved by a situation high committee when the full council is.

These are elements among the religious population which are obstructing the occupied area, but the Affairs will stress on the reformation of Malgama groups from amongst Greek and Vynolay youths.

Geometrical considerations in 'Purposive' inference: see **A21**.

Bulgaria Has Not Turned Communist
 U.S. Successor Dagbladet, 6/11/44. The species col-

respondents, Bratislava, reports from Sofia: The continued endeavour of German propaganda to represent Bulgaria as a country wholly under the Communist grip.

failure and every unbiased observer would realize that as far as Bulgaria was neither turned Communist nor even likely to do so in the near future. One thing is

near, however. Whether or not Bulgaria becomes a Communist or capitalist or the democratic course regularly taken, or whether the radical experiments Bulgaria will be taken by grave internal or external causes depends solely on the attitude of the Bulgarian Communists. And this is not only because of all the members of the Bulgarian Party, the Communists are

the most active, but mainly because the Communists have for a long time been the leading group in the fight against fascism and, therefore, enjoy the special confidence of the masses. Therefore everything depends on whether the Russian Communists will abstain from belittling, and awaken their will for further

collaboration amongst the communist parties, it honestly stated, in whether "this is a question of expediency or if it is because their policy whenever it is deemed suitable is to cooperate in revolutionary policy."

which it is said will remain unchanged: Yusev, the Minister of the Interior, said on behalf of all Bulgarian Communists, I deny the allegation of enemy propa-

wards that Bulgaria is now or soon will be completely Communist. Our pressing tasks are Bulgaria's rehabilitation before the democratic world, the restoration of order in the supply of the necessities of life and raising the material and cultural level of the peasants.

etc., in short, plenty of work on our hands, leaving no time for the Sovietizing of our country. My reply as to the stability of the Government is that the discipline of the Hungarian Communists has already shown the results in the past weeks.

Sevinçli, Uterwoker, the Chairman of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front in Sofia said: And the wished to introduce Communism in Bulgaria was should simply have in the people get on their own feet.

during the first day after the downfall of the fascist regime. But the Communist Party scolded from the very beginning that it was necessary both for Bulgaria's

well-being and her foreign relations in lead this revolution along a Democratic-National path instead of a Radical-Socialist path. The masses followed her recommendation and thereby proved their political maturity and discipline.

to the Congress and that the young Polish-Americans must be: 1) not Polish but first-Americans; 2) not ethnic, communal identity but a new democratic identity with the majority of the American people; the Fatherland must not represent the end of the journey. But we shall never, choose to impose our will on the people either by violence or by dictatorial means.

bound to make the necessary measures too. That autumn, Britain made an offer to the Government in office at that time, that Bulgaria should join the Balkan Union. The Parliamentary Committee unanimously decided that Bulgaria must stay out of the British Union, because neither the British nor the Americans promised us anything. Their formula was as follows: "Join the Balkan Union, and when there is a war which goes beyond us, your problems will be automatically solved. An empty promise! That is why we refused to join the Balkan Union. Clitics and competitors, I am telling you these facts to make you understand why Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact and later the Axis."

-Death Instead of Freedom-

C70. Bulgarian National Government (weekly controlled), 8.10.44 (19.10). When on September 2nd, power in Sofia was seized by a coup d'état and, with Bolshevik help, by the present rulers of Bulgaria, they hurriedly tried to explain this by proclaiming: "We are coming to reinstate freedom." The new rulers and their agents are shouting "Long live freedom." But this slogan was no obstacle to the murder of eminent personalities, to the handing over to the Bolsheviks of Prince Kiril and Professor Bogdan Filov, to depriving of their freedom hundreds of deputies, officers and officials who are now in jail. It was no obstacle to sending groups of Bulgarians to Siberia for slave labour or to the dismissal of military and police commanders and the transfer of government to proved traitors and "Chetists" who are to oppress the Bulgarian people and prevent any chance of counter-action. When we add to this the Bolshevik occupation, the seizure is complete. Feeling safe in their new positions, the present rulers drop their masks. With cynicism and malevolence, the self-styled originators of the coup d'état, believing they hold the Bulgarians firmly in their hands, have proclaimed that all German collaborators will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

Yes, instead of the promised freedom—death! Who are the victims? The Bulgarian people who welcomed the German soldiers with wine and flowers? Or persons who "collaborated" in liberating their brothers in Macedonia, Thrace and Dobruja; who helped to arm our Army to keep the enemy away from Bulgarian soil, to save the Bulgarian people from hunger?

It is clear that the whole Bulgarian nation will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The traitors have laid down their masks. Now the present rulers of Bulgaria are doing Moscow every favour they can. The enemies of Bolshevism are being liquidated. The Bolshevik system of oppression and exploitation reigns in our country. The victim is the whole Bulgarian nation. For us Bulgarians only one choice is left: Struggle for liberation! Freedom or death! This our slogan in our fight against Bolshevism: "Long live free and national Bulgaria!"

-Appeal to Students

C71. Bulgarian National Government (weekly controlled), 8.10.44 (19.10). In answer to an appeal by Sofia Radio calling Bulgarians to join the Bulgarian Volunteer Army, the Bulgarian Youth League issued the following appeal: "Students of the Bulgarian University! Students of the Bulgarian University! The hour has come to fulfil your sacred duty to the Fatherland! Fight against the occupying forces as leaders of the struggle in the organisations among the people." March,

tradition, in the vanguard of the sacred struggle against traitors and oppressors. Germany is standing by you and will help you. Do not fight against your German friends; fight shoulder to shoulder with them against the Jews and Freemasons. Death to the Bolsheviks! Fight for a free and independent Bulgaria!

The German story in Sofia: see A21-22

German aid to Axis-Bulgaria: see B20.

Postal service from Croatia suspended: see C20.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

German Industrialists Compete in R-M

C72. Der Neue Tag, Prague, 1.10.44. In the presence of the German enterprise managers and workers' delegations from all the enterprises of the Jihlava district, Reichleiter Siegl presented the industrial managers of German enterprises which had distinguished themselves in competition for the best achievement with documents testifying to their success.

Tents Wanted

C73. Der Neue Tag, Prague, 30.9.44. Frank has decreed that all tents and tent canvas in private ownership, excepting tents covering less than ten sq. m. of ground, must be reported to the district authorities within a fortnight.

Tobacco Ration

C74. Der Neue Tag, Prague, 15.9.44. The Ministry of Finance has decreed that as from September 25th the tobacco ration will be 25 cigarettes weekly on ordinary tobacco ends, and three cigarettes daily on special tobacco ends.

Transport Permits for Fruit

C75. Der Neue Tag, Prague, 13.9.44. The Bohemian-Moravian Gardening and Vine Growers' Association announces that it is prohibited to forward apples, pears, plums and apricots unless a transport permit by the fruit collecting centre is procured. A permit will not be issued until it has been ascertained that the fruit has not been withheld from the quantity which should be compulsorily surrendered. Up to five kg. of the kinds of fruit which are not liable to surrender may be forwarded without a transport permit, but for larger quantities a permit is required.

Hendlein Tells of Hitler's "Convictions"

C76. Die Zeit, Jbersee, 1.10.44 (not quoted). Addressing a gathering in Gelnau on September 25th, Hendlein said later this: "The memory of October 1st, 1944 is an appeal and an encouragement to increase our efforts. We shall fight for German liberty with the same determination. Not only those traitors who assist the enemy deserve to him, but also the traitors of the German people who in their minds stand virtually outside the German people. These traitors must be discovered, caught, and their names must be made known to the German people. Foreigners can do more harm to the German people than the traitors. There are people who, in the midst of a long war, are still dreaming of peace and promises. We must, against this, for we experienced once again the enemy's promises, was

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bound to take the necessary measures too. That autumn, Britain made no offer to the Government in office at that time, that Bulgaria should join the Balkan Union. The Parliamentary Committee unanimously decided that Bulgaria must stay out of the Balkan Union, because neither the British nor the Americans promised us anything. Their formula was as follows: "Join the Balkan Union, and when there is a war which goes favourably for us, your problems will be favourably solved." As simply promised: That is why we refused to join the Balkan Union. Citizens and compatriots, I am telling you these facts to make you understand why Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact and later the Axis.

—Death Instead of Freedom—

C70. Bulgarian National Government (agency controlled), 13.11.44 (19.15). When on September 9th, power in Sofia was seized by a coup d'état and with Bolshevik help, by the present rulers of Bulgaria, they immediately tried to explain this by proclaiming: "We are coming to renounce freedom." The new rulers and their agents shouting "Long live freedom." But who was the obstacle to the murder of enemies to the having later in the Bolsheviks and Professor Bogdan Filov, to deprive them hundreds of deputies, officers and now in jail. It was no obstacle to the Bulgarians to Siberia for since the dismissal of military and police commissars for of government to provide liberation for who are to oppress the Bulgarian and any chance of counter-action. When the Bolshevik occupation, the victims feel safe in their new positions, they drop their masks. With cynicism and the self-styled arbiters of the coup they hold the bayonets firmly in their hands, they claimed that all German collaborators will be to death or life imprisonment.

Yes, instead of the promised freedom—death! Who are the victims? The Bulgarian people who welcomed the German soldiers with wine and flowers? Or persons who "collaborated" to liberate their brothers in Macedonia, Thrace and Dobruja who helped to arm our Army to keep the enemy away from Bulgarian soil, to save the Bulgarian people from hunger?

It is clear that the whole Bulgarian nation will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The traitors have laid down their masks. Now the present rulers of Bulgaria are doing Moscow every favour they can. The enemies of Bolshevism are being liquidated. The Bolshevik system of oppression and annihilation reigns in our country. The victim is the whole Bulgarian nation. For us Bulgarians only one choice is left: Struggle for liberation! Freedom or death! This our slogan in our fight against Bolshevism: "Long live free and national Bulgaria!"

—Appeal to Students

C71. Bulgarian National Government (agency controlled), 13.11.44 (19.15). In answer to an appeal broadcast by Sofia Radio asking Bulgarian students in Germany not to join the Bulgarian Volunteer Forces formed there last year's *Diets* 1973, C299. Domusander now broadcasts an appeal by a Bulgarian student saying: Students of the Bulgarian universities! The hour has come to fulfil your supreme duty towards the Fatherland! Fight against the Red hydra by acting as leaders of the struggle in the Army and as organisers among the people. March, true to your

mission, in the vanguard of the sacred struggle against traitors and oppressors. Germany is standing by you and will help you. Do not fight against your German friends; fight shoulder to shoulder with them against the Jews and Foreigners. Death to the Bolsheviks! Fight for a free and independent Bulgaria!

The German change to Sofia: see A21-22.

German aid to Axis Bulgaria: see D20.

Polish service from Cronia suspended: see C26.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

German Industrialists Compete in B-M

C72. *Der Neue Tag*, Prague, 13.11.44. In the presence of the German enterprise managers and workers' delegations from all the enterprises of the Jihlava district, Kresceter Stigl presented the industrial managers of German enterprises which had distinguished themselves in competition for the best achievement with a testimonial to their success.

C73. *Der Neue Tag*, Prague, 13.11.44. Frank has announced that he will arrive in private ownership of the district covering less than ten sq. m. of land reported to the district authorities.

C74. *Der Neue Tag*, Prague, 15.11.44. The Ministry of Agriculture has decreed that as from September 20th, 1944, the collection of fruit will be compulsory weekly on success cards and three cigarettes daily on success cards.

Transport Permits for Fruit

C75. *Der Neue Tag*, Prague, 15.11.44. The Bohemian-Moravian Gardeners and Vine Growers Association announces that it is prohibited to forward apples, pears, plums and apricots unless a transport permit by the fruit collection centre is possessed. A permit will not be issued until it has been ascertained that the fruit has not been withheld from the quantity which should be compulsorily surrendered. Up to five kg. of the kinds of fruit which are not liable to surrender may be forwarded without a transport permit, but for larger quantities a permit is required.

Huslein Tells of Hitler's "Caveat"

C76. *Die Zeit*, Ulm, 13.11.44 (do not quote). Addressing a gathering in Ulm on September 30th, Huslein said that the memory of October 1st, 1936, is an appeal and an encouragement to increase our effort. We shall fight for German liberty with the utmost fanatism. Not only those traitors who assist the enemy or desert in this, but also the traitors of thought and attitude who in their minds stand victoriously on the enemy's side must be discovered, caught and excluded. Every German who falls even once in the presence of foreigners can do more harm to the Reich than the hostile voices in British or Soviet broadcasts. Here and there there may be people who, under the handshaking and suffecting of a long war, are deceived by the enemy's bait and promises. We must steel our hearts against this; for we experienced once before how our confidence in the enemy's promises was repaid with hatred.

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First, sources of all kinds, periodicals and newspapers, magazines, are used to find literature couples to study. Then, information and investigation departments collected so that the necessary instructions can be issued.

Simplification of Spelling

Some Radio (home edition), 7.04.44 (18.30). The

(68). Undergraduate National Government Institute con-

cluded 1944 (10.15). We are giving advance notice from

...the simplification of Bulgarian spelling.

On 19th, 1938, was the beginning of the darkest winter which we have been living in since. It was a horrible situation. Remember these words: Why did it happen?

There are two main reasons for this. First, the data are not normally distributed. Second, the data are not independent. The data are correlated because the same person is measured at two different time points. This correlation is called the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC is a measure of the degree to which the data are correlated. In this case, the ICC is 0.75, which indicates a strong correlation between the two measurements. This suggests that the data are not independent, and therefore, the standard statistical tests that assume independence are not appropriate. Instead, we need to use statistical tests that take into account the correlation between the two measurements. One such test is the paired sample t-test. The paired sample t-test is a statistical test that compares the means of two related groups. In this case, the two related groups are the two measurements of the same person. The paired sample t-test is appropriate because it takes into account the correlation between the two measurements. The results of the paired sample t-test show that there is a significant difference between the two measurements, $t(11) = 2.34, p = .03$. This suggests that the two measurements are not equal, and therefore, the data are not independent.

The second brief, the findings being most severely punished another. The primary action was to prevent Abkhazian fighters from coming in the force. Despite all the blow

Published From "Lombard News—"

CBL, Sofia Radio (home service), 91.10-44 (11:30). A
 of beauty and 2) the different the Bulgarian people
 and the Bulgarian intelligentsia were becoming strong
 of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people were becoming strong
 of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people were becoming strong

Government Council of Experts, Deputy President, and Ivan Paliashvili, Secretary.

“The general cheese-planting, Eastland Forest committee has been established at 1000 N. 1st St., St. Louis, Mo. The committee will be in charge of the planting of the forest and will also be in charge of the general cheese-planting.”

—Support from Rethinking-zoo Initiative
CNS, Sothe Radio (name sector), 5-10-94 (18:00). The
radio by our newspaper's magazine 1 column left in
The main drive of May 1991 was also fully in-
decently.

The following statement was made by the Chairman of the Committee:

"The Commission has been very fortunate to have had the opportunity to meet with you today. We are grateful for your time and input. The Commission will be working hard to ensure that the results of our work are as effective as possible."

(Order in Farmers—
and 5000 Bales (some given to the A.P.
to be sold). The first buyers have been
to the 1000 Bales, the Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary
quarters from which they are expected to. Some

[illegible]

17. In the above case, the money, which was deposited in the account of the deceased, was not withdrawn by the deceased, but it was withdrawn by the deceased's wife, who was the sole beneficiary of the account. The money was withdrawn by the deceased's wife, who was the sole beneficiary of the account, and it was not withdrawn by the deceased.

Willux, Supt. of Food and Cattle
CNS. Soja Radio (harm active), 8.10.44 (11.30).
This also carried on addition and was made in dis-
understanding for the Soviet Left.
This also carried on addition and was made in dis-
understanding for the Soviet Left.

1. The company is a public company.
 2. The company is a private company.
 3. The company is a partnership.
 4. The company is a sole proprietorship.
 5. The company is a limited liability company.
 6. The company is a corporation.
 7. The company is a trust.
 8. The company is a joint venture.
 9. The company is a franchise.
 10. The company is a subsidiary.

Order to Trade...
the fall of the coalition Government and set up a new, decent, democratic and purely Nigerian Government. When the Army realised that it was being deceived. Cde. Soga Rukia Thiong'ere, (Lt. Col). The

1. **Contractor's Name:** [Name of Contractor]
 2. **Contract Number:** [Contract Number]
 3. **Project Name:** [Project Name]
 4. **Location:** [Location]
 5. **Contract Type:** [Contract Type]
 6. **Contract Value:** [Contract Value]
 7. **Contract Period:** [Contract Period]
 8. **Contract Start Date:** [Contract Start Date]
 9. **Contract End Date:** [Contract End Date]
 10. **Contract Description:** [Contract Description]
 11. **Contract Terms and Conditions:** [Contract Terms and Conditions]
 12. **Contract Signature:** [Contract Signature]
 13. **Contract Date:** [Contract Date]

On: Sofia Radin (Russia) advised, \$27.44 (\$10.90)
Suppliers of vegetables and fruit to be supplied at

...not attend will not be allowed to continue in business.

⁷ Ibid., 80-81; *Soyuz Radio* (Moscow Review), 6 April 1930. The Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives was founded in 1929 as a result of the merger of several smaller organizations.

20

9 156

... ..

The leading enemy personalities have stated, frankly and repeatedly, the fate that they really have in store for the Germans. Hines imagines that the Sudeten German question can be solved by killing one million, sending one million as slaves to Siberia, and brutally forcing the rest to renounce their nationality. No, Mr. Hines, this will not happen! Even if we had to perish — which we shall not do — we would defend ourselves town by town, village by village, house by house, and be buried under their ruins. Once before Hines wished to make the hammer and sickle the emblem of our homeland, and he is now trying to do so a second time, but he will see that the Eagle of the Reich bearing the Swastika victoriously in its clutches, will for ever remain the emblem of Fatherland-Moravia.

When I saw the Führer a few weeks ago and he explained the military, political and economic situation, he was more confident of victory than I had ever seen him before. He possesses a profound knowledge and conviction that this heroic fight is bound to end in our victory. His belief in our nation and his profound trust pledge us to equal faithfulness and equal confidence.

Similar demonstrations were held at the same time in various other parts of the Sudeten Gau. (For Frank's article see Digest 1567, 2.10. C88.)

—And Salutes the Führer—

C77. *Der Neue Tag*, Prague, 1.10.44. On October 1st: Hensele cabled to Hitler: Palfutful to the pledge we took in the hour of our greatest happiness when returning to the Reich, we Sudeten Germans, in this time of our hardest trials, are ready for any effort which you, our Führer and liberator, may demand. We know that you are guiding us towards the victory and greatness of the Reich. The whole of the Sudeten land salutes you in loving gratitude and in unwavering loyalty.

—Nenborg's Conviction: Less Optimistic

C78. *Die Zeit*, Liberec, 1.10.44 (do not quote). Nenborg, broadcasting on the anniversary of the return of the Sudeten land to the Reich, said inter alia: It must be made clear to every German, and especially to the Germans on the battlefronts, that the main fighting line goes straight through his own frame of mind, courage, and valour. It is only the inactive, apathetic and lazy people who are now losing courage. We, who always stood amidst a restless community, need not ask at this moment whether we shall still be able to check the hostile armies in the west and in the east. A nation, of which every man and woman is ready to die rather than renounce their liberty and honour, can never be defeated.

District Chief Volunteers for Waffen-SS

C79. *Die Zeit*, Liberec, 1.10.44 (do not quote). Landrat Rudolf Wenzel, of Teplice-Banov, who volunteered in the Norwegian campaign, has again joined the Waffen-SS as a volunteer. Landrat Dr. Feller of Blžná is acting as his deputy.

Slovak Home Guard Sworn In—

C80. *Transparen* (in German for Europe), 2.10.44 (16.07). reports from Bratislava: In the presence of Dr. Jozef Tiso, the Slovak President, the First Infantry Regiment of the Domobrana (Home Guard) was sworn in at the Slovak Military Academy in Bratislava. Among those present at the ceremony, which took place on Friday (October 6th), were members of the Slovak Government, the German Commander in Slovakia,

Hoelle, representatives of the German Armed Forces and the Waffen-SS, the chief of the HG, Kukala, members of the Diplomatic Corps.

—Personalities Present—

C81. *Slovak Home Service*, 2.10.44 (19.00). Among those present (at the swearing in of the First Regiment of the Domobrana) were: Dr. Modický, Dr. Ophelid, Dr. Mederly, Stano, Dr. Polak, Kubala, Karmasin, General Kunderlik and Fulmich, Bishop Bizauka, and representatives of the Army, the HG, the HM, the gendarmerie and the police. Among the foreign guests were the Czech Minister Lorkovic, the Hungarian Minister Kuhl and the Italian Charge d'Affaires.

The President of the Republic, who arrived accompanied by Dr. Stefan Tiso and German Minister Ludin, was received with fanfares. He listened to the report by the commander of the rallied formations and then, accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, Hoelle, and by the German General Hoelle, inspected the formations in his capacity as C-in-C. of the Slovak Armed Forces. After the National Anthem, he addressed the Domobrana. The addresses given by the President of the Republic and by SS-Hauptgruppenführer and General of the Police Hoelle were followed by the swearing-in of the Domobrana. The ceremony ended with a parade of the Domobrana, at the head of which marched a unit of the President's Guard.

—Tiso's Order

C82. *Slovak Home Service*, 2.10.44 (19.00). At today's swearing-in of the First Infantry Regiment of the Domobrana the President of the Republic read the following Order to the Army:

"Officers and men of the Slovak Home Guard! After the serious repercussions which affected our nation and our armed forces a few weeks ago, we are again raising our flag, the flag of national and military honour, with the firm conviction never to let it slip from our hands. The Slovak soldier honourably served and died in centuries past. Friends, neighbours and foreigners paid tribute to the glory of his regiment. With the restoration of the Slovak State of Prince Fribina and King Svatopluk, the Slovak Armed Forces were also renewed. Slovak regiments, which have become the most reliable safeguard of our national and State existence, were revived. From their very beginning they built up their State and homeland with ardent patriotism and spread their reputation in victorious and glorious fighting.

This year's dark August and September days con-founded some of our soldiers but broke neither the nation nor the hearts of its many faithful sons in arms. Betrayal and blindness did not affect the core of our nation; the reorganised Slovak Armed Forces, under the name of Slovak Domobrana, stand ready and in arms only a short time after the setting up of the new order. The Slovak Domobrana embodies, in its tradition, honour, heroism and faithfulness to the flag, to its superiors, comrades, and Allies; it embodies above all faithfulness to the Greater German Reich and to its Armed Forces, which are not only setting us an example in the fight for our national life and Europe's culture against Bolshevism, but in their faithful honouring of the alliance with us, are also obliging us to preserve our courage and allegiance. In this spirit and with these ideals the new Slovak Domobrana has been formed. It will be reorganised and well equipped, and will in future be the most

reliable safeguard of the nation's existence. For many centuries God has protected our nation. I believe God will also protect our nation and State in the future.

"The life, work and blood of the soldiers of the Slovak Domobran belong to the nation and State, which is being assaulted by treacherous enemies. The Domobran will clear our peaceful homeland of the invader of Bolshevik hostility and secure peace and order throughout Slovakia, enabling her citizens to resume joyful, creative work in their homeland."

Labour Service Call-Up

CBS. Slovak Home Service, 8.10.44 (1940). On October 1st the fifth group of recruits of the Slovak Labour Service was called up. Thousands of young Slovak men joined the Labour Service to serve the nation and State.

Mass Graves Propaganda

CBS. Translated for Far East, 8.10.44 (18.24). reports from Bratislava: According to Slovak mass graves were discovered near Zilina in the neighbourhood of a stronghold used by Bolshevik partisans as their HQ. In a meadow, under some trees of fresh earth, numerous corpses were found of people shot in the neck. The dead included Burgomaster Aureas Chovan, of Turas, his deputy Michael Dozien; Albert Pachar, local chairman of the HSLS; Kutrbanc, local commander of the HS, and other men and women not yet identified. All appear to be people taken by the Bolsheviks from the Ruzica region.

Another "Swiss" Report

CBS. Buzler Nachrichten, 5.10.44. The Slovak patriots, persecuted by the Russians, have now proclaimed an independent Slovak Soviet Republic in Turfiansky Svety Martin. When one realizes that even under the former Czechoslovak Republic the Slovak Communist favoured autonomy in Slovakia, this establishment of an independent Slovak Soviet Republic must be regarded as a logical conclusion to the Communist and expressed desires for an independent Slovakia. The present phase of the insurrection in Slovakia reveals many Communist pro-Russian tendencies. Events in Slovakia may produce further surprises. Especially since a large proportion of the former partisans' territory is now under the control of Bratislava, and owing to the fact that many partisans were induced to fight through a false report that the Germans and Hungarians had begun to occupy Slovakia, and also had been assassinated.

Culen Commends American Slovak Attitude

"The Slovak Home Service, 8.10.44 (1940). Culen said at a talk that the attitude of Slovaks resident in America was a matter of great interest to Slovaks at home. "We have now learned a number of new facts from trustworthy sources and I propose to tell you about them." He then paid tribute to "our brethren overseas who have no direct links with us and who are, nevertheless, bravely resisting the onslaught of enemy propaganda; in short, they are courageously adhering to the Slovak political line."

Culen then drew on the "temporization" of Slovak life in America, gained from reading the Slovak press in the U.S.A., of the sacrifices that branch of the nation had to make, etc. "From these papers we also learn that a society for the prevention of a third world war has been formed in the U.S.A. and organizing meetings attended by outstanding politicians, industrialists, etc.

The papers of the Great Powers and their statesmen tell us this war will finally solve all the world's problems, and that Germany and Japan will be beaten; if that is so, whom do they want to fight? Certainly not a defeated Germany or Japan! The inevitable conclusion is that the Allies are getting ready for another war, a war among themselves. Ambassador Bullitt hit the nail on the head when he said the people of the U.S.A. could be divided into two groups—pessimists and optimists. The optimists, he says, are those who do not expect the third world war to break out for 15 years from now; the pessimists, of whom he was one, believe it will break out immediately after the end of this war. Well, it seems we have something to look forward to. However, we are more interested in the problems which concern us more directly, as we know we cannot, by ourselves, prevent this third world war."

Referring to Benes's recent statement that the future Czechoslovakia would be decentralized, Culen quoted the Slovak-American politician Husek as saying: "The Slovak reply to this is—we do not believe this promise." "And how could they believe it? We have had so many bitter disappointments." Husek is quoted at length, warning Slovaks against "Benes's decentralization." "Do not believe it," says Husek, "whatever they promise you, because they have always broken every promise made up to now, only to make fun of the gullible, glib little Slovaks." "Ghost" voice: "Husek is a fascist agent." "We, too, are in favour of a decentralization of Slovakia from Czech domination and will do it, Husek says his aim is an independent Slovak Parliament; in short, an independent, democratic Slovakia with complete authority in all Slovak matters, and led by a Government of the people, for the people, by the people."

Culen then quoted another article by Husek, in which he said: "If the Czechs desired for the Slovaks what they desire for themselves, there would be no Czechoslovak problem. Unfortunately this is not the case. As long as the Czechs insist on solving the Slovak question the Czech way, this question will not be solved. This is what will divide Czechs and Slovaks for all time. This is the cause of Slovak fate—that by living in one State with the Czechs, Slovaks would lose God's most precious gift—their language and national identity." Benes's granting of equal rights before the law does not interest Slovaks. After all, this is a matter of course. The question is, will Slovaks have equal rights with the Czechs as a nation? "Ghost" voice: "Yes, they will!" There can be no equal rights unless the Slovaks are masters in Slovakia and the Czechs in the Czech lands. The Slovaks are not harming the Czechs, but the Czechs are harming the Slovaks, because they are trying to take away their rightful property from them."

In his book "Behind the Steel Wall," Arvid Fridborg says the Slovak people expect much of the American Slovaks, and are willing to let them decide some of the outstanding questions. Benes's paper Slovenský Sokol attacked Fridborg for this. If it was true, as this paper maintains, that 90% of American Slovaks are in favour of Benes, he should be glad Slovaks at home have confidence in the Slovaks in America. Slovenský Sokol replied that Slovaks in America are quite prepared to let Slovaks at home decide. "We know," the paper said, "that the Benes group are not annoyed with the Swedish journalist because he did not speak the truth, but precisely because he did." "Anyone listening to the London radio, particularly to its broadcasts in Czech, must gain the impression that the whole world lies prostrate before Dr. Benes. If you read

foreign newspapers, however, you realize that much criticism is being levelled abroad at Beneš. Nivarsouk of June 12th points out that Beneš must tackle a number of problems in his resurrected State, mentioning that General Prebala, the last Czech Governor of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, is now selling Lendau émigré that Beneš had no right to sign a treaty with Stalin as his term of office as President expired in 1932. Sir Beneš must also tackle Communist opposition.

The leader of the Czech Communists, Klement Gottwald, favours the establishment of an organisation on Soviet lines consisting of federated States with autonomous rights, Slovakia to be one of these States. And although Beneš and his propagandists apparatus keep proclaiming the idea of a resurrection of old, centralised Czechoslovakia, the public cannot be persuaded that it is possible to rebuild a State which has failed in all respects when put to the test. The U.S. press points out that Beneš may in some ways be Moscow's man today, but that those who are retired in Moscow, like Gottwald, have very different plans. If Moscow wins, naturally those nearest to Moscow will win with it.

The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the U.S.A., Hurban, recently visited Slovaks in Bethlehem. He was received warmly by most of the Slovaks present. An English paper, on the day of his visit, stressed the tremendous abyss which divides this exponent of the Czechoslovak conception from the broad mass of decent Slovaks. The Slovak people was puzzled at the obvious contradiction between Beneš' famous claims that Slovaks had been treated with absolute justice on the one hand, and his promises now that former wrongs would be righted. When did Beneš speak the truth, when he claimed that the Slovaks were being treated justly, or now, when he admits injustices? Why did Hurban never speak of these wrongs and why did he not demand that they should be righted? Hurban did not meet with much success.

"We at home admire the stand of our American brethren. It proves to us that our path is a good one, as apart from small, understandable exceptions, we have no differences, particularly as regards basic principles. American Slovaks proudly take their stand by the idea of the Slovak State. Nor could this be otherwise. As early as 1907, Husak was making propaganda for this ideal. Forty years ago good Slovak patriots in America repeated Stur's theory that Slovaks could only rid themselves of their mistakes if they had a State of their own."

Slovak diplomats in Italy move to Bellagio: see R9.

POLAND

Sentences on Germans

C87. Danziger Vorposten, 29.9.44 (do not quote). The Special Court in Grudziadz has sentenced a medical officer named Viktor Gumowski to eight years' hard labour. At the beginning of the war he buried and otherwise concealed large quantities of urgently needed goods, a large part of which were spoiled owing to the unsuitable nature of the places in which they were stored.

C88. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, Poznań, 29.9.44 (do not quote). The Amtsgericht in Inowroclaw has sentenced a German peasant to three months' imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 RM and a Polish worker, named Chudelinski, to four months' penal camp. Their care-

lessness in the use of an agricultural machine had caused a fire in an unspecified locality, which destroyed several peasant farms.

Harvesting Over Round Table

C89. Luznerschäfer Zeitung, 30.9.44 (do not quote). Announces that harvest-thanksgiving festivals have been ordered in all the Ostgruppen in the District of [redacted].

Fortifications: Bulbous

C90. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, Poznań, 17.9.44 (do not quote). An article on the feeding of fortification workers contains the following data about the weekly rations each person receives: 600 g of meat, 5,000 g of bread, 300 g of butter and fat, 225 g of sugar, 7,000 g of potatoes, 125 g of Nahrungsmittel, 175 g of marmalade, etc. [These rations are twice or three times as large as the ordinary Polish rations—see figures 1530, 253, C79.]

Anti Party Members

C91. Obererschlesische Zeitung, Katowice, 30.9.44 (do not quote). Speaking in Katowice on September 28th at a rally of Ortsgruppenleiter, Gustav Bracht started with a general description of the political and military situation, admitting that a few weeks ago Upper Silesia had been in a situation that was not without danger. At this moment, when tens of thousands were hastening to work on the fortifications, there were yet still people who only considered their own welfare and he abused them angrily. Their number was in any case extremely small and he had taken severe measures, even expelling some of them from the Party. But the majority of Upper Silesians were working in an exemplary fashion on the construction of a system of fortifications of which they could be proud. In the future sectors of the fortifications would be allotted to every District and Ortsgruppe, which would then be responsible for their maintenance.

Bracht went on to announce with pride that Upper Silesia was at the moment contributing more than her quota of men to the Armed Forces. Finally, he proclaimed: Every Upper Silesian knows what he is about . . . that he must work and fight in the coming decisive months with an even greater fanatical and with complete faith in victory. . . . Come what may, Upper Silesia will continue to face the future with unshakable confidence and loyalty to the Führer.

Pölsch = Production

C92. Obererschlesische Zeitung, Katowice, 28.9.44 (do not quote). Speaking on September 27th to workers in a war factory in Katowice, Pölsch (Gausmann) of Upper Silesia said that the order of the day was to increase one's efforts still further and to work like a soldier who was fighting on the frontiers.

"Bandits" Liquidated

C93. Obererschlesische Zeitung, Katowice, 27.9.44 (do not quote). Announces that the police in Teschen rounded and after a fight liquidated a gang of criminals who had for some time been infesting the region. Their crimes included the assassination of a soldier in March. A number of other people were also arrested.

Frank Addresses A.V. Officers

C94. Harkauer Zeitung, 27.9.44 (do not quote). Announces that Dr. Frank made a long speech on general

subjects to officers of the Flaktowe attending a course on ideology in Glogow.

—Training of New Conscripts

C85. *Krakauer Zeitung*, 29.8.44 (do not quote), announces that there will be public training for the men who were recently called to the conscripts in large numbers.

Blackout of Military Cars

C86. *Krakauer Zeitung*, 1.10.44 (do not quote), publishes a decree, issued by the Government of the CG and dated September 22nd, which announces that military vehicles will in future travel with only the left headlights on and urges people to be careful on the roads as a result.

—And Restrictions for Civilian

C87. *Krakauer Zeitung*, 10.10.44 (do not quote), publishes an announcement about the issue of new licences for motor cars, dated September 12th.

The present licences for civilian motor cars which are not for official use become invalid on September 25th, 1944. Applications for new licences, which will have a mauve stripe, may be made from September 20th onwards to the Road Transport Office with which the car is registered, or in whose district it is at present.

The authorities have received new regulations for the re-issuing of licences for the official use in the town of motor cars marked with a "B" (double red diagonal stripe). A travelling order and not a licence is necessary for long distance official journeys in official cars.

The owners and users of motor cars must after September 25th without the above licence, or abusing it, will be punished with imprisonment. †

No Poles Contribute to WHW

C88. *Krakauer Zeitung*, 9.9.44 (do not quote), publishes an announcement addressed to the heads of Party offices, Government offices and business enterprises:

The present special conditions prevailing in the town and District of Cracow make it necessary to distance from the regulations in the Reich to be found with subscription lists on Sacrifice Sundays and make direct collections for the Reich Street Collections only on the premises of offices and businesses. The first subscription list collection is to be made on September 10th. The collection lists for Sacrifice Sundays, on which the names of all the German employees are to be entered, and directions for the carrying out of the WHW... are obtainable.

It is expected of all German employees that they should pay special attention to the carrying out of the WHW collection and to the despatch of the contribution, so that in spite of all the difficulties the collection results in the town and District of Cracow may be at least equal to those in the Reich and East of the Reich, thus giving expression to the unshakable will to victory of all the Germans who live here.

[The announcement is signed by Dr. von Burgsdorf and Kallweil, Trustee for the WHW in the District of Cracow.] †

C89. *Krakauer Zeitung*, 2.9.44 (do not quote), publishes a short article praising the self-sacrificing spirit of the Germans. It contains the following statement: A collection for the German Red Cross was made among the Germans working on the construction of fortifications in the CG, which in one of the numerous

sectors (Baubeschäft) alone produced the sum of 137,276.75 zl. †

German SS Commanders from Warsaw decorated:

see A40.

Swedish press on the surrender of Warsaw: see C84.

Polish refugees reach Sweden: see C107.

THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

Baltic Refugees

C100. *Dagens Nyheter*, 5.10.44. According to information received from the Swedish Committee for accommodating refugees, by October 4th there were about 15,000 Baltic refugees in Sweden, the majority of them being Estonians. Of the 15,000, 14,000 are in quarantine. The number of Latvians is not large. The above-mentioned estimated figure is steadily increasing day to day. In this figure, however, 4,000 Estonian Swedes are not included as they are cared for by the Riga Committee.

C101. *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 5.10.44. Wills, the special correspondent, reports that over 2,000 Baltic refugees exhausted, hungry, and insufficiently clad to withstand the cold weather—arrived at Öregrund on October 3rd in a convoy of small boats, many of which were just ordinary rowing-boats. On an average, their voyage lasted 11 days.

According to the correspondent, the sufferings and ailments undergone during the voyage, particularly by small children, defy description. He says that there is scarcely a single boat in Riga which has not now been used in the flight to Sweden. All boats leaving Estonia are crammed full.

C102. *Dagens Nyheter*, 5.10.44, reports from Umeå: The refugee traffic across the Gulf of Bothnia is still lively and new refugees arrive daily. They often arrive in unknown boats which immediately put to sea again.

C103. *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 5.10.44, reports that 37 refugees, including ten children from Dagö, arrived at the Stockholm Archipelago on October 4th. Among the refugees was one mother whose child was born on the voyage. On arrival a collection was made and a savings bank (savings account) opened to help the destitute young mother.

C104. *Svenska Morgonbladet*, 5.10.44. Over 250 Baltic refugees arrived at Öregrund on October 4th after unprecedented hardships during the voyage from the Baltic States and Finland. One boat containing 70 refugees was 14 days at sea.

C105. *Swedish Press*, 4.10.44. No fewer than 1,200 refugees arrived in Öregrund on October 3rd. The biggest contingent, of 1,000, crossed the Baltic in a cargo vessel, and other groups numbered 185 and 100.

C106. *Swedish Press*, 4.10.44. One hundred Baltic refugees reached Nynäshamn in several small motor boats and a sailing vessel on the evening of October 2nd and early on the morning of October 3rd. One of the boats had been at sea five days and the occupants were in a state of exhaustion. A further large number of Baltic refugees, including some who spent 10 days in an open boat, arrived at Gäddede on the evening of October 3rd.

C107. *Stockholm Press*, 4.10.44. Several boats with about 50 Poles and Estonians arrived at Tisted on October 3rd.

Latvians in German aircraft land in Sweden: ■
D87

NORWAY

German Destroyer Put Out of Action

D1. *Stockholm-Tidningen*, 4.10.44. RUP reports: A German destroyer which for several years has been under construction in Bergen shipyard was recently to have been transferred to a German shipyard for completion. The day before the transfer, however, a violent explosion occurred on board the destroyer which now lies seriously damaged in Bergen harbor. The destroyer which is of 1,300 tons would certainly have been completed long ago if the Germans had not been short of all kinds of materials. Their repeatedly ordered machinery and other tools which had already been installed in order to repair other ships. Every attempt to force the Norwegian workers to work overtime failed.

Petrol Dump Blown Up

D2. *Fri Fagbevegelse* (underground paper), 15.9.44. The few German petrol dumps still left in Oslo are guarded and fully lit up by German sentries night and day. At Vestheim school a petrol dump was blown up last week. The Germans were very nervous and closed all the streets around the school, arrested passers-by. A horse cab was halted and as the frightened horse did not stop immediately, the Germans fired several shots killing the horse and wounding the person inside the cab.

Finnish POWs in N. Norway

D3. *Stockholm-Tidningen*, 2.10.44. A private report to the paper says: The first contingent of Finnish prisoners of war has now arrived in North Norway where they will be interned. They will probably be treated as other "enemy" prisoners of war. Finnish soldiers on board Finnish ships in Norwegian ports when Finland broke with Germany have been interned together with Finnish civilians in Norway. There are, however, very few of the latter. Finnish sailors were given an opportunity to enter German service but refused without exception.

Bergen Raid: Rising Death Roll

D4. *Norwegian Home Service*, 4.10.44 (20.30). The clearing up work at Rahnevåg, Bergen, continues with out interruption. Bodies are still being recovered, says *Aftenposten*. So far 130 bodies have been found. (Names of those identified follow). . . . The figures must be regarded as provisional. (See yesterday's *Digest* 1373, D1-3.)

Funerals—

D5. *Danish Home Service*, 5.10.44 (22.30). There will be a mass burial of the victims of the Bergen air raid. The first funeral will take place on October 10th at 10.00 followed by other funerals every half hour until 10.20. Funerals will be continued on succeeding days at the same time. After the Laksevåg disaster, evacuation plans are to be considered.

Money from Qulshug

D6. *Aftenposten* (7.7.10.44). Qulshug has given 1,000,000 kr to help war victims and evacuees from North Norway and 100,000 kr to the people of Bergen suffering as a result of the air raid. (See *Digest* 1072, 7.10. D1.) The money will be distributed through the NS Aid Organisation.

New Prison Camp

D7. *Arbeider Bladet*, 4.10.44. RUP reports: A new prison camp has been opened at Midtland, about 18 km north of Trondheim. The camp, which is supervised by the OT, has so far received about 60 prisoners who are working in quarries, etc. Some are political prisoners, some people who have robbed the Germans, and others ordinary criminals.

Reproof for Discrimination

D8. *Fri Folk*, 2.10.44. Pava Jacob-Haug writes: The Secretary of the (Danish) People's Teetotaler Organisation—and these "Kvæle" has seen it in an interview with the paper (*Folket*) with regard to Teetotalers' Day to say that a circular was sent to all clergymen throughout the country "urging them to mention the matter". A clergyman has written to Fri Folk to say that he had received as such request and had therefore written to the Secretary to ask whether this request had been withheld from loyal clergymen. The Secretary wisely enough did not answer. The fact is that we loyal clergymen received no request. It is not the first time that the same Secretary has "told small lies" and he should be examined more closely. The Christian People's Teetotaler Organisation enjoys State support and thus demonstrations against the same State are too much.

Norwegians Mal-treated

D9. *Fri Fagbevegelse* (underground paper), 15.9.44. In Hessa and the surrounding districts the State police and the third have carried out many arrests and mal-treated several prisoners with the result that some of them have died. One policeman is said to be especially brutal and the death sentence has been passed on him.

No Priority for Pro-Germans

D10. *Fri Folk*, 3.10.44. An article signed Theodor says: I am a front fighter, and have a silver ring with the swastika and sun-cross engraved on it which I got from a German friend at the front—a ring of friendship symbolizing the common effort and friendship of Germans and Norwegians. This ring, however, in too big, and I therefore asked a goldsmith in central Oslo whether it could be made smaller. The woman behind the counter said it would take eight days, but I ask if it could not be done in seven as I had to go away. The woman asked to see the ring, and afterwards went into the workshop in the back room. When she returned she said "I am sorry, it will take at least two months."

Prisoner Shouts Policemen

D11. *Fri Fagbevegelse* (underground paper), 15.9.44. An unusual feat is reported from Nyborgsind where a young man succeeded in overwhelming four State policemen. He was arrested on suspicion of having come from Sweden and the four policemen handcuffed him and took him to the police station. There he asked permission to put on his coat and one policeman laid

down his revolver to remove the handcuffs. The young man immediately seized the revolver, shouting the two policemen dead and wounding the two others, whereupon he disappeared.

Swedish press on Norwegian cultural work: see 1405-1410
Swedish press on 1. Swedish consulates in Norway: see 1381

DENMARK

German Search for Unemployed

D12. DPT. 8.10.44. On the night of October 6th the German police carried out a new search in Copenhagen searching for workers who had deserted from Germany and for the unemployed. Since yesterday's (October 5th) 1944. About 90 in the shops in Næstved was barred, all restaurants were carefully investigated and those taken prisoner were transferred to Shell-houses in large vehicles. The majority will probably be released, but the rest will work for the Germans.

In Odense 75 persons have been arrested in raids. Among those recently arrested are the merchant Daell and the market gardener Frodo Sørensen of Landhøje-søen. Felix Billow, 74-year-old butcher, succeeded in escaping dressed only in his underclothes, when the Gestapo called for him. This came with, however, probably a mistake.

Committee to List War Criminals

D13. DPT. 8.10.44. A special committee has now been formed in the resistance movement which is to investigate reports about war criminals of every kind, and it is hoped in this way to avoid mistakes resulting from private considerations and the like.

Explosions: Training College

D14. Danish Home Service, 8.10.44 (12.30). On the night of October 7th at about 10.30 a violent explosion shook the town of Hjørring. The news spread quickly that an outrage had been committed against the old training college. Crowds of people flocked to the spot and met a terrible sight. Through huge clouds of dust they could see the college blown to pieces. Part of the building was torn away and rubble was spread around. It was realized immediately that a bomb outrage had been committed. The window panes in adjacent houses were blown out. Even in the new training college at a distance of about 100 m from the old college and in one of the teachers' houses the doors had been blown to pieces and the foundation of the houses had been damaged. Rescue squads from Hjørring rushed off the place and together with the pupils started the clearing work which is still in progress.

Newspaper Office

D15. Danish Home Service, 8.10.44 (12.30). On the night of October 6th at 12.15 the inhabitants of large parts of Aarhus were woken by the heaviest explosion ever heard in Aarhus. The explosion was so violent that houses within a radius of one km were shaken. A bomb outrage had been committed against the large building of the paper *Demokraten* on the Banegårds-pladsen.

From the grounds in front of the Aarhus main station a very heavy 115 lb charge had been thrown through one of the large windows into the printing building. The

bombs had been thrown into the end of the building farthest away from the main building which faces the station square. This part contained *Demokraten's* jobbing printing office, which was cased to the ground. The paper's stereotypic illustrations were also completely destroyed.

In the adjacent wing of the building the Aarhus branch of *Arbejdernes Landsbank* had its offices. Here and in the many private printing and editorial offices in other parts of the building severe destruction was caused.

Several inhabitants suffering from shock had to be taken to hospital. One elderly woman died. During the fire-fighting a fireman was seriously injured.

Train

D16. Danish Home Service, 8.10.44 (12.45). A violent explosion took place under an evening express train going in a northerly direction from Fredericia when it was three km north of Hjørring at 20.00 this evening. It is believed that a bomb had been placed on the railway line. Several carriages were damaged, especially the first passenger carriage, which was blown to pieces. Many passengers were injured, and it is believed that several were killed. It is not yet possible to form a clear picture of the extent of the damage.

Aarhus Building Blasts

D17. DPT. 8.10.44. The two bombs which exploded in the art building in Aarhus were placed in an annexe in the grounds erected by the Germans. The art building itself was hardly damaged at all. (See yesterday's *Thuset*, 1944, 1944.)

Chief of Police Cooperates?

D18. DPT. 8.10.44. The chief of police in København A. Finn Thomsen, handed over a list of the weapons belonging to the København police to the Germans shortly after the action against the police. He had previously refused a request from patriots to postpone the decision on the status of the police for a day. The chief of police stated that the weapons were to remain where they were and that he would not send the "illegal police" in his house. He failed to understand that by a decree his men had at that time been made outlawed. This is in any case they were wanted.

Celebrations Interrupted

D19. DPT. 8.10.44. During an episode at 17 Aarslev on Aarslevsgaard in which a German soldier and a young Dane were killed and another Dane arrested, the Germans fired on the property of the former Maries Sørensen during confirmation celebrations. The guests were held up and locked in for almost five hours. Further details are not known.

Attack on KU Chairman's Shop

D20. *Dagens Nyheder*, 8.10.44. The Copenhagen correspondent reports: On the afternoon of October 7th a man entered a small Aalborg shop owned by the former chairman of the Conservative Youth Association, Jens Bech, a merchant, drew a revolver and fired two shots at the first assistant Christian Andersen, aged 37, who stood behind the counter talking with Bech's 17-year-old daughter. Andersen died later. The perpetrator escaped on a bicycle which a friend held ready in the street.

National-Socialist Takes Revenge

D21. DPT. 8.10.44. The "schalburga" of Rosen-dahl's printing works in Esbjerg was the result of German support of a National-Socialist act of revenge. The former printer Kaj Olsén is responsible for the attack; his father used to run the business together with Rosen-dahl. After the father's death the son tried to work together with Rosen-dahl, but the latter dis-missed him some years ago and Kaj Olsén had to give up the business and at the outbreak of the war he had very little money. Now he is a kept man. He was seen at the scene of the explosion after the disaster aimed in the workshop of the Germans, who drove off the spectators with the butts of their rifles. Rosen-dahl is the chairman of the Provincial Printing Association. (See Digest 157). C.19. D24-25.)

Mrs. Gløse Identified as Informer

D22. DPT. 8.10.44. The infamously of 40-41 Godthaabsvej, who were collectively arrested, have for the most part been released. (See yesterday's Digest 157). D23. Mrs. Gløse was killed as an in-former probably because during the general strike she directed the arrest of various persons from her window with cries and shouts. The daughter who was hurt believes she is able to identify the man who killed her mother. The Germans have threatened to blow up the whole building, but have shown no signs of carry-ing out this threat.

Sommer Installs Himself

D23. DPT. 8.10.44. After Captain Sommer with bodyguard had settled at Jons-trup training college he took over the house of the head of the establish-ment, Christensen, and turned him and his family out.

Nordic Citizenship Proposed

D24. Svenska Dagbladet, 8.10.44. TT reports from Copenhagen. As part of the information work of the Association Norden, the Danish Home Office official Knud Larsen has written a book dealing scientifically with inter-Nordic citizenship. Larsen suggests that present nationalities should be maintained, but that simultaneously a national status covering the entire North should be created. This would mean that a Dane, Finn, Swede, Norwegian or Icelandic would automatically become a citizen of the Nordic Union. The citizens would be able to travel freely and seek employment within any Nordic country.

Kind-hearted Bandits

D25. Sørø Amtstidende, Slagelse, 4.10.44. On the evening of September 29 two armed men stopped the Huskilde ambulance driving to hospital with a patient. The armed men intended to use the ambulance, as their private car had broken down. When they were told that the patient needed immediate medical atten-tion, they let the ambulance pass.

Ban on Liquor

D26. Nationaltidende, 5.10.44. Varde has pro-hibited the serving of liquor after 22.00. Ringebu has also prohibited the serving of liquor after 15.40 and the same prohibition is expected to be introduced in Esbjerg from 20.00.

Dangerous Patient at Large

D27. Danish Home Service, 6.10.44 (21.45). Police's rescue squad announces: A prisoner, Otto Hermann

Jensen, aged 25, escaped at 10.00 today from Holbæk district hospital where he was a patient because he swallowed a razor blade. He was only wearing a shirt but had taken a red woollen blanket with him. Jensen is regarded as a dangerous man. Information leading to the arrest of this man is wanted.

Fire

D28. Nationaltidende, 5.10.44. Dansk Fugtnereri in Bjallese including valuable machinery was destroyed by a violent fire on the morning of October 4th. The damage is estimated at 25,000.000 kr. The fire is be-lieved to have been caused by spontaneous combustion.

Death of Editor

D29. Swedish Home Service, 6.10.44 (12.30). Copen-hagen reports that the editor in chief of Børsen, Henrik Støin, has died of a heart attack. A prominent public figure, he was formerly deputy chairman of the Execu-tive of the Association Norden.

Correction

■ yesterday's Digest 1573 D24, the second sentence should read: Outside Stige in Odense A4 a bomb ex-ploded in the side of the ship.

Danish quislings in Sweden: see D22-23.

Danish prisoner in Sweden escapes to Norway: see D24.

Danish diplomats in Italy still in Venice: see X3.

FINLAND

Control Commission in Terms

D30. Svenska Dagbladet, 8.10.44. reports from Haparanda on October 7th: Representatives of the Russian Control Commission are now in Tornio. They are in full action, carefully registering all booty taken from the Germans.

Expected in Aland

D31. Dagens Nyheter, 8.10.44. The Swedish Consul in Mariehamn, Yngve Vendel, who has served in Sweden, says that most of the rumours about Aland during the Finnish-Russian crisis were false. The Germans have made no attempt to land on the island and no fighting has occurred. A Russian Commission of 25 to 40 men is expected.

Political Prisoners to Resume Diet Seats

D32. Västmanlands Läns Tidning, Västerås, 7.10.44. The Helsinki correspondent reports: The Government on October 6th decided to grant the request of the Six Men Group to resume their seats in the Diet (see yes-terday's Digest 1573, D23) of which they were deprived in 1941.

Elections Early Next Year

D33. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (11.30). The Ministry of Justice has sent a letter to the provincial administration stating that the election registers for the new Diet elections to be held early in 1945 will be based on the 1942 census lists. A lowering of the election age to 21 would, however, be considered. The experts appointed to make preparations for the new elections have stated that their work will soon be completed. The

elections will be held in the middle of January, if circumstances permit. The Government and Doel will make the final decision about the date.

Government Grant for Evacuees

D44. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (11.30). The Government has granted 20,000,000 Fm to the Colonization Department of the Ministry of Agriculture to purchase land for evacuees.

Hackzell No Better

D35. Morgon-Tidningen, 8.10.44. STB reports from Helsinki on October 6th: Dr. Pekkari, who is attending Hackzell, announces that his condition is still serious. The fever continues and his right side remains paralysed. He has not regained the power of speech.

Vuori Speaks at TU Meeting

D36. Morgon-Tidningen, 8.10.44. TT reports from Helsinki: Trade unions held a festival in the People's House on October 5th under the slogan "Hand in hand, today and for ever." Vuori in a speech of welcome said: Even if the fulfilment of the armistice terms demands many privations and even if remarks about their harshness are understandable, we should consider the reasons which made the other side put forward certain demands. I wish not to touch here on the suspicion which can be explained by the fact that, owing to certain circumstances, relations between Russia and Finland before the war did not develop on lines of mutual confidence, and the fact that for many years we have been at war with Russia.

Some Swedish papers take a very pessimistic view of the armistice agreement, thus helping to create an atmosphere which is only injurious to the honest efforts of the Finns to consider confidential relations with Russia as a basis for the future. The various points of the agreement take on a different light if we suppose that both parties have the goodwill to carry out its terms in cooperation and mutual trust. I think that this is what the majority of Finns desire, and I believe the same spirit also animates the Allies. If anyone feels that it is difficult to fulfil the demands of the agreement, we must, I say, remember this important fact—that if we had not, through this agreement, succeeded in extricating ourselves from the war, we should have been compelled to surrender unconditionally in a short time as a result of the resources of Russia and her Allies and the insignificant help Germany can give now.

Everybody who understands a little of world developments and takes a realistic view of our country's position, knows also that this is our only possible course. People had expected peace, but a hard war must still be fought, and this is not due merely to the armistice agreement. I am inclined to think of it as a war against the forces which also dragged our small nation into the war. These forces must be expelled from our territory, where they have already done much damage. Through this struggle, as also through the fulfilment of the other tasks of the agreement, we are redeveloping the guarantee for our independence. The fight against the Germans must be conducted with all our strength and energy.

The agreement has placed us in a new situation, not only externally but also internally. The war (I should say) Germany unambiguously strengthened the reactionary forces of the country, even if the democratic elements were strong enough to prevent a National-Socialist coup. In my opinion the policy of the Trade

Unions decisively hampered such a development. In the present phase of our development the working class will acquire a central and influential position, and its activity will greatly influence the future of the nation. Those now active among the working class may feel their responsibility. From the point of view of the working class and the Finnish community, it is important that the Labour Movement should retain its uniformity to the greatest possible extent. In my opinion the various Socialist currents do not differ as much in an ideological respect as after the first Great War. It is more a question of certain prejudices and mutual suspicion. If this can be overcome, and if unanimity can be reached on certain points—like regard to the nation's right to self-determination and the development of the country's democratic organization—it will be possible to find a common basis for the political efforts of the working class. Lack of prejudice and resignation are the only things demanded.

"Tass" Correspondent Arrives

D37. FNB (in English for N. America), 8.10.44 (15.50). On October 7th the Tass correspondent Vassili Karjagin arrived from Stockholm. This is the first time a Russian journalist has visited Finland. (See yesterday's Digest 1973, D36.)

Class Discrimination

D38. Suomen Sosialidemokratia, 8.10.44. Muso-Maalari complains that the workers are often treated quite differently from gentlemen in shops, restaurants, etc. Such treatment creates bitterness, and this creates hatred which may burst out in action when the community is in a state of fermentation. Equality before the law is not sufficient, it ought also to be applied to everyday life.

Kemi Hostages Released

D39. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (18.00). Some people who escaped to the south from Kemi related on October 7th that as a result of coercion on the part of the German authorities, the Kemi Town Council was summoned to an extra meeting. An ultimatum in respect of certain acts was presented, and, as the Council decided that it could not be accepted, all the members were arrested. In addition to what has previously been announced about the arrests made by the Germans in Kemi, it is now known that the arrests were chiefly made in the streets. Only a few people were arrested in their homes. At least three of the Kemi hostages have been set at liberty—the chief of police Koskimäki, commissar Vihtori Mäkinen and J. J. Lalo, inspector of the Kemi elementary schools. These men have been liberated because they must answer for it that no Finnish civilians should any hostile acts against the German forces. (See yesterday's Digest 1973, D34-35.)

—Some Still in Prison

D40. Aftonbladet, Stockholm, 8.10.44. Helsingin reports from Helsinki: A great number of hostages in Kemi have now been released, but the most prominent citizens are still imprisoned. The Germans have begun to destroy the town, which indicates that they are preparing to abandon it. During the past 24 hours Kemi has been enveloped in clouds of smoke, and great fires have been observed.

The Fighting: War Communiqué—

D41. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (11.30). Our troops have captured the large village of Poasi. North-west of Naima the Germans were forced to retreat to Ylimaa after a battle. In the direction of Kemi our troops have advanced in the outskirts of the town, where fierce battles are in progress against the German forces, who offer stiff resistance.

East of Tornio the fire of the German heavy units has at times been strong. North of the town the violent German attempts to break through have been repelled in hard fighting.

Twelve German tanks have been destroyed since October 1st in the Tornio area.

D42. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (11.30). Our advance continues north-west of Poasi. At Ylimaa our troops are engaged in battles with German forces, which are offering stiff resistance. After the capture of Kemi (see D41), our forces have continued the pursuit of the retreating German forces about the river Kemi north-west. The bridge over the river Kemi has been destroyed. After east of Tornio, the Finnish advance was hindered on October 8th, and contact was made with the troops advancing from Kemi and thus the coast of the whole Gulf of Bothnia, up to the state boundary, is now in our hands. North of Tornio the encircled German battalions were forced after particularly heavy battles, to surrender. About 400 Germans were taken prisoner and in addition about 35 AA guns, 30 motor vehicles and about 50 motor cycles were taken as booty. Our air forces have successfully supported the operations of the land forces along the river Kemi.

—How Kemi was Captured—

D43. Finnish Home Service, 8.10.44 (12.00). Supplementing the communiqué issued this morning, it has been reported this evening that Kemi has been captured. (See D42.) Our troops, who attacked from the direction of the coastal road and islands to the north-west of the town, encircled the town yesterday, and cut the main road north of the railway. According to information so far received, some 500 Germans have been interned.

—Germans Now Officially Enemies—

D44. *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, 8.10.44, reports from Helsinki: The German Army in North Finland is now definitely considered an enemy force, since the official communiqué for the first time on October 7th says: "The enemy lost 100 killed." Earlier reports have only used the word "Germans," but now the latter are officially stamped as enemies of Finland.

—Finnish Optimistic—

D45. *Dagens Nyheter*, 8.10.44. Nyblom reports from Haparanda: Finnish officers judge the situation on the northern front optimistically in the main, although the fighting has demanded heavy sacrifices. Losses have been remarkably high considering the forces engaged. The Finns now hold their positions securely against the Germans, who are trying to approach Tornio from Kemi, and the situation in the Vajakkala sector is still more favourable, since the Finns there have succeeded in encircling the Germans. The Finnish problem is that the only harbour in the Tornio sector—Röyttä—can still be reached by German artillery.

Military experts think that it is now time for the Germans to evacuate, in view of developments in the Tornio area. They can scarcely any longer have

strategical or tactical use of this sector. However, it is possible that Rendulic will follow Hitler's recipe, and make the soldiers fight to the last. The Germans have suffered their heaviest losses in the area between Tornio and Kemi. They succeeded in breaking through at Alaslahti, but the Finnish troops repelled them effectively. The situation round Kemi is impossible to judge, but apparently the Germans still hold the town. (See D43-44.) A large-scale evacuation is expected from the islands off Kemi. One thousand five hundred women and children will go to Sweden.

It is reported that the Germans have arrested a number of journalists in Kemi who have sharply criticised the German measures.

—German Position at Tornio Hopeless—

D46. Swedish Home Service, 8.10.44 (18.00). According to the latest report from Haparanda, the situation for the Germans north of Tornio is now hopeless. In the afternoon of October 8th it was reported that all the units of the German army and all the units of the German navy under the command of a captain, and all the others having been killed or injured or having escaped to join the German main force further north.

D47. Swedish Home Service, 8.10.44 (12.30). During a drive this morning along the Tornio river it was established that German forces were about seven to eight km north of Tornio. The German group which was three to four km north of Tornio has been cleared up since the night of October 8th. The Germans here were either killed or have gone into hiding. When mopping-up operations started on October 8th about one German battalion was there.

It now appears that the Germans have left the island of Oranienstern in the Tornio river.

—Heavy Losses—

D48. *Aftonbladet*, Stockholm, 8.10.44. Billy reports from Haparanda: The Tornio fighting has already cost the Germans such heavy losses that it is questionable whether it is still advantageous for them to continue. Strategically they are retreating and fully realise that they must sooner or later abandon North Finland. The retreat should have taken place much earlier, since now it will be chaotic and the cost will be enormous. The battles which have been raging for the past two days have already cost the Germans so many killed that they cannot bury them. Since the Finns have now received reinforcements the Germans have little if any chance of recapturing Tornio. Instead their so-called eastern front may be cut off, and the same applies to the group in Kemi which is now involved in hard fighting.

An official representative told the correspondent that the evacuation of civilians in the threatened territories is now almost completed. The behaviour of the Germans towards the Finns varied considerably. In some places they have helped with the evacuation, while in others they have acted very cruelly and have shot wounded Finns. No official reports are available, but the matter is being investigated.

—Fighting Moves Away From Tornio—

D49. Swedish Home Service, 8.10.44 (19.00). It is reported from Haparanda that the fighting on the southern sector of the Tornio bridgehead today was moved further and further away from Tornio. In Haparanda, one could only hear the gunfire from the

south and the east sporadically. It seems as if the position of the Finns has been considerably improved in this sector. As the front in the south and east is pressed farther away, the risk of Haparanda coming into the firing line decreases.

On the southern sector, fierce fighting took place throughout the whole of the day. The island of Oravateenari in the river Torne, has changed hands several times during the past week. This afternoon it seemed as if the Germans were holding it. This morning the civilian population—which has been evacuated to Sweden—was given permission to go over to the island to look after the animals.

An air raid by nine German "Stuka" aircraft was made at noon today a good way from Tornio, and this confirms the supposition that the front line in this direction has moved away from the town. It was impossible to observe in detail the result of the air raid, as the bombs fell behind a forest area.

—New Weapons—

D50. *Uppsala Nya Tidning*, 7.10.44. reports from Haparanda: One of the Germans' new weapons has been used on the Torneja front: Two large aircraft, obviously of the "Dornier" type, suddenly released a flying bomb from the wing; the bomb fell and then rose before disappearing towards the sea, evidently outside Koyla harbour.

—First Snow Falls—

D51. *Finnish Overseas Service* (in English for N. America), 9.10.44 (13.15). The first snow of the season has fallen on Lapland. When there is enough snow for skiing the Finnish troops, over many of whom is an expert skier, will gain a big advantage over their German opponents. Then the numerous ski patrols can go into action and give the German rear no rest night or day.

—Swedish Breaches of Security—

D52. *Uppsala Nya Tidning*, 7.10.44. reports from Helsinki: Official circles in Helsinki are displeased with the Haparanda correspondents of the Swedish papers, who often give the Germans useful information by mentioning place names. In this connection the Finns state that the former German Press Attaché in Helsinki, Metzger, is now serving at the German Legation in Stockholm. Metzger, who speaks perfect Finnish and Swedish, is regarded in Finland as one of the heads of the German Secret Service.

—Incidents in German Retreat

D53. *Aftonbladet*, Stockholm, 8.10.44. Hälsösten reports from Helsinki: In Kuusamo near Koyla the Germans have burnt almost all the houses. "The Finns are told of a letter written by a German soldier to his relatives in Germany, saying: 'The Germans are just about to invade Britain.' The writer maintains that all the German secret weapons will be used."

D54. *Aftonbladet*, Stockholm, 8.10.44. Hälsösten reports from Helsinki: German mines have caused civilian casualties, since they mined even back yards. Between Talvaskoski and Puolanka the Germans have destroyed 21 bridges. In Talvaskoski they broke valuable telephone and took the staff and five or six other municipal officials as hostages. The latter were compelled to follow the retreating German troops but succeeded in camping at Pudasjärvi and are now at home.

Refugees Unmolested—

D55. *Dagens Nyheter*, 8.10.44. TT reports from Haparanda: In the last few days the Germans apparently have not hindered the evacuation of places even south of Upper Tornio, but they do not wish refugees to pass Aavasaksa.

—Except at Aavasaksa—

D56. *Dagens Nyheter*, 8.10.44. The Haparanda correspondent reports: The way the Germans are hindering the evacuation from Aavasaksa is that they are building extensive fortifications there.

German version of Rendille's new powers: see A17. Finnish prisoners of war in North Norway: see D3. Finnish Chief of Police to be tried in Sweden: see D58.

Swedish press urges material help for Finland: see D53.

Finnish refugees in Sweden: see D70-75. Germans from Finland take refuge in Sweden: see D76-78.

Sweden: Comment and Axis Activities

Swedish Unwillingness to Help Germany—

D57. *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 6.10.44. says it was unwelcome news which reached the Swedish public when it was announced that Sweden had undertaken to look after German interests in Finland. (See *Dagens*, 1945, 9.3. D14-15.) To refuse to do so would have been a departure from international practice, but it would have been a departure brought about by Germany's own conduct. The Germans are still continuing their deportations from Norway. One cannot with a clear conscience oblige a Power which for four and a half years has infringed all the rights of free peoples. Now Germany does not recognise any international laws. One cannot go on considering the Germany of today to be on the same footing as the other nations.

Sweden cannot feel neutral in the present struggle between German invaders and her sister nations, Denmark and Norway. It is Germany's own affair how she establishes relations with the outside world. The Swedish Government should realise that the Swedish people do not wish to carry out any confidential missions for the Germans. It would be anything but pleasant if, on examination into Nazi bankruptcy, Sweden had the right to appear as the administrator of extensive German capital. The right of asylum applies just as little to war criminals as to their relatives. When Sweden undertook to look after Germany's interests in Finland, the motion was of course not to serve Nazism but to be able to do Finland the same service in Berlin. At the same time Sweden does not desire to be the Protecting Power for Germany.

—Caution Over Foreign Captives—

D58. *Swedish Press*, 6.10.44. *Ekonomisk Revy*, the organ of the Swedish Bank Association, publishes an article on the question of asylum rights for the personal fortunes of political refugees. Theoretically, says the paper, an asylum country like Sweden should be capable of protecting political refugees against any income taken by a foreign Power to deprive them of their property in Sweden. This principle ought to serve as a working basis, but exceptions must be made

in practice for reasons of international law. If one State is to maintain smooth relations with another, its courts of justice, should not, except in case of urgent need, question the legitimacy of measures taken by a foreign Power within its frontiers. Such a procedure wounds the feelings and prestige of a foreign Power and might easily lead to reprisals.

Also discussing the implications of Müller's recent statement on war criminals (see Digest 1046, 74, 1221) the paper refers to the important question of how Sweden by refugees of an undesirable type. In such cases it is imperative that both the responsible banking authorities and other financial institutions should observe the greatest caution in dealing with financial transactions and commissions of an irregular nature in which it can be presumed that citizens of a belligerent country are involved.

German Legation Official Resigns.

059. *Swedish Press*, 7.10.44. *Dagens Nyheter* reports that Dr. Hermann Kappner, Secretary at the German Legation, has resigned his position and is at present residing in Sweden as a stateless alien. The paper declares that the news will not surprise his acquaintances who have long been aware that he was unhappy in his position. The recent trend of events has evidently led him to "jump off."

Kappner came to Sweden some years ago before Hitler gained control in Germany and he practised as a teacher until shortly before the outbreak of war when he was appointed superintendent of the Culture Department of the German Legation. Since then he has been mainly responsible for cultural exchanges between Sweden and Germany.

Chilly Welcome

060. *Dagens Nyheter*, 7.10.44, writes that Hermann Kappner, who as a well-known figure in Sweden, does not seem to have been guilty of any act which might place him in the category of war criminals. He is a more plausible type, but in the circumstances by no means harmless. During his service with the Board of Education he has diligently served the expanding Nazi propaganda organizations, working all the time for interests which were anything but Swedish. Conspicuous people did not notice whose errands he was running; they thought him a nice quiet fellow, obliging and very pro-Swedish. Now Kappner has disassociated himself from Nazism, but his character has not improved merely because he has taken this step a little earlier than his German contemporaries in Sweden. He ought to be treated as an unwelcome guest and nothing more. At the present time Sweden is well acquainted with these changeable, threatening and smiling, but nowadays mostly treacherous Germans. If we must have them in Sweden, we can at least keep them at arms' length.

Sweden Stands Afloat.

061. *Nya Dagbladet*, 6.10.44, discusses the possibility of establishing a union of States in Western Europe after the war. The Economist now maintains that the region should also include Scandinavia and declares that the idea underlying the Western European and Scandinavian unions is identical with that which made Russia interested in Finland and the Baltic States. The Economist's statement is remarkable since, after she has been beaten, Germany will scarcely be able to threaten Britain or force her to

sink securely according to regional principles. Sweden desires to be able to live at peace with the peoples in the west and with the Great Power in the east. The best thing for Sweden, and indeed for all Scandinavian countries, would be to remain outside the Great Power blocs if the new world is to be founded on their principles.

(German contingent; see A26-24.)

Financial Aid to Reconstruction

062. *Swedish Press*, 9.10.44. At a meeting of the Swedish Ladies Union on October 8th Rektor Alva Myrdal gave a lecture on post-war planning and the contribution of women. She said that Sweden must create her own UNRRA. The sum of 400,000,000 kr voted by the Riksdag for international reconstruction was three times as much as Sweden would have been obliged to pay if she had been a member of UNRRA, but it must be emphasized that it was not in Sweden's interest that these sums should be used entirely for credits to the various countries. It was more rational to appropriate a large part to the deliveries which Sweden will be able to make. The Swedish people desire to pay at least in money for the war which they have avoided paying for in blood.

Nazi Plan for Partisan Warfare

063. *Svenska Morgonposten*, Stockholm, 7.10.44. Commenting on Himmler's plans to create an underground army, the paper says that the entire scheme bears the stamp of pure Nazism. Not for one moment do the Nazis hesitate to plunge their Fatherland into needless suffering during a protracted and hopeless struggle characterized by extreme desperation. The Nazi leaders are speculating on the prospects of inflicting the German people after capitulation with the same war but which has caused the Germans so much trouble and so many difficulties in oppressed countries. They, in fact, propose to continue their brutal methods against the defeated German people.

Warsaw: "Foretaste of Post-War Politics"

064. *"Göteborgs" Morgonposten*, 5.10.44, writes that the Warsaw tragedy further weakens the relations between Russia and the Polish Government in London and also between Russia, Britain and America. The battle of Warsaw has caused great irritation. It is clear that the chief cause of conflict is the Russian desire to solve the entire Polish problem in her own way. The political aspect of the Warsaw tragedy should be understood. It is the first taste of post-war political conflicts. Sweden must keep aloof from this conflict by remaining neutral and must employ all her material resources in the construction of a new and peaceful Europe.

Norwegian Home Front Stands Firm

065. *Svenska Dagbladet*, 8.10.44, refers to the Norwegian cultural week which is about to commence and says that during the last century Norwegian culture has been the best in the world in quality in comparison with the small population of the country. "We Swedes ought to take advantage of this unique opportunity of extending our knowledge of Norwegian culture." Discussing the Norwegian home front, the paper writes that recent events in Norway have been overshadowed by those in Finland and Denmark since more open publicity has brought them more into the public eye. Sometimes, however, as in the case of the slave ship "Westfalen," the situation in Norway

is drawn into the limelight. In spite of all the efforts of informers, provocateurs and the Gestapo, the Norwegian home front remains firm and unshakable: of late it has even been stimulated by the war news from outside which with admirable speed is spread over the neutral country verbally and by the illegal newspapers. The Norwegians must not be impatient for action, but the faithful life of Norway will not doubt eliminate the danger of an impulsive call to arms.

—Affinity with Sweden

Stockholms-Tidningen, 2.10.44, refers to the Norwegian cultural week, which it says will be of great value for future relations between Sweden and Norway. Norway's day of liberation is specially approaching, and it gives Sweden cause to rejoice that the remaining time need not be reckoned in years, but only in months. The paper refers to the many differences of opinion between the Swedes and the Norwegians, and says that the Swedish people have followed the heroic struggle of Norway with a strong feeling of common affinity, but at the same time have been convinced that their own policy was the only one possible in the circumstances. The Swedes also believe that their economic, military and political forces will be of some importance for neighbouring countries in post-war years. They harbour no illusions, however, and are fully aware of the risks of political disunity.

Iron Ore Still Going to Germany?

D67 Swedish Press, 6.10.44. *Trois Affir* reveals that since ore traffic stopped in the Baltic harbours, the transport of Swedish ore to Germany has continued via Väner's dock. The ore from the Hälsjö mine is freighted by D3 and MPA railways to Öckerö, where it is met by German boats. The official declaration that Swedish ore traffic with Germany has ceased pales in the face of these facts and that the ore comes from German-owned mines is no excuse.

Finnish Chief of Police to be Tried

D68 Swedish Home Service, 8.10.44 (14.00). At the Privy Council today it was decided that the Governor of Stockholm should try the former Finnish Chief of Police, who is now in detention.

Finnish comment: see D72.

Send Arms to Finland

D69. *Trois Affir*, 4.10.44. The Finnish-German fighting on the Swedish frontier has brought Sweden within the danger zone. Sweden gave Finland effective assistance with arms and ammunition in 1939, despite her scanty reserves, and thousands of volunteers hastened to the aid of the brother nation. Why is there such silence on this question now that the task is much simpler, and would ease the dangerous pressure on Sweden and all Scandinavia?

"We do not demand participation in the war, but is it too much that we should, in the interest of democracy and our own security, help Finland's democratic people Government to eliminate the Nazi vermin by supplying arms and ammunition—as in 1939? It was then said: 'Finland's cause is ours.' Is it less so now that Finland is in the hands of democracy, now that at last the Scandinavian atmosphere is clear and we have a Scandinavian platform for the first time?"

Swedish papers give away information on Finnish fighting: see D72.

Finnish Refugees: Total—

D70. Swedish Home Service, 7.10.44 (18.00). Since the Swedish authorities have permitted the evacuation to Sweden of Finnish frontier areas, a considerable number of temporary evacuees, whom both the Finnish and Swedish authorities have helped to settle in their homes, have arrived in Sweden. It is estimated that 13-14,500 such evacuees have arrived. With the more permanent ones, the total number of Finnish evacuees in northern Sweden this evening totals 40-42,000.

—Wealthy—

D71. Stockholms-Tidningen, 7.10.44. The United correspondent reports on October 5th: Well-to-do refugees are arriving across Kvarken. Part of the former Finnish Legion staff in Berlin is said to have crossed in a sailing boat. A number of officials, including two marshals, have arrived in Sweden.

—Three kinds—

D72. Dagens Nyheter, 6.10.44, reports that the Finnish refugees now arriving at Umeå can be placed in three categories: Those fleeing from the Russians, those fleeing from the Germans and lastly informers and collaborators who have gone in fear of their lives. The first-mentioned category are in the majority, but the latter seems to be on the increase.

—Wounded—

D73. *Nya Dagbladet-Ålsholms*, 7.10.44, reports from Umeå: A hospital train said to contain 50 wounded Finns is expected at Umeå on October 9th.

D74. *Dagens Nyheter*, 8.10.44. Forty wounded arrived on October 7th at Skellefteå and another train with wounded arrived at Grönviksbruk.

—Financial Distress

D75. *Norwegian Home Service*, 4.10.44 (18.00). *Norwegian Daily* reports that the Finnish refugees in Sweden are in a desperate plight economically. They have to rely on the black market and pay 200 Finn for one Swedish kr.

Germans Reach Sweden—

D76. Swedish Press, 8.10.44. Among the Germans who crossed the frontier from the sanctuary in Tornio were two sick German women. At least 100 German and Finnish wounded soldiers crossed to the Swedish side on October 8th.

—After Escape from Tornio

D77. *Aftonbladet*, Stockholm, 8.10.44. Ditt reports from Haparanda: One hundred and seventy German soldiers who were imprisoned in Tornio sanctuary escaped to Sweden on the night of October 7th. The Finnish guard was not very strict, as several of the Germans were wounded. At 02.30 the Finns were requested to fetch their own wounded from the battlefield further north. Some of the guards were sent there by ambulance. The Germans seized the opportunity and ran to the old main road which leads from north Tornio to Swedish Karasjok. They did not meet any resistance on the way and have now been interned by the Swedes.

D78. *Nya Dagbladet-Ålsholms*, 8.10.44. T7 reports from Haparanda: A German captain who has escaped

from Tornio said that the Germans in the sanctuary were allowed to catch wounded Germans outside Tornio in an ambulance. While the vehicle was away other Germans prepared to escape. When it returned the Finnish scouts opened the gate and the Germans slipped out. One hundred and twenty walked and the rest came in the ambulance to the Swedish side. Before they reached the frontier they threw away their weapons but brought heaps of blankets and bread with them.

Surprise at Number of Hospital Trains

D78. *Swedish Press*, 8.10.44. A person living in the immediate vicinity of the railway at Karlskrona, who sees all the hospital trains from the window, writes to *Krigspolis* expressing surprise at the number of trains. At least these long trains in each direction have passed weekly for the last month. Since then they have been in heavy traffic in the north during this period, the correspondent would not have called "divulge" only once a day but as a regular affair. *Krigspolis*'s reporter on a visit to Karlskrona station was surprised at the number of unattended passengers who were visible through the window of the hospital train.

German Prefers Internment

D81. *Alfred-Tidningen*, 8.10.44. Reports that a German machine-gun with a crew of five and two German soldiers arrived at Lundbom on October 4th. The investigation being carried on by the local police indicated that the captain intended to make for a Swedish port rather than the destination to which he had been ordered. Both the captain and the crew indicated their intention to stay in Sweden but the two soldiers wanted to return to Germany and departed on the evening of October 5th for Helsingborg from where they will continue to Denmark. According to an unconfirmed report the boat was armed with a machine-gun which was dismantled by the military authorities.

Telephone Communication With Germany Cut

D81. *Swedish Home Service*, 8.10.44 (12.20). Telephone communications between Sweden and Germany, which were cut at 10.00 on October 5th, are still interrupted. As late as about 12.00 today it was still impossible to make contact with Berlin and Hamburg. Telephone communications with the whole of the southern continent have been interrupted as a result.

Danish Quislings Come Prepared

D82. DPT, 7.10.44. In addition to the two notorious quislings, Henning Dalgaard and Jari Stenbach who are interned in Sweden, the brothers Haulberg have now also fled to Sweden. Henning Dalgaard and Jari Stenbach arrived on September 18th at Mälar in a pleasure yacht from Dalgaard's summer villa at Isfjärden. Dalgaard brought his wife and two children and an enormous amount of luggage, including four ox-hide trunks, five suitcases and rhinoceros protectors, colonial shirts of food, silver stuffs, and hats, some furniture, new ladies underwear of more and more brand new things and Swedish, Danish and French money. (See *Digest* 1557, 30.9. D80.)

D83. *Arbeter*, Malmö, 5.10.44. The editor in chief of *Arbeter*, Helge Bangsted, has arrived in Sweden and has been taken care of by the Swedish authorities. Bangsted crossed in a small boat which capsized outside Helsingborg. A Helsingborg boat came to the rescue and

saved Bangsted whose pockets were full of abundant Swedish bank notes and ration cards. Danish circles in Sweden believe Bangsted intended to sneak to Sweden in order to inform against his compatriots. It is also probable that he had found the revenge of his compatriots.

Danish Engineer Escapes

D84. *Swedish Press*, 8.10.44. Helge Eriksson, a Danish engineer who was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment last October on charges of fraud, escaped from Swedish internment camp nearly a month ago and is believed to have crossed the Norwegian frontier.

Russians Arrested

D85. *Swedish Press*, 6.10.44. Four Russians between the ages of 20 and 30 have been arrested following an attempted attempt to pass to Russia in a stolen motorboat, the remains of which floated away after they had left the coast.

Scots Still Detained

D86. *Swedish Press*, 8.10.44. The Attorney-General has agreed to prolong the period of detention of Renato Sertus, an Italian suspected of having been engaged in unlawful intelligence activity. (See *Digest* 1572, 7.10. 200-70.)

Landing Is German Aircraft

D87. *Swedish Home Service*, 8.10.44 (12.10). An aircraft with German markings made a forced landing on Gotland 18th afternoon. There were two Latvians in the aircraft who said they had escaped from German service. The aircraft was undamaged and the crew uninjured. They have been taken in charge by Army personnel, reports the Defence Staff.

Swedish Aircraft Attacked

D88. *Swedish Home Service*, 8.10.44 (11.00). A Swedish aircraft was attacked at 12.08 today by two German fighters over Swedish territory north of Haparanda. The aircraft was not hit. The German aircraft left Swedish territory immediately afterwards, states the Defence Staff.

One for Cars

D89. *Swedish Press*, 6.10.44. *Tyds Allt* in connection with the hiring out of Swedish motor-cars to Dietz's troops in Finland three years ago reveals that Sweden stipulated that she should receive nickel ore from the Petsamo mines in exchange.

Appeal for Meurling's Release

D90. *Swedish Press*, 8.10.44. A further appeal for the release of Per Meurling, the Communist who was sentenced to two years' penal servitude for unlawful intelligence activity, was lodged on October 5th. The signatories who included Carl Albert Andersson, chairman of the Stockholm Town Council and Laurence Markus Söderstedt, pointed out that since Finland and Russia had now made peace all political prisoners in Finland had been liberated. It would be inadvisable that Meurling should complete the sentence passed for intelligence activity related to the Finnish war. (See *Digest* 1556, 30.9. D77.)

Broadcasts in Scandinavian Languages

D91. *Swedish Press*, 8.10.44. The Swedish broadcasting authorities announce that as from October 9th

in German, in French, Dutch and Norwegian will be a regular event on the Swedish radio. In view of the large number of Scandinavian refugees now in Sweden, the authorities intend to broadcast brief surveys of topical events in Sweden three times a week.

"Dagposten" Withdraws Suit Against C. in C.

The Swedish *Dagposten* case against the C. in C. General June was resumed today before the special military court in Stockholm. (See *Digest* 1344, 58, 1256). The paper's representatives withdrew their suit against the General since the latter had stated that it was never his intention to accuse the paper of criminal activities. June was not present, but was represented by the barrister Sids Kjelset who submitted that the withdrawal of the suit did not call for a statement from the C. in C. who had no place against the official chief of the Swedish Press and Public Opinion. Since the General did not consider the attack directed against him personally, he dropped it before his difficulty in sue *Dagposten's* representatives. This part of the case was then closed.

The acting Public Prosecutor, Military Prosecutor Rydman, said that another four weeks would be required for the police investigations into the question of possible collaboration between *Dagposten* and a foreign Power. He presented a letter from the Chief Military Prosecutor appealing for a postponement of the hearing as the latter was not yet in a position to state his case.

Kjelset said he found it difficult to understand that object of the letter from the Chief Military Prosecutor. He considered it strange that the latter should limit at an "error in the discharge of official functions" while at the same time seeking to charge. He urged that at the next session of the court the Chief Military Prosecutor should put forward such charges as could be considered by facts. The hearing was postponed until November 18th.

"Dagposten's" Printing Press

The *Dagposten* Press, which in its military notice is connected with the probably impending liquidation of *Dagposten*, today again points out that the printing press was received from the Germans who stole it from the Communist paper *L'Humanité* in Paris.

German-Swedish telephone connections cut: see B11
Baltic refugees reach Sweden: see C100-111.

BELGIUM

September Statement Explained

El. *De Vlaamse Post*, Berlin 30.9.44. R. Wellens writes: During a variety performance by Jan Baet in a Saxon town on 24.9.44, we sat among a group of Dutch and Flemish workers, who did not know we were journalists. They openly discussed the speedy end of the war, and Dieckhoff and Flemings agreed that the Germans could hold out at most a fortnight longer. They discussed the various means of communication by which they intended to go home. One suggested that the slow trains would still be running, another mentioned going by car. It is a fact that the Germans are still far from beaten and their resistance is growing daily. We cannot ignore the fact that these laborers miscalculated so grossly because we are not.

stated that it is chiefly laziness that makes them look for the end of the war. They are not the only ones who miscalculated.

Couratill stated ten months ago that the war must end before October 1st, otherwise... He did not finish the sentence, but it is clear that he intended to say: otherwise England and the Americans would have won the war. In September 1943, the English and the Americans had only two weeks of good weather at their disposal and their utmost to force a decision within that time. On the other hand, the Germans had good defence positions and were exerting themselves to win the race against time; if they were capable of stopping the Allied advance in the east six weeks ago, they would thereby have won the time to turn the chances and perhaps to win the war with new weapons. Churchill's two months and "Seydlitz's" two weeks have passed without the Anglo-Americans having forced a decision. Little is left of the premature triumph cries of London and Washington. The American and English newspapers have suddenly become much more cautious and when the public against any exaggerated optimism. The *Manchester Guardian* writes that the bitter battle on the Marne during the last fortnight must be a lesson proving that tales of a speedy end of the war are stupid and dangerous. The *New York Herald Tribune* warns the Americans that only club strategy strategists dare predict the end of the war before the end of 1944. When you read these level-headed press wires and, on the other hand, you consider that some weeks ago British propaganda was asking Germany why she continued the lost fight, whether friend or foe, one must respect the achievements of the Germans during that time. To say the less it is reckless for Flemish workers to discuss whether they will return home by slow train or by bicycle during a KdF performance, especially in the light of the fact that the performances of this kind are still taking place in the sixth year of war in a country looking for life or death.

No General Mobilization Under German Occupation

El. *De Vlaamse Post*, Berlin 30.9.44, commenting on the general mobilization in Belgium states: All men aged 18 to 50 are to be called to arms. Pleris, who had already deserted his people and deserted the measure, which endangers the lives of thousands of "Belgians". For four years, from London, he encouraged terrorism and turned the population's heads with his promises. What has become of them? Eric Wastham writes in the *Observer*: Since September 1940 there has been no bread in Brussels. The supply situation is now considerably worse than under the German occupation. Since the English marched into Brussels meat is no longer sold to the population. Potatoes and fat have become very scarce. The coal stocks are nearly exhausted.

Transport of coal from mines to towns has become very difficult because American aircraft have destroyed the railways and rolling-stock. This means that the winter the population of Flanders and Walonia will starve and freeze. Now that men aged 18 to 40 are to be sent into the front for Britain and America, many who formerly longed for "liberation" will certainly change their minds. Perhaps they will remember that during the four years of the German occupation nobody starved or froze, and that the Ger-

man Wehrmacht never compelled any Fleming or Walloon to take up arms against Britain.

British designs on Belgium: see A25-26.

HOLLAND

Chaos, not Liberation

ES. Dutch Home Service, 11.04.44 (19.40), broadcast interviews with refugees from Southern Holland: A refugee from Noord-Brabant said he had not fled because he anticipated trouble from the Allied Occupation force having been in contact with the Germans, but because pressure was brought to bear on the whole population to join the Dutch armed forces; he had no intention of doing so. For four years they had been in the war, now it was the turn of the others to carry it. Speaking about the liberation he admitted that what the Allies expected, Eindhoven, there was no longer enthusiasm. The fact was that the people were wearing Orange trousers—in fact it resembled an old fashioned Brabant Kerndesser. But the enthusiasm soon flagged when it transpired that the promised chocolate, cigarettes and other delicacies were not forthcoming. The British brought with them what they needed themselves, and paid no heed to the desires of the population. The "civilian authorities" had to look after that.

They were woefully inefficient; they had been reinstated, and were left to create order out of chaos. Food supplies—owing to the isolation of these areas—had broken down and hunger resulted. The Allies do precisely nothing to alleviate it. The civil authorities try to institute some sort of equal distribution of the few remaining supplies available, but so many parties try to have a say in the matter that it looks as if the pre-1914 situation will recur. Everybody wants to give orders, everybody wants to have contributed more towards the liberation. The black market, which flourished nicely before this upheaval, is now going stronger than ever in Eindhoven. There is not much destruction where some looting by the "liberating" troops has taken place. In brief, something quite different had been expected from the "liberation."

Families Face Winter With Fear

ES. Van Honk, Platen, 23.4.44 (do not quote). The editor, who recently visited Holland, writes: A few days after the invasion, one fact that the war had reached Holland was perceptible in a way which irresponsible elements had not expected. Railway traffic was seriously hampered by military traffic and attacks by Allied fighters, and this immediately had such an effect on the population's supplies that the situation threatened to become catastrophic. Few trains are still available for civilian needs, practically none run between 08.00 and 16.00 hours. No steam-trains are running; traffic with the southern part of the country can therefore only be maintained as far as 's-Hertogenbosch. Consequently there is now traffic in the triangle Alkmaar-Amersfoort-'s-Hertogenbosch.

The effect on the food-supply can hardly be grasped. After a few days, difficulties occurred in the food supply of large towns: meat and butter were practically unobtainable even in the black-market. In Amsterdam pears and apples were unobtainable, whereas in Utrecht, hawkers were selling fruit in the streets as before and had difficulty in selling their supplies at the present ridiculous prices of one guilder for three kg of apples or pears. Amsterdam must

obtain its food supplies from the neighboring polders, which will be possible for a time but the population invaded the polders threatening equitable distribution. The Burgomaster has therefore forbidden entrance to the polders. Almost everywhere emergency cards have been issued for feeding the population from public kitchens. Traffic from country to towns, which would create possibilities of supply if the farmers transported goods by automobile or cart, is nearly impossible because no one is safe from Allied pilots' attacks.

The traffic stagnation has had a still more serious effect on the coal supply. Gasworks or electricity works in large towns are almost without coal. Amsterdam has restricted its gas supply drastically, announcing that its coal stocks were only sufficient for about one week. Consequently the tram-service also has been considerably run down. In most towns trams have stopped between 08.00 and 16.00 hours. Automobile traffic is entirely prohibited, and the State of Emergency decreed on September 4th obliges everyone to remain indoors after 20.00 hours. Many families since the winter with fear because they have not secured any coal and probably will not, as the coalmining districts are in the war zone. At the beginning of this week, black dealers demanded 100 lll for one hl of coke. Many enterprises must cease work owing to lack of materials. These enterprises are already disregarding the social laws enforced under the occupation; often workers are dismissed without notice and must await their "liberation" without either work or money.

Americans Know Not Why Nor Where

ES. Dutch Home Service, 8.04.44 (12.00). Our Holland trembles with the noise of war. All our people is the battle across which with fearful hearts we tension to the rumble of the distant guns. People in nearby areas listen with dread to the terrible stories of misery and suffering told by the refugees. We listen, but do we really understand what terrible heart-breaking scenes take place so near to us? Everything is so strange and unreal. It is so different from what tens of thousands of our people imagined it would be like. It is so different from what they were told, and what they liked to believe, hoping that everything would then be well.

No, listeners, I hardly have to tell you how you had envisaged the liberation—the disappearance of the German soldiers. From this dream our people were awakened by brute force. Our small country became a great battlefield overnight. The name of — beautiful town of Arnhem has become world famous—a sad name. But do these names mean anything to the Americans? No, an American does not know whether Arnhem is a town or a country. He does not know whether it is inhabited by Dutchmen or Hortenloos. I am stating this with great bitterness. This is the truth. American prisoners do not know whether they were fighting in Holland, France, Belgium, or whether it was Germany or Holland. The one is their enemy, and the other is their ally! They do not know why, but they do not care and continue fighting.

Allied Leaflets Attacked

ES. Volk en Vaderland, Utrecht, 25.4.44. "The Vliegende Hollander", a propaganda pamphlet spread by Allied aircraft, writes the following about the opinion of the French to the British-American "liberation": "Men and women crowded out tired and dirty from

cellars and holes in the ground. They had arms full of red and white flowers. Propaganda is nice but you can make it too silly. You can just see it. Dirty and tired French people crawling out of cellars and holes with arms full of flowers!"

More Invasion Instructions From Underground Front

ET. The clandestine paper *Das Volk*, July 1st, 1944, publishes the following instructions to the Dutch people (not including instructions to armed resistance groups. - Ed.): 4. Instructions which you must follow now in order to prepare yourselves for the arrival of the Allied armies.

II and II give detailed instructions concerning the provision of shelters, fire-watching and conduct during raids. III. Form First Aid Squads now. Register with blood transfusion services. Ask advice from a doctor. Do nothing on your own. Bear in mind the possibility of gas attacks.

IV. Be mindful of the danger of fire. Do not let the fact that the ARP regulations are imposed by the enemy, prevent you from having good equipment to combat incendiaries.

V. [Detailed instructions in regard to ARP.]

VI. Exercise your powers of observation. It is of the greatest importance that you should practice this now. Every person must be able to answer the following questions without consulting anything or anyone:

- (1) How many gauges are there in your neighborhood?
- (2) How many railway bridges. Are they built of bricks, quarry stone reinforced concrete or metal?
- (3) In what direction of the wind does the railway run, for example, north to south, or east to west?
- (4) How great is the correct distance from your house to the nearest hospital, station, pond, brook or river?
- (5) Where does your water supply come from?
- (6) If you live in a town, can you draw a map of the main street with the names of all the side streets which run into it and where all these go to?
- (7) Where are the nearest woods? What area do they cover?
- (8) What are the main types of trees growing there.
- (9) Who is the local station master, gas, electricity and water supply superintendent.
- (10) Practice estimating distances and verify your answers in this carefully and regularly.
- (11) Observe military data:
 - (a) Situation of enemy positions and how they are camouflaged.
 - (b) Movements of troops, tanks, guns, etc. Num. ber, armament, type, direction, speed.
 - (c) Enemy storage dumps and repair shops. Type of storage dumps, food, munition, etc. and how they are camouflaged.
 - (d) Condition of the ground and the roads: swamps, flooding, good or bad roads, clay or sandy soil.
 - (e) Activities of the fifth column: civilians who behave in a suspicious way and who are known to be in the service of the enemy.
 - (f) New weapons or new weapon technique.
 - (g) Possible use of gas by the enemy: what kinds.

VII. Form a listening circle. Here, however, you must settle work very carefully. It is sufficient to know that in case of invasion you can yourself hear the instructions of the Allied Supreme Command from Mr. X. In that case take down notes and hand on the news to definite acquaintances. Practice this now. You will then notice whether the system is satisfactory or whether the news only gets through imperfectly. It is better to be able to contact less people with accurate instructions than that many should receive multiplied reports.

VIII. Sabotage the German measures! Recently the Germans have been calling up people on a large scale for the construction of obstructions along the coast. It is everyone's duty to evade this as far as is possible, for these are the obstructions which will presently have to be overcome by our own compatriots at the cost of lives. Those are the trenches from which the Germans will presently batter our liberators with machine guns. On no account may any Dutchman cooperate in this. The least you can do is not to go unnecessarily to excursions, football matches, etc., where many people gather together. Very often these places are cordoned off and all the people, young and old, are transported to Zeeland. You are not asked whether for reasons of health you are not in a fit state to do heavy work. Everyone has to go. For three weeks or longer the people are then allowed to stand up to their knees in water to build obstructions in the inundated areas. The food is terrible, the housing usually consists of a stable or barn with straw. Should there still be Dutch people who are not able to sabotage these measures in principle, then they can do so from material considerations!

B. Instructions which, if followed, will be of great use during the liberation operations themselves:

1. Remain where you are. Above all, flight is public must be avoided. In this war it has been proved again and again that such flight brings disastrous consequences especially to the fugitives, and moreover the liberation operations would be seriously hindered thereby. If everyone remains in his own place of abode, suffering will end more quickly. Then, at any rate, everyone will know the exact possibilities, such as the nearest Police, Fire Brigade and first aid posts, the shelter room available and places which could serve as accommodation for homeless people, or even wounded—such as societies, meeting places, billiard rooms, etc. That is why we point out the official instructions once more:

"In no circumstances must the public leave their place of abode in order to go to a supposedly safer place, thus causing a stream of refugees which would end in a catastrophe." We must naturally not look upon this instruction as a contradiction of what has been said in broadcasts from the BBC, namely, that if possible, one hour before air raids on towns, leaflets with warnings will be disseminated, after which the population must leave the town. The evacuation of the town applies only as long as the air raid lasts. Once it is over everyone must return to his place of abode. This withdrawal is thus efficient safety measure and bears anything but the character of an endless flight. Everyone must decide now where he will go. All unnecessary luggage is an impediment.

II. Be mindful of the following dangers:

(1) Airways, bombardments, road street lighting if you hear shooting, machine-gun or mortar, go to the shelter and not into the street or in front of the window.

(2) Mines. If the enemy is fighting a defensive action or is withdrawing, he will probably lay mines in the roads. Do not ride or walk on the roads before you have ascertained that they are safe.

(3) Traps. A resourceful "fox" or the enemy is to connect lost knobs, or other apparently innocent domestic objects, with landmines or booby traps. Do not enter any houses which the enemy has just left without first having consulted the competent military authorities.

(4) Accidents with children. Be especially sure that your children are aware of the danger of running outside and of touching strange objects. Small children get accustomed more quickly to new circumstances than adults and are thus less careful.

(5) Rumours. As in May, 1940, the Germans will spread rumours in order to rouse panic and confusion among the civilian population. Check them as much as possible. If you have formed a listening circle adhere to the reports which you receive through it and whose reliability has already been proved. But remain on your guard here, too, for the Germans will doubtless also try and broadcast on the same wavelength as the BBC. Therefore remain well in your mind the "well-known voices." Furthermore, support the underground press.

(6) The taking of hostages. It is possible that the enemy will attempt to take hostages while evacuating the region where you live. See to it that those who are probably on the enemy's list as possible hostages hide themselves at the first sign of the liberating operations.

(7) Gossiping. Take into account that the Germans may temporarily capture a place. Do not in that case gossip about acts of sabotage committed by yourself or others. It is possible that you may thereby condemn yourself or others to death.

(8) Acts of revenge. Avoid all acts of revenge, however just they may be. They cause incredible confusion and chaos of which every sane Dutchman may also become the victim. It is certainly very useful to compile as detailed a description as possible of all actions and war criminals from your police-borough with an accurate enumeration of their crimes. They will then be tried as rapidly as possible by the competent Dutch authorities.

III. Hinder the Germans. Sabotage the German measures as much as possible. But above all do not set to work here recklessly.

(1) The blocking of roads. This is very useful. Every hold-up, however short, is fatal for the Germans. Realise that bridge-poles as well as high-ways must be blocked.

(2) Industrial sabotage. If you work in a concern indispensable to the German prosecution of the war immobilise the machines by removing and hiding a vital section so that if necessary the machine can be immediately put into action for the Allies.

(3) Obstruct transport. Immobilise as many vehicles as possible, also by hiding vital parts: if this is possible, then cut the tyres.

IV. The immediate food supply in the area where the Allies have landed.

(1) The Germans in their retreat will try and take with them or destroy all available food stocks. This must as far as possible be avoided, for in view of the fact that the Allies will first of all land tanks, guns and men, there will otherwise be a serious shortage of food. It is therefore necessary for every Dutchman

to lay aside some food which is not perishable for a period of emergency which will perhaps last from one week to three weeks according to the region where he lives. The Allied Supreme Command know that it is extraordinarily difficult to save food from your meagre rations. But you must! Those who have more food than others or are in a better position to produce their own food are in the name of the Fatherland and Freedom to help their compatriots wherever possible. In this respect the following instructions should be followed:

(a) Begin now to lay up a store of food for cases of emergency, and hide it carefully.

(b) Make a note of all local storage places of food, clothing, and fuel and every means of transport which can be used for the distribution of them, such as hand carts, wheelbarrows, barries, etc.

(c) Plan now how you can protect these stocks against destruction by the enemy.

2. The black market. The black market which was so necessary during the first stage of the occupation, now serves the interests of the enemy. Farmers, growers, middlemen, who sell to enemy agents are warned that they will not be forgotten when the Allies arrive. It is now your patriotic duty to sell direct to the population, thus helping your compatriots and keeping your produce out of the enemy's hands. But as soon as the enemy has gone all food must be distributed among the entire population through the official channels. At that moment the black market will become nothing more than anti-social and despicable profiteering for which no excuse can be found and which will be suppressed without hesitation. (See Digest 1946, 7.8. E4.)

Municipalities Refuse to Help Fortification Work

28. The clandestine paper *Je Maintiendrai*, second May issue, 1944, reports that in the Zaai district civilians have also been called up to build German fortifications. The Burgomasters of Koze, Zandijk and Wommersley were given instructions at the beginning of May to indicate a number of civilians for this purpose. The first gave in, but the second one refused to assist and went into hiding, followed by the entire personnel of the Secretariat. The third one refused to assist, but did not go into hiding, with the result that he was fetched by the *Sicherheitspolizei*. After that, police removed the population register at Wommersley and set the town hall on fire, so that the Commissioner of Police, fearing to be blamed for this, also went into hiding.

It is now apparently intended to form the Zaai municipalities under Vitters, the NSB burgomaster of Zaandam.

The same kind of tales have been reaching us from other places as well, for example from Diever, near the airfield of Staville, where the Burgomaster also went into hiding after having refused to give the names of civilians.

After secondary school pupils had been called up to work on fortifications in some places, lists are now being demanded in various places of pupils of 17 and older. The directors of these schools should know their duty and refuse to make any statements, and parents should be warned as well.

Zala-Holland and Zealand Detective-Chief Murdered

29. *Draatsch Dagblad*, Moppe, 11.8.44 (do not quote), publishes details of the burial of Colonel van der Schutte-Olivier, Commandant of the Detective

Force of Zuid-Holland and Zeeland who had died "by a cowardly murderer's hand." A speech was given by Licut.-Col. de Boer who stated that the Commandant "had perhaps one quality which hindered him in the execution of his duty, his kindness."

An address was also given by Colonel Boelgaard on behalf of the Comrades' Association of the Dutch Police. †

Fake "De Gil" Issued

E10. The clandestine paper *Ons Volk*, June, 1944, states that on May 1st a "special extra edition" of the NSB paper *De Gil* appeared in Amsterdam, which turned out to be written by the clandestine press. *Ons Volk* describes the population's eagerness to get hold of a copy once it was realized that it was "faked."

De Gil is a fake clandestine, issued by the NSB. —Ed. †

NSB Activities in Germany

E11. *Volk en Vadersland*, 11.8.44, publishes details of NSB activities in Schwelm, Bocholt, Kleve, Berlin, Heidelberg, Kassel, Emmerich, Cologne, Swinemünde, Münster, Eising, Dortmund. †

New NSB Group Held First Meeting

E12. *Oldenburgische Staatszeitung*, 12.9.44 (do not quote). The NSB *Orisgrupp* Oldenburg held its first meeting on September 18th in the *Reinhold* of the *Amstam* at Oldenburg. Van der Heide, the NSB *Orisgrupp* leader, opened the meeting with a short speech in which he expressed the unshakable determination of the NSB to stand *loyalty* with Hitler.

Dr. Boelgaard spoke that in Dutch and later in German about the background and development of the war and explained the position of NSB members in Holland. He described the NSB's fight against the adherents of views which are guided by international Jewry. The NSB stands firm with Hitler, who is guiding the war to save Germanic blood, he said. Boelgaard ended his speech by urging his comrades to let nothing shake their loyalty and confidence in the Führer so that the latter can finish his work of saving Germanic blood.

Heide, a member of the NSDAP *Gleichschaltung*, described the struggle of NSDAP members in Germany. They did not get their greatest strength from reason but from faith. The German people's community had developed out of mutually opposing currents within Germany into a whole whose inner strength could overcome the heaviest blows. It was particularly interesting to compare the National-Socialist *Weltanschauung* and the Soviet idea, which is nourished by ideas of world revolution.

The audience warmly welcomed Heide's words on the relationship between German and Dutch National-Socialists. He ended his speech by a fervent profession of loyalty to Hitler, who is the heart of the great and holy Germanic Reich. The meeting ended with

Dutch and German national anthems and a salute to the Führer.

German Attitude to Foreign Workers

E13. *Van Hoek, Plagen* (do not quote), 23.9.44. Leenvaart, a Dutchman who is working in a German factory in Potsdam, wrote a letter complaining that his chief told him that the authorities had forbidden German workers to shake hands with foreign workers. Leenvaart used to shake hands with his German worker comrades each morning. His German comrades call this measure nonsense.

Van Hoek showed this question to the German authorities who answered that Leenvaart's chief was wrong. The German Government has as a principle, a respect for every nationality, just as the German population expects to be respected by every foreigner. No one Dutchman or citizen of any other foreign state will be forcibly estranged from his people or made into a Nazi. *Leij and Shuckel* have repeatedly stated that the foreign worker in Germany is acknowledged as a human being and a comrade.

Children to Have Metal Identity Discs

E14. *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant*, Vlissingen, 1.9.44 (do not quote). The Dutch Red Cross Committee writes: The cardboard identity cards which the Dutch Red Cross issues for children under 15 years of age can now be replaced at very small cost by metal discs. A Dutch firm has succeeded in obtaining sufficient metal and has moreover developed a process by which the disc can be inscribed in indestructible white ink on the double-sided dark disc. The Secretary-General of the Department of Education, Science and Protection of Culture, has sent a circular to all heads of schools invoking their cooperation for the ordering of these metal discs. The identity discs are three by five cm and the disc can be inscribed on them by the class teachers by the children themselves under their guidance, with the white ink which will be sent with the discs. †

Amsterdam Children Return from Dracule

E15. *Draatsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden*, 20.9.44. The Amsterdam office of the NVJ announces that all children who had been sent to Dracule have returned safely. All children who were in Dutch children's homes have now returned to Amsterdam. †

British designs on Holland: see A25-26.

FRANCE

No material received in time for this issue.

German view of conditions in France: see A24.

Italy

LATEST COMMENT

Former Bolshevik Denounces Bolshevism

M. Italian Home Service, 6:10:44 (14.00). Pomeriggi publishes the first of a series of articles by I. Simon Ivtrowski, a former Bolshevik, who was at one time chief editor of a great Ukrainian paper as well as correspondent of Pravda and Izvestia, and who has now joined the Russian Army of Liberation. In this first article he explains why he has taken up arms against the Communist Party, of which he had at one time been an active member, and at the same time gives a synthesis of the history of the revolution or, shall we say, of the tragic Stalinian mystification at the expense of the Russian people.

The observations made by Nicola I. Combaogil, who, after a long stay in Russia, fled in horror from Soviet theories, reappear here in an even more actual form. It is a terrible picture of what Communism really is, and we think it should be dedicated to some of the erring clergy and to certain classes of persons who are not yet prepared to give up some of his dangerous delusions. Ivtrowski says: "I would have hesitated to write those notes if I were an exception, or if there were only a few tens or hundreds of Russians who think as I do."

"Had such been the case, we might have been dubbed renegades or traitors to our country and would deserve to be treated as such. But, in addition to me, there are millions and millions of my compatriots, many of them men of culture and scientists, generals and soldiers, who were members of the Red armies, workers and the common people of Great Russia who think as I do. According to a recent communication in Pravda, the official Moscow organ, there are twelve million Russians on the other side of the fence who have chosen to fight against the Bolshevism to which they were once subject. Is it possible to say that 12 million persons are renegades and traitors? No. There are no such cases recorded in history, especially when the greater part of these men are intellectuals, Soviet officials, army men of every rank and active members of the Communist party, who up till now had believed in the doctrines of Marx."

The article goes on to illustrate the motives which prompted these 12 million men to take up arms against Stalin, aware of the tremendous illusion, under which all the people of Russia are living, and concludes with these words: "We now ask ourselves: could we have gone to war for Stalin or for the Bolshevik regime? Fighting for him would have meant assisting the consolidation of a system which has reduced our country to an immense prison, and our people to mendicants, with no will of their own, no morale and no protection of any kind. On the contrary, it is for us a doctrine of faith that, if we wish for the real good of our people, we must fight Bolshevism and lay it low. This is how we see things, and this is what guides us in our actions. To fight Bolshevism, the irreducible enemy of all mankind, is the duty of every honest man. That is why we are proud to wear on our arms the badge of the Russian Army of Liberation. We know that truth is on our side. Victory will be ours."

Looting of Art Treasures by Allies

Popolo e Libertà, Refinanz, 3:10:44, reports from the frontier: The Fascist press ascribes to the

Allies a plan to seize great Italian works of art (See *Popolo e Libertà*, 2:15, 111 and 132; 3:55, 433 and 434). *Corriere della Sera* announced that nine deposits containing the world's most famous pictures and many Michelangelo sculptures had passed into the control of the Allied Armies' Civil Affairs Division. It is reported, adding that: "The Division is now working information regarding other deposits in the fighting zone. These will be examined and will pass into the power of the Allies as soon as the territories where they are situated are occupied."

Pro-German Sympathies in South

13. Transgona (for Far East), 8:10:44 (22.58), reports from Milan: The Italian soldiers' newspaper, *Segno*, says millions of Italians are pro-German. Though co-operating with the Germans is punishable, according to the ruling of south Italian courts, the paper considers that many in Allied-occupied Italian territory who were Anglophile yesterday are today pro-German.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

Arch-Torturer and His Band Arrested

Kl. *Popolo e Libertà*, Refinanz, 5:10:44, reports from the Italian frontier: The new *Questura* of Milan, Finizio, has arrested Koch's band of torturers. Francesco Koch, born in Rome in 1912, worked for a long time for the Fascist secret police, first as a member of the OVRA. He was charged with safeguarding the Duce's meetings with Clara Petacci. After September 8th, 1943, under the Curcio regime, he participated in the hunt for patriots. Rome, Florence and Milan witnessed the ferocity of his band. (See *Diposta* 1468, 2:6, K8: 1500, 15:7, K7: 1547, 8:9, K15: 1552, 14:9, K11: 1559, 22:9, K1 and 1561, 27:9, K3.) Koch acted independently, communicating the results of his "enquiries" directly to the Minister of the Interior and Mussolini, who praised him and gave him special jobs.

Many people whom Koch arrested died under torture but no questions were asked. For instance, Colonel Cordero Di Montezemolo was not killed outside the gates of Rome but died under torture in Koch's villa in the Via Tuscolana in Rome. His body remained for three days in an underground cell of the clandestine prison and was then taken by car into the country, in order to simulate execution.

In Milan, Koch and his band not only made an ostentatious display of independence, but showed contempt for the so-called regular police, whom they accused of inactivity and corruption. They themselves were "inexpugnable" in addition to Koch's band, as he seven other more or less secret police, acting autonomously were given full freedom of action, causing a chaotic situation.

Finizio, learning that he might one day be held responsible, decided to use force against them, it is reported, with German support. A large detachment of *Questura* agents armed with Tommy-guns, surrounded the villa in the Via Uccello where Koch's band had its HQ and torture chambers. The villa had been converted into a kind of fortress, with barbed wire, and sandbag barricades with loopholes. Koch and his band surrendered, however, without fighting, convinced, perhaps, that they could still claim the protection of

Mussolini and his Ministers. At present Koch and all the members of his band are well guarded in San Vittore prison. Those arrested include M. L. L. Captain Mario Carito, Koch's chief collaborator, the actor Cavallotti Valente, his wife or mistress Luisa Ferida, 17, Triana and the so-called "Duke of Toledo".

It appears that the prison which Filadelfo started in his own Questura, arresting a number of Communist officials (see Digests 1551, 224, K12, and 1505, 219, K12), will be extended to other branches of the secret police. The prisoners whom Koch kept at the Via Uccello have been transferred to San Vittore prison.

Modesty and Reprints—

K2. Dovere, Bellinzona, 5.10.44, reports from Chiasso: The Italian press reports that both the partisans and the Squadristi sustained fatal casualties in the operations in the Sondrio region. The partisans are reported to have lost 20 dead, including the political commissar Orfeo Grandi of Milan.

Stampa, Turin, reports that the partisans lost 52 dead, seven wounded and 59 prisoners in an engagement in the Turin region, as well as a huge amount of war material.

During large-scale mopping-up operations in the Piacenza region, in which a German unit took part, violent fighting occurred in the Roncole district, both sides losing many dead. Many persons have been arrested for complicity with the rebels and for desertion. In one house a clandestine transmitter was discovered for intercepting and receiving important propaganda material from the CNL. As a result, three persons were immediately executed. The Fascist press declares that action against the partisans will soon be intensified.

At Sessa, an attack was made on Alberto Guicini, an officer of the GMR, as a result of which severe reprisals will be taken.

K3. Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 5.10.44, reports from Chiasso: According to the Fagel press, the "Mull" Brigade is carrying out mopping-up operations in the Como region, where 160 partisans opposed it in an action which resulted in a violent battle. Operations are continuing.

K4. Pomeriggio, Milan, 5.10.44. Renato Tettini, a student, who escaped on August 26th with his accomplice (1) from a prison in Parma, was arrested by the Germans near Missaglia on September 30th. His accomplice is still at large.

—German Armed Genoa Workers—

K5. Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 5.10.44, reports from Chiasso: Pasolini has arrived in Genoa, where he conferred with the German military authorities on the situation in Liguria. The latter have succeeded in mastering the situation in Genoa, La Spezia and Savona by means of mass arrests among the workers who were on strike. The patriots remain active outside the principal cities. In Genoa curfew has been advanced to 20.00 hours.

—Bishop of Bergamo Condemns Civil War—

K6. Dovere, Bellinzona, 5.10.44, reports from Chiasso: The Bishop of Bergamo, Mgr. Benazeggi, has appealed to all those under his jurisdiction to live on terms of brotherhood, return to peace and bury fratricidal hatred. He ended his message by calling for spiritual unity.

—And Zerbins Appeals for Order in Turin

K7. Stampa, Turin, 30.9.44. Paolo Zerbins, Extraordinary Commissioner for Piedmont, in agreement with the German Command, has fixed the time of entry for the city of Turin at 22.00 hours from today. "This step has been taken in the confidence that the people of Turin will prove themselves worthy of the trust placed in them and by their discipline contribute towards the maintenance of public order. The Republic certainly does not intend to hide the number of its dead, which is considerable." Captain Ercule Comberi, whose public funeral took place in Turin yesterday, was shot dead on September 23rd by an unknown assailant in the Via Monginevro near the Lancia works.

Recruits Wanted for Italian SS Legion

K8. Corriere della Sera, Milan, 1.10.44, publishes the following advertisement: "Young men of Italy! The Italian SS Legion which has gathered into its ranks the greatest volunteer spirit, gloriously demonstrated on the Northern front, awaits you! The recruiting centre for the Province of Como is the Barracks, No. 9, Via Anzani, Como."

Bellagio as Diplomatic Centre

K9. Transocean Star Par East, 9.10.44 (9851). Schütz reports from Lake Como: Bellagio, the resort on Lake Como, is the new residence of foreign diplomats accredited to Mussolini. The big "Grande Italia" Hotel has become diplomatic headquarters. The Hungarian mission, headed by a general, is numerically the strongest group after the German and Japanese. At the official inauguration of the Italian diplomatic town, representatives of the Italian Government, German, Roumanian, Hungarian, Slovak, Thailand and Japanese diplomats filled the festively decorated hall of the "Grande Italia" Hotel. The Danes still remain in Venice.

Periodical Resumes Publication

K10. DNR, 8.10.44 (1252), reports from Milan: La Vita Italiana, which for years has been edited by Giovanni D'Adda, a proponent of the idea of racial purity (rasenreinheit), is now resuming publication. It has not been published since the Badoglio Putsch.

New Postage Stamps for Blacks

K11. Transocean Star Par East, 10.10.44 (2650), reports from Milan: The Italian postal authority in Milan has issued a new series of stamps. These are welfare stamps for the benefit of negro children.

Air Attack On Train

K12. Italian Home Service, 8.10.44 (9840). On October 7th, at about 26.00 hours, seven British glider-bombers, directed at the Biella-Torino train near Chivasso and machine-gunned the passengers. Eight were killed, among them four workers, and 20 injured.

Lack of Confidence in Cheques Reported

K13. Stampa, Turin, 3.10.44. "It is revealed that there is an inexplicable tendency to refuse cheques issued by banks outside Turin. This must be summarily nipped in the bud. We cannot think what measure of prudence induces people to such absurd refusal; the fact remains that if, for example, a cheque

issued by the Turin branch of the Credito Italiano is accepted it would show very poor intelligence to refuse one issued by the Milan branch of the same bank. In order to set people's minds at rest we are able to deny a rumor that Post Office are also refusing cheques issued from other than the Turin bank. The exact opposite is the case.

The Administrative Director of Posts and Telegraphs has kindly made the matter clear by referring to a letter dated as far back as May 3rd which reads: "Instructions have been laid down in Postal Regulations whereby cheques whether issued by the Banco d'Italia, the Banco di Napoli, the Banco di Sicilia or their branches are to be accepted, as well as cheques issued by all branches of public institutions, istituti di diritto pubblico, such as the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the Istituto San Paolo, Turin, Monte dei Paschi, Siena, Banca Italiana Banco di Roma, Credito Italiano, Banca Commerciale, etc." (See Digest 1530, 18, K21 and 1522, 10, K16.)

Further Appeal for Workers for Germany

K14. *Nova Africa*, 2-10-44, publishes the following advertisement under a picture representing Italian and German helmets over the snow and summer surrounded by a laurel and oak wreath: "The Italian Army is back in the field. Workers, the valor and faith of our soldiers is more more lacking its weight felt on the battlefields for the privilege and rebirth of Italy."

Collaboration with our allies has become closer and more effective with a new spirit of comradeship which is spreading to the field of work. Today Italians working in Germany feel themselves surrounded by a brotherhood of new and profound sympathy and liking. New laws guard their interests, new privileges have been accorded to them. Workers intending to leave for Germany will also enjoy more advantageous conditions; handsome signing-on bonuses, special payments and good salaries await them. Welfare Relief Commissions are in existence both for the worker employed in Germany and for his family left behind. Finally, every worker is at liberty to transfer himself and all his family to Germany. Is not this worth considering? Reflect! For further information apply to Provincial employment offices."

Employment of Disabled Ex-Servicemen

K15. *Italian Home Service*, 7-10-44 (20,000). Gold Medalist Carlo Dornani, President of the National Federation of disabled ex-servicemen, on the occasion of a decree being issued whereby the number of disabled ex-servicemen to be employed by both the State and private enterprises will be doubled, sent the following telegram to the Duce: "Disabled ex-servicemen join me in expressing gratitude for an ordinance which, by doubling the percentage of disabled ex-servicemen to be employed by State administration and private enterprises, will ensure their future employment. The Italian Socialist Republic is the first among the nations to adopt this law, which solves an important social problem."

Bonuses and Allowances

K16. *Stampa*, Turin, 30-9-44. According to repeated requests on the part of the Turin Trade Unions, the National Federation of Labour has decided to grant a permanent character to War Bonuses which will not only be maintained but will be revised every three months in accordance with the economic situation.

Thus, all categories of workers will have their war bonus adapted to effective changes in the cost of living. As regards workers' family allowances, the obstacle caused by the difference between workers and employees has now been overcome by bringing the amount of the allowance to the same level and an approach has been made to standardize contracts desired by the Turin workers.

Trade Workers Less Well Off Than Industrial

K17. *Nova Milano*, 2-10-44. "Commercial workers are protesting, and their are right. Being looked upon as the poorer brothers of the industrial workers they have each tried to make great efforts to obtain the same wages if they are not already suffering from a glaring inequality of treatment. The absence of large groups of workers makes the creation of factory retail shops difficult, and the commercial worker is too often deprived of the possibility of buying articles at great discount at a low price. Besides he is paid at a lower rate than the industrial worker and his family allowance is less. To this is added exclusion from the new wage regulations, i.e. bonus for attendance absorbed in his pay (see Digest 1540, 22, K10), and the special high cost of living bonus of 25 lire (see Digest 1505, 30, K21)."

"To make distinctions in the economic, welfare, relief, and social sphere signifies a negation of the bases of social justice, because work, or whatever nature, is the only element which establishes the rights of citizens. If one category of workers exists, it is logical to admit that it should be treated on a par with the others. Otherwise there would be no sense in the creation of a single consideration for individuals and articles. What we have said with regard to commercial workers naturally applies to all others excluded from the recent wage regulations, if for no other reason than for cohesiveness."

Decree Extending Farm Subsidies

K18. *Italian Home Service*, 5-10-44 (23,000). The *Giornale Officiale d'Italia* publishes the Duce's decree concerning farming subsidies, which will be extended until the end of the agricultural year succeeding that in which the creation of the war takes place.

Milan: Influx of Refugees

K19. *Popolo e Libertà*, Bellinzona, 4-10-44, reports from the Italian frontier: Milan, where life becomes daily harder, is assuming the characteristic aspect of a city behind the front line, like Rome before its fall. Thousands of refugees, almost all of them Fascists or collaborationists, ceaselessly flock towards Milan. Lodgings are extremely expensive, partly because most people desert this kind of refuge. (See Digest 1518, 5, K16 and 1523, 11, K1.) Those unable to find a place in the city overflow into the neighbourhood and the Como and Varese regions are also packed. Many cities belonging to anti-Fascists have been requisitioned. Elsewhere, owners or tenants are obliged to place "superfluous" rooms at the disposal of the homeless (sequestered), as Fascist fugitives are euphemistically called.

Causes Food and Fuel Shortage

K20. *Popolo e Libertà*, Bellinzona, 4-10-44, reports from the Italian frontier: The situation in Milan is not yet catastrophic owing to the resources of the Lombard Plain, but the increase in population, coinciding with increased transport difficulties, is causing a constant rise

in black market prices. The extra population has resulted in administrative chaos, and rationing has become a farce. It is estimated that the population of Milan will shortly number two million, while 3,000 houses have been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable through air attacks.

The weekly ration, distributed on Saturdays, has been enforced in theory into rigid queues, but as there is considerable with ration cards, people make their own arrangements. The stocks of soap ingredients are exhausted and the September ration was completed with an extra distribution of "white" flour. In fact, the flour was 80% adulterated. The ration for October is 50 g of butter and one deciliter of oil (naturally seed oil). Milk, which is completely skimmed, is reserved for children. There is no coal or firewood for heating. However, the Fascist authorities do not trouble much as they expect others to do their bit.

—Watch on Black Market Ignores Its Real Source—

ROME, Milan, 24.44. "The watch on suburban trains and farms on the part of the Food Squads has become intensified, but it ought to be exercised with the indispensable modicum of discretion (con 'grano aita') indispensable without which often the most just of laws becomes merely vexatious, or unjust, to say the least of it. Regulations are very often carried out to the letter. Even in cases where the citizen is bringing in a kilogram of foodstuffs from the countryside or from some rural suburb where the market has more to offer, his modest bundle is taken from him and he is punished.

Such severity is misplaced, first of all because the quantity, even taken as a whole, is inadequate and brings relief to the housewife, and secondly because, going to transport difficulties, the distribution of the controlled goods to which she would be entitled is delayed so long that, if people had to wait for it and did not take steps on their own account to do and ferret out something in the countryside, they would literally not know what to do.

Far better to get to the root, but right down to the

root, in the other cases which are the real objective of the legislation, such as coldblooded, greedy speculation, withdrawal from the pools of large consignments, shrewd by the dishonest peasant, and the thousand and one small frauds carried out by the equally dishonest retailer in the towns. In short, hit the black market at its source in the country and in the vast urban organization."

—Black-out Period—

ROME, Milan, 24.44. Following the recognition of calm (ing ore Diori 1960 239 K23), the ANP Committee of Milan Province announces that, as from October 2nd, the black-out will last from 10.30 to 05.00 hours.

—Alerts

ROME, Milan, 24.44. As from October 1st, the preliminary raid warning will consist of five blasts lasting one second each with three second intervals. The actual alert will consist of six blasts lasting five seconds each, with five second intervals. The "all clear" remains unchanged, i.e., one minute of continuous sound.

Adriatic Zone: Trieste Forms a Black Brigade

ROME, Milan, 24.44. At Trieste a Black Brigade has come into being bearing the name of (Città Pidiemo). *Italia Repubblicana* in its issue of September 24th, announcing the formation of the Brigade, writes: "The very name of our Brigade is a programme in itself, defence, but also attack, if necessary, to purge and punish everything that threatens lives in the shadow and does harm to our land: retribution for the insults and cowardly destructions of human lives, deaths brought about only by a spirit of useless reprisals when we are all Italians, and all brothers."

Great defence of Trieste: see C25.

Great-Italian trading company changes its name: see C26.

FORWARD

~~SECRET~~

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR *
TOD 042014Z OCTOBER

FORWARD 51/05
TOR 050355A OCTOBER
WM 050503A OCTOBER

S E C R E T

R O U T I N E

FROM : AGWAR FROM MCCARTHY
TO : SHAEF FORWARD PERSONAL FOR GENERAL SMITH
REF NO : W-41230. 4 October 1944

WX-41067 sent to General EISENHOWER by General
SURLS had reference to publicity for flight to be made directly
from STEPHENVILLE to Continent.

The project has General MARSHALL's personal approval and he understands it will mean photographers, [redacted] reels, and all other publicity media present at field upon his arrival. He is willing for the Public Relations people to shoot the works and understands that this will mean immediate release of his presence in FRANCE upon his arrival. The foregoing is based of course on the supposition that local conditions do not make it undesirable.

Justice BYRNES title is "Director, Office of War Mobilization". Major General K A CRAIG's title is "Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations Commitments and Requirements". Request MCCARTHY not be listed as General MARSHALL's aide. Chief refers to HANDY as "Chief of Operations US Army" and likes to [REDACTED] this title used in press.

WX-41067 is FS IN 10943, 4/10/44, FWD

ACTION : SCS

PG IN 11048 5 Oct 44 0542A M/1F REF NO: W-41230

SGS Dist	SC	DSC	CS	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR		SGS	COOR			
Copy No.	4			<u>S E C R E T</u>				1	2			

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 041402Z Oct

SHAEF FWD X111/04
TOR 041935A Oct
hgt 042036A Oct

SECRET

URGENT

FROM : AQWAR FROM SURLS
TO FOR ACTION : SHAEF FWD FOR EISENHOWER
FOR INFO : USSTAR FOR SPAATZ, ETOUSA MAIN ATTENTION PQOS
REF NO : WX-41067, 04 Oct 1944

Flight by OWI personnel reference WX-34876 dated 22nd September will be exceeded in public interest by a forthcoming flight in another plane by VIP.

Request announcement of existence of direct ATC route from this Continent to PARIS be made in connection with arrival of VIP soon due and that pending the break of this story in PARIS that no public reference be made to flight of OWI personnel. No objection to public notice of OWI flight following original news break tied to other plane and other more important personnel.

WX-34876 is FS IN 9443, 29/9/44, PWD.

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
9-3
COM Z
SUSPENSE
PRD
AG RECORDS

FS IN 10943 4 OCT 44 2243A HFK/rs REF NO: WX-41067

6 181

SECRET

COPY NO 18

22 Sept 44
SHAEF File No. 041417
Extract 353.02/10
4 Oct

SECRET

SECRET

FORWARDED
SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR MARSHALL
FROM : SHAEP FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-16481 CITE: SHFWD

Book message WX-34876 dated 22nd Sept received 29th Sept. Recommend this flight be adequately covered for publicity and propaganda purposes. In addition to OWI representatives you will have doubtless considered US press and radio needs.

WX-34876 is FS IN 9443, 29/9/44, FWD

ORIGINATOR : FWD AUTHENTICATION: MAJOR R. K. FRIED
INFORMATION : PRD COORD WITH: PRD
SGS
G-3
AG RECORDS

FS OUT 4024 1 OCT 1944 1734A AGD/jap REF NO: FWD 16481
TGO: 011600A

SECRET

6 182

SECRET

COPY NO

4

SHAEP FILE NO. 011600A

1 OCT

LT G. Morris
1447 Roberts

EXTRACT FROM 'DAILY EXPRESS' -
30th September

150000277 File
C/S MRS
FM
84

GOMBEIS GIVES LEAFLETS WARNING.

'VERY CLEVER'

Express Radio Station.

Through his mouthpiece, Karl Siegbold, Gombels last night broadcast a warning to Germans against Allied leaflets.

German soldiers and civilians were told: "There is not a single sentence in these leaflets which does not ~~mean~~ to do us harm. They ~~are~~ addressed to the weak points which exist in every nation.

"It ought to be below ~~our~~ dignity to read what these ~~leaflets~~ say. These leaflets are weapons and ~~we~~ must be careful with all weapons.

"The enemy intends to frighten us by his leaflets, but what he could not achieve by bombs and tanks he will certainly not achieve by leaflets.

"There are two kinds of these leaflets. The first is small-size news sheets, very cleverly done, with impressive maps and pictures in many narrow columns. They have a completely bona-fide appearance.

DISTRUST

"But among correct and truthful reports, they contain innumerable half-truths, omissions, exaggerations. Indeed, every ~~item~~ item, every short article, every comment contains a small - only just noticeable - amount of distrust in the actions of the German High Command.

"The second type of leaflet is different. It is openly treacherous, grinning with lies and broad impudence.

"German soldiers are asked what they think of the treachery of July 20 an event which we have indeed long forgotten. German soldiers ~~are~~ fed ~~with~~ lies consisting of fictitious declarations made by German prisoners.

"Or, in the crudest way, ~~we~~ are told that, for such and such reasons, Germany has lost the war. These methods are the same ~~as~~ used in the last war, 26 years ago. They ~~are~~ the methods that Northcliffe set up. Northcliffe knew, however, that the propaganda weapon is always only ~~a~~ auxiliary weapon, and therefore waited until our front began to waver and morale at ~~the~~ was beginning to all and fail.

"The ~~attempt~~ attempt is being ~~made~~ today."



7700.25

30 Sept 44

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

1. Following is an extract from a report of 7th Army PW activities:

"With the exception of the leaflet file prepared before the southern invasion, no leaflet activity has been undertaken. An air force unit dropped tons of a proclamation prepared by PW and signed by Gen. Wilson into the bay at Marseilles, sinking a small lighter (German). No copies reached the public."

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

SHAFFSGS File No. 0911442

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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

JAPS

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 282137A SEPT

SHAEP FWD 10/29
TOR 282125A SEPT
njb 290230A SEPT

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ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM MARSHALL.

TO : SHAEP MAIN FOR EISENHOWER, (RELAYED TO
SHAEP FWD), COM Z

REF NO : WX-34876, 22 SEPT 1944.

BOOK MESSAGE

(See WX-41067, 4 Oct)
Presented to the War Department by Office of War Information (Mr ROBERT SMITHWOOD, Director Overseas Branch) is a scheme concerning the first West-East crossing by an ATC plane to a terminal base on the Continent.

Application is made to permit Mr ROBERT KAYE, War Correspondent attached to LONDON Office, Office of War Information, now in the US, and a Radio Engineer, Mr HAROLD KENNEY, to board this plane and make recordings by the use of portable radio equipment before, during and after the flight. These recordings would then be played over the PARIS radio and the US government's American Broadcasting Station in EUROPE, after approval by SHAEP Censor.

In view of propaganda value and the importance of this historic flight to the OWI Psychological Warfare program, it is desired that you forward without delay your remarks and recommendation relative to this proposal.

General HOAG of ATC is reported as being familiar with this plan.

ACTION : FWD

INFORMATION: SGS

G-3

COM ZONE

SUMMARY

AG RECORDS

FS IN 9443

6 185

29 Sep 44

0750A

M/15

NO: WX-34876

COPY NO.

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22 SEPT 1944

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1170 67737

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

28 August 1944

302J.OT: Effect of Propaganda on Enemy.

To : Chief of Staff ✓
Deputy Chief of Staff

1. The following extracts from a 21 Army Group report for week ending 24 August may be of interest to you.

German officer disseminates Allied leaflet.

The greatest direct compliment paid this week to the effectiveness of our leaflet comes from the Senior Veterinary Officer of 989 G.R. in 277 Inf Div. This officer produced a copy of SG.45 ('Line Minute') to the interrogator in one of the British Corps cages and stated that he had passed the leaflet to all personnel of his regiment whom he could contact in order, he said, that panic might be avoided in the 'pocket' and that German troops might surrender in good order and with military bearing.

Desertion of Reichsdeutsche Influenced by Leaflets.

Deserters captured during the past week or ten days by one of the British Corps have included a very high percentage of 'Reichsdeutsche' who agreed on interrogation that Allied leaflets had helped to persuade them to take the first opportunity to desert. It is of significance that Polish deserters have stated that our leaflets often help them to persuade Germans to desert, and it is a fact that from many units groups have appeared consisting of two or three Poles and a German or two.

Relative Popularity of Leaflets.

The Safe Conduct Leaflet has been found on ever-increasing numbers of prisoners. Of one batch of 10 from units of 89, 271 and 277 Divs, 6 prisoners had given their passes up to their captors, the other 4 proudly handed them in at the Corps cage.

The general impression gained by PW Officer Second British Army is that the evidence from interrogation and captured documents during the past week has amply demonstrated the long term effect of our propaganda, and he considers that we are now reaping the harvest of past leaflet shoots and drops carried out when the front was static.

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JJ33

TCR 291053B AUGUST

SHAEF 159/29
TCR 291606B AUGUST
HP 291745B AUGUST

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : FWE AFHQ SIGNED WILSON

TO FOR ACTION: ACWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SHERWOOD
OWI, USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
LONDON COORDINATORS, SHAEF FOR FWD

REF NO : FX-89126, 29 AUGUST 1944, CITE: FHPRO

HAF-767.

Highlights FWE Directive week 28 August.

FWE Central.

1. General: We adopt opening paragraphs

2. FRANCE:

lines.

Northern operations. We adopt FWE and SHAEF

Southern operations. We show Allies ability take
maintain initiative everywhere and destroy WHEERMACHT wherever
met. We outpoint German troops in Southern FRANCE cut off
and must decide own fate: Honorable surrender or face death
as did Germans in North.

3. RUSSIA: We adopt FWE Central.

4. ITALY: We follow monnaquies not over
playing news renewed fighting nor suggesting such engagements
mean major offensive has been launched. We stress cooperation
between Allied Armies and Italian patriots.

5. Air War: We adopt FWE Central.

SMC IN 5555

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY

THIS MESSAGE IS FWD TO ALL

SGS-SHAEF File No. 091412

892/29/44

S E C R E T

REF NO: FX-89126 29 AUGUST 1944

SHAEP 159/29

6. Far East: We keep them alive using statements committing Allies to JAPAN'S defeat.

7. Inside GERMANY: Without artificially attempting revive "Peace Movement" plot we use available material to show best informed Germans understand HITLER'S folly and futility further resistance. We outpoint futility "Total Improvisation".

8. Surrender RUMANIA:

(A) We use surrender to prove GERMANY has lost war and world realizes this recalling 1918 Bulgarian surrender and stressing collapse German cause in BALKANS and desertion satellites mean now as then beginning of end. Until clear picture of diplomatic and military consequences available we use statements of fact avoiding personal comment.

We do not encourage idea RUMANIA will be accepted immediately at own rating as ally. We do not suggest Rumanians already fighting Germans in organized manner. We do not speculate on powers responsible for surrender taking for granted RUMANIA surrendered to United Nations. We do not speculate on territorial settlements. We do not anticipate on results but wait hard news.

(B) While expressing satisfaction RUMANIA realized truth and taken appropriate steps we stress Rumanians must show by action that they have broken with policy of former rulers and must do all in power hasten German collapse.

We outpoint German troops on Rumanian soil may demand Allied airforces act against them, and their lines communications. It is for Rumanians render this unnecessary and denying the Rumanian facilities and resources.

(C) To BULGARIA and HUNGARY we stress RUMANIA realized GERMANY'S defeat and that GERMANY had not power to interfere with RUMANIA'S decision. RUMANIA acted but none too soon and we outpoint other satellites must

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

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REF NO: FX-89126 29 AUGUST 1944

SHAEF 159/29

be equally prompt if they hope any consideration from
UNITATIONS and wish avoid total destruction during last
weeks war.

To BULGARIA — stress speeches not enough and
immediate withdrawal from SERRIA MACEDONIA and THRACE
to carry conviction.

(D) To YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE we give straight
news particularly avoiding implication RUMANIA will immediately
rank as ally.

(E) To all German troops we drive home
lesson, particularly to those in BALKANS stressing their
isolation.

9. Satellites: We adopt OWI line. We
stress Rumanian surrender as above unspeculating on results
BULGARIA'S peace request but reporting all Allied official
releases on subject and official Bulgarian statements.

10. BALKANS:

(A) YUGOSLAVIA: We take particular pains
not allow other sensational news overshadow YUGOSLAVIA'S
contribution.

(B) We avoid neglecting Albanian resistance
which — attribute Albanians not to specific organizations.

11. French Affairs: We follow OWI on Civil
Administration Agreement, stress French put in control
liberated areas subject only to Supreme Allied Commander's
military requirements.

12. Italian Affairs: We keep alive Prime Minister's
visit and his support of Italian Govt. We do not speculate on
ITALY'S status nor — publication of armistice terms. We stress
German destructive withdrawal and pillage of Italian food
resources. We continue publicity on part played by Allies
in liberated ITALY and — GRANAI campaign.

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THE MESSAGE OF THE SHAEF STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL IS FORWARDED

SECRET

REF NO: FX-89126

29 August 1944

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
PRD
G-2
SHAEP FWD
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

SGS	Div	TO	INFO	CS	D	DCS	DCS	SGS	COB	Adm	Ops	Copy No.



SMO IN 5555 29 August 1944 1941B DWR/gsh Ref No: FX-89126

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ALPHABETICALLY INDEXED
Psychological Warfare Division

21 August 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brig. Gen. R.A. McClure

FROM: Mr. Frank F. Kaufman

SUBJECT: Report on trip to France from 13 August - 17 August 1944 and Recommendations in regard to Combat Leaflet activities.

I.

1. 21 Army Group is conducting a small, compact, and well-organized leaflet operation.

2. Their artillery leaflet program is governed entirely by local situations and by requests from or to, division, and corps. It varies greatly in quantity from day to day and week to week. At the moment it is quite small due to the fast-moving fluid front.

3. 21 Army Group has been disseminating leaflets by fighter bombers for about one week. Five days ago they did not expect to be able to distribute more than 5 leaflet bombs a day by fighter bombers. Each leaflet bomb holds approximately 14,000 leaflets. One fighter bomber carries 2 such bombs. Thus, 21 Army Group did not expect to be able to get the use of more than 4 fighter bombers per day, with a maximum dissemination (counting on a flying day a week) of about 700,000 leaflets per week.

4. However, Major Long told me on the telephone today that they have now arranged for 24 bombs to be disseminated each day by fighter bombers. This arrangement is of the unofficial, hand-to-mouth kind. The Commanding Officer of the British fighter bombers assigned to support 21 Army Group is not sympathetic to leaflet distribution by this kind. The arrangements in force have been made by P and AF, 21 Army Group, at lower airforce levels. Major Sheppard believes that for the present the best policy is to let things alone, but it may be necessary for a high-level decision to be taken before long in order for dissemination at the rate of 24 bombs per day (or anything like it) to be maintained.

5. W.P. PARK, who is acting C/AF, is second to 21 Army Group, is not their air division officer. He is there is doing a very good job and does not appear to need an assistant.

II.

6. 19.

1. 12 H.A. Army Group is conducting a much larger artillery and fighter bomber leaflet operation than is 21 Army Group.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By Authority of C.A.B.
By [Signature]

205-38467 File No. 6711412

2. Their artillery program, like that of 21 Army Group, varies greatly. At the moment there are not many artillery leaflet targets, particularly on the pro Army front, as it is moving so fast.

3. 12 U.S. Army Group believe that they will be able to disseminate about 50 leaflets per day by fighter bomber. These will be carried by the 9th and the 19th Tactical Air Forces which support the 1st and 3rd U.S. Armies respectively.

4. When I left 12 U.S. Army Group four days ago the maximum number of leaflets being distributed on any day up to that time was 25. However, they expect to increase the number from 25 to 50 on a gradual basis.

5. Captainacey has been assigned by GHP, SHAF, to 12 U.S. Army Group to handle our leaflet air liaison. Acey has done a very good initial job but is badly in need of assistance, as the fields with which he deals are scattered over 100 miles or so. He is sending Capt. M. J. Moore to help Acey through his initial stage. (Moore's orders call for his return within 10 days, as we need the help of the U.S. in connection with the operation of the aerial leaflet program.) We are also, on Colonel Powell's request, searching for an Air Force pilot to assist Acey. Colonel Powell stated that the order could be carried on the 12 U.S. Army Group TAC. We have located a liberator pilot who is a 1st Lieut., has been awarded the D.F.C., has finished his tour of duty, and came in to see us about joining GHP. Colonel Powell and Captainacey would prefer to have a fighter pilot - if possible, a 9th Air Force fighter pilot. We are looking for such a man but if we do not find him shortly we will suggest to Colonel Powell that we take the liberator pilot.

6. Then I arrived at 12 U.S. Army Group. Colonel Fitzgerald had instituted a rule that no fighter bomber's could be used to carry leaflets except on specific requests from armies. Colonel Powell and I explained to him that leaflets were being distributed regularly by other units. I believe Colonel Fitzgerald is now willing for fighter bombers to undertake regular deliveries. However, it might be advisable, if you think it desirable, for you to have a word with Colonel Fitzgerald about this matter and indicate to him that you are most anxious for maximum fighter bomber dissemination of leaflets.

III.

1. The Leaflet Section, GHP, SHAF, has undertaken to try to supply and ship to 21 Army Group and to 12 U.S. Army Group the necessary number of leaflets by its own accessories for fighter bomber carriage and also the quantities and types of leaflets they require for artillery and fighter bomber dissemination.

2. 21 Army Group has very small printing facilities. 12 U.S. Army Group has a rather good mobile printing truck which turns out about 50,000 leaflets per hour. It also has the use of good printing facilities at Remen where it is currently producing (twice a week) German front newspaper called "Frontpost". In order to make use of the Remen facilities, 12 U.S. Army Group will need to be supplied with considerable quantities of paper. The same will probably be true if 12 U.S. Army Group is to make use of printing facilities in other French cities which have been or will shortly be liberated.

3. Because of lack of printing facilities and paper, both 21 Army Group and 12 U.S. Army Group are presently relying on SHAEF to supply them with the bulk of leaflets for artillery and fighter bomber dissemination.

4. Major Shepherd has informed me that you are going to try to turn over to P and PW, 21 Army Group, some of the mobile printing facilities which are not being used by other PW units.

IV.

1. All of the PW in the field have been highly appreciative of the leafletting job which has been done by planes based in the U.K. They seem to think that it has accomplished a great deal.

2. To date the leaflet campaign from bases in the U.K. has been carried on mainly by the special heavy bomber squadron. Their efforts have been supplemented to some degree by Marauders of the 9th U.S. Air Force and to a lesser degree by Mitchell's of the 1st British Tactical Air Force. Lately, the Marauders have carried out special leafletting missions for us.

3. Colonel Maxwell, Director of Operations, USSTAF, has spoken to me several times lately regarding our use of the special heavy bomber squadron. He has stated that he believes that most of our German troop leaflets should be dropped by medium bombers and fighter bombers which belong to air forces assigned to support the ground troops, and not by heavy strategic bombers. Further, he has indicated that the time may not be far distant when our special leaflet heavy bombers will be able to fly over Germany, unescorted, at night. If that should happen Colonel Maxwell has stated that USSTAF would expect us to use those bombers in a more strategic and less tactical way than we are doing at the moment.

4. We will almost surely want to use our special heavy bombers, or other special leafletting planes based in the U.K., for dissemination of NACHRICHTEN since that paper necessarily is tied to Tolpelt's establishment and is distributed within several hours after it comes off the press. However, I think we should try to make arrangements under which most of our German troop leafletting is done by planes other than those belonging to the special heavy bomber squadron.

5. If 12 U.S. Army Group is able to have 50 leaflet bombs dropped ~~every~~ by fighter bombers of the 9th and 19th Tactical Air Forces, it will (counting on a flying days a week) achieve a dissemination of approximately 4,000,000 leaflet units per week. If 21 Army Group is able to have 25 leaflet bombs dropped per day, it will (again counting on a flying days per week) achieve a dissemination of about 2,500,000 leaflet units per week. Operating in the way we have since D-day, we are able to distribute, in addition to NACHRICHTEN, over 1,000,000 leaflet units per week on the German troops in France, if we get a good nights of flying weather. Thus, fighter bomber dissemination will not come close to matching the quantity of dissemination by our special heavy bombers. In addition, although fighter bombers can achieve dissemination over German troops along the bombing line, they cannot accomplish leafletting over large concentrations of German troops in road junctions and in towns five or ten miles back of the bombing line with the same regularity and accuracy

that our special heavy bombers can. The latter planes, flying at great altitudes at night, can carefully blanket designated areas, whereas the fighter bombers suit in and get away a good deal faster. Since both types of planes are carrying bombs which explode at altitudes of about 1,000 feet, the wind drift in both cases is about the same.

6. As pointed out above, the distribution to date by medium bombers has been sporadic. Berrumers and Mitchells have carried leaflets on regular missions and have dropped them on German concentrations if they happened to be attacking them or passing over them in the course of their missions. Also, 4 or 5 special Berrumer missions, consisting of between 4 to 8 planes with fighter escort, have carried out special assignments for us. These assignments were each specifically requested by PW units in France.

7. If we could arrange for regular medium bomber dissemination of tactical leaflets other than JRG BROADCAST, we could then afford to concentrate our special heavy bombers on strategic leafletting assignments and on the dissemination of MACHINISTEN. This medium bomber dissemination would, when tied in with fighter bomber dissemination, give us as good if not better coverage than we are now getting with our heavy bombers.

8. A Berrumer carries 6 of the larger type leaflet bombs, each of which contains approximately 80,000 leaflets. If 12 Berrumers were assigned to do only leafletting, we could count on having 6 planes operational each day. With 6 days of flying between, these planes would be able to disseminate more than 20,000,000 leaflets a week.

9. I strongly recommend that you talk to the Commanding Officer, 9th U.S. Air Force, about having some Berrumers assigned for leafletting. The special medium bomber planes for leafletting should, if possible, be based in France. This would enable them to operate without relation to the weather over England and over the Channel. It would also enable the persons manning these planes from a leaflet point of view to be in closer contact with PW officials at Army Group and Wartara.

10. There will, of course, be a number of paper, printing, and transport problems which will need to be faced in order to carry on a large scale medium bomber leaflet operation from French bases. However, it is believed that these problems could be solved within a few weeks. Further, it is believed that if the air should meet through the winter, we will, in any case, be required to carry on a leaflet operation from French bases and will thus have to face and solve the supply and transport problems involved.

11. The present directive is set by SHARP which governs the relationship between PW, SHARP, and 2 and PW, 21 Army Group, and 2 and PW, 12 U.S. Army Group, states that SHARP is responsible for leaflets carried by planes based in the U.K. or by planes based to the rear of army group boundaries. It is expected that most of the medium bombers will be based to the rear of army group boundaries. Thus, whether we continue to have our medium bomber leafletting done on its current sporadic basis or carried out by special leaflet planes, SHARP, rather than the army groups, would be responsible for their leaflet activities. This would seem to make sense since the medium bombers operate over targets affecting the entire front and not just over targets on the 21 Army Group or 12 U.S. Army Group front.

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

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TOO 221411Z AUGUST

SHAEF 220/22
TOR 221945Z AUGUST
NJB 222038Z AUGUST

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PRIORITY

FROM : PWD AFHQ SIGNED WILSON

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF,
SHERWOOD OWI, USAFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF AND LONDON COORDINATORS AUTHORITY,
FOR PWD SHAEF.

REF NO : PX-86114, 22 AUGUST 1944. CITE: PFWO

NAF 764

1. We repeat last weeks Directive, reinforcing our argument by accounts rapid Allied Advance North FRANCE and successful landings in PROVENCE.

2. European battlefronts: We use OWI Central German military crisis. For French front we adopt SHAEF Nr 10 on NORMANDY, Para 1 to 3, rephrasing in order give more general application, in view other German forces threatened by Allied advance. We give full prominence to FFI, showing their role indispensable part of campaign. We repeat last weeks line prisoners. On Eastfront we do not commit Russians beyond their official claims. On Italian front we repeat last weeks Directive giving news of FLORENCE as it occurs, without special prominence. On BALKANS we repeat last weeks Directive and shall give heavy play to expected story on German desertions.

3. FAR EAST: We reaffirm last weeks Directive adding OWI Central on ROOSEVELTS speech.

4. German crisis: We continue exploit news of German crisis aiming to foment discord between Axis and German party and people. We expose futile character of total mobilization.

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SECRET

REF NO: FX-86114

22 AUGUST 1944.

SHAEP 220/22

5. AUSTRIA: We adopt OWI Regional caution against correspondents stories about EAC planning.
6. POLAND: We repeat last weeks line on Polish political developments.
7. TURKEY: We reaffirm last weeks directive.
8. ITALY: We adopt FWS-ROME on Liberated ITALY.
9. BALKAN Allies: We reaffirm last weeks Directive.
10. Satellites: We reaffirm last weeks Directive adding on BULGARIA general themes from OWI Regional but not BULGARO German split and subsequent detailed instructions.
11. FRANCE: We repeat para 2 of political guidance from special guidance on landings in Northern FRANCE.
12. We give full play world security conference especially HULL assurance to small nations.

ACTION : FWD
INFORMATION : SGS
FRD
G-2
SHAEP FWD
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS



SEC IN 4175 22 Aug 44 2200R VAN/lp REF NO: FX-86114

SECRET

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

JJJJ

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 150204Z AUGUST

01153/15
FOR 151007Z AUGUST
mp 151150Z AUGUST

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : PWB AFHQ, SIGNED WILSON
TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SHERWOOD CMT.
EYOUSA FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND LONDON
COORDINATORS. SHAEF FOR PWD.
REF NO : FX-83157, 15 AUGUST 1944, CITE: PEPWO

WAF 762.

Highlights PWB Directive week 14 August.

1. General:

1 and 3. We adopt PWB central of the week ahead of para

2. Battle MARCHES:

We use SHAEF Directive 9 NORMANDY weeks principal task with PWB central on safety and good treatment of German prisoners.

On French front we keep to official news particularly in regard to use of captured BRETON ports.

On East front we repeat SHAEF Guidance of 2 August.

On ITALY we adopt PWB Directive of 13 August.

3. Far East:

We adopt CMI CENDIRECT August 8 to 15 not allowing our listeners to forget that war is global and demands on shipping to defeat JAPAN will delay European recovery after armistice.

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SHAEF File No 151007Z AUGUST 1944

SHAEF 153/15

4. German crisis we adopt FWE GUERRA on purge of
Generals, fullness of total mobilization and Nazi criminal efforts
to gain time.

We repeat last week.

No repeat last week.

We adopt FWE NORM of 4 August on FLORENCE and
liberated ITALY points in FWE NORM Directive of 11 August.

FINLAND and HUNGARY:

We use PWE Control summarizing our Directive of
Last week on ROMANIA and BULGARIA.

We reaffirm last weeks Directive. We should appreciate earliest advance Guidance on handling fall of PARIS.

INFORMATION : 308
FBI
C-2
SUMMARY
CHIEF AND
AG RECORDS



500 17 2650 15 AUGUST 1944 13105 DWR/jap KSF NO: PX-63157

SGS Dist	SC	DSC	CS	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR		SGS	CDOR	Misc	Adm	Ops
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6 753

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Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO: Date 6 August 1944

General SMITH:

For information.

F.T.

6 200

TOP SECRET

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

6 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

Subject: Report on Special Operations during OVERLORD.

Following is a brief of information contained in FWS Report on Special Operations during OVERLORD (TAB A): *4 Aug 44*

1. The media for covert propaganda during OVERLORD has been: (1) combined radio programs of news and music; (2) daily newspaper for German troops in the West; (3) medium and/or short wave programs, and (4) forged documents and subversive leaflets distributed in Germany.

2. It has been definitely established by prisoners and documents captured in Normandy that both officers and men of the German Army listen regularly to the broadcasts. It is also believed that the newspaper played a part in misleading the enemy about our military intentions.

3. In our propaganda the Home Front has been kept well in the picture, with particular reference to the approach of the Russian Armies to Germany and the sufferings of the population due to bombing. Constant emphasis is laid on the inequality of sacrifice between the party officials and the ordinary Germans.

4. Good evidence is available to show that there is good circulation of black leaflets in Norway, France, Switzerland and Germany.

5. Further cooperation is required from the Air Forces in order to carry out the following projects:

a. Intrusion by medium wave transmitter on a German frequency of a counterfeit German official broadcast in such a way that German listeners will accept instructions as being of official German origin. In order to accomplish this the Allied Air Forces must be counted on to drive German wireless stations off the air upon receipt of appropriate authority to take such action.

b. Present delivery of our daily newspaper for the German troops in the West is carried out by one squadron of the U.S. Ninth Air Force, which drops 250,000 copies. It is desirable that the R.A.F. should be asked to cooperate in night and day operations to drop this newspaper, as an adequate distribution is considered to be 2,000,000 copies.

J. N. Alexander
J. N. ALEXANDER,
Capt., Cav.,
Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff.

TOP SECRET

Sec-Staff File No. 37-93

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~~✓ 2 BT - [unclear]~~

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
STAFF VISITOR SOCIETY

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCE ARTICLES ARE LISTED BY SUBJECT CATEGORY

11 Feb. 1961:

REPORT: Report on Special Operations During OVERLORD DATE 4 August 1944

Number each step of blocks consecutively. Fill in each column, signed log's, draw a line across the sheet. Use square grids of dots for the memoranda.

Via	From	Pass to	Date	Has this paper been coordinated with all concerned?
1.	PWD SMAAF	Chief of Staff, SMAAF	4 Aug 1944	<p>1. The attached report of special operations during OVERLORD is for your information.</p> <p><i>Robert A. McClure</i> ROBERT A. MCCLURE, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.</p>
1 Incl	Rpt sub	above.		

F.D.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

作者: 吳世雄 地址: 廣東省潮陽縣潮陽鎮潮陽中學 電話: 0754-3611111

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PW

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET TAB "A"

REPORT ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING "OVERLORD"

Memorandum
Alexander F.
a/s.

1. The media for covert propaganda during operation OVERLORD have been four:
 - a) The combined radio programme of news and music for the German Armed Forces known as Soldaten sender Calais and Kurzwellensender Atlantik (Soldiers' Station Calais and Short Wave Station Atlantik) broadcast daily from 1830 hours until 0800 hours the following morning. (On medium wave Lapidistra from 2000 hours until 0500 hours)
 - b) The daily newspaper for the German troops in the West (Nachrichten fuer die Truppe) which is dropped by American Aircraft in quantities varying from 250,000 to 750,000 a night over targets in the West selected by 21st Army Group.
 - c) The medium-wave (and occasionally short wave) programme of talks for the opposition movement within the SS which is broadcast irregularly at various hours of the day and night on wave lengths used by official German programmes.
 - d) Forged documents and subversive leaflets distributed in Germany and occupied countries by agents and by balloon. These purport to come either from German official sources or from the various brands of German opposition. They aim at promoting defeatist and subversive activity.

The first two media carry the same news material and comment and carry out the same general propaganda policy. But the newspaper maintains a neutral attitude, speaking neither from an Allied nor from an explicitly German standpoint.

2. OPERATIONAL TASKS

Two months before D-day the role of these media in Operation OVERLORD had been discussed and agreed with G-2 and G-3 S.H.A.E.F. It was to be the task of black propaganda to direct subversive news and comment, both military and political, to the German forces in the West; to use S.H.A.E.F. and other intelligence sources to present exclusive and expert versions of military events; to assist in maintaining deception plans with the advice of G-3 S.H.A.E.F.

An audience for both our principal black media had been built up in preparation for OVERLORD. In the eight months preceding D-day it was known that large numbers of German officers and men in all three Services of the Wehrmacht listened regularly to the Calais station and had been impressed by its quick news service and detailed, inside information.

It has since been learnt from prisoners and documents captured in Normandy that the news and comment carried by the station were widely believed and discussed in spite of urgent warnings from the German military authorities that it was British and that those caught listening would be severely punished.

Aircraft distribution of the newspaper for the troops was begun a month before D-day and is thought to have played a part in misleading the enemy about our military intentions.

3. POLICY

Both before and after D-day the main task of black propaganda has been to concentrate the attention of the German soldier on the enemy within (Party authorities) rather than on the enemy without.

In the strictly military field it has endeavoured to keep before the mind of the soldier in the West the military disasters on the Eastern front; the growing weakness of German war production under stress of bombing, blockade and call-up; the impotence of the German Air Force at home and on the battlefields; the breakdown of authority, in particular police authority and the consequently increasing safety of defiance of the law.

6/8/44

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After D-day the course of operations in France was used to illustrate the hopelessness of Germany's continuation of the war while every opportunity was taken to suggest to the German fighting men on the invasion front that they were being sacrificed uselessly and being let down by their leaders. We have striven to suggest the incompetence and selfishness of the German military leaders and their disunity, particularly with reference to quarrels between Rommel and Rundstedt, Rommel and Dollmann, and between the various services.

4. TECHNIQUE

The technique of the two main media, Calais/Atlantik and the News-sheet, has been to provide German soldier listeners with a news service comprising a mixture of harmless items of general interest to German soldiers (e.g. Sports News, Promotions, Decorations), of news taken from the German DNB wireless teleprinter services, and, in the case of radio, put out frequently ahead of the German official broadcasting services, often with a subversive twist. The news service is flavoured with subversive inside information items based on intelligent deduction from intelligence material and careful reading of German newspapers and plausible inventions. Propaganda by direct appeal has played a part.

Military situations and themes have been given special treatment in talks, these talks afterwards being rewritten into leading articles for the Troop News-paper. Examples of such themes are:

- i) The coastal divisions have been written off by the High Command as a loss and are there simply to serve as human land-mines in the way of the invasion.
- ii) The Cherbourg peninsula has been abandoned by the High Command. No attempt is being made to reinforce it.
- iii) Von Schlieben and 25,000 officers and men have set an example of military realism in refusing to obey the theatrical Fuehrer-order to fight to the last cartridge.
- iv) Heavy losses incurred by U-boats in futile attempts to interfere in the Channel under suicidal conditions. The failure of the one-man torpedo in the Seine Bay owing to insufficient preparation.
- v) Shortage of munitions, shortage of petrol, shortage of transport makes it impossible for the troops to carry out tactical tasks and justify their surrender. The breakdown of rear communications on the Normandy front owing to bombing and the efforts of the Maquis.
- vi) The frittering away by the nervous, impulsive Rommel in the battle between the Orne and the Odon of his tanks and Panzer Grenadiers, rendering impossible the promised counter-offensive with masses of armour to which we had committed him.
- vii) The realisation by Germany's best generals that the outlook is hopeless leads to an organised conspiracy to kill Hitler and set up a government which will make peace.

We have kept the home front well in the picture with particular reference to the approach of the Russian armies to Germany, the sufferings of the population under bombing. (We give lists of bombed streets so that soldiers may apply for compassionate leave) Constant emphasis is laid on the inequality of sacrifice between the privileged Party officials and the ordinary Germans. Throughout we endeavour to give news with an appeal to the self-interest of the individual listener likely to cause him to act for himself against the collective interests of the German war effort.

5. EVIDENCE OF RECEPTION OF WIRELESS PROPAGANDA

We have ample evidence from statements of prisoners of war captured during OVERLORD that the Calais transmissions have been regularly heard and their content believed. S.H.A.E.F. interrogations of a number of prisoners during the week ending July 1st showed that over 50% had listened to the station. They

TOP SECRET

included men from infantry, armoured and artillery units, both regular and SS. General von Schlieben and other senior officers listened to Calais as a valuable source of news during the siege of Cherbourg and certain key phrases — themes of our propaganda have reappeared in statements made by Schlieben (as in those of other prisoners) suggesting that they may have been absorbed into his ordinary line of thinking. It is known that the station is listened to by U-boat officers and men at sea — well as at sea. From prisoners' statements it is known that Calais has a large audience among officers and men of the German Air Force and is even turned on in the messes. Official documents have been captured warning against the station. Official statements have — issued denying stories heard on Calais and subsequently circulated by officers and men.

It is considered that our campaign to represent the generals' conspiracy as a powerful movement to save Germany from military disaster by the elimination of Hitler and the securing of peace has had considerable success.

6. EVIDENCE OF LEAFLET CIRCULATION

— have good evidence from Norway, France, Switzerland and inside Germany of the circulation of black leaflets which have been distributed by agents — balloons.

The enemy appear to regard as most dangerous a handbook on methods of malingering which has been printed under various disguises. An order from the High Command warning against this document and expressing concern at the spread of malingering among the troops is in our possession.

Our leaflets purporting to be issued by a German deserters' organisation, giving advice on ways of deserting to neutral countries, have — found circulating among German troops in Norway and France. Our forged ration cards, dropped by aircraft, are known to be circulating in Germany and seem to have caused considerable administrative difficulties to the German Food Ministry.

Our imitations of official publications for the troops similar to — own ABCA have been warned against by the German military authorities.

7. PROJECTS FOR THE FUTURE

To carry out fully the plans for black propaganda which our resources and policy allow, further cooperation is required from the Services in two respects.

We have in the Aspidistra medium wave transmitter now used for broadcasting the Celsis programme on medium wave an instrument enabling us to intrude — German frequency and counterfeit a German official broadcast in such a way that the vast majority of German listeners will accept instructions or news put out by us in the name of the German Government as of official German origin. To make such an operation possible we need the cooperation of the R.A.F. in forcing the target station of the German radio network off the air so that — can take its place with our counterfeit programme. Research has been carried out into the reaction of German stations to enemy air attack and, although it has been impossible to find an absolutely reliable scheme, it is believed possible to work out an air operation enabling us to carry out the Aspidistra operation.

But our plans cannot be advanced without closer consultation with the staffs in charge of air operations against Germany. To carry out a successful intruder wireless operation at a moment of crisis inside Germany, — must be able to count on the Allied Air Forces driving German wireless stations off the air at a pre-arranged time, and on receiving the appropriate authority to take action. Owing to the absence of such machinery for ordering air attack and authorising an Aspidistra operation at short notice, we were unable to exploit the recent political crisis in Germany in the manner for which this transmitter was designed.

5 285 One other respect, too, closer cooperation with the Air Force is desirable. At present the delivery of our daily newspaper for the German troops in the West, which is considered by 21st Army Group to have priority over all other leaflet operations on their front, is carried out entirely by — squadron of the U.S. Ninth Air Force. It is desirable that the R.A.F. should be asked to cooperate in night and daylight operations to drop this newspaper, which at present has the disadvantage of being fully circulated of 250,000 copies, in

TOP SECRET

adequate distribution would be two million daily.

The further use of black propaganda to assist military operations is largely dependent on the extent to which P.W.E. are consulted in the early stages of their planning.

THE LEAFLET PROPAGANDA

FRONT

4 August 1944

A. COMBAT LEAFLETS

1. Over 1,000,000 per day

In spite of adverse weather conditions (five "no flying" days out of the first seven) the Allied leafletting squadrons succeeded in covering the 106 mi. Normandy front with an average of more than 1,000,000 leaflets per day throughout the 18-day period 27 June to 15 July. As often as weather permitted each day's allotment of aircraft took off from its base in England to spot-drop its load of leaflet bombs over the German lines and forward installation areas. At the end of the period the number of leaflets dropped totaled 20,052,050.

2. Synchronizing the message to the tactical situation

By June 27th Cherbourg was ours, the last resistance nests in the area had been mopped up. Leaflets' job was to drive home the import of Cherbourg's fall. ZG.19 was designed to do this, tracing the course of the campaign from D-day; showing pictures of the fortifications before and after the surrender, the long lines of prisoners taken; emphasizing the greatly improved allied position. ZG.20 high-spotted a photograph of von Schlieben after his capture, underlined his arguments in favor of surrendering. ZG.22 ("The Guns Are Broken!") contrasted position of Germany today, retreating on all fronts, with its hey-day in '42. ZG.23 ("One Minute That May Save Your Life") told the German soldier the big push was on its way; to give himself up while he still had the chance.

3. Reactions of the German Command

There was plenty of evidence that the German Command appreciates the effectiveness of combat leaflets:

- a. They employ an elaborate and well illustrated portfolio called "Instruction Material in the Fight Against Enemy Propaganda." A letter accompanying this portfolio, which is distributed to units down to companies, suggests short lectures on propaganda every week with repeated showings of leaflets depicted in the portfolio.
- b. They issue a pamphlet called "The Officer as Leader in the Fight Against Enemy Propaganda". Excerpts: "A German officer must forget the terrible lesson which history has taught -- in modern warfare propaganda is a serious weapon." "The enemy ... drops leaflets and newspapers; he lies, falsifies, incites, suspects - whatever line he may select, he is always the enemy The situation of total war does not permit to play with the contents of enemy propaganda."
- c. Captured non-coms and officers have been asking desperate attempts to convince us that our propaganda has no effect on their men - a story disproved by the testimony of the men themselves (see para. 4 below).
- d. Report after report from FWD forward detachments quotes Ps/W on measures taken by officers to stop the reading of leaflets by their

6 "261

4. Reactions of the rank and file

That the German troops are reading our leaflets and reacting to them on a big scale was brought out by Mr. Eden in a recent speech to the House of Commons. He said that 77% of the German prisoners captured in Normandy

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admit that they have read our leaflets, that 14% actually had leaflets in their possession when they were brought in. "Many of them," he continued, "regard them as something in the nature of a passport when they come in."

Here are a few typical statements from recent reports by POW detachments in the forward areas:

"Of a group of fifty-two, all had seen leaflets."

"Of a group of thirty-five PW interviewed, fifteen had seen leaflets in German, five had seen leaflets in French."

"Of a group of eight, all had seen leaflets. No one doubted their truthfulness. All stated that leaflets had been discussed by the men and read openly. One man was especially impressed by a leaflet stating the Americans didn't believe that 'Haven and Earth; but a genuinely decent life.' (26.10 - this leaflet has been commented on favorably by numerous prisoners. (See para. 2)."

"P/W thought leaflet dropped on June 15th (26.1) describing American strength and determination to advance was most convincing."

"Prisoner said he had surrendered after a long 'Buchenwald' (26.15). Popularized it greatly among the POWs to an area subject he had seen in other units."

"Of a group of nine, all had seen leaflets. One P/W had not read them. Three of the other P/W stated that the more leaflets they read the more they believed them."

"P/W said he had surrendered because of leaflet 'Angereiften' (26.1 - telling prisoners of the Atlantic that they were 'expendable') and 'Selbstmord' (26.7 - 'your duty as a soldier has been done; now look after yourself')."

"Of the four P/W brought in in this detail all had leaflets."

"Two P/W had leaflet 'Angereiften' (26.1). They said it had given them the final suggestion to surrender. They stated that the men in their units were eagerly reading leaflets in spite of an order that they would be shot for so doing."

"All P/W knew our leaflets. Notes on treatment of P/W were generally believed, as are tactical remarks."

"P/W stated that of his group of 26 only one had a leaflet on which to write his name (26.6, which contains a box to be filled in with name, rank, full name address, to be used by Red Cross in informing soldiers' family - P/W's safety) and they had been waiting for the new leaflets to be brought so that all could surrender together."

"All but 2 of 10 P/W had seen leaflets. One said that 'Angereiften' had caused him to surrender."

"P/W had heard that he would be sold a slave. Saw von Schlieben leaflet (26.20); says it caused him to surrender. Reports one man in his outfit had risked his life to go out on a field under artillery fire to pick up a leaflet."

5. For the Home Front to be seen.

One P/W captured in the forward front told of having received leaflets which had been dropped on his home town, Borsig, Sauerland, and forwarded on to him by his wife.

6. For 200 leaflets and 100

Numerous reports during the period have indicated that P/W reactions indicate leaflets as an important factor in the decision to surrender.

warfare than radio. According to one P/W, "Only non-Nazi listen to radio. Everyone reads leaflets." Apparently the form of Allied propaganda most popular with the German troops is the "front newspaper" (approximately two-fifths of the combat leaflets dropped were of this type). Next come other types of leaflets, and third, radio.

7. It wasn't the message - it was the way it was delivered

Apparently the most lied-in-the-world Nazis have been impressed in many cases, if not to the subject matter of our leaflet propaganda, at least by the extent of our leaflet operation. Said one violent Nazi P/W: "Not one single word of what was written did I believe. Still it is amazing that you can affect the time, money, men, and air power to do these things." Said another, "In propaganda, it must be admitted you have really beaten us."

8. LEAFLET PROPAGANDA TO CIVILIANS

8. 12,000,000 flown from British airfields ... Millions more from Mediterranean bases

Behind the enemy front the strategic, long-range leaflet campaign continued. Out over Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and Norway went 12,000,000 leaflets from air fields in England. And from Mediterranean bases millions of other leaflets were flown to South France, Italy, Eastern Germany, Czech-Slovakia, Hungary, and The Balkans.

9. Kind of Leaflets

Some of these were our regular propaganda publications, such as "Sternen-Banner" (U.S.G. Series - Germany), "Vier" (U.S.N. Series - France), "L'Armee en Ciel" (X.H. Series - Belgium), "Flying Dutchman" (X.E. Series - Holland); others were booklets, such as "The Danish Manual" (D.7 - Denmark), "The R.F.C. Song Book" (P.177 - France), "Wer Gilt Richtig?" (G.13 - Germany); and still others were special leaflets such as "The Bishop's Message" (P.65 - France), "D'Alessio's Speech" (S.4 - Belgium), or "Message to the Poles" (X.P.2 - Poland).

10. Reaction to Strategic Leaflets.

It is a slower, more difficult job to ascertain the reaction to leaflets of this type than it is to check on the effectiveness of Combat Leaflets. In the latter case it may often be merely a question of hours after a drop has been made before we have prisoners in our hands who give us a first-hand story of their reaction to the combat leaflet in question. In the case of Strategic Leaflets we have to rely on more devious means of getting the information. In the main, these are: a) Radio broadcasts which mention one or more of the leaflets specifically; b) Magazines and newspaper articles appearing from enemy or occupied areas; and, c) Reports from members of the Underground movements within occupied areas. A few leaflet reactions gathered in this way are given in the paragraphs below.

11. "De Wapen leidt" featured in Dutch evening paper

The collaborationist paper "Wolk en Veldroos", published in Utrecht, comments on an issue of "De Wapenleidt" (1.4.41) which is dropped regularly over Holland. After quoting long passages from an article describing a battle with the Luftwaffe, the article poked heavy headed fun at Allied claims that the Luftwaffe's strength is waning.

12. Radio Brussels discusses "Gedropt le Bouillon"

Radio Brussels recently quoted long extracts from "Gedropt le Bouillon" (X.E.12), referring specifically to page 53 and commenting sarcastically on the Allies' admission of "difficulties" and their change of front in asking the population to assist from the shortage of food supplies which they formerly advocated on grounds that it went to the Germans.

13. Leaflets in the Streets of Budapest

The Swiss paper Berner Tagblatt reports that numerous leaflets have been found in the streets of Budapest inciting sabotage and desertion from the army. "Bourgeois are hiding leaflets and giving shelter to large numbers of deserters from the Hungarian Army," says the report.

14. German radio reaction to drop on Holland

The German Overseas Service in Dutch for the Netherlands ridiculed in the strongest possible terms the British leaflet dropped on Maastricht in June.

15. "Imitation" of Hitler's speech provokes Nazis' comment

The Nazi radio recently referred to Allied aircraft having dropped leaflets "imitating" editions of the Volkischer Beobachter, Hitler's Berlin newspaper. After commenting on the fact that an increase in American propaganda had been noticed in recent weeks, it suggested that this was due to an ill-considered campaign designed to cut down loss of life on the battlefield. The radio was careful not to broadcast that the "imitation" of the Volkischer Beobachter (leaflet 26.30) consists of a greatly reconstructed front page of the paper's 10 October 1941 edition, which carried the headline "The Campaign in the East Won", nor that the leaflet dramatically underlines the contrast between these 1941 headlines and the situation today - with France invaded, the Italian front in retreat, and the Russians hammering at the gates of East Prussia.

16. Fascists warn civilians against Allied air drops

The Head of the Province of Cuneo has ordered "that it is absolutely forbidden to all citizens not only to remove but also to touch materials of any kind whatsoever dropped by or falling from enemy aircraft. Anyone who finds them must at once notify the nearest Italian or German military command or police post. Persons who infringe this order are punishable by detention up to three months and a fine up to 2000 lire."

RECEIVED
AUG 6 08 11 1944
Chief of Staff
SHAFTSBERG STAFF



SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe-conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and is to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

PASSIERSCHEIN

An die britischen und amerikanischen Vorposten.
Der deutsche Soldat, der diesen Passierschein vorzeigt,
benutzt ihn als Zeichen seines ehrlichen Willens, sich
zu ergeben. Er ist zu entwaffnen. Er muss gut be-
handelt werden. Er hat Anspruch auf Verpflegung
und, wenn nötig, ärztliche Behandlung. Er wird so
bald wie möglich aus der Gefahrenzone entfernt.

Auf Grund von Kapitel 2, Artikel 11, Vertragsnummer 846 der Genfer Konvention vom 27. Juli 1929 erhalten Kriegsgefangene Soldaten* in amerikanischen oder britischen Händen die gleiche Verpflegung wie Soldaten des amerikanischen oder britischen Heeres. Ihr Essen wird von Köchen aus ihren eigenen Reihen auf die Art ihres Landes zubereitet.

In Amerika oder Kanada erhalten Kriegsgefangene für ihre Arbeit innerhalb oder außerhalb des Lagers pro Tag 80 cents. Die Hälfte davon wird für die Zeit nach dem Krieg auf einer Bank hinterlegt, die andere Hälfte in Gutscheinen — bezahlt, mit denen sich der Gefangene Marketerwaren wie Zigaretten, Süßigkeiten, alkoholfreie Getränke und dergleichen kaufen kann.

Den Kriegsgefangenen wird Gelegenheit geboten zur Abhaltung von Bildungs- und Lehrturfen, zur Ausübung von Sport und Spielen und zur Veranstaltung von Konzerten, Theateraufführungen und Vorträgen. Sie dürfen Zeitungen lesen und Rundfunk hören.

Postverbindung zwischen den Gefangenenerlagern und der Heimat geht über das Rote Kreuz. Sie ist zuverlässig und verhältnismäßig schnell. Nach Kriegsende werden die Gefangenen so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt.

* Als Soldaten werden auf Grund der Haager Konvention (IV. 1907) angesehen: Alle kriegswirksamen Personen, die Uniform tragen oder ein Abzeichen, das von einer Entfernung aus erkannt werden kann.

TYSKLANDS SISTE KRAMPETREKNINGER

Goebbels utnevnt til „utøvende myndighet
for den totale mobilisering i Tyskland og
de okkuperte områder.”

Den 25. juli utnevnte Hitler Göring til formann
for et ministerråd for Rikets forsvær, „for i enhver
henseende å omordne det sivile liv til å innpasse i
den totale krigsføring”. Göring i sin tur oppnevnte
Goebbels den utøvende myndighet med fullmakt
til å finkjemme det sivile Tyskland for arbeidskraft.
Fullmakten gjelder også for de okkuperte områder.

Helt siden katastrofen ved Stalingrad har Tysk-
land vært „totalt mobilisert”. Hitlers håp om å
presse selv Tyskland til enda større ytelser kan
neppe virkeliggjøres.

Han vil derfor ty til de okkuperte områder !

Planene om total mobilisering av arbeidskraften i
de okkuperte land for tysk krigsinnsats vil bli forsøkt
gjennomført — først ved list, siden ved brutal
makt.

HJEMMEFRONTLEDEREN har i overens-
stemmelse med DEN NORSKE REGJERING
allerede utstedt retningslinjene for det norske folkets
kamp mot en slik tvangsmobilisering. Hjemme-
frontens direktiver er blitt godkjent av DEN
ALLIERTE OVERKOMMANDO som har gitt
ordre til at dette flybladet skal spres.

Derfor er det folks stilling klar

Ordren er :

**Fullstendig boykott ■ enhver
form for arbeidsmoblisering**

*Hjemmefrontledelsen har sendt ■
følgende retningslinjer :*

■ **arbeidspliktige :**

1. MØT IKKE TIL SESJON UNDER NOEN OMSTENDIGHETER HVERKEN FOR ARBEIDSINNSATS ELLER ARBEIDSTJENESTE.
2. Sett deg i forbindelse med venner og kjente, skaff deg det nødvendige utstyr og dra avsted.
3. Utnytt dine kontakter på landsbygda fra arbeid eller ferie. Et eller annet sted vil du ha et inntak når du tenker deg om.
4. Gjør alt det arbeid du settes til så godt du kan. Legg godviljen til. Det du ikke kan, kan du lære.
5. Skap ikke noe hemmelighetskremmeri omkring din person. Men hold deg i ro der du arbeider. Bland deg ikke med andre. Snakk ikke med fremmede.
6. Gå ikke rundt med den innstilling at det er andres plikt å hjelpe deg. Hjelpe deg selv.
7. Vær på vakt mot ellersøking. Tenk på hvordan du lettest kan komme unna.
8. Vær på vakt mot provokasjoner og tyske agenter ■
er ute og ■■■■

Til det norske folk:

Hjelp de arbeidspliktige — gi dem husrom, mat og penger når de trenger det.

Til bøndene:

Gå ■ for å beholde arbeidspliktige på gårdene.
Tilby arbeidspliktige i hyene arbeid.
Nekt å motta A.T. arbeidere.

Felles innsats for felles seier!

Il Consiglio Unito della Federazione Internazionale delle
Miniere, dei Metalli e dei Trasporti ha radiodiffuso il
seguente messaggio ai lavoratori stranieri in Germania :

"Il momento che voi avete atteso così a lungo è giunto.
La potenza di Hitler è stata sfidata da generali tedeschi.
È stato instaurato un centro rivale di autorità. Tanto i
soldati quanto il popolo tedesco hanno — la dimo-
strazione che i loro comandanti militari hanno perduto
le ultime speranze di vittoria.

Dipende ben più dall'azione di massa entro la Germania
che non dai generali, se Hitler riuscirà o no a ristabilire
un poco più a lungo il suo potere.

Noi non abbiamo la pretesa di darvi delle istruzioni.
Noi sappiamo che voi obbedirete i vostri dirigenti, e che
farete di tutto, come stanno facendo i vostri compagni in
patria, per affrettare il crollo di Hitler e la fine della
guerra. Voi sapete quale posto importante occupate in
Germania, sia per il vostro numero, sia per la vostra
posizione in tutti i punti centrali delle industrie belliche
tedesche.

Voi riceverete da Londra tutto l'aiuto e tutte le in-
formazioni che sarà possibile darvi dall'esterno. Ascoltate
Londra! Voi stessi comprenderete la vitale importanza
di dirigere contro Hitler, in questo momento, tutte le
forze disponibili in Germania, a collaborare — tutti
i lavoratori tedeschi che dimostrino coi fatti, in questi
momenti critici, che cosa intendano fare.

Lavoratori stranieri in Germania! I vostri compagni
in patria, quelli di tutti i paesi occupati, quelli di tutto il
mondo libero rivolgono i loro sguardi su di voi. Essi
sanno che voi non mancherete all'appello."

Ascoltate i programmi per i lavoratori italiani in Germania,
ogni venerdì e ogni martedì alle 17,30 in italiano, e ogni sabato
alla diciannovesima e un quarto in tedesco.

Der Stein ist im Rollen

DEUTSCHE ARBEITER!

Die deutschen Generale haben einen tödlichen Schlag Hitlers Macht geführt — tödlich, ganz gleich, ob sie sofortigen Erfolg begleitet — oder nicht.

Das faschistische Regime, das einen schon verlorenen Krieg führt, kann keine solche Untergrabung seiner Autorität nicht lange ertragen.

Die deutschen Arbeiter können sich von einer Revolte, die von deutschen Generalen geführt ist, kein dauerndes Versprechen — so wenig wie die Arbeiter anderer Länder.

Aber heute kommt es nur eins: Die Generale haben ein Unternehmen ins Leben gebracht, das das deutsche Volk Rettung und Frieden bringen kann. Der Masseneinsatz der Arbeiterschaft kann dieses Unternehmen zu Ende führen. In den Betrieben kann Hitler seine Niederlage finden.

Wir tragen die deutschen Arbeiter in entscheidender Weise dazu bei, den schon verlorenen Krieg abzukürzen und Schluss zu machen, die volle Katastrophe über Deutschland hereinbrach.

Damals gab es keine 12 Millionen Fremdarbeiter im Herzen Deutschlands wie heute. Sie bilden einen Teil der Massen innerhalb des Reiches, die dazu beitragen können, den Zusammenbruch Hitlers zu beschleunigen.

Die Fremdarbeiter in Deutschland sind heute ein Faktor von allergrößter politischer Bedeutung. Es ist die unzweifelhafte Pflicht der deutschen Arbeiter, in jeder Weise mit ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten und, wenn nötig, ihrer Führung zu folgen.

Die deutschen Arbeiter müssen ihn weiterstossen!

*Mezinárodní Rada horníků, kovodělníků a nepravých
zaměstnanců vysílá ruskými následující poselství celým
dělníkům v Německu:*

DLOUHO očekávaný okamžik nastal. Němečtí
generálové se postavili Hitlerovi — odpor, a vytvořili
nezávadné mocenské středisko. Němečtí vojáci a německý
lid musí před sebou důkaz, že jejich vojenská vítězství se
razdělí naděje na vítězství.

Zda se Hitlerovi podaří udržet moc o něco déle, závisí
však více na hromadné akci uvržit Německo než
generálech.

Není naším úmyslem vás poněovat. Víme, že budete
poslouchat svých předáků a, že se přičiníte ze všech sil, jako
se přičinují vaši krajané doma, abyste uspěli Hitlerův
pád a konec války. Víte — ti nejste, — díky své počet-
nosti a posilím, které zaujímáte ve válečném průmyslu,
máte Německo ve svých rukou.

Z Londýna se vám dostane v krajních mezích možnosti
podpory i informací. Naslouchejte Londýnu. Sami nejlépe
oceníte, jak nesmírně je důležitá, aby v tomto okamžiku
všechny síly odskoje v Německu byly soustředěny proti
Hitlerovi, jakož i abyste spolupracovali se všemi německými
pracovníky, kteří evyní činy v tomto kritickém okamžiku
prokážou na čí straně jsou.

Gizí dělníci v Německu! Pracující vrstvy ve vašich
vlastech, v celém ujitmené Evropě, a ve všech svobodných
zemích světa k vám vzbízejí. Jsme pevně přesvědčení, že
nezklamete.

*Naslouchejte programu pro české dělníky v
Německu v neděli 45 minut po půlnoci; v
německé řeči v sobotu 15 minut po půlnoci.*

Der Stein ist im Rollen

DEUTSCHE ARBEITER

Die deutschen Generale haben einen tödlichen Schlag gegen die Macht geführt — tödlich, ganz gleich, ob er solch einen Erfolg begleitet sein wird oder nicht.

Das faschistische Regime, das einen schon verlorenen Krieg führt, kann eine solche Untergrabung seiner Autorität nicht lange überleben.

Die deutschen Arbeiter können sich von einer Revolte, die von deutschen Generälen geführt ist, kein dauerndes Heil versprechen — so wie die Arbeiter anderer Länder.

Aber heute kommt es auf eins an: die Generale haben ein Unternehmen ins Rollen gebracht, das dem deutschen Volk Rettung und Frieden bringen kann. Nur der Arbeiter kann dieses Unternehmen zu Ende führen. In den Betrieben kann Hitler seine Niederlage finden.

1918 trugen die deutschen Arbeiter in entscheidender Weise dazu bei, den schon verlorenen Krieg abzukürzen und Schluss zu machen. Die volle Katastrophe über Deutschland hereinbrach.

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Fremdarbeiter in Deutschland sind heute ein Faktor von größter politischer Bedeutung. Es ist die unzweifelhafteste Pflicht der deutschen Arbeiter, in jeder Weise mit ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten und, wenn nötig, ihrer Führung zu folgen.

**Die deutschen Arbeiter
müssen ihn weiterstossen!**

ZJEDNOCZONY KOMITET DO OBCOKRAJOWYCH ROBOTNIKÓW

Następująca odezwa została nadana przez radio do robotników cudzoziemskich w Niemczech przez Zjednoczony Międzynarodowy Komitet Górników, Metalowców i Transportowców:

Chwila tak długo przez was oczekiwana nadeszła. Utworzony został ośrodek władzy który przeciwstawia się panującemu systemowi. Żołnierze niemieccy i naród niemiecki mają obecnie dowód że dowódcy wojskowi nie mają nadzieję na zwycięstwo.

Czy Hitlerowi uda się ustanowić ponownie swą władzę czy też mu się to nie uda — zależyć będzie tylko od generalów ile od masowej akcji wewnątrz Niemiec.

Nie zamierzamy dawać wam instrukcji. Wiemy że słuchać będziecie waszych przywódców i że tak jak rodacy wasi w kraju, uczynicie wszystko co możliwe aby przyspieszyć upadek Hitlera i koniec wojny. Wiedziecie sami że odgrywanie decydującą rolę w Niemczech dzięki waszej wielkiej ilości oraz dzięki temu że zajmujecie stanowiska we wszystkich ośrodkach niemieckiego przemysłu wojennego.

Otrzymacie z Londynu wszelką pomoc i wszelkie informacje, które mogą być dostarczone z zewnątrz. Słuchajcie audycji z Londynu. Wy sami zdajecie sobie sprawę jak żywotną jest konieczność skierowania w obecnej chwili przeciwko Hitlerowi wszystkich sił jakie Niemcy są do dyspozycji i współdziałania z wszystkimi niemieckimi robotnikami, którzy w krytycznej chwili czynami udowodnią po jakiej stronie się znajdują.

Robotnicy cudzoziemscy w Niemczech! Na was skierowane są oczy robotników w waszej ojczyźnie, robotników całej okupowanej Europy, całego wolnego świata. Wiemy, że nie zawiedziecie.

Słuchajcie programów polskich dla robotników polskich w Niemczech w tygodniu o 9.20 i czwartki o 19.45, oraz w języku niemieckim w soboty kwadrans po północy.

Der Stein ist im Rollen

Die deutschen Generale haben einen tödlichen Schlag gegen Hitlers Macht geführt — tödlich, gleich, er von einem Erfolg begleitet sein wird nicht.

Ein faschistisches Regime, das einen schon verlorenen Krieg führt, kann eine solche Untergrabung seiner Autorität nicht lange überleben.

Die deutschen Arbeiter können sich von einer Revolte, die von deutschen Generalen geführt ist, kein dauerndes Heil versprechen — so wenig wie die Arbeiter anderer Länder.

Aber heute kommt auf eins an: die Generale haben ein Unternehmen ins Rollen gebracht, das dem deutschen Volk Rettung und Frieden bringen kann. Nur Masseneinsatz der Arbeiterschaft dieses Unternehmen zu Ende führen. In den kann Hitler seine Niederlage finden.

trugen die deutschen Arbeiter in entscheidender bei, den schon verlorenen Krieg abzukürzen Schluss machen, ehe die volle Katastrophe über Deutschland hereinbrach.

gab keine Millionen Fremdarbeiter im Herzen Deutschlands wie heute. Sie bilden einen Teil der Massen innerhalb des Reiches, die dazu beitragen können, Zusammenbruch zu beschleunigen.

Die Fremdarbeiter in Deutschland sind die ein Faktor von allergrößter politischer Bedeutung. die unzweifelhafte Pflicht der deutschen Arbeiter, in jeder Weise mit zusammenzuarbeiten und, nötig, ihrer Führung folgen.

Die deutschen Arbeiter müssen ihn weiterstossen!

63

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten!

Um unnützes Blutvergiessen ■ ersparen, ■
auch dieses Flugblatt zugestellt.

■ SEID JETZT ABGESCHNITTEN.
IHR HABT TAPFER GEKÄMPFT, ■
VON JETZT AN KÖNNT ■ DURCH
WEITERKÄMPFEN NICHTS MEHR ER-
REICHEN. IHR MÜSST EUCH ■
ODER STERBEN.

Ihr erkennt ■ Lage. Es gilt jetzt, dement-
sprechend ■ handeln. ■ muss ■ sich
selbst entscheiden.

Es ist keine Zeit ■ verlieren!

Kommt in kleinen Gruppen—nicht über 5—
ohne Waffen, Koppel oder Helm. Die Hände
hoch, schwenkt diesen Zettel oder ein Taschentuch.

Die Entscheidung drängt!

BEHANDLUNG

701 Kriegsgefangenen

1. **Anständige Behandlung** ist dir durch ☐ Genfer Konvention zugesichert. ☐ wirst als ☐ behandelt.
2. **Gute Verpflegung** — nämlich genau dieselbe die wir, das bestgenährte Heer der Welt, erhalten.
3. **Lazarettpflege** ☐ modern ☐ erstklassig — identisch ☐ der ☐ eigenen Truppen.
4. **Schreibgelegenheit.** ☐ kannst im Monat ☐ Briefe und 4 Karten nach Hause schreiben.
5. **Besoldung.** Ausser 80s per Tage für Arbeitsleistungen erhältst du ☐ üblichen 83 per Monat.
6. **Weiterbildung.** Zahlreiche Bildungs- und Lehrkurse werden in allen Gefangenenlagern abgehalten.
7. **Nach Kriegsende** — möglichst baldige Heimkehr.

DAS RÄTSEL der Luftwaffe

IM OSTEN

wird unser Kameraden erklärt, die Luftwaffe werde für die Abwehrkämpfe im Westen benötigt. Hier im Westen wurde den Kameraden der 91. I.D. erzählt, die Luftwaffe decke die Rückzug in Polen auf. Ostpreussen. Wie erklärt sich das?


SÜDEN

unser Kameraden gesagt, sie sei bei Cherbourg zusammengezogen worden. In Cherbourg warteten 50 000 Kameraden vergeblich auf Luftunterstützung. Die 243. I.D. bekam in 15 Tagen 1 deutsches Flugzeug zu sehen. Wie erklärt sich das?

IM WESTEN

wird auch immer mit dem Verbleib der Luftwaffe Schind-
kader getrieben, indem man den Verteidigern von St. L.ä
sagte, die Luftwaffe müsse in die Panzerschluchten bei
Caen eingreifen. In Caen war sie aber auch nicht. Wie
erklärt sich das?

Das Rätsel löst: Die Luftwaffe ist nicht im Osten, im Westen und im Süden. Sie ist nicht irgendwo aus. Genauso wie die anderen. Sie ist nicht irgendwo aus. Genauso wie die anderen. Sie ist nicht irgendwo aus. Genauso wie die anderen.



SIE FEHLT...

Frage einen alten Frontsoldaten, der den Frankreich-Feldzug 1940 oder den Afrika-Feldzug 1941 mitgemacht hat, was ihm heute ☐ meisten fehlt. Die erste Antwort, die er dir geben wird, ist: Am meisten fehlt uns die Luftwaffe!

● für Aufklärung: Damals konnten die Bleser Stacks und Araden noch ungehindert aufklaren, während der Feind ☐ Durchdringung blieb. Heute ist die Lage umgekehrt. Heute ist die Lage umgekehrt.

● für Nachschub: Damals sollte der deutsche Nachschub ungehindert zur Front, während Stacks und Araden dem Feind die Nachschubstrassen zerschlagen. Heute ist der deutsche Nachschub unterbunden, die Lage umgekehrt.

● für Fronteinsatz: Die grossen deutschen Durchdränge 1940 und 1941 erfolgten mit hollenden Stacks-Umratz. Heute sind es die Michells, Mannufers, Typhasen und Spinnas, die den Weg für Durchdränge bereiten.

Frage einen alten Frontsoldaten, was in einer hoffnungslosen Lage zu tun ist, wenn der Einsatz des Lebens dem Vaterland nicht mehr nützen kann. Er wird dir sagen: Wenn es nicht anders geht, dann lässt ☐ sich eben gefangen nehmen!

RESTRICTED

Landser haben das Wort

SEITE 2

DIE ÜBERLEBENDEN

„Von unserer Kompanie waren überhaupt nur mehr 25 Mann am Leben. Wir hatten die stärksten Ausfälle tags zuvor gehabt, durch Art-Beschuß. Die Lage war eben hoffungslos. Zuletzt schossen die noch mit Phosphor. Wir konnten ihnen nichts gar nichts entgegensetzen. Nach kurzer Beratung beschlossen wir, eine weisse Fahne zu hissen. Es war nur ein Handtuch oder eine Unterhose. Ich erinnere mich nicht, aber der Tormat hörte zu schreien auf und nach kurzer Zeit kam er und gab gleich den Verwundeten erste Hilfe, und dann ging es in die Kriegsgefangenschaft.“

— Unteroffizier, 91. I.D.

IST KOMMISSBROT BESSER ?

„Die Verpflegung im Lager ist prima, aber da gibt's sonst nichts, die stehen das gute deutsche Kommissbrot dem amerikanischen Weisbrot gleich vor. Wir sind gewohnt, so weich zu essen.“

— Grenadier, 71. I.D. (Süd)

EIN PARTEIGENOSSE SPRICHT

„Ich schäme mich durchaus nicht, dass ich Parteimitglied bin. Ich bin bei der Bewegung gewesen — schon lange vor der Machübernahme. Ja, damals waren alle noch ganz idealistisch gesinnt. Keiner dachte daran, sich zu drücken oder was dergleichen zu verdienen. Damals hatte die Sache noch Schwung. Heute ist es allerdings anders. Wenn ich an die Kasse denke, die da hinten sitzen und schreien, da kann einem schon manchmal Zweifel kommen. Aber das ändert nichts an der Tatsache, dass die Bewegung an sich für das deutsche Volk etwas ganz Grossartiges gewesen ist.“

— Feldwacht, 709. I.D.

DAS RÄTSEL DER LUFTWAFFE

„Bei uns in der Kompanie wurde erzählt, dass die deutsche Luftwaffe Flugverbote hat. Die Piloten sollen sich die Nerven für die nächste grosse Offensive schonen. Ich gehe aber an, dass es sich um Mangel an Treibstoff handelt.“

— Grenadier, 94. G. Div. (Süd)

EIN OFFIZIER ZUM FÜHRENBEPFEL

„Der Führerbefehl hat allerdings gefehlt. Ausnahmen bis zum letzten Mann. Die Frage ist nur, ob der militärisch nicht geschult ist. Schliesslich muss man doch dem Truppenführer Gelegenheit geben, zu operieren oder auszuweichen. Es hat sich ja auch herausgestellt, dass das mit dem Sünden, Siegen oder fallen einem nicht nur die Einsatzfreudigkeit nimmt — es war auch taktisch ganz verheerend. Ich habe mich lange genug damit auseinandergesetzt, ob ich die Stellung halten sollte, oder ob ich sie berechtigterweise aufgeben sollte. Schliesslich war es aber dann zu spät. Wir konnten sie weder halten noch verlassen. Wir wurden von den Engländern einfach einkassiert.“

— Leutnant, 716. I.D.

LUFT-EINSATZ BEI CHERBOURG

„Ich habe seit dem 8. Juni in Cherbourg überhaupt nur ein Flugzeug von uns gesehen. Eine Luftüberlegenheit war da, es war schon nicht mehr schick. Am Tag konnte das aus seinem Loch überhaupt nicht mehr raus. Jeder einzelne Mensch, jedes einzelne Fahrzeug wurde besetzt. Es war unmöglich, sich auf der Strasse zu bewegen. Kein Lager ist gestört. Man kann den Fliegern eigentlich gar nichts überlegen — es wäre reiner Selbstmord gewesen, zu starten. Andererseits wieder fragt man sich, ob sie überhaupt noch Maschinen übrig haben.“

— Grenadier, 242. I.D.

NAMEN ☐ SOLDATEN ☐ SELBSTVERSTÄNDLICH NICHT VERPFLICHTET
Z.G.33

ATLANTIKURONT

„Meiner Ansicht nach erringt Deutschland den Endsiege, wenn wir die Geheimwaffe, in aller nächster Zeit. Ich meine nicht die Vergeltungswaffe, die man jetzt eingesetzt hat. Wenn das die wirkliche Vergeltung wäre, dann können wir allerdings einpacken. Ich habe aber gehört, dass der Führer mit einem finischen Forscher an der wirklichen Geheimwaffe arbeitet — und zwar so, dass sie mit ihr möglich sein. Truppen per Luft nach Amerika zu schicken. Da werden wir so plötzlich durch die Luft gestreift werden.“

— Obergefreiter, 13. Flak-Div.

„Wir waren 17 Mann in unserem Bunker. Der Amerikaner kam zwischen uns und dem Nachbarbunker durch. Unser Leutnant, so ist ganz jung von der HJ, ging zurück, da wir bloß der Feldwebel und ich. Nun haben wir gesehen, wie sie den Nachbarbunker gekümmert haben. Also haben wir eine Beratung. Sagt der Feldwebel: „Was machen wir?“ „Ja“, sage ich, „Sie sind hier der Feldwebel und ich bin bloß Unteroffizier. Vor uns ist die schwere Art, links und rechts die amerikanische Infanterie, hinter uns die Panzer — also ich überlasse es Ihnen, ich habe nur was Sie mir befehlen.“ Da sagt der Feldwebel: „Also, Jungen, wir geben die paar Schuss ab und dann Schlus.“ Wie ja auch richtig — die Lage war eben hoffnungslos.“

— Unteroffizier, 716. I.D.

„Unsere Waffen sind gut, besonders unser MG 42 — da hat der Feind nichts ebenbürtiges. Aber die amerikanischen Granatwerfer, das muss man schon sagen, die sind unheimlich genau. Die stehen ja direkt Messerball. Unsere Stellung haben die beherzt, systematisch von hinten nach vorne, ich habe nicht weniger als 48 Granaten auf vielleicht 25 Quadratmetern geschüttet. Die Ausfälle in der Zug war. Meiner Ansicht nach ist — es noch immer — Geschütz, aber der Ton ist unheimlich — schwere Waffen. Munition bräukes die annehmend gar nicht zu sparen.“

— Gefreiter, 342. I.D.

„Meiner Ansicht nach liegt es am Nachschub. Nach der Gefangennahme wurden wir hinuntergebracht zur Einschüpfung, und wie ich gesehen habe, was so bei denen dort aufgestapelt liegt, da ist mir direkt alles runtergefallen. Das stimmt sich nur so — so wie man überhaupt sehen kann — Fahrzeuge, Panzer aneinandergereiht, Kisten und Tonnen, Sprit in Hülle und Fülle — und von unseren Flugzeugen keine Spur! Was das für Angriffswerte gewesen wären! Und was die Amerikaner alles für Sachen haben — wir bekamen gleich Bombenstationen mit ausgezeichnetem Fleisch, Keks, Konfekt, Bohnenkaffee und Zucker. Ich sagte ihnen ganz offen: „Wenn wir soviel Material und einen solchen Nachschub hätten, dann wäre ihr jetzt nicht hier.“ Die Amerikaner lachten Grinsen und schrien nur.“

— Major, 3. Fallsch.-Div.

DMER. SOLDATEN WENDEN

VERBÖFFENTLICHT

1. **Waarom gebruikten ■ Deutsche generaals Kolonel von Stauffenberg om te trachten Hitler en zijn kliek te vermoorden op Donderdag ■ Juli?**

OMDAT ...

**■ Deutsche generaals
weten dat Duitschland de
oorlog verloren heeft!**

2. **Waarom zetten Hitler en de nazi-leiders ■ verloren oorlog voort?**

Omdat zij weten, dat de vrije wereld hen heeft veroordeeld en gewonnen. Omdat zij weten dat deze oorlog hun einde beteekent. Omdat zij Duitschland en de geheele wereld in hun val willen meeslepen.

3. **Hoe staan ■ landverraders, de Musserts en Feldmeyers ■ opzichte van dezen opstand der generaals tegen ■ de partij?**

Mussert zou de zijde der generaals willen kiezen. Hij weet, dat Duitschland verloren is, zooals zijn laatste rede in het Concertgebouw in Amsterdam heeft bewezen, en ook hij zou zijn huid willen redden. Feldmeyer echter, staat naast Hitler en zou Nederland zijn eigen ondergang willen zien deelen. Maar beide misdadigers weten dat het volk van Nederland hen ten doode heeft opgeschreven en dat hun einde nadert.

4. **Wat zullen de gevolgen zijn van ■ samenzwering der generaals?**

Hitler, als Tiberius, als Nero, zal langzamerhand iedereen gaan verdenken. Niemand is meer veilig voor

zijn wantrouwen. Hij zal zich zoowel tegen hen richten, die bij de samenzwering betrokken zijn, als tegen de anderen.

Iedere Deutsche officier is gevangen tusschen hamer en aanbeeld. Hij weet niet of de orders, die hij ontvangt, van superieuren komen die Hitler's vertrouwen genieten, of van superieuren die tegen Hitler samenzweren. Hij weet niet of een soldaat, die iets tegen hem heeft, niet van de verwarring gebruik zal maken, om hem te schieten. Hij is beangst voor zijn familie thuis, die door de Gestapo als gijzelaars kunnen worden opgesloten. De soldaten zelf moeten er zich bewust van zijn dat de nazi-officieren hen ter slachtbank leiden.

Dit vergif zal zich zeker in het Deutsche leger verspreiden en het onvermijdelijke einde verhaasten.

Wij weten dat het Nederlansche volk al deze feiten onder de aandacht zal blijven brengen van de Duitschers en hun handlangers.

5. ■■■ betekent ■■■ opstand der Deutsche generaals
de Geallieerde Mogendheden?

Hun besluit staat onveranderd vast. Zij zullen niet met de Deutsche generaals onderhandelen, doch cischen van het Deutsche Leger.

ONVOORWAARDELIJKE OVERGAVE

VERSPREID DOOR DE GEALLIEERDE LUCHTMACHT

DAS SPIEL IST AUS

Der Einmarsch der [] in Ostpreussen bedeutet [] endgültigen Zusammenbruch der Gesamtstrategie Hitlers.

Hitlers Plan bestand darin, zuerst [] britischen und amerikanischen Armeen [] Westen [] schlagen und sich dann mit voller Kraft nach Osten zu wenden, um die russische Offensive [] stehen [] bringen.

Um diesen Plan durchzuführen, hatte Hitler nicht nur der Ostfront keine Reserven mehr zugeführt, sondern noch Truppen [] Osten nach Westen werfen lassen, darunter [] ganzes Panzerkorps.

Heute stehen Hitlers Elite-Panzerverbände [] Westen den beiden grössten Industriemächten der Welt in einem hoffnungslosen Materialkampf gegenüber.

Inzwischen wurden im Osten grosse Teile der deutschen Heeresgruppe Nord durch den russischen Vorstoss auf Mitau und Riga endgültig abgeschnitten, und jetzt haben russische Divisionen die Reichsgrenze überschritten.

Die Gesamtverluste der deutschen Wehrmacht betragen allein seit Mitte Mai rund 750 000 Mann. Davon haben sich 270 000 Mann in der Normandie, in Italien und in Russland mitsamt ihren Generalen und Offizieren ergeben, weil sie einsahen, dass weiterer Widerstand sinnlos war.

[] deutschen Generale, [] ihrer Spitze der aktive Generalstabschef, General Zeitzler, hatten dies vorausgesehen. Sie wussten, dass Deutschlands militärische Lage hoffnungslos ist.

Darum versuchten sie, durch ihren Friedensputsch [] 20. Juli das Hitler-Regime im letzten Augenblick zu stürzen, Schluss [] machen und dem deutschen Volk den Krieg auf eigenem [] zu ersparen.

Der Putsch misslang — der Krieg auf eigenem Boden ist zur Wirklichkeit geworden.

Jetzt wissen nicht nur die Generale, jetzt weiss das ganze deutsche Volk, dass es nur [] Ausweg gibt:

**SCHLUSS MACHEN [] RETTEN,
WAS ZU RETTEN IST!**

Die Russen haben die Reichsgrenze überschritten

AMTlich WIRD MITGETEILT:

Einheiten der 3. Weissrussischen Armee unter General Tscherniakowski haben die ostpreussische Grenze überschritten.

■ 22. Juni ■ überschritten die deutschen Truppen ■ Befehl ihres Obersten Befehlshabers ■ die russische Grenze. Die Woge der deutschen Invasion rollte weit nach Russland hinein — bis nach Stalingrad.

Jetzt rollt die Woge zurück — grösser, gewaltiger und schneller als je zuvor.

Aus der Invasion Russlands, die Hitler mit seinem Überfall ■ 22. Juni 1941 begann, ist die Invasion Deutschlands geworden.

Die Russen stehen auf deutschem Boden.

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Die Russen stehen auf deutschem Boden.

Wahrheit über den Friedens-Putsch

Wer stand hinter der Bewegung?

Göring erklärte in seiner Rundfunk-Ansprache, [] hinter dem [] Putsch wären „... eine Handvoll von Generalen, die wegen ihrer Unfähigkeit entlassen worden waren“. Tatsächlich sind bisher von Hitler wegen ihrer [] der Kriegsführung abgesetzt worden: Generalfeldmarschalle v. Beck, v. Brauchitsch, v. Kleist, v. Leeb, List, v. Manstein, v. Rundstedt, v. Witzleben u.a.m.

Was bedeutet [] Bewegung?

[] Generale wussten, dass [] zwecklos ist, [] und Himmler von der Aussichtslosigkeit des Krieges [] überzeugen. Sie wussten, dass Hitler und Himmler entschlossen sind, den Krieg bis zum bitteren Ende, bis [] Minuten nach 12, fortzusetzen, komme was wolle. **SCHREIEN** Um Deutschland das bittere Los, den Kampf auf deutschem Boden zu ersparen, wollten sie die Regierung [] und [] Friedensregierung []

DIE RUSSEN STEHEN IN



Jedesmal, wenn Ihr den Wehrmachtbericht hört, werft einen Blick [] Karte. Als die Generale zu ihrem verzweifelten [] kamen, sahen sie bereits [] sich jetzt abspielt.

DIE GENERALE WUSSTEN:

Der Friedens-Putsch am 20. Juli war die Folge harter Tatsachen, die erfahrenen deutschen Generalen logisch erfasst worden. Der Putsch wurde niedergeschlagen. Aber die Tatsachen bleiben bestehen. Die Generale haben 5 Hauptgründe für den unabwendbaren Zusammenbruch:

1. Hitlers Strategie ist bankrott

Die Strategie bestand darin, dass die Engländer und Amerikaner zunächst im Westen zurückgeworfen werden. Daraufhin sollte ein blitzschneller Offensivstoß in die westlichen Befestigungen im Westen wie im Osten, die ungenutzte Unterlegenheit.

Diese Strategie ist gänzlich fehlgeschlagen. Die anglo-amerikanische Offensive im Westen durchbrach die deutschen Befestigungen und band die Grundsätze der deutschen Panzer- und Infanterie-Divisionen in gewaltigen Materialschlachten, in denen sich die Überlegenheit der zwei größten Industriemächte entfalten konnte. Inzwischen brachten die Russen durch die geschwächte Ostfront, zerschmetterten in gewaltigen Keilschlachten die gesamte Heeresgruppe-Mitte und stießen durch Polen und bis an die ostpreussische Grenze.

2. Die Reserven sind aufgebraucht

Die wehrfähigen deutschen Verlustoffiziere sind am Anfang des Krieges zum OKW geheim gehalten worden. Es ist, dass bisher über 7 Millionen Soldaten gänzlich ausgefallen sind - als Tote, Schwerverwundete oder Kriegsgefangene. Seit dem 11. Mai dieses Jahres verlor Deutschland allein an Kriegsgefangenen weitere 92.000 in Italien und Frankreich und 158.000 im südlichen und nördlichen Abschnitt der Ostfront.

Jungen von 16 Jahren und alte Männer stehen jetzt im Einsatz. Zwangsgepresste Anständer in der Wehrmacht können nicht mehr gemacht werden, was fünf Jahre lang an deutschen Menschenleben vergossen worden ist. Die Wehrmacht kämpft an Fronten gegen drei Wehrmächte, jede Aussicht auf Verstärkungen.

3. Die Festung Deutschland hat kein Dach

Die Generale schwenken. Ringen in der deutschen Luftwaffe ist die deutsche Luftwaffe endgültig besiegt worden. Flugzeugfabriken, deren Aufgabe es gewesen wäre, der deutschen Luftwaffe neue Maschinen zuzuführen, wurden auf die Herstellung von Vergeltungswaffen umgestellt. Jetzt ist die deutsche Luftwaffe zu schwach und kann weder die kämpfende Truppe an den Fronten noch die Kriegswirtschaft zu Hause verteidigen. Kriegswichtige Werke werden sobald sie hergestellt sind, von alliierten Bombern erneut zerstört.

4. Vergeltungswaffen sind kriegsentscheidend

Hitler und die Parteiführer glauben an Wunder und Geheimwaffen. Die militärisch geschulten und erfahrenen Generale wussten, dass V-Waffen nur in Zeiten militärischer Erfolge eine Unterstützung auf die Zivilbevölkerung schwächerer Verbündeter haben können. Ihr Einsatz zu einer Zeit, da Deutschlands Niederlage eine Tatsache ist, ist gänzlich ausserstande, den weiteren Verlauf des Krieges zu beeinflussen.

5. Die Treibstoffkrise gibt den Ausschlag

Nach Überwindung der deutschen Luftverteidigung durchtraten die anglo-amerikanischen Luftmächte systematisch die Ölfabriken in Deutschland und den besetzten Gebieten. Schon zehrt die deutsche Wehrmacht an ihren Ölserven. Durch Verlust der rumänischen und polnischen Öle, durch Überbeanspruchung der heimischen Produktion, Zerstörung der Raffinerien und symbolischen Treibstoffwerke sind nunmehr die Öllieferungen so tief gesunken, dass sie nicht mehr bis Ende dieses Jahres reichen.

5 Ursachen der deutschen Niederlage waren den Generalen bekannt, als sie sich zu dem Friedens-Putsch entschlossen. Der Putsch wurde niedergeschlagen, Aber die Ursachen der deutschen Niederlage bleiben bestehen. Der 20. Juli ist der letzte, unumstößliche Beweis:

DIE DEUTSCHE WEHR HAT DEN KRIEG VERLOREN!

JAPAN'S NIEUWE REGEERING


De Jageren vinden en de wijzen
waarop de: is opgetoet, teunen dat
de: is een, dat regenting en Geregule
dat zich is een werkelijke sluitende be-
sluiting.

Aden mit verschiebten den ersten mit ver-
schiedensten Resultat beobachtet. Maner be-
achtet die Mische wenn sie aus der Luft ge-
nommen werden. Bei der Luft. Bei der Luft ge-
nommen werden. Bei der Luft ge-

[illegible]

Yashoventer Jeze (1886), nam kam' zashchit
nashchitnoy ekonomizatsii in kuznetskoy Rabotnoy,
1940 (1941) vuznachenskiy nam 1941 namnoy namnoy.
Ten 1941 de Primiriy Oshchitki Kozlo, de

"Hinter uns Korea", ein sehr interessantes und informatives Interview mit dem japanischen Ex-Botschafter in Seoul, der nun in Japan lebt. Der Herr hat eine sehr interessante und sehr interessante Geschichte. Er war in Korea, als er in Japan lebte, und er hat eine sehr interessante Geschichte. Er war in Korea, als er in Japan lebte, und er hat eine sehr interessante Geschichte. Er war in Korea, als er in Japan lebte, und er hat eine sehr interessante Geschichte.



In Normandië werden de "Verdringen" en de nazipropaganda afgehaakt en vervangen door afkeer van het vernedering.

Buitenlandse Overzichten

[illegible][illegible]

De aangelegte was dus niet alleen een
in de aangelegde, maar ook een
Vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid, koninkrijk
geestes onafhankelijkheid. Daarom is het
geest niet het koninkrijk, maar de
geest is het koninkrijk over het
de koninkrijk. Gevoerd werd: het
brood-ke koninkrijk in de koninkrijk. De
aan de aangelegde en de aangelegde
koninkrijk. De koninkrijk van de koninkrijk

Uitlandse en lokale krachten. Het is duidelijk dat wij dit onderscheiden, nog niet geheel juist zullen doen. Maar de doordringende crisis is eenmaal alomtegenwoordig, het kanken alomtegenwoordig. Overal wordt gezegd: nu moet het wel. Het is niet mogelijk om te wijzen op de verschillen van de twee krachten, want de verschillen zijn nu niet meer van belang. Het is nu niet meer van belang, dat de een krachten, vooral in Londen, zijn. Het is nu niet meer van belang, dat de een krachten, vooral in Londen, zijn. Het is nu niet meer van belang, dat de een krachten, vooral in Londen, zijn.

De Russische springvloed

In een verhouding van Mendonca uit heb-
ben 18 van de 27 hun het Wladimir-
front betreden en worden Duitse geweren
slechts die van de bezetter van Zwettow van
Bismarck als alleen voldoende zijn, namelijk
het Vierde Leger, het zeventiende van het
Negende Leger, en het Dertigste Pantser-
leger. "De Duitsers van deze catastro-
fische zin, zou schrikken als de ver-
keerde getuigenis van de Russen
was, dat de Duitsers de Duitse troepen
die Duitse bladen steldt dat wijler, het
voetschreden van verspreiden van de Zwettow
waarde die bezetter van Zwettow is opgevoerd
aan een veldslag."

Voor het eerst hebben de Duitse
de Koningin degen die op weg naar
Oost-Prusen, waren te malen: dan
hebben sommige eenigen tijd
de economie van hun boerder. Verder
Zuiden, acht dinst de Duitse

Spitting in Deutschland

[illegible]

Handwritten text (likely a signature or name) in the bottom right corner.

[illegible]

Tournameuse stripe
Normandie

Vorige week Dinsdag voorde Montgomery een heftige aanval uit op het Dalmeische leger bij Cavu. Een weier in de voorste Rijnlinie twee werd voortvluchtig onder een paar zwaar bevoorraden. Toen wakkere Slachten tanken over de Oepn, maar een legeraanval op een versterkt punt was niet succesvol en de aanval werd afgekeerd.


De Russetta springvlond

tu een verhuizing van Mendeum van het
jaar 18 van de 22 van het Willemschloot
front betrekken vrouwen Duitse vrouwen
Katholiek die van de bejaagde Zwarte
Binnen de schied vroeger zijn, namelijk
het Vierde Lege, het zonnende van het
Nieuwe Lege, en het Derde Pausen
Rover. "De sociaal van deze catastro-
fische zin, zoo schiet de, een ver-
keerde getuigenis van de Kruis-
tocht, die de bejaagde Zwarte van
Duitse blanke kind, die wijler, een
voetstuk van veroveren van de Zwarte
waars: die bejaagde Zwarte is opgevoerd
aan een Jansel?"

Voor het eerst hebben de Duitse
de Koningin degen die op weg naar
Oost-Prusen, waren te malen: dan
hebben sommige eenigen tijd
de economie van hun boerder. Verder
Zuiden, acht dinst de Duitse



DEZE FRANSCHE MEISJES EN VROUWEN UIT CHIRBOURG HADDEN
ZICH MET QUITSCHEERLE AFGEHOVEN. Nu de bevestiging hebben de postbode
hen haar afgevoerd en ze daarna door de straten gered.



KRAKI (Evening Standard, London).

VAN OVERAL

General MacArthur's hoofdkwartier heeft bekend gemaakt, dat Lt.-kolonel George J. O. de Tolier, voorzitter van de Nederlandse Medische Vereniging in Australië, is overleden. Hij was 48 jaar oud. Hij was de zoon van de bekende Nederlandse historicus Dr. J. A. A. de Tolier. Hij was de zoon van de bekende Nederlandse historicus Dr. J. A. A. de Tolier. Hij was de zoon van de bekende Nederlandse historicus Dr. J. A. A. de Tolier.

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
In Sydney is op 21 juli overleden Rijkman Loebman, directeur van de...



Wilt u niet er op attent zijn, dat de... op... 6 235



Erge in Rotterdam wordt de 14e juli, de Nationale vrijheidsdag, gevierd met een feestelijk optocht van Nederlandse militairen en een groot aantal...



De Nederlandse bevrijdingsbrigade begint de Britse troepen die in hun nadering zijn...

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Op 11 juli heeft in Londen een Nederlandse Medische Vereniging plaats gevonden. De Nederlandse Medische Vereniging in Australië heeft bekend gemaakt, dat Lt.-kolonel George J. O. de Tolier, voorzitter van de Nederlandse Medische Vereniging in Australië, is overleden. Hij was 48 jaar oud. Hij was de zoon van de bekende Nederlandse historicus Dr. J. A. A. de Tolier. Hij was de zoon van de bekende Nederlandse historicus Dr. J. A. A. de Tolier.

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IT BEWAR N-D O G E N

LE 26 JUILLET 1945

No. 112

Une victoire: celle des **Alliés**
Une défaite: celle du **Axe**

[illegible]

EN NORMANDIE LES ALLIÉS ATTAQUENT

[illegible]

Nor James Galloway, ministre de la
paix et du développement humain,
répond, à propos d'un récent séminaire
Communauté que depuis le début des
années les ATC ont une grande part
à jouer de l'économie 57,796
principales et de leur santé.

14 juillet 1944. Mousre em eorom Berlin an Vichy an
interdît aux Français de célébrer le 14
juillet. Mais ces jours, un Murvaillan en a pu voir les drapeaux
français, américains et britanniques flotter côté à côté au-dessus
de la cité de la Liberté. Et l'an prochain, que la France...



Camaraderie : quel est le lien qui unit les camarades ? C'est la solidarité, c'est la fraternité, c'est l'amour.

USP 130 **Apporté au Peuple Français par les Armées de l'Air Alliées**

LSP, 1994.

Apporté au Peuple Français par les Armées de l'Air Alliées

231

La liberté de la presse ! Les gens de Vichy avaient voulu cela pour la 1907. Mais les personnes claudrines ont assuré la continuité et ont exigé lui. En Normandie, elle est retrouvée son droit pour les Français. C. Chénier - "La France Chénier" - premier quotidien de la France libre, donne des nouvelles, exprime des opinions qui ne prévalent l'ancien sur la propagande.

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En flot continu CHIFFRE 43 milliards L'Anaportant à travers la Manche des quantités énormes de matériel de guerre versés directement dans les ports militaires de l'Europe.

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Des civils français aident largement des soldats américains à combattre les Vietnamiens qui arrivent en Normandie par convois nocturnes.

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D'un correspondant de guerre

D'un correspondant de guerre

Quelque part en Normandie, juillet, 1944. Le Normandisme. Membre à l'œuvre peu à peu on s'aperçoit que ça peut être possible. Les gaisins ont été chassés, les Français s'en vont faire les vaches, les Allemands passent sur le bord des routes. Pour les enfants c'est une grande nouveauté, comme ça c'est d'abord l'ennemi, il est vite compris que la partie est perdue, pourquoi aller les chercher, profitez des gains qu'on a enlevés dans les Allemands. On présente un grand acte des groupes d'enfants français, allemands et anglais, tous ensemble, les Allemands sont les bienvenus, les Français sont les bienvenus, les Anglais sont les bienvenus.

Les infections nosocomiales

[illegible]

Donnerstag, 2. April 1942

Donnerstag, 2. April 1942

Saint-Lo, 19 juillet. — Je suis retourné à Saint-Lo ce matin.
 Si l'après-midi chemin, je l'aurais peut-être trouvé un peu
 civil pour lui demander une indication. Les habitants de
 Saint-Lo sont tous partis pour les arrières, la majorité d'entre
 eux évacués de force par l'ennemi, quelques uns dispersés
 dans la campagne environ-
 nante: ainsi quelques vieux
 et quelques vieilles se re-
 tiennent et malin dans la ville
 d'attendre de se trouver en-
 tre les mains de l'ennemi.
 L'ennemi est midi par la route
 de Cammeray. A quelques
 cents mètres du camp de la
 ville un détachement du nord de

parader. Leur but
 de séquestrer la population en der-
 rière, pour qu'ils puissent transfor-
 mer la ville en un camp de
 saillie. Je puis assurer, mal-
 gré la certitude d'écouter l'avis de
 la ville, que l'ennemi n'a pas
 encore fait de Saint-Lo un
 camp, à leur chagrin à l'heure.
 Je me suis rendu dans la rue de
 la ville, et j'ai vu que l'ennemi
 et je suis resté là jusqu'à ce matin.

"*My dear mother . . .*"

[illegible]

"Le cinquième front est ouvert"

[illegible]

Alger, 23

Alger, 23

Un tel p
M. Giercel
volonté du p
t. M. A la p
balancement
un accroisse
appreciable
moyenn, un
partisan de p

L'ordre de

À la suite de l'Assemblée Générale de l'Université de la Province de la Colombie, les membres du Comité de la Région de la Colombie ont été élus pour la période 1990-1991.

6 210



L'ARC EN CIEL



LE 26 JUILLET 1944

Apports au Peuple Belge par l'Aviation

National

No. 29

L'AVALANCHE RUSSE

Au moment où les Allemands terminaient leurs préparatifs de guerre mondiale et allaient passer à l'attaque de la Pologne, le chef du Gouvernement de Moscou déclara à quelques uns de ses collaborateurs immédiats: "Les Allemands attaqueront la Russie et envahiront l'Ukraine; mais je le leur reprocherai et j'irai à Berlin!"



Une photo qui permet de se rendre compte de l'ampleur de l'attaque de la Russie par les Allemands. Les chars allemands sont en train de passer sur les débris de la Pologne.

Les forces militaires ont été... Depuis le 23 juin, jour où les Allemands ont déclaré la guerre à la Pologne, les forces militaires ont été... Les forces militaires ont été... Depuis le 23 juin, jour où les Allemands ont déclaré la guerre à la Pologne, les forces militaires ont été...

Un gros succès américain en Normandie

Fendant que se livrait une bataille acharnée entre Britanniques et Allemands au Sud de Caen, les Américains lançaient leurs troupes lourdes, puis l'infanterie portée au Sud et à l'Ouest de St. Lo. Le succès fut complet. Le front ennemi fut rompu. Jeudi les Américains étaient à 8 kilomètres de Caen, capturant à Lamey et à Fleury un important 1.000 prisonniers. Pris en flanc, l'ennemi battait en retraite au sud de Coutances.

La bataille a fait rage tout le long du 25 juillet dans la zone de Caen. Les Américains ont lancé leurs troupes lourdes, puis l'infanterie portée au Sud et à l'Ouest de St. Lo. Le succès fut complet. Le front ennemi fut rompu. Jeudi les Américains étaient à 8 kilomètres de Caen, capturant à Lamey et à Fleury un important 1.000 prisonniers. Pris en flanc, l'ennemi battait en retraite au sud de Coutances.

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Nombreux sont les soldats de l'Armée de l'Air qui ont été tués pendant la bataille de France.

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Le pilote belge qui a été tué pendant la bataille de France. Le pilote belge qui a été tué pendant la bataille de France.

Pilote belge à l'honneur

C'est un pilote belge, le capitaine Jean de la Haye, qui a été tué pendant la bataille de France. Le pilote belge qui a été tué pendant la bataille de France.

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
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



Wm 30 Apr 17 U he fern ch
Rosen - 2nd class 1911



Les deux participants de la conférence ont approuvé les travaux de la commission.

1946:1-64779 "H. Johnson bought liquor in large
volumes for sale." - (12 Mar. 1944).



RESTRICTED VOIR

Images du monde d'aujourd'hui

Edition par avion - No. 7

G. GRIMAULT

spécialiste

ENFIN UN JOURNAL LIBRE! LA LIBERTÉ DE LA
PRESSE EST UN DROIT SACRÉ POUR LE FRANÇAIS



AU SUD DE CAEN, des canons britanniques de 155 mm. attaquent des concentrations ennemies.

CES OFFICIERS de marine britannique voient des fortifications allemandes tomber et s'effondrer sous le feu des canons du cuirassé britannique "Rodney".

CAEN EST LIBÉRÉE. Mais dans certains immeubles en ruines des combats continuent; allemands se cachent toujours. Ce soir britannique guette leurs mouvements.




Sur le front de Normandie

SUR LE FRONT DE NORMANDIE, les troupes allemandes connaissent les mêmes défaites sanglantes qu'en Italie et en Russie. Après avoir libéré Cherbourg, les troupes américaines ont déclenché leur offensive dans le secteur de Saint-Lô. Pendant ce temps, les armées britanniques commandées par le général Montgomery ont exécuté leur plan d'attaque contre la ville de Caen. L'aviation alliée, l'artillerie lourde et les

batteries de la marine britannique opérant au large des côtes ont annihilé les fortifications allemandes. Les 6 et 9 juillet, l'infanterie britannique a pénétré dans la ville. Un mois après le débarquement en Normandie, les Alliés contrôlent Cherbourg et Caen, bastions des défenses allemandes sur l'Atlantique. En France, comme en Italie et en Russie, les Allemands tentent en retraite — en direction de Berlin.



APRÈS LA BATAILLE, une unité blindée britannique pénètre dans la ville de Caen toute enveloppée de fumée.



PRIS AUX ALLEMANDS ■ camion, attelé de chevaux ■ labour sert à ■ Français à regagner ■ ■ ■

La vie reprend son cours

LA VIE NORMALE reprend un peu partout en Normandie libérée. On n'oublie pas, certes, les souffrances dues à quatre ans d'occupation allemande. Mais il faut, avant tout, préparer l'avenir. Tout n'a

pas été détruit, tout n'en faut, dans la lutte pour la libération. Tous les correspondants de guerre alliés, après l'entrée à Caen, ont rendu hommage à l'inébranlable courage du peuple de France.



DES NOUVELLES | Les gens de Cherbourg se pressent pour lire un bulletin qui leur ■ enfin la vérité.



AU CINEMA chacun s'en va voir des films qui ne sont pas de la propagande.



TRAITRES A LEUR PATRIE Jean Tournu et Roger Leroy avaient accepté d'espionner pour les Allemands. Le tribunal de Cherbourg les a condamnés aux travaux forcés à perpétuité.



14 JUILLET : Le Président Roosevelt et le général de Gaulle, les trois drapeaux volaient dans

CE POMPIER DE CARLON n'a pas le geste qui lui a saisi par ses cheveux, non par les nœuds.

LES TRAVAUX QUOTIDIENS ont repris dans le petit bourg de Cruilly, miraculeusement épargné par la guerre. Au lavage sur les bords de la Seille, les français et soldats allemands travaillent côte à côte.




Le quatorze juillet



TOUS LES FRANÇAIS ont célébré avec ferveur le 14 juillet 1944. A Londres, le général Koenig commandant en chef les Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur dépose une gerbe tricolore au pied du monument Foch.

A BAYEUX, une foule grave et recueillie célèbre le premier quatorze juillet de la libération.



A COURSEULLES-SUR-MER, une cérémonie a lieu devant le monument aux Morts de la guerre 1914-1918.



Aux portes de l'Allemagne



DANS MINSK LIBEREE le drapeau rouge flotte à nouveau. En un mois les Russes ont avancé de 450 kms. Plus de 100.000 Allemands sont morts ou prisonniers.



LES PREMIERES TROUPES soviétiques pénétrant dans Polotsk, libérée au début de la grande offensive d'été.



LES FEMMES DE VITEBSK leurs libérateurs qui ont, depuis, poursuivi leur avance victorieuse vers l'ouest.



WINSTON CHURCHILL, en voyage d'inspection, rencontre sa fille Mary, officier dans une des batteries de DCA chargées de la lutte contre les avions-bombes.



LE LIBÉRATEUR de Minsk et de Vins, général Ivan Tcherniakovsky qui commande la Troisième armée, un des chefs les plus jeunes de l'Armée Rouge.

Figures du jour



PAUL GARDNER, commandant dans l'armée britannique, est chargé d'assurer la protection des trésoirs artistiques italiens.



JOHNSTON Président de l'Union des Chambres de Commerce américaines, vient d'avoir à Moscou d'importants entretiens commerciaux.



LE GÉNÉRAL THEODORE ROOSEVELT de l'ancien président des États-Unis et ancien combattant, est mort en Normandie.

Sur la route de Tokio




UN BOND AUDACIEUX de 1.800 tons. a permis aux troupes américaines l'invasion et la conquête de Saipan, situé à mi-chemin entre la base américaine la plus rapprochée et le Japon. Dans leurs tentatives de s'opposer au débarquement, les japonais ont perdu plus de 1.000 avions et 100 navires de guerre coulés ou endommagés. Aujourd'hui, Saipan est, pour les forces navales américaines, une base d'opérations des plus importantes.



CONSTAMMENT le ravitaillement des troupes a été assuré grâce aux équipages des péniches de débarquement.

PULVERISÉES par l'aviation et la flotte américaines, ces installations vont cruellement manquer à l'industrie japonaise.



LES PERTES JAPONAISES se sont chiffrées par 10.000 hommes. Les américains ont perdu un peu plus de 3.000 hommes.

UN DRAPEAU JAPONAIS pris au cours de la bataille de Saipan qui a pris fin le 10 juillet, après 26 jours de combat.





LA RECONSTRUCTION commence dans la petite ville de Terra Annunziata.



DE TOUT LEUR COEUR, les Italiens apportent leur concours dans la mesure de leurs moyens.




LE MATERIEL LE PLUS [redacted] suit l'avance des piliers et est mis en oeuvre sitôt la [redacted] terminée.

L'Europe qui renaît - En Italie

"L'IMAGINATION la plus audacieuse" apportée dans le travail de démolition. Cette phrase est tirée d'un ordre signé par le maréchal Kesselring et tombé entre les mains des armées alliées qui combattent le front d'Italie. Les allemands l'écourent fidèlement et s'efforcent sauvagement de détruire, au fur et à mesure de leur retraite précipitée, tout ce qu'ils ont épargné : bombes et les obus. C'est,


tel est à ce prix seulement que se poursuit l'œuvre de libération de l'Europe. Heureusement, en route de la libération, les Alliés se sont depuis longtemps penchés sur les problèmes soulevés par la nécessité de relever de leurs ruines les pays dévastés. Une première preuve de l'efficacité des moyens mis en œuvre est donnée en Italie où, dans chaque cité, le travail de reconstruction suit immédiatement la libération.



UN SAPEUR sur l'ouvrage. Antenne télégraphique et téléphone fonctionnant à nouveau.



SOLDATS ET CIVILS, américains et italiens, travaillent à réparer les conduites d'eau de Naples.



QUELQUES HEURES aux unités du génie allié pour rétablir ce pont détruit par les Allemands en Sicile.



ARTÈRES ESSENTIELLES. les voies ferrées sont sans retard les territoires libérés.



L'IMMENSITE DU PACIFIQUE complique la tâche des Etats-Majors. Mais la "Superforteresse" résout le problème.

Un nouveau géant de l'air

GEANT DE L'AIR la nouvelle "Superforteresse" B. 29. mystérieuse — vue ici, au premier plan, volant à côté avec une "Fortresse" B. 17 — type normal. Les caractéristiques de la "Superforteresse" sont: envergure 42 mètres — longueur 30 mètres — quatre moteurs 18 cyl. de 2.200 C.V. — longueur des pales d'hélice 5 mètres. Les "Superforteresse" ont déjà attaqué à deux reprises le territoire métropolitain japonais, bombardant le grand centre industriel de Yawata et la base navale de Sasebo, le Toulon nippon.




LE GENERAL ARNOLD, chef de l'aviation américaine a pris le commandement direct de la 8ème Armée de l'Air, constituée de "Superforteresse".



A LEUR BASE quelque part en Aila, les "Superforteresse" sont l'objet d'une soignée révision et sont bientôt prêts à entreprendre un nouveau vol.

UN SEUL COUP D'ÉPÉE, les formations
diverses de la "Supermarine" - une loi à côté
d'un avion d'entraînement.





IN VALLE L'INFANTRIA BRITANNICA
IN VALLE L'INFANTRIA BRITANNICA

VOIR

Publié chaque semaine par le Ministère américain de l'Information, VOIR a pour seul but de
présenter les images du monde d'aujourd'hui à la France pendant sa libération et jusqu'à
l'arrivée de la première troupe alliée en France. Les images sont envoyées directement de la zone
libérée, sans passer par le censure. Elles sont envoyées directement de la zone libérée.

Les Américains solidement établis à Avranches



Tandis que la 2ème Armée britannique a refait les Allemands d'une dizaine de kilomètres au sud de Caen, en Normandie, les Américains ont pris le vieil village d'Avranches et nettoient toute la côte occidentale de la péninsule de Cherbourg, de Granville à Avranches. Ils avancent aussi vers Villiers, entre Granville et Vire.

Le flanc gauche des Allemands est dangereusement menacé par la poussée américaine, et déjà il est attaqué violemment à Gavray, Percy et Tessy, où la bataille fait rage. Plus au nord, nous avons pris Torigny.

L'ennemi a été surpris par la rapidité avec laquelle les blindés américains ont avancés vers la rive de la péninsule. On estime qu'ils ont fait découvrir à la moyenne d'une quinzaine de kilomètres par jour.

Au sud de Caumont, les Britanniques se sont emparés de plusieurs importantes et puissantes lignes de défense, et d'une dizaine de kilomètres, en défilé d'une trentaine de kilomètres des Allemands, qui tentent de le temps de mener le jeu sur une vaste étendue.

Toujours, les forces alliées avancent partout. Après la prise de Caumont, libérée dans la nuit de samedi, les blindés de Bradley ont immédiatement poussé au sud-ouest, soit vers Granville, et ont avancé vers Granville. Une autre colonne s'est emparée de Gavray, point de croisement de pont routier.

Après avoir, les deux colonnes, en la zone Trouville-Caumont, ordonné la route Caumont-Gavray.

COMMUNIQUE No. III DU G.G. SUPREME ALLIE

Les troupes alliées de secteur occidental ont pénétré dans la ville de Granville et ont nettoyé toute la région côtière entre Avranches, Granville et Bréhal.

On est aussi occupé à réduire d'autres foyers de résistance et la bataille bat son plein au sud-ouest de Torigny ainsi que dans le district de Percy.

Les troupes alliées ont avancé de chaque côté de Torigny-sur-Vire et elles ont chassé l'ennemi au sud de Gavray.

Au sud de Caumont, l'avance alliée continue et nous avons pris St-Germain d'Elter, Caumont et St-Martin des Bordes. La colonne 305, à l'est de St-Martin, reste aux mains des Allemands en dépit de plusieurs contre-attaques acharnées.

Des bombardiers américains ont largué des bombes incendiaires sur plusieurs villages des côtes de la zone de combat. Le bombardement des ponts de Caumont de fer aux Vignes, à Châteaufort, au sud de Barenton, et sur la Loire, au sud de Torcy, a été très réussi. Ailleurs, il a été impossible de se rendre efficacement compte du résultat.

Les chasseurs-bombardiers ont apporté un soutien immédiat à l'attaque de la zone.

Des unités de bombardiers lourds ont attaqué deux secteurs de nord de la France un peu après midi.

LES F.F.I. AU COMBAT : DESTRUCTION DE PONTS

On apprend, de source française autorisée : Parmi les actions de destruction opérées par les F.F.I., contre les voies ferrées, les plus efficaces sont celles qui eurent comme objectif les ponts de chemins de fer.

C'est ainsi que sur la ligne Montargis-Paris, le pont situé entre Bouffes et Dardennes fut détruit la nuit du 14 au 15 juin. Depuis cette date le trafic ne peut être rétabli. Sur la ligne Paris-Orléans, au kilomètre 152, entre La Roche et Bretoncelles, le pont sauta. A 7 kms. de Mâcon un autre pont important fut détruit.

Dans l'Est-et-Loire, dans la nuit du 19 juillet, trois arches du viaduc de Cléry sautèrent. Les experts estiment les dégâts irréparables. Parmi les autres opérations entreprises, et menées à bien ces jours-ci par les F.F.I., citons l'incendie de 17 wagons de munitions, près de Lavault; l'explosion dans l'Autre des trois wagons chargés de bombes volantes; la destruction de trois génératrices d'une usine électrique à Melun, et le sabotage de la ligne haute-tension Chartres-Orléans.

Le 11 août, les F.F.I. ont détruit un pont important sur l'U.R.S.S. et la Turquie.

Il n'est pas besoin d'être un expert pour constater que les F.F.I. ont fait preuve d'une grande efficacité dans la destruction des ponts de chemins de fer.

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La Turquie briserait avec Berlin

A nous d'impression, la Turquie briserait ses relations diplomatiques avec l'Allemagne au cours de cette semaine.

Von Papen, l'ambassadeur allemand à Ankara, doit avoir un dernier entretien avec le président de la République.

Le gouvernement turc, après les observations polonaises, a déclaré qu'il ne pouvait rien à l'attitude turque.

Tous les navires allemands dans les ports bulgares et roumains ont été rappelés, ce qui est un indice de la décision qui sera prise à Ankara. Si l'Allemagne déclarait la guerre à la Turquie, la suite de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, ces navires seraient immédiatement capturés.

Depuis quelques temps, l'opinion officielle de Turquie a été de plus en plus favorable aux Alliés, et il ne faut pas de doute que cet état d'esprit allemande entre deux pays, les Turcs auraient l'aide directe et immédiate des Alliés.

Si les villes turques d'Erzurum et d'Ankara sont exposées au bombardement aérien, il faut dire que l'aviation alliée, en fait, basée en Turquie, peut attaquer les garnisons allemandes et les installations industrielles du Reich en Orient, en Roumanie, en Bulgarie et dans la Méditerranée.

On rapporte la de Rommel

Plusieurs officiers allemands ont été capturés en Normandie, notamment le général Rommel, qui a été tué par le front de l'ouest. Certains prisonniers prétendent qu'il est mort au cours d'un bombardement aérien; d'autres, qu'il a été tué par la suite par la mine d'un chariot allié. Ces rumeurs d'ont pas encore été confirmées officiellement de Berlin.

EN BREF

● Les files et les wagons des trains de 25 km et de 10 km. Le 12 juillet 1926. ● Angleterre, sont répartis les avions de guerre.

● Le gouvernement italien a aboli la peine de mort que Mussolini avait établie dans le code pénal.

● L'Agence allemande de presse a annoncé un accord U.R.S.S. et la Turquie.

● Himmler aurait ordonné l'arrestation de Baldur von Schirach, gouverneur allemand de l'Austrie, comme il a été révoqué de ses fonctions.

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Massacre de femmes et d'enfants

L'examen des dossiers du chef de la police française d'Arrezzo a mis à découvert un nouveau crime allemand.

On a trouvé la preuve d'un massacre général commis le 11 avril dans le village de Selt, au sud d'Arrezzo, en guise de représailles contre les partisans.

Les partisans, 240 en tout, ont été tués dans le village.

Pour éviter un acte de violence de la division allemande, les partisans ont été tués.

On a exhumé les cadavres pour vérifier l'authenticité de ce crime.


Il y a eu au moins 103 victimes, dont 30 femmes et 15 enfants en bas âge.

Six enfants avaient moins de 4 ans. Parmi les victimes, il y avait un bébé de trois mois.

Churchill et la guerre

A la Chambre des Communes, M. Winston Churchill fera mercredi une déclaration sur la guerre. On attend avec intérêt.

SOUS LES DRAPEAUX



Dans les districts récemment libérés de la Normandie, les Français se souviennent sous les drapeaux afin de marquer la libération du nord de la France. Ci-dessus, cinq civils qui se sont portés volontaires et qui revêtiront prochainement l'uniforme glorieux de l'armée française.

Die Wahrheit über den Friedensputsch

1.—Was ist geschehen?

Die deutsche Generalität hat erkannt, das der Krieg verloren ist und das nur die Beilegung Hitlers und die Herbeiführung eines sofortigen Waffenstillstandes Deutschland vor dem Schlimmsten bewahren kann. Aus diesem Grunde hat die Generalität am 20. Juli einen Putsch unternommen, mit der Absicht, die Staatsgewalt an sich zu nehmen und die Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen einzuleiten. An dem Putsch waren weite Generals- und Offizierskreise beteiligt. Dies ist bewiesen durch die eigenen Erklärungen Hitlers, Goebbels, Doenitz und Guderians.

Es ist nicht wahr, dass es sich bei den Putschisten um „eine ganz kleine Clique“ handelt, die dem deutschen Heer „nichts tun“ hat. Goebbels selbst hat erklärt, dass die Putschisten eine neue Reichsregierung gebildet hätten und Befehle an alle Truppeneinheiten ergaben. Guderian hat zugegeben, dass nicht Generäle an dem Putsch beteiligt waren. Aus den amtlichen Meldungen über die Vorgänge in Berlin geht hervor, dass die Putschisten den gesamten Befehlapparat des OKH in der Hand hatten.

Es handelt sich also um einen Putsch mit weiten Vorzweigungen im ganzen Heer, an der Front und in der Heimat. Dass führende aktive Frontbefehlshaber sich der Friedensbewegung des OKH angeschlossen hatten, zeigt die plötzliche Entlassung Rundstedts und Falkenhausen, das Ausbleiben von Loyalkasklärungen für Hitler von der Ost- und Südfont, und der Aufruf der 16 Generale der Heeresgruppe Mitte, die sich in den letzten Wochen ereignet haben. In diesem Aufruf fordern die 16 Generale das deutsche Volk auf, Hitler zu stützen und den verlorenen Krieg zu brechen.

Hitler und Himmler haben den Friedensputsch der Generalität einstweilen niedergeschlagen. Die Aktion gegen das Offizierskorps dauert noch an. Wie sich dieser Adelstand unter den gefährlichsten Stabschefs, Truppenführern auf die Kampfkraft des deutschen Heeres auswirken wird, werden die nächsten Wochen zeigen; ebenso, wie viele der bisher noch nicht entlassenen, verhafteten oder erschossenen deutschen Generale und Offiziere im Geheimen mit der Friedensbewegung des OKH sympathisieren.

2.—Worum ging es?

Männer, die den Friedensputsch vom 20. Juli 1944 unternahmen, sind deutsche Männer, die, längst vor Hitler, mit aller Macht die deutsche Aufrüstung

des der Außenwelt verweigert hat und dass sich jetzt eine anglo-amerikanische Millionengewalt in Frankreich aufbaut; sie wussten, dass für Folgen der völligen militärischen Zusammenbruch an der Westfront im Osten für die deutschen Ostgebiete in den nächsten Wochen nach sich ziehen wird; sie wussten, dass die deutsche Munitionslage bedrohlich, die Treibstoffversorgung katastrophal ist. Sie besaßen das militärische Wissen, um die Folgen von dieser Situation zu ziehen. Und sie erkannten: Wenn jetzt nicht ohne Verzug Schluss gemacht wird, dann steht Deutschland das Schicksal Polens und der Ukraine bevor. Deutschland durch Fortsetzung des verlorenen Krieges nichts mehr gewinnen; aber es kann nach sehr, sehr viel verlieren.

Daher der Friedensputsch der Generale.

Und warum Hitlers und Himmlers wilder Widerstand?

Nicht etwa, weil Hitler und Himmler, wie sie dem deutschen Volk immer noch erklären, glückselig, sie könnten den Krieg jetzt noch gewinnen. Solche Ideen sind nicht zu finden. Sondern weil ihnen, im Gegensatz zu den Generalen, das Schicksal Deutschlands vollkommen gleichgültig ist. Hitler hat schon am 8. November gesagt, er würde Deutschland keine Träne nachweinen, wenn es erliegt. Für Hitler und Himmler geht es heute schon längst nicht mehr um das Schicksal Deutschlands, sondern nur noch um ihr eigenes Schicksal. Sie wissen: Wenn Deutschland heute Frieden machte, so würde dies Millionen von das Leben und die

Existenz retten und Deutschland die Schwere einer Invasion ersparen; aber ihnen selbst würde es an den Kugeln, jeder weitere Tag Krieg verlängert ihr Leben. Das allein ist Grund genug für sie, niemals zu kapitulieren. Für den Augenblick haben Hitler und Himmler die Oberhand behalten.

3.—Was nun?

Der Friedensputsch der deutschen Generalität ist zunächst niedergeschlagen worden. Aber die Gründe, die ihn veranlassten, sind damit nicht aus der Welt geschafft—und werden jeden Tag dringender. Die Russen kommen mit Siebensternen, sieben Stufen. Der deutsche Widerstand im Osten ist im Erliegen. Im Westen verblieben die Divisionen Rommels in einer Materialschlacht ohnmächtig.

Die alliierten Armeen kommen in jedem Fall. Aber es macht einen Unterschied, ob die alliierten Besatzungsarmeen nach einem Waffenstillstand kommen—oder als Eroberer, im Sturm. Besatzungsarmeen schießen nicht, Sturmkolonnen schießen.

Hitler und Himmler können Rundstedt und Falkenhausen entlassen, aber nicht Rundstedt und Montgomery. Sie können General Beck erschießen, aber nicht General Eisenhower. Sie können die deutsche Armee besiegen, aber nicht die russische, britische und amerikanische Armeen.

Gaststätten hier, bereits die Kanonen. Bald wird ganz Deutschland Kriegsschauplatz sein. Wo moderne Schlachten gekämpft werden, wächst kein Gras mehr. Wenn die völlige Zerstörung abgewendet werden soll, ist es höchste Zeit. Es gibt noch wie vor nur einen Weg, sie abzuwenden: Sturz Hitlers und sofortigen Waffenstillstand.

Während des Friedensputsches der Generale haben sich viele Kriege des deutschen Volkes wie unbeteiligte Zuschauer verhalten. Das ist eine sehr gefährliche Haltung. Kein Deutscher ist in dieser Lage unbeteiligt. Kein Deutscher ist Zuschauer. Zum ersten Mal seit 1918 hat das deutsche Volk die Möglichkeit, selbständig zu entscheiden und selbständig zu handeln.

Nur Deutsche können Deutschland retten.



DEUTSCHE, die in den jüngsten Kämpfen in Ostpreußen gefangen genommen wurden, marschierten am 17. Juli durch Moskau auf ihrem Weg zu einem Gefangenenlager. Das Foto zeigt die Gruppe deutscher Generale, die den Zug eröffneten.



DE FORENTE NASJONER

No. 1

MED HUSEN DE

27. JULI 1944

DET RAKNER . . .

Bombe mot Hitler — Himmler sjef for hjemmehæren

Nyhøtene om attentatforsøket mot Hitler kom som den største overraskelsen siden Mussolins fall. Skrekken og forvirringen blant nazilederne gjorde det klart at dette ikke var et nazistisk propagandaknep. En gruppe av de ledende tyske militære gjorde uten tvil forsøk på å myrde Hitler. De forsøkte sikkert også å velte nazi styret ved å utstede ordre til elementer innenfor de væpnede tyske styrker, erklærte seg for å være den nye regjering i das Reich.

Bevis for hvor alvorlig situasjonen var, ga nazilederne selv gjennom sine hysteriske opprop til det tyske folk. Hitler appellerte til tyskerne ikke å ta noe hensyn til ordres utstedt av „usurpatorene“ og å drepe dem når de så dem. Nazistene har fått seg en skrekk i livet, og Himmlers utnevning til sjef for alle hæravdelinger i Tyskland vil ganske sikkert bevirke at „utfredse“ tyske militæres hoder vil rulle i lang tid framover.

Serikpersonelet mellom de to parter er opplagt. Mange av Tysklands fremste militærledere har innsett at nederlaget er uunngåelig. De ønsker å redde situasjonen ved en tidlig kapitulasjon i det håp å skape et kraftig og militært Tyskland igjen i framtiden. Hitler da hans gæst, som ikke kan tjene noe på en overgivelse, vil av all makt forsøke å fortvile dem. Generallieutenant Beck, oberst von Stauffenberg, og andre slårke vilberge og sikkert ikke de eneste som håper på å velte nazi-styret og en tidlig kapitulasjon.

med høyeste og respektfulle offiser, oberst von Stauffenberg, Runderstedt, Halder, Falkenhausen og mange andre. Ingen tenkte tysker, hverken i Tyskland eller ved frontene, kan unngå å få mistanke om at det finnes utvilsig bredde sveik mellom den profesjonelle militærledelsen og nazilederne.

For De Forente Nasjoner betyr dette midlertidig oppgjør ikke noe annet enn at den vil franske krigens slutt. De generelt kom undertrykket Hitler da han var i sin glimperiode, vil ikke møte noen sympati hos de allierte fordi de sjø opprør mot ham nå når han taper. Himmlers og nazistenes er to alen av samme stykke. De Forente Nasjoner vil ikke tolerere hverken det ene eller det andre.

Gjøre to skylden for sammensvergelsen på en generallieutenant som var blitt „spøket fra den stilling“. Det ender samme han med en gang søkelyst på en hel rekke av Tysklands



MANDE: De alliertes overbevisende rikken av bombeforsøket viser at de har tre fronter. Her på vi allierte tankt på i angrepsstilling ved Berlin.

AVGJØRENDE SLAG I EUROPA

De Major Lewis Hottel, den britiske luftforskeren

Opprøret blant generalene i Tyskland og attentatforsøket mot Hitler er selvfølgelig begreper av den aller største betydning. Hvis noen enn vil henge i de kosmiske ukter, så er det klart at det nå står over et åpent brudd i det tyske lederskapet.

Hvis framtiden vil bringe, så er det forlovet best å gå ut fra at Hitler framdeles sitter ovenkunder trygt i sadelen, og at han og hans nazistiske ledere vil bevare kontrollen over Tysklands krigsmakt. Derfor kan det være av interesse å se litt på hva offisielle tyske talere sier om de har utvilsomt om krigen. Til tross for katastrofene på østfronten legger tyske talere fremdeles vekt på Vestfronten og påstår at det er der som er den avgjørende fronten. Hvis en grunnlegger til de tilkøper operasjonene i vest den største betydning.

Tre fronter

Den viktigste grunnen er antagelig at tyskerne på østfronten enda får over store områder uten livskraftige majler eller politisk betydning som de enda kan erstatte. Hvis de vil og kan trekke seg ut av de baltiske land, vil de være istand til å konsentrere sine styrker på en meget bred og kortere frontlinje fra Øst-Prøyssens til Karpatene. Dermed vil de tilbake med egne forsyningslinjer, vinne tid og samtidig forhindre russiske forsyningslinjer. Hvis tyskerne på Vestfronten imidlertid begynner å trekke seg tilbake i stor målestokk, vil de tilkøper ressurser. Krigen på Vestfronten går over til en begrepsdring vil de allierte få meget bedre anledning til å utnytte denne overlegenhet i ressurser. Det samme gjelder nok når de går over til åpne. De alliertes flydeler opererer framdeles stort sett fra Storbritannia. Hvis de får adgang til store områder i Frankrike, vil dette gi dem et en langt større slagkraft enn hittil.

I virkeligheten har tyskerne selvfølgelig ikke så meget de skulle ha.

(fortsettelse side 3)

KM.2.


Av World

Det nye interregionale taluflønder
peker ut over overgangstidens særlige
problemer og representerer et av de
første leddene i oppbyggingen av et
varig mellomfølelig økonomisk samarbeide.

De allra mest mynnighetligt lägger vi stor vikt på att personer som är blottade för att bli utsatta för en sådan situation ska kunna få hjälp och stöd. Vi vill också se till att de som är utsatta för en sådan situation kan få hjälp och stöd. Vi vill också se till att de som är utsatta för en sådan situation kan få hjälp och stöd.



En pige blev meget og fælder dækket.
Hun har været i masken og smeltet.
Siden der har den første behandling. Alle
der er søn har hun skude.
Hun er glad, hun har søn med baller
til forskelligste forskellige plisser,
officerens plisser m.m. Hun blir på
vejen udstyrt med smækkeperer. Som
hendes søn har hille, hun har hun
faldt og har sønne bunder, an-
sejntiske huller osv. Hun har sønne
følger hain stæd på hane
omrædet. Hain stæd. Transporets
Hovka til England. Joregns for de
hæst, sønne sønne sønne dæst, og
sønne sønne sønne sønne sønne
sønne sønne sønne sønne sønne
for Transporets sønne sønne sønne
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sønne sønne sønne sønne sønne
den hospital sønne sønne sønne



UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH

100

opp. _____

Saipans erobring fører til Tojos fall

Alliert seier bringer krigen til japansk jord

Omtrent samtidig med at de allierte landet i Normandie ble et viktig øyeblikk i kampen om Japan. Den 9. juli — 25 dager etter at de amerikanske styrker hadde gått i land — tok de allierte kontroll over Saipan. Det er den første japanske besetning fra før krigen som er tatt av de allierte, og erobringen av øya er et viktig skritt i kampen mot Japan på japansk grunn.

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Oppstillingen sett fra Saipan er en viktig vinnings. Fra Saipan kan de allierte angripe de japanske øyene i Filippinene. Den 9. juli har allierte vært angrepet fra Japan på det amerikanske territorium, og de allierte luftstyrker har nedlagt over 100 japanske fly i det indiske og Stillehavet.

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Den 25. dagens kampen kostet de amerikanske styrker 2.350 drøpt, 11.481 såret og 1.213 savnet.



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En ny total mobilisering

Den 25. juli erobret Hitler et viktig øyeblikk i kampen om Japan. Den 9. juli — 25 dager etter at de amerikanske styrker hadde gått i land — tok de allierte kontroll over Saipan. Det er den første japanske besetning fra før krigen som er tatt av de allierte, og erobringen av øya er et viktig skritt i kampen mot Japan på japansk grunn.

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NORLANDER: en landstigning på Saipan. De amerikanske styrker har tatt kontroll over øya.

AVGJØRENDE SLAG I EUROPA

(fortsettelse fra side 1)

Det er et viktig øyeblikk i kampen om Japan. Den 9. juli — 25 dager etter at de amerikanske styrker hadde gått i land — tok de allierte kontroll over Saipan. Det er den første japanske besetning fra før krigen som er tatt av de allierte, og erobringen av øya er et viktig skritt i kampen mot Japan på japansk grunn.

Mangel på utstyr

Reservemangelen og mangelen på utstyr har allerede ført til at de allierte har tatt kontroll over Saipan. Den 9. juli har allierte vært angrepet fra Japan på det amerikanske territorium, og de allierte luftstyrker har nedlagt over 100 japanske fly i det indiske og Stillehavet.

Saipan: amerikanske troppesoldater angriper i land fra den store kysten av Saipan.

BREV FRA London Washington

London-avisen Daily Express, som har et daglig salg på over 1.000.000 eksemplarer, har i et stort antal levere spørgsmål om hvilken løsning de tok til problemet med at de måtte overtage graver og jernbaner. Avisen, som alltid har holdt seg selv som en forkjemper for det private initiativ, må erkjenne at jernbaner svar ikke var etter forhandlingsstadiet. Av dem som svarer tilbake 66 prosent at de var for statsdrift graver, og 59 prosent tilbake at de var nøytrale for statsdrift jernbaner.

Av den samme art i Frankrike ville drive et hele internat opplysningsarbeid om nødvendigheten av privat initiativ.


Hvert av Londona fem nye dages tilfuktighet har utspelt for 1.000 personer. De er alle påvirket med feversykdommer, skrubbel, kopper og blandede nertelinger. De er frivillige og har god kunnskap til hjelp. En anti-medarbeider beaktning er at disse tilfuktighetene ved nasjonal. Av de tilfuktighetene sergespløsser — huss halsparten i bruk.

Det er opplyst at det i London erdrødet all i alle sinne tilfuktighet 10.750.000 personer.

De Kjøtt i Nordatlantiske fluslar gradvis bedre og bedre deli store talle som motstandgruppen i de okkuperte land spiller i kampen mot nazistene. De er grunnene til det er at den allierte overkommandoen stadig sender ut kommandeer om plysjer som etter inspeksjoner er blitt utført av disse grupper.

I et av de siste kommandeer fra SHAEF heter det:

Siden den allierte landstigningen har motstandgruppen i Belgia vært opplyst med en systematisk utlegging av plysjer, utbrudd, seksjon og telegrafier, jernbaner og signallanterner over hele landet. De resultatene som er nådd er meget tilfredsstillende. Vel og fremtidsrettet i Belgia er for en stor del, ikke brukt, og dette har betraktelig bidrag til å forsinke transporten av tyske forsterkninger til slagområdene.



En av blokadebryterne — „Cap Viking“.

Utenriksminister Hull meddelte 16. juli at en serie forhandlinger vil begynne i Washington i morgen. Representanter for de Forente Stater, Storbritannia, Sovjet-Ligues og China vil delta og skal diskutere opprettelsen av en internasjonal sikkerhetsorganisasjon etter krigen. Forhandlingene vil bli uformelle og endingen er å få overblikk over hvordan de andre nasjonene tenker overfor President Roosevelts plan for etableringen. Roosevelt planer faktisk på å etablere en verdensorganisasjon av alle frihetelskende nasjoner, med et råd bestående av representanter for de fire stormakter og et visum med andre nasjoner. En internasjonal domstol skal domme i eventuelle uoverensstemmelser og de store nasjoners militære styrker skal i felleskap avverge valdehandlinger og skjedene som følger vedendelsen i krig.

Den internasjonale minnerne konferanse i Breton Woods som ble holdt i juli måned var meget vellykket og resulterte i en god grunnlag for de forberedende forhandlinger om en internasjonal sikkerhetsorganisasjon.

De Forente Stater har lagt en ferskegjeldende byrge og en glimrende skildring i General Theodor Roosevelt som nylig påtok i Nordatlant. General Roosevelt var sjef av den amerikanske President Theodore Roosevelt og utmerket seg både i denne og forrige verdenskrig. For krigen var han visemarineminister og hadde også vært guvernør for Puerto Rico og generall på Filippinene.

Det amerikanske Medisinske Selskap av det Nasjonale Helseråd har slutt seg sammen om en etterdrakt kampanje som skal gjenopprette og som tar seg på å fremme den allierte helsearbeid i Amerika. I de to organisasjoners fellesprogram heter det: „De utfordringer vår nasjon har møtt i krigen og senere igjen berører en gang for alle hvor viktig det er at hvert eneste amerikansk borger, friskt og sunt, og fysisk sterke blir utviklet og vedlikeholdt“.

Roosevelt Eller Dewey?

Begge partier forplikter seg til både krigen og freden

President Roosevelt har for fjerde gang latt seg utnevne til demokrat-partiets president-kandidat, og har uttalt at hans første mål er å vinne krigen, sikre freden og opprettholde Amerikas økonomi slik at det kan bli en levestandard for alle.

Denne uttalelse, hvor President Roosevelts motkandidat er Governor Thomas E. Dewey fra New York, trykker ca 150 år gammel tradisjon. Liksom han var den første amerikanske president som ble valgt for tredje gang, er Roosevelt den første president som har blitt valgt for tredje gang. Han er en annen og like gammel tradisjon er blitt opprettholdt — nemlig at intet av de fire store det politiske partiene velges til presidentvalget. I 1936 ble Franklin D. Roosevelt valgt som den amerikanske presidenten. I 1940 og 1944 ble han valgt for tredje og fjerde gang. I 1948 vil amerikanerne velge, under krigen, på til valgmenen i november for å avgjøre hvorvidt den nåværende administrasjonen skal bli skiftet eller om den skal erstatte seg selv.

Det framgår med all mulig tydelighet av de to parti-programmer at det handler absolutt ingen politisk opposisjon fra amerikanskpolitikk. Demokratiske og republikanske organisasjoner, basert på prinsippet om at ingen kan bli valgt som president uten å ha vært i militær tjeneste eller i stats-tjeneste, som utøver alle stats-tjenester, som utøver alle stats-tjenester, som utøver alle stats-tjenester.

I den nye President Roosevelt holdt da han tok mot utnevnelsen, uttalte han at folket har en rett til å velge og at amerikanske rik er klar over at „det som berører i Nordatlant og på Sjøen har direkte innflytning på Oklahoma og California sikkerhet og velstand“.

Som visepresident-kandidat har demokratiske valg omkommer Henry A. Truman fra Missouri.

VI GIR DERE

Utgående reiser og ankomster for de Forente Stater i september måned på norsk

nr	utgangsreiser	ankomster
1	1. september	1. september
2	2. september	2. september
3	3. september	3. september
4	4. september	4. september
5	5. september	5. september
6	6. september	6. september
7	7. september	7. september
8	8. september	8. september
9	9. september	9. september
10	10. september	10. september
11	11. september	11. september
12	12. september	12. september
13	13. september	13. september
14	14. september	14. september
15	15. september	15. september
16	16. september	16. september
17	17. september	17. september
18	18. september	18. september
19	19. september	19. september
20	20. september	20. september
21	21. september	21. september
22	22. september	22. september
23	23. september	23. september
24	24. september	24. september
25	25. september	25. september
26	26. september	26. september
27	27. september	27. september
28	28. september	28. september
29	29. september	29. september
30	30. september	30. september

Utgående reiser og ankomster for de Forente Stater i september måned på norsk

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Utgående reiser og ankomster for de Forente Stater i september måned på norsk

Latest reports of LEAFLET REACTIONS

Number 2

"Proof" of Voluntary Surrender.

A report has come in of a group of German soldiers captured in civilian clothes who claimed to be deserters and presented our newspaper leaflets to prove that they had surrendered voluntarily. They at once had no "Goldbach" (Pay Book) and declared that they had destroyed them.

Good Distribution of "M-1."

It has just been learned via El Esteban that distribution of the Eisenhower leaflet by a hooded figure was highly successful. A certain extent of an underground network who had traversed the entire coastal area from Akko to Haifa had said that a great many people had seen them and that they were being considered as deserters.

Types of Leaflet Jobs.

Types of leaflet jobs are divided into one of two main objectives in view:

1. Targeted Distribution ... SP6, addressed to the Cherbourg Gorkovskis; and SP13, calling on a specific unit which had been surrounded to surrender, were examples of this type. Their effectiveness usually can be judged easily and accurately by the direct results.
2. Long Term Results ... SP7, "Division of War leaflet"; and SP14, "A Division of War leaflet", were examples of this type. Its effectiveness can only be estimated over the long term (for example, by totaling the percentage of prisoners who soon to have been influenced by them).

COPY 412

Number.....



Lates reports of LEAFLET REACTIONS

Number 1/2

"MINK" SHOWS RESULTS OF ZK 27

1. A picture released by Mink magazine shows one of the Russian soldiers, who "then" captured by the Germans on the Eastern front were forced to fight against the Allies in France, pointing out Nazi positions and then to Russian soldiers after his capture by Allied troops. The caption tells of the Russian soldiers who gave themselves up to the Allied forces after reading a leaflet written by one of their comrades (leaflet ZK 27).

"GERMANS KEEP OUR LEAFLETS" - MINK

2. (a) Mink has officially announced in the House of Commons that 77% of the German prisoners captured in Germany admitted that they have read our leaflets or listened to our propaganda.

According to R/D reports from the battlefield, the percentage in some groups is over 90%. Mink also noted the fact that the objectives of our leaflet campaign in general are:

- (a) To persuade the German soldier that Germany is losing the war
- (b) To persuade him to surrender or that he sacrifice his life uselessly
- (c) To prevent his surrender by convincing him that he will be treated decently as a prisoner and returned to his homeland at the conclusion of hostilities

The following comments from recent R/D reports are interesting:

The average of R/D's believing that Germany has lost the war is between 65% and 70% (this compares with between 20% and 30% immediately after D-Day).

There is no doubt that our leaflets are being widely read. Many of the R/D's go into great detail about them, occasionally making specific observations and even suggestions for improving individual leaflets.

- b 27 There seems to be no longer any general belief that the Allies will retreat captured Germany. One R/D said that, at the beginning, there was a concern that Americans can't take any prisoners. Then, that only the Parachutists didn't take any. Finally, when the Soviets came down, all rumors about atrocities

RECEIVED

RESTRICTED

WIE SOLL DAS WEITERGEHEN?

Im Kriege kommt es nicht auf grosse Worte an, sondern auf harte Tatsachen. Tatsachen sprechen für sich selbst.




1 Menschenmaterial.
Jedes Jahr werden in Amerika, Russland und England viermal so viele Männer wehrdienstfähig wie in Deutschland. Das ist nicht Propaganda. Das kann man sich an den Fingern abzählen.



2 Kriegsmaterial.
Während die deutsche Kriegsindustrie weiter zerstört wird, türmt sich auf der alliierten Seite Gerät für weitere Materialschlachten. Das ist nicht Propaganda. Das merkst du hier selbst.



3 Luftüberlegenheit.
Die nie geglaubten Zahlen der amerikanischen Flugzeugproduktion werden über Europa zur Wahrheit. Warum ist die deutsche Luftwaffe dauernd auf Urlaub? Die Bombardierungen wirken sich aus.



4 Nachschub.
Warum hört man jetzt so wenig vom U-Bootkrieg? Weil er genau wie im letzten Krieg aussieht. Der deutsche Nachschub wird hingegen durch Bombardierung der Industrien und Verkehrswege immer knapper.



Dreifrontenkrieg.
Der Zweifrontenkrieg hat schon einmal für Deutschland die Niederlage bedeutet. Heute kämpft die Wehrmacht im Osten, Westen und Süden — und ist nirgends dem Massenansturm gewachsen.

STIMMT DAS ODER STIMMT DAS NICHT?

Auf Grund von Kapitel 2, Artikel 11, Vertragsnummer 846 der Genfer Konvention vom 27. Juli 1929 erhalten Kriegsgefangene Soldaten* in amerikanischen oder britischen Händen die gleichen Rationen wie Soldaten des amerikanischen oder britischen Heeres. Ihr Essen wird von Köchen aus ihren eigenen Reihen auf die Art ihres Landes zubereitet.

In Amerika oder Kanada erhalten Kriegsgefangene für ihre Arbeit innerhalb oder außerhalb des Lagers pro Tag 80 cents. Die Hälfte davon wird für die Zeit nach dem Krieg auf einer Bank hinterlegt, die andere Hälfte in Gutscheinen ausgezahlt, mit denen sich der Gefangene in der Kantine Zigaretten, Süßigkeiten, alkoholfreie Getränke und dergleichen kaufen kann.

Den Kriegsgefangenen wird Gelegenheit geboten zur Abhaltung von Bildungs- und Lehrkursen, zur Ausübung von Sport und Spielen, und zur Veranstaltung von Konzerten, Theateraufführungen und Vorträgen. Sie können Zeitungen lesen und Rundfunk hören.

Postverbindung zwischen den Gefangenenerlagern und der Heimat geht über das Rote Kreuz und ist zuverlässig und verhältnismäßig schnell. Nach dem Krieg werden die Kriegsgefangenen so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt.

* Als Soldaten werden auf Grund der Haager Konvention (IV, 1907) angesehen: Alle offizientragenden Personen, die Uniform tragen oder ein Abzeichen, das von einer Entfernung aus ertanzt werden kann.

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ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)



DEM Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Armeen liegen jetzt schlüssige Beweise vor, dass die deutschen Streikkräfte in Frankreich gemäss der Erklärung des deutschen Oberbefehlshabers West vom 7. Juni 1944 gehandelt haben, in der die Mitglieder der französischen Widerstandsgruppen als Francistes bezeichnet werden.

Der Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Armeen gibt daher folgende Erklärung ab:

1. Die französischen Streikkräfte der Inneren Front bilden eine kämpfende Truppe unter Kommando und Führung von General Koenig. Sie bilden einen wesentlichen organischen Bestandteil der alliierten Expeditions-Armee.
2. Die französischen Streikkräfte der Inneren Front im Maquis stehen im offenen Kampf gegen den Feind und haben Befehl, ihre Operationen im Einklang mit den Bestimmungen des Kriegesrechts zu führen. Sie tragen sichtbare Abzeichen und werden von General Eisenhower als eine Armee unter seinem Kommando angesehen.
3. Unter diesen Umständen stellen Vergeltungsmassnahmen gegen Widerstandsgruppen einen Verstoß gegen die Bestimmungen des Kriegesrechts dar, zu die Deutschland gebunden ist. Verbrechen dieser Art bestärken die Vereinten Nationen nur in ihrem Beschluss, den Krieg zu einem raschen und siegreichen Ende zu bringen, damit der Gerechtigkeit Genüge geschieht.
4. Der Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Armeen ist entschlossen, alles zu tun, um die Urheber aller Grausamkeits-Akte festzustellen, die gegen Angehörige der unter seinem Kommando stehenden Streikkräfte begangen werden. Entsprechende Massnahmen werden bereits getroffen. Die Schuldigen werden zur Verantwortung gezogen werden. Ihre Untaten werden eine rasche Sühne finden.

MIT der umstehenden Erklärung des Alliierten Oberkommandos gilt nunmehr die Erschiessung ■■■ Mitgliedern der französischen Streitkräfte der Inneren Front als Kriegsverbrechen. Die Führer der Vereinten Nationen haben zu wiederholten Malen Erklärungen abgegeben, dass Kriegsverbrecher nach Kriegsende strengstens zur Verantwortung gezogen werden.

Premierminister Churchill
am 8. September 1942:

„Wenn die Stunde der Befreiung in Europa schlägt — und sie wird schlagen — ■■■ wird ■■■ auch die Stunde der Vergeltung sein. Und die Naziverbrecher werden in jedem Lande, in dem ■■■ gefrevelt haben, vor Gericht gestellt werden, auf dass für künftige Zeiten eine unauslöschliche Warnung ergehe und kommende Geschlechter sagen mögen: Wer tut, was jene taten, soll vergehen!“

Präsident Roosevelt
am 7. Oktober 1942:

„Wir haben nicht vor, mit Massenrepressalien ■■■ antworten. Aber wir sind entschlossen, nach Recht und Gebühr die verbrecherischen Führer zu bestrafen, die für den planmässigen Mord tausender unschuldiger Menschen verantwortlich sind und für die Schreckenstaten, mit denen sie alle christlichen Glaubenssätze geschändet haben.

In dieser Politik kennen wir keinen Kompromiss. Aber dem einfachen Mann in den Ländern der Achse werden wir ■■■ Haar krümmen. Den schuldigen barbarischen Führern der Achse werden wir ihre Strafe nach vollem Mass zumessen.“

Trotz misslungenem
Attentat auf Hitler!

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GENERALE PROKLAMIEREN FRIEDENSREGIERUNG!

Berlin, 21. Juli: In einer Radioansprache
■ 1 Uhr morgens gab Hitler zu, dass
die gestrige Proklamation der Friedens-
bewegung von führenden deutschen
Generalen ■■■■

Goering befahl der Luftwaffe, gegen die Bewegung einzu-
schreiten und erklärte, dass es sich ■■■ „abgesetzte deutsche
Generale“ handele. (Von Hitler bisher abgesetzt: Feld-
marschall v. Leeb, List, v. Rundstedt, v. Bock, v. Brauchitsch,
Generale v. Falkenhausen und Halder). Von Seiten Goerings
und Doenitz wurde sofort nach Hitlers Rede der alten
Reichsregierung Gefolgschaft erklärt. Keine derartige
Erklärung erfolgte ■■■■ OKH.

Die Friedensregierung gab Wehrmachts-Befehlshabern in-
■ ausserhalb Deutschlands ihre Proklamation und Befehle
bekannt. In Deutschland werden Flugblätter verbreitet, die
erklären, dass ■■■■ verantwortlich sei, den verlorenen
Krieg noch länger fortzusetzen und dass ■■■■ Stunde
■■■■ Handeln gekommen ist.

Himmler wurde an Stelle von Generaloberst Fromm ■■■
„Befehlshaber der Heimatarmeen“ ernannt. Generaloberst
Guderian wurde zum Generalstab des Heeres berufen.

FEST STEHT FOLGENDES:

1. ☐ die deutsche Generalität ☐ besten weiss, wie die militärische Lage ☐
2. Dass die deutsche Generalität zu der Einsicht gelangt ist, dass Deutschland den Krieg verloren hat.
3. ☐ ☐ deutsche Generalität daher verlangt hat, dass man Frieden schliesst.
4. Dass die deutsche Generalität, als ihrem Verlangen nicht entsprochen wurde, selbst handeln musste.
5. Dass es in Deutschland jetzt eine Friedensregierung gibt, ☐ die Goering „gewarnt“ hat.
6. Dass zu dieser Friedensregierung die erfahrensten und bestinformierten deutschen Generale gehören.

☐ ☐ FÜR DICH BEDEUTET:

Du ☐ jetzt, ☐ die Generalität ☐ Wochen gewusst hat—dass Deutschland den Krieg verloren hat. Die Friedensregierung mag niedergeschlagen werden oder nicht, an dieser Tatsache rüttelt niemand mehr.

Jede deutsche Reichsregierung ☐ kapitulieren, ☐ Frieden zu schliessen. Die Bedingungen ☐ für dich ☐ deine Kameraden durch althergebrachtes Kriegsrecht und die Genfer Konvention geregelt. Die Generalität hat gehandelt. Was immer du ☐ tust, bedenke ☐ jetzt erfahren hast.

RESTRICTED EINE KLEINE CLIQUE?

In seiner Radio-Ansprache hat Hitler zugegeben, dass der Friedens-Putsch von deutschen Offizieren organisiert worden ist. Göring nannte in seiner Ansprache die Männer hinter der Bewegung „eine kleine Clique von ehemaligen Generalen“.

Hier sind die unbestreitbaren Tatsachen: Hitler ■■■ Himmler haben die militärische Leitung des Krieges gänzlich ■■■ den Händen der Berufs-offiziere genommen. Unter ■■■ ■■■ Hitler abgesetzten Generalen sind:

Generalfeldmarschall Fedor v. Bock,
Generalfeldmarschall Walter v. Brauchitsch,
Generalfeldmarschall Ewald v. Kleist,
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter v. Leeb,
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List,
Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich ■■■ Manstein,
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd v. Rundstedt,
Generalfeldmarschall Erich v. Witzleben,
Generaloberst Ludwig Beck,
Generaloberst Freiherr ■■■ Falkenhausen,
Generaloberst Fritz Fromm,
Generaloberst Franz Halder,
Generaloberst Erich Höppner,
Generaloberst Richard Ruoff,
Generaloberst ■■■ Stfauss.

Ist ■■■ ein „kleine Clique“? ■■■ sie „gewissenlos“? ■■■ Jedenfalls handelt ■■■ sich bei den obenstehenden Generalen um Wehrmachts-Offiziere, die in militärischen Belangen anders denken als die politische Führung. Die „kleine Clique“ bestand darauf, dass Deutschland ■■■ Krieg sofort beenden ■■■

Es ist klar, dass ■■■ in Deutschland jetzt nur mehr zwei Seiten gibt: Die Seite der Kriegs-Verlängerer und die Seite der Friedens-Beschleuniger.

FEST STEHT FOLGENDES:

1. Dass die deutsche Generalität ■■■ weiss, wie die militärische Lage ist.
2. Dass ■■■ deutsche Generalität ■■■ Einsicht gelangt ist, dass Deutschland ■■■ Krieg verloren hat.
3. Dass die deutsche Generalität daher verlangt hat, dass der Krieg beendet wird.
4. Dass ■■■ deutsche politische Führung nicht ■■■ schliessen kann ohne unterzugehen.
- Dass die deutsche Generalität, als ihrem Verlangen nicht entsprochen wurde, selbst ■■■
5. Dass die Friedensbewegung nicht ■■■ einer „kleinen Clique“ stammte, sondern ■■■ erfahrenen Generälen.

DU WEISST JETZT BESCHIED:

Heute weisst du, was die deutsche ■■■ den letzten Wochen selbst erkennen ■■■: dass Deutschland die militärische Niederlage nicht mehr vermeiden kann. Und dass ■■■ politische Führung nicht gewillt ist, daraus die Konsequenz zu ziehen. Warum? Weil sie weiss, dass ■■■ Kriegsende ihr eigenes Ende bedeutet.

WAS IST ■■■ TUN?

DIE HEIMAT tut, was sie kann, um den Frieden zu beschleunigen. Trotz Gestapo, trotz Hinrichtungen und Massenrepressalien haben Deutschlands Arbeiter erkannt, dass die Räder der ■■■ Kriegsmaschine nur durch Massen-Arbeitsverweigerung stillgelegt werden können.

■■■ selbst hat oft Gelegenheit, ■■■ Frieden ■■■ beschleunigen. ■■■ deutsche Soldaten weigerten sich, auf der Cherbourg-Halbinsel Selbstmord ■■■ begehen. ■■■ Osten ergab sich die gesamte 4. Armee in hoffnungsloser Lage auf Befehl ■■■ Generalleutnant Müller.

Letzten Endes liegt es aber an dir selbst, ob du für dich selbst Frieden schliesst oder dich in den Untergang des Systems mitreissen lässt. Dein Leben liegt in deiner eigenen Hand. Und mit ihm ■■■ Zukunft Deutschlands. Denn Deutschland wird dich nach dem Krieg brauchen.

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EINE KLEINE CLIQUE?

In ■■■ Radioansprache hat Hitler zugegeben, dass der Friedensputsch ■■■ deutschen Offizieren organisiert worden ist. Göring nannte in seiner Ansprache die Männer hinter der Bewegung „■■■ kleine Clique von ehemaligen Generalen“.

Hier sind die unbestreitbaren Tatsachen: Hitler und Himmler haben die militärische Leitung des Krieges gänzlich ■■■ den Händen der Berufsoffiziere genommen. Unter ■■■ von Hitler abgesetzten Generalen sind:

Generalfeldmarschall Fedor v. Bock,
Generalfeldmarschall Walter v. Brauchitsch,
■■■ v. Kleist,
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter v. Leeb,
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List,
Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich v. Manstein,
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd v. Rundstedt,
Generalfeldmarschall Erich v. Witzleben,
Generaloberst Ludwig Beck,
Generaloberst Alexander v. Falkenhausen,
Generaloberst Fritz Fromm,
Generaloberst Franz Halder,
Generaloberst Erich Höppner,
■■■ Ruoff,
Generaloberst Adolf Strauss.

Ist das „eine kleine Clique“? Sind ■■■ „gewissenlose“ Männer? ■■■ handelt sich bei diesen Generalen um Wehrmachtsoffiziere, die in militärischen Dingen anders denken als die politische Führung. Diese „kleine Clique“ bestand darauf, dass Deutschland den Krieg sofort ■■■ bringen ■■■.

Es ■■■ klar, dass ■■■ in ■■■ jetzt nur noch zwei Seiten gibt: Auf der einen Seite die Kriegs-Verlängerer, auf der andern ■■■ Friedens-Beschleuniger.

NG 16.

FOLGENDES STEHT FEST:

1. Die deutsche Generalität weiss am besten, wie die militärische Lage ist.
2. Die deutsche Generalität ist der Einsicht gelangt, dass Deutschland den Krieg verloren hat.
3. Die deutsche Generalität hat daher verlangt, der Krieg beendet wird.
4. Die deutsche politische Führung kann nicht Frieden schliessen, ohne selbst unterzugehen.
5. Die deutsche Generalität daher selbst handeln, als ihrem Verlangen nicht entsprochen wurde.
6. Friedensbewegung stammte nicht von einer „kleinen Clique“, sondern von erfahrenen Generalen.

WISST JETZT BESCHIED:

Heute wisst ihr, was die deutsche Generalität in den letzten Wochen selbst erkennen musste: Dass Deutschland die militärische Niederlage nicht mehr vermeiden kann. Und die politische Führung nicht ist, daraus Konsequenz ziehen. Warum? Weil sie weiss, dass die Kriegsführung ihr eigenes

WAS IST ZU TUN ?

Die Front tut, sie kann, um den Frieden zu beschleunigen. 50 000 deutsche Soldaten weigerten sich auf der Cherbourg-Halbinsel, Selbstmord zu begehen. Im Osten ergab sich die gesamte 4. Armee in hoffnungsloser Lage auf Befehl von Generalleutnant Müller.

Heimat hat die beste Gelegenheit, den Frieden zu beschleunigen. Trotz Gestapo, trotz Hinrichtungen Massenrepressalien haben deutsche Arbeiter erkannt, dass Räder der Kriegsmaschine nur durch Massen-Arbeitsverweigerung stillgelegt werden können.

und Heimat müssen ihren Beitrag zur Beendigung des Krieges leisten. Die Generalität hat ein Beispiel gegeben. Es liegt jetzt allen Deutschen, durch gemeinsames diszipliniertes Handeln das Ende zu beschleunigen.

Der Stein

ist im Rollen

DEUTSCHE ARBEITER

Die Generale haben einen tödlichen Schlag Hitlers Macht geführt, — tödlich, ganz gleich, ob er von sofortigem Erfolg begleitet wird oder nicht.

Ein faschistisches Regime, das einen schon verlorenen Krieg führt, kann eine solche Untergrabung seiner Autorität lange überleben.

Die deutschen Arbeiter können sich von einer Revolte, die von deutschen Generälen geführt kein dauerndes Heil versprechen, — wenig die Arbeiter anderer Länder.

Aber heute kommt es auf eines an: die Generale haben ein Unternehmen ins Rollen gebracht, das dem deutschen Volk Rettung und Frieden bringen kann. Nur der Masseneinsatz der Arbeiterschaft kann das Unternehmen zu Ende führen. In den Betrieben kann Hitler seine Niederlage finden.

1918 trugen die deutschen Arbeiter die entscheidende Last dazu bei, einen schon verlorenen Krieg abzukürzen.

Damals gab es keine 12 Millionen Fremdarbeiter im Herzen Deutschlands wie heute. Sie bilden einen Teil der Massen innerhalb des Reiches, die dazu beitragen können, den Zusammenbruch Hitlers herbeizuführen.

Die Fremdarbeiter in Deutschland sind heute ein Faktor von allergrößter politischer Bedeutung. Es ist die unzweifelhafte Aufgabe der deutschen Arbeiter, in jeder Weise mit ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten, und ihnen nötig ihrer Führung zu folgen.

**Die deutschen Arbeiter
müssen ihn weiterstossen**

Tatsachen, die denken geben

ADOLF HITLER, 21.7.44.:

„Eine ganz kleine Clique ehrgeiziger, gewissenloser und zugleich unvernünftiger, verbrecherischer Offiziere hat ein Komplott geschmiedet, um mich zu beseitigen. . . . Der Kreis, den diese Unstapeln darstellen, ist ein denkbar kleiner. Er hat mit der deutschen Wehrmacht und vor allem mit dem deutschen Volk nichts zu tun.“

1. Diese „Clique“ im Stabe, neue Reichsregierung Befehle an Truppen hinauszugehen. Am 21. Juli konnte die Sache nicht länger vertuscht werden. sprechen. Göring hatte anzuordnen, dass von der Luftwaffe erhaltene Befehle bestätigen wären. Hitler hielt es für notwendig. Heilmarmee aktionsbereit der inneren zu machen und Himmler zu ihrem Befehlshaber.
3. Göring seinerseits musste Kräfte der Luftwaffe in Deutschland zu Himmlers Verfügung stellen: und dies einer Zeit, wo jedes Flugzeug zur Verteidigung der deutschen Fronten und Fabriken in der Heimat benötigt wird.
4. Die „Clique“ Generale, die — nach Görings Worten — „wegen ihrer ebenso feigen wie schlechten Führung davongejagt wurden“ oder — nach Lays Worten — „für die Rückzüge verantwortlich waren“. Das heißt: die Generale, die in den letzten Monaten wurden, weil sie mit Hitlers Strategie nicht einverstanden waren. Die Namen der Generale, in der letzten Zeit „davongejagt werden mussten“, :
Generalfeldmarschälle: v. Bock, v. Brauchitsch, v. Kleist, v. Leeb, List, v. Manstein, Rundstedt, v. Witzleben. Generalobersten: v. Falkenhausen, Fromm, Halder, Hoppner, Ruoff, Strauss.
Diese Liste ist durch den Namen Zeitzlers zu ergänzen, dessen Ersetzung als Generalstabschef des Heeres durch Guderian von Hitler selbst am 21. Juli bekanntgegeben wurde. Alle diese Männer konnten am besten wissen, wie Deutschlands militärische Lage bestellt ist. Sie haben eingesehen, dass der Krieg verloren ist. Sie forderten den Frieden.
5. Am Juli versicherten Göring und der Öffentlichkeit, dass Luftwaffe und Marine noch hinter dem stünden. Keine derartige Erklärung erfolgte vom OKH.
6. Am 22. Juli sandten Feldmarschall Kluge, Generaloberst Falkenhorst und Generaloberst Wechs von Frankreich, Norwegen und dem Balkan ihre Glückwünsche zu Hitlers. Bis zum 25. Juli lagen keine solchen Kundgebungen von den Befehlshabern an der Ostfront und in Italien vor.
7. Dr. Ley hielt am 22. Juli für angebracht, die deutschen Arbeiter gegen die „blutdürstigen Schweinehunde und Reakt“ im Offizierskorps aufzuheizen. Damit erklärte er den Krieg gegen Generalität.

Trotz misslungenem Attentat auf Hitler

RESTRICTED

PROKLAMIEREN GENERALE FRIEDENSREGIERUNG

Berlin, 21. Juli :

In einer Radioansprache um ein Uhr morgens gab Hitler zu, dass deutsche Generale gegen den Nationalsozialismus in Aufruhr sind.

Göring befahl der Luftwaffe, gegen diese Friedensbewegung einzuschreiten und erklärte, dass ■ sich ■ „abgesetzte deutsche Generale“ handelt. (Von Hitler bisher abgesetzt: Feldmarschälle u. Leeb, List, v. Rundstedt, v. Bock, v. Brauchitsch, Generale v. Falkenhausen und Halder.) Von Seiten Görings und Doenitz' wurde sofort nach Hitlers Rede der alten Reichsregierung Gefolgschaft erklärt. Keine derartige Erklärung erfolgte vom O.K.H.

■ ■ Führer der Armee und der Partei stehen sich im Kampf gegenüber. Beide Seiten kämpfen für ■ eigene Zukunft.

DEUTSCHE ARBEITER UND ARBEITERINNEN :

**Nur Ihr könnt über Eure Zukunft
entscheiden—und über die Zukunft
Deutschlands**

FEST STEHT FOLGENDES:

1. Dass die nationalsozialistische Regierung nicht kapitulieren kann, ohne selbst unterzugehen.
 2. Dass die deutsche Generalität am besten weiss, wie die militärische Lage ist.
 3. Dass die deutsche Generalität ■ der Einsicht gelangt ist, dass Deutschland den Krieg verloren hat.
 4. Dass die deutsche Generalität—wie Ludendorf ■ Jahre 1918—verlangt hat, dass ■ Frieden schliesst.
 5. Dass die deutsche Generalität nach ■ Weigerung ihrer Forderungen durch Hitler selbständig handeln musste, um weiteres Blutvergiessen zu verhüten.
- Dass es in Deutschland jetzt eine Friedensregierung gibt, gegen die Göring „gewarnt“ hat. Zu dieser Friedensregierung gehören die erfahrensten und bestinformierten deutschen Generale.

WAS DAS FÜR DICH BEDEUTET:

■ Du weisst jetzt, dass offener Krieg zwischen Armee und Partei ausgebrochen ist. Die Generale verlangen sofortigen Friedensschluss, aber die Partei besteht darauf, den Krieg zu verlängern, um ihr Ende auf ein paar Monate hinauszuschieben. Zum ersten Mal seit 1933 hat das deutsche Volk die Möglichkeit, selbständig zu entscheiden und selbständig zu handeln.

Eine Million deutscher Arbeiter können in 100 Stunden mehr ausrichten als alle Generale Deutschlands zusammengenommen. Wenn Ihr Arbeiter gemeinsam handelt, könnt Ihr eine Friedensbewegung ins Werk setzen, die den Krieg beenden muss.

Vergesst nicht, dass Hitler Euch fürchtet, weil er Euch braucht. Durch diszipliniertes gemeinsames Handeln in Fabrik und Werkstatt, im Bergwerk, Eisenbahn und ■ Büro

KÖNNT ■ DIE KRIEGSMASCHINE STILL LEGEN

L'Amérique en Guerre



En pleine déroute Les Allemands, sur le front russe, défilent de «colonnes» quantifiées d'armes et de matériel, dans ce qui ne peut être que quelques échouilles de la déroute. Ils ont été vaincus par l'Armée Rouge victorieuse.



Le général Koenig commandant les F.F.L., vient de signer la capitulation de la poche de Metz. Il est entouré de ses officiers. En haut, les Allemands défilent en déroute. En bas, les Français défilent en victoire.



Un rôle capital Les Français ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Ils ont été les premiers à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

LES FRANÇAIS MAÎTRES CHEZ EUX EN LIBÉRIES

Le lieutenant-colonel américain Huxley, officier chargé des affaires civiles, a adressé à M. Petain, maître de la France, une lettre dans laquelle il exprime sa confiance dans la victoire finale des Français.

«A l'heure où la libération de la France est imminente, nous sommes convaincus que les Français, après avoir été les premiers à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France, vont être les premiers à la reconquérir.

«Nous espérons que les Français, après avoir été les premiers à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France, vont être les premiers à la reconquérir.

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Un message de Mme. Roosevelt aux Françaises

Il y a quelques jours à l'occasion de la fête nationale américaine, Mme. Roosevelt a adressé aux femmes de France le message suivant :

«Les femmes de France ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Elles ont été les premières à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

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Alors ils ont souri, comme jamais depuis quatre ans

D'un correspondant de guerre français.

Normandie, 12 juillet. — A l'heure où nous sommes en train de vaincre les Allemands, je dédie ces quelques lignes à quelques Françaises qui ont été les premières à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

«Les femmes de France ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Elles ont été les premières à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

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«Les femmes de France ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Elles ont été les premières à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

J'avais écrit la semaine dernière, à l'occasion de la fête nationale américaine, un message aux femmes de France. Je me suis dit : «Ces femmes de France ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Elles ont été les premières à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

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Nous espérons que les Français, après avoir été les premiers à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France, vont être les premiers à la reconquérir.

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RADIO - AMÉRIQUE - IN - SUCCÈS

Les Français ont joué un rôle capital dans la victoire. Ils ont été les premiers à ouvrir la voie à la libération de la France.

TOUS Quartier
AJIA, 16
S FRONTS

L'Armée rouge déferle à l'ouest du Boug

Churchill en France

Prisoners

Gains alliés le long de l'Orne

**COMMUNIQUE
NO. 97 DU C.G.
SUPREME ALLI**

Une carrière qui touche à sa fin

Les Nazis aux prises avec les généraux

Pei J'ornie, male h
justern.

Stuepnagel blessed

Radio-Paris a annoncé la mort que son directeur-gérant, gravement blessé par un tir d'artillerie allemand, a été tué par un tir d'artillerie allemand, en l'occurrence les régions de l'Est.

Apporté par les forces
aériennes alliées

TOUS LES FRONTS

Quartier Général Suprême
Allié, le 22 juillet 1944

Hitler administre une nouvelle purge

A en juger par le communiqué issu du Q.G. de Hitler, la situation se tend en Allemagne.

Même en faisant la part réservée à la propagande pour les besoins politiques, il apparaît que les antagonismes au régime hitlérien s'aggravent sérieusement.

La nouvelle, diffusée dans la nuit du 20 juillet par les postes allemands, annonçait qu'un attentat avait été fait contre la vie de Hitler ; le speaker ajoutait qu'à part quelques brulures et contusions, Hitler était indemne. Plusieurs officiers de son entourage, y compris Jodl, son chef d'état-major, auraient été blessés ou grièvement blessés.

Pour être Hitler en personne parlait au micro.

Il décrivait l'attentat comme un crime sans précédent dans l'histoire de l'Allemagne. Il ajoutait qu'il avait été commis par "une très petite clique d'officiers ambigus et irresponsables, insensés et criminellement stupides, qui n'ont servi en combat pour l'Allemagne, mais que la Haute Commandement de la Wehrmacht."

Hitler a déclaré que c'était le colonel von Stauffenberg qui avait jeté la bombe, mais avait échoué à deux mètres de lui.

Répondant que le cercle des conspirateurs était restreint, il

souligna que ce groupe d'éléments criminels se dissolvait, mais réaffirmait son espoir.

Il citait l'ordre qu'aurait donné l'autorité militaire, qu'aucun commandant d'unité, qu'aucun simple soldat en campagne ne devait se conformer aux directives émanant de ces groupes d'insubordonnés (sic).

Le Führer annonça ensuite qu'il avait nommé Himmler, commandant en chef de l'Armée, à l'intérieur de l'Allemagne.

Le commandant en chef de l'Armée, le général Gerd von Rundstedt, a été nommé chef d'état-major général.

Insistant une fois de plus qu'il ne s'agissait que d'une toute petite clique de traîtres et de déserteurs, il déclara que cette fois se porta à l'encontre de cette élite de la jeunesse allemande aux intentions socialistes.

Il fut aussi un propos, par l'Amiral Dönitz qui se porta garant de la Marine et par Goebbels qui donna la même assurance au nom de la Luftwaffe. Il annonça qu'il avait mis la Wehrmacht sous le commandement du général von Stülpnagel à qui la plus stricte obéissance devait être accordée.

Au moment d'être nommé, il a pu encore recevoir des renseignements détaillés de sa propre main.

Néanmoins, cependant, qui jusqu'à présent, après avoir subi une purge, n'est venu au milieu pour répondre à Hitler de la loyauté de l'Armée.

Elargissement du saillant allié à l'est de l'Orne



Le Havre, 21 juillet
La bataille se poursuit, depuis la rupture des premières lignes de défenses allemandes au sud de Caen, avec un acharnement accru.

L'ennemi a des efforts désespérés pour empêcher les Britanniques d'exploiter la rupture de son front. Il contre-attaque sans cesse avec des chars et de l'infanterie. Mais s'il a réussi jusqu'ici à empêcher un déplacement spectaculaire des blindés britanniques, l'aviation alliée continue, toute nuit, jour et nuit, l'effort pour couper les voies de ravitaillement.

Dans la journée du 20, une avance au sud-est de Caen aboutit à la capture de Rougemont.

Au sud de Caen, après la chute de Fleury, plusieurs villages, parmi lesquels Ha, Dras et Hubert-Fabre, ont été libérés.

Le 20, les forces alliées ont avancé de 10 km, vers le sud-est, vers le village de St. André.

Prise de St. André
Grenneville, qui avait été encerclé et dépassé par les premiers éléments britanniques, et où d'importantes forces allemandes continuaient à résister, a été occupée.

Entre Engleville et Etenville, l'ennemi avait établi de fortes positions défensives, d'où il se fut délogé qu'après de durs combats.

Une nouvelle attaque de l'infanterie alliée, déclenchée à partir des hauteurs dominant au nord le village de St. André-sur-Orne, a mené les Alliés au-delà du village, qui est alors sous main.

Entre St. André et Rougemont, de nouvelles unités ont franchi la ligne d'une autre avance de l'infanterie alliée.

A l'ouest du champ de bataille de Caen, l'ennemi s'est retiré par une nouvelle ligne au sud de la route de St. Valéry à Caumont, entre St. Valéry et Seilles et Bellot.

Sur le reste du front, il n'y a rien à signaler.

La 5e Armée avance vers Pise

La 5e Armée, sous l'ordre de Livorno, a pour ainsi dire atteint Pise. Des troupes américaines ont atteint la ville de Colle Salvetti, située sur une ligne de hauteurs, la dernière avant la vallée de l'Arno.

D'après de nombreux prisonniers, l'ennemi a été surpris de la rapidité de l'avance américaine dans ce secteur.

Sur le front florentin de la 5e Armée, l'ennemi, ayant fait une tentative vigoureuse mais infructueuse pour reprendre l'offensive aux troupes du général Kuhl, bat rapidement en retraite le long de la vallée de l'Arno.

Entre les Américains à l'ouest et les Français à l'est, l'artillerie lourde américaine bombarde déjà les positions allemandes sur la rive droite de l'Arno sur un front de 40 kilomètres.

L'avance de la 5e Armée le long de la vallée de l'Arno a été suivie par des pluies torrentielles.

Dans le secteur ukrainien, les Polonais qui avaient capturé l'important port d'Ankove, ont déjà une tête de pont de 10 km de largeur sur la rive gauche de l'Istev, à une quarantaine de kilomètres au nord d'Ankove.

Roosevelt nommé candidat

La conférence des démocrates a nommé le Président Roosevelt, candidat démocrate à la Présidence des Etats-Unis. Sa nomination a été accueillie par une ovation qui dura plus d'une demi-heure.

COMMUNIQUE NO. 91 DU Q.G. SUPREME ALLIE

Hier, les troupes alliées ont poursuivi leur avance au sud de St. André-sur-Orne, surmontant la résistance de l'ennemi qui se développait en une contre-attaque dans la région de St. Martin-de-Pansey.

Cette contre-attaque, qui était soutenue par des blindés, fut repoussée, l'ennemi subissant des pertes.

Dans la région à l'est de Caumont, nos troupes ont réalisé une légère avance. Les forces alliées dans la secteur ont obtenu de légers gains locaux au nord de Brévaux et le long de la route Pîtres-St. Lo, au sud de Remilly-sur-Lozon.

Une contre-attaque ennemie à Rals a été repoussée.

HOMMAGE DE LA JEUNE FRANCE



Le général Montgomery remercie un garçonnet qui vient de lui remettre un bouquet.

Les Russes débordent Brest-Litovsk et Lvov

Moscou, 21 juillet

Tandis que le maréchal Koniev, dans une offensive contre Lvov, a coupé la voie ferrée qui relie cette place-forte à Varsovie, le maréchal Rokossowski, dans une nouvelle attaque unifiée par un Ordre du Jour de Staline, a passé le Bug polonais en force au sud de Brest-Litovsk.

L'offensive du maréchal Koniev a élargi les importantes nœuds de communication de Ravn-Tousska, à cinquante kilomètres au nord-ouest de Lvov, et de Włodzis-Volynski, à cinquante kilomètres au sud-ouest de Kurd.

Ainsi, l'armée russe a déjà parallèlement isolé Lvov du reste

front et des troupes allemandes.

Dans la région à l'est de Lvov, la destruction des troupes ou quatre divisions allemandes encerclées au début de l'offensive de Koniev, se poursuit rapidement.

La nouvelle offensive du maréchal Rokossowski a pour premier résultat la rupture du front allemand sur une largeur de plus de 140 kilomètres, suivie par le passage du Bug polonais en force et une avance de cinquante kilomètres au sud de Lvov.

A l'est de Brest-Litovsk, les troupes de Rokossowski, avançant le long de la voie ferrée Vahouski-Brest-Litovsk, ont à leur disposition de nombreuses divisions de cette dernière.

Ainsi, les deux grands bastions allemands du secteur central, qui protègent Varsovie, la plaine polonaise et les côtes des Karpathe, sont directement menacés.

L'ennemi, fait des efforts désespérés pour ralentir l'avance du maréchal Koniev, il a lancé d'importantes unités de chars dans la bataille, pour tenter de précéder les réserves qui ont été déployées sans succès.

Après avoir subi des pertes énormes, les chars allemands ont été détruits, les réserves ont été détruites, les réserves ont été détruites.

La consolidation des troupes de point russe sur la rive gauche du Dniéper se poursuit.

Mort d'un grand patriote

M. Pierre Vernet, représentant à Londres du Comité Français de la Libération Nationale, est décédé à Londres le 20 juillet à l'âge de 47 ans. Diplôme habile, M. Vernet s'est fait de nombreux amis dans le Corps diplomatique de la capitale. Grand blessé et grand de la dernière guerre, son état de santé avait été compliqué par le traitement qu'il avait subi aux mains de Vichy.

Le roi George a transmis ses condoléances à la Délégation Française et M. Eden a présenté les sentiments du gouvernement britannique.

NOUVELLE OFFENSIVE AERIEENNE SUR LE REICH

London, 21 juillet

On déclare au Quartier Général allié qu'une nouvelle offensive aérienne contre l'Allemagne a été déclenchée.

En outre, on en compte, elle est comparable à celle qui, en février de l'année en cours, porta sur l'Allemagne, en particulier sur la région de Cologne.

Depuis le 16 juillet, par des

opérations coordonnées, la 8ème Armée de l'Air des Etats-Unis, basée sur la Grande-Bretagne, et la 15ème Armée de l'Air, basée sur l'Italie, ont mené une campagne d'attaques contre les centres industriels allemands.

Officiellement, il est indiqué que 50.000 obusiers et bombes et 4.500 avions ont été engagés dans cette campagne.

Le 20 juillet, pour la deuxième fois consécutive, plus de 1.200 gros bombardiers américains

ont pénétré au cœur de l'Allemagne.

Les objectifs visés à l'effet de perturber les communications et les transports ont été atteints.

Une série de raids ont été effectués à l'effet de perturber les communications et les transports.

Des avions de combat ont été envoyés à l'effet de perturber les communications et les transports.

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
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L'offensive britannique canadienne a été précédée d'un bombardement aérien sans précédent. Les avions de la RAF ont attaqué les positions allemandes dans la région de Caen.

Les F.F.I. au combat

London, 21 juillet

Le Quartier Général Suprême des Forces Expéditionnaires Allées communique :

"Du 4 au 5 juillet, les forces de la Résistance française ont continué leurs opérations, et ont eu de nombreuses succès, en particulier dans la région de Caen.

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pendant 30 heures. Elle a tué 800 soldats et 300 blessés.

Sur l'ensemble du système ferroviaire, nous avons eu de nombreux succès, en particulier dans la région de Caen.

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Chute du Cabinet Tojo

Le gouvernement de Tojo, qui dépendait des hostilités contre les Etats-Unis, est tombé.

Le général Kuniida Kiso et l'amiral Mitamura ont été chargés par l'empereur de la formation d'un nouveau cabinet.

Une modification importante a été apportée au Cabinet. Alors que Tojo avait été nommé directeur du Japon depuis octobre 1941, les deux nouveaux ministres seront les premiers ministres.

Les communications radio japonaises ne tentent pas de cacher que la chute de Tojo est la conséquence directe des graves revers japonais dans le Pacifique.

Radio Tokyo a même annoncé que Tojo était coupable de crimes impardonnables d'avoir mis l'empereur Hirohito dans une position extrêmement embarrassée.

Portes canadiennes

Le Service d'Information de guerre du Canada annonce que les pertes des forces canadiennes depuis le commencement de la guerre, s'élèvent à 37.673, dont 17.022 tués.

RESTRICTED



VLIEGENDE HOLLANDER



WEEKBLAD VERSPREID DOOR DE GEALLIEERDE LUCHTHACHT

No. 41, D. 20 JULIJ 1941

Oorlog op drie fronten...

... tot de onvoorwaardelijke overgave!

Londen, 19 juli.—Het plan van Toheran wordt afgevoerd. Sindsdien zijn de Duitschen verhoogen en verscherpten in een strijd die zich in het Oosten reeds heeft ontwikkeld tot een catastrofe voor den vijand, in het Zuiden tot een opmarsch, den hij door gemiddeld heeft kunnen winnen, en in het Westen tot de definitieve doorbraak van den een en anderen "Westwall".

Waar raakt het Duitse opperbevel zijn laatste strategische reserves bezwaaren? Welk get roept overtuigd met het andere get politiek worden? Troepen met Frankrijk, slaan het Italiaansche front verscherpt; soldaten die reeds weken geleden in Rusland stonden, zijn in Normandië gevoegen

geworden. In Wit-Rusland hadden de Duitschers niet voldoende troepen; vergaan hebben zij voldoende vliegtuigen om de geallieerde verhoogen. Maar het meest is dat de Duitschen in den strijd gevoegen worden tegen de Franse paritiet. In Normandië waren onder de vijandige troepen soldaten van 15 tot 75 jaar. In Duitsland werden de 16-jarigen voor militaire dienst opgetogen. Het is niet te denken op een en de Russische staatswiel tot massen te brengen?

Duitsland's overleving is onwaarschijnlijk, en het is er zich evenwel van bewust, als de Geallieerde onder zijn van de overwinning.

In Rusland

De strijd waartoe de Russen en Duitschen reeds een halfjaar geleden in het Oosten begonnen hebben, heeft zich nu in de laatste fase van het Oostenfront, maar het finale aspect van den oorlog een dramatische wijziging doen ondergaan. De strijd van het Rode Leger heeft zich voortgezet op een wijze, die de overtuiging verscherpt van het Duitse opperbevel dat het overtuigd is, dat de Russen een Duitsche leger vernietigen. In drie weken van strijd heeft de Russen een Duitsche leger vernietigd, twee andere vernietigen, de derde Duitsche veldopdrachten in Rusland onder een voortdurend en een klein om k.m. opgetukt over een 1000 k.m. breed front. Onder de Duitsche soldaten werden reeds een aantal in krijgsgevangenschap genomen. Het is niet te denken, dat de Russen de Duitschen in het Oostenfront vernietigen. Het is niet te denken, dat de Russen de Duitschen in het Oostenfront vernietigen. Het is niet te denken, dat de Russen de Duitschen in het Oostenfront vernietigen.

In Normandië

In de ten welken steden Duitse troepen de Geallieerden vernietigen nadereicht is het Oostenfront, te overtuigen van het beslissende effect van de Russen's linie aanbrengen moet en den strijd verhoogen niet om te denken, maar de Geallieerde superioriteit in materiaal zich van de Russen's superioriteit. Dit is de strijd van de Russen's superioriteit. Dit is de strijd van de Russen's superioriteit. Dit is de strijd van de Russen's superioriteit.



In total

A grainy, black and white photograph of a street scene in a city, likely New York City. The image is characterized by high contrast and a noisy, textured appearance. In the foreground, a person is partially visible, possibly sitting or standing near a low wall or bench. The background shows a street lined with buildings, some of which have multiple windows. A large tree is visible on the right side of the street. The overall composition suggests a candid, perhaps surveillance-style, photograph of an urban environment.

Buitenlandsch Overzicht

Montgomery valt aan

Het treft een man die de laatste jaren zich met muziek heeft beziggehouden, werd daarop aangehouden door twee van zijn zware Amerikaanse bondgenooten en van honderden dollars afgevoerd. Zij weigeren — fransoonse woorden — uit te leggen die gevonden te zijn op de grond. In dit soort gevallen is het gebruikelijk dat de verdachte wordt afgevoerd naar een gevangenis, waar hij wordt opgesloten tot hij zijn straf heeft uitgezeten. Het is echter niet gebruikelijk dat de verdachte wordt afgevoerd naar een gevangenis, waar hij wordt opgesloten tot hij zijn straf heeft uitgezeten.

Kausale Zusammenhänge

**BERICHTEN
VAN EEN
GROOTEN STRID**


● Ein vollständiges Bild der Zugschleife findet sich auch auf der Seite 100 des Buches.

[illegible]

14 JUILLET IN NORMANDIE. Voor het eerst champagne feestten weer in vrijheid. Een hal van het parlementsgebouw was omgeven door de feestende soldaten met "Craie" (witte krijt) op de muur.



**PREZIDENT ROOSEVELT VERWELKOMT
GENERAAL DE GAULLE** tijdens zijn bezoek
aan Washington, waarbij een staatsdiner werd
bereikt zeggende het voorlopig bestuur van de
bevrijde Franche gebied.



EEN BESLAAGDE AANVAL OP EEN DUITSCH CONVOOI. Britisch Bom-
bierders hebben vijf machtsgelede drie pantserde trekkers en een vrachtwagen in



Sherman Montgomery (Amerika), te veld, 88 mannen van de luchtmacht wilden de strek beschermen bij landingschepen daarheen gezonden.



Minister van Justitie

dad, Knaard van de Amerikaanse Luchtmacht en Gen.-Maj. Fominoff van de Soede Luchtmacht bevestigden den commandant van een Amerikaanse escadrille, dat zij nu op een dierre liggen naar een luchtbasis op Russisch grondgebied te verplaatsen.

[illegible]

HET LOGBOEK

De slachtoffer-
talstelling van de
Duitsers mijlde
brecht twee miljoen
betrouwd worden be-
ken 1945-1946
www.ijde van land-
vervoerers en stree-
aanbieder

Black women, they
want you here
and all the other
black boys they need

bevestiging onder de naam "Modern
leeds" twee jaar naop en hun werkdag
was op verschillende gronden, die oeg-
kijking der goede Persoonlijken: gansen
duidelijk dat de Persoonlijke van andere

Van dit ligt daarom de voorkeurskeuze bijhouden van de huidige situatie, die de versiers met die wijzen voor een land in het huidige wereldwijde netwerk, positief hebben veranderd. (The World Bank, 2013)

Nederland's sokkings te verwerken, in ver-
val van een Grilleurde, zoodat als een een
Dufache overwinsting, een beetje niet een
in landverdragsland. De Dufache is
de "amie" lobbys, en de kank, der

Die beiden ersten Punkte sind die folgenden: 1. Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist in der Lage, die notwendigen Mittel für die Produktion von Rüstungsgütern zu beschaffen. 2. Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist in der Lage, die notwendigen Mittel für die Produktion von Rüstungsgütern zu beschaffen.

was zij in het Nieuw Leven koninkrijk
wilde samenstellen. Dit was het
1938, en in september van dat
jaar. Zo was de toekomst van het
land aan zijn zijde bevestigd. Het was
nu om het wel willen veranderen."

De bevoegde instanties zijn vaker van de voorlichtingsplicht hanteerend sedert de wet is in werking getreden. Het aantal meldingen is toegenomen van 141 in 1981 tot 149 in 1982. Het aantal meldingen is toegenomen van 141 in 1981 tot 149 in 1982.

[illegible]

Deo lasten sijn heeft het ombudsings-
verkeersrecht onder de Duitse landbouw-
recht niet uw rechten aangetast.

Deze posten werden in het werk gesteld van 1 tot 100000, dat het landbouwland en het vee van de land- en landbouwten niet alleen maar, maar ook de andere dingen die erin zitten.

"Het is de God die is", bewijst hij een ding als de brochures van den christenwetenschappelijke Schrift der goden van de antichristen, en het volkomenen om van de dwaze artikelen in de dagbladen ook maar niet

Anderszins is er een klein verschil.
nam het principe deservatien. dat men die
waars in de handel zit. over 300 duiz
mogelijk wil verhoogen.

DOOR VERWARTING VAN VERKLEININGEN DIE
ZICH NIET IN DE VERVOLGINGSRECHTEN VAN WILHELM
DR. A. A. MEIJER EN VERVOLGINGSRECHTEN VAN
H. MEIJER EN DE ZIJNEN DE VERVOLGINGSRECHTEN
VAN DE VERVOLGINGSRECHTEN VAN DE VERVOLGINGSRECHTEN

die Verträge zu 30 Tagen. Für den Fall
zu unterbreiten der Verhandlungen im Voraus.
unter einer Zeitfrist von 30 Tagen. - Was
hierbei mit dem als zugewiesene des gewöhnlichen
Niederlande die Bewegung aus der besten

Het is niet een wonder, dat vijf vliegen van hetzelfde vleugelkleur de Dullekarsen zette en dat hijzelf ook een vlieg van hetzelfde vleugelkleur zette.

terker raaisle van sijn tot dat in haren te
niet verdrillen haren het was de gescheiden
van Peiderover van in verdrillen. Want, be-
willig van van Peiderover en gescheiden sijn te haren
verdrillen, dat om de 12. van 12. haren

voor het Ministerie der Financiën, ook in Nederland.

~~SECRET~~

100

1000



Apporté au Peuple Belge par l'Action des Stations Unies

Attaqués de Partout

Cor Aléxandru **1944** a peu manquer de trouver que si le nombre de prisonniers allemands n'est pas exagérément élevé en Roumie, en Italie ou en Normandie en considérant le total des prisonniers faits sur ces trois fronts, il n'en est pas moins vrai que les nazis ont tué d'un quart de million. C'est presque autant que durant les trois derniers mois de 1918.



schier in mynne bykommene dechende ut burren, te nide, Drieste haffwate kinnen ons toe bykommende oest omen
Nietwende. Vocht niet plots en oetien. van nachtbombardement, verhoed + v. 20 21-22.

RECEIVED
CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

4017

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Leaflet

DATE 31 July 1944

Number each sheet or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	FM Div SHAFF	Chief of Staff, SHAFF	31 July 1944	1. Forwarded as a matter of interest. <i>not needed</i> <div data-bbox="962 860 1356 960" data-label="Text"> <p><i>Robert A. McClure</i> ROBERT A. MCCLURE, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.</p> </div>
1 Incl:	Translation of Leaflets XO 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.			<div data-bbox="829 985 1372 1456" data-label="Text"> <p><i>Handwritten notes and signatures in the bottom right section of the table.</i></p> </div>

304

FORM 400 FORM No. 1 (REVISED 10-1-44)

CLASSIFICATION

16 P. 0. 13 525 2-44/1944-5225

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

SGS DISTRIBUTION

Col. Trimble *34*
Exec Control O
Ops Group
Admin Group
Misc Group
SMC
Stats Sec.
Hist Sec.

0 0 2519555 JULY

SHAEP 124/26
FOR 260705 JULY
Vls - 260740 JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

SGS-SHAEP File No. 091411

FROM : PWD AFHQ SIGNED WILSON
TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
SHERWOOD CMI TO USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF AND LONDON COORDINATORS TO SHAEP
FOR FWD
REF NO : FX-75307 25 JULY 1944 CITE: FWDFO

REF 754.

Highlights FWD Directive week beginning
July 24: Crisis within GERMANY. We place utmost
emphasis on need exploit this in all MEDIA and to all
targets particularly German Troops and satellites.
For treatment we adopt CMI cables of July 21 and 22.

On other issues general line of directive
week beginning July 17 is reaffirmed.

ACTION : FWD
INFORMATION : SGS1 MR PEAK AG RECORDS
G-2 AMB PHILLIPS
G-3 PRD
G-5 SHA F FWD
EACS SUMMARY

6 305

SMC IN 9377 26 JULY 44 0815E VAN/daw REP NO: FX-75307

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 33

UNCLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MESSAGE IN FOREIGN DISSEM

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

PWE/115/1/2

26 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 16

251500 July to 261500 July

1. LEAFLETS

No leaflets dropped due to bad weather conditions.

2. P.200 a.

On July 23, for the first time since the war began, the BBC brought German PW a V - Officers and GPs - to the microphone to broadcast to Germany.

b. BBC and ABESE have broadcast the Supreme Commander's statement concerning treatment of P.P.W. by the Germans.

c. A more powerful transmitter will shortly be installed at Cherbourg to take the place of the mobile transmitter now operating there.

H.D. KENN
Colonel, P.W.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S

SGS

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-5 War Room

C-4

C-5

AG

AVCOP

AGAF

Political OCF (IS)

Political OCF (PR)

PRD

TRMS

SIGNAL

PWD (Main)

SGS - SHAEF File No. 011412

RESTRICTED

ENTREPRENEURIAL
ALLIED INFORMATION FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Pawar)

1702/113/2/1

25 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 15

241500 July to 251500 July

1. ITEMS

a. Dropped in combat areas night 24/25 July (Preliminary)

Item	Area	Quantity
German Troop Newspaper	Barleux-Argentan	100,000
German Troop Newspaper	Villers Bouvry-Colingua	50,000
German Troop Newspaper	Throum-Argentan	40,000
Revolt of German Generals (20-35)	Barleux-Argentan	360,000
Revolt of German Generals (20-35)	Throum-Argentan	180,000
News of Attempt on Hitler's Life (20-34)	Barleux	160,000
News of Attempt on Hitler's Life (20-34)	Villers Bouvry-Colingua	400,000

b. In other Areas.

French Newspaper (X-15)	Palaise-Argentan	
	Alencon-Le Mans	
	Elbeuf-Evreux	
	Dracy-Chartres	250,000
Statement by General Eisenhower on treatment of P.R.I. (20-9)	Palaise-Argentan	
	Alencon-Le Mans	
	Elbeuf-Evreux	
	Dracy-Chartres	800,000

H.D. 1000
Colonel P.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S	C-3 War Room	ABW
SCS	C-4	Political OMT (US)
C-1	C-5	Political OMT (HR)
C-2	AG	HR
C-3	ANCM	SCS
		Signal
		HR (Main)

6 307

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U.S. SHAEF File No. 191.417

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

PWD/110/4/2

24 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 11.

231500 July to 241500 July

1. INCIDENTS

- a. Correction on report of 22 July.

Total distribution of German Troop Newspaper reporting the attack on Hitler was 758,000 instead of 650,000.

- b. Dropped in combat area night 23/24 July (Preliminary)

Item	ACOM	Quantity
German Troop Newspaper	Greenwood to St Lo.	82,400
German Troop Newspaper	Trouen-Burau	13,200
German Troop Newspaper	Bully-Spiny-Courmont	51,500
The Attack on Hitler (20-34)@		
and Revolt of German Generals (20-35)	Greenwood to St Lo	960,000
The Attack on Hitler	Trouen-Burau	430,000
The Attack on Hitler and		
Revolt by German Generals	Bully-Spiny-Courmont	1,040,000

- c. Dropped in other areas night 23/24 July

French Booklet	Rouen-Dieppe	250,000
----------------	--------------	---------

- d. Dropped in interior of Europe 13 July to 21 July (Preliminary)

(1) Germany

New Periodicals	1,010,000
War Child Booklet	11,000
Leaflets on special subjects	6,115,000

(2) Holland

New Periodicals	200,000
-----------------	---------

(3) France

New and picture periodicals	3,578,000
French Manual	18,000
RED Song Book	16,000

- Copy for War Room enclosed.

H.D. KEITH
Colonel P.A.

DISTRIBUTION

C-3	C-3 War Room	ASAP
363	C-4	Political OAT (18)
C-1	C-5	Political (18)
C-2	AS	PD
C-3	ANEXE	ECAS
		Signal
	308	PD (Main)

SGS-SHAEF File No. 691412

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

100/201/4/2

23 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 13

221000 July to 231500 July

1. LEADERS

a. Dropped in combat area night 22/23 July (Preliminary)

German Troop Newspaper	In Front & Rear Blank	103,000
German Troop Newspaper	2nd US Army	
News of Attack on Italian	In Front 1st US Army	103,000
Life (20-34)		2,400,000

b. In other Areas

Belgian Newspaper	Brussels-Elzev (XB 22)	200,000
-------------------	------------------------	---------

M.D. 1000
Colonel J.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-5	G-5 War Room	MAAF
SGS	G-4	Political OFF (IS)
G-1	G-5	Political OFF (IS)
G-2	AG	PSI
G-3	ANEX	WCS
		Signal
		PD (Maine)

SGS - SHAEF File No. 091.412

b 309

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8/7/44
Col. Harris

RESTRICTED

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

FWP/102/5/2

22 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 12

211500 July to 221500 July

1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat areas night 21/22 July (Preliminary)

Item	Area	Copies
German Troop Newspaper	Left Flank 2nd Army	51,500
German Troop Newspaper	Right Front 1st Army	206,000
German Troop Newspaper	Villers - Roer Area	103,000
Appeals to Foreigners in Army (20-27)	Left Flank 2nd Army	400,000
(20-10)		
(10-23)	Ordnance Area	400,000
OF ATTACK ON HITLER	(20-34)	

b. In other Areas

German Troop Newspaper	Calais Area	30,900
German Troop Newspaper	Brussels - Dunder	103,000
German Troop Newspaper	Nantes-Orleans-Orleans	103,000
German Troop Newspaper	Amiens-Paris	51,500

2. GERMAN PROPAGANDA

The main themes of current German Military propaganda are:-

- The West is the most important front strategically.
- The Allies have been disappointed there because:-
 - The Germans prevented a break-through on the British front and,
 - Progress on the American front is slow.
- The effectiveness of our new submarine has been emphasized. Less reference is being made to the flying-boat in home broadcasts than in those beamed abroad.
- The attack on Hitler's position had very minor support including only 2 General Officers. General Beck is the only one named so far.

H. J. KEM
Colonel F.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

100	G-3 War Room	AEAF
100	G-4	Political OAT (JF)
100	G-5	Political OAT (IR)
100	AG	ISD
100	AFCEP	ISD
		ISD (Gen)

b 310

SCS-SHAFF File No. 571/101

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

FWP/100/3/1

21 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 11

221500 July to 221500 July

1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat area night 20/21 July (Preliminary).

Item	Area	Copies
German Troop Newspaper @	Night: Front of 2nd Br Army	103,000
German Troop Newspaper	In Front of 1st US Army	103,000
Battle of the Bulge (ZG-30)@	In Front of 1st Army	400,000
Surrender Suggestion (ZG-23)	In Front of 1st US Army	800,000

b. In other areas


French Newspaper	West of St Malo, Brittany	200,000
------------------	---------------------------	---------

c. Copies attached for insertion in War Room File
Included also are copies of ZP-8 and ZP-9.

H. D. R. L.
H. D. R. L.
Colonel F. A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S	C-3 War Room	AREP
SGS	C-4	Political Off (US)
C-1	C-5	Political Off (BR)
C-2	AG	PRD
C-3	ANCKP	FRCS
		Signal
		IWD (Hain)



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SS - SHAF File No. 04/102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAFF HEADQUARTERS
ARMED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

PWT/99/2/1

20 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO 10
201500 July to 201500 July

1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat area night 19/20 July (Preliminary)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Copies</u>
German Troop Newspaper	In Front 2nd Dr Army	103,000
German Troop Newspaper	In Front 1st U.S. Army	103,000
Russian Threat to Germany (ZG-30)	In Front 1st U.S. Army	400,000
Surrender (ZG-23)	In Front 1st U.S. Army	400,000
Just Treatment of Prisoners (ZG-7)	In Front 1st U.S. Army	400,000

b. In other areas

Closing Frontiers (ZG-22)	Ostend-Flotport.	800,000
---------------------------	------------------	---------

14. 17. 1944
H.D. KERR
Colonel P.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S	C-3 War Room	AREAF
SGS	C-4	Political Off (US)
C-1	C-5	Political Off (BR)
C-2	AG	IRD
C-3	AREAF	EMCS
		Signal
		PWD (MAIN)

6



SGS - SHAEF File No. 5412

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ARMED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

FWF/05/4/1

19 July 1944
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 0
181500 July to 191500 July

"NOTHING TO REPORT"

H. D. K. I.
H.D. FEH.
Colonel., P.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S	G-3 War Room	LEAP
SGS	G-4	Political Off (BR)
G-1	G-5	Political Off (US)
G-2	AG	PRD
G-3	ANEXE	ELCS
		Signal
		PWD Main

305-SHAEF File No. 591412

6 313

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SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD

FILED 180452Z JULY

SHAEF 142/18
TOR 181400 JULY
VIB - 181645 JULY

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : FMB AFHQ
TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
SHERWOOD ONI
FOR INFO : USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
LONDON COORDINATORS, SHAEF FOR PHD, AND
AFHQ ADV CP.
REF NO : FK - 73292 18 JULY 1944

REF 751

Highlights FMB Directive, week July 17.

1. General Approach: We adopt general tone
of FMB paras 1 and 11.

joint
2. Output to German Troops: We adopt
para 1 (a) adding joint 6.

3. Battle Fronts: We adopt joint

Para 1 (B), SHAEF line on NORMANDY,
adding instructions to stress EISENHOWER'S statement July
15 on FFI as integral part of AEW, and to report FFI
operations in conjunction with west front when possible. We
prepare for Russian entry on German soil. We show our
advance in ITALY pegging down and draining German resources.
We uncommit GOTH line with HITLER GUSTAV Lines and uncommit
ALEXANDER to rapid breakthrough. We commit GERMANY to necessity
holding their entire line. We treat fighting in BALKANS as
regular war front. We adopt ONI on Far East, stressing need

SMC IN 8019

2 244

SECRET

COPY NO.

SGS SHAEF File No. 001411-1

SECRET

REF NO: EX - 73291 18 JULY 1944 SHAW 142/18

For full reporting this Theater.

4. BALKAN Allies: We stress need unity and action in BALKAN countries, but avoid administering them, using rather distant and recent accomplishments BALKANS to stimulate their pride.

5. Flying Bomb: We adopt joint

6. FRANCE: We adopt joint 2, 3, 5 PWE control 15, 16, adding full publicity must be given unimpaired condemnation atrocities.

7. Occupied ITALY: We follow same general line as for FRANCE.

8. Concerning our unanswered request of 3 weeks ago for guidance on treatment mobilization and volunteering in liberated FRANCE by Frenchmen to help fight against GERMANY: We adopt and recommend for general use, treatment laid down by PCHL Directive: Do not mention mobilization measures in liberated zone which might decide Germans to strip regions near front of all young men.

ACTION : PWD

INFORMATION : DGC
G-3
G-5
G-2
MACS
MR. PEAKE

AM . PHILLIPS
PR
SH EF PWD
SU MARY
AG RECORDS



EX-73291 18 JULY 1944 10258 DMC/jdr REF NO: EX 73291

RESTRICTED
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

17 July, 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 7

161500 July to 171500 July

1. LEAFLETS.

a. Dropped in combat areas night 16/17 July (Preliminary)

Item.	Area.	Copies.
German Troop Newspaper	Entire Front	208,000
Surrender (28-28)	In front of 1st Army	400,000
Bluff or Feat (28-24)	In front of 1st Army	400,000

b. In other areas: night 16/17 July:

French Newspaper	South West of ST. MALO	400,000
The Closing Frontiers (28-12)	CALAIS Area	400,000

c. During June the following were dropped:

(1). Against the Germans:

Troop Newspaper	4,800,000
Tactical Leaflets	38,600,000
Strategic Leaflets	5,800,000
News Periodicals	2,400,000

This does not include leaflets fired from Artillery or disseminated by hand.

(2) In other languages:

Belgian	4,300,000
Danish	800,000
Dutch	2,900,000
French	27,500,000
French News	1,500,000
Norwegian	1,600,000

H. D. Kehm
H.D. KEHM,
Colonel, P.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o 5	C-5 War Room	AEAP
SGS	C-4	Political Off(US)
C-1	C-5	Political Off(ER)
C-2	AG	PRD
C-3	ANXIP	EACS
		Signal
		PWD (Main)

h 317

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705-SHAFF File No. 291-412

RESTRICTED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

16 July 1944

FW/71/6/1

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 1

151500 July to 161500 July.

"NOTHING TO REPORT"

H. D. K. L.
E. D. KEGG,
Colonel, P.A., '43

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3	✓	G-3 War Room	LEAF
SES		G-1	Political Off (US)
G-1		G-5	Political Off (BR)
G-2		AS	PRD
G-3		ANONF	EACS
			Signal
			PRD (Main)

RESTRICTED

6 318

JCS-SHAFF File No. 297.412

Print 100/6/45

X 000.74

141500 JULY to 151500 JULY

a. Dropped in combat area 12/16 July (Prohibited)

SGS-SIAEF File No. 891-472

(1) July 11 and 11/12 (Preliminary)

(2) July 14/15

2. RADIO

3. MISCELLANEOUS

- b. Interrogation of 370 prisoners taken at GIERBOURG reveals that:

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

7-1 @ Condensed
RMB
my wife
Date: E6 AUG 1945

H.D. KREM
Colonel F.S.

Political Org (Br)
Political (JB)
1941
S. 100

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JOJD

FILED 151803E

SHAEP 259/10
TOR 152338E JULY
njb 160005 JULY

X091 BULGARIA

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED WILSON.
TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CMI.
FOR INFO : DIMPOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, PWB AND CMI
SHAEP, AFHQ ADV OP.
REF NO : FX 72544 15 JULY 1944. CITE: PFWO

MAP 742

Theatre policy is to create maximum commitment
for Germans in BULGARIA forcing them if possible to occupy
country.

To this end PWB cooperating in major subversive
effort towards BULGARIA with object creating state of affairs
where which might force GERMANY to take action desired.
Action includes fostering popular opposition including
organized resistance with aim of ultimate revolution. Special
attention will be paid to troops in occupied zones with object
fostering trouble and encouraging withdrawal. You will
doubtless wish to insure that directives generally take above
into consideration.

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-3
G-2
SHAEP FWD
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 7556 16 July 44 0043B VAN/dos REF NO: FI-72544

SECRET

6 32E

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SGS-SHAEP File NO. 091/412

RESTRICTED

B

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

FW/63/9/12

14 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. ■

131500 July ■ ■ July.

"NOTHING ■ REPORT"

H. D. Kelm,
H.D. Kelm,
Colonel. P.A.

DISTRIBUTION:

C o S	G-3 War Room	AEPF
SGS	G-4	Political Off (US)
G-1	G-5	Political Off (BR)
G-2	AG	PTD
G-3	ANGCP	EACS
		Signal

6 221

RESTRICTED

SGS-SHAFF File No. 63/4/2

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
 ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
 Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

31 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT 181500 TO 211500 JULY

1. LEAFLETS dropped in combat area July 10/11 (preliminary)

Item	Area	Copies
German troop newspaper (Incl. 1)	Right front of 2nd Army	255,000
German Defeats Cherbourg/Russia	Same	165,000
Z-26 (No sample available)	South of beach	400,000
German Troop Newspaper	Front of 2nd Army	31,000
French News Folder	Behind front lines	Unreported

2. PRESS

a. Reported that French will be asked to provide editorial staff for all newspapers in the Cherbourg-Cotentin area. News service, censorship and operational guidance are to be provided. Allied editing authorities. Planning is in cooperation with General Keenly's PAF (press, radio, cinema) section.

b. EAPF newspaper will be published effective 31 July under same conditions as REFLEX and DEFENSE papers. (Incl. 2)

3. RADIO

Mobile broadcasting station operational at CHERBOURG.

RECEIVED

Handwritten signature
 MAY 1945

H. D. KEEM
 Colonel, P.A.

2 Incls:

1. Sample of German Troop Newspaper
2. Sample of French Newspaper

Handwritten: 6-3 War Room
 copy only.

DISTRIBUTION:

C of S	G-3 War Room	HEAD
SOS	G-1	Political Off (US)
G-1	G-1	Political Off (FR)
G-2	AG	PRD
G-3	ANEX	EACS
		Signal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

505-SHAFF File No. 1944/12

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

CONFIDENTIAL

PW/58/5/16
12 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 2

11 1300 to 12 1200 JULY


1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat area night 11/12 July (preliminary)

Item	Location	Copies
Pair, Government for Prisoners (2G 20)	In front of 1st Army	680,000
Appeal to Foreigners (2G 13)	In front of 1st Army	300,000
Safe Conduct (2G 21)	Same	460,000
German Defenses (2G 24)	Same	160,000
Appeal to Transport Workers (2G-7)	German Rear Area	(?)
Appeal to Belgian Workers (2B-1, Y)	Belgium	(?)

b. Dropped in interior from 1 July to 10 July.

(1) France:		
French Manual		5,000,000
News Periodicals		3,000,000
Our Air Force		1,900,000
War in the Air		1,800,000
BBC Song Book		300,000
(2) Holland:		
News Periodicals		1,500,000
(3) Belgium:		
News Periodicals		3,000,000



2. 1st Army fired 400 artillery leaflets shells (300,000 leaflets) in period ending 2 July 1944.

* Copy enclosed for War Room.

DISTRIBUTION:

C of M	G-3 War Room	AEAF
SCS	G-4	Political Off (US)
G-7	G-5	Political Off (FR)
G-2	AG	PRD
G-3	INOCF	KACS
b	20	24-0000

E.D. KENN
Colonel F.A.

SGS-SHAFF File No. 091412

SECRET

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74/57/3/5

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED RECONSTRUCTION FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

13 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 3
12 1500 to 13 1800 JULY.

67/417

1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat area night 12/13 July (preliminary)

Item	Area	Copies
German Troop Newspaper	In front of 1st Army	150,000
Surrender Leaflet (2G,23)	In front of 1st Army	1,600,000
Propaganda vs East (2G,13)	In front of 1st Army	275,000
Safe Conduct (2G,21)	In front of 1st Army	125,000
German Troop Newspaper	In front of 2nd Army	105,000

b. Dropped in interior 4 July to 10 July (in addition to Para. 1.b of 12 July Report)

(1) Germany

News sheets 5,100,000


(2) Holland

News periodicals 750,000

(3) France

Our Air Forces 640,000
News sheets 2,625,000

Half of these were dropped in areas just behind the German lines



2. INTERROGATION RESULTS.

a summary of results of interrogation of several hundred prisoners captured on the Cherbourg Peninsula 25 to 28 June, reports the following:

a. Between 65 and 70% feel that Germany has lost the War. The most common reasons given are:

- (1) War on 3 Fronts.
- (2) Material superiority of the Allies.
- (3) Germans are tired - U.S. has vast fresh forces.

b. The morale value of the secret weapon (V.1.) is low. The reasons given are:

- (1) It has shown no military effect.
- (2) Cannot be produced in sufficient quantity.
- (3) Secret weapons have not prevented bombing of Germany.

c. Over 50% had seen Allied leaflets.

DISTRIBUTION:

5-1	G-3 War Room	ASAF
5-2	G-4	Political Off (BR)
5-3	G-5	Political Off (LB)
5-4	AG	FM
5-5	AFMCP	EnCS
		Signal

H.D. KEMM.
Colonel, P.A.

SGS - SHAEF File No. 094, 412

R

Figure 1

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7/15/3/6

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCISE FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

13 July 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REPORT NO. 5

12 1500 to 13 1300 JEX.

1. LEAFLETS

a. Dropped in combat area night 12/13 July (preliminary)

Item	Area	Copies
German Troop Newspaper	In front of 1st Army	150,000
Surrender Leaflet (20.23)	In front of 1st Army	1,600,000
Propaganda vs Fact (20.13)	In front of 1st Army	275,000
Safe Conduct (20.21)	In front of 1st Army	125,000
German Troop Newspaper	In front of 2nd Army	125,000

b. Dropped in interior 4 July to 10 July (in addition to Para. 1.b of 12 July Report)

(1) Germany

News sheets

3,100,000

(2) Holland

News periodicals

700,000

(3) France

Our Air Forces

850,000

News sheets

2,325,000

Half of these were dropped in areas just behind the German lines

2. INTERROGATION RESULTS.

A summary of results of interrogation of several hundred prisoners captured on the Cherbourg Peninsula 25 to 26 June, reports the following:

a. Between 85 and 90% feel that Germany has lost the War.
The most common reasons given are:

- (1) War on 3 fronts.
- (2) Material superiority of the Allies.
- (3) Germans are tired - U.S. has vast fresh forces.

b. The morale value of the secret weapon (V.1.) is low.
The reasons given are:

- (1) It has shown no military effect.
- (2) Cannot be produced in sufficient quantity.
- (3) Secret weapons have not prevented bombing of Germany.

c. Over 50% had seen Allied I.C.F.s.

RESTRICTION:

G-3 War Room
G-4
G-5
AG
ARCAF

ARAF
Political Off (38)
Political Off (35)
SAC
SACS
Signal

H.D. REHE.
Colonel, P.A.

SGS-SHAFF File N 091-412

~~SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Major-General K.W.D. STRONG

K. W. D. STRONG
3334
2015 K. 74
MME

384.1

8 July 1944

R
SCS
H

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Operations by Amphibious Unit against Cherbourg Garrison.

With reference to your note on the attached document, I do not think that there is anything abnormal in this incident. The German officer is jealous of his "military honor" and feels that if he surrenders he should be given a good excuse to do so, e.g. phosphorous grenades---to which he has no answer, or a Sherman tank to which he equally has no answer. If after the war there should be any inquiry into his conduct he will then be able to show that his position at the time of surrender was untenable.

File
MMS
JW

K. W. D. STRONG
Major General
A C of S, G-2

Ext. 56

3 Incl.

- Incl 1 - Report of operations
- Incl 2 - Route slip fr Brig. Gen. McClure
- Incl 3 - Note fr Chief of Staff to Gen. STRONG

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
RESTRICTED
RWS
mju

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SCS-SHAFT File No. 2286/3
091414

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(CLASSIFIED)

In your reply please quote
COORDINATING ROUTE **412**
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

14/1825/24-1

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Operations by Amplifier Unit against Cherbourg Garrison 3 July 1944

Shopper each or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long messages.

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	PWD SHAFF	Secretary Gen.Staff	3 July 1944	<p>1. I believe the Chief of Staff will be interested in seeing this report.</p> <p><i>R.A.M.</i> ROBERT A. MACLURE, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.</p> <p><i>See report 29/6/44 the file</i></p> <p><i>B</i></p>
6			228	

CLASSIFICATION-CHANGED
To: *Secret*
By: *RMG*
Date: *29/6/44*

SECRET

SHAFF AGO FORM No. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Revised 1 Feb. 1943

CLASSIFICATION

AR 7-50 505 2-11/10/1-11/22

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEP PNC/1164

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR MCCRYSTAL-TYLER
FROM : SHAEP FROM MCCLURE SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-55227 SITE: SHPND

Sending in separate telegram text which to would
like translated and matted in TARTAR (in Latin characters),
GEORGIAN and AZERBAIJANI.

Please send these on for matting in CAIRO. This
supersedes text furnished previously. If mats of other text
already made please make new mats for this text.

ATTENTION IS INVITED TO SMC OUT 1699 9/7/44 PND

ORIGINATOR : PND

AUTHORITY (ACTION): H. H. JOHNSON,
IA. CO.

INFORMATION: SGS
(R-2)
SHAEP PND
AG RECORDS

SGS - SHAEP File No. 691215

SMC OUT 1698

9 JULY 1944

00000

302/10

NOTED: 10/10/44
YOU: 10/10/44

b

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO

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SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AMHQ TO WILSON FOR WOLYKSTAL BARRER
 FROM : SHAF FROM MCCLURE WOODWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER
 REF NO : S-55135 QTYR: SHPMD

Week ending 12 July, this is Directive No. 4.

WIRKHAUT.

Main task this week while CAEN battle continues is bring to peak attitudes in German soldiers and officers to produce mass surrenders. Targets: Troops in CAEN area and troops below COTENTIN Peninsula.

GUIDANCE-GENERAL.

Use LINSK downfall show way is open for double Soviet attack across POLAND to GERMANY. One development possible directed at BREST-LITOVSK, in which case it would serve as right arm of pincer in conjunction with new attack from south, or alternatively it might be aimed for KOENIGSBERG and would effectively offset Germans in Baltic States. Upmark the daily diminishing distance Russians from traditional Reich frontiers.

Upbuild significance CAEN battle as decisive importance in destruction Wehrmacht.

Maintain in commentary and news threat to PAS DE CALAIS.

Keep BRADLEY's attack in news capitalizing the progress but refraining from speculation regarding future developments.

Keep CHERBOURG in news stressing potential value noting American expert Commodore SULLIVAN and restored Italian ports already at work.

Make clear we have complete tactical initiative which among other things responsible for DOK's wastefulness of tanks and also piecemeal attacks dictated by our initiative resulting in great loss.

Continue appeals transport workers sabotage of rail and road communications. Far as possible, specific operations should be mentioned in leaflets.

Uplink battle our air attacks oil plants throughout EUROPE.

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213

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SGS-SHAEF File No. 097.410

22

SECRET

-2-

Ref No: S-55135

6 July 1944

(Continued)

Cross report widely and constantly phase in PID/OWI propaganda to foreign workers in GERMANY.

GUIDANCE FOR POTENTIAL PRISONERS.

Report constantly cumulative daily totals prisoners captured each of the 3 fronts, east, west, ITALY. From 11 May to 3 July total almost 150,000. Basic theme: GERMANS being captured at higher rate than average last 100 days of 1918.

Encourage teen age recruits turn to older enlisted men for advice and example.

Outpoint realism which led many senior officers to bow to superior force. Our propaganda should enable GERMAN troops rationalize their capture in terms of our overwhelming forces.

Outpoint primarily the junior officers with their arrogance and inexperience are insisting on futile suicidal resistance.

Use constantly such material as leaflet "Propaganda and Wirklichkeit" to contrast propaganda boasts with Military failures.

Outpoint inadequacy Luftwaffe in battle area.

Constantly emphasize strength our fire power, naval, land, air, citing VON SCHLIMBENS statement.

Report all evidence qualitative deficiencies in weapons munitions and quantitative deficiencies in weapons munitions and manpower. OKW explains these qualitative deficiencies due to:

- A. Rapid expansion output by mass production methods coincidentally widespread use of substitute materials.
- B. Introduction new types ammunition without adequate tests in field.
- C. Transfer manufacturing facilities to area.
- D. Lack of skilled workmen.

Interlink constantly 3 fronts exemplifying relative prisoner figures.

Roundups of battles European resistance front should be given constantly to WEHRMACHT reporting 3 fronts in GERMANY. On lines appeal to AUSTRIANS recalling MOSCOW declaration.

SAC OUT 1598

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SECRET SHAEF

Ref No: S-55135

6 July 1944
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

(Continued)

Indicate conflict in GERMANY leadership has been determined on GENTENDAMMERHORN and socialist realists who desire save remaining GERMAN Army for next war. Make it unequivocally clear we have no use either school.

Occupied Europe.

GUIDANCE.

Make further appeals organized resistance and transport workers to continue sabotage communications. Report good work French troops in ITALY. Special guidance will be issued on treatment forthcoming SHAEF declaration on shooting of FFI Prisoners by GERMANS.

Liberated FRANCE.

GUIDANCE

Report success ANGLO-FRENCH discussions also DE GAULLE's visit WASHINGTON. Express appreciation good work done by French local government authorities. Far as possible stick to news items, particularly about FRANCE and minimize editorials features etcetera. Unrefer planning, policies or missions of the fiscal, legal or Public Health branches of SHAEF, G-5. Specific instructions will be issued by these in due time. Our guidance displaced persons and refugees to stayput continue.

Propaganda treatment regarding UNRRA being air pouched.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: HOWARD B. JORDAN,
LT. COLONEL

INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
SHAEF FWD
AG RECORDS

SAC OUT 1598 6 July 44 23200 Jom/cob

REF NO: S-55135
TOO: 061645B

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COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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- 2 -

3. Operation 27th June.

At the request of Commanding General, 9th Division, No. 13 A.U. entered Cherbourg at 0700 hrs the following morning to operate against defences still holding out. Here the position was as follows:

Approximately 600 men, consisting of the garrison of Cherbourg Arsenal, and commanded by a General, were holding out in the arsenal itself, the most strongly fortified position in the port. The main body were below ground in subterranean positions which went down to a depth of 80 ft. They had been attacked for three days, and although they knew that General von Schlieben, the commander of the German forces in Cherbourg, and Admiral Hennecke commanding the naval forces, had surrendered the previous day, they would not give in. Although the position was hopeless for them, they had plenty of food and ammunition, and it was thought that they could hold out in this position for a considerable time, although bombed incessantly.

The van was brought into position about 500 yards from the arsenal wall and a speech to the garrison troops was then delivered by Sgt Conrad, in German, and by Mr. Kaver, in Polish, on the following lines:

'This is an appeal by the American General commanding the U.S. troops for honourable surrender. General von Schlieben and Admiral Hennecke and their staffs, together with 10,000 men gave up yesterday. Your position is just as hopeless. You have fought bravely and distinguished yourselves. You have done honour to your country. But further resistance means that you will sacrifice your lives in vain. If you come over to us you will be treated honourably as P.O.W.s, you will have good food and treatment, you will be cared for in our hospitals and you will have mail from home. You have ten minutes to make up your minds. It is now 8 minutes past 9. If by 12 minutes past 9 an officer of your unit, carrying a white flag does not appear, you will be reduced to dust by our artillery, which is awaiting our orders. This is your last chance to save your lives with honour.'

At 0910 hrs several white flags were seen flying from the arsenal. The German officer who came to negotiate said that the men would come out immediately, but the General himself would not officially surrender unless he were shown a tank. A Sherman tank was then brought to the arsenal walls, and the General then considered that he had been subjected to a tank-attack and could surrender honourably.

Among the prisoners taken on this occasion were several Russian civilians, who were so overcome with emotion at their liberation that they insisted on kissing personnel of the Amphibious Unit.

An interesting sidelight on this operation is that prisoners and officers captured on 26th June said that although most of Cherbourg had fallen, the troops in the arsenal would never give up, as their position was absolutely impregnable.

Sgt GORDON SHEPHERD
Major, G.S.

c/c 2nd Army HQ, C.A.
27th June

DISTRIBUTION: C/S
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4

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SECRET

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ARMY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION.

File
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DIRECTIVE NO. 2.

(Week beginning Thursday, 29th June, 1944)

NOTE: THIS DIRECTIVE IS PERSONAL TO THE INDIVIDUAL WHOSE NUMBER IT BEARS AND HE OR SHE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SAFE CUSTODY. IT MUST NOT BE SHOWN TO ANYONE ELSE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE SECURITY OFFICER.

x none

I. THE WEEK AHEAD.

1. The preconditions of final victory are now in conjunction:

- i. Cherbourg is ours, and our lodgement in the West is secure;
- ii. The Russian offensive is irresistibly under way;
- iii. The advance in Italy continues.

2. We must attain our output in this period of great achievement. The time for argument whether Germany has lost the war is finally over. Those arguments belong to the routine of a long war. They do not belong to the dynamic period in which we now are.

3. At the same time, the signal for the final psychological warfare assault which will accompany the final battle is still to come. It will be timed, in conjunction with our Allies, for the psychological moment.

4. Until the battle round Caen is fully joined we must not expect spectacular developments to follow the fall of Cherbourg. We must, however, continue to build up the significance of Cherbourg both in terms of its importance as a port and as a measure of German defeat.

5. Meanwhile we can rely on the Russians to exploit the smashing of the German defence line by further rapid gains of ground, but we must not count them to any objective beyond Minsk.

6. In Italy the Germans continue to squander troops in an attempt to gain time for the consolidation of the Pisa-Rimini line. We must not, however, anticipate an early attack on this line since Alexander will need time to build up his next offensive.

II. OUR TASKS THIS WEEK.

7. The Russian advance will give us a unique opportunity to demonstrate the bankruptcy of German strategy which claimed that having defeated the invasion in the West the GERM would have time to deal with the Russians in the East. In fact, by turning vital armoured divisions westwards they have virtually stripped their armies between the Baltic and the Pripyet Marshes of armour. This opportunity should also be used for positive development, i.e. in terms of superiority of U.S. planning and leadership.

8. The Two Front War. Especially in German output we must put these facts in the German framework of the two front war - the Western and the Eastern Fronts. These are the only two fronts in Europe on either of which the Germans expect to be decisively defeated. For this reason the German dread was always of being forced into a position where they must mount simultaneous major offensives on the Western and Eastern fronts, which they feared would strip them of vital reserves in other theatres. What they feared was that they would be forced to fight a two-front war in the fifth year of war, major offensives on the Iron East and West which they never had to face at the peak of their power in the last war.

CLASSIFIED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By *R. M. [illegible]*
Date *2/1/45*

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Indexed

SGS-SHAFF File No. 091.412

9. We can, in exploiting this two front factor which Nazi indoctrination has increased in recent years, relate it to the long-standing German fear of encirclement. We can relate only:

- i. that the traditional two fronts are established in conjunction with other vast operations, e.g., Italy, the Air War, and internal resistance, which will help to force a final decision.
- ii. the offensive aims of East and West are making encirclement a policy of fact, and not merely the political abstruse theory of Nazi propaganda.
- iii. The major offensives from East and West are being undertaken simultaneously without any lessening of effort in other active, or potentially active, theatres. Moreover, the U.S. have shown that they are capable of launching a two front major offensive, not only in Europe, but also in the Far East.

10. Resistance. Build up the appointment of Koenig by the SAC with the approval of the French Authorities as C-in-C of the FFI. The emphasis should be on his function and appointment and not on his name and personality.

11. Last Man Order. Use stories from Cherbourg to emphasize once again the refusal of Germans, including Germans, to obey Hitler's orders to fight to the last man. Do not dispute cowardice. Leave the facts to speak for themselves. This applies to all languages.

III. MONTGOMERY.

12. Normandy. The first two phases of the battle for the West - the breaching of the Atlantic Wall and the capture of the port - are now complete. We should expect an interval, though it may be marked by hard fighting, in which Montgomery builds up for his third phase - the offensive against the main German armored forces in the West.

13. Deal with Cherbourg and Lilla in terms of the rapid restoration of such ports as Tripoli and Naples.

14. Build up the coming battle by stressing the German commitment of elite troops, especially armor, against Montgomery's left flank.

15. We must continue in our propaganda to keep the Germans guessing both as future landings in the Pas de Calais, Brittany, Belgium, and Norway, and as tactical developments from the lodgment area.

16. Italy. Do not commit Alexander to an immediate assault on the Pisa-Rimini line.

17. Resume the achievements of the campaign so far, showing how whole areas (including the city of Rome) have been liberated intact.

18. Stress particularly the substantial military contributions of the Italian Forces of Liberation.

19. Russia. Stress the usual failure of German intelligence in anticipating the weight of the Russian offensive in White Russia. Point out, however, that they have every reason to expect a further offensive in the south.

20. Sea War. The failure of Germany against the two great sea powers can be tied to the statement expected from the Admiralty on the failure of the U-boats to affect the campaign in Normandy. We should use this

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-3-

as a peg to point out German failure throughout the war. It failed to achieve any of the following objectives; (a) starvation blockade of Great Britain; (b) severing German's transatlantic communications; (c) preventing American aid from reaching Germany; (d) deterring the United States from intervening in the European war; (e) interrupting the Arctic convoys to Russia; (f) preventing Britain being built up as an Allied air, naval, and military striking base for operations against the Continent; (g) hamstringing the Eighth Army's campaign in North Africa; (h) preventing the building up of huge Allied shipping reserves; (i) preventing the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa; (j) preventing the Anglo-American invasions of Sicily and Italy; (k) preventing the Anglo-American invasion of Normandy; (l) attacking the Allied supply corridor across the Channel.

21. Air War. We should credit the Luftwaffe to an early and all-out intervention in the Normandy battle by assuming that it must come in and fight rather than remain uselessly in the background in this, the most critical stage of the war.

22. Point out to the peoples of the Western Occupied Territories that the bombing attacks which they have been called upon to endure on railway centres, bridges, etc., in their neighbourhood have greatly contributed to the success of the operations in Normandy.

23. Flying Bomb. Stress the complete irrelevance of the flying bomb in the military picture of the war.

24. Point out that while the German soldiers were left without adequate air cover, and were supplied with pre-war model French tanks, manpower and materials were being squandered on this weapon which is militarily useless.

IV. THE MAIN ENEMY.

25. The lessons of the surrenders of the troops at Cherbourg and Vitebsk must be constantly emphasised.

26. Link Schlieffen with Paulus and Arnim. Show that the generals, like the soldiers, are not prepared to accept death sentence by Hitler.

27. Stress that such orders, designed to involve the German soldiers in a series of Stalingrads, only to prolong Hitler's regime, are cynical in the light of the OKW's complete failure either to plan, or supply, relief.

28. Stress that with the final phase now irrevocably in process, such sacrifices are senseless, both for the individual and for Germany.

29. We must do everything to combat the German attempts to persuade the troops that surrender means death or torture.

30. Lay particular stress on overwhelming material superiority and firepower of the Allies in the battle zone.

31. Link this with the air attacks, and the effectiveness of resistance behind the combat zone, in the destruction of lines of communication and supply and show that no army, however resolute, can be expected to carry on without infantry reinforcements, munitions and artillery.

32. Demonstrate the futility of the Flying Bomb as a deterrent to the air assault on Germany, showing that we can bomb not "either/or", but both the German industrial centre and the combat zone.

33. To the German home front, stress the relation between captured and killed, pointing out that even on the Eastern Front the proportion of prisoners is increasing.

V. WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.

Resistance.

34. Continue to build up the impressive picture of organized and disciplined action by resistance.
35. Follow Eisenhower's admonition, and reiterate how by adherence to instructions all sections have helped military operations, i.e. the population avoided a loss on mass, leaving effective action to the trained cadres of resistance, to the transport workers and to the forces of the Maquis.
36. We must continue to discourage non-effectives from seeking refuge in the Maquis, where resources of food and equipment are severely taxed.
37. We must pay special attention and tribute to the remarkable and heroic contribution which Belgian resistance has made to the success of our armies in Normandy.
38. Discourage "careless talk" about local acts of resistance.

Transport.

39. Continue on lines of Annex A to Directive I.

Civil Affairs.

40. Point out, wherever possible, that people in the liberated territories are showing their willingness to play an active part in the defeat of the Nazis.
41. Civilian casualties in the liberation phase have been very much smaller than German propaganda claims. Any news illustrating this should be emphasized.
42. Repeat the instructions that refugees and displaced persons should stay put. Wherever possible, instructions should be originated or supplemented by the Allied Governments concerned.
43. Continue instructions to owners and workmen to protect local utility plants, industrial machinery and fire-fighting equipment.
44. Progress in Allied-French relations make it desirable to emphasize the true place of the Civil Affairs officer in the field:
- i. He is an integral part of the army;
 - ii. he is to function only as long as military needs require;
 - iii. he is on hand not to govern but to assist local authorities;
 - iv. he is not a relief agent but will relieve distress as he is able;
 - v. he does not attempt to settle French political issues.
45. Emphasize the friendly and full co-operation between the French authorities in the liberated territories and the Allied Army authorities.
46. Publicize the achievements of the local French authorities in liberated areas in terms of self-government, the maintenance of order, and the planning of food distribution. Liberated France is being administered by Frenchmen. (General Bradley's statement on Cherbourg should be kept to the fore.)

47. The damage to French homes and property has been considerable. We should not minimise the sufferings involved.

48. While difficult problems still remain to be solved, we should take every opportunity to show how, in practical working in Normandy and in the technical discussions on civil affairs between the British and French authorities, satisfactory results are being achieved.

49. It is essential that there be no manifestation or impression given in output of Anglo-American disagreement on French Affairs. Doubtful cases (e.g. parliamentary or press comment) should be referred.

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

A. TO OCCUPIED WESTERN TERRITORIES:

PERMEATION OF PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS
22/6/44 - 28/6/44

SECRET

CAPITAL	BY LETTER	NEWSPAPER	VOICE OF STATE	IN RADIO
1) Appeal to Organized Resistance & to private letters on masses.	1) 276,000 Membership 198,000 De Gaulle Statement	1) French Army of Ex- terior activities. Gen. Koenig release. Resistance & sabotage in Italy & Italians.	1) ---	2) 200 3) 200 4) Reporting on resistance & sabotage in France & Italy. Gen. Koenig release.
2) Appeal to Transport Workers & Doctors.	2) 1,600,000	2) ---	2) Appeal to look & R. & volunteer in Chetovoy to stay put. (213).	2) ---
3) General information to occupied countries	3) 1,050,000 "Avenir" en France (Fr.) 750,000 "Le Monde" (Belgian) 280,000 "Courrier de l'Est" (Fr.) 900,000 "Flying Dutchman" (Dutch)	3) ---	3) ---	3) Belgian Govt instructions to civilians in event of invasion.
4) OTHER.	4) ---	4) SHAME VOICE #12, 14, Surrender stories.	4) Request to German Govt Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway to remain in port June 28-29. (211)	4) 1) Republican convention key- note speech & foreign policy platform. 2) 2) 2000 3) 2000 4) 2000 5) 2000 6) 2000 7) 2000 8) 2000 9) 2000 10) 2000 11) 2000 12) 2000 13) 2000 14) 2000 15) 2000 16) 2000 17) 2000 18) 2000 19) 2000 20) 2000 21) 2000 22) 2000 23) 2000 24) 2000 25) 2000 26) 2000 27) 2000 28) 2000 29) 2000 30) 2000 31) 2000 32) 2000 33) 2000 34) 2000 35) 2000 36) 2000 37) 2000 38) 2000 39) 2000 40) 2000 41) 2000 42) 2000 43) 2000 44) 2000 45) 2000 46) 2000 47) 2000 48) 2000 49) 2000 50) 2000 51) 2000 52) 2000 53) 2000 54) 2000 55) 2000 56) 2000 57) 2000 58) 2000 59) 2000 60) 2000 61) 2000 62) 2000 63) 2000 64) 2000 65) 2000 66) 2000 67) 2000 68) 2000 69) 2000 70) 2000 71) 2000 72) 2000 73) 2000 74) 2000 75) 2000 76) 2000 77) 2000 78) 2000 79) 2000 80) 2000 81) 2000 82) 2000 83) 2000 84) 2000 85) 2000 86) 2000 87) 2000 88) 2000 89) 2000 90) 2000 91) 2000 92) 2000 93) 2000 94) 2000 95) 2000 96) 2000 97) 2000 98) 2000 99) 2000 100) 2000

CATEGORY	BY EXAMINER	BY RADIO - FBI ASIS
1) Overall	<p>1) 995,000 German newspaper 3,360,000 "Aktionen zwischen 1937-1945" 1,700,000 Polish Gov't, message 75,000 "Human Landings" (Polish) 1,440,000 "Who Killed Stalingrad?" + Red Cross files 700,000 "Paving" 960,000 "W American" 2,340,000 "Warfare"</p> <p>2) 4,000,000 "Sturmabteilung" 1,000,000 4-Point war</p> <p>3) 1,700,000 Polish Gov't message (above) 75,000 "Human Landings" Polish (above)</p>	<p>1, 2 & 3) 3-Point war in terms of triple victory: Germany, Poland, Russia</p> <p>German offensive in "Western Plan" for 3-Point war.</p> <p>Balance of Germany in Poland.</p> <p>Berlin Enslightened.</p> <p>Ability of "Fight to Last War" at Casablanca.</p>
2) Summary		
3) Non-German		

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PWC/991

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR MCCRYSTAL, BARNES
FROM : SHAEF FROM MCCLURE, WOODWARD SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO. : S-54820 CITE: SHPM

5 July. This is directive number three week ending

Three points interlinked: CHERBOURG and lodgement in west secured plus Russian offensive plus continued Italian gains. Present dynamic stage eliminates arguments whether GERMANY has lost war necessitates attuning our output to this stage great achievement. Signal final psychological assault accompanying final battle still to come. Big moment will be timed in conjunction our Allies. Upbuild CHERBOURG as port and measure of German defeat but unexpected spectacular developments following fall CHERBOURG until CAEN battle fully joined. Rely on Russian smashing German defence line by further rapid ground gains but uncommit them objectives beyond WIESE. German troop squandering continued in ITALY for consolidation PISA-RIMINI line. Unanticipate early attack this line as ALEXANDER needs time upbuild next offensive.

Russian advances demonstrate bankruptcy German strategy. Sending armoured divisions westwards GERMANY virtually stripped their armies between BALTIC and PRIPET marshes. Develop positively superiority our planning leadership

Two-front war. German output stress what Germans feared has come true this fifth year war of major offenses east west plus dispersion vital reserves other theatres. Exploit Nazi two-front phobia interlinking German long standing fear encirclement.

Emphasizing his function and appointment and not his and personality upbuild EISENHOWER's appointment of KOENIG as Commander-in-Chief of FFI with approval French authorities.

6 342 Use CHERBOURG stories reemphasize refusal Germans including commanders obey HITLER's orders fight to last man.

SMC OUT 1335

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SECRET

REF NO: S-54820 30 June 1944 (Continued)

Unimpute cowardice. Let facts speak themselves. This applies to all languages.

Battlefronts. **NORMANDY.** Post capture and ATLANTIC WALL Breaching completed expect interval MONTGOMERY upbuilds for next phase offensive against main German armored forces in west. Interlink CHERBOURG demolitions rapid restoration NAPLES and TRIPOLI. Upbuild coming battle by stress German commitment elite troops especially armour against MONTGOMERY's left flank. Continue propaganda keep Germans guessing future landings in PAS DE CALAIS, BRITANNY, BELGIUM, NORWAY plus tactical developments from lodgement area.

ITALY. Uncommit ALEXANDER immediate assault PISA-RIMINI line. Review campaign achievements showing how whole area been liberated intact including ROME and stress particularly substantial military contributions Italian forces liberation.

RUSSIA. Stress usual failure German Intelligence anticipating weight of Russian offensive in White Russia outpointing every reason to expect further offensive in south.

Sea War. Outpoint U-boats failure affect campaign. Outpoint U-boats failure throughout war noting starvation blockade GREAT BRITAIN, severing BRITAIN's Trans-Atlantic communications, preventing American aid reaching BRITAIN, deterring U. S. intervening European War, interrupting convoys to RUSSIA, preventing BRITAIN being upbuilt striking base operations against continent, hamstringing Eighth Army's North African campaign, preventing upbuild huge Allied shipping reserves, preventing Anglo-American invasions NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, ITALY, NORMANDY, air attacks our supply corridor across channel.

Air War. Commit Luftwaffe to early all-out intervention NORMANDY by assuming it must come in and fight. Instead remain uselessly in background during this critical stage of war. Outpoint to peoples western occupied territories our bombing attacks on bridges etc. their neighborhood contributed greatly success in NORMANDY.

Flying Bomb. Stress complete irrelevance flying bomb to military picture of war. Outpoint German soldiers lack

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SHAEF

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

REF NO: 1335 OUTGOING MESSAGE

air cover plus employment proven model French tanks while manpower and materials being squandered on militarily useless weapon.

The Main Enemy. Constantly emphasize surrender troops CHERBOURG and VITREUIL. Link SCHLIEBEN with PAULUS ARNIM showing generals and soldiers unprepared accept death sentence by HITLER. Orders which designed involve German soldiers in series of STALINGRADS only to prolong HITLER's regime are cynical in view K WILLIAMS complete failure to plan or supply relief. Stress senselessness continued sacrifices. Do everything combat German attempts to persuade troops surrender means death or torture. Stress particularly overwhelming Allied material and firepower of Allies in battle zone. Link this with air attacks plus effectiveness resistance behind combat zone in destroying line communication and supply outpointing that no army however resolute can be expected carry without infantry reinforcements, munitions and artillery. Demonstrate futility flying bomb outpointing we bomb German industrial center and combat zone. To German home front stress relation between captured and killed outpointing proportion prisoners increasing even on eastern front.

Western Occupied Countries. RESISTANCE. Continue upbuild impressive picture organized and disciplined action by resistance. Follow EISENHOWER's commendation reiterating that adherence to instructions helped military operations thereby avoiding losses en masse by population and leaving effective action to trained resistance cadres and transport workers and masquis. Continue discourage noneffectives seeking refuge in masquis where food, equipment resources severely taxed. Pay tribute remarkable contribution BELGIUM resistance has made to success ALLIES in NORMANDY. Discourage careless talk about local acts of resistance.

TRANSPORT. Continue following directive 1 annex.

Civil Affairs. Wherever possible outpoint peoples liberated territories show willingness take active part defeat Nazis. Civilian casualties in liberation phase much smaller German propaganda claims. Repeat instructions refugees and displaced persons should stay put. Wherever possible instructions should be originated or supplemented by Allied governments concerned. Instruct owners and workmen protect local

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COPY NO.

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S E C R E T

REF NO: S-54820 30 June 1944 (Continued)

utility plants, machinery, firefighting equipment. Emphasize true place Civil Affairs officer in field outfitting as integral part of army and will function only long as military needs require and is on hand assist local authorities in government and will relieve distress if possible but not a relief agent and he must not settle French political issues. Emphasize friendly cooperation between French authorities liberated territories and Allied army authorities. Publicize achievements local French in liberated areas as regards self government, maintenance of order, planning food distribution. Liberated FRANCE is being administered by Frenchmen. Bring forward General BRADLEY's statement on CHERBOURG: minimize the suffering involved since damage French homes and property considerable. Despite unsolved remaining problems, take every opportunity show how in practical working in NORMANDY and in technical discussion on Civil Affairs between British and French satisfactory results being achieved. It is essential no manifestation nor impression be given in output of Anglo-American disagreement on French affairs. Doubtful such Parliamentary press comment should be referred.

ORIGINATOR

PWD

AUTHENTICATION: H B JORDAN
Lt Col

INFO

G-2

SGS

SUMMARY

AG RECORDS

SMC 1335

30 June 1944

1841B

DWR/jes

REF NO: S-54820

T00: 291745B

S E C R E T

345

TOP SECRET

REDACTED-GENERAL R.A. MOORE.

With the compliments of
Major-General R.A.D. Brooks.

28.5.44.

*63848K Po the Prison
General R.A.D. Brooks*

SECRET

SGS-SHAFF File No.

OUTLINE OF NEWS AND ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Issued from:
Dush House
Room 621
Exemption No.

This document is designed to call attention to major items of news and enemy reactions to news, which have broken in the hours immediately preceding its issue. It does not set out to be a substitute for facts and newspapers, but rather a means of helping readers to tell when they need to consult these sources.

R
SGS
1

1. MILITARY NEWS

Military installations in the Bay of Biscay, near Bordeaux, this morning - by Lancaster and Halifax (Air Ministry)

Airfields and a German oil base in France attacked today - by Liberators and Porters (AFMUSA).

Germans admit Allies have reached outskirts of Cherbourg town - German Communiqué. The German Home Service (12.30) reported that, in the central part of the fortress area, the Allies are still being held up by new German defensive lines and by the islands of resistance still fighting in the rear.

Americans resume infantry attack against Fort de Moulle - This is the last remaining strong point in German hands in the area south of Cherbourg-Velaines road. (LSE).

Tilly sur Seuil captured by British troops - According to a cable which has been received in New York from Normandy today it has been officially announced that the Allies have captured the town and advanced 1,000 yards beyond it. (Reuters).

Germans report increased activity by Allied MPAs in Channel Islands area - Transkontinent Press (11.30).

2. POLITICAL NEWS

Stockholm discussions on Iceland Islands - Transcon (15.30) reported that the future of the Iceland Islands will presumably be discussed during the coming week, between representatives of the autonomous Government of the Islands, and the Swedish Government.

Spanish comment on the shooting of Allied POWs - The Spanish paper 'Voz' commented today that "the air war against Germany will have a new intensity resulting from the massacre of the RAF prisoners. It was entirely useless cruelty. Every Allied airman will now feel that a personal reason is added to military and political reasons behind his task." (Reuters).

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 231805Z JUNE

283/23
TOR 232200B JUNE
dmp 232215 JUNE

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGMAN SIGNER CAMPBELL SPOFF
TO : SHAEF FOR EISENHOWER SHPND FOR MCCLURE
REF NO : NONE 23 JUNE 1944

Incoming information, requested air mail letter.

Reference your radio S54037, W 54968 being forwarded.

S-54037 is SMC IN 739, 17/6/44, PWD
W-54968 is not identified in SHAEF SMC files

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

SGS-SHAEF file No. 291412

SMC IN 3768 23 June 44 2242B VAN/10 RMP NO: NONE

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR McCRYSTAL
 FROM : SHAFF FROM MCCLURE, SIGNED EISENHOWER
 REF NO : S-54428 CITE: SHPWD

Daily quarter hour radio program to FRANCE outlined your P-60182 June 16. Considered good idea by SHAFF and completely acceptable to General KOENIG who as head of French Forces Interior under EISENHOWER is person in control all such operations.

Because KOENIG's Headquarters are here MCCLURE and KOENIG both believe such program should be initiated here via medium of "Les Francais Parlent Aux Francais" which ALGIERS could relay or adapt by adding its special intelligence.

KOENIG now discussing with MAILLOU and BOYSLAMBET best method of insuring continuous flow intelligence to you and for LONDON program. Will advise you when plan evolved which hope for shortly. SHAFF considers KOENIG appointment as Commander of French Forces Interior a serious important and useful appointment and not an empty gesture. We are acting accordingly and have established excellent relations.

P-60182 is SMC IN 2586, 17/6/44, PWD.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: H.B. JORDAN
 LT. COLONEL
 INFORMATION : SGS
 G-2
 G-3
 SPEC FORCES HQ
 AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 1015 23 June 44 1832Z VAR/1p REF NO: S-54428
 T00: 231200Z

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SSS-SHAFF File No. 094412

1091 1/16/44
1091 1/16/4420. VI. 144
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION FOR WESTERN SEABOARD

This document, which represents the combined views of Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information, relates primarily to events during the 49 hours preceding the compilation (at 15.00 hrs.)

File
603
1

7. GERMANY

Home Propaganda

General: Retent of secret weapon output about even, but action intensified. Secret Weapon: Retent of secret weapon ("Horchowder") to second place. Nervously fighting handled cautiously; the decision still to come. Strength of Japan played up. (this often indicates a lack of other measuring news).

Secret Weapon: Two distinct lines run simultaneously: (1) impressionistic descriptions of terrific effects continue; British said to see no possibility of checking the increasing destruction. (2) warnings against belief in miraculous power to end war. New line introduced by Krieger today was that secret weapon must primarily be signal for maximum effort at home. This illustrated by Spurr's assurance about arms production. Subsequent actions to deny idea that employment of weapon spelled German chances of milder peace with West - again in indication of hopes in this direction. Great importance attached to impressing soldiers with military value of weapon again apparent. The German soldier, who has been saving about 40 per cent of the Anglo-U.S. formations captured in the British Isles with only about 10 per cent of counter-attacks formations of our defense. Known word this way mean for US. (See also Appendix A).

Progress: Attention still diverted by Peninsular. German admission by authoritative commentator (Breithorn von Imhoff) that German prevented from maintaining cohesive front being to air attacks and parachute action deep in rear areas. Fight for "fortifications" (unspecified) only beginning. "It is vital for Americans to cut Peninsular on line St. Lo-Contances". No preparation for loss of Cherbourg Peninsula - on contrary strength emphasized. Germans held strong barrier lines, and will launch strong counter-measures. Communiqué today claims British attacks in Tilly-livry area failed. Much made of successful torpedo bomber attack on Channel convey, and claims given for Luftwaffe and E-boats during first ten days. Front Report describes arrival of Luftwaffe reinforcements and suggests greater equality in air. No mention of U-boats. Propaganda Points: Political implications of struggle against Americans stressed; they fight not only for Cherbourg, but for re-election of Roosevelt. Much made of European solidarity.

Aboard

General: Proportion of output devoted to secret weapon less than in home propaganda and than yesterday's output for abroad.

Secret Weapon: As before, military effects predominant. Seabroacher emphasized effects on supply ports, speculating that whole invasion schedule may have to be revised. Seabroacher (Transocean) stressed that whether new weapon would probably appear soon. Highest papers quoted on military effect of occupation of London. One political result will probably be to prevent Turkey joining Allies; spirit of French opposition will also be broken. Stress on intensity of A.B. fire. Military spokesman apparently refused to support claims in creation of vast fires, saying "though explosions also cause fires, the German missiles are by no means designed as fire-bombs".

Progress: Cutting of Peninsular by no means tantamount to opening way to Cherbourg. Seabroacher claims immediate threat to Cherbourg wholly out of question. Today Transocean admits loss of Briquebois, but denies Tilly. Latest U.S. attacks marked "by unmistakable exhaustion". Continued emphasis on heavy French civilian casualties. Again reported that Allied prisoners are paraded through Paris. Transocean says prisoners received with indifference, in contrast to Rouen where stones thrown. Berliner Morgen Zeitung (home and Europe) writes on the fiancé of air landings (although these were previously admitted in a Front Report to have been the key to success of landing, and Imhoff admits their effect on German supplies.) Forecasts: As Allies are unable to land on west coast of Cherbourg Peninsula, owing to German coastal artillery, they will probably attempt to land on Guernsey and Jersey. Otherwise, very little speculation on future.

II. FRANCE

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French Bureau of the Interior: French Intelligence Service reports German attacks on

Indexed

the Meuse in the Vermeir plateau, northwest of Grandville. Partisans surrounded St. Vierge in Marcheville after fierce battle. Fighting continues in Meuse-Gontard. A tank repair factory in Verdun closed for 10 days on account of sabotage. Swiss press reports state Antwerp station closed and the Antwerp-Brussels line cut at several points.

Administrative Measures: (a) Following prefabricated changes announced JACQUES, from staff of Ministry of Information in the north zone, becomes subprefect of Rhodas; BLANCHET, subprefect of Rhodas, becomes prefect of the Cote-du-Nord; LEBLANC, prefect delegate of Cote-du-Nord, becomes prefect of the Seine.

(b) From June 20th all private radio press suspended in South zone.

(c) Unofficial reports that Germans have taken over partial or total executive control in six further departments.

Repressive Measures: Compulsory census of men born between 1.7.1864 and 30.6.1928, and women born between 1.7.1869 and 30.6.1926, ordered in the Savoie, (in conformity with S.T.C. Law of February 2nd 1944) in order to control refractory.

Propaganda: Pilots no longer featured quite so recently. Usual references to destruction and demoralization in London and invasion ports. Attacks viewed as retaliation.

Other themes on Vichy and Paris radios: (i) glorious activities of the Waffen SS in the struggle against Bolshevism (Jacques Barthaut, who has just returned to Radio-Paris after four months on the eastern front); (ii) Allied liberation means death, the Normans gradually realize, as more and more fleeing civilians are machine-gunned on the roads (Jacques Barthaut); (iii) sentimental American stories of co-operation of Normans with the Allied forces ridiculed by Henriot; (iv) Churchill and Santa visit their "Norman conquest"; (v) "Slylock" (U.S.A.) using French gold to back "Invasion Press" (Dut); (vi) Bishop of Bayeux accused of breaking Vichy-Vietnam agreements by greeting de Gaulle; (vii) refugees and homeless in France now total 2,600,000; figure of Frenchmen killed yesterday 35,000, now 40,000.

Liberated Territories: M. ROCHAT, subprefect of Bayeux, removed from office by Commissioner of Provisional Government.

French enthusiasm and co-operation increases as realization grows that Allies have at last launched the Western offensive, and not an isolated German raid.

III. BELGIUM

Military News: On German lines.

Propaganda Lines: (1) Stalin's orders; horror of Bolshevism in Belgium. (2) French population rallying to Vichy; Gauls on decline; Magots men returning to work;

(3) Less output about new weapons; devastating effects described on German lines.

(4) Ex-101 trade union leaders accused of spending union funds in London and New York; Minister Gutt violently attacked as Jew, international swindler, etc.

Transport situation: "Le Pays Bas", S.G. (received today); 96% of Belgian families without means of heating or cooking; some have not received coal ration for October, 1943.

IV. HOLLAND

Military news: On German lines. German Service for Dutch troops in U.K. claimed that a company of 120 Dutchmen repulsed 250 British parachutists.

Propaganda Lines: (1) Invasion mentioned for first time by Blokzijl, in talk on attitude of Dutch. National Socialists realized Stalin forced invasion now, while Russia still had strength to attack; that "liberation" meant devastation, Bolshevism etc; they were convinced "all was water well" and would stand firm if Holland was invaded. "Antis" persisted in doubting German reports of conditions in liberated territories and believed Allied propaganda. (2) Secret weapon: German claims of damage, mass evacuation, etc. repeated. "Het Volk" quoted by Transocean, said it proved German war industry not destroyed; British could expect no sympathy from Dutch. German Service for Dutch forces in U.K. ran same lines and mentioned shortage of A.A. ammunition in London.

New Decrees: (Published 10.6, received today). (1) Van Gaellendonk, Minister's Deputy, formerly in charge of Home Affairs and National Safety, now to concentrate on National Safety, (i.e. organization of anti-invasion forces?). (2) Heavy penalties for evasion or assisting in evasion of labour service (fortification works, etc.)

APPENDIX A

Colwyn, German Home Service, 19 June:

"...But in these days when a sigh of relief can be heard throughout the German people - nay, throughout Europe - a word of warning may not be out of place. As far as technical matters go, the nations opposed to each other are about evenly matched, and even the best secret weapons cannot bring about the end of the war from one day to the other. Belief in miracles would be out of place in this context and might easily become disastrous. Besides, we are the last persons to stand in need of such a belief. Let us recall that our old and well-tried defensive weapons were able to destroy from the month of January to the end of May an average of half a Geschwader of enemy aircraft per day. Truly an unprecedented achievement! However, as false hopes are out of place, so is exaggerated pessimism".

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SHAEEF FWD/774

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

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ROUTINE

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR MOCHRYTAL-BESSIE
FROM : SHAEEF FROM MOULIERE, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-54273 CITE: SHFWD

Details our position with French following by courier re F59167. Draft agreement you refer to does not exist. Present position extremely difficult. French personnel, whom HART has been training for vocal file, were removed today, and emergency plans have been made to fill French places in press teams with Britons or Americans. Useful Army Group recon reports will be sent to you as they come in.

No French service at present going to FRANCE. Understand Agence Francaise Independente on existing wave lengths not receivable North or VICHY. MOULIER wishes send five thousand words daily to Northern FRANCE but neither transmitters nor frequencies are available. Expect him now to request FWD to carry Agence Francaise Independente.

F59167 is SMC IN 2110 14/6/44 FWD

ORIGINATOR : FWD AUTHENTICATION: LT. COL. JORDAN
INFORMATION: BGS
AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 899 21 JUNE 1944 1044B HFK/jc Ref No: S54273
F00cdp-291730B

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355-SHAEEF File No. 091712

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

GRQP

7 0 0 27:540 June

SHAEF 173/19
TOR 191709B June
was 191715B

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ROUTINE

FROM : ENFOR MAIN BEDDING
NO FOR ACTION : CG FIRST US ARMY FOR PAGE P AND PV
FOR INFO : PWD SHAEF, FIRST US ARMY PLAN FOR ANDREW
P AND PV SECOND ARMY (BR) MAIN FOR CA FOR
SHEPHERD
REF TO : PWN-130 17 June 1944

Phase B Psychological Warfare Plan referred
to as SHAEF/17426/1 and PV dated 16 June now effective.

Have prepared leaflet to follow bombing.

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SCS
G-5
G-2
AS RECORDS

SEC IN 3000 19 June 44 1740B GME/ot Ref No: PWN-130

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SCS - SHAEF File No. 67147

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PWD/749

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

TO : FREEDOM
FROM : CHAMP PWD RECORDS, SIGRUM HIGHWAY
REF NO : S-54009 CITE: SEPRI

Reference NMDIS S-54009.

Directive one annex. Delete from second sentence third paragraph "certain categories railworkers should disappear after hiding irreplaceable essential parts while other categories stay put."

S-54009 is SMC OUT 709, 16/6/44, PWD

ORIGINATOR : PWD
INFORMATION : G-2
 SGS
 AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: CHARLES C BLATHER
COLONEL

SGS-SHAEF File No. 091-412

SMC OUT 841 20 June 44 00103 VAN/lp REF NO: S-54206
700: 191215B

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UAGP

TOO 171220 JUNE

SHAEF 147/17
TOR 171325B JUNE
gob 171350

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : EXFOR MAIN NEVILLE
TO FOR ACTION : CG FIRST US ARMY FOR PAGE P AND PW
FOR INFO : FWD/SHAEF, FIRST US ARMY REAR FOR ANDREW
P AND PW.
REF NO : PPW 104, 17 JUNE 1944.

Your text German Russian Polish surrender leaflet in hand but SHAEF cannot produce before 18 June. SHAEF will send you 200 copies through ANDREW. Stocks of this leaflet useful for phases B and C of PW plan sent you 16 June.

Am dropping earliest German Russian Polish leaflet already prepared (ZG 13) and fate of 716 Inf Div (ZG 11).

ACTION : FWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
AG RECORDS

SMO IN 2625

17 JUN

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DWD/ppm

Ref NGP/PPW 104

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SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL PWO/702

OUTGOING MESSAGE

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

TO : C.G. ABERDEEN PROVING GROUNDS, ABERDEEN,
MARYLAND
FROM : SHAFF FROM McCLURE SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : 8-54037 CITE: SHPWO

Understand bombing data being compiled on M-26 Flare for use as Leaflet Bomb at request of 15 Air Force. Request that information be forwarded PWD SHAFF with report of any other similar experiments.

ORIGINATOR : PWD / AUTHENTICATION: CHARLES C BLAKENET,
Colonel
INFORMATION : SCS /
AG RECORDS

SGS-SHAFF File No. 6911

SNC OUT 739 17 June 1944 1435B DWR/sgb Ref No: 8-54037
TOO: 161830B

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

0700

FILED 160600Z JUNE

SHAEF 86/17
FOR 170614 JUNE
sch 170630 JUNE

SECRET

x 091/Annex

PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ FROM PNB SIGNED HILSON
 TO : STOUSSA TO FWE AND ONI
 PASSED TO : SHAEP FOR ACTION
 REF NO : F-6C182 16 JUNE 1944 CITE: FHPWO

FWE planning daily 1/2 hour radio program 1030 GMT in French. Material would be from French-British-American intelligence sources, personal messages for resistance groups as furnished by special ops, local news of Southern French as available. Success would largely depend on contribution of material from French French army authorities interested, could supply flow material and possibly officer to announce program, but they make their acceptance contingent on de Gaulle's approval of principle.

PW will only proceed if SHAEP has no objection and gives concurrence.

Program would be strictly "White" propaganda, tending to offset possible reaction and depression which might arise in Southern France after first enthusiasm of landings pass and Southern French realize that they are apparently last to be liberated.

If quality program such as we hope it should create local audience very useful for messages from this Theater if and when they are needed, and for transmitting SHAEP messages from here if SHAEP feels them useful.

SMC JW 2585

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SGS-SHAEP File No. 894-102

-2-

SECRET

REFNO: F-60182

SRANT 85/17

Appreciate your immediate answer on this,
possible JACKSON could clear with STANT.

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
SPECIAL FORCE HQ
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

SNC IN 2586 17 June 44 0755 VAF/10 REF NO: F-60182

8

362

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL PWQ/691

OUTGOING MESSAGE

V 091 Belgium
V 091 FranceS E C R E T
P R I O R I T Y

TO : AFHQ
 FROM : SHAEF, STUNED EISENHOWER
 REF NO : S-54009

Directive 1 annex.

PWD SHAEF launching special radio campaign leaflet supported to BELGIAN FRENCH railworkers requesting paralyse and dislocate enemy's communication lines in rear. Campaign area that part of FRANCE North of line running along the LOIRE to ORLEANS thence through CHAUMONT to STRASBOURG plus whole of BELGIUM. Inadvisable railway men commit sabotage battle area or immediately behind therefore special action zone will lie between above line and railheads behind battle area.

Follow this Directive. In battle zone railway mens main task to survive so ready help Allies upon arrival. Railway men avoid being upstret by GERMAN's and removed and uncommit sabotage except cutting railway telecommunications.

Remainder campaign area railwaymen's task to paralyse communication network by nonspecialists sabotage appeal especially to repair gangs. Special guidance will follow giving specific instructions various categories railworkers and indicating such jobs which specialists execute.

SMC OUT 709

-1-

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Approved

S65-SHAEF File No. 091/42

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

S E C R E T

REF NO: S-54009

16 JUNE 1944

(continued)

Certain categories railworkers should disappear after hiding irreplaceable essential parts while other categories stay put. Recognize danger of tasks warning workers take adequate precautions for own and families safety.

Tell railwaymen remainder FRANCE stay put continue previous sabotage plus wrecking GERMAN troop ammunition trains. Mention indiscriminate sabotage may dislocate civil food supplies. Except railworkers under direct orders local resistance group, foregoing instructions must be strictly observed. Undertake unnecessary risks.

Notes. FRENCH BELGIAN railworkers and trades union officials should launch appeals far as possible. Cross report to occupied countries appeals plus any hard evidence of results. Treat as panic indicators all GERMAN measures aimed specifically railworkers. When necessary extend campaign area we will issue new Directive.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: CHARLES BLAKENBY,
COLONEL.

INFORMATION: SGS
G-2
AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 709

16 JUNE 1944

2316B

HFK/jc

Ref No: S-54009

TOO: 1614253

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PWC/683

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

P-201 No. 2000

1370-600 2000

1091 2000 2000

1091 2000 2000

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : FREEDOM
 FROM : McCLURE, SIGNED EISENHOWER
 REF NO : S-53997 CITE: SEPWD

For week ending 22nd June here is Directive
 Number 1.

Background not for output.

Ensigns & military problems are:

Relation between current operation and additional future landings other French and Belgian coastal points. Solving their substantial communications problem. Bulk Jerry armour in West been summoned to battle area but often impossible use railways partly due our successful air attacks rail and highway bridges. How contend our air superiority. How distribute resources over various fronts.

Propagandawise German problems:

How explain Atlantic Wall breaching, non-appearance Luftwaffe effectively, ineffectiveness reserves although now engaged, continuing silence German leaders. How convince German people also Satellite GERMANY will still win despite breach Atlantic Wall and 2 front war.

SMC OUT 697

-1-

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SGS SHAEF File No.

091412

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

S E C R E T

REF NO: S-53997

16 JUNE 1944

(continued)

Guidance to follow in output. Initial beach head securing is over. Describe current phase as "Buildup" indicating seesaw battle possible. Report our reverses factually along SHAEF communique lines. In news handling necessary check against boring repetition and prophecy future successes.

Do these. Maintain balance invasion with other fronts by relation United Nations synchronized action all front. In propaganda to enemy especially use successes in ITALY. Stress growing vulnerability possible landings North-west EUROPE and MEDCOAST as GERMAN's move to invasion NORMANDY. Note enormous bonus yielded by bombing SENNE and LOIRE bridges. Link these bombings with sabotage facts and our transport campaigns. Especially to enemy stress great United Nations organizational and logistical achievements. Outpoint GERMAN's huge physical investment ATLANTIC WALL construction intended yield them high returns but due our superior resources, organizational ability, tactical thinking, planning, fighting morale plus inelasticity German thinking, we overwhelm best Wehrmacht can build. Represent channel crammed Allied Naval Forces umbrella covered most dangerous world area for GERMAN surface and U-boats. GERMAN's could only cope if possessed equal air and sea forces as Allies which GERMAN's cannot match. Emphasize Luftwaffe failure interfere embarkation, sailings, landings, reinforcements or provide protection own troops. Point out Luftwaffe failure results from insoluble problem defend encircled GERMANY and link with RUSSIAN based AMERICAN bombers. Publicize our press released divisions experienced other Theatre battles against crack GERMAN troops exemplify AMERICAN 1st Infantry and 50th NORTH-MIDLAND. Point out progress Allies judged by defense positions broken and captured not mileage. In military commentary commit enemy all-out defense LE-HAVRE and CHERBOURG plus full use Luftwaffe supporting counter attacks. Unassert peninsula cutoff until released officially.

SMC OUT 697

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

REF NO: S-53997

16 JUNE 1944

(continued)

Do not use front combat zone place names excepting official communiques or those released in front line stories by censor. Unmention special landing stage equipment until released. Play up officially released resistance stories but unname individuals concerned. "Unsuggest Levee en Masse. Continue ban on "Secret Weapon". Unmention without specific guidance legal and constitutional matters in areas liberated. Unpromise regarding food supplies. Unmention hoarding or black marketing or rationing system in liberated areas.

This para FXI only. Propaganda to enemy special guidance. Most important leaflet operation this week directly assisting troops is in CHERBOURG Peninsula with special attention paid to GERMAN soldiers recalling the TUNISIAN parallel. Leaflet and combat area appeals to surrender or desert will stress our offensive power and futility further resistance plus our good treatment prisoners plus their possible assistance rehabilitation GERMANY.

Wherever possible link air attacks GERMANY from South, East, West with shortage GERMAN fighters. Stress tremendous Allied land, air, sea fire power used breach ATLANTIC WALL and now used throwback counter attacks. In commenting JAP defeats recall recent JAP promise help GERMANS.

Propaganda special guidance Wehrmacht to non GERMAN. Continue POLISH and CZECH present transmissions following lines of POLISH and CZECH Governments. Cross report broadcasts by POLISH prisoners. In GERMAN transmissions give all available news on foreigners surrender.

Propaganda special guidance Western occupied countries. Requests for discipline and restraint follow strictly line of Supreme Commanders statement plus instructions of national authorities discouraging Levee en Masse. In DEGAULLE's situation report official statements and facts as they were officially

SMC OUT 697

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-3-

6 367 THE OUTGOING MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

REF NO: S-53997

16 JUNE 1944

(continued)

announced. Report factually reactions of FRENCH to Allied troops and French personalities. Use greatest restraint preceding two sentences. Unencourage order civilians join MAQUIS. Heavy strains on MAQUIS food and equipment makes desirable only specialists, resisters already armed, genuine fugitives upjoin. Unless instructed contrary by SHAEF all war zone refugees and displaced persons advised remain own locality. In occupied territories farmers and peasants encouraged protect crops, tools and livestock from seizure or destruction by GERMAN'S. Foreigners in TODF organization requested desert and bring information and encourage others to sabotage by reporting examples and use them as instruments of GERMAN demoralisation.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: COL. CHARLES C. BLAKENEY

INFORMATION: SGS

G-2

SUMMARY

AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 697

16 JUNE 1944

1935B

HMT/jo

Ref No:

S-53997

TOS: 151800B

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE



JDJD
FILED 141443B JUNE

SHAEF 270/14
TOR 131555B JUNE
vs 141612B

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FROM : AFHQ PWB BESSIE SIGNED WILSON
TO : SHAEF FOR MCCOURE, HART, HERBERT
REF NO : F59167, 14 JUNE 1944, CITE: FMFWO


Extremely informative helpful your 353644.

As best we can make out from these details your arrangements similar to our plans for operational phase but should appreciate full details by courier of relations with French and complete text agreement referred to as awaiting DE GAULLES signature. Should also appreciate any information gleaned by Press Reconnaissance Party at Army Group.

Is any news service presently going into FRANCE except your voice file? Does AMI or any other French organization plan service into FRANCE.

S-53644 13 SMC OUT 465, 11/6/44, FWD

ACTION : PWB
INFORMATION : SGS
G-5
AG RECORDS



SMC IN 2110 14 June 1944

LIB DWR/jos REF NO: F-59167
COPY NO.

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SHAEF File No. 101, 1/4

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY


TO : AFHQ TO WASHINGTON FOR RECRYSTAL
FROM : NCOLUNE, SACRED BEEFMEATER
INFO TO : S-53734 CTR: SHAFD

Fifth sentence of S-53644 should be: "Equip-
ments virtually limited to one jeep and two Marconi CR 100
receivers with auxiliary power. No generator likely to be
available." Also, last sentence second paragraph should
read: "Prices not yet fixed but probably on basis of cost
in US or BRITAIN with no charge for transport."

S-53644 is SMC OUT 465, 12/6/44, PWD

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: LT COL JORDON

INFORMATION : SGS
G-5
AG RECORDS



SMC OUT 514 12 June 45 2348Z HXK/LT REF NO: S-53734
6 370 TDC : 122315B

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SGS-SHAEF File No. 094/412

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

x 691 F. France
x 501 120 - Bouddie
x 000.76

803
1

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR MOSCRYSTAL

FROM : MCCLURE, SIGNED RISHNOWER

REF NO : 3-53644


CITE: SHFWD

Present plan substantially discussed with you as per R-56531. French have unofficially agreed to put two men into each of eight groups of four men but have made it clear their participation is conditional upon DE'GUALLE's signature of agreement. Each group will be led by an American or an Englishman and will include a Morse supervisor. Equipment virtually limited to gear. No generator likely to be available. Three groups are to be lifted on 2030 and 42 respectively and the remaining 5 between 50 and 60. In addition there is a small press recee party at each Army Group.

Owing to newsprint supply and lift difficulties we propose to limit newspapers to single sheet 17 inches by 12 3/4 inches printed both sides circulation envisaged is one paper to each five inhabitants. Newsprint programme for six months period is on this basis. Newsprint and complementary supplies are being carried forward by G-5 in the same manner as other civilian supplies but on requisition from PWD. Prices not yet fixed but probably on basis of cost in US or BRITAIN with no charge for support.

At our level full understanding with French has been reached. Post operational planning is clouded by the high level position. Will advise you immediately of any changes.

Does this fit in with your plans?



TOP SECRET

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6 37.

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SHAEF File No. 0011112

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

REF NO: S-53644

11 June 44

(Continued)

F-56631 not identified in SHAEF SMC files

ORIGINATOR

: PWD

AUTHENTICATION: LT COL JORDON

INFORMATION

: SCS

G-5

AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 465 11 June 44 1700B REF/IF REF NO: S-53644
TOO : 111700B

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SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

X09 France

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : FREEDOM FOR MOCHRISTAL PWB
FROM : SHAEF, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53667

CITE: SEPWD

Please airpouch soonest operational plan for
French consolidation propaganda teams from your Theater for
SOUTHERN FRANCE.

Need full details on numbers and functions of
personnel and equipment and transport contemplated.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: C. C. BLAKENEY
COLONEL
INFORMATION : SCS
G-3
AG RECORDS

SNC OUT 472 11 June 44 2256B HFK/1f REF NO: S-53667
TOO : 111515B

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SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

MTFA

TOC 091140Z JUNE

SHAFF 100/09
TOR 091355 JUNE
UWB - 091415



RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FROM : EXFOR MAIN
TO : ACTION : COMMAND POST FIRST US ARMY
FOR INFO : SHAFF
REF : 098 : 9 June, 1944 :

Reference your request. Regret weather prevented pamphlets being dropped night 8/9 June. Will arrange as soon as possible.

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
ATAF (SHAFF)
AG RECORDS

SGS-SHAFF File No. 091140Z

SMC 1224 9 June 44 1437B VAN/et Ref No: 098

374

RESTRICTED

Indexed

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SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE ^{PWD/513}

SECRET
PRIORITY

TO : FREEDOM TO WILSON FOR BARNES FOR TYLER
FROM : SHAEF FROM MCCLURE SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53250 CITE: SHPWD

Leaflets based on information contained in cables
S-53003 and S-53004 are suggested for distribution by you.
However the decision is left entirely up to you. Texts of our
leaflets cannot be cabled.

S-53003 is SMC OUT 49, 2/6/44, PWD
S-53004 is SMC OUT 48, 2/6/44, PWD

ORIGINATOR : PWD
INFORMATION : SCS
G-3
G-2
EACS
AO RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION : H B JORDAN
Lt Col

333 SHAEF File No. 44117

SMC OUT 189 5 June 1944 2242B MM/joa REF NO: S-53250
TOO: 051700B

b 375

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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URGENT

TO : APHQ FOR PWB
FROM : SHAEF, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S 53249 OITE: SHPMD

Reference your F 54446.


Our S 53063 concerning D and post D Day leaflets sent you informationally hoping this would convey sufficient information for you to create similar leaflets for use against targets available to your Theatre.

Security prevents cabling full texts and uncertainty courier service makes MATS inadvisable. For technical details on nomenclature special types of railway, highway and waterway workers and transportation routes suggest you consult HENRI MATEN Minister Transport. Whatever you can do will greatly assist.

S 53063 is SMC OUT 49, 2/6/44, PWD
F 54446 is SMC IN 355, 3/6/44, PWD

ORIGINATOR : PWD
INFORMATION : SCS
G-3
G-2
EACS
AC RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
BRIG GENERAL



SMC OUT 168 5 June 44 2242B MU/ppm Ref No: S 53249
TOO: 051530

3 376

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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

Y 370.64
X 091.4012

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD
FILED 041921B JUNE

SHAEP 144/04
TOR 042100B JUNE
rjd 042017B JUNE

~~TOP SECRET~~
ROUTINE

FROM : AFHQ, SIGNED WILSON
TO : SHAEP
REF NO : F-55027, 4 JUNE 1944. CITE: WILSON

1-6-44 file
Believed here that your message S-53003 and S-53004 of 1 June 1944 warranted TOP SECRET classification and handling. Received here only SECRET and handled accordingly.

570.62 SOURCE
■ 53003 is SMC OUT 49, 2/6/44, PWD
S 53004 is ■ OUT 48, 2/6/44, PWD

091017
ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
EACS
AG RECORDS

CLASSIFIED
TO
By AUTHORITY OF CALA
By RWS
By magwell
5

SGS-SHAEP FILE NO. 42100B/412

SMC ■ 566 4 June 44 2125B DWE/ppm Ref No: F 55027

6 377
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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JNDJ
T00 0516250 JUNE

SHAEP 130/03
TOR 0319208 JUNE
SMO - 031945

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : AFHQ PWB SIGNED WILSON
TO : SHAEP TO JACKSON PWD
REF NO : F54446 3 JUNE 1944 CITE: FHPWO

Leaflets D day and post D day.

Re S53004.

Is this informational, or is it suggested,
or requested PWB AFHQ make up and distribute similar
leaflets? If any action our part, requested specify exactly,
and provide us either full texts, descriptions, or mats, or
actual leaflets as you think best.

S-53004 in SMC OUT 48, 2/6/44, PWD

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : 3GS
G-7
G-2
EACB
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 395 3 June 44 1957E VAN/et Ref No: F54446

6 378

SECRET

SECRET

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COPY NO 4

SGS-SHAEP File No. 4444

S-53004
4/4/44
Kuo PWD

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SHAFF

140/474

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AFHQ TO WILSON FOR BARNES FOR TYLER
 FROM : SHAFF FROM MCCLURE, SIGNED EISENHOWER
 REF NO : S-53003 CITE: SHFWD

Special D-Day and immediate post D-Day leaflet addressed to French Belgian Railway, Highway, Waterway workers requests all possible disruption of communications. Short text lists each special type of railroad, highway or waterway worker emphasizing that secondary transportation routes no longer exist as such since all communications of primary importance to enemy and asks each to do his share preventing enemy using alternative routes. Text ends asking persons not transportation workers to follow SHAFF instructions but hand on leaflet. Leaflet double unit one side showing outline map all FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND to ZUIDER ZEE with main railways, roads, rivers, canals in red, black.

Text cleared with representatives French Interior, Information, B.R.A.I and KOENIG Staff.

ORIGINATOR: FWD AUTHENTICATION: HOWARD B. JORDAN
 INFORMATION: SGS Lt. Colonel
 G-3
 G-2
 EACS
 AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 49 2 June 1944 0922R HFI/rob Ref. No: S-53003
 700: 011830B

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SGS-SHAFF File No. 37002
 091412

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PWG/WTB

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

X 091.68.11.11
1000.71
X 091.68.11.11
X 091.68.11.11
X 091.68.11.11

TO : FREEDOM TO WILSON FOR BARNES FOR TYLER
FROM : McCLURE, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53004 CITE: SHPMD

German Troop leaflet to be dropped D day and D plus 1 entitled FOUR FRONT WAR. Map indicates East, South Home and West Fronts. East and Home Fronts treated briefly, Air War emphasized in latter, recent victories in ITALY treated at some length. Finally states Fourth Front now opened in West. Headlines feature work West Front.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: HOWARD B. JORDAN
LT COL

INFORMATION : SGS
G-3
G-2
MACS
AG RECORDS

SS - SHAEF File No. 091.68.11.11

SMC OUT 48 2 June 44 0922B HFE/12 REF NO: S-53004
TOO : 011830B

SECRET

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SECRET

COPY NO 4
Indexed

4/3
PM

Handwritten: 10/2/45

Central Intelligence
ADLPH. EXHIBITION. RE. PROCE
Psychological Warfare Division

25 May 1944

1. The enclosed is intended for reference to the (London).
The (Washington) and other. The date reference (excluding background)
will be taken to be 20.

2. The background information has been a preliminary statement.
Source and the subject of the Civilian Activities, the are of the
the cover and description given, to fact conduct to such place.

3. The enclosed propaganda reference is due to be made to the
by reference, of the.

4. General, please will call for comments to be made
checked with for policy review.

6
381

Handwritten: Gen. Morgan
Report
Indexed 3

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

868

COPY NO. 7

25th May, 1944.

(This guidance is valid for the first four days of the operation. It will be supplemented as required.)

I. BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR PROPAGANDA AGENCIES. (Not to be used in output.)

A. Military.

1. Initial Composition of Forces.

- (a) Not only Anglo-U.S. troops but also other Allied troops will participate, including French airborne troops. Later, additional French forces will be landing and taking up their duties.
- (b) Allied naval and air forces will carry, maintain and protect the operation.

2. Synchronisation with other Offensives.

- (a) There will be synchronised, but not necessarily simultaneous, offensives on (i) the Russian front, (ii) in the Balkans by Tito, (iii) in Italy, (iv) and in the air war over Germany - unless air needs over the beachheads interfere.
- (b) It will be the first of a series of West European operations aimed at targets ranging from Trondheim to Bordeaux in the north and Civitavecchia to Perpignan in the Mediterranean.

3. Likely German Strategy and Resources.

- (a) German resistance will be fanatically determined, and they will be employing all their available resources. Rommel's main assignment for the past four months has been to strengthen the Atlantic Wall, and for some time German propaganda has taken the line that ultimate victory goes to the army which not only has the arms but also deserves victory because of its morale.
- (b) Under Rundstedt, Rommel, along with Blaskowitz, will be in charge of operations. We can expect that Rommel will throw forward all the men at his disposal so as to crush the landings on the beachheads themselves, or the immediate vicinity, as soon as possible.
- (c) The Germans will have initial superiority in supply facilities and with the use of these may well be able in twenty-four hours to concentrate numerical superiority. In the early stages these superiorities may be substantial. Against these we shall have (i) marked air superiority, (ii) naval supremacy, (iii) limited strategical initiative and tactical surprise; the Germans do not know how many shore landings there will be and this will immobilise their shore reserves.

CONFIDENTIAL
Date: 25.5.44
By: RWS
initials

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

4. First Phase - Seizure and Consolidation of the Bridgehead.

We should assume, in preparing propaganda, two possible critical moments during the first phase: - (i) the first few hours on the bridgehead, and, (ii) the first few days when we are seeking to enlarge and consolidate the bridgehead. This first phase may well last four days.

5. Second Phase.

After the bridgehead is established the next critical time will be that of the German counter-attack. This phase may well last for a fortnight.

B. Intelligence.

- (a) The morale of the German battle troops should be assumed good. This will not apply to the Polish and Russian (Bergian) units. Although there is a considerable risk that the latter will fight well.
- (b) Nervousness and tension will probably be high among the inactive fleeing troops and fleeing civilians, who at the beginning will be making attack on themselves.
- (c) Appreciable numbers of non-Germans in the German labour organizations and trade organizations will be in the vicinity.

C. Local Population.

- (c) The civilian population in the areas concerned is far below the normal strength - most of the residents will be women, children and old men. They will be instructed by radio and leaflets to stay put. We cannot assume, however, that these initial instructions will be obeyed or that they will be able to obey them.

- (b) Organized professional assistance groups have received their instructions from the appropriate authorities to make a maximum effort from the moment of landing.

II. STRATEGY.

A. General Considerations.

1. In launching the new bearing upon the operation it will be necessary to maintain a balance between:
 - (a) our complete confidence in the outcome of the operation
 - (b) our recognition of the difficulties and hazards of the greatest amphibious operation ever staged against inactive defenses.
2. A further parallel difficulty exists in reconciling the scale of the forces involved with the magnitude of the still greater issue at stake.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3-

B. Overall Guidance.

Do's.

- (a) Call our forces the "Allied Expeditionary Force", not "the Armies of Liberation".
- (b) Emphasize integrated action by all three Services.
- (c) Maintain by related reporting, the balance between this front and all others, showing synchronized action by the United Nations on all fronts.
- (d) Stress the increased vulnerability to further landings of the rest of Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean coast.
- (e) Point out that progress of our forces must be judged not in terms of miles but of defense lines broken and enemy killed. It will be achieved against German troops whose defenses, numbers, material and, above all, morale, are good - as good as any available to the German High Command.
- (f) Comment that progress achieved is the result of (i) our superior morale, (ii) our superior tactics - especially in terms of flanking and encircling movements, (iii) preceding air attacks on German lines of communication and supply throughout occupied Europe, (iv) the assistance of organized professional resistance and of transport workers, (v) our strategical and tactical superiority on the sea and in the air.

Don't's.

- (a) Don't claim that the maximum German naval effort to defeat the operation has been made and overcome; their maximum effort may come at a later stage. Don't ask what has happened to the German surface fleet.
- (b) Do not call the operation the "invasion" or "the Second Front".
- (c) No suggestion of the use of "Secret Weapons" by either side unless it is covered by official United Nations release.
- (d) No suggestion or implication that this is the only landing taking place or contemplated in North-western Europe.
- (e) No mention of the nationality and comparative strength of the troops engaged until official release.
- (f) No naming of, or speculation about the identity of, the commanders of naval, air and land forces, except those announced officially.
- (g) No speculation as to rate of progress or future objectives.
- (h) Don't state or imply that victory is in sight or that the beachheads are early stages of the operation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (i) No reports or discussions about food and relief supplies should be given unless based on official releases.

C. Special Guidance for Propaganda to the Enemy.

- (a) Do not waste radio time on the German troops in the battle area. They will not be listening.
- (b) Concentrate on explaining to the German people as a whole, and in particular to the German troops on the flanks, the plight of the forward and flanking troops left behind like "human land mines" to be "winkled out". Draw parallel from Casino and the Hitler line.
- (c) A special directive will follow for propaganda to foreigners in the German army.
- (d) Air attacks on Germany should, wherever possible, be linked with the shortage of German fighters - particularly night fighters - over Germany. Due to their concentration in the western occupied territories.
- (e) Exploit the tension of German troops standing to along the whole length of the Atlantic Wall.
- (f) Generally in handling the news avoid melodrama. The treatment should be soldierly, sober, matter of fact.
- (g) Stress the tremendous fire-power which will be needed to breach the Atlantic Wall, emphasizing the effects of our naval gunfire, the heaviest yet experienced by German troops. Play up hard of the effects of our fire-power on sea and land.

D. Special Guidance for Propaganda to Western Occupied Countries.

- (a) Maintain constant appeal for restraint and discipline. These should follow strictly the lines of Supreme Commander's statement. In particular, follow the Supreme Commander's lead in doing all you can to discourage a levee en masse in this phase. The Supreme Commander will be supported in this line by statements from King Haakon, the Dutch Prime Minister and Pierlot. It is still uncertain whether General Gaullis will speak, and if he speaks, what he will say.
- (b) London radio will give the line for a special campaign to encourage transport workers to organize sabotage communications feeding the Atlantic wall between Antwerp and Nantes. This line will be given by British and American speakers and also by Guigud in a special appeal to members of the French trades Union, CGT. This line must be strictly followed and no appeals to transport workers outside the above area. Cross reporting in various language broadcasts is permitted.
- (c) News of successful action by transport workers should be fully reported and related where possible to our campaign against German communications. Contrariwise, suggesting levee en masse should be played.
- (d) Achievements of organized resistance groups should be treated solely as part of military operations and not as prelude to levee en masse.



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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

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FILED 242306Z MAY

SHAEP 30/25
FOR 250440Z MAY
dnp 15/0500

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AOWAR SIGNED BISSELL

TO : SHAEP FOR G2

REF NO : W41024 24 MAY 1944 CITE

Necessity increasing effectiveness propaganda to enemy — subject air war requires continual release latest photo interpretation of bomb strike — damage information. With special emphasis — industrial and communications targets GERMANY and Central EUROPE.

OWI being instructed treat — — hot news when issued regardless date of original mission. This will put statistics of missions and box score in second place, unless new peaks of intensity justify departure from rule. Desire utmost cooperation by intelligence in release of damage information consistent with security.

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : SGS
G-3
AFAP (SHAEP)
FWD
PRD
SUMMARY
AU RECORDS

SMO IN 2211 25 MAY 44 0540B VAN/ra REF NO: W41024

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SGS-SHAEP File No. 097.412

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

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RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FROM : ACWAF FROM HUNTER
TO : STOUFA FOR PRO AND ADDRESSEES CONCERNED
PASSED TO : SHAFF FOR INFORMATION
REF NO : UX-38416 19 May 1944

Subject: Release of Propaganda Leaflets
employed in psychological warfare activities against the enemy
in your Theater.

The War Department has no objection to the
release of propaganda leaflets, provided the Theater Commander
approves such release in each case.

ACTION : PRO STOUFA
INFORMATION : GCS
PRD
G-2
FWD
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

2MC JR 1670 19 May 44 17070 VAB/et Ref No: UX 38416

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COPY NO. 1

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222 PWD

Wm. M. ...

KNOW THE ENEMY

PROPAGANDA VERSUS FACTS

I. FASCISM CHANGES LANGUAGE.

The Nazis established a meaning - a degrading one - for the word "propaganda". The international system of "propaganda" machines created by Goebbels made the term stand for "distorted news"; it meant "falshoods in place of facts". Today the great majority of our soldiers (not to mention our civilian population) reject propaganda as something contrary to their interests - no matter what is being propagandized.

This prejudice is a source of strength. It shows that our people have recognized the lies in Nazi propaganda: the promises not to be realized, the bluff and terror in place of assurances, and the pacts which were broken before Hitler, Ribbentrop and their victims had signed on the dotted line. Our soldiers remember the "propaganda" campaign which won no many victories for the Nazis, victories that no Army could have won. As the Nazi method developed, propaganda attacks on our way of life were not advertised as propaganda. The American people know that enemy propaganda is an important weapon of total warfare aimed directly at them in their individual relation to the war effort of the United Nations. And because this is fortunately so, the Orientation Office will often be presented with the problem of treating the word "propaganda" in a realistic way. We are still green in the art of political warfare, and there is little time left to re-educate a whole nation as to the other meanings of certain terms that Fascism has successfully changed during the last twenty years. Besides, whatever our conception of the word "propaganda" may have been during pre-Nazi days it did not carry any single meaning. The makers of dictionaries, and other learned authorities, have as yet to present one universal definition. Here is one early conception of propaganda:

"Occasionally words must serve to veil the facts. But this must happen in such a way that no one becomes aware of it; or, if it should be noticed, excuses must be at hand, to be produced immediately." (Machiavelli, 15th Century)

George Mylster Viereck, well known Nazi agent in the United States and head of the German propaganda drive during World War I, defined his "propaganda" activities thus:

"Propaganda is a campaign camouflaging its origin, its motives or both, conducted for the purpose of obtaining a specific objective by the manipulation of public opinion".

The Nazis, who have stolen usable ideas from every source (including the French and Russian Revolutions and American advertising agencies) sum up their concept of propaganda in Hitler's own words:

"Mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic: these are our weapons".

Thus the missionaries who propagated faith, the communists who advocated the teachings of Marx, the persuasive salesman who peddled his product have all unwittingly contributed to the Nazi propaganda machinery. Goebbels himself admits that his early teacher in propaganda matters was not a Nazi, but one of his enemies: Edgar-Stern Barbarik, a German liberal and staunch supporter of the German Republic of Weimar. Barbarik's book, "Propaganda als politisches Instrument", was early exploited and amplified

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by the German Fascists. And soon Hitler's "political propaganda" soldiers were marching through the streets of the Republic plugging people to death, terrorizing whole districts, and bluffing the weak authorities, while loudspeakers mounted on trucks repeated Nazi slogans.

II. ELASTIC PROPAGANDA

"The secret of total war", Goebbels has been saying recently, "is tactical elasticity". This is a big and windy name for a familiar propaganda weapon. The Germans asked the French and British in 1939: "Why go to war over Danzig?" and later "Why go to war over Poland?". That is an example of so-called tactical elasticity. Today the Germans tell us, "We have nothing against you. Why do you fight the war of the British?" But to the British they say: "The American Army came to Europe to subjugate your resources as well as ours. They fight like gangsters, without any regard for national rights and aspirations, and without any concern for human feelings and decency." Similar elastic propaganda is constantly aimed at the German homefront and the German soldier by the Nazi machine. How else can the Nazis force a change of public opinion, smoothly and successfully, in accordance with any particular line of policy? Without this elasticity the great majority of the German masses would probably still remember Goering's boast of Sept. 9, 1939: "I have seen to it that no enemy plane drops its bombs on German soil."

But no reliance is placed with Goebbels. His methods of political warfare are different from ours. He will tell the truth. Nazi propaganda deliberately distorts facts, uses threats, threatens, bluffs and stimulates lies through thousands of channels. Conquered people are not offered a choice between two sides when decisions are to be made. There is only one side, the Nazi side, and decisions are made for them.

III. FACTS VERSUS RUMORS

Every propaganda directed against our armed forces via short wave radio makes use of rumors of camps and neighborhood towns in the form of vicious rumors because innocent but careless listeners become Goebbels' assistants. Anxiety, hate, the desire to escape reality, or the belief in the supernatural, either one or several of these elements within the human being are exploited by Goebbels. Does he succeed? Here are a few rumors he very definitely succeeded in spreading, not without the help of American citizens:

- 1) The Red Cross doesn't need any more human blood because animal blood will do just as well. (Escape, supernatural.)
- 2) We will feed England and Russia even if our babies starve. (Anxiety)
- 3) Jewish doctors mix Negro and white blood in the Red Cross banks. (Hate and curiosity)
- 4) Our government has no intention of paying off the War Bonds. (Hate and anxiety)
- 5) Broadcasters live right inside our army camps. (Curiosity, anxiety)
- 6) Hitler is very sick, he lost his voice. (Escape)
- 7) A disastrous U.S. navy sinking in which 1,500 American troops lost their lives has been kept from the American public. (Anxiety)
- 8) Negroes and Jews are the only dates the girls can find because the white and Christian boys are busy fighting. (Hate, anxiety)

Every orientation officer must be prepared to spike rumors with facts. Facts must be cited promptly. Our soldiers should be conditioned by facts to refuse to spread rumors and thus become carriers - innocently - of enemy propaganda.

IV. GOOD AND BAD PROPAGANDA

The Orientation officer should try to present all aspects of the picture. He is not attempting to regulate opinion as one would not an alarm clock. In a word, orientation should be devoted to truth and accuracy. Between our method and the method of

the Nazis live a whole world. The methods have nothing in common, not even title or name. The days of Munich (1938) brought to a close the era when democratic nations could easily be deceived by "veiled facts". The Orientation officer will find explanations about the good and bad of propaganda quite useless. He is not likely to get very far with the soldier if he argues: "This is Nazi propaganda, and that is our own propaganda." Soldiers thus addressed will probably react with the same old healthy stubbornness which can best be expressed by the words of one of them: "I don't care. Propaganda is always propaganda. I refuse to have it stuffed down my throat". Whether we like it or not, this is the general attitude. Here arises the question: should we attempt to clear the issue by giving history lessons covering several centuries, or should we accept the popular objection? -- "Propaganda is something against us, propaganda has enslaved the people of Europe, we want no part of it!" In most cases it would be wise to choose the second method. It is a good rule to keep the word propaganda away from all issues concerning political warfare as conducted by the United Nations. (Office of War Information, combined psychological warfare efforts in the theatre of operations, orientation and education, etc.)

V. DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

We have lost considerable time in learning that the battle is not between several nations or continents beyond our oceans, but a battle between conflicting ideas: a battle concerning the two different kinds of societies in which man is to live. And we have lost - and are still losing - precious time re-learning that Democracy is "never a thing done", but that "Democracy is always something a nation must be doing".

There are still a few among us who, most likely in time of need and misery, will accept the definition of democracy as prepared by enemy propaganda for those who are weak. The French were victimized because they were led to believe that Democracy was "old, rotten system, not worth fighting for". Goebbels destroyed the integrity - the definition - of the word "democracy" in France and turned it upside down. The soldiers and the people of the Republic of France faced the most fatal issue in their history without inner conviction.

The Nazi "war of words" has attacked the whole conception of Freedom. It is naive to suppose that Freedom, and the integrity of the word "Freedom," are guaranteed by the "Bill of Rights". The enemies of Freedom have no respect for words that Congress adopted in the 18th Century, they are out to misrepresent and to liquidate their meaning, and finally to destroy such Freedom as we may possess. Only Democracy in action will be able to match conviction with conviction; in action no power on earth can conquer it.

VI. STRATEGY OF TRUTH

That is the issue of Democracy which must be made precise and clear to every soldier - no matter what his job or rank may be.

One task of Orientation is to interpret all aspects of the war on all fronts. Another, not less important task, is to interpret Democracy in a realistic sense in relation to the current news. If we believe that a person's behaviour springs from his ideas, then the task is also the good human life of the multitude, the betterment of human life itself. Orientation is, in its core, the effective influencing of attitudes of officers and enlisted men. So conditioned by freedom of honest thought our soldiers will not fall victim to any Nazi propaganda, they will not march home to look for "scapegoats": our soldiers will know that Democracy is an issue of which they are and have been an important and responsible part. That is the final achievement. There is no better way to create "faith in the future" and "belief in mission" for the American soldier. In this way Orientation officers will help the commander by providing him with efficient soldiers who possess three basic qualifications: "Maximum Zeal", "Maximum Self-Discipline", and "Maximum Self-Confidence".

There is only one appropriate weapon to beat the devices of the Nazi propaganda machine: the strategy of truth against propaganda.

This strategy calls for orientation, wisdom and guidance. It must be a continuous process - clear, confident, and inspiring; and it must be a serious command responsibility as the subject of "Military Security". Without conviction and belief in our cause, security is beyond our reach. A France lacking that conviction has shown how easily the enemy can paralyze and destroy the will to fight.

The strategy of truth is the task of informing our soldiers about the enemy and his methods. That strategy has for its object a truthful understanding by the soldier of the meaning of the war.

VII. THE INFORMED SOLDIER

"Propaganda" writes Lt. Col. F. S. Gillette, Command and General Staff School, "is intended to confuse rather than convert". Speaking of the soldier of our present Army in comparison with the American soldier of the first World War, he asserts:

"We have a different species to handle and we have to use a different psychologic approach to get the same results. Remember, however, that human nature has not been changed - it is only the education, the ideas and ideals put in the minds of these young men that is different. The approach must be different, but the results can be greater, for the soldier of today has more initiative, resourcefulness, and perhaps intelligence than his father had. Certainly he has a bigger job to do and if he can only be made to realize that fact and then shown how to accomplish the task, we need not be worried about the ultimate outcome."

Soldiers who are informed about the purposes of the enemy are more efficient. They will know, for instance, that a peace offensive by the enemy will not result in peace but in an increase of slaves. With correct records of events of the past years at our disposal, and with the victims of enemy propaganda offensives as examples before us, information can be disseminated on a large scale without great labor of research.

Orientation and information of our troops is a task which will not be fulfilled if we "borrow" from Goebbels. The strategy of truth is the exact opposite of propaganda in its present meaning.

ORIGINATORS FILE No. _____

SHAFF MESSAGE FORM

CALL _____ CIRCUIT No. _____ PRIORITY _____ TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS _____

NR

SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM	UNIT	ORIGINATOR	DATE/TIME OF ORIGIN
(A)		11/40	211832Z April 1944
TO FOR ACTION	AGWAR		
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)	FREEZE	TOP SECRET	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR
(REF NO.)	5-50895	(CLASSIFICATION)	

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COPY FILED FOR COMINT DEPARTMENT
100-3542-10-100

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			282105	
By authority of _____ Date _____	THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY UNIT		TIME CLEARED	

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SECRET
By: [Signature]
[Stamp]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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BY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS CMA THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARA SEVEN WILL APPLY FOR
THE TREATMENT OF ALL EXERCISES OF THIS NATURE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ORIGINATORS FILE NO.

OF SINATORS FILE No. _____

SHAFF MESSAGE FORM

CALL CIRCULAR NO. PRIORITY TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

NR

SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNAL USE ONLY

FROM (A) **UNITY** ORIGINATOR DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
 TO FOR ACTION **ARMED** **281830Z April 1944**
 TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO) **TOP SECRET** MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS **GR**
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 (REF NO.) **3-50896** (CLASSIFICATION) **TOP SECRET**

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TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION C/S C-2 C-3 PRO PRO ANCYF ARAF <i>Pro (Baw 244)</i>	COORDINATE WITH THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION	Precedence URGENT ORIGINATING DIVISION Secretary General Staff NAME AND RANK TYPED TEL NO MAJ J.B. MOORE Col. Ford Fritchley AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE	FBI or TOR Opr.
	NOTES THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS	TIME CLEARED	

(R3)

281830Z April 1944

S

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the G-6 at General Headquarters

1. Report Date 14 Feb 1945

Reference None

2. Date of Communication 4 Feb

3. File No. 5146

4. From Shawwood, G-6

5. To Gen Eisenhower

THE STAFF SPACE

6. The following is a summary of the information received from the G-6 on 4 Feb 1945:

7. Date Received: 4 Feb

8. Date Received: 4 Feb

9. Information until Daily

Initials BM

(G-6)

Initials

10. Remarks: Report checked to G-6 for

ready & preparation of reply.

Shawwood to G-6 2/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
ALLIED EXERCISE COMMAND COMMS

SLAF (44) 26

11/10 April, 1944

SUBJECT: COM/ONI Outline Political/Psychological Warfare plan -
"OFFICIAL"

TO : Air Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

1. The Supreme Commander has directed that the COM/ONI plan for Political Warfare be put into operation forthwith. Owing to political complications, however, the VERMONT section of the plan may not be put into operation in its entirety, but it is unlikely that the distribution of leaflets will be affected.

2. AG of A, G-6 (1st & 2nd Division) is being instructed to implement the plan and, in respect to the dropping of leaflets, to call upon you for aircraft to the extent of the ARAF air lift mentioned in SLAF (44) 26 (Add) dated 20th March, 1944.

3. The services of the Special Forces Squadron will be obtained direct by G-6 Division. This Squadron has, however, certain other commitments already assigned to it and it may be necessary for you to effect adjustment with respect to its employment on the leaflet distribution.

By Command of General Eisenhower:

W.H. Smith
W.H. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

Copies to: The Under Secretary of State,
The War Office, (HQ 1),
Office of the War Cabinet (Brigadier Jacob),
Headquarters, WEY/20, LONRUE,
SLAF -
G-2 Division (for CIN) (2),
G-3 Division,
G-6 Division,
Mr. Phillips,
Mr. Reske.

CONFIDENTIAL
RMB
10 AUG 1944

6 - 397

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Views on the Proposed
Reorganization of the Joint Staff, dated 1 April 1944.
Reference is made to the Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

1. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

2. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

3. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

4. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

5. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

6. The Joint Staff's report dated 24 March 1944.

Encl.

Distribution:

STAFF

SEC

SEC

Mr. Tolson

Mr. E.A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Egan

Mr. Gurnea

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Pennington

Mr. Quinn

Mr. Nease

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Mr. Pennington

Mr. Quinn

Mr. Nease

Mr. Gandy

Mr. Egan

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Mr. Pennington

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21 MAY 0800Z URGENT

GL-100 GLASS 3 x 20-40 L, 100%; 4. 187.5 x 224.4 WITH TROD PEGS 60.

A. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

2. Doublet Plan.

his flock will be one main target, the weapon against enemy troops before, on, and after D day.

(c) Let μ be a ν -p.s.

During this period, federal security agencies are "white" leaflets can be addressed to middle class Americans.

Terrible and cruel and a waste of the sort of the type now being dropped on Germany should be stopped else an unnecessary number German civilians in the West.

The purpose of the booklet is to increase war readiness among the garrison soldiers, and they must have no reference to future operations.

The form of user distribution will be decided in conformity with the Cover Note.

These facilities are the responsibility of SSGW in consultation with
21 Army Group. (S) (U) (C) (R)

(b) Don't go to end of world. Fine.

During this period no artillery or rifle shooting is likely to be possible.

Security will not, however, permit the mailing of airborne leaflets addressed to specific enemy formations including non-German units as well as leaflets addressed to enemy troops in the home area selected.

These facilities, unlike those damaged prior to 9 May, should be based on current operations. They should be designed to reinforce the sudden shock of invasion, impressing on the enemy the present weakness and the ultimate helplessness of his position. Plans specific to this will include any official efforts of amnesty which may be used to neutralize a target, and will be concentrated on targeted positions likely to be destroyed by the German withdrawal plan.

These leaflets will be prepared by H. Army Group in consultation with SILEX, and will be additional to the routine strategic leaflet programme, which will be the responsibility of S. A.

(c) From End of Article 1990 to 2 Plus 40.

On the main front, at least until 8 plus 40, the average daily rate of advance brought by the Long Group is too rapid to permit the shooting of artillery effects based on tactical intelligence and mounted in the field, save perhaps against an occasional pocket.

On the Mince, targets for lo 'trot shall ever well arise.

On the left flank the rate of progress forecast is slow. On the right flank, the rate forecast is that as well as on the main front, but good targets are present elsewhere wherever enemy units are pressed back against the sea.

Small stocks of standard leaflets (including "Trans-Jordanians") drafted and printed before today in the U.K. will be carried over in the first P.L. transport of all formations of the Army Group landed in this phase. These small stocks of newly printed leaflets, disseminated by our artillery or

Early in this period, a mobile printing unit will, if necessary, be landed with Army Group Main HQ, which, in conjunction with any liberated printing presses, will print tactical leaflets needed for the rest of this phase.

Para. 21 Army Group Leaflet Units are equipped to roll and deliver to British and Canadian units all leaflets produced in the field. First US Army will endeavour to conform by providing Leaflet Transport Units (jeep and trailer is suggested) on the minimum basis of 1 per Bn down to Corps inclusive (Appendix 'B' refers).

Field-loaded leaflets dropped by aircraft operating from overseas bases in the S.W.P. Consolidation area will still be the responsibility of SHPP, but 21 Long Group will take all possible steps to arrange for the dropping of field-loaded leaflets by aircraft operating from bases in its Combat Zone.

(2) Execution of Plan.

To co-ordinate this leaflet plan in all its phases to the civil population as well as to the army, EL Army Group will detail an officer to act as liaison with EMB/ELAF Leaflet Section. It will be a SLMF responsibility to clear all leaflet plans with the civil agencies.

2. Loudspeakers.

Though the Amplifier Units of PW 21 Army Group are primarily intended for news and propaganda to the civilian population, they have been designed for long range propaganda against encircled enemy units should the opportunity arise, and their personnel will have the linguistic qualifications for both tasks.

3. Interrogation of Pr.7.

It is agreed that on 21 Army Group frontiers of operations (c) above, propaganda investigation is a basis for tactical insights will not be needed on a large scale during the whole period under review. P (iii) i.e., 21 Army Group, augmented by two M.S. Division officers (II of appendix 'C' refers) and working in close conjunction with 15th interrogators, will suffice at least for the initial phase both for this purpose and for supplying G.H.Q. with such prisoner intelligence as may affect its policy. For later phases, further attachments of personnel from G.I.I.F. may be required (vide Note 2).

21 ANY OTHER INFO. about me:-

- (i) to supply special intelligence to brief base propaganda,
- (ii) to conduct ps. of W. for special interrogation by PWB/SHAF at InterPalm.
- (iii) to conduct ps. of W. for broadcasting purposes.

B. COMBINED POST : RELATION TO CIVILIAN ("FIRE AND CONSOLIDATION")

2. Amplifier Units (= U.S. Mobile Public Address Units)

Frontier units will be the principal means of disseminating news, instructions and encouragement to the civilian population in this zone. They are equipped with wireless receivers for relaying B.L.S. broadcasts direct, and for such monitoring as the linguist personnel require. The U.S. Public Address Units will also carry portable receiving operators.

21 Army Group (see Appendix 1). They are directed to be required to RAs of Arms and Corps, where their services will work in close liaison with the Branch in all their functions. Their duties will include the making of reports on civilian morale and the conduct of any information work of a political propaganda policy, strategic or tactical. These reports and data will be collected by R (iii) at Group HQ.

It has been arranged to land one amplifier unit with or in advance of the Main HQ of each Corps of Second British and First Canadian armies. First U.S. Army will endeavour to conform in phasing their own Public Address Units.

The remaining amplifier units will cross with 21 Army Group Main HQ, viz. between D plus 15 and 40.

2. Other Equipment for Disseminating Propaganda to Civilians in Combat Zone.

The Mobile Printing unit at Group HQ which can be used for printing notices, news sheets and leaflets for civilians behind our and the enemy lines as well as for shell leaflets, will be landed with 21 Army Group Main HQ early in period D plus 15 to D plus 40, if required.

A 4 kilowatt transmitter for emergency local broadcasting will be landed during this period.

3. Local Newspapers.

Moreover it is deemed desirable to start up local newspapers in the area forward of our army boundaries, the Press Liaison Officers mentioned in Section VI of Appendix 'C' will summon up from S.W.A.F. Consolidation Zone such technical, editorial and administrative personnel as may be needed.

4. Monitoring.

(a) Basic monitoring needed by amplifier units for their duties in the Combat Zone will be done by Amplifier Units on the receivers provided in their equipment.

(b) The Light Monitoring Unit to be attached to 21 Army Group by S.W.A.F. will operate at Group HQ and will provide such special regular monitoring required by HQs of formations in British and Canadian sectors. First U.S. Army will have its own Monitoring Unit (see Appendix 'B').

(c) S.W.A.F. have agreed to allot battery receiving sets for use by P.W. staff sections and formation HQs of 21 Army Group. 20 such sets will be required.

5. Psychological Warfare Intelligence.

Interrogation of P.W. is to be in line with A 3 above.

British and Canadian armies have no Psychological Warfare Intelligence or their own for assessing civilian morale. P (111) will collate reports on this subject received from amplifier units at Army and Corps Hqs. C.I., I (b) etc., and pass necessary information to S.W.A.F. (Section II of Appendix 'C' refers).

6. S.W.A.F. Peace Parties.

To ensure smooth transition between Army Group Combat zone propaganda to civilians and S.W.A.F. operational consolidation propaganda to civilians behind our army boundaries, it is suggested that S.W.A.F. should direct that their peace parties as set out in Appendix 'C', be landed with 21 Army Group Main HQ.

C. COMMUNICATIONS AND CRYPTS.

21 Army Group will receive directives from S.W.A.F. In addition to those, for the execution of its Combat Zone propaganda to the enemy and to the civilian population in the area forward of our army boundaries, 21 Army Group considers that, as its P.W. staff sections and all detached P.W. units

will listen regularly to R.B.C. broadcasts, it will need from SHLEF only such brief emergency guidance as any major political event would necessitate. SHLEF will state that communications they will require to enable their consolidation propaganda in line of any boundaries (static radios, papers, etc.) to be operated without undue burden in any signals.

The press communication requirements between SHLEF and 21 Army Group must be agreed by the "J" Branches concerned.

P & PW Branch
HQ 21 Army Group.
29 March 1944.

(Exclusive of Administrative Personnel)

RES. (C. & E.)

Publicity, Censorship & Psychological Warfare Policy

21 02/17/02

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The Mobile Printing Press
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One of the transmitters
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Five English Language Units	Five English Language Units
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[illegible]

REFERENCE TO
2. 100/1/100/2 & PW
200129 March 1944

ACTUAL REPORT FROM THE 100/100/2 & PW

F & M, First 10 Army will need the following minimum equipment to enable it to conduct its Combat Zone Propaganda on the same lines as Second British and First Canadian Armies:

1. Mobile C.A. Units (with radio receivers) - 1 per Bz down to Corps inclusive.
2. Jeep & trailer (for delivery of filled
100/100/2 & PW) - 1 per Bz down to Corps
inclusive.
3. 1 Mobile Printing Unit (Davidson) with operating staff.
4. 1 100/100/2 & PW (3 writers)
5. 1 Light Monitoring Unit.

STAFF OF THE 21st Army Group TO BE ATTACHED
TO THE 21st Army Group

Note 1: The personnel listed in this letter are required to be attached to the 21st Army Group to fulfill the main functions:

- (a) to represent First US Army on P (iii) and P (iv) 21 Army Group,
- (b) to enable 21 Army Group to conduct, on behalf of SHARP, reconnaissance and other consolidation activities in the Combat Zone Area.

Note 2: It is desirable that, to fit in with personnel requirements of present P & P, 21 Army Group, nearly all of the officers listed below should be French, and certain of them, in addition, should be German specialists.

I. Administration.

To administer the personnel attached to the establishment of P & P, 21 Army Group, as listed below, and to co-ordinate from military or local civilian sources the supply of equipment and stores needed.

Extra personnel needed from SHARP and First US Army: 2 Officers (French speaking): 7 Gns.

II. Psychological Warfare Establishment.

Section I (ii) of P & P, 21 Army Group, already has a number of British and German officers to carry out this work, which will also be done in part by the personnel of the Psychological Warfare Unit and by the "W" Detachment.

Extra personnel needed from First US Army:

- 1 Officer (French and German speaking)
- 2 Gns. (German speaking, one, P & P)

III. Liaison.

The Liaison Section of the 21st Army Group (iv) of P & P, 21 Army Group, have liaison facilities for their own needs, and some liaison is to be done with the 21st Army Group.

Extra personnel needed from First US Army:

- 2 Gns. (one, P & P)
- (1 Liaison Unit and Liaison Unit - officers and non-tech. Gns., P & P)

IV. Static Unit.

The operation of these is a responsibility of SHARP Consolidation personnel. P & P, 21 Army Group will call on as required. Civil Technical means to be to intercept and report on transmission in liberated areas of the Combat Zone, and (b) to be SHARP capable and liable to operate and control these transmissions, to be put into the Combat Zone the necessary official, technical and administrative staffs and SHARP Consolidation Unit.

Extra personnel needed from SHARP:

- 1 Officer (French speaking) 4 Gns. technical.

V. Printing and Leaflets.

- (i) Mobile Printing Press - for printing and leaflets, notices for civilian population, etc. for dissemination by P (iv) in Combat Zone of 21 Army Group.

Extra personnel needed :

1 officer: 15 ORs. (1 Mobile Printing Unit)

- (ii) Editorial - to assist the present editorial personnel of P (iv) P & PW in writing leaflets etc. for the American Army operating with 21 Army Group.

Extra personnel needed from First US Army:

2 officers; 3 ORs. (for attachment to P (iv) (all French and German speaking and all with some journalistic ability).

- (iii) Static Printing Presses: The operating of these is in the main the responsibility of SHAEF Consolidation personnel. As for Static Transmitters in IV above, what is needed at P & PW 21 Army Group is a small recon team.

Extra personnel needed from SHAEF:

1 officer (French speaking): 3 ORs. (technical)

VI. Local Press Liaison.

To reconnoitre in the Combat Zone facilities for the production of newspapers by local nationals, and, where it is found possible to operate and control these newspapers, to summon forward from the Consolidation Area such SHAEF personnel as may be needed.

Extra personnel needed from SHAEF:

2 officers (French speaking): 2 ORs.

VII. Cinema and Film Distribution.

To reconnoitre on behalf of SHAEF, cinema facilities and film distribution needs in the Combat Zone.

Extra personnel needed from SHAEF:

1 officer (French speaking)

VIII. Liaison.

For inter-service liaison with light bombing force (dropping of tactical leaflets printed in the field) 1 liaison officer is required per tactical Air Force operating on the Continent.

Extra personnel needed from First US Army and SHAEF:

2 officers.

IX. Co-ordinating of French Propaganda Policy.

An advisor to assist in co-ordinating the policy of propaganda to the civilian population in the Combat Zone.

Extra personnel needed from JCS/C I:

1 officer.

The above table omits the transport and drivers needed for these attachments. These details, and the ranks and nationalities of the personnel required will be settled direct between SHAEF and 21 Army Group.



~~SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

FILE COPY

30 March 44

TO: AC of S G-6:

Returned herewith in folio of leaflets left
for JGCS, with his remarks.

/s/ R.A. Harris,

Lt. Col
EA to JGCS.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FILE COPY

March 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Blakeney

- (1) I suggest that we copy these German leaflets and send them to Bromesbury as object lessons in how NOT to do propagandist. Students to analyze precisely what is wrong.
- (2) In replying to General Harzin, we might tell him that no German propaganda in Anglo-Saxons has been any good. Chief reason: Unlike us, they have not at their disposal a large number of highly skilled exiles. They have to rely on a few I.R.A. Irishmen, and renegades like Joyce and Pound.

/s/ R.H.S.C.

R.H.S. Crossman


RUSC/rr

(Pencilled note)

ACOS G-6

Many thanks. Ours looks to me to be pretty high class stuff

/s/ F.E.M.



b 405

~~SECRET~~

1. Name of Subject _____
 2. Date of Birth _____
 3. Place of Birth _____
 4. Date of Entry _____
 5. Date of Exit _____

26 March 1944

2. Date of Birth: 24 May 1944
 3. Date of Entry: _____
 4. Date of Exit: _____
 5. Date of Exit: _____

6. Subject was also known as: Political/PWE outline
 Plan for Operation. Action launched
 to G-3 to answer letter to Mas Office
 JIM

7. File Index Ref: _____ 8. Asst. Secy No. 8571
 9. Re-Open until _____ Initials: JIM
 (DATE) Initials: _____
 (DATE)

10. Remarks: _____

DRAFT CABLEGRAM

FROM : MIAMI

TO : Combined Chiefs of Staff

RECEIVED : BRITISH Chiefs of Staff

I am forwarding by fastest means copies of PW/OWI Outline Plan for political/psychological warfare in support of 'OVERLORD'.

Plan fully agreed here except for FRENCH Section. BRITISH Chiefs of Staff approval of FRENCH Section is withheld in view of Foreign Office comments that this section is unacceptable pending issuance of a directive to Supreme Commander defining the degree of recognition to be accorded the FRENCH Committee of National Liberation. As time is running short the Plan will be implemented insofar as possible in the absence of this directive. Until the directive is received considerable limitation is imposed upon the implementation of the FRENCH Section which constitutes a large portion of the complete Plan. It is urged therefore that all action practicable be taken to issue the directive at the earliest possible date.

SECRET

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(7)

SECRET

Secretary's File Copy
JBA/s,

SECRET

"OVERLORD" - Political Warfare Outline Plan

24 March 1944

1 538 C-3 24 March
Ops 1944

There is attached hereto for action letter from the Offices of the War Cabinet, dated 23 March 1944 regarding above named subject. This has reference to SHAEF (44) 26, dated 14 March 1944 as amended by SHAEF (44) 26 (Addt) of 20 March 1944.

1 Incl.
ltr dtd 23 Mar 1944 from
Offices of the War Cabinet
to C/S re: above subject.

F. T.

Date mailed _____

Date signed _____

6 315

SECRET

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OFFICES - THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

23rd March, 1944.

My dear General,

"OVERLORD" - POLITICAL WARFARE OUTLINE PLAN.

The Chiefs of Staff have read the Memorandum by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, on the outline plan on Political/Psychological Warfare Plan for OVERLORD, and take note:-

- (a) of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force's opinion that there appears to be no danger that the operational or the cover plans will be prejudiced.
- (b) of the air lift requirement for disseminating leaflets and of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force's views on meeting this requirement. In this respect, the Chiefs of Staff assume that any adjustments that may become necessary because of the shortening of time - for example an increase in sorties per month - are within the capacity of the proposed air forces.

The Memorandum makes no mention of the Foreign Office criticisms of the outline plan, but the Chiefs of Staff understand that agreement has been reached on the points mentioned. They would be grateful if you would consider the comments made by 'C' contained in the attached paper (C.O.S.(44) 172 (O)), and have invited 'C' to discuss with you the possibility of conflicts arising between his interests and those of S.O.E. and P.W.E. The Chiefs of Staff feel that it will be unnecessary to

Lieut.-General W. Bedell Smith,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force,

/refer

See letter
3 April 44

(2 copies)

414

3. The Chiefs of Staff would ~~also~~ like to be assured that account has been taken of the demands which will be made on available air lift by the requirement for introducing agents, wireless operators, etc., into enemy occupied territory which action constitutes a feature of the outline plan.

Yours sincerely,

Leila Carver

0418-25-8487244
G. A. ... Division



1364

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
DATE: 21st March 1944

21st March 1944

TO: The Director, War Office

FROM: A.C. of S, C-6

1. I am in the position of the War Office to say that, as far as the 21st March 1944, there has been a change in the opinion of the War Office as to the situation in Italy. There are most interesting aspects of this. I am not sure that the public will be able to follow the changes in my mind. I had the impression that it was to believe that the Germans were experts in this propaganda game, and that we should look to them for guidance in all matters connected with the particular situation, but at the same time we should be able to see the truth in their propaganda and the fact that they can do, then to see that I have not at all. These changes in opinion are to be made in connection with some of the most important aspects of the situation.

2. It is not clear to me whether our efforts are really better than those of the enemy. If they are not, then I am not sure that there is any reason to believe in the Army Group's opinion that the Germans are experts in this propaganda game. I am not sure that we are not better than they are. I am not sure.

3. I am not sure that the situation is as bad as it seems to be.

0911412

W. J. M. M. M.
Major-General,
War Office Staff.

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Phot

SECRET
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Copy to 16

SECRET (AA) 26 (Am 4)

27 March, 1944

SUBJECT: Two-day propaganda for "OPERATION"

To : The Secretary,
Chief of Staff Committee,
Office of the War Cabinet.

It is reported that paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report on the JMS/OSI Outline Plan for Political Warfare, SECRET (AA) 26 dated 14th March, 1944, were based on a miscalculation of the air lift available. It is understood that, on realising the error, the Staff of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force have taken steps to delay the completion of this report pending this correction. Paragraphs 4 to 5 of the report should therefore be deleted and the following substituted:-


"5. The JMS/OSI outline plan envisages the dissemination of 262½ (short) tons of leaflets over FRANCE, 27 over BELGIUM, 47 over HOLLAND, 40 over NETHERLANDS and 3½ over LUXEMBOURG. This total of 432½ (short) tons, amounting to 131,590,000 leaflets, represents the total requirement up to 15 May, to be disseminated in two drops per month over that period."

6. Allied Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters consider that it would be undesirable to divert strategic bomber aircraft from their normal role to undertake this task, and have stated that arrangements could therefore be made for the Tactical Air Force under their control to combine leaflet-dropping with their operations, but only over the areas in which they normally operate. In this way the whole of the 181st AF commitment, 22 (short) tons could be met, and approximately 126 (short) tons of the MARCONI.

7. There could also remain the commitment for BUNTAY, REPOBANK, HOLLAND and the remainder of 181st AF, totalling some 256 (short) tons. This could be met by the special purpose aircraft which specialise in the dropping of leaflets by night, as it is calculated on the basis of past experience that it could drop 420 (short) tons in the three months' period. This figure is based on an average of twenty sorties per month of five aircraft each, carrying a load of 2,600 lbs per aircraft.

8. Finally, that approval is given for this squadron to undertake the longer term work to be completed, and that the surplus capacity is not exceeded by other commitments, the additional air lift called for by this plan could be found without calling upon the strategic bomber forces."

For the Aircrew Commander



6 417

C/

[Signature]
For the Aircrew Commander
16 AUG 1945

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of
The War Secretary, The War Office,
The War Secretary of State, The War Office (H. 1).
The War Secretary of State, The War Office (H. 1).
The War Secretary of State, The War Office (H. 1).

Page No.

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MEMORANDUM

Q-2 Division.
Q-3 Division.
Q-3 Division, (for attention Major General).
The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).
The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).
The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

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SECRETARIAT
2266
S. H. A. E. P.

SECRETARIAT

18 March, 1944

The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

1. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

2. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

3. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

4. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

5. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).

6. The War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), has received a letter from the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1), dated 18 March 1944, regarding the War Secretary, Political Affairs (H. 1).



Attached
Signed by D/S
(REM) 18 MAR 1944
Returned to 2-3

18 MAR

14 March 44

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SECRET (44)

March, 1944

SUBJECT: Pre-D day propaganda for 'OVERLORD'

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Office of the Chief of Staff.

It is regretted that paragraphs 5 to 8 of the report PWE/ONI Outline Plan for Political Warfare, (44) 26 14th March, 1944, based on a miscalculation of the air lift available. It is understood that, on realizing the error, the Staff of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force have taken steps to delay the consideration of this report pending this correction. Paragraphs 5 to 8 of the report should therefore be deleted and the following substituted:-

"5. The PWE/ONI Outline Plan envisages the dissemination of 100% (short) tons of leaflets over FRANCE, 52 over BELGIUM, 47½ over HOLLAND, over NORWAY and 31½ over DENMARK. This total of 433½ (short) tons, amounting to 131,590,000 leaflets, represents the total requirement up to D day, to be 100 tons drops per month over that period.

6. Allied Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters consider that it would be undesirable to divert strategical bomber aircraft from their normal role to undertake this task, and have stated that arrangements could therefore be made for the tactical Air Forces under their control to combine leaflet-dropping with their operations, but only over the areas in which they normally operate. In this way the whole of the BELGIAN commitment, 52 (short) tons could be met, approximately 126 (short) tons of the MERCH.

7. There would thus remain the commitment for NORWAY, DENMARK, the remainder of FRANCE, totalling 256 (short) tons could be met by the special Fortresses squadron which specializes in the dropping of leaflets by night, as it is calculated on the basis of past experience could drop 420 (short) tons in the three months' period. This figure is based on an average of twenty sorties per month of five aircraft each, carrying a load of 2,600 lbs per aircraft.

8. Assuming that approval is given for this squadron to longer trips that would be involved, and that its surplus capacity is exceeded by other requirements, the additional air lift called for by this plan could be found without calling upon the strategical forces."

For the Supreme Commander

CONFIDENTIAL
BY [Signature] 67 Gen Morgan
100% Mar 44 and returned
6-3
b 420

W.B. [Signature]
Lieutenant General, US Army
Chief of Staff

(Distribution (see list))

DISCUSSION

34594

The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Office of
The War Cabinet,
The Under Secretary of State, The War Office (No 1),
Air Headquarters-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force,

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2000年12月29日
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Gen. M. L. Lutz,
C-3 Division.
Gen. E. W. Davidson, (for attention Major Fraser).
Mr. E. W. Davidson, Political Warfare Div.
Mr. C. E. Smith, Political Warfare Div.
Sgt.

[illegible]

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MOST SECRET.

Copy No. 56

C.O.S.(44) 109(0)

19TH FEBRUARY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEF OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - POLITICAL WARFARE OUTLINE PLAN
(Reference: C.O.S.(44) 109(0))

Noted by Secretary


The attached copy of a letter from "G" commenting on the OVERLORD Political Warfare Outline Plan² is circulated for consideration by the Chief of Staff.

2. In anticipation of instructions, it has been referred to C.O.S.E. 1 with a request that account of it should be taken in the review of the Outline Plan now being prepared.

(Signed) L.G. HOLLIS

Officer of the War Cabinet, S.M.L.

19TH FEBRUARY, 1944



6 annex
C.O.S.(44) 109(0) - 510 10 Feb 44

SECRET

"OVERLORD" - POLITICAL WARFARE

Copy of letter (C/P 22) dated 17th February, 1944
sent to the Secretary, Chief of Staff

In your letter of 13th February (190/4) you ask for my views on the plan for Political Warfare which had been prepared for operation OVERLORD.

I take it that this plan represents the maximum of activity which, under ideal circumstances, it could be hoped to achieve. Even if allowance is made for some scaling-down of stated requirements to correspond to the number of men and machines which are likely to be available, I still regard it as inevitable that the execution of this plan, even in a modified form, would have a

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serious effect upon the vital work of S.I.E. I base this view not only on the point mentioned in paragraph 3 of your letter, namely the general disturbance and confusion which may well ensue in my existing intelligence networks, but also on two other factors which should be taken into account:

- (1) The increase in German counter-measures, which will certainly be intensified as soon as the scale of these projects becomes apparent with the approach of "D" day. In this connection I may mention that I have already had evidence of -
 - (a) The reinforcement with German personnel of the guards upon railways in France and the Low Countries.
 - (b) The preparation of "diffiches" for rounding-up civilians who have no good reason to be at large.
 - (c) The forthcoming issue of new cartes d'identite as a check upon suspects.
- (2) The strain on our already limited resources in aircraft and personnel. If you will refer to the "Estimates of Requirements" for the various countries concerned, you will see that the following agents and wireless operators are required under this plan:

<u>Agents</u>		<u>Operators</u>
Belgium	17	16
Holland	13	11
Norway	20	unspecified, say 18
Denmark	10	unspecified, say 8
	60	53

You will notice that no estimate is given for France, which presents the largest problem, but on the basis of the foregoing requirements for the smaller countries, it must be assumed that at least 20 agents and 20 operators would be required. Assuming that each agent and wireless operator would go as a pair, it may be estimated that some 77 sorties would be necessary to deliver these 104 bodies. I need hardly emphasise the extent to which these requirements will increase the existing competition for aircraft and suitable personnel; the shortage of trained wireless operators is particularly acute. It must also be borne in mind that excessive transmissions tend to congest the ether, unless frequencies are controlled.

I do not wish to appear unduly critical of the plan as a whole, but I feel that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of all its implications. I have already had a preliminary discussion with Major-General Brooke, who has agreed that P.W.E. should consult my organisation about the details of these projects, but I understand that P.W.E. are not altogether free agents, since the Political Warfare plan has been jointly concerted with the Americans. I feel, therefore, that the requirements of this plan emphasise the need for priorities to be assigned on the highest level and that, if the plan is put into effect on its present scale, the ability of S.I.E. to obtain vital operational intelligence may well be adversely affected.

serious effect upon the vital work of S.I.S. I base this view not only on the point mentioned in paragraph 3 of your letter, namely the general disturbance and confusion which may well ensue by existing intelligence networks, but also on two other factors which should be taken into account:

- (1) The increase in German counter-measures, which will certainly be intensified as soon as the scale of these projects becomes apparent with the approach of "D" day, in this connection I may mention that I have already had evidence of -
 - (a) The reinforcement with German personnel of the guards upon railways in France and the Low Countries.
 - (b) The preparation of "affiches" for rounding-up civilians who have no good reason to be at large.
 - (c) The forthcoming issue of new cartes d'identite as a check upon subverts.
- (2) The strain on our already limited resources in aircraft and personnel. If you will refer to the "Estimates of Requirements" for the various countries concerned, you will see that the following agents and wireless operators are required under this plan:

	agents	operators
Belgium	15	25
Holland	10	21
Norway	20	unspecified, say 18
Denmark	10	unspecified, say 8
	55	70

You will notice that no account is given for France, which presents the largest problem, but on the basis of the foregoing requirements for the smaller countries, it must be assumed that at least 25 agents and 20 operators would be required. Assuming that each agent and wireless operator would go as a pair, it may be estimated that some 70 aircraft would be necessary to deliver these 154 bodies. I need hardly emphasize the extent to which these requirements will increase the existing competition for aircraft and radio personnel; the shortage of trained wireless operators is particularly acute. It must also be borne in mind that excessive transmissions tend to congest the ether, unless frequencies are controlled.

I do not wish to appear unduly critical of the plan as a whole, but I feel that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of all its implications. I have already had a preliminary discussion with Major-General Greene, who has agreed that F.W.E. should consult my organization about the details of these projects, but I understand that F.W.E. are not altogether free agents, since the Political Warfare plan has been jointly conceived with the Americans. I feel, therefore, that the requirements of this plan emphasize the need for priorities to be assigned on the highest level and that, if the plan is put into effect on its present scale, the ability of S.I.S. to obtain vital operational intelligence may well be seriously affected.

14th March, 1954.

24.9 (5) 26

[illegible]

TO : The President,
Office of the President,
White House, Washington, D.C.

To: Mr. [illegible]

Con Papers
Book I

7. In addition to the details of work (the high meeting (3), item 5), a report is prepared based on the results of the three emphasis plan for political leaders to the event and description (item not 4) covered, and on the amount of financial efforts provided to implement the plan.

3. The object of the plan is to prevent the establishment of the occupied countries in backwardness which is a factor of eventual invasion. Care will be taken neither to encourage nor hinder action, nor to build up any expectation of assistance in the near future. There will be given instructions on their behaviour in the event of the enemy not intervening in order and using the threat of the onsets at the appropriate moment if necessary. The whole plan, with the exception of minor adjustments not indicated, is sufficiently general to be adapted to suit the system, covering from the original plan to reveal the presence of invasion in any form.

5. The purpose sterilization of the landless should also not compromise the overall plan. The rate of unemployment will be allowed to build, and the relative number of landless children in the various ecological zones will provide no significant information on the target area or its target rate. In fact, the rate of unemployment is to be allowed to fluctuate in the extreme North-East of India and in the low populated states in which it is high even in them.

4. In General Wischnewski's opinion, therefore, there appears to be no danger that either the recruitment or the cover plans will be jeopardized.

5. The official statistics of the distribution of 151,580,000 leaflets during the year are summarized by chart in the appendix prior to the "Summary". In addition to the statistics the words of personal observation. The gross additional effort required will be required to implement the plan is summarized in the attached report, and shown in the number of twenty-eight heavy bomber sorties per day over North-West GERMANY and NETHERLANDS for the next three months. Plans state that of this additional effort, twelve bombers and the Special Airforce Squadron, which has undertaken their operations over all North-West GERMANY, can undertake the NETHERLANDS and one half of the important GERMANY commitment. The RAF have no other resources to undertake the remainder of the North-West GERMANY commitment. Therefore, it is more that this remaining commitment, amounting to a total of one hundred and thirty (130) sorties during the three months period, will be immediately taken over by a new unit to be undertaken by the strategic bombers. It is to be noted, in evidence, that the total diversion of bomber effort for this purpose must be started at this time in the absence of information as to the limited distribution which can be accomplished in consequence, with partial bombing operations.

5. In order to be in compliance with the regulations which can result of dropping a child, the child must be notified by letter to this effect and the child must be given the opportunity of such a hearing. In particular, the requirements of contacts and services can be reduced by a reduction of the child's

1. That, based on information by
 the witnesses, the total
 he stated at this time in the
 action which can be accomplished
 2. The information which
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 was that of the witnesses
 a person can be judged by
 3. The information which
 was obtained by the witnesses
 was that of the witnesses
 a person can be judged by

It is further suggested that if the question that the additional effort is necessary at this early stage is to be implemented on the basis which he considers is feasible, the extra effort must be generated in extensive and continuous consultation with friendly foreign governments. For the proposed propaganda to produce the required identification, it will be necessary to deliver it on a fairly extensive scale. It will be necessary to prepare the people of the occupied countries adequately for the propaganda, and thereby reduce the effectiveness of anti-aircraft assistance, and will have a varied impact on the success of OPERATIONS.

4. It is recommended, therefore, that an allocation of approximately one hundred and fifty dollars over the above period should be provided to meet the portion of the conflict management costs in the attached Appendix which cannot be reimbursed by charging the resources of the JMWG (Special Forces Liaison and Modern Warfare).

[illegible]

Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

Chlorine, 25.00%

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

^a $\chi^2 = 0.76$, $p = .82$.

The Secretary, Division of Social Security, advises of the most satisfactory of them, the San Antonio (2103), and recommends its purchase.

4. 2. 7.

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Case 2: $\text{deg}(f) = 3$.

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C-22 Synthesis

5-11

Geoff Milne

 $12 = 13$

Mr. J. Phillips, Political Advisor (US)

14

Dr. G. Jerome, 1014 1/2 2nd St. S. - (601)

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• *See also* 100-101, 102-103, 104-105, 106-107, 108-109, 110-111, 112-113, 114-115, 116-117, 118-119, 120-121, 122-123, 124-125, 126-127, 128-129, 130-131, 132-133, 134-135, 136-137, 138-139, 140-141, 142-143, 144-145, 146-147, 148-149, 150-151, 152-153, 154-155, 156-157, 158-159, 160-161, 162-163, 164-165, 166-167, 168-169, 170-171, 172-173, 174-175, 176-177, 178-179, 180-181, 182-183, 184-185, 186-187, 188-189, 190-191, 192-193, 194-195, 196-197, 198-199, 200-201, 202-203, 204-205, 206-207, 208-209, 210-211, 212-213, 214-215, 216-217, 218-219, 220-221, 222-223, 224-225, 226-227, 228-229, 230-231, 232-233, 234-235, 236-237, 238-239, 240-241, 242-243, 244-245, 246-247, 248-249, 250-251, 252-253, 254-255, 256-257, 258-259, 260-261, 262-263, 264-265, 266-267, 268-269, 270-271, 272-273, 274-275, 276-277, 278-279, 280-281, 282-283, 284-285, 286-287, 288-289, 290-291, 292-293, 294-295, 296-297, 298-299, 300-301, 302-303, 304-305, 306-307, 308-309, 310-311, 312-313, 314-315, 316-317, 318-319, 320-321, 322-323, 324-325, 326-327, 328-329, 330-331, 332-333, 334-335, 336-337, 338-339, 340-341, 342-343, 344-345, 346-347, 348-349, 350-351, 352-353, 354-355, 356-357, 358-359, 360-361, 362-363, 364-365, 366-367, 368-369, 370-371, 372-373, 374-375, 376-377, 378-379, 380-381, 382-383, 384-385, 386-387, 388-389, 390-391, 392-393, 394-395, 396-397, 398-399, 400-401, 402-403, 404-405, 406-407, 408-409, 410-411, 412-413, 414-415, 416-417, 418-419, 420-421, 422-423, 424-425, 426-427, 428-429, 430-431, 432-433, 434-435, 436-437, 438-439, 440-441, 442-443, 444-445, 446-447, 448-449, 450-451, 452-453, 454-455, 456-457, 458-459, 460-461, 462-463, 464-465, 466-467, 468-469, 470-471, 472-473, 474-475, 476-477, 478-479, 480-481, 482-483, 484-485, 486-487, 488-489, 490-491, 492-493, 494-495, 496-497, 498-499, 500-501, 502-503, 504-505, 506-507, 508-509, 510-511, 512-513, 514-515, 516-517, 518-519, 520-521, 522-523, 524-525, 526-527, 528-529, 530-531, 532-533, 534-535, 536-537, 538-539, 540-541, 542-543, 544-545, 546-547, 548-549, 550-551, 552-553, 554-555, 556-557, 558-559, 560-561, 562-563, 564-565, 566-567, 568-569, 570-571, 572-573, 574-575, 576-577, 578-579, 580-581, 582-583, 584-585, 586-587, 588-589, 590-591, 592-593, 594-595, 596-597, 598-599, 600-601, 602-603, 604-605, 606-607, 608-609, 610-611, 612-613, 614-615, 616-617, 618-619, 620-621, 622-623, 624-625, 626-627, 628-629, 630-631, 632-633, 634-635, 636-637, 638-639, 640-641, 642-643, 644-645, 646-647, 648-649, 650-651, 652-653, 654-655, 656-657, 658-659, 660-661, 662-663, 664-665, 666-667, 668-669, 670-671, 672-673, 674-675, 676-677, 678-679, 680-681, 682-683, 684-685, 686-687, 688-689, 690-691, 692-693, 694-695, 696-697, 698-699, 700-701, 702-703, 704-705, 706-707, 708-709, 710-711, 712-713, 714-715, 716-717, 718-719, 720-721, 722-723, 724-725, 726-727, 728-729, 730-731, 732-733, 734-735, 736-737, 738-739, 740-741, 742-743, 744-745, 746-747, 748-749, 750-751, 752-753, 754-755, 756-757, 758-759, 760-761, 762-763, 764-765, 766-767, 768-769, 770-771, 772-773, 774-775, 776-777, 778-779, 780-781, 782-783, 784-785, 786-787, 788-789, 790-791, 792-793, 794-795, 796-797, 798-799, 800-801, 802-803, 804-805, 806-807, 808-809, 810-811, 812-813, 814-815, 816-817, 818-819, 820-821, 822-823, 824-825, 826-827, 828-829, 830-831, 832-833, 834-835, 836-837, 838-839, 840-841, 842-843, 844-845, 846-847, 848-849, 850-851, 852-853, 854-855, 856-857, 858-859, 860-861, 862-863, 864-865, 866-867, 868-869, 870-871, 872-873, 874-875, 876-877, 878-879, 880-881, 882-883, 884-885, 886-887, 888-889, 890-891, 892-893, 894-895, 896-897, 898-899, 900-901, 902-903, 904-905, 906-907, 908-909, 910-911, 912-913, 914-915, 916-917, 918-919, 920-921, 922-923, 924-925, 926-927, 928-929, 930-931, 932-933, 934-935, 936-937, 938-939, 940-941, 942-943, 944-945, 946-947, 948-949, 950-951, 952-953, 954-955, 956-957, 958-959, 960-961, 962-963, 964-965, 966-967, 968-969, 970-971, 972-973, 974-975, 976-977, 978-979, 980-981, 982-983, 984-985, 986-987, 988-989, 990-991, 992-993, 994-995, 996-997, 998-999, 1000-1001, 1002-1003, 1004-1005, 1

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SECRETARIAT

1. NAME: _____

1905

S. H. AE. F.

33

AMERICAN
 26 MAR 1944
 14th March, 1944

AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERTISE IN ITALY
 (PART I) INFORMATION FOR THE JAPANESE

Country	Number of sections	Estimated machine production		Number of sections acquired
		Number of machines	Weight in tons	
FRANCE	3 sections	100,000,000	250 tons	12
BELGIUM	3 sections	1,000,000	25 tons	51
NETHERLANDS	3 sections	2,500,000	50 tons	23
HUNGARY	3 sections	1,400,000	20 tons	27
GERMANY	3 sections	1,500,000	20 tons	22

426

(6)
 Number of machines 100,000,000
 Estimated weight 250 tons
 Number of sections 12

11. (1)

13.5.44

DAILY BRIEF OF RUSSIAN DEFENSES PARANOL

(12th/13th March, 1944)

DISSEMINATIONS

The Germans suggested that the new Russian offensive was following the familiar pattern - "remarkable successes" at the outset, though insufficient to admit strategic exploitation, now followed by a general stiffening of German resistance owing to the arrival of "considerable reserves". The danger threatening certain German units of encirclement "can now be considered as past". It was admitted, however, that "heavy defensive fighting" continued against a "numerically superior enemy", and that the Germans had succeeded in advancing in some sectors, although they had again been ejected from Paranopol and their attempts to cross the Bug and the Ingulets had been smashed.

The Germans congratulated themselves on the results of the first fifty days of fighting in the Anzic beach-head; as a result of their two February offensives, they had manoeuvred the Allies into a dangerous position and frustrated their plans. According to a "Trans-caucas" correspondent, the Allied troops were engaged on fortifying their forward lines still more strongly with barbed wire, and it therefore appeared that the operations in the beach-head would for the immediate future retain the character of trench warfare.

MAIN FEATURES

FEBRUARY

Russia: On the sixth day of the new Russian offensive, "the most important points of the attacking area" were "firmly in German hands". Marshal Zhukov's nearest objective, the Tarnopol-Skutsch railway, was being protected against "the wild thrusts of the Kolchessky". Attempts by the Germans to push across the frozen Bug near Tarnopol and south-west of it, and across the Ingulets in the lower Bug area were smashed. The Russians now indeed said only to have succeeded in gaining ground to the south-east of Kirovograd, and that at the expense of "considerable unsuccessful sacrifices". But the outstanding feature in the situation was, according to an "International Information Bureau" report, "the intensified German counter-attacks, which, particularly in the Tarnopol area, largely frustrated the attempts to holding the territory taken on the first day of the attack". It was claimed that the Soviet troops, who had again penetrated into Tarnopol on Saturday, were annihilated except for a handful of prisoners. Although Marshal Zhukov was continuously bringing up reinforcements "from the rear and the central sector to replace his immense losses in men and material", German resistance was continually stiffening "owing to the arrival of considerable reserves".

The "Trans-caucas" military correspondent gave quite a different picture of the position. The Germans, he said, had allowed for the most part carried out their "systematic detachment operations", and the threatened encirclement of certain German units "can now be considered as past". There was nothing new in Marshal Zhukov's strategy. He was engaged on a massive attack on a wide front at focal points and "attempted pinning movements over large areas", involving "ruthless abuse of his own infantry and tank assets". The first successes following such mass attacks were familiar from former Russian offensives. A Hungarian commentator, broadcasting in German, following the same line, compared the present course of events with the great battles of last summer, when the Russians' initial gains were "checked in the end by successful German counter-attacks".

On the northern sector a "clear and particularly outstanding defensive successes" were obtained at the "old front points".

Italy: The "Trans-caucas" correspondent on the Italian front remarked on the quietness of the front on "the fifteenth day" since the landing of the Allies south of Anzio. "The German line (Anzio)", he said, "very well be satisfied with the results of these first fifty days. After the successful reduction of the landing beach, at the outcome of the two February offensives, the divisions of Marshal Mordvinov have manoeuvred the Allies into a dangerous position, and, for the time being, have frustrated their offensive plans." He deduced from

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the fact that "Allied investigators have furnished still more strongly their foremost lines, using linked live entanglements... that the battle of the beach-head will remain for the immediate future the character of beach warfare."

"Some sensational statements", made by Italian soldiers who had escaped to the German lines regarding conditions in Sardinia and Naples, were broadcast by "Trans-ocean". The civilian population of Sardinia was said to be practically without bread, whilst the food situation in Naples was "catastrophic". The Allies were threatening Italian soldiers who deserted to the Germans with torture and death. "If they would come over in their thousands", it they only knew the welcome which awaited them "in the German lines".

"D.K.S." stated that the German Command had deliberately avoided the occupation of Florence "in order to prevent the inevitable railroad arguments there... but this did not prevent the Anglo-Americans from directing their terror bombers to Florence."

The Second Front: There was some reaction to the speeches made by General Montgomery and General Eisenhower. According to "D.K.S.", "they are both talking big and trying to persuade their audience to believe that the invasion and a victory over Germany are really only child's play". A "Trans-ocean" message, dated from Stockholm, asserted that General Montgomery's "exuberant optimism" was "evidently not shared by the British command", as "the greater part of the successful predictions about the coming invasion" had been omitted from Reuters' "corrected" version of the speech. The two bogus freedom stations suggested that the invasion of the Continent was being deliberately delayed. The "New British Broadcasting Station" explained that, according to "a persistent rumor in circles very close to the Government", the delay was due to uncertainty regarding the policy of the Russians and in fact had started: "Very serious and important discussions in Moscow have strongly suggested that if a great Anglo-American expeditionary force were to invade Western Europe, Stalin would considerably alter the extent of his military efforts on the Eastern Front."

According to a "Radio France" message from Berlin, von Rundstedt was on a tour of inspection of units on the Atlantic Wall between March 26 and 31. "He stressed the need for the efficiency of the Atlantic system which will check all landing attempts. In a short speech, he gave as a slogan 'Destruction of the enemy and a fight to the last man'."

Foreign Day: German home broadcasts were largely devoted to the commemoration of "Foreign Remembrance Day". Admiral Doenitz, who spoke instead of the Fuehrer, emphasized the need for national unity and "unconditional loyalty" to Hitler, and warned his hearers that "even the slightest deviation from this attitude diminishes our strength."

DISTRIBUTION:

A.C.I.C.S., R.M.O., D.M.C., P.M.A., P.P., P.A.A., D.O.M.L.(1), D.D.M.L.(2),
D.D.E.P., R.C.S., 4, 12, P.O.M.S., R.M.S., 1, 4, 7, 18, L.S.B.B., R.L.C.,
F.L.(P), C.A.B., 20, A.S.A.C., L.A., L.A., Research Secretariat, C.A.2, P.R.1.,
A.R.O.A., A.D.(S.), S.P.A.M.P., V.A.S.(1), Hon. Secs., P.S.(2) Commands,
21st Army Group, 79th Airedale Division, Canadian Military H.Q., Polish C.I.C.,
P.V.E., Adm. Staff, Air Ministry, C.P.O., C.S. Secs., British Liaison Office,
E.T.C., U.S.A., Soviet Military Mission.

~~SECRET~~
 CHIEF HEADQUARTERS,
 AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 C-3 Division

REF: 17240/322

11 March, 1944

SUBJECT: P 2/01 Outline Plan for Political Warfare

TO : Chief of Staff

I - RECOMMENDATION

1. Under date of 31st January, 1944, the AC of S, P 2/01 Division, transmitted to AC of S, C-3, a copy of an estimate of air lift requirements (TAB A) to implement the P 2/01 Outline Plan for Political Warfare. This estimate envisaged the distribution, during approximately a three month period prior to D Day 'OVERSEAS', of 151,590,000 leaflets over North-east EUROPE and GERMANY-VIA, in addition to maintaining the existing scale of leaflet distribution. The additional air lift required for this purpose is estimated at an average of twenty-eight heavy bomber sorties per week for the three month period.

2. The Chiefs of Staff (C-3) (TAB A) (c) Item 5) (TAB B) invited the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces:-

a. to review the Outline Plan for Political Warfare in relation to the Operation and cover plans now approved; and

b. to estimate the amount of additional effort required to implement the Plan, and to submit a report.

3. I have had the P 2/01 Outline Plan reviewed carefully and find it in accord with approved Operation and cover plans providing certain considerations are observed in its implementation. These considerations are covered in letter which I have prepared for transmittal to the AC of S, C-3 Division. Copy is attached at TAB C.

4. I have also had the matter of additional air lift requirements studied in consultation with the Air Staff. The Air Staff made certain proposals in TAB D (air, dated 1st February, 1944, (TAB D) for meeting the air lift requirements. The C-3 Division found these proposals unsuitable, however, and on further study the AC of S reported that RAF could undertake the constituent covering GERMANY-VIA and one half of North-east EUROPE (TAB E). The remaining constituent (one half of the leaflet distribution for North-east EUROPE) will apparently have to be covered for by the use of strategic bombers if the complete distribution is to be made. It amounts, however, to only approximately one hundred and thirty sorties for the three month period, or approximately twelve sorties per week. Possibly, also, some of these sorties can be covered in conjunction with normal heavy bomber missions.

5. It is my opinion that the required air lift to implement the P 2/01 Plan for Political Warfare should be furnished.

6. I have prepared, for the Chief of Staff's signature, a report to the Chiefs of Staff in compliance with their request. (Please refer to paragraph 2 preceding.) A special copy of this report is attached at TAB F. It recommends (in its final paragraph) that the additional lift required to implement the P 2/01 Plan be provided.

II - EXPLANATION

7. That the Chief of Staff approve the letter report to the Chiefs of Staff (TAB F), and sign the airmail (TAB G).

III - OTHER MATTER

8. Political advisers' views.

b. The Staff has been consulted and has furnished the information as to AEF's resources to meet the commitments (TAB H) which have been incorporated in the letter to the Chiefs of Staff (TAB F).

TAIRATER: 6


Approved

FEM

11/3/44

Returned to C-3

11/3/44,
 Major-General, C-3,
 Chief of Staff, C-3



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STANDARD HEAD LINES
M. I. D. L. 100/101 - MAY 1944
1st Division

SHAW/17250/028

March, 1944.

SUBJECT : 1st day propaganda for tomorrow
TO : Chief, G-6 Division.


Reference SHAW/17404/15/4, dated 5th February, 1944.

1. The JWS/OWI Outline Plan is agreed, provided that the following considerations are observed in its implementation:-

- a. No notice must be taken which will disclose the target area.
- b. The text of the leaflets will in no way disclose the imminence of the target area.
- c. Very precaution must be taken to prevent any premature notice by nationals in the occupied countries.
- d. The point to bulk of leaflets must be, as far as possible, evenly spread in the different countries, and should bear no relation to the operational importance of these countries as likely targets for attack. Council area should not be included for distribution.
- e. Once the plan has begun to be implemented, distribution must remain steady. There must be no increase of tempo either in bulk or propaganda content.

2. A report on the plan is to be rendered to the BRITISH Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Chiefs of Staff 44th Meeting 105 (9) dated 10th February, 1944. A draft of this report is attached as an appendix to this letter.

3. This report places your requirements before the BRITISH Chiefs of Staff for approval.



By SHL,
Major General, GS Army,
AG of S, G-5.

C/

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

Date 6/3

TO: ACOS - G-3

I am told that the outline Prop-
aganda Plan is with you.

Can you tell me how it stands,
please?

PEM

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4

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CONFIDENTIAL

1. It will be the policy of the United States to support the free people of the world in their struggle for freedom and independence. This policy is based on the principle that the United States has a right to be free from the domination of any other power and to live in peace with all nations.

2. It is the policy of the United States to support the free people of the world in their struggle for freedom and independence. This policy is based on the principle that the United States has a right to be free from the domination of any other power and to live in peace with all nations.

3. It is the policy of the United States to support the free people of the world in their struggle for freedom and independence. This policy is based on the principle that the United States has a right to be free from the domination of any other power and to live in peace with all nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. It is the policy of the United States to support the free people of the world in their struggle for freedom and independence. This policy is based on the principle that the United States has a right to be free from the domination of any other power and to live in peace with all nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. It is the policy of the United States to support the free people of the world in their struggle for freedom and independence. This policy is based on the principle that the United States has a right to be free from the domination of any other power and to live in peace with all nations.

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SECRET

Supreme Commander's Requirements of Norwegian Government Regarding Publicity and Propaganda.

1. Mr. 303 10
William Phillips.
Political Officer
(US) &
Mr.
Charles Reake.
Political Officer
(UK)

1. Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Supreme Commander's Requirements of Norwegian Government Regarding Publicity and Propaganda", 17 February 1944, has been received and considered. Is it desired to submit this document for action or for information?

2. If submitted for action, it is requested that the document be sent through interested Staff Sections for their comments and recommendations before being submitted to the Chief of Staff for final approval or action recommended by the Staff.

1 Incl:

Mr. and Mrs. [illegible] in Political Officer's Office.

D.G.

nns

Attached

2. 353 Political 19
Officer Feb
'44

As-submit to C of S for approval please through:

AC of S, C-3
AC of S, C-5
AC of S, PA19

When you can mark as concurring.

C.F.

AC of S, 303 12 Feb.
C-3 1944
AC of S,
P & PR

For your recommendations to the Chief of Staff.

1 Incl: n/c


D. G.

nns

Date Signed *21 Feb 44*

Date Valid *21 1555*

Suspend until 3 Feb 44



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SECRET

18-2-44

10-1-44

563-487

CARB

SECRET

563-447

EACH MEMO ON REPLY BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER.

TO	FROM	DATE	FILE NO. SUBJECT: Supreme Commander's Requirements Norwegian Government Regarding Publicity and Propaganda.
1. Mr. William Phillips, Political Officer (US) & Mr. Charles Peske, Political Officer (BR)	809	19 Feb 1944	<p>1. Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, Subject "Supreme Commander's Requirements of Norwegian Government Regarding Publicity and Propaganda", 17 February 1944, has been received and considered. Is it desired to submit this document for action or for information?</p> <p>2. If submitted for action, it is requested that the document be sent through interested Staff Sections for their comments and concurrences before being submitted to the Chief of Staff for final approval of action recommended by the Staff.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">D.G.</p> <p>Incl: Ltr, subj as above, dtd 17 Feb 44, fr Political Officers, SHAEP. <i>Attached</i></p>
2. SCS Political Officer	19 Feb 44		<p>re-submit to C of S for approval please through:</p> <p>AC of S, 7-3</p> <p>AC of S, 7-3</p> <p>AC of S, 10-3</p> <p>which you can back up concerning.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">D. P.</p>
3. AC of S, G-2, AC of S, G-3	SCS	21 Feb. 1944	<p>For your recommendations to the Chief of Staff.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">D. G.</p> <p>Incl: n/c</p>

8034 21 FEB 1944
G-3 (Ops) Division

CONFIDENTIAL

Rm. Bins
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SECRET

ADO-SHAEP

PAGE No.

Office Form No. 1 (27 Jan 1944)

LIST HERE

USE OTHER SIDE

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference: _____

~~UNITED STATES - SECRET~~

CHARITY:
TO :

CHARGE BY THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND DISSEM

CHARGE BY CHIEF
ASST. CHIEF
ASST. CHIEF, I-1
ASST. CHIEF, I-2

1. Since our agreements with the Norwegian Authorities have been signed it will be necessary to discuss with them our propaganda responsibilities in Norway.

2. In 1940 the British Government concluded with the Norwegian Government an agreement which gave propaganda for Norway and not for the United Kingdom. The United States Government has concluded a such agreement. The Norwegian Government have a right of individuality and exclusiveness where propaganda is concerned and have hitherto, as a result of this agreement, made it extremely difficult to bring propaganda work in Norway.

3. The American authorities have stated that the Norwegian Military Authorities, and the Norwegian Government, are not authorized to agree to any attempt to bring propaganda work to the Norwegian Government or the Norwegian Military Authorities. It is authorized to agree to it.

4. It has been agreed, therefore, that even the agreement is signed it will be agreed in the British Foreign Secretary, and the British Government will have to agree to keep the Norwegian Military Authorities informed of the Norwegian situation and to, respectively, keep them that the British Government will have to keep the Norwegian Military Authorities informed of the situation in the field of propaganda, and all other matters of the United States and British

By
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By
By

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(P&C INVOICE)
C-14151

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S. H. AE. F.

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10 FEB 1944
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COPY

5. "OVERLORD" - POLITICAL WARFARE PLAN-

(C.O.S. (44) 108 (0)).

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (44) 33rd Meeting (0), Minute 12).

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Note by the Secretary covering an outline plan for political/psychological warfare for "OVERLORD", which had been submitted by S.H.A.E.F. for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIMPSON pointed out that the Plan would need revising in the light of the cover and deception plans* which had now been approved by the Chiefs of Staff. For example, it would be important to ensure that the building up of a sense of urgency amongst the populations of occupied territories should be timed to meet the requirements of the deception plans rather than those of the actual date for launching the assault.

With reference to objective 'B' of Aim One of Annex I to the Plan for "FRANKIN" Case C, he felt that warning should be issued against excessive promises for rehabilitation and relief which we had no hope of implementing in the early stages of re-entry.

SIR NEVILLE SYFRINT referred to the statement in the Introduction regarding the importance of making available the necessary number of Allied agents. He felt that it should be made clear that, while recognising the necessity for ensuring that the authorities who would execute the Plan should have available sufficient suitable agents to implement their final plans, we should deprecate anything which encouraged any large-scale release of personnel from Allied military forces such as might be read into paragraph 3(b) of the Introduction.

SIR DOUGLAS SMILL said that, although there were frequent references to the employment of more agents and leaflets, there was no attempt to assess the additional aircraft which would be required to distribute them.

He said that he agreed with the need for reviewing the plan in relation to the specific deception plans which had now been approved and suggested that, while this was being done, the amount of effort required to implement the plan should be estimated, since it would be impossible to decide whether it could be carried out in full until that assessment had been made.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Accepted, in general principle, the class of action proposed in COS(44) 108 (0).
- (b) Invited the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force:
 - (i) to review the Plan in relation to the deception and cover plans now approved;
 - (ii) to estimate the amount of additional effort required to implement the Plan, and to submit a report.
- (c) Invited the Foreign Office, in their examination of the Plan, to take note of the comments of the Chiefs of Staff as reported above, and to take action in (b) above.


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* Minutes 3 and 4 above.

-4-

~~SECRET~~



Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

Date: 14 July 1944

TO:

General SMITH

General MURPHY

For information.

(General MacLure forwards the attached captured German document as a matter of interest because it demonstrates enemy's reaction to Allied propaganda.)

6 436

Commanding General
709th Inf. Div.

RESTRICTED

Headquarters
3 Feb. 44.

SUBJECT: Questions of Leadership and Morale
Defensive Measures against Enemy Propaganda.

TO: Commanding Officer of Regiments and Battalions.

1. The enemy is trying, with unheard-of hatred, with ever-changing tricks and ruses, with lies and falsehoods and with everything however mean, to undermine the morale of the German People and to force a decision on the "battlefield of War of Nerves", just as he did in the first World War. In the West, the efforts of the enemy agitators have been intensified from month to month. I need only mention the increasing number of seditious leaflets in German and the dangerous propaganda broadcast by the provocative enemy station "Soldatensender Chatelet". It has become decisive for the outcome of the war that we provide officers, non-commissioned officers and men with convincing counter-arguments well ahead of time and that we promptly parry any propaganda attack by the enemy.
2. There still are occasional cases where unit commanders have not yet been convinced of the importance of this task. We must bear in mind that during the first World War enemy propaganda succeeded in wearing down the morale and fighting spirit of the German people to such an extent as to contribute materially to the economic and military breakdown. We must always be aware of this precedent as a warning example.
3. The best means of gaining the morale of the soldiers is, in addition to the example which an officer must set by his conduct, for the commanders to talk to their men. The purpose of these talks is so to instill the principles of National Socialist leadership into the individual man that they become part and parcel of him. Therefore, political instruction cannot and must not be neglected any more than the cleaning of rifle or gun. It is less important for the subordinate unit commander to deliver a well-prepared elaborate lecture than to discuss with the soldiers current political and military questions, to dispel any doubt and to look after the well-being of his men. This requires that the unit commander himself is so firm in his political belief and so well versed in National Socialist ideology as to convince the man of the sincerity of the person talking to him about these things. The commander's heart must be in it.
4. In those exceptional cases where this type of instruction cannot be carried out regularly or often enough, as in isolated strongpoints, it becomes doubly important to insure that officers and men will have an opportunity to read the material reaching them. All commands are regularly supplied with instruction material - the situation, current political and military events, and on all kinds of problems confronting the soldier, and with material for combatting enemy propaganda. We may mention, among these, the "Kursnachrichten des OKW" (Brief News from Supreme Headquarters), "Nachrichten des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht" (News from the Supreme Headquarters), "Mitteilungen fuer die Truppe" (Communications to the troops), "Mitteilungen fuer das Offizierskorps" (Communications to the Officers' Corps), "Armee-Nachrichten" (Army Journal), newspapers and periodicals. This material - and especially daily papers - can of course be effectively used only if it reaches the lowest units as fast as possible. The place for newspapers and periodicals is not in offices but with the troops.
5. The Political Officer (N.S.-Fuehrungsaffizier) of the division is available also to individual units for lectures and will call on the units, on my orders, to advise and assist unit commanders.
6. The Fuehrer demands that all commanders down to the company COs etc. will do their utmost to utilize fully every opportunity to maintain also the fighting spirit of the troops.

6 436

(sgd) von Schlieben

A True Copy

(Signature)

Captain

Copies to: C/A
C-2 (Gen. Strong)
C-3 (Gen. Bull)
7/13/44

RESTRICTED

*Copy for
Director
File*

COSSAC (43) 48,

Principal Staff Officers

*for original directive
see file 3173.1044 B*

US-CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH - SECRET

8th September 1943.

PROPAGANDA PLANS


1. A copy is circulated for your information of a Directive approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for issue to all theatre Commanders.
2. Action in this matter will in the first instance be co-ordinated by the Major General Intelligence, who will make proposals as to the procedure to be followed in the framing of a propaganda plan for 'OVERLORD'.

Central Secretariat,
HQ COSSAC

Major 28

Major 28

MC



DIRECTIVE.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Whenever a plan for an operation is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, you will without delay submit a propaganda plan pertaining thereto. This plan will become effective upon approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. Each plan will be in consonance with basic propaganda plans in effect in the areas involved or will indicate any changes desired therein.

3. The plans will indicate:-

- (a) The propaganda aims and themes to be effective before and during the operation.
- (b) The plan for effecting changes in approved themes to meet changes in the situation.
- (c) The assistance desired from agencies under the control of, or co-operating with, the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (d) The system for releasing information of the initiation of major phases of the operation.
- (e) To include such other features as you may desire.

Brigadier General
The Adjutant General

[illegible]

* THIS INFORMATION IS SUPPLIED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND RECORD-KEEPING PURPOSES ONLY. IT IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSES. IT IS NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY. IT IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSES. IT IS NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY.

*Approved by the Board of Directors on 12/15/2011

10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE *U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

10. The assignment described in the preceding paragraph is being made for the purpose of conducting the investigation of the activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A., in the State of New York, and the results of the investigation are being furnished to the State of New York for its use in the prosecution of the case.

...in the situation

6 AUG 1955
U.S. AIR FORCE
RECEIVED

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2. ~~Group 1~~ In comparison with local companies, it was

the Commission will be able to make a more informed decision on the proposed plan.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

1. The Joint Hqs, China of Staff have approved the following

Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Army Forces
China-Burma-India
Commanding General,
Southwest Pacific Area
Commanding General,
Burma Defense Command
Commanding General,
Burma Defense Command

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

(098-639) SUBJ: UPANISAD; REFERENCE: "SOPHIA"

6 September 1943

NOV 4 1964 000-126 JEW/1252

AG 051.412 (2 Sep 43) On E-E-12

The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

2) 214.130 DV

DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. D.D.
Date _____
Article _____

OPD 000.24 (1 Jul 43)

2 July 1943

000.7

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS:

Subject: OMT Outline Plan for Propaganda to
Belgium - Basic and Contingent.
(JCS 366 & 366/1)

(581)
Enclosed OMT Outline Plan for Propaganda to Belgium has
been approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It is
submitted for your information and appropriate action.

THOS. T. HANCOY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

L. J. Lincoln
L. J. Lincoln
Lt Col. G.S.C.
Acting Chief, Combined Subjects Sec.

2 Encls.
JCS 366, Copy No. 32.
JCS 366/1, Copy No. 8.

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CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
TO CONFIDENTIAL
DATE 15 AUG 1945



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C/ (B)

WAR DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. C.D.
JUL 2 1943
Date
Initials

OFD 000.24 (1 Jul 43)

2 July 1943

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SHAFFSGS File No. 091, 112

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS:

Subject: OMI Outline Plan for Propaganda to
Yugoslavia - Basic and Contingent
(JCS 365)

Enclosed OMI Outline Plan for Propaganda to Yugoslavia
has been approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It is
submitted for your information and appropriate action.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

L. J. Lincoln
L. J. Lincoln
Lt Col. G.S.G.

Acting Chief, Combined Subjects Sec.

1 Encl.
JCS 365, Copy No. 32



Handwritten initials and marks: C, 10, 11

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S., OPD

Date *July 1943*

000.7

OPD 000.24 (1 Jul 43)

2 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS:

Subject: OWI Outline Plan for Propaganda to
Denmark - Basic and Contingent.
(JCS 367/1)

Enclosed Outline Plan for Propaganda to Denmark has been
approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted
for your information and appropriate action.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

L. J. Lincoln
L. J. Lincoln
Lt Col G.S.C.

Acting Chief, Combined Subjects

1 Encl.
JCS 367/1, Copy No. 31.



AG TOP SECRET
CONTROL PROGRAM
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4

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BEGINS

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
TROJAN HORSE

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-4 Division

REF: A749/1/100

SUBJECT: 'TROJAN HORSE'

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff



19 April, 1944.

1. I have had the above project examined and am able to give the following information on its status.

2. 'TROJAN HORSE' is the nick-name given to the conscript-foreign workers inside GERMANY. The project is as 'harnessing the TROJAN HORSE' is the brain-child of P.C. Gordon Walker, a young G-4 AGD and journalist who is at present head of the GERMANY Regional Broadcasts, a sub-section of the BBC Foreign Broadcast Service. The outline project has been submitted to various authorities, including the War Office and the Ministry of Information.

3. Both the War Office and the Ministry of Information have refused to have anything to do with the project. WE have also rejected it in its present form, but are independently studying the possibility of 'harnessing the TROJAN HORSE' in support of our operations.

4. In its present form 'TROJAN HORSE' is a dangerous plan were it to be put into effect. The outline argues that 'the millions of conscripted workers and foreign prisoners of war now in GERMANY constitute a unique revolutionary force', whose latent power, if properly led and co-ordinated with our operations, might be tremendous. If we do not employ the 'TROJAN HORSE', it is argued, we may lose an opportunity of creating chaos behind the enemy's frontiers and thereby prolong the war.

5. The project recognises that it would be most effective if put into operation when 'HARKIN' 'U' conditions are imminent. In fact, the argument in its favour is similar to that in favour of a levee en masse in FRANCE, namely, that it may turn the scales at a critical moment. In its present form however, the project, though it might succeed in tipping the balance, would in so doing upset the scales.

6. I have therefore assured myself that an action is being taken along lines suggested by Dr. Gordon Walker. To make certain that the AGD are not acting independently I have arranged with the War Office to render this headquarters a report on the type of broadcast carried out by the GERMANY Regional Broadcast, and to furnish me with samples of the programme material used.

7. WE's investigation of 'TROJAN HORSE' promises to raise quite different questions. Their approach to the question is threefold. They are concerned with:

a. organising the conscript workers inside GERMANY. This action is in full swing to-day in collaboration with G-4/AGD, and constitutes the 'Homer Plan' action outlined by the Gordon Walker project. The object of this organisation is to secure:

- (1) creative action or passive resistance on the part of the foreign workers inside GERMANY, or
- (2) direct action on their part against GERMANY morale and the GERMANY war industry.

b. large scale sabotage when the organisation of the workers has progressed sufficiently far,

c. a form of levee en masse inside GERMANY at the crucial moment.

246

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SGS - SHAEF File No. 912/41

R.

8. [redacted] is little [redacted] use [redacted] do [redacted] a. [redacted] along [redacted] lines [redacted] approved by this Headquarters. That [redacted] underground [redacted] having some [redacted] appears certain but [redacted] difficulties of communication are such [redacted] we cannot estimate its magnitude. [redacted] scope of a. above is such [redacted] be [redacted] avail at. [redacted] provided it [redacted] not get out of [redacted] lead to bloody repression we must encourage [redacted]. Every Gestapo agent required in a GERMAN factory [redacted] one base for FRANCE.

9. The proposal with regard to b. [redacted] operation 'BRUNSKILL II' should be put into effect. This involves the scattering [redacted] some 5,000,000 special-type incendiaries over selected [redacted] in GERMANY. Each incendiary could have attached to it an instruction leaflet for its use printed in nine languages. It is hoped [redacted] a substantial proportion [redacted] these incendiaries would [redacted] their way into the hands of conscripted foreign labour. [redacted] expected to use them to good effect. We [redacted] not [redacted] alarmed at the possibility of this operation being put into effect without [redacted] knowing it, as [redacted] requires War Cabinet sanction [redacted] it can be launched, and as [redacted] stocks of incendiaries [redacted] held by GOR.

10. What we must pay [redacted] attention to is [redacted] proposal for a leave on [redacted] inside GERMANY. This is [redacted] the subject of study by PW, [redacted] copies of any resultant outline plan will be passed to G-3 for 'vetting' before submission to the Chief of Staff.

11. Thus [redacted] there is little indication (unless the reports [redacted] to receive concerning the MGC's broadcasts are to provide the evidence) [redacted] we [redacted] become unduly alarmed about PW activity affecting GERMANY. The existing activity is not in conflict with directives [redacted] by this Headquarters, and any proposals for future action [redacted] be submitted to G-3 before being forwarded to the Chief of Staff for approval. I consider therefore that General Mason [redacted] been unduly alarmist in his information on 'TROYAN SQUARE'.

12. I shall keep you informed of any further developments.

H.R. BULL,
Major-General, GSC.
AC of S. G-3.

28

(END COLUMN)

(Taken from "Daily Sketch" - April 14, 1944)

HITLER FEARS ARMY OF THE TROJAN HORSE

By "Daily Sketch" Special Correspondent

There is in existence to-day a great Allied army which the Nazis fear as much as the advancing Red Army or the Allied invasion armies preparing in Britain. It is an army inside Germany, an army numbering millions. The Army of the Trojan Horse.

This Trojan Horse is composed of hundreds of thousands of workers from all the countries the Nazis have overrun—French, Belgians and Dutch, Norwegians and Danes, Poles and Russians.

To their number are added almost weekly escaped prisoners of war. These include British soldiers—officers and men.

According to the German Press, they have also been joined by Allied parachute agents and by Allied airmen who have had to bale out.

Huge numbers of these men are to-day going about openly in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Hitler cannot cope with the problem they present.

In the big R.A.F. and American raids, Nazi administrative offices have been wrecked and documents and card indices relating to Germany's labour slaves destroyed. Frequently sabotage completes the destruction.

FORGED RATION CARDS

As a result, in many places Nazi administration has broken down. When a factory is bombed the foreign workers, often joined by the Germans, merely walk out. They find themselves free of all control.

Evacuation and dispersal of labour and other offices have added to the confusion.

The Hamburg Press recently reported that after last July's blitz more than a million people—half the population—left the city. Similarly the people who fled from Cassel after a big raid last October have not yet been tracked down.

The organisation of the Trojan Horse is daily improving. To-day a foreign worker who escapes can be provided, if necessary, with clothing, money, food, false papers and forged ration cards—all within 24 hours.

Liaison with the underground fronts of the occupied lands has been established. Couriers pass regularly between the secret movements in the occupied lands and the army of Trojan Horse in Germany.

So, as the Allied Governments in London are in close touch with their underground fronts at home, it is a logical deduction that the authorities in London are in contact with the Trojan Horse organisation inside Germany.

The People of Germany do not know what to fear most - the R.A.F., the Gestapo, or the Trojan Horse.

FOOD RAIDS ■ FARMS

When food supplies are needed, the men on the Trojan Horse boldly raid German houses or plunder farms. They are carrying out small-scale operations in preparation for the day when they can strike with all their force and co-operate with our invasion armies.

6 449

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO ~~SECRET~~ SECRET

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SGS - SHAEF FILE NO. 100/100/100

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SECRET

Already the men of the Trojan Horse have begun to secure German arms and Allied officers in their ranks are giving them military training.

Himmler now finds himself in a vicious circle. Foreign labour — needed and the men who now form the Trojan Horse were brought in. But meanwhile many of the regular police and S.S. men who might have kept them in check have been dispatched to help fill the gaps on the Eastern Front.

At the same time, the occupied lands — growing more and more restive, and police and Gestapo reinforcements have had to be sent there.

Germany's Home Guard, the Landwehr, has also proved inadequate. So a fortnight ago all Germans were ordered to undergo rifle training to cope with the menace in their midst.

When the time comes these men will come out into the open and the Germans, assailed from East and West, will also have to deal with a merciless enemy in their midst.

COPY

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

18 April 1944

My dear Sir Robert:

Mr. Gordon Walker's paper containing a plan for "Trojan Horse", which has been furnished General Morgan, Deputy Chief of Staff, by General Wason, has caused some concern in this headquarters. The implementation of this plan without close coordination with the Supreme Headquarters might cause considerable interference with military operations.

The Planning Section of this Division has concerned itself with plans for the control of movements of displaced persons and also with calls for assistance from unorganized nationals of occupied countries. Such plans in these directions as are drawn up by this Division will, of course, be coordinated with your office.

It is recognized that a useful purpose is now being served by encouraging these foreign workers in Germany to make individual efforts to get back home, — to slow down their work, or commit minor acts of sabotage which might not be detected, and such appeals and instructions to them should continue. It is the latter part of the plan calling for mass movement which gives us major concern.


It is requested that any "Trojan Horse" activities be closely coordinated with this headquarters, and under no circumstances any call for mass movement of displaced persons be issued without the Supreme Commander's approval. Since these programs go out over BBC facilities, can you advise me whether their broadcasts on this matter are under your complete control?

Sincerely,

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Copy to G-3
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, KCMG,
P.T.D.,
Bush House,
London, W.C.2

SECRET



6 451

COPY

COPY FILE NO. 44/11/1

OPY

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PPH 221

18 April 1944

SUBJECT: Trojan Horse


TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, SHAEF

1. With reference to Mr. Gordon Walker's paper == plan for "The Trojan Horse", which was forwarded from General Morgan through G-3 Division to G-6 Division, the planning section of this Division has been engaged for some time on preparing a plan to cover this matter. Upon completion of this plan it will be coordinated with both G-2 (Int) and G-3 Divisions, as well as the propaganda agencies, before it is put into operation.

2. While we have had oral assurances that the mass movement contemplated in the "Trojan Horse" plan would not be implemented without full coordination with this Headquarters, a letter has been written to the Director General PWE making formal representation to this effect. Copy attached.

/s/ ROBERT A. McCLURE,
ROBERT A. McCLURE,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

1 Incl.
Copy of letter to
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart



See SHAEF File No. 44/111

~~SECRET~~

OPY

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copy

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SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

11th April 1944

SUBJECT: Trojan Horse

TO : A.C. of S, G-3

11 April 44

1. Would you please have a look at this note of 7th April by G-6. Maybe it is all right, but I have sort of feeling that what P.W.E. think they are doing and what they ~~are~~ actually achieving may be two very different things.

2. Apparently the underlying intention is as ~~is~~ decided it ought to be in the first instance, namely that the effect of the Trojan Horse operation should be, as you might say, nothing much more than a bad smell. But I get the impression from various sources that the actual result being produced is getting to be very like that described as undesirable by G-6 in their para. 3.

(R2)

3. What do you know about it?

/s/ F. E. MORGAN,
F. E. MORGAN,
Lieutenant-General,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO ~~SECRET~~
By authority of C.E.L.A.
BY P. PAISLEY
ANAL AGENT
Date 28 JUL 1945

SECRET FILE NO. 01.11.44

28

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copy

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SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED PROSECUTION FORCE

10th April 1944

SUBJECT: Trojan Horse

TO: A.C. of 2, C-3

1. With regard to my note of 4th April on the subject of the "Trojan Horse", I see from the Central Directive issued by P.C.E. that the Trojan Horse plan is in full swing and orders have been issued to intensify this work. From reports it seems that there is considerable evidence of the success of the scheme up-to-date, and presumably it will become increasingly successful as it goes on.

2. Though we would possibly have had it otherwise for various reasons, it seems that there is no possibility of interfering with what is going on, and we must be to the inevitable. Further plans should be made (more on this).

F. S. MORGAN,
Lieutenant-General,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

6 454

DATE SIGNED 10/4/44
DATE MAILED 10/4/44

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO: Date 20 April 1944

GENERAL MORGAN.

The attached memorandum is
in answer to your letter of 11 April
1944 (TAS A).

/s/ F.F.
F.T.

SECRET
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-6 (Publicity & Psychological Warfare) Division

PPW 221

20 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Trojan Horse.

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. As General Mason says, in his letter of 20th March, much propaganda effort in support of the foreign workers in Germany, and to disturb the peace of mind of the Germans concerning them, has been and is being done.

2. For your private information, there has in the past been considerable discussion between S.O.E. and P.W.E. on this subject, but after close examination, it was decided that instructions to these foreign workers should, in general, be limited to the following:-

- (a) "Go slow" tactics in factories,
- (b) Endeavour to escape back to their homes in the confusion following heavy air raids on German cities,
- (c) Spread defeatism among German factory workers and ordinary civilians, and endeavour to persuade them to listen in to the R.R.C. German language broadcasts.

Both through P.W.E. agents in Belgium and S.O.E. contacts with Resistance groups in that country and in France, it has been possible to indoctrinate and instruct certain workers prior to their departure for Germany for this conscripted labour. But, the impossibility of organizing secure and rapid communications once the men are in Germany has greatly limited activities. However, the fact that many thousands of French, Belgian and Dutch workers have succeeded in escaping from Germany would indicate that Allied efforts to influence these have not been entirely unavailing. Further, the fact that German propaganda frequently depicts the foreign workers as scape-goats for crimes committed in the black-out or after air raids tends to show that the authorities are nervous of the "Trojan Horse" in their midst. This nervousness is in turn communicated to the general public in Germany.

3. It is felt that the possibilities of using these workers in anything but a passive role to support military operations are strictly limited, mainly due to the difficulty of transmitting instructions (other than general advice by means of the R.R.C.) and maintaining contact. In any event, it would appear improbable that the workers, unarmed, without central leadership, and broken up into relatively small groups in Germany or German-occupied territory, could effectively stage a rising subsequent to D-day. Their best opportunity would occur a few hours before the final cracking of the German front and home-front. But, since military requirements for the rapid occupation of Germany demand a strong central authority to control the armed forces within the country, and the civilian population, rebellion and rioting by millions of vengeful foreign workers could only lead to chaos and a multiplication of the Displaced Persons Problem, which is already acute. Therefore, it would seem that the "Trojan Horse" should continue to be used as a powerful psychological weapon, but in a passive rather than an active role.

It is suggested that a reply to General Mason should include:-

- (a) Advice that this Division is already in close contact with P.W.E., G.W.I. and other interested parties, on this subject.
- (b) That a representative of this Division will gladly read the paper prepared by the R.R.C. Workers Section on past activities.
- (c) That this Division may from time to time suggest to P.W.E. and G.W.I. aims and themes required by G-2 to support military activities.

/s/ ROBERT A. MCCLURE
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Prigadier General, G.S.C.

SECRET

6 457



Department of State,
Public Affairs Office

SECRET
File No. 91.41-1

1. However, in a paper that I have obtained recently on the subject of "Hypnotizing the Russian People" it deals with an aspect of psychological warfare that is of the greatest interest to us.

2. In my mind, this paper alone constitutes an irreproachable argument for tightening your hold on psychological warfare. I fancy that the paper, as it stands, has no force, but it is nevertheless symptomatic of what is going on and that is increasingly likely to go on behind the scenes. If this project as it stands is allowed to go into effect it is likely to create a state of affairs exactly such as we would not wish. In other words, we shall have 8-5 (Eight minus 5) against 6-6.

3. I am far from satisfied that we have acquired anything like sufficient degrees of control over any of the more sophisticated methods of warfare and I would be obliged if you would take this matter under study and see how we can improve our control of psychological warfare in particular. The psychological warfare should now be in full blast and should have been so for some time. It may not be too late to take hold of it and put it in our Commanders' hands. We must do our best to do so.

SUBJECT: Russian Hypno.
A.O. of S. G. J.

File

4th April 1944

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APR 11 1944

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

30th March 1944


SUBJECT: "Trojan Horse"

TO: A.C. of S, G-6

1. I enclose a letter and newspaper cutting that I have received from General Mason of the S.R.C. ■ due course, would you please return these to me with some indication as to how I should reply.

2. I seem to have heard of this "Trojan Horse" somewhere, possibly from you, possibly from S.O.E. I take it that this particular activity will come under the general cover of ■ psychological plan if and when we ever get one, but I am ■ bit hazy ■ to the channel we should use when dealing with this subject. Does one do it through you or through S.O.E, i.e. G-3?

/s/ F. E. MORGAN
F. E. MORAN,
Lieutenant-General,
Deputy Chief of Staff.



28 JUL 1945

6 458

(B)
365 CHAFF File No. 091217

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~~SECRET~~

THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Bush House,

W. C. 2

29th March 1944.

My dear Freddie,

Here is another B.B.C. activity to which I am — you would like to have your attention drawn.

There is a "section" in the European Broadcast Organization which has been broadcasting to the "workers" in various countries in Europe. This is with the help of the three big International Trade Unions. It has latterly had its eye also on the foreign workers in Germany, and it has gone a certain distance in giving them instructions as to organization and action. There are also the prisoners of war, and there is a special programme for them — at present in French only. Together these bodies go by the name of the "Trojan Horse" (of which you've heard): there are 10,000,000 — of them. (R)

So far instructions on this subject have been received from the P.W.E.; more correctly they have been drawn up by the B.B.C. Workers' Section, and O.K. -3d by P.W.E. There is a large body of evidence that they reach their audience, and that the Germans are apprehensive of the "Trojan Horse". I attach a cutting just by — out of yesterday's TIMES. 27 March 44

This section is run by Gordon Walker, an Oxford Don. I have been asked to find out if the use of this (from the military point of view) potential weapon is being studied. He has written a paper on the development of the work of his section. Would you like to depute — to read it? It is not very long, (7 pages of foolscap).

Yours sincerely

S.R. Wason
(Military Correspondent;
BBC European Division).

6 459
Lt. Gen F.E. Morgan M.C., C.B.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By authority of CALA
By **K.F. PAISLEY**
Major, AGD
28 JUL 45

~~SECRET~~

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GERMAN SETTLERS

"TERRORIZED

ABANDONED HOMESTEADS

IN BALKANS

From Our Special Correspondent

Stockholm, March 27

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO RESTRICTED By U.S. AIR FORCE By J. M. PAISLEY Date 28 JUL 1946
--

The Germans have published the remarkable announcement that areas in the Balkans have become unsafe for habitation by German civilians, and settlers of German race, because they are infested with armed bands who plunder homesteads and kidnap, beat, or kill the occupants "terrorizing all by day and night". Therefore, the enemy authorities say, they are organizing rescue work and the transfer of the German population to safer regions by special "evacuation commandos".

The areas mentioned as being most dangerous are north-west Slavonia and Croatia, where the "commandos" are now rounding up the surviving Germans. The first batches have already been taken to Vojvodina province, nearer the Rumanian-Hungarian frontiers, and assembled temporarily in Syria, between the rivers Sava and Danube.

According to one German provincial newspaper, this evil of "armed terrorist bands" exists not only in the Balkans but much nearer Germany, and "threatens public security in many parts of Germany itself." The bands are composed, it is said, chiefly of fugitive war prisoners, foreign labourers, deserters from the German army, enemy agents dropped by parachute, and so on. German deserters as a component of "terrorist bands" have scarcely been mentioned before in the frequent German references to armed bands behind the front in Russia, the Baltic States, and Poland.

PROTECTIVE POLICE

The eastern half of Poland is still an "infested" area, but the activities of the partisans are clearly extending westward. To combat them the Germans have organized a new police force called the landwacht, besides the existing Stadswacht and Ortswacht, both for parts of the so-called General-Government and for Wartheland and other annexed Polish territories. Almost every German Adolescent and adult in these regions now belongs to some sort of armed police force for protecting the local German community.

Last week the Germans announced that since 1940 they had brought to Wartheland alone to occupy the homes of evicted Poles 1,000,000 persons from German colonies in the Baltic States, Russia, and the Balkans. Three months ago the German Gauleiter Muehl declared that Wartheland was an "oasis of peace and quiet," but now a German newspaper in Lodz describes the landwacht as organized there "to combat risings and bands, guard places threatened with sabotage, maintain order in foreign labour camps, and help the regular police during riots."

These increased German anxieties are directly connected with the enemy's setbacks in Russia and the westward movement of the front.

665-SHAFF File No. 11111

~~RESTRICTED~~

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21.3.44

"HARNESSING THE TROJAN HORSE"

by

P. C. Gordon Walker

ARGUMENT

■ argument of this paper is as follows:-

- (1) ■ many millions of foreign workers ■ prisoners of war now ■ constitute a unique revolutionary force. It will be unique in its explosive power; ■ in its transience. The revolutionaries' sole aim ■ to leave the scene of their revolution as quickly ■ possible. It will be a ■ content.
- (2) ■ would follow our failure to ■ and direct force inside Germany. ■ its strength ■ premature ■ acts. ■ would be exposed ■ mass-reprisals by the ■ An uncontrolled mass-return of these foreigners to their own countries ■ spread chaos and serious social disorder.
- (3) If we control ■ guide ■ force we can largely avert these dangers. And ■ will have in our ■ a time-bomb inside Germany that can materially aid our military operations.
- (4) ■ to contact ■ influence this force inside Germany ■ already been created. Full use of these means of contact depends upon certain preliminary political and military decisions. These decisions are the key to the whole operation.
- (5) A draft plan for a propaganda operation to ■ guide this ■ Germany ■ included ■ ■



500 - Staff File No. 14.44

~~SECRET~~

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COPY

2 - HARNESSING THE [REDACTED] FORCE.

NOTE: Throughout [REDACTED] paper the [REDACTED] "foreign conscripts" or "conscripts" is used as a [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] prisoners of [REDACTED] inside Germany.

The [REDACTED] of decisive action for [REDACTED] conscripts is called the "crisis". The [REDACTED] to which the timing of this crisis can be controlled is discussed in [REDACTED] paper.

THE FORCE INSIDE GERMANY.

There [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] in Germany 9-10 million or [REDACTED] foreign conscripts. [REDACTED] inevitably [REDACTED] or towards the crisis of [REDACTED] war develop explosive [REDACTED] revolutionary forms and activities.

[REDACTED] can assume that many millions of these conscripts will still be in Germany at the crisis. A social force of these dimensions cannot simply disintegrate or disappear. Even if we assume and encourage (as we should) the maximum drift of these conscripts back to [REDACTED] Germany there are factors that control the rate of drift. There is the German watch and ward up to the moment of collapse; there are the special conditions necessary for each escape, and [REDACTED] involved [REDACTED] the rate of flow will also be [REDACTED] by the [REDACTED] at the receiving end; every great migration is partly the outcome of push from the point of departure and partly of pull towards the destination. [REDACTED] is a limit to the intake-capacity of occupied countries. These factors taken together with the immense numbers involved and with the further [REDACTED] of new conscripts by Germany [REDACTED] that the conscript-force will subsist. [REDACTED] if we imagine a tremendous drift [REDACTED] of the order of 3 million - it would still leave a huge force of 6-7 millions. [REDACTED] it is proper at the same time to encourage a drift homewards and to prepare for a very large residuum in Germany at the crisis. To gauge the importance of this body its numbers must be compared with the number of German males of working-age in Germany. This force will [REDACTED] naturally explosive. It will be very anti-Nazi, it will [REDACTED] many [REDACTED] to pay off. And it will suddenly find itself released [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The role of prisoner and warden will be partially reversed [REDACTED] this always has [REDACTED] explosive [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] will undoubtedly [REDACTED] by the [REDACTED] authorities against these foreign workers that will [REDACTED] them.

[REDACTED] however a further [REDACTED] that will give these conscripts [REDACTED] explosive force of unprecedented proportions.

The discontent will be enormously increased because [REDACTED] [REDACTED] scripts will [REDACTED] overwhelming desire, the desire to get home, and [REDACTED] desire will inevitably be frustrated. Any attempt by 6, 7 or [REDACTED] million people simply to [REDACTED] home will [REDACTED] up against insuperable problems of transport. [REDACTED] will be great competition for [REDACTED] transport; [REDACTED] scripts themselves will be attempting to move [REDACTED] crisis-cross directions; [REDACTED] of German troops will [REDACTED] on the move; [REDACTED] transport facilities [REDACTED] likely to be seriously depleted, possibly by strikes.

[REDACTED] the attempt [REDACTED] walk home will [REDACTED] up against insuperable problems of hunger, exposure, disease and congestion. [REDACTED] will, [REDACTED] course, be an accelerated movement homewards. But there [REDACTED] absolute brakes upon mobility.

For a period of several weeks the conscripts [REDACTED] [REDACTED] by inescapable [REDACTED] of their hearts' desire. They will be forced [REDACTED] look after themselves and organize themselves [REDACTED] period.

[REDACTED] efforts together with their frustrated and pent-up [REDACTED] will constitute their explosive revolution [REDACTED] the heart of Germany. A revolution that may well be unique in its violence and [REDACTED] certainly be unique in its duration, which may be put at some three weeks. The revolution will destroy and disrupt but it will have no permanent interest in its revolution. It will be a revolution without social content.

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HARRISSING

We can imagine the broad [] that [] revolution [] follow, if [] attempt whatever to control it.

There will be a total cessation of work; barracks [] prison camps will be destroyed; there may be riots [] sporadic fighting; people will [] on [] Directly [] there is a [] on this [] and groups will be set up to keep life going. [] will happen easily [] naturally where such committees have already existed in camps and barracks. No doubt measures will be taken, more or less successfully, to safeguard food supplies, to commandeer transport, even perhaps to establish travel priorities. The sudden movement of foreign workers in the countryside will bring food-production [] an end [] many areas. In [] countryside where [] foreign workers [] a large majority of [] population, they will be the dominant force. Here too, there may be [] spontaneous organization if protection against [] Landwehr becomes necessary.

[] spontaneous attempts at organization (unless they are [] encouraged [] directed) will probably not [] in making such impression on the extremely tense [] compressed crisis-cross [] of millions [] people. [] will probably be pockets of organized people (e.g. groups of prisoners) making their [] [] less coherent [] through [] chaos.

[] conscripts are left entirely [] themselves they [] likely [] far ahead of German workers [] soldiers in striking [] in setting up rudimentary councils [] the like. It is they [] will initiate the revolutionary breakdown.

ARGUMENTS FOR ACTION

High advantages would come to us if [] properly exploit and guide this explosive force inside Germany. [] the other hand, failure on our part may have serious, indeed calamitous, consequences.

[] set out here [] major arguments for action on our part. [] one of these arguments by itself [] a sufficient ground for action.

- (1) The conscripts in Germany, in their outburst against their masters and [] the frustration of their desire to go home, will [] any case spontaneously [] many acts that will seriously incommode and disrupt the German administrative machine. If we [] no leadership, these spontaneous actions may come at very inconvenient [] for us. They may come prematurely and waste their strength; they may be too late and too uncoordinated to benefit [] to [] full. Unpredictable [] may be done that suddenly divert our attentions [] efforts. The flood of humanity may get [] the light of [] military operations [] throw out our supply plans.
- (2) If we [] leadership [] guidance we [] increase the hitting power [] these allies [] Germany. [] (within limits) coordinate [] time their actions to fit [] with our plans. We [] secure actions and forms of organization that would not [] spontaneously engendered.
- (3) There will be serious dangers of German reprisals against the prisoners of war and [] foreign workers in Germany. They may [] treated [] hostages and held as a pledge for [] the safe [] turn of Germans in occupied countries; they may even [] used [] a power [] armistice negotiations. [] may present [] with appalling problems.

Only [] we have asserted control [] guidance [] we hope to help [] conscripts to defend themselves.

- (4) Only if we have, during the [], given help [] guidance [] a type that [] caught [] held the attention of [] conscripts

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- 4 - THE TROJAN HORSE

■ ■ hope to exercise some control of ■ ■ to ■ ■ with our military ■ ■ and ■ ■ avoid the spreading of ■ ■ disorder ■ ■ territories of ■ ■ Allies. Last-minute and unprepared ap-
peals by governments where their organization is already being over-
whelmed will be of hardly any use. Our power to ■ ■ at this stage
will depend directly ■ ■ the services we have managed to do in the ■ ■
immediately preceding weeks.

These ■ ■ the ■ ■ arguments for action.

■ ■ prophecies are no ■ ■ possible in this field than in ■ ■
field of military operations. But it can ■ ■ with considerable
certainty that we could if ■ ■ exercise ■ ■ control over
the ■ ■ actions ■ ■ the conscripts in Germany.

Radio would play ■ ■ indispensable part in achieving ■ ■ objectives.
The nature of radio-propaganda must therefore ■ ■ borne ■ ■ mind in any plans
■ ■ make.

■ ■ all this principle is important:-

The extent to which we succeed in asserting control and
guidance over the conscripts depends directly upon the
nature and length of our preparations.

The making of these preparations will, in turn, depend upon
certain basic decisions, and upon their being taken in time.

KEY DECISIONS

■ ■ operational decisions ■ ■ would ■ ■ to ■ ■ taken ■ ■

- (1) ■ ■ decision whether the conscripts in Germany ■ ■ to ■ ■
used ■ ■ to ■ ■ best of ■ ■ ability, or to be left to
their ■ ■ devices.
- (2) The decision on timing. At what point do we wish to secure
■ ■ striking-power of ■ ■ forces?

Within ■ ■ the ■ ■ of crisis can be ■ ■ - ■ ■ can be
delayed or advanced. ■ ■ have ■ ■ absolute freedom of ■ ■;
audience ■ ■ are dealing ■ ■ will ■ ■ inner logic of ■ ■
which ■ ■ must respect. But though we ■ ■ dictate or issue
precise orders, we can guide. ■ ■ longer ■ ■ more effective
period of preparation the greater will be the control ■ ■
exercise.

■ ■ timing ■ ■ not be fixed by reference to ■ ■ date. It
can ■ ■ in reference to some military ■ ■ operation which
the revolution of the conscripts should precede, coincide with,
or follow. ■ ■ must ■ ■ that certain very decisive military
events (like a successful invasion or a rapid advance towards
Germany ■ ■ liberation of a particular country) may have a
very stimulating effect on the conscripts.

- (3) ■ ■ decision to guarantee (and perhaps extend) the existing radio
■ ■ of communication to the conscripts. ■ ■ imperative
instruction would be necessary to preserve ■ ■ special programmes
to ■ ■ conscripts, whatever the ■ ■ of ■ ■ events.

■ ■ ■ ■

These 3 decisions ■ ■ essential preconditions to action. ■ ■
decision would ■ ■ to ■ ■ taken in ■ ■ course of the propaganda action.
Here, too, of course, the earlier the better.

■ ■ ■ ■

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HARNESSING THE TROJAN HORSE.

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(4) Decisions about the nature of the actions we want from the conscripts. Under this head would come decisions about the use of extra-propaganda methods.

The goal of Britain we could set out to achieve are as follows:-

(a) We could much increase the degree of organisation by groups and committees amongst the revolting conscripts.

(b) We could suggest certain lines of action; such as seizing food-stocks; commandeering motors, lorries and trains; securing arms; arresting guards, officials etc; occupying key-points (factories, post-offices, stations).

(c) We could suggest the seizure of public buildings in order to disseminate instructions to local authorities.

(d) In the countryside we could lay particular stress on the need for the conscripts to assert themselves, to set up councils over regions, to seize food and get it to the towns where there are many foreign workers.

(e) We could encourage leadership by the prisoners of war, who will be in groups and used to command.

(f) We must decide whether we want to spread away to sort the conscripts out by nationalities and to concentrate them. We might concentrate particular nationalities at particular points. In towns where there are large numbers of mixed nationalities we would want joint councils.

(g) We would want means for the conscripts to communicate with us. We might use them to seize transmitters or we might drop them equipment by air.

(h) Leaders might be dropped by air.

(i) Arms might be dropped at particular points, like prisoner of war camps. In this case we would want to avoid mass-departures and to secure concentration at these points.

(j) We might use aircraft to assist the conscripts in particular difficulties.

(k) When the armistice is made special conditions could be imposed to aid the conscripts. And these could be communicated to them.

x x x x

These are intended only as examples of the sort of problems we would have to decide to make our operation effective.

It would not be necessary to communicate the exact nature of these decisions to the propaganda executives. All they would need to know is that decisions have been taken.

A propaganda action could be worked out, which would be put into effect piece by piece on the receipt of instructions from those who make the decisions.

All that would be absolutely necessary would be to know that the decisions had been taken to use the conscripts - and that (undisclosed but precise) decisions had been taken to carry the plan through.

DRAFT PROPAGANDA OPERATION

(This draft indicates the sort of plans that could be made. ~~29~~ practice greater detail would be needed)

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HARNESSING THE TROJAN HORSE.

OPERATION HOMER

- OBJECTIVES: (1) To exploit the Trojan Horse in Germany.
(2) To get the foreign conscripts home in an orderly way.

PHASES OF OPERATION:

The operation can be divided into three phases:-

- (1) HOMER PHASE - embracing the plans that precede the crisis.
(Plans A, B, C1 and C2)
- (2) HOMER PLAN - The plan for the crisis (Plan D)
- (3) HOMER PLUS - The plan for the post-crisis or homing period
(Plan E)

1. HOMER PHASE

PLAN A. This is the Plan in fact in operation at present.

- OBJECTIVES (1) Main. To create, maintain and extend channels of communication.
(2) Secondary. To secure certain "safe" activities by the conscripts; to create solidarity and self-subsistence.

- MEASURES (1) Urge the importance of organized listening wherever there are groups of conscripts. Spread amongst all conscripts knowledge of the times and wavelengths of the programmes meant for them.

(NOTE: It is hoped to reinforce this with leaflets. Direct reactions by the German authorities indicate that we are succeeding in these aims.)

- (2) Stress importance of foreign workers and our recognition of their importance. Encourage a drift towards of conscripts; encourage them to get de-registered and lost inside Germany; encourage safe forms of sabotage; give as much guidance and help as possible without ordering or appealing.

(NOTE: A feature of this Plan A has been the TROJAN HORSE SONG. There is a common melody and words in all the languages broadcast. The song stresses the importance and the solidarity of the foreign workers).

- (3) Foreign Workers' Programmes in all the relevant languages are now established. A prisoner of war programme goes out in French. Further programmes are planned.

X X X X

(NOTE: This plan A should be displaced by a more concrete and directed Plan as soon as possible. It is not wise to keep up vague and unprecise preparations too long in a period of mounting crisis).

PLAN B: This Plan could be introduced at any moment. It should have a duration of at least several weeks. But it could run much longer.

There is no need for propaganda-executives to know how long this

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HANDLING THE TROJAN HORSE.

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plan will last.

The essence of Plan B, which will distinguish it from Plan A, is that the decision has been taken to make full use of the concertists in Germany. In consequence consistent preparations can be made without any danger of having up disappointment and disillusion for ourselves in future.

OBJECTIVES A major objective in this Plan (and throughout the whole of HOLER TENS) will remain the establishment and extension of channels of communication.

The special objective would be to heighten the sense of the audience that their role is understood and will be vital and that they will not be forgotten at the moment of crisis. Some preliminary preparations for action could be made.

METHODS

To talk openly about "the Day" - to discuss it in a general way.

We could give precise instructions not to do anything until told and promise they would be told.

We could ask them to leave their eyes open for places of importance, food-stocks, etc.

We could inform them of their own situation (e.g. where the main concentrations of foreign workers are; where the prisoners of war camps are).

If touch is not broken, we can tell them about this.

Stress importance of German workers and prisoners of war missing and talking to them each other; of agricultural industries etc.

We could give them some messages (about events, about the situation, about the situation etc.). They may be asked to repeat the messages but they must be told to repeat.

We could tell them to prepare their own, their own national leaders etc.

If we could increase the importance of this in an important way of showing importance of the audience. (This device could be used instead in Plan C or even D).

Towards the end (if this Plan B were subdivided) we could talk in a general way about some of the problems that exist now at the crisis.

Plans for communication by the Government should be given great emphasis.

PLAN C - This would be a Plan to deal with an approaching crisis. It could last for several weeks and its broad length need not be discussed.

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Plan C should be divided into two parallel plans, one for Germany (G) and one for communication (C). G could have the main role, C would be the support.

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Plans B and C should be used at the same time and in their own way to the same end.

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INCESSIVE THE THOUGHT PROCESS.

military effort or other cause, there is danger of premature action. There might, for instance, be deliberate German communication with Russia in this case.

The difficulties will be very sharp. These would have to be accompanied by absolute pledges of action later at a moment to be disclosed. We should be further in disclosing the nature of areas of our plans and talk more openly about the detailed arrangements to establish the conspiracy.

2.2. When we would have to appear, not in our own way - will continue to act all together and to wait for instructions.

(NOTE: The details of our propaganda would depend on whether special agents were being used. Code messages could be broadcast)

2. THE PLAN

PLAN B To set the actions of the German war. This plan will last about 6 weeks and will move into the next Plan (for which we are not yet ready).

The detailed plan will be based on the decisions made about the sort of military that is wanted and about the extra-propaganda needed to be used.

The essence of this plan would be the complete openness of aim. It would take the form of a plan and the action. As far as possible this should be given by people (military commanders, political leaders etc.) whom the conspirators will recruit.

The Plan will be initiated by a very military announcement of high military character.

3. HOW TO USE

PLAN E This plan is for the basic period. It will cover about Plan B. For example such greater stress will be laid on the organization of local priority. Government commissioners could be flown to Germany to assist. Their work would be made much easier if preliminary working into nationalities and the concentration of these nationalities had occurred.

We need in this phase transfer the agencies to the transmitters of local governments. Our own should be considered as well.

We would need here to be very frank in our discussion of revolution and planning, description of difficulties at home and the like. We might have to try and secure the passage of certain nationalities out of Germany before others.

If the conspirators have to stay longer in Germany it will be essential to give them useful things to do. To help our advance we will collect information about some factories; to hold by others for us.

We can also ask them to adopt what attitude we like to German events and movements inside Germany.

The extent to which our plans will work is not extremely important but there will depend directly upon the success we have had in the period just preceding. It is our success here that will give us the audience, the title to talk to them and the right to be played.

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091.412/3

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

AGAINST GERMANY

VOL: 2

091.412/3

WAR RELIEF COMMISSION
ATTN: DISPOSITIONS AREA
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

WHH/as

9 June 1945

GUIDANCE POINT FOR COMMERCE IN GERMANY FOR THE WEEK
OF 25-31 MAY, 1945

1. Release of German prisoners of war. This subject, of top interest to millions of American families, should be given detailed news coverage, but without recourse to special news releases for release. The fact that soldiers are being released specifically for work on the land should be kept before the audience. It is to run campaign to stimulate food production.

2. Propaganda Point - 21. Following guidance point in the notes for the week of 25-31 May is called to your attention:

"5. In order (a) to counter German feelings of self-consideration on the score of increasing food hardships, etc., and (b) to arouse them to greater efforts in food production, evidence should be set forth showing that the Germans in the past years have in fact been the spoiled children of Europe, feeding off the produce of twelve over-run nations and profiting from the labor of millions of enslaved foreign workers. The magnitude of the spoliation done to the rest of Europe should be kept continually before the German eye, to the end that the Germans understand the logic of their present hardships and the necessity of immediate self-help."

3. Attraction

a. Attention is directed to point 3 of guidance notes for the week of 25-31 May, and to the standing guidance on PROPAGANDA: THE-TRUTH OF GERMAN RESPONSIBILITIES, dated 21 May.

b. We must to more than ever careful not to convey the impression that we are conducting by press and radio an "at action" campaign. Individual and factual reports should be reported, but not anthologies or compilations of their highlights. Where possible, material should be used implicating more than those immediately responsible for the conduct of concentration camps.

Implementation

PRD Document report (ref. SR 1776/p/1s 282) dated 22 May and circulated to PR Detachments, contains correspondence between the Gestapo and the Wittenberg Minister of the Interior, which shows not only the high death-rate in concentration camps and lack of enough fuel for the crematoria, but also the fact that officials of the Wittenberg Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Economics knew just what was going on in the camps.

(45)

12-13 Intelligence history of 251pg under Section III
 stating a report that the red, pharmaceutical lab. used
 the slave labor of 1,000 inmates of the Auschwitz concen-
 tration camp for its artificial rubber factory. Neither
 did I. G. Farbenindustrie have any cooperation in requesting
 from the SS kind of documents. It had to work in their
 subterranean stone rooms and other installation in the region
 of the poison-gas-chambers. The pharmaceutical branches
 of IG had their drugs tested at the object. And station of
 the concentration camp as a result of these experiments,
 which were performed without special supervision, the human
 guinea pigs, in some cases, suffered a death rate as high as
 50%.

BRUNNEN TACTICAL, 17 APR. regarding the statement of a Swiss
 butcher who had been employed in the town of Friedberg.

"Die Häftlinge, in welcher ich arbeitete, holten für den
 Lager. Aber bitte keine Gedanken, das die SS-Abteil-
 ung nicht glückte, die Häftlinge durften es höchstens
 unter strengster Aufsicht haben. Auch sah ich sie vor mir,
 diese Häftlinge, die in schwarz-weiß gestreiften Gefängnis-
 kleidungen waren, schienen, sozusagen, gar nichts,
 gleich einem dunklen Pyjama, schienen, sozusagen, gar nichts,
 wie ein und keine Unterwäsche und das bei 16 Grad Celcius unter
 null. Ihre schwarzen Haare waren gefaltet. Oft sah man
 Abteilungen solcher Gefangenen durch die Stadt marschieren
 abwärts und aufwärts. Und, es war im Herbst 1944, ach
 ja, die Häftlinge, die auch nicht verschuldet waren in
 Straßengassen. Es hatte mit dem geordneten eines
 Gefangenen nichts zu tun. Ganz anders, das war letzten
 Endes in der Konzentrationslager und die dort herrschenden
 Zustände. Überall wurde davon gesprochen, man sich nicht offen
 das heute schon an der Hand zu sehen. Die Lagerinsassen
 seien schließlich, untereinander, die nichts anderes verdient
 hätten.

"The prisoner shop, in which I was employed, delivered to the camp
 about 100,000 cigarettes, only the SS men were allowed to buy, the
 prisoners could not buy it, for they were under heavy
 guard. I can still see the inmates of the concentration camp,
 each wearing a black and white striped pyjama-like garment and
 absolutely nothing else - no shirt, no underclothes -, with the
 temperature at 16 below zero. Their shoes were made of canvas.
 Instead of them, stretched over them, could often be
 seen markings through the toes. Once in autumn, 1944, I saw
 a prisoner told to pick up a rotten apple in the gutter. He
 was then told to eat it and spit the core out. The whole
 of Friedberg, down to the last child, knew about the concentra-
 tion camp and the conditions there. It was a war, if not open,
 talk. People thought that at least there was order. (The camp
 inmates were after all considered the deserted nothing better.)

4. Corruption, Intelligence and Control of the system. There is little to be done in this area. It is better to indoctrinate us as to the system and the way to use it, than that they should do this. It is better to be informed, than they should be. We have seen the way the CIA has used in fact the West and even the most democratic people in Europe. Therefore we must make it clear that:

- a. the German people made the decision of "leaving politics to the experts" instead of making a healthy dissent in their own defense.
- b. as a result of this, the Third Reich's "experts" became dictators controlling the whole German chain.
- c. more, particularly, the use of the "experts" to keep alive under the situation of uncontrolled economic and political power is quite disturbing.

Deployment

an example of an employee worked with under the Professor Dr. QUINN, Chief of the Pittsburgh office for special policy, and later director of same University. His official record described him as having been especially qualified for his career by his education for teaching laws and "eugenics". He was a close personal friend of sterilization; in 1935-36, 1938-39, and 1940-41, he was in attendance upon the eugenics conferences at the University of Iowa and facilitated one of his visits. He performed many operations, with sterilization, through which he was a politician and philosopher's writings are contained in a 1941 1942 year intelligence report.

in order to illustrate the varied nature of Nazi civilians and military leaders. In comparison, the following sentiments, also in their captors' hands, should be useful:

1960s, director of the psychopressurization, and in control of more than 750,000 party newspapers. "The small people are not responsible."

William Paul, administrator of the school, "I was only a school teacher. I did not cooperate with anyone of this sort or kind of policy."

The witness, chief of the fields of inquiry: "I was merely a spectator."

On both general education, 6 out of the national
general population have a general idea of what a human
group is and what it does in the world.

1960-1961, 1962-1963, 1964-1965, 1966-1967, 1968-1969, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, 1974-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1979, 1980-1981, 1982-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1990-1991, 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, 2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2022-2023, 2024-2025, 2026-2027, 2028-2029, 2030-2031, 2032-2033, 2034-2035, 2036-2037, 2038-2039, 2040-2041, 2042-2043, 2044-2045, 2046-2047, 2048-2049, 2050-2051, 2052-2053, 2054-2055, 2056-2057, 2058-2059, 2060-2061, 2062-2063, 2064-2065, 2066-2067, 2068-2069, 2070-2071, 2072-2073, 2074-2075, 2076-2077, 2078-2079, 2080-2081, 2082-2083, 2084-2085, 2086-2087, 2088-2089, 2090-2091, 2092-2093, 2094-2095, 2096-2097, 2098-2099, 2100-2101, 2102-2103, 2104-2105, 2106-2107, 2108-2109, 2110-2111, 2112-2113, 2114-2115, 2116-2117, 2118-2119, 2120-2121, 2122-2123, 2124-2125, 2126-2127, 2128-2129, 2130-2131, 2132-2133, 2134-2135, 2136-2137, 2138-2139, 2140-2141, 2142-2143, 2144-2145, 2146-2147, 2148-2149, 2150-2151, 2152-2153, 2154-2155, 2156-2157, 2158-2159, 2160-2161, 2162-2163, 2164-2165, 2166-2167, 2168-2169, 2170-2171, 2172-2173, 2174-2175, 2176-2177, 2178-2179, 2180-2181, 2182-2183, 2184-2185, 2186-2187, 2188-2189, 2190-2191, 2192-2193, 2194-2195, 2196-2197, 2198-2199, 2200-2201, 2202-2203, 2204-2205, 2206-2207, 2208-2209, 2210-2211, 2212-2213, 2214-2215, 2216-2217, 2218-2219, 2220-2221, 2222-2223, 2224-2225, 2226-2227, 2228-2229, 2230-2231, 2232-2233, 2234-2235, 2236-2237, 2238-2239, 2240-2241, 2242-2243, 2244-2245, 2246-2247, 2248-2249, 2250-2251, 2252-2253, 2254-2255, 2256-2257, 2258-2259, 2260-2261, 2262-2263, 2264-2265, 2266-2267, 2268-2269, 2270-2271, 2272-2273, 2274-2275, 2276-2277, 2278-2279, 2280-2281, 2282-2283, 2284-2285, 2286-2287, 2288-2289, 2290-2291, 2292-2293, 2294-2295, 2296-2297, 2298-2299, 2300-2301, 2302-2303, 2304-2305, 2306-2307, 2308-2309, 2310-2311, 2312-2313, 2314-2315, 2316-2317, 2318-2319, 2320-2321, 2322-2323, 2324-2325, 2326-2327, 2328-2329, 2330-2331, 2332-2333, 2334-2335, 2336-2337, 2338-2339, 2340-2341, 2342-2343, 2344-2345, 2346-2347, 2348-2349, 2350-2351, 2352-2353, 2354-2355, 2356-2357, 2358-2359, 2360-2361, 2362-2363, 2364-2365, 2366-2367, 2368-2369, 2370-2371, 2372-2373, 2374-2375, 2376-2377, 2378-2379, 2380-2381, 2382-2383, 2384-2385, 2386-2387, 2388-2389, 2390-2391, 2392-2393, 2394-2395, 2396-2397, 2398-2399, 2400-2401, 2402-2403, 2404-2405, 2406-2407, 2408-2409, 2410-2411, 2412-2413, 2414-2415, 2416-2417, 2418-2419, 2420-2421, 2422-2423, 2424-2425, 2426-2427, 2428-2429, 2430-2431, 2432-2433, 2434-2435, 2436-2437, 2438-2439, 2440-2441, 2442-2443, 2444-2445, 2446-2447, 2448-2449, 2450-2451, 2452-2453, 2454-2455, 2456-2457, 2458-2459, 2460-2461, 2462-2463, 2464-2465, 2466-2467, 2468-2469, 2470-2471, 2472-2473, 2474-2475, 2476-2477, 2478-2479, 2480-2481, 2482-2483, 2484-2485, 2486-2487, 2488-2489, 2490-2491, 2492-2493, 2494-2495, 2496-2497, 2498-2499, 2500-2501, 2502-2503, 2504-2505, 2506-2507, 2508-2509, 2510-2511, 2512-2513, 2514-2515, 2516-2517, 2518-2519, 2520-2521, 2522-2523, 2524-2525, 2526-2527, 2528-2529, 2530-2531, 2532-2533, 2534-2535, 2536-2537, 2538-2539, 2540-2541, 2542-2543, 2544-2545, 2546-2547, 2548-2549, 2550-2551, 2552-2553, 2554-2555, 2556-2557, 2558-2559, 2560-2561, 2562-2563, 2564-2565, 2566-2567, 2568-2569, 2570-2571, 2572-2573, 2574-2575, 2576-2577, 2578-2579, 2580-2581, 2582-2583, 2584-2585, 2586-2587, 2588-2589, 2590-2591, 2592-2593, 2594-2595, 2596-2597, 2598-2599, 2600-2601, 2602-2603, 2604-2605, 2606-2607, 2608-2609, 2610-2611, 2612-2613, 2614-2615, 2616-2617, 2618-2619, 2620-2621, 2622-2623, 2624-2625, 2626-2627, 2628-2629, 2630-2631, 2632-2633, 2634-2635, 2636-2637, 2638-2639, 2640-2641, 2642-2643, 2644-2645, 2646-2647, 2648-2649, 2650-2651, 2652-2653, 2654-2655, 2656-2657, 2658-2659, 2660-2661, 2662-2663, 2664-2665, 2666-2667, 2668-2669, 2670-2671, 2672-2673, 2674-2675, 2676-2677, 2678-2679, 2680-2681, 2682-2683, 2684-2685, 2686-2687, 2688-2689, 2690-2691, 2692-2693, 2694-2695, 2696-2697, 2698-2699, 2700-2701, 2702-2703, 27

Subject: History of the Republic of the Philippines "I

field garrison commander von Hilde, Commander of Army Group B, all known, etc. One of the first to leave the area was a com-
manding officer of the 1st Division (German), and the second was a 1st Division (German),
notorious for its atrocities against the Jews. "I wouldn't hesitate in shooting all the Jews."

Hermann Goer, former Bavarian Minister and Reichs Secretary for Propaganda, "I am a special case, I am the only one who did not receive a Wehrmachtkreuz."

It is "leaving things to the experts" which ultimately brings to power such men as Goebbels and Gauckel of Hamburg, even in 1941, after Hitler's propaganda had started and food supplies were sharply restricted in Germany. Gauckel continued to drink large quantities of luxury foods and wines from the party palaces, the "great pleasures" in Berlin. (FBI report of 1779 N.Y. 202 of 25th May de-
tails the amounts drunk and money paid by Gauckel).

(Note: All material given under "Implementation", above, has been cleared for output.)

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,

William S. Paley
WILLIAM S. PALEY
Colonel ADJ
Deputy Chief, PW

This is blank
to be filled in
by *AB*

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL
3 May, 1945

PWP 338.18

SUBJECT: Announcement of contacts between Bernadotte and
Himmler.

TO : The Chief of Staff

X 000-7
file no.
205 has been
205 has been

DISCUSSION

1. In top secret cable W-75860 dated 2 May, 1945 (personal for Eisenhower) Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was requested by AOWAR (Marshall) to issue an announcement concerning contacts between Bernadotte and Himmler at Lubeck.

2. This announcement was released by Psychological Warfare Division 2 May, 1945, text of which is in cable at TAB A.

RECOMMENDATION

3. That Chief of Staff approve for dispatch to AOWAR cable at TAB A. *ad*

CONCURRENCES

None required

ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

Date 4 May 1945
APPROVED
/s/ W. B. Smith
/t/ W. B. SMITH,
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.
Dispatched to PWD



63

TO FOR ACTION: ADVAR FOR MARSHALL

FROM : CHAIR MAIN signed RISKINOWLER

TO FOR INFO :

Reference your W-70800 of 1 May 1945. Follows [redacted]
released by Supreme Headquarters, A. E. F., 2 May 1945.

[redacted] following statement has been authorized.

Admiral Doenitz has stated in his broadcast on the night of May 1st that Hitler met a hero's death, [redacted] that he, Admiral [redacted] nominated by Hitler before his death as his successor, [redacted] as Chancellor [redacted] as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. In virtue of this, Admiral Doenitz claims that [redacted] allegiance of the German Army is now transferred from Adolf Hitler to him.

In view of these assertions by Admiral Doenitz, [redacted] following information is made public:

1. A meeting took place at Lubeck [redacted] 0100 hours [redacted] the morning of April [redacted] between Count Bernadotte, of the International [redacted] Cross, [redacted] Reich Fuhrer, Heinrich Himmler. At [redacted] meeting, Himmler admitted that Germany was finished. [redacted] told Count Bernadotte that Hitler was so ill that [redacted] might be already dead. At any rate, he could not be expected [redacted] live [redacted] than two days longer. General Schillenburg, [redacted] also present, added that Hitler [redacted] suffering from brain hemorrhage.

Admiral Doenitz's statement, therefore, that Hitler [redacted] a hero's [redacted] at his post is in contradiction with [redacted] facts given by Himmler and General Schillenburg.

In conclusion, it must be stressed that the attempt by Admiral Doenitz, both in his statement [redacted] the German people [redacted] in his Order of the Day to the Wehrmacht, to drive a wedge between the British [redacted] Americans [redacted] one side and the Russians on the other will [redacted] completely ineffective as the many previous efforts which have [redacted] made. Constant contact is being maintained not only between the three Governments, but between this Headquarters [redacted] Headquarters of [redacted] Soviet Army, and nothing which either Admiral Doenitz or [redacted] may say or do can change in any way the agreed operations of [redacted] Allied Armies.

Classification: Unclassified


Precedence : Priority

Coordinated with:

Distributions: GCS
G-2
G-3
PRD
Political Officers
AD records

b 474

Pl. A (new)



Secretariat File Copy
AAMJ/mk

Refutation of Attributed 100% Statement

2 May 1945

1 P.W.D. SCG
(Pnd) 2 May
1945

42
Attached is a staff study prepared for the consideration of the Chief of Staff which has been taken by hand by General Horton to the Supreme Commander, who has approved it subject to the pencil amendments noted at T43 E. The staff study has been returned, after perusal by the Chief of Staff, without passing through your office. It is therefore returned to you to note and register the Supreme Commander's decision.

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division;

H. J. HUTCHINSON
Major GS


2 SGS
SHAFF
FND 3 May
FND 1945

Attached Staff Study has been noted by this office and is returned herewith.

Incl

J. B. MOORE, III,
Lt. Colonel, GSC,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

AAMJ/mk



2 MAY

ALLIED SUPREMACY
ALLIED SUPREMACY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
(Forward)

2 May 1945

Subject: Refutation of Admiral DORNITZ' Statements.

To : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The President of the UNITED STATES has authorized the use of certain diplomatic information as to Hitler's condition prior to his death for propaganda purposes with the objects of refuting

- a. the claim that Hitler died a hero's death,
- b. the arguments used by Admiral DORNITZ to encourage the Germans to further resistance and to convince the Germans of the solidarity of the British, Russians and Americans (TAB A).

2. It is felt that the best method of achieving this is to prepare a statement for release to the Allied Press which will

- a. give the known facts on the state of Hitler's condition prior to his death, and will imply that DORNITZ' version of Hitler's death is false,
- b. create doubt as to the legitimacy of Admiral DORNITZ' succession,
- c. confirm anglo-american-russian solidarity.

A draft statement for issue after receipt of the Supreme Commander's approval is at TAB B.


3. A press conference will be held at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Main, this afternoon at 1430 hours. If possible, it is desired to release a statement at that conference, which will ensure that it receives the widest possible publicity.

II. EXECUTION

4. That the Supreme Commander approve the statement at TAB B for issue at this afternoon's press conference.

III. CONCURRENCES

5. G-3 Division



M.B.J. HUISSON
Major G.S.
for

ROBERT A. McCLURE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

APPROVED BY
Dwight D. Eisenhower

6 476

SURRENDER HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

TAB 15

2nd May, 1945

STATEMENT AUTHORIZED BY THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR RELEASE TO THE

ALLIED PRESS

Admiral Doenitz has stated in his broadcast on the night of May 1st that Hitler met a heroic death, and that he, Admiral Doenitz, was nominated by Hitler, before his death, as his successor, both as Reichschancellor and as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. In virtue of this, Admiral Doenitz claims that the oath of allegiance of the German Army is now transferred from Adolf Hitler to him.


In view of these assertions by Admiral Doenitz, the following information is made public:

1. A meeting took place at LUXEMBOURG on the morning of April 24th between Count Bernadotte of the International Red Cross and Himmler. At this meeting Himmler admitted that Germany was finished. He told Count Bernadotte that Hitler was ill that he might already be dead. At any rate, he could not be expected to live more than two days longer. General Schellenberg, who was also present, added that Hitler was suffering from brain haemorrhage.

Admiral Doenitz's statement therefore that Hitler met a heroic death is in contradiction with the facts as given by Himmler and General Schellenberg.

2. Himmler further told Count Bernadotte that since Hitler was finished, he, Himmler, had full authority to act for the German state. Admiral Doenitz's claim, therefore, to be the legitimate successor to the Reichschancellor, as the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, is open to the gravest doubt, and there is no reason to accept the validity of his claim that the allegiance which was given by the officers and men of the Wehrmacht to Adolf Hitler has been now transferred to him.

In conclusion, it must be stressed that the attempt by Admiral Doenitz, both in his statement to the German people and his order of the day to the Wehrmacht, to drive a wedge between the British and Americans on the one side, and the Russians on the other, will be as completely ineffective as the many previous efforts which have been made. Constant contact is being maintained not only between the three Governments, but between this Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Soviet Army, and nothing which either Admiral Doenitz or Himmler may say can change in any way the agreed operations of the Allied armies.



6 471

TOP SECRET

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SHAEF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TCO 020122Z MAY

SHAFF FWD 66/02
TOR 020358Z
WML 020407Z MAY

~~SECRET~~ S E C R E T

U R G E N T

FROM : AGWAR FROM MARSHALL
TO : SHAEF FWD PERSONAL TO E
REF NO : W-75800, 2 May 1945

In view of DOENITZ' statement to the effect that HITLER died at his post carrying on to the bitter end against Bolshevism in an effort to secure maximum resistance by the Germans, the President authorizes you to use information ■ to HITLER's condition obtained through contacts between BERNADOTTE and HIMMLER at LUBECK.

The purpose of such broadcasts or announcement, which to be effective should be made immediately, would be not only to destroy the HITLER martyr myth but to refute DORNITZ in his arguments to encourage the Germans to further resistance and to convince the Germans of the solidarity of the British, Russians and Americans.

The following is quotation from Minister JOHNSON's message from STOCKHOLM on 25 April referring to meeting between [REDACTED] and Count BERNADOTTE:

"This meeting took place at one o'clock in the morning April 24. BERNADOTTE reports that HIMMLER, although tired and admitting that GERMANY was finished, was calm and coherent. HIMMLER told him that HITLER was so ill that he might be already dead or could not be expected to live more than a few days longer. (General SCHILLENBERG, HIMMLER's confidential Staff Officer, told BERNADOTTE that HITLER was suffering from brain hemorrhage.) HIMMLER said that while HITLER was still active he would not have been able to take the step he now proposed to take but as HITLER was finished, he, HIMMLER, is in a position of full authority to act."

PS IN 332

TAB 'A'

FS IN 332

478

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COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

REF NO: W-75800

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SHAEP FWD 66/02

In any announcement or broadcast to the German people on this matter it might be well to bring out the fact that all operations have been and are being conducted with a plan agreed between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians, that constant contact between the forces under your command and the Russians is being maintained, that there is no chance whatever of disruption or change in these agreed operations.

We have had no time to coordinate this with the British but we are furnishing British Joint Staff Mission here the substance of this message.

ACTION : PWD REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER THROUGH SGS BEFORE DISPATCH FOR APPROVAL

INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
PRD
SUSPENSE
AG RECORDS

RELAYED TO SHAEP MAIN.

PS IN 332

2 May 1945

0530B

DWR/kf

REF NO: W-75800

6 473

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-2-

SECRET

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF SHEET)

REPLY TO

201 *Tealder*
201 *Thompson*
091-41-20 *Sh*

(CLASSIFICATION)

SUPREME

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy Meeting

DATE: 10th April, 1944

Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER	ALL CONCERNED
1	P.W.D. (Pm)	Office of the Dep Supreme Cdr Office of the Dep Chief of Staff G-1 Division G-2 Division G-3 Division G-5 Division PR Division Political Advisor GS Political Advisor GS		Reference CBS of this Division, even date, subject: "Psychological Warfare Policy Meeting", following points will be discussed:- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I. Psychological Warfare operations against NORWAY. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> II. Distribution of information inside occupied enemy territory. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> III. Handling of Verewolf. For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division	
	Copy to: P.W.D. Attn: Maj Outvillig			<i>[Signature]</i> M.B. J. HULSTMAN Major GS	

Room 11 at 1500 hours

[Signature] 1/5
** not in B.G. file*

6 480

(CLASSIFICATION)

PW 1.5-108/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ref. 100-10211
X 381 Norway
2000
2000

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TO: [REDACTED]
COPY NO. 1

EW 385

30 April, 1945.

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare to Norway.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

DISCUSSION.

1. As military operations against German forces on the Continent are being pressed to their conclusion, one of the major remaining pockets of German forces is in NORWAY. It is not at present considered likely that 'HOSTILE' or 'DOUBTFUL' conditions will come about in the absence of special psychological warfare operations. Therefore, a land-based military operation may have to be undertaken to liquidate or force the surrender of German troops in NORWAY.

2. It is considered that Allied psychological warfare can take advantage of the collapse of German resistance on the Continent, disappearance of authority of the German government and High Command, and the growing influence of the Supreme Commander over German troops (as evidenced by the mass surrenders in the Ruhr pocket), to secure the surrender of German forces in Norway prior to the launching of large-scale military operations against them.

METHOD.

3. A plan for psychological warfare to Norway to be executed prior to the launching of Allied land-based operations, designed to bring about 'HOSTILE' or 'DOUBTFUL' conditions, is at T.E.F. This plan contemplates a "Voice of ALLIED" to the German commander of troops in Norway, to be followed up by sustained psychological warfare supporting the initial "Voice". This plan has been designed to be equally as a softening-up operation for any subsequent land-based operations, if it fails in its immediate objective.

CONCLUSION.

4. That the Chief of Staff approve the plan at T.E.F. and authorize its execution at a time to be decided conjointly between G-3 and Psychological Warfare Division.

CONCURRENCES.

2.C. of S., G-1 Div.
2.C. of S., G-2 Div.
2.C. of S., G-3 Div.
2.C. of S., G-5 Div.
Political Adviser (U.S.)
Political Officer (Br.)
Political Officer (U.S.)

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
By authority of CALA
[Signature]
15 APR 1945

ROBERT A. McCUNE.
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

LNCS: T.E.F. A, B, C, D, E, F.

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600

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB 'A'

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Psychological Warfare Division

~~TOP SECRET~~

30 April, 1945.

OUTLINE PLAN - PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS, NORWAY, MAY 1945.

OBJECT.

1. To induce the enemy forces in NORWAY to capitulate before major military operations are initiated against them.
2. Failing the immediate achievement of this object, to facilitate military operations in NORWAY by weakening the enemy's will to resist.

DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY SITUATION.

3. Strength.

Enemy forces in NORWAY number approximately 300,000 made up of:

Army:	150,000
Navy:	60,000
Air:	50,000

and an unknown number of OT and administrative personnel - possibly 50,000 in all.

4. Composition.

- a. Roughly 12 divisions or part divisions are represented in NORWAY. Of these about half are field formations of useful fighting value; and half static coast defense formations of mediocre fighting value.

CLASSIFIED WHEN CHANGED
CONFIDENTIAL

By order of C.A.B.
W. J. H. G. J. J. J. J. J.

Date

There are no SS or larger divisions as such. The ■ and Gestapo are represented by a number of police and Lithuanian units.

- c. In at least the divisions there is a high proportion of Austrians.
- d. Naval personnel are largely represented by U-boat crews and trainees - mostly young men of high morale.

5. Prospects for the defense of NORWAY.

- a. The country is difficult to attack from the west and north. In addition to natural difficulties, German defensive works are on an extensive scale.
- b. Sweden is neutral still, her intentions problematical.
- c. The forces in NORWAY are self-contained for supplies and warlike stores for at least some months.
- d. The enemy can cope easily with Norwegian resistance.
- e. Therefore, the German Commander-in-Chief in NORWAY may consider it well worth while to hold on and make the most of his nuisance value.

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-2-

6. Factors affecting the morale of German

- a. They are far from home and will be anxious about the fate of their families in Allied hands and eager to return to them. Against this must be set the assumption that those whose homes are in Russian hands will not be anxious to return.
- b. The German forces proper have been reasonably happy in NORWAY. Excesses against the population have been committed by SS, Gestapo and Quislings - not troops. More than 5,000 Germans have married Norwegian women. The better elements will be loth to NORWAY and its people destroyed.
- c. Most Germans in NORWAY must have weighed in their own minds the pros and cons of becoming prisoners of against the advantage of saving their lives they will have set grim prospect of becoming slave labour. They particularly fear the prospect of being handed over to Russians.
- d. Against inclination to surrender to Allies must also be set distrust of our intentions with regard to GERMANY. They know their country is largely destroyed, and if prospects for the future seem unrelievedly bleak, they may decide to fight to the end.
- e. The Austrians in NORWAY are not on the best of terms with the Germans. Given the prospects of a fair future for AUSTRIA, the majority would be inclined to their lives.
- f. There is no doubt that many Germans in NORWAY have considered the prospect of internment in SWEDEN rather than face death or capture at the hands of the Allies.
- g. With Germany in our hands and perplexed by the uncertainty of their future, it is reasonable to assume that German troops in NORWAY are more than ever thrown back on their officers. The morale of the officers will decide the morale of the men. If their officers decide to adopt a course which seems to offer a reasonable way out of the predicament, the majority of the men will follow them.

PLAN.

7. To foster such a state of mind among the officers of enemy forces in NORWAY as will lead them to:
 - a. Favour capitulation.
 - b. Put pressure on their Commander-in-Chief to capitulate.
 - c. Take steps themselves to bring about capitulation.
8. We have about 60 days before large scale military operations against NORWAY can be mounted. If we use this time successfully, the enemy forces will capitulate and operations 'DOCBEDLY' and 'APOSTLE' will take place. If we fail in achieving complete capitulation our psychological warfare barrage will at least have softened up the enemy morale for the main operation.

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-3-

9. In order of action points we must:

- a. Convince enemy forces in NORWAY that further resistance is futile, while reassuring them about their future.
- b. Give them detailed advice on how they can capitulate.
- c. Persuade them to take the necessary steps to capitulate.

INTROD

10. By "Voice of SILENCE" broadcast and leaflet to issue Supreme Commander's special message to German forces in NORWAY - addressed to their Commander-in-Chief. (See proposed text at TAB 'A').

11. By special broadcasts, regular news sheets and impact leaflets to convince enemy forces in NORWAY that resistance is useless, that they must stand behind those of their officers who are for capitulation, and that they have good prospects for the future under our control. (See outline of themes to be used at TAB 'C').

12. Upon the Commander-in-Chief in NORWAY or a representative group of his officers signifying their intention to capitulate, we must continue our psychological warfare barrage, in order to:

- a. Control the situation between capitulation day and the arrival of 'DOOMEDAY' or 'RESCUE' forces.
- b. Prepare the Norwegian people for the arrival of Allied forces.

13. If enemy forces in NORWAY decide to resist we must continue psychological warfare operations to them from U.K./GERMANY, while undertaking combat preparations in support of the military operations.

14. At all stages we must sustain adequate psychological warfare output to the Norwegian people - news, warnings, instructions - in order to:

- a. Maintain their morale and get their assistance in weakening the enemy's will to resist.
- b. Enable them to avoid casualties.
- c. Prepare them for the tasks and difficulties which will face them when NORWAY is liberated.

(For themes to be used to the NORWEGIAN people, see TAB 'D').

METHODS

15. Leaflets

- a. For adequate coverage of enemy concentrations and centers of Norwegian population, the following output will be required, assuming five missions per week are accomplished:

For the Germans:	90 leaflet bombs per night.
For the Norwegians:	80 leaflet bombs per night.
- b. Target areas of enemy forces - concentrations of 1,000 or more - are listed at TAB 'E'.

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- c. Target areas of the Norwegian population — listed at TAB 'F'.
- d. Leaflet output must take the form of:
 - (1) News sheet for enemy forces (at least bi-weekly).
 - (2) News sheet for Norwegian people (bi-weekly).
 - (3) Impact leaflets for enemy forces.
 - (4) Impact leaflets for Norwegian people.

Most important — and first — of impact leaflets for enemy forces must be "Voice of SHARF" text, which must be given the most effective and sustained dissemination, both as special leaflet and in the news sheets.

16. Broadcasting.

- a. Special shortwave time on BBC and LBSIE will be required for service to enemy forces in NORWAY — half an hour to one hour daily.
- b. BBC and LBSIE should augment time for Norwegian language shortwave transmissions.
- c. Psychological warfare campaign will open with broadcast of special "Voice of SHARF" message, to be repeated for several days and supported by leaflets.
- d. Broadcasting service to enemy forces should take form of news reporting, authoritative statements by German officers, talks by prisoners of war, and instructions under Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. authority, and should be closely coordinated with leaflet news-sheets.

LIMITED DISSEMINATION OF NEWS AND MISCELLANEOUS PRISONERS.

17. A proportion of the output to NORWAY must be directed towards the 60,000 Allied prisoners of war (and displaced persons (the majority Russians) who are now there. Material to be used will follow Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. policy lines.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

18. In addition to urgent sources intelligence material for output to NORWAY must be obtained by:

- a. Special psychological warfare interrogations of enemy prisoners of war who have recently been stationed in the country.
- b. Stationing of a Norwegian-speaking psychological warfare officer in SHARF as "listening post".

COMBAT AND COMMOBINATION EXPERIMENTAL.

19. Plans for the above must be ready for two contingencies:

- a. Implementation of operations "DOGBODY" and "POSTLE".
- b. Mounting of large scale operation.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE GROUP, FOR FORCE/SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, A.E.F.
PROPOSED FOR KOREA.

20. General Sir A.F. Andrew K. Thorne, Head of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. Mission to KOREA and Commander Force 134, makes these recommendations for the employment of the Psychological Warfare Group for KOREA:

- a. Since operations 'DOGBLAY' and/or 'LIFESTYLE' may have to be mounted at any time, the Group must be at readiness to support such operations.
- b. In order to maintain the closest possible contact with Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., 21 Army Group and the civilian agencies during the psychological warfare campaign, the Psychological Warfare Group will be divided as follows:
 - (1) Contact and liaison element in LONDON, with Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. (Rear), working with Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. (Main), civilian agencies and Norwegian authorities.
 - (2) Communications element and stockpile in SCOTLAND.
 - (3) Combat prepared element in readiness to join 21 Army Group.
 - (4) One element reporting directly to A.L.W.F.

1. THE GROUP WILL BE DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

21. The liberation of KOREA will be an allied operation including Norwegian Forces. In order to avoid undue difficulties and misunderstandings it will be necessary for Norwegian representatives to be taken in on all psychological warfare planning and output.

2. PLAN:

22. This plan is based on the assumption that A.L.W.F. remains neutral. If and when this policy is lost then the A.L.W.F. will either enter the war on the side of the allies, or will remain neutral for information, or be forced to remain neutral for the effective use of this factor.

TIME:

23. This plan should be put in operation on 10 May, 1945.

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TAB 10'

APPROXIMATE MESSAGE SHEET FOR EFFECT
OF JEWELRY, CLOTHING, AND OTHER VALUES IN RUSSIA

1. SOFT VOICE - send 1 message to German C-in-C from Supreme Commander, pointing out futility of further resistance, urging to capitulate and advising how to capitulate.
2. Futility of further resistance - in support of 1) impact on German soldiers, example of Hitler pocket, appeals by General Kriebitzsch, General Winter, etc., reporting of German results, action against other pockets.
3. Branch between soldiers and Nazis to be featured by appeals to soldiers to respect themselves from 1st ditch tactics - play up "soldierly honour" - objectively report PHASES, BUCHENWALD and 1st ditch at Nazi door - stress invalidity of Hitler's orders - stress support of right-thinking officers.
4. Responsibility for German people - remind soldiers that they have not yet committed themselves (there have been talk of so and so, policy) - state that every German soldier will be individually responsible if German people destroyed - play up their better nature towards people they respect - report situation in Germany, food dropping, etc.
5. Looking to the future - further branch between Austrians and Germans - give hope of future for Austria, to which they can return with fair prospects - encourage Austrian esprit de corps.
6. Germany's future - provide some reassurance to Germans in Norway that they will not only save their lives by surrender but that they will be able to return to their homes and families reasonably soon - objectively report Military Government of Germany - play up German views on our fairness and justice - make clear that we do not intend to leave Germany and the Germans without hope for the future - use authoritative statements on a world at peace, including Germany.

THAT MESSAGE TO BE COUNTERED BY REFS SENT (POLAR
NORWEGIAN) - COUNCIL - COUNCIL - COUNCIL - COUNCIL - COUNCIL -
THAT MESSAGE, AND - IN AREA OF NORWEGIAN.

7. Principles and action points:

- Further resistance is futile.
- If you realize you will lose your lives and destroy Norway.
- There is no chance of capitulation.
- Let one thing, name to Hitler - the death of death.
- Let Nazis cannot harm your families.
- You will be able to see your families reasonably soon.
- German soldiers and civilians are well treated by us.
- We do not intend to obliterate the German people or
- Leave Germany without a hopeful future.
- YOU GO ON WITH YOUR LIFE.
- If you are not already disciplined under officers who
- take reasonable course for surrender.
- Help let in and let out the Nazi families.
- Protect Norwegian people from their criminal acts.
- Stay with your units.
- Look after allied in/7.
- Avoid all close with civilian population.
- Support those officers who negotiate for capitulation.
- Stay in the zone.
- Listen to our radio, read our leaflets.
- Wait quietly to surrender to our forces.

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125-72

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE GUIDE FOR IS. FLEET AND
BRANCHES, BRANCHES, BRANCHES TO THE EXTERIOR AREAS

1. Certainty of liberation - maintain morale under trying circumstances by reiterating Allied desire and intention to free NORWAY on a short basis for her people - Allied and German forces will soon be either German fight or not, but Norwegians must play their part in easing the task.
2. Work on enemy morale - convince Germans of futility and certainty of psychological battle, reveal - encourage, breached between soldiers and Nazis - support anti-Nazi and Austrians.
3. Avoid futile opposition - resistance is up to trained groups - avoid mass rising without hope of success - keep away from enemy installations, stay ashore, look out for mines, booby traps - preserve food supplies.
4. Advice on pressing problems - maintain uncorruptive information derived on food, diet, clothing, etc. and all the problems which liberation will bring.
Note: COMMISSIONER'S BUREAU IN CRAFT.
5. Refined discipline - give expert advice by hand and big movements - give up spirit of defiance shown so far and steel for last time effort - show people's efficient support of Home Front in Norway, government and Supreme Commander.

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TABLE

CONCENTRATIONS OF OVER 1,000 D.A.F. ARMY & NAVY
IN NORWAY

No.	NAME	MAP REF.
1.	THORSEN	05/6246
2.	BAKSTADSEN	07/4174
3.	ROD	X13/5996
4.	WATSON	47C/4938
5.	ROA BLANK	47C/4334
6.	ROA	43D/4640
7.	ROA BLANK	46D/4739
8.	ROA BLANK	43A/4876
9.	ROA BLANK	026/3305
10.	ROA BLANK	433E/3281
11.	ROA BLANK	B33E/3358
12.	ROA BLANK	B33W/3392
13.	ROA	B33W/7894
14.	ROA	4A/1589
15.	ROA	5C/0332
16.	ROA	19L/4284
17.	ROA	20L/0573
18.	ROA	10B/7746
19.	ROA	12L/8347
20.	ROA	
21.	ROA	
22.	ROA	
23.	ROA	
24.	ROA	
25.	ROA	
26.	ROA	
27.	ROA	
28.	ROA	

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TAB 2

LEAFLET FIGURES AND TARGETS

THAI PORT AREA

1. <u>OSLO AREA</u>	<u>Approx Pop.</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
OSLO & SUBURBS	500,000	600,000
DRUMMER	50,000	70,000
EDDY	15,000	30,000
POSS	10,000	20,000
SARPSBORG	20,000	40,000
TRONDHJEM	20,000	40,000
TOMMEROD	20,000	40,000
LAUVIK	15,000	30,000
SAITEN	20,000	40,000
ROTHSCHILD	10,000	20,000
ELTON	15,000	30,000

2. KRISTIANSDAL-OSLO AREA

TRONDHJEM	15,000	30,000
KRISTIANSDAL	25,000	50,000
MOEN	7,000	15,000
FLORVANGSDAL	5,000	10,000
ROTHSCHILD	7,000	15,000
LAUVIK	5,000	10,000
OSLO AREA	70,000	150,000
TRONDHJEM	25,000	50,000

3. BEKKEN AREA

TRONDHJEM & SUBURBS	150,000	300,000
EDDY	25,000	50,000
POSS	5,000	10,000
KRISTIANSDAL	15,000	30,000

4. TRONDHJEM AREA

TRONDHJEM & SUBURBS	200,000	400,000
EDDY	5,000	10,000
POSS	7,000	15,000

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CONFIDENTIAL

PWP/3172-30

SUMMARY OF THE
ALLIED INFORMATION COLLECTIVE FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

CART/JS

IN 000.77

29 April 1945

GERMAN FEELING FOR THE ALLIES IN GENERAL FOR THE WEEK OF 1945 -
IN THE WEST.

GENERAL FEELING.

The proportion of Germans living under Allied occupation to those still in the shocking area between the Russian, American and British Fronts is now a good deal higher than it was last week.

Nevertheless, the former should be even more present in the minds of those shaping output than hitherto, but it is still true to say that there is a good deal of overlapping in the material which should be directed to each category, etc.

the "starve or starve" campaign,
the exposure of Nazi atrocities and the lavish living of bonzes
the retention of the facts and causes of total, irretrievable
German defeat,
the setting in of the originality of continuing a lost war and
the reasons for doing so.

In view of the fact that the refusal to live, about the refusal of
Germans in unoccupied areas to continue to support the struggle and even
to take active steps to bring it to an end is (as outlined above) identical
with that which is most useful in securing the acceptance of defeat and
occupation, killing at the outset the ideological resistance movement,
encouraging cooperation and self-help and at the same time re-education
and indoctrination among the Germans in occupied areas.

There is a good deal of evidence to show that, in addressing adult
male Germans in unoccupied or occupied zones, the Allies should use as
authoritative (and even peremptory) a tone as possible. The German is
today so conditioned that he tends to obey orders issued by authorities
capable of inflicting punishment. He is so little open to reason, argument and
intellectual correction, that if he is presented in the latter manner he
will remain bewildered, passive and inactive, whereas if given clear
instructions he will respond with considerable alacrity.

There is some reason to believe, on the other hand, that young women
and young people and old, have a more of less distinct tendency towards
individual self-expression and a fairly strong reaction against regimentation
a bullying or bullying attitude on our part, or a scoldingly contemptuous
approach, which denies to the German woman, and, particularly, the
adolescent, the right to be regarded as a human individual with opinions
and aspirations, are likely to excite fruitless zeal for the coming of such
seeds as those of the so far sterile, but potentially fertile, Werewolf
movement.

It is significant that the Werewolf radio station conducts its appeal
in terms calculated to exploit against the Allies these tendencies among
German youth which have been observed in the Hitler Youth movement and other
groups of boys and girls who in the last two or three years have developed
a strong and fairly active, if politically vague and indistinct, revolt
against Nazi regimentation and crushing, of the more or less instinctive
desire of the adolescent to assert himself or herself as an independent
individual. Thus the Werewolf station takes a strong anti-Nazi line,
denounces the Nazi leaders, makes great play with the romantic, adventure
stories by Karl May about red Indians and openly aligns itself with the
spirit which animated the pre-Nazi Wandervogel movement.

505-SHAFF File No. 077 4123

29 APR.

(40-11)

In general, the greater danger is not that unregenerate arrogance and conceit to dominate will persist in Germany, but that the nation as a whole will be too crushed and degraded to make any attempt at self-help and self-reconstruction, while the least minded and least spirited elements (those between the ages of 16 and 30) will find an outlet for their desire to assert themselves as individuals in extralimited activities.

Since the realization of any kibbutz which may be established will depend to a considerable degree on the loyalty to the State leaders of the Youth, it is as important from the point of view of Jewish military organization to have the political and administrative capabilities of the young people developed as to have them trained in the use of arms. This may be accomplished by giving them the experience of super-militaristic discipline, drill and blind to the legislative activities of the young to play an active and leading role in the building of a new society, and giving the last-ditcher by making the experience of national champions of the right of Jewish youth to have a full education in a kibbutz. Men to undertake individual studies of Jewish self-education.

The young youth can probably be induced to recognize the glamour, romance and adventure of building in such a liberal and anti-Communist world of peace and information. It will be presented in the right way. Buildings, drama youth can probably be convinced and shown that it is a real part of the world around them. From World and inner-outer differences and how they affect these are exposed, religiously

There seems to be less doubt in the immediate future than might have been expected of the reaction by the new Indian officers of the situation. It seems likely that the average officer of the command with considerable experience and a good deal of susceptibility to allied propaganda in any kind of center of continued resistance which the Party leaders may establish. German officers of all ranks display within a comparatively short time an appreciation of the fact that it is no longer a question of the present and the (typical) a superfluity of every kind, which is both redundant and impracticable. This important realization must soon be confirmed and conveyed to the population that defeat is no time and due to no fault in the north and that the verdict can never be reversed.

1. It is also and even intensify the food campaign, with as much illustration in maps as possible of the harm effect upon food production, to be in Germany of a famine, and throughout the world, of continued military operations, which not only prevent farmers in unoccupied zones from tending their fields, but hamper such activities in occupied zones insofar as they run in military military concentrations, and also in the work of large urban millions of men kept on the land are kept in Germany. (The last, however, be careful not to give the impression that we are unable to prevent famine and chaos in occupied Germany):

2. In 1940, undoubtedly, not only the direction and origin of
Naziism and the description and self-indulgences of the leaders and
they pull Germany down into the abysses of starvation and misery.

3. Publicize all examples of Allied retaliation, or obvious preparation for it, and lack thereof, and all examples of use by the Allies for publicizing and the functioning of men and women with a good record.

4. Inform the remnants of German officials and others who are left that the German war machine has been broken by superior military power and the remnants of Hitlerism in a world, which, they now admit will never tolerate, unless proved its ability to prevent, German domination of Europe. At the same time, move the source of the war in such a way as to bring the remnants of such German officials, and outline Allied intentions in such a way as to reinforce the acceptance of the fact that the war must in fact be ended by now. (For this purpose full and brief coverage of the San Francisco conference is vital.)

5. In connection with the above, establish and sense of adventure is possible, and establish the world which is before the young generation in all countries in building a new world of peace, justice and progress.

6. Make clear the need for the people justification of our own and Allied attitude towards the German people as a whole, pending such time as they have proved themselves fit members of a civilized community of nations. There should always be this element of hope for the future. (Friedrich Heidegger's statement to his troops on non-intermission is useful in this connection.)

7. Give fair and adequate coverage to all instances of genuine anti-Nazi activities or resistance by Germans which date back to a time before Germany was officially losing interest. Give attention to, but without emphasis to, the many cases of resistance, and cover in full the acts of courage, and resistance against Hitler's policies and military operations, German soldiers and civilians, and the many cases of non-compliance, and resistance to German troops and police during the first years of the war.

8. Emphasize by evidence now available that a certain number of German women of character were never won over or coerced by the Nazis.

9. While never leaving any room for doubt that Germany is a thoroughly defeated and conquered nation, and that any immensely prolonged resistance, either in a fight or underground, will be mercilessly crushed, make it equally clear that Germany if she recognizes her guilt and learns the lesson from it, will be given the chance to recover within the limits of self-respect and a fair position in the world. Do not seek to encourage despair and hopeless resignation. We now require the Germans to help themselves.

10. Keep Germans adequately informed of important world events, without forgetting our own, and time to time they will be obsessed with events in Germany, present and past, past, present and future, and are not likely to listen to or read long pieces about extra-German affairs. Re-education of occupied Germany should at this stage concentrate almost entirely on German affairs, recent history and international developments, for the future of the German people. While Germany is unoccupied zones, even less susceptible to a more catholic and general approach, can best be kept by use of the same material plus the instructions from the Supreme Command.

11. Instructions to and news about Allied prisoners and displaced persons should be reported in Germany in such a way as neither to encourage the Germans to recover a feeling of superiority towards them, nor to feel themselves threatened by them. The Germans should be made to realize that these allies of ours have been severely treated by the German nation, while at the same time appreciating that present conditions of considerable disorder do not represent a permanent state of license to foreigners in the Reich to exact individual retribution and satisfaction for their sufferings.

DEFILATIONS.

Here are two examples of material available to implement the above:

Disillusioned German Officers.

Major General Von Leinburg, CG of the Bergen and Pillinghastel Eng Centers, and now in Allied hands, was in command of the German forces defending Paris until ten days before the city was liberated. He claims that he ignored Hitler's orders to destroy the Seine bridges and hold the city at all costs. He told his staff that the troops at his disposal were police forces only, and not capable of defending the city against the American army. He had learned to love Paris and the Parisians, says the General, and the destruction of the Seine bridges would have been military nonsense in any event. Ten days before the Americans entered, von Leinburg was replaced by General von Choltitz. He proper times he had tried to order the city, and, says von Leinburg, he directed his successor to spare the city.

Lordian, in connection with the 20 July plot, he had arrested SS General Olweg and the entire Gestapo and SA in Paris on General von Stulpnagel's orders. When the plot collapsed, the SA and Gestapo men were released, but von Leinburg was covered by the "order" under which he had acted.

Speaking of his beloved Fuehrer, von Leinburg says: "Burn him, torture him. Leave him to us, leave vengeance against all Nazis to the Germans. The Americans are too damned decent".

General Koenig, CG of XI Corps and his staff have been captured. The XI Corps was the last German unit to be completely defeated in the Pacific-MacArthur sector and was held since September 1944. Its officers were the best which Germany could put into the field. They were full of genuine pride for their army. I expressed disapproval of Hitler and his system. Their war weariness found this expression in the words of Major Blum, G-3 of the Corps: "The German General Staff under Hitler was the most ridiculed, powerless and stupid part of the German Army. Under those circumstances, the officers felt some kind of uplift to our morale when the abolition of the German General Staff Corps was declared at the Yalta Conference. I only hope this war aim is carried out. I am sick and tired of suffering and never want to see a soldier or a man again."

General Leuchting said: "For the year of terror I never knew whether the next day would bring concentration camp or execution. I had lost all human dignity and was a miserable slave. I went next to be a German slave laborer. I was a little land in a dark forest. I went to battle with them and for the first time I felt the pain. My wife is in French custody. Maybe the French will be kind and let me live and die in peace."

General Leuchting too, managed to unsway non-German spectators and relatives to prove he was not a true Russian collaborator. He dug back 100 years to the time when his family immigrated from Italy. He added that he lived near the Latch border and preferred the Latch to the Germans. However, he had no work living in Latch. "I was just on my way to visiting uncle in Latch (Lach) when the war started. Maybe I can see the Latch now", said the General hopefully.

Major Fritz Grotzner, of Grotzberg, who entered the German Army in 1909 and fought through the last war and most of this one, became a party member in 1931, but, disgusted with the treatment of the Jews and the introduction into the Army of officers chosen for their Nazi views and not for military proficiency, he quit the party soon after the start of the war.

* Johanneskeiser, the Ortsgruppenleiter Weiskert, the Hauptsturmfuehrer
Quandt, and Heinrichs were members arrived at the local side to give orders
for his destined to be fire the arrival of allied troops. As they came up
to the main gate, the Chief of the Invasion, Wagner, stopped forward
and shouted angrily: "First you destroy our mine, then you leave." Before
a burst or so was in, he jumped out from his place and shot him, killing
Weiskert, suddenly standing silent, but missing Quandt. Then he took to
the road.

He said that the first thing he did, when he returned, was to tell that he had been ordered to the destruction of the livelihood of 1,500 men and the loss of existence for the entire community of 16,000. Following this declaration, he said, he felt he had not only given his orders to the soldiers, but he had also, as a specialist, the business man of the camp, with a knowledge of life and death. In addition, he said he said that "if the population should resist everything, blow up all the bridges, the houses, all houses, factories, and all gardens as well as churches, etc. to be destroyed."

Another does not have his subscription added yet is done. "We must have the records to show what contributions he has."

[illegible]

The last slide is a picture of the "concentration" pillar, mentioned in the report of the speaker. It illustrates the self-destruction of General Guevara. They then quoted a 1963 report which is distributed to all Bolivians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Guatemaltecos, and Argentinians according to the 1963 statistics which were made at that time and place. The speaker said that they, in the last hours. They urged the people to join anti-concentration camps in their first days (to make liaison with the people) and the destruction of machinery, cutting in order to prevent the use of food stores, and in order to live or slaughter their cattle and to cultivate their land.

The light is provided by an organozinc which has some light during life detection.

can be learned in this last document, group is beautiful, about 15 years from finishing, to be made, linked to the last population (two-thirds) local "50-1 like owner", "10-15" have, Simon (Senior) 22 and Helen Linder, children 14 (brother), 10 (sister) - 1931. Forty member class, 1929, belongs to an American officer family with political leanings to the right. He also served, as with similar, He is accused of all the crimes in the last document, and is said to be wanted by Russia, as a war criminal for deeds committed in Poland and Russia. The people say that, "there was the name of the latter document" by not showing his name, and by killing, Linder and his "hardcore company".

A leaflet signed "Communist Party of Solingen" states that "Hitler fascists and the finance capitalists behind him" have tried to bring the entire world under the iron yoke. Though the war is hopelessly lost for Germany, the German people are being sacrificed in a senseless, criminal policy. The German people must persevere and should give up this criminal policy. The leaflet ends by urging the Germans that obedience to the "Mussolini" policy will only harm them on themselves, and that they should turn in "themselves" to the occupying authorities.

Consequences of Ruhrkampf.

When American troops were preparing to storm Düsseldorf two citizens of the city appeared at Battalion Command post and asked for the city to be spared.

These men were not officials of the city, but claimed to be founders of the "Freies Deutschland" Party in Düsseldorf. They offered to lead US troops into the city, over the city's main railway and several bridges by road blocks. They stated that there were five hundred troops left in the town and these men being there for organized for defense. This proved to be true, and Düsseldorf fell without a shot being fired.

Water, gas and electricity were still functioning. According to a reliable informant, two weeks before the American entry, German soldiers had begun to blow the bridges, during which operations some of the city water pipes had been destroyed. The city fathers had complained to the camp commandant, and it was decided that destruction of the water plant would only lead to greater hardship for the civilian population. It was similarly decided not to destroy the gas works and the power plant.

Anti-Nazi Youth.

An Allied Intelligence officer carried out an investigation in Bonn and district which yielded the following results, in his own words:

"Every person to whom I spoke knew of the Edelweiss movement and everyone else knew how children belonging to the movement were recognized - namely by a leather wristband some 2 cm wide enclosing an Edelweiss - and in addition in some cases by the "Edelweiss" on Edelweiss behind the coat or shirt lapel. Herr Karl Edelweiss, Curator of Bonn school had studied the movement closely being, principally interested in Youth movements. He had noticed its growth in the schools - principally in Düsseldorf among children aged between 12 and 14, in 1941. He had questioned such children and found that their adherence to the Edelweiss movement was principally an expression of their desire for freedom from the stifling restrictions of the Nazi organizations. It gave them a chance to express freely their opinions with other members of their movement and to indulge in a definite opposition to the NSD. Professor Wingenbach, the Vice of Bonn told me that parents in his town had taken their children because they had Edelweiss members and in order to try to force them back into the NS fold, and so save the family from being sent to jail.

"Professor Walter Holmann, of Bonn University, described the Edelweiss as a form of "Jugendstreik" (youthful protest) but agreed that in every case their "protests" were directed against the NSD and RDA members.

"An Edelweiss member declared: "Ich habe keinen jüdischen, polnischen, russischen oder anderen Feind. Ich bin ein deutsches Kind." (The Nazis took every natural feeling away from youth - that is why one becomes an Edelweiss). The son of a high Nazi official of Oberhausen/ablenz was taken to jail by the Gestapo and there declared openly, referring to Nazi teachings: "Ich konnte diese Fesseln nicht mehr ertragen". (I was fed up with wearing these "chains"). He was sentenced for being a member of the Edelweiss.

"Later the Edelweiss developed more active and energetic methods of demonstration, their subscription to the NS. In using as they lost to a large extent the little white roses and varied towards a type of the Edelweiss. They began to be known as the "Edelweiss fighters". The Edelweiss fighters were a dangerous force for any youngster to visit the house of an Edelweiss member. NS members and particularly SS officers no longer walked alone in these parts, but used to go in bands for their own safety. Elisabeth Liska, of Berlin, born, told me that she saw a girl friend beaten up in front of her school in plain daylight in 1943. Another girl, a school friend of hers, of Rumschlag, Laskerich, was shot through the leg as she passed a group by a boy who was identified by his mother as an "Edelweiss fighter".

"In Cologne, a branch called itself the "Kreuzer". Their members scrawled anti-Hitler slogans such as "Hitler ist LSE" on walls in intelligible red.

"The lighting of Cologne called in the Catholic priests and accused them of inciting the youngsters to anti-Nazi acts. The priests angrily pointed out that none of the slogans were painted on Catholic churches. "Do you think it likely", they asked, "that members of the Catholic youth would write their views on churches?" The police had to confess themselves stumped.

"The Catholic youth movement under its leader Ernst Weiler also kept a consistent resistance to the Nazis, although it was less demonstrative in its methods. After the Nazis forbade the carrying of the famous "IX" Catholic flag and the singing of Catholic songs in open assembly, many thousands of youths kept their old IX flags pinned on their bedroom walls and were even encouraged by their priests. Priests held private meetings and private Masses where the youth used to join in singing the old Catholic songs. Through all the long years of Nazi oppression, these children succeeded to a certain extent in opposing National Socialism.

"There is no question that the Edelweiss youth by their physical demonstration and the Catholic youth by their mental attitude were of distinct resistance value against the Nazi regime and should that among the children of Germany there was at least a spark of independence and resolution."

Dr. Ludwig Löffelmann, Cologne.

"Politically conscious and vigorous anti-Nazis of long standing are rare in Germany today, but here is an example.

"T. held an important official position in the Rheinland before 1933 and is now actively cooperating with the Allies.

"T. was promptly ousted from his position when the Nazis came to power. He then opened a small store to keep himself and his family alive, and entered upon a career of resist not to the Hitler regime which he never abandoned. T. used his position as a leading Catholic layman as the principal medium for political opposition. He addressed church groups on civil inferiority, on the rights of prayer, on anti-Nazi political standpoint. One of his papers appeared in 1936, spread throughout the Rheinland; it pleaded for recognition of the dignity of the individual human being, regardless of race, color, or creed. Another, dated 1944, dealt with the subject of truth, peace and freedom. In church circles, T. was sometimes quite outspoken. When a priest in one church prayed for a "just peace" T. stood up before the congregation and exclaimed "A just peace? But can we German that also ask for a just peace? If we get a just peace, then we would all be judged - that would be justice. Let us, on the contrary, have an unjust peace, a peace that we do not deserve."

They arrived at Birkenau, where 10 men and women, children and workings were staying. Babies were torn from their mothers, who, however, if they insisted, were allowed to join this group - the death detachment. None was ever seen again but the people of Birkenau say they constantly saw the flames of the five crematoriums and smell the stench of burning flesh.

These buildings were packed to the limit and, ordered to disrobe, their hands shaven by male workers. Given a bath shower and then marched in the nude outside in columns of five. There they were issued a gown. Some girls attempted to cut off a piece of cloth to cover their bald heads. They were beaten. All gowns were taken away and cut so that only a part of the thighs was covered.

They were put together in blocks of 1000, in groups of primitive huts. Here they slept on the bare ground without straw or blankets. If they were fed at all, and sometimes they were not, they received a little soup, perhaps a little potato or turnip or cabbage. Those who became ill on this diet and from living in the dingy ground were simply removed. Their clothing was disinfected for further use.

With the arrival of several other transports after several weeks, a group of 1000 girls were prepared for shipment, issued clothes, a set of underwear, a pair of wooden shoes. Again they were loaded into freight cars, again with a diet of water, a little bread, a little sausage and margarine. During the three days passage, they were permitted to leave the cars thrice.

They arrived at Auschwitz, where they were put to work, melting and mixing high explosives for grenades and bombs under the guard of 10 women, wearing the complete Schutzstaffel uniform, except for caps. The work was dangerous and tiring. They were beaten for a host of petty, for insubordination, idleness. Those who could no longer work for fatigue and illness were removed by the SS.

They continued to work in the factory, even during air raids, up until three weeks ago, when with the approach of American troops they were marched away in five groups by 10 men. After 25 miles of hiking in wooden shoes, they were incapable of going on. The SS were in a hurry and made off without killing them. When the girls recovered, they started walking back, and, with the instructions of German soldiers, they made their way towards the American lines.

Today there are 210 of these girls in Kitzingenbach. They live in private houses and are fed by the villagers, according to SS instructions.

Robert H. L. L.

ROBERT H. L. L.
Prisonier General, S.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION: 1 S B 1.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-2

FORWARD HEADQUARTERS

/JIS/5


27 April 1945

SUBJECT: Efforts to Persuade German Generals
in UNITED to Broadcast to
German Army.

TO: Chief of Staff.

1. In March, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed it was worth
while trying to persuade some of the German Generals in British hands to
broadcast an appeal to German forces in the West to surrender. The
Prime Minister agreed General [redacted] discussed the matter with three
senior German officer PW.

2. The German Generals, though willing to cooperate, refused to
broadcast since they believed that reprisals would be taken against their
families. [redacted] for their refusal set out in detail in [redacted]
attached paper together with General THORNE's account of the interview.



K. W. D. STROGO
Major General
A C of S, G-2

US-SHAFF File No. 096412/5

27 April

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 531

(40A-1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PWP/2011


Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

26 April 1945

SUBJECT: Guidance for Output in German

TO : The Chief of Staff, Supreme Hq, AEF (Fwd)
APO 757, U S Army

I am attaching a copy of our Weekly Guidance
which does not come to you in regular distribution.
I feel the sidelined portions will be of interest.


ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General GSC
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

File No. 60-111213


28 APR 1945

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502

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SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UAGP

TOO 241915B APR

214/24
242010B APR
Juv 242032B

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : EXFOR MAIN
TO : SHAEP MAIN PWD
REF NO : PPW 770, 24 APRIL 1945.

Ref your S-85793, apparently only to this formation.

No sizeable pockets of resistance in this sector but where situation arises will attempt to secure required information.

RUHR not responsibility of this formation.

214/24	242010B APR	242032B
S-85793 is OUT 5145 21-4-45. PWD		
ACTION : PWD		
INFORMATION : SGS		
G-3		
AR RECORDS		
6	503	

SMC IN 7552

24 April 44

2326B

EBH/bvc

REF NO : PPW-770
COPY NO.

SECRET

THIS MESSAGE IS AN EXACT COPY OF THE MESSAGE AS RECEIVED

SHAEP File No. 091.4123

24 APR

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCITIONARY FORCE
psychological warfare division

CONFIDENTIAL

CAH/36

REF 009.77

21 April 1945

X FEB

EVIDENCE FOR OUTPUT IN GERMANY FOR THE WEEK 23 - 30 APRIL, 1945.

(NOTE: While the material in this paper is primarily for German output, it should also be given thorough coverage in the languages spoken by the important groups of foreign workers in the Reich. All material not marked with a side-line is for use in output.)

APPRECIATION.

The character of our task is changing fast; more of the people whom we are addressing in the spoken or written word are in Allied occupied areas than in Nazi-controlled districts. There is no need to attack their will to resist; they are, almost without exception, delighted to be out of the war. As a Swiss observer remarked "their colour is white; National Socialism is dead for them as a political faith, but there is nothing in its place; their attitude is symbolized by the white flags of surrender which cover the country from the Baltic to the Swiss frontier; it is a complete blank."

National-Socialism may be dead but it is necessary to make sure that its legend and myth are not resurrected. It is also necessary to ensure that its place is not taken by other more disguised anti-democratic, reactionary and militarist movements.

Above all, it is essential to convince the inhabitants of occupied Germany that the worst consequences of the disaster which they have brought upon themselves can only be averted by their own efforts. The belief is too general that, by assuming the authority vacated by the Third Reich, the Allies have laid upon themselves the responsibility for solving the Germans' problems and guarding them against the consequences of their own follies, wickedness and political bankruptcy. If Germany is to survive the material retribution for starting and continuing the war long after it was lost, there must be a moral and spiritual rebirth, which alone can stimulate Germans to grapple with the threat of anarchy, famine and pestilence.

The task of awakening the Germans already under our rule to the true character of the regime which they tolerated and served for so long and thus of shocking them into a realization that all their miseries are of their own making and must be overcome by their own efforts, begins now to take priority over the increasingly limited assistance which can be given by this Division to the operations of the armed forces.

Nevertheless, there is still a big job to be done in this sphere, too. This is to ensure that resistance in the various pockets ends with the utmost swiftness. The experiences of the past week indicate that both troops and civilians are at last disposed to make an end of it by laying down their arms en masse, or by surrendering their cities and villages.

Fortunately, the circumstances in which the Third Reich is going into liquidation provide material which is at one and the same time valuable for encouraging those Germans still in unoccupied zones to submit, and for awakening those in occupied zones to the true nature of the regime which they have served

98A

For 15 years it which is trying to create the conditions for an eventual comeback.

To this extent the two parts of our double task can be carried out simultaneously.

APPROACHES:

1. Public use should be made of the great wealth of material brain lying out the combination of reckless savagery and cunning expedience which characterizes the Nazi beast in defeat, thus both regain the fire and courage of those whom they still hope to annihilate and destroying at the same time the legends of German heroism on our side of the line and entangling legends about the Nazis, based on the lies of those in their days of glory, and fed by the Nazi propaganda which anyone must experience after defeat.

2. Publicity should be given to the almost incredible reinforcement and increasing self-satisfaction and political blindness of circles of the German aristocracy, generals, and industrial circles with whom we are not coming into contact by objective reporting of circles which reveal the enormity of this behaviour - but Germans might be tempted to look again to these elements for leadership.

3. Widest possible currency should be accorded to the factual facts not being uncovered concerning the atrocities committed in the concentration camps, and the German as well as foreign press.

4. The courage and fortitude of the men and women who choose to suffer appallingly rather than to compromise with the Nazis should receive their full due, as a noble and inspiring example. The now fully attested existence of a strong intellectual opposition to Nazism among both students and professors at the universities should be properly publicized, while the spontaneous and widespread, if largely unorganized and uncoordinated, revolt of youth and general public should be adequately reported and directed so as to intensify the pressure on the latter days we expect to see, in the political, but that there is hope for the German nation of a return to civilization.

5. All evidence of Nazi guilt in starting the war and prolonging it when it was lost should be heavily played with particular emphasis on the irreconcilability for the perilous food and health situation.

6. The fact that the Nazi High Air Force even late drops are approaching, should be constantly reiterated, alongside evidence that, whereas in unoccupied zones, nothing is being done, in occupied areas desperate efforts are being made to make up for lost time.

7. The mass surrender of troops led by high officers based on England in particular with the remarkable sight of troops whose officers will not allow them to surrender and who have not themselves the sense or courage to defy their officers.

8. As many instances as possible should be reported of successful surrenders of cities, towns and villages, with particular attention to those cases in which the Wehrmacht played a role in the affair. Successful surrenders and the consequent sparing of the community's homes and livelihood should be contrasted with the fate of places which allow themselves to be taken by force of arms.

9. Every penny of evidence of the breakdown of Nazi authority should be publicized, in contrast with the firm but generally popular exercise of authority by the Allies.

SOME DETAILS:

Here are some examples, taken from recent reports, of the kind of items which should be publicized.

Nazi Panzer in defeat:

In Frankfurt-am-Main GAG, city and party officials left Frankfurt with the police and GAG on 26 March, as soon as they had seen the German crossing of the Rhine. According to some information they drove out of the city in their automobiles and trucks carrying a pre-arranged air cover, so as both to disguise their departure and also to move out when the roads would not be clogged with refugees. Transportation and parking seemed to be plentiful for the Nazis, since they could say afterwards to requisitioning Americans and civilians, to whom they gave small slips of paper on which they pencilled: "Good for one bicycle."

Local rumor has it that the Nazis "threw their Party buttons into the Rhine." OTS BULFERTHEIM and other Nazi leaders changed into civilian clothes and left the Party uniforms on the banks along the river. The BULFERTHEIM speaker also said, a lot of the population deserted upon ironically because of the number of death sentences he had handed out in the Standarten to deserters.

In Spremberg, the VS leader found a note hanging from the chain of his water closet saying, that if he called the VS in a letter he would be hanged. He left Spremberg hurriedly.

Men captured from the 103 VS Div in the Ruhr pocket say that officers and party officials of Duisburg were engaged in uninterrupted drinking parties. The civilian population of the Ruhr was carrying on passive resistance and committing frequent acts of petty sabotage. While the Div was in position along the Rhine, its telephone lines were often cut at night. In early March, a hand grenade was thrown at one CG Captain while he was motorcycling through Duisburg, badly injuring a soldier who accompanied him.

The Mayor of Gmund, who was at the same time party OTS BULFERTHEIM, was a fanatic named Zebich. He ordered the VS to defend the town, and threatened to shoot those who deserted. As the fighting approached, he changed from his party apparel into military uniform, and when the American attack began he ran off to the forest at nearby Eschenborn, and changed costume again, this time to civilian clothes.

Antisemitism, Nazism and Religion:

Prince August Wilhelm von Hohenzollern, fourth son of the late Kaiser Wilhelm II, in the course of an interrogation at the Friedrichshof Castle, residence of his aunt, Margarete, Princess of Prussia, at Rosenberg, said he regards Hitler as the Jewish and Gypsy.

Prince August Wilhelm is now under American arrest.

The intimacy of the relations between Hitler and the son of the former Emperor of Germany, particularly in the crucial years between 1929-1933 when the Republic was undermined and destroyed, is graphically illustrated by August Wilhelm's own words. "When I (Hitler) had not felt he would win my personal access," he still believes that the Führer "has a heart of gold," is understanding, human and "so full of an inherent love that it was moving".

That Hitler himself had full confidence in August Wilhelm's complete allegiance to the Nazi cause is evident from the following revelation:

In 1934 Hitler urged August Wilhelm to agree to assume the post of President of the German Reich in the event of Hindenburg's death. August Wilhelm says he declined the offer because he did not want it to appear that he had joined the National Socialist Party in order to make a comeback to a high state position. He also felt that the stein was rightfully Hitler's and the subsequent merging of the Chancellorship and Presidency in the person of Hitler as Führer was in fact the final solution.

Despite his reluctance to serve as Reichspräsident, August Wilhelm accepted a high rank in the Nazi hierarchy. He met Hitler for the first time in 1929, was invited to attend the Party Congress in Hamburg, the same year, became an NSDAP speaker, joined the Party in 1930, became Reichstag Deputy for Mark Brandenburg in 1933 as well as a Nazi Deputy in the Prussian Landtag. Since 1939 he has been an OBERSCHUTZFÜHRER (Lieutenant General) of the Brownshirt Storm Troop Army.

During the years that the National Socialist Party was battling its way from the political underground to supreme power, August Wilhelm was a tireless Party orator, addressing rallies and mass meetings throughout the Reich. Once when he asked Hitler for general directives for his speeches, the latter replied, "You know me and what my aims are; talk freely". He is very proud of his role as a Party agitator; proud that, as a son of the Kaiser, he could carry a mass meeting of German workers from a soap-box, proud that he was "very conversant" to the Nazi cause.

August Wilhelm's service to the cause of Hitlerism did not stop with public-speaking, speeches to crowds of German workers. Between 1933-1938, he devoted his talents to the services of Gauleiter Goebbels' organization for Germans living abroad, the Fifth Column Network of Nazi foreign policy.

The mass extermination of millions of Europeans under the aegis of the regime which he had so faithfully served, is a subject which Prince August Wilhelm finds painful to discuss.

Admitting knowledge of German war crimes, he avows his "disapproval," but also confesses that he never interested with Hitler or other high Nazi leaders to change that policy. "ICH WAR NUR EIN KLEINES MÄRCHCHEN" (I was only a little sausage), says SA Lt. Gen. Prince August Wilhelm von Hohenzollern, son of the Kaiser and personal confidant of Adolf Hitler.

Prince Karl Edward, Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, was interned at his 1000 year old castle Die Burg near the city of Coburg. On 6 April Captain Zotte came to the castle with a detachment of some 6-80 soldiers. He had his orders to defend Coburg to the last. Karl Edward was very much opposed to the idea. "All this beauty here will be shot to pieces in," he said. Capt. Zotte agreed but insisted that he had to obey orders to hold off the American tanks from the castle before falling back to Coburg. On 10 April American dive bombers and fighters struck at the castle while artillery shelled the city itself. While Captain Zotte was trying to make up his mind, the Duchess took things in her own hands and hoisted the white flag from the castle tower.

The Duke thinks that Hitler did a "wonderful" job in Germany. Only trouble is that he "overshot the mark". Hitler should have managed his 1933-1934 emergency measures short of war. The method used in eliminating the Jews was "harsh," but he thinks it was necessary.

During the interrogation someone entered the room to announce that military trucks were moving the great stores of food from the castle. "Of course," said the Duke, "they want to starve us to death." A check disclosed that the food hoards was collected upon the Bürgermeister's orders for equal distribution among the people of Coburg.

When asked how he would like to lead a new German state, the Duke looked at his wife, and upon receiving her lively nod of approval said "Yes, of course." He pointed out, however, that he would need, hour, to name his colleagues. When asked from what group he would choose his co-workers, Karl Edward replied: "From the National Socialist Party."

When the Bishop of Münster was interviewed in Bielefeld he asserted: "I have been fighting the party for years, and quite frankly I would have preferred to have carried on this fight without your help." When pressed for details about his anti-Nazi activities, he was evasive, but stated that the Nazi problem was a national and not an international problem. It was a shame that Allied intervention had prevented the church from solving this problem in its own way.

It will be the Allied problem, said the Bishop, to feed the German people. The Americans and British were the conquerors, and they must shoulder the responsibilities of victors and provide for the war-wounded. He thought too that German Jews must be released immediately so as to avoid famine in Germany. "At the moment," he declared, "we have enough to eat, but if we cannot work our fields there will be a terrible famine in Germany during the coming winter."

When the Americans found time to have a closer look at the citizens of Frankfurt-on-Main they discovered Herr Direktor Dr. George von Schnitzler, one of the three chief directors of I.G. Farbenindustrie.

The American officers found him at Ober Israel, well outside the old Frankfurt, where he was living in what he called his farmer's house. Schnitzler received the Americans dressed in fine Scottish tweed, cashmere sweater and English brogue shoes. On the wall of his sitting-room was a black and white painting of the fowls in Paris. So far he had managed to have from his farm eggs, poultry, milk and plenty of butter; all things most Europeans have not seen for a long time.

The American officers were not impressed when he said he was hoping to see old friends in America and Britain soon. They told Schnitzler of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, he seemed to have forgotten what had happened during the last 5 1/2 years. When the Americans demanded to see records of the I.G. Farbenindustrie he said he re-nitted deeply but the records had been destroyed. The Americans asked him to come along to his old office, but he replied he was unable to do so as the way was so long, and he was so old. The next invitation came from a sergeant with a tank gun and a jeep. This time the Herr Direktor did come.

Russians:

When the Americans entered Ohrdruf they asked Mayor Schneider if he knew anything of the atrocities which had gone on in the nearby concentration camp, and when he denied that he did, the MG on 6 April showed him the camp and the 33 murdered bodies still lying on the ground where the SS had shot them. Mayor Schneider was shocked. "I did not believe," he said "that Germans are capable of atrocities like these. We were told that the Russians are cruel and commit wholesale murder in a brutal manner. There were rumors in the town but we did not believe them."

The MG therefore ordered the Mayor to take representatives of the population to see the camp the next day; they should see for themselves. Mayor Schneider acquiesced, promised that he would prepare a list of the most prominent members of the community. They would appear at the MG office at 0800 hours the next morning.

The next morning, however, Mayor Schneider did not appear. MG sent a soldier messenger to the house of Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Singer, where Mayor Schneider was staying. On the back porch of the second floor he found the Mayor and his wife with their wrists slashed. Examination proved that they had committed suicide the night before. A note left for the Singers gave no clue to their reasons: "Forgive us," the note ran, "for doing this in your house, but it cannot be helped." Mr. and Mrs. Singer simply stated that the Mayor had returned from the camp depressed, had eaten apathetically and then gone up to his bedroom with his wife.

Of the fourteen survivors of the concentration camp at Ohrdruf, three had been at the concentration camp at Buchenwald. These, they claim, received British and American visitors were exposed to death by the Nazis.

Along with many other prisoners, Russians, Americans, and British, these fourteen airmen, had been held at the 1st camp at Gholia. When this camp had to be evacuated in September 1944 because of the Russian advance, they were brought to Buchenwald. They were told that there was no room for them at regular A. camps. The fourteen airmen, however, were treated as regular inmates of the concentration camp, were beaten and fed starvation rations. They lived in Block 32 with a number of Russians who were later transferred to Ghdral.

The fourteen airmen went to the camp commandant and demanded their rights under the Geneva Convention. They were told by the commandant that since they refused to work they were considered as saboteurs. The commandant then ordered that they be placed in Block 19, and it was in that block that they were gassed and later cremated. A delegation of Russian fellow-prisoners protested to the commandant. They were told that if they did not keep quiet they would suffer the same fate. Most of them did.

A German General Sees the Light

The following is a written statement by a German General captured on the British 2nd Army Front. He had been in an administrative post in Magdeburg.

"The senior officer of Kernigerode, a medical officer, complained bitterly that his request to surrender the town which is full of hospitals, without a fight, was turned down. About 100 Volksturm men with panzerfaust and rifles are available for the defence. And only on account of this, the town will probably be made to rubble without detaining the enemy more than a couple of hours. He is probably right. The enemy may be detained shortly, but he will reach his objective for the day anyway. Therefore, the effort of hapless children and old people cannot hope for any success whatsoever. In this fashion even the small remainder of our ruined country will be turned into a heap of rubble.

"In Magdeburg, I shall have to write immediately to Keitel about what desperate conditions prevail here. He is the responsible consultant of the Fuhrer. The battle of the almost unarmed and untrained soldiers must cease. Each day costs countless victims. The 16 year olds are fighting with the panzerfaust, which they don't even know, against manifold superiority. Our cities have been reduced to ashes. Keitel must muster the courage to tell that to the Fuhrer. I for one, will certainly not keep silent, even though it means 'retirement,' but at the same time it will make for a good conscience."

A German General Beats the SS

Gen der Infanterie Friedrich Wezbach, the former C Gen of the 4th German Army is in allied hands having just escaped death at the hands of the SS in Göttingen. Friends had warned General Wezbach that the Gestapo was on his track and so when an SS Major accompanied by a police officer and 2 civilians rang the doorbell of his house at 11 Wilhelm Weberstrasse, he was prepared for action. He ran upstairs to the top balcony of the house and fired 2 or 3 warning

shots into the air to attract the attention of people in the street. The platoon then dove below, fired back and in the corner of the street where their car was waiting, shooting wildly all the way. The General coolly returned their fire from his commanding position on the balcony, emptying all his ammunition clips at the SS thugs. By this time there were so many spectators of this "wild-west" scene thronging the streets that the SS Major and his companions felt dissuaded to be the better part of valour and sped away in their car. It was found afterwards that the entire block had been ringed off by Hitler's police to prevent the General from escaping, but the arrival of the Americans in Göttingen one hour later prevented the Germans from renewing their attempts.

Gen Heibach had been dismissed from the German General Staff in 1938 for siding with General von Fritsch, but subsequently became Army General until he was relieved of his post in January. He has always been a strong opponent of senseless slaughter and fighting to the last man.

Popular Resistance to Nazis

The CG of the 19 VG Div, Genlt. Müller, ordered a Lt. Colonel to organize the defense of Pöckelshagen. The local HG and the police joined were to participate, along with old lots from the Piv. train. The Lt. Col. found only one Co of Volksturm, all aged between 50 and 60, and his attempt to mobilize the HG was frustrated by their aged parents. Under these conditions resistance to the Allies was almost impossible.

The following is an extract from telephone conversations overheard at Witten on 7 April 45:

Party members and Volksturm men are facing grave difficulties in connection with the rotten attitude of those of the civilian population and leaders who are taken to prevent civilian fleeing, such as women - especially in Catholic regions. Anyone holding the white flag will be hanged. Anyone must at no account be thrown away.

The demoralized, retreating German soldier no longer receives welcome from his compatriots, and civilian action against the Wehrmacht's loss and concern is becoming quite common. In Pöckelshagen the CG of the 19th Sicherungs Bn was approached by the citizens and told to get him men out of town, that they only constituted a danger to life and property. When the Wehrmacht replied he was only an officer obeying orders, the people went to the local Ortsgruppenleiter with an ultimatum. Either you get the soldiers out of town or we take care of you ... first. The citizens, like many of their brethren in other frontlines to us, then proceeded to tear down the heavy logs from the Panzerbrecher (tank obstacles), pulling them off the road with the aid of horses in order to facilitate the entry of US armored spearheads. One of the officers exclaimed: "SIE HABEN ES JA IN DER QUARTIER LACHEN NICHT NIEHLEN! SIE HABEN ES NICHT GEWISSEN VERLIEREN UND ALLEN NACH NICHT IN SPURDE HABEN ALLENDEPOTE VERLIEREN (you really can't blame the people, they have lost so much already and don't want to lose what is left in the last hour of the war)

The citizens of Plombey too had their minds well set; there could be no fight for their town if they could help it. German came on their part and our loudspeaker appeal, telling them how to get their town out of the war, did the work. On 3 April, the local doctor heard the SS address from one of our aviators, when asking for unconditional surrender. The doctor acted. He telephoned the Mayor, convinced him and shortly thereafter appeared on the Adersborn road waving a white flag. He told our troops that the town was clear of German troops. The last soldiers, members of an SS unit, had pulled out two days ago. The local Volkssturm surrendered their 27 mm machine gun after they had told their CO, the local Leutnant, that they would not fight.

The Bürgermeister of Alten, after surrendering his community, proceeded in good and cheerful spirit to accompany our forces to the next town, Reibach, where he promptly arranged with the local Mayor for the capitulation of this community.

Mayors and Their Towns.

The Mayor of Leunbach surrendered the village twice. A few of our reconnaissance vehicles appeared and white flags were hung out. When no more troops arrived for several hours, the Mayor ordered the flags to be taken in. Thereupon our fighter-bomber group attacked the place, causing a considerable amount of destruction. The villagers seized the Mayor, and beat him up while hanging out their flags again.

Unequivocal opposition to current Nazi policy and autonomous local action appears in an order dated 6 April of Col. Mueller, Town Commandant of Osterwald. He declared the town a hospital town and in accordance with the Geneva Convention he forbade any military activity or the storing of any weapons. He also ordered that all weapons be given up and that all troops, the Volkssturm and Wendland carry on its fighting outside the town limits. Violation of these orders would endanger the wounded and the town inhabitants and would therefore be punished. In a second order dated 7 April Colonel Mueller points out that the Nazis had ordered before they fled, that the Geneva Convention should be broken and the hospital destroyed, and that the civilian population should conduct partisan warfare through the Wendland and that there should be no administration by Germans of the occupied territory or the supplying of food. "This," says Mueller, "is suicide of thousands of innocent German people. These orders contradict every law of the people and any humanity." He therefore ordered that the Volkssturm and Wendland be dissolved, and that anyone who wish to fight, should go on to the East and there to fight as soldiers. He also ordered that the civil administration of Osterwald, Reibach, Wendland and Wendland should continue to operate and be responsible for the provisioning of the community. "Only peace protects us from death by starvation. Country people, cooperate so that we may still save what can be saved." These orders were to obtain until the occupying forces replaced them. Allied troops arrived shortly after the order was written, for it concludes with a postscript that the American military authorities had confirmed the signature as Commandant of the Hospital.

The rabid Mayor of Gredeburg, a town of 2-3000 people, refused the population's request to declare the town open, with the caveat that it is not 75% destroyed. The Mayor, Schlauchmann, has been arrested.

Kreisleiter Rheinisch of Bonn-Bad Godesburg forced the garrison and people to the town to defend it over the protests of Peter Barmert. He thus made himself responsible for many deaths. A woman denounced him, or he tried to hide himself in the disguise of a private and on the way to the cage his guards had to protect him from lynching. He was responsible too for having denounced many people to the Gestapo for execution.

When the Americans were outside Saligenstadt the local population told the Mayor to put up a white flag. This the Mayor refused to do, so the local people beat him up. The Mayor then poisoned himself and his family.

Gestapo on Youth

Information as of 10 January 45 from [redacted] reveals that the Studenten Gruppe of Frankfurt, a body of soldiers selected by the Wehrmacht to complete their medical education, was a hotbed of Edelweiss Firsten activity. About a fourth of this group were regular members of the movement paying dues and attending meetings twice a week. Many of the Firsten belonged to Edelweissland, a Catholic youth organization banned by the Nazis.

The Firsten conducted anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist propaganda and sponsored the printing of leaflets. Sabotage was attempted - once by the deliberate failure on the part of a chemical engineer to use the proper formula in preparing a compound.

A Catholic is resident of Munich, who returned there on furlough in Jan., said that about 250 Edelweiss Firsten of both sexes have been arrested and some executed. In Sept. 44 many students disappeared when they received their induction papers, but the Gestapo is still hunting for them. Rebelious students call Munich "Die Stadt der Gegenbewegung" (City of Opposition).

At Marburg University there are groups of anti-Nazi students who slowly and surely dissociated themselves from the National Socialist elements in the Kameradschaften, and usually met outside of Marburg in some tavern.

The anti-Nazi thinking of these students, approximately one third of the enrollment at Marburg, was conditioned largely by the professors, by Heitmann, the psychologist, and especially by Kuhn, the eminent Art Historian.

There was no real political attraction to the anti-Naziism of these groups. Their sympathy with democratic forms of government came largely out of their opposition to their present constitution. They wanted "freedom," above all "freedom of speech". They believed in a democratic life, where those who were capable could establish themselves.

For the future, the students were mostly concerned with the overthrow of the present government. They did, however, understand that the future would have to be built with the "less educated classes" who had never been contaminated by the National Socialists. They did definitely want a democracy.

They value free investigation and research and the integrity of these freedoms, and they are more likely to challenge any future infringement on these freedoms than they ever were before.

Food prospects:

An allied reporter in the Ruhr area says: German fields look green and the grass is lush. But there is little ploughing. Occasionally one sees a pair of oxen pulling a plough. Sometimes a team is seen harrowing. But in general the fields are not being cultivated extensively. He talks to a number of farmers and they expressed anxiety about the future. "It looks like the Polish and Russian farm workers - practically free labour. Now the German workers are leaving the farms. Often only the Polish girl is left. One farmer told us that he and his Polish maid are left to run the farm. His German farm workers had run away.

This is the last month for ploughing, and what will happen to Germany's food supply next winter, since it is nearly no more than labour left. German farm workers are either sent to the front or in the aftermath. So when another farmer could use city workers. The reply was "he needs labour and will take any."

In the cities there is unemployment, and in half-out factories. City people, to be sure, do not like hardship, but if Germany is not to starve next winter, it will be necessary for it to substitute them for the farms.

Allied authority:

At Frankfurt-am-Main the Hauptstaatsanwalter, parcel post packages were being rifled. According to the postal officials they were the personal effects of dead German soldiers which were being returned to their next of kin. The postal employees were unable to dissuade the crowd from taking these packages. They found they could command no respect. Said one: "Not that our German leaders have deserted us, the people only have respect for the Americans." AP investigators found that their orders to stop looting and plundering within the city of private houses and warehouses ceased as soon as the posted signs limiting the population of street peddlers for looting.

ROBERT A. RECHLING,
Assistant General Counsel,
Chief, Legislative and Public Relations Division.

DISSEMINATION: 1 & D 1.

SECRET

1209

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : 21 AG TO DEBER
FOR INFO : PWD SHAEP HEAR
FROM : SHAEP MAIN FROM MCCLURE SIGNED SCAEP CITE: SHFWD
REF NO : S 85793 T00: 211502B

Chief of Staff here directed PWD to investigate thoroughly situations in present and prospective pockets of resistance and develop if possible special PW activities to secure quick capitulations.

Recent investigations of French Atlantic ports have secured valuable information. Request you make special effort to provide urgently data from RUHR as to effectiveness our propaganda and what main morale factors dictated resistance or surrender. If possible include appreciations covering local civilian and military leaders as well as troops and men in street.

ORIGINATOR : PWD

AUTHENTICATION: W M ADAMS
1st LtINFORMATION : SGS
03
AG RECORDS

✓ SSG OUT 5145 21 April 1945 2140B MM/jes REF NO: S 85793
T00: 211502B

SECRET

6 515

SECRET

COPY NO 9

SECRET

REF: C.O.S. 543/5



~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET.

GREAT STREET,

S.W.1

CHIEF OF STAFF TO SUPREME COMMANDER
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(326)
I am instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to forward for the information of the Supreme Commander the attached copy of a report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on General Thorne's interview with certain German Generals with a view to enlisting their co-operation to bring to an end the slaughter of their countrymen and the destruction of their country.

2. The Chiefs of Staff have taken note of this report, and in view of the attitude adopted by the German officers, consider that no further action is required.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO SECRET
BY authority of C.A.L.A.
BY <i>K.M. [Signature]</i>
Date 22.4.45

LCMellis

20th April, 1945.

See (33B) (4041)

S



WSP/1270-22

By overruling the tradition of the past and by turning Germany's foreign workers and traffic on its head, we are now in a position to give full details of Nazi atrocities. In view of the military situation, there is no reason to hold back this information, but our proper regard for effectiveness, especially in the future, must be regarded fully and objectively within the larger framework of an education of the German people about the true history of the Nazi Party and the German catastrophe during the years of the last foreign occupation and occupation, during the war. It is important for the American people to know that in Nazi regime has been not only a threat and a warning, but also a warning, has been a moral blight upon Germany and the world, and the millions of victims of its evil character. Therefore, to inform and to educate, by informing this regime, are in Nazi responsibility for the victims and particularly those who are still suffering and who are in the hands of the German people in terms of the future welfare of Germany. It should be pointed out that the Nazi leaders, the so-called "Hitler Youth", the political opponents and foreign, in such a cold-blooded manner are not in the same cold-blooded manner sacrificing the German people themselves.

1. Advertising. The following are typical advertising stories which it would be well to have the German people hear:

- [illegible]

- c. Ohrdruf was a peaceful little city 15 km S of Gotha, and has been very little damaged by the war. On a hill overlooking the town is a neat row of stone barracks. Formerly housing SS troops. On a hill nearby is a group of new wooden buildings, not so neat, and permeated by the smell of dead bodies. In the open spaces formed by these buildings are three dead rows. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to call them three dead mounds in various stages of starvation.

This is the concentration camp Ohrdruf-Nord, a relatively new establishment, not famous as yet. It has none of the features of the better concentration camps, no gas chambers, no electric chairs, no torture cellars. Yet in the five months of its existence at least 2,000, probably 3,000, Europeans died here, of what might be described as "natural" causes, since people still died from an infectious disease, starvation, exposure, beatings and shootings.

During the winter such deaths numbered about 100 per day (2,000 per day). One such natural death, for example, occurred when a Russian became too weak to walk. He was stripped naked at 0900 and was forced to stand up in the open until evening, when he collapsed.

There is a small wooden building at one side of the camp, something like an ice-house. Here are stacked about thirty rows of bodies, looking more like worms in their thickness than like human beings, and completely naked. They are piled four deep, and are sprinkled with lime. These were awaiting transportation to the burial pits in the nearby forests, when the Germans were driven off. The interrogators arrived during what must have been the slack season. In winter they were told, bodies filled this shed up to the roof.

The schedule at Ohrdruf-Nord was as follows:

- 0400 Rise up, clean barracks and grounds.
- 0500 Breakfast. One-half liter of watery coffee without sugar, issue of badly baked rye bread, sometimes 20 grams of margarine or marmalade.
- 0600 Marched to work, one hour away on foot. Only wooden shoes were worn, though these caused sores, or perhaps because these caused sores. Whoever fell out of line was shot on the spot by the SS guards.
- 0700-1730. Work on tunnel, etc. No rest or interruption. On the way back from work those who could no longer walk were again shot on the spot. Thus the number who returned to the camp was invariably less than the number which set out in the morning.
- 1830 Supper. One half-liter of watery soup with a few potatoes or kohlrabi in it.

Throughout the day "inspections" were frequent. The camp commandant and his assistant walked among the inmates. If they did not like the face of one they told him so and proceeded to improve it by beating him with a club or gun-barrel. Almost all the survivors have scars on their faces, particularly around the mouth. Any who did not march in line or stand at attention properly, was punished in the same way.

- d. STEINBERG. He stayed at this Stalag from 1941 till February 1943. Many Russians stayed at this camp and the situation for the Russians was the worst imaginable. The Russians were put in the open, fought over, 70 men lay there where they had stood ankle deep in dirt.

After the train had come to a stop the sides of the cars were tipped down and a whole row of Russians would fall to the ground. The men by this time were weakened from the trip and hunger and they were driven up a hill to the camp by the guards. When they lagged behind they were driven on with rifle butts and those that could not go on were kicked again and again until they either moved on or died from weakness. The Russians occupied Blocks 6 and 7. The guards assigned to these blocks treated their prisoners only to poor and insufficient food and constant beatings. I heard himself two times beaten to death.... In the winter of 1941 to 1942 as many as 18 to 19 Fw's were carted away daily, their bodies wrapped in brown packing paper. Many of the Fw's showed swollen limbs and bloated bellies from malnutrition.

6. When a FWD interrogator was distributing copies of 12 JG I & IV's newspaper for occupied territories, the 'Mitteilungen', on the streets of Frankfurt, he heard a voice behind him saying: "Let me see a paper again. I am a Jew, and I have not seen a paper for many years."

For years no fully Jewish family has lived in Frankfurt, whose previous Jewish population was over 25,000. They were either killed or deported, most frequently to Poland, at the outbreak of the war. Those who remained, the "mixed" Jews, were classified under several official categories: (1) Jews were the Jewish partners in mixed marriages. (2) GELINGSTADEN were the children of a mixed marriage who had not been baptized before 1935 and who were not brought up in Christian schools. (3) MISCHLINGE were the children of a mixed marriage who were baptized before 1935 and who were brought up in Christian schools. (4) MISCHLINGE 2 were simply persons with one Jewish and three Aryan grandparents.

All GELINGSTADEN had to wear the yellow star of David. They had a big "J" printed on their ration cards, which meant they could buy practically nothing but dark bread, oatmeal, margarine, but no eggs, meat, white bread, milk or biscuits, or even holiday rations. Those in Frankfurt still capable of working, did so in cemeteries, digging the innumerable graves of air-raid victims. In other towns they cleaned train lavatories or the streets. Analytical chemists, lawyers, business men and laborers performed these menial tasks.

7. RESEBRO, 26 Feb, 1945.
Message from the "Gauler" HQ concerning annex to the conference resolutions: Gauler and Reichsfürer
Gauler for Gm South-Westphalia.

No shot-down fighter-bomber pilots will be protected from the rage of the public. I expect of all party agencies not to act in any way as protectors of these gangsters. Official agencies which try to counteract the public sentiment of revenge will be called to account by my own person. All policemen and gendarmes will be informed accordingly.

/s/ ALBERT HOFFMANN
Gauler.

8. The Fate of German Cities. The following items are useful in illustrating the fate of German cities that have been destroyed or the methods by which certain cities have been saved from complete destruction:

5 000

3. DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMY. The following are useful illustrations of the current disintegration of the Wehrmacht:

2. 343 Security Bn. was admitted to vic of Federborn on 31 Dec 61. At 0800, 1 April, American armored cars appeared in the force. Streiber was not only present but was carried out in a disciplined manner which might well serve as an example to all German units. One of, who was asleep in a reconnaissance, was awakened by a German soldier who was

accompanied by an American. "Battalion order - turn over weapons and fall in!", said the German. The same scene was repeated in all four Companies of the Battalion. From the German flag of a red field with a black cross the American officers who accompanied the German staff decided to use the German officer's flag as a signal, around Germans in positions on the road. One US soldier was dispatched to the German platoon leader who dispatched him to a German officer. The latter conveyed the surrender by Companies, by sending one messenger and two of the various units, before the last of the units of the II were thus surrounded and had been in all.

- b. At dawn on Good Friday, newly formed SS HOLF was admitted via BULGHEM to stop the advance of American tanks. "We had been promised that units with heavy weapons would arrive to support us," says one SS. "The only weapons we had to fight the tanks with were a great number of Panzerfausts. Our men had only theoretical training, but none of them had ever fired a Panzerfaust. I don't think any of them would know how to use it. While the Sergeant was demonstrating, the weapon went off and I was very burned. This accident did not improve morale. "In the meantime," SS continues, "we had to watch while American tanks came nearer and nearer, without being able to do anything, shoot it, shoot they came from all sides. Our positions were at the intersection of four roads and completely cut off. The men were sitting in their positions, completely apathetic. They knew they could not do anything. It was all the same to them. They were thinking of their homes, and of their families whom they would probably never see again. "I considered it completely useless to even attempt to put up resistance, and the men would have been killed without being able to stop the Americans. In this hopeless situation there was no other decision left, and there was no one among the other leaders who wanted to continue the fight... That is the morale of most officers and SS. We have no prospect of putting up successful resistance against the attack with our ridiculous weapons. No one believes in our weapons. The only sensible thing to do is to surrender." SS HOLF surrendered intact within 24 hours after it had been activated.

- c. A member of advanced party of 602 Regt., 106 ID furnishes this account of the breakdown of his organization:

"At first we went to the Wehrkreis HQ Kassel to find out which sector had been slated for our Regt. After only a few minutes at this place, we had gained the impression that a hopeless mix-up reigned in HQ. High officers were engaged in the burning of secret documents. Not even the exact location of the front line was known to the gentlemen at HQ. Nobody knew anything about the whereabouts of the two battalions of our Regiment. They were supposed to have arrived in this sector It so happened that we met the CO of 1 Bn. in the railroad station in Korbach quite accidentally; but not knowing that to do with the Battalion, we left the men to their own devices Our Regimental CO was given command of the Battalions that were in the sector, but any possible leadership was precluded, right from the beginning, under the circumstances. There was no communication between the units in the immediate area; we did not know who our nearest neighbours were."

6. Two 16 year old female Hs members were walking toward an air-raid shelter, 21-011, when they too 11 members of KKKKK, dressed in black, stopped them. He asked the boys if they were not ordered, at their age, to run around in circles, and ordered a female Hs to take them to the nearest military barracks for "induction". At the barracks they were issued uniforms but no weapons, and ordered to go to the front line report to a Lieutenant. 500 yards behind the front they encountered a Captain, who issued each of them a rifle and sent them on. When they arrived at the O2 of their Lieutenant, they found it in the process of withdrawing, and they were given the mission, with three others, to cover this withdrawal. Employed in a bomb crater they observed soldiers approaching when they failed to recognise an American. In order to buy them time, one of the boys fired into the air, immediately losing our rifle. Within 10 minutes, the only two boys obey their "induction", they were taken prisoner by our men. There was probably the shortest stay during the night.

1. At the last to-day I saw one of the last of very strange
I've noticed. One getting off the train and one of them threw
himself in the train and started getting it - another took off
his shoes, exclaiming "Gee, I will take a nice hot footbath",
and walked into a crowd of people. A third approached a
byrd man and said, "I would like to catch the 8.20 train
to get to my home, which is at 1st". When asked where his
home was, he answered, "Gee, do you go to such nice
places?". Another observed that about 100 men with mental
defects had been meeting at the Elmer Sherman of inmates
building. No one picture of their talking organization
was obtained. All were complete unknown, but it was not
clear whether they had ever taken part, or been intended
to take part, in active campaigns.

For the Chief, Psychosocial Warfare Division,

Vol. 8, p. 100

WILLIAM. DALEY.

[illegible]

Deputy Chief, U.S. Customs & Border Protection Division.

JUSTIFICATION 1 & 2 1.

Secretariat File Copy
WRS/rmb

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of [REDACTED]

15 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: General [REDACTED]

Subject: Incitement of German Civilians to Revolt

2. Your action as indicated in paragraph 3 of the [REDACTED] memorandum is quite correct except that Mr. Murphy should [REDACTED] been advised that in any propaganda carried on to incite civil war, [REDACTED] State Department's [REDACTED] will be considered. It must be [REDACTED] that we [REDACTED] operating as [REDACTED] Allied Headquarters, and [REDACTED] matters of this kind [REDACTED] views of [REDACTED] State Department must be brought [REDACTED] harmony with those of the Foreign Office before those of our own [REDACTED] considered.

W. B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Chief of Staff

1 Incl:

[REDACTED] to D G/S dated 12 April 45

6 524

PPH/0964

SECRET

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

12 April, 1945.

SUBJECT: Incitement ■ German Civilians to Revolt.

TO: The Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

1. This Division has received ■ Robert Murphy, stating that ■ has received ■ the U.S. State Department an ■ to the effect ■ in any propaganda inciting German civilians to revolt:

"(1) Incitement to revolt should offer as ■ only ■ quicker termination of the destruction now being wrought ■ Germany;

"(2) Our propaganda should not ■ designed ■ political thinking about ■ future ■ Germany. We ■ to leave no doubt in the minds of the German people that it is ■ intention to establish a comprehensive military Government."

2. This Division, of course, remains ■ by your decision ■ connection with our Directive No. 3, that there will be no propaganda inciting ■ civilians in forward areas to revolt. It does not now ■ propaganda inciting German civilians in deeper ■ to revolt.

3. This Division ■ advised Mr. Murphy that in ■ propaganda carried ■ to incite to civil war, the ■ Department's ■ will ■ to, ■ has further pointed ■ that ■ have constantly attempted ■ clear our intention to establish comprehensive military government, by plugging ■ Eisenhower's Proclamation No. 1, the Military Government talks, and all available ■ information about the operation ■ Military ■ which implement ■ policies.

ROBERT A. MCCLURE.

Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

124 DR.

6 526

SECRET

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

April 1945

SUBJECT: Guidance for Output in [REDACTED]

TO : The Chief of Staff, Supreme Hq, AEF, (Fwd)
APO 757, U S Army

1. You are not on the regular distribution for these weekly Propaganda Guidances. However, I would like you to glance over one. 53-4
2. The marked portions will be of interest.

Paul
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General GSC
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

1 Incl: Guidance for Output in German

17 APR 1945

Noted
mm
b 526

PCWP/0899
101 The Chief
201 Smith

SCS-SHAFF File No. 101 4/1/45

12 April

THIS DOCUMENT IS

PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of **S.C.A.E.F.**

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Copy No. 24

431E(US)123(6)
1207 Thorne

regulation, the consideration of the effect of the

11. 6

APPENDIX

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx$$
$$d_{\text{eff}} = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{d_1} + \frac{1}{d_2} + \frac{1}{d_3} + \frac{1}{d_4} + \frac{1}{d_5} + \frac{1}{d_6} + \frac{1}{d_7} + \frac{1}{d_8} + \frac{1}{d_9} + \frac{1}{d_{10}}}$$

For the purpose of this study, the following hypotheses were formulated:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}, \quad \text{where } L = T - V, \quad \text{and } T = \frac{1}{2} m \dot{x}^2, \quad V = \frac{1}{2} k x^2.$$

Re: 001 - The James Earl Ray and Jo-Ann Bates

On 18th March, 1967, the Chief of Staff agreed that it was better simply to omit the word "the African Committee" in the letter to the United Nations and to the African States in the West to emphasize further the main importance of approval to this approach by the Government of Guinea-Bissau. A letter dated 1-4-67, signed jointly, visited Mr. J. L. Durr on 2nd April, at Lisbon, and requested contact at with large number of people living in the area.

A. J. ... said that ... went to the ...
... the
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

3. The following information was obtained from interviews
conducted by the FBI and the State Department with
various officials of the Cuban government.

Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 20(1), 6-19.

[illegible]

Citation: *Environ. Biol. Fish.* 2013. 96: 1–12.
 DOI 10.1007/s10641-012-9950-2

527

$$\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n!} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^n = 2 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n!} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^n = 2$$

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 TO **SECRET**
 BY *RMG/umg*
 DATE **16 AUG 1945**

[illegible]

1999

- (1) The above description would be the best possible effort to make.
- (2) The camp was to be all in their power to arrest and hold and release.
- (3) And their own wives and families of the personnel that were in the camp, and their families, and of which accounts were made in the camp, and their families, and of which accounts were made in the camp.
- (4) The camp was to be all in their power to arrest and hold and release.
- (5) The camp was to be all in their power to arrest and hold and release.
- (6) The camp was to be all in their power to arrest and hold and release.

[illegible]

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TRANSLATION

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WILHELM STRASSMEYER
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

JWP 000.77

9 April, 1945.

GUIDANCE FOR OUTPUT IN GERMANY FOR THE WEEK 9 - 16 APRIL, 1945.

(NOTE: While the material in this paper is primarily for German output, it should also be given thorough coverage in the languages spoken by the important groups of foreign workers in the Reich. All material not marked with a side-line is for use in output).

APPRECIATION.

The war in the West is becoming a large-scale mopping-up operation. Masses of German troops are cut off, surrounded or facing the imminent danger of being cut off. From past experience, we may expect some where particular troops fight fanatically, but the Germans cut up into smaller pockets and units are isolated, the majority will have a sense of futility and a wavering mentality, making them ripe for psychological warfare action.

The battle in the Ruhr stands as a momentous symbol. German troops there may fight on until they are decimated and destroyed. In that case, the remaining wealth of the Ruhr may also be destroyed in the process. Alternatively, there may be an orderly mass surrender in the Ruhr. If this takes place, the action may have a powerful effect on troops in other parts of the Reich. The choice facing soldiers in the Ruhr - quick surrender or slow destruction and death - is the choice facing soldiers all over Germany, and the Ruhr is therefore the focal point of interest for Psychological Warfare at the present time.

We may be quite certain that civilians in the surrounded Ruhr, as well as in other areas of Germany, have one prevailing desire at the present time - that the war should end in its last convulsions destroy what remains of their hopes and families.

POLICY

Every effort must be concentrated upon bringing about group surrender of the surrounded armies in the Ruhr. The troops must not only be told of the complete futility and hopelessness of their position, but it must also be pointed out that continued resistance will mean the final and complete destruction of this richest of Germany's industrial areas. What this will mean for Germany's future must be explained in detail.

GEREF instructions to surrounded and cut off troops are to be given full play in tactical media as warranted by military opportunities, and in strategic media, linked to news of surrender (see Directive of 6 April, 1945) and all evidence of breakdown of military control in the Wehrmacht is to be exploited. Our effort now is to transfer authority from the German High Command, which is losing control, to the Allied High Command. This transfer is to be obtained by the issuance of sharp military orders, which assume without question the right of command. It is our purpose to achieve orderly surrender by units rather than by single individuals. Propaganda to officers and non-coms must therefore be heightened, since they alone can bring about group surrender in orderly fashion. Examples of officers who have surrendered in hopeless situations should be presented, without, however, revealing their identity, or implying any derogation to their soldierly honour. Our tone should reveal we consider such officers have done their military duty in surrendering troops in hopeless circumstances.

(NB: There should be no reference to Model's order to shoot all stragglers).

24

9 April

For civilians, our policy continues to be that of indicating how disastrous continued resistance will be for Germany, and of giving specific instructions and examples as to how civilians can help bring about its speedy end.

Our propaganda should also now be laying the groundwork for the post-hostilities period. There are two main points to put over at the present time:

1. The destruction of Germany and the exhaustion of food and supplies, which will bring such suffering in the future, are the responsibility of the German people. By continued resistance they will have brought this situation upon their own heads. The food campaign, already initiated, is to be continued with full implementation. Instructions to farmers have been issued as a "Voice of SHAEF".

2. Germany's defeat is a military defeat and nothing else. The Germans must not be allowed the excuse of "a stab in the back". Information indicating how complete and thorough the military collapse has become should be used to this end.

With regard to the "Nazi Werewolf" programme, our policy is not to encourage this movement by appearing to be concerned about it. It should be referred to occasionally if at all, and when treated it is to be presented casually for what it is worth - a propaganda campaign, behind which lurks the Nazi hope of spreading further chaos. Straightforward reports upon the attitude with which Allied troops are received in Germany provide the best antidote. We can also profitably report, in this connexion, evidence that German soldiers and civilians actively resent the activities of those who are trying to prolong the useless struggle and perpetuate present chaos.

IMPLEMENTATION:

1. Civilian acts to end war.

The following items are examples of German civilian actions taken to bring about a speedier end of hostilities. These acts may stand as examples to other Germans who are similarly inclined:

- a. In Koblenz on the Moselle there were a number of tank obstacles set up by the Germans. Civilians took these obstacles apart and used the logs for firewood. Before the bridge across the Moselle at Trittenheim was blown by the fleeing Wehrmacht, several civilian women pleaded with the soldiers to let it stand, since it was their only link with their place of work in the vineyards. The request was promptly reported to an officer, and the women were arrested and compelled to leave with the soldiers.
- b. Villagers protect deserters. A middle-aged German woman, a war widow, reported that there had been a group of deserters who had obtained civilian clothes, hiding in the town of Neuss. They were denounced to the party leader, who came to investigate. The population prevented the investigation and chased him out of the town. Boys throw stones at him and he escaped him only because he was protected by the guns of some party members.
- c. According to a Pl. of L. Co., 6 Landes Inf. Regt., civilians on the right bank of the Rhine have been calling to German troops: "Throw away your rifles!" Anxious to see their homes spared from the destruction of battle, they cry: "Soldier, why don't you quit?"

- d. According to a Pz of 13 Co., 1055 Regt, 89 ID, there is a rising civilian chorus calling upon soldiers who have crossed the Rhine to "put on your civilian clothes and stop the war". The population is friendly to beaten German troops, giving them food, shelter and good advice on how to quit. Officers, on the other hand, get a cool reception because they are to blame, as well as the Nazis, for the continuation of a lost war.
- e. Complaint about civilian behaviour appears in an order of the 6 SS-Heer Bn.(mot), 6 SS-Mountain Div., dated 11 March. "There should be no doubt among the civilian population that sabotage will be punished on the spot. Mayors are to be informed of this. Special attention should be paid to the behaviour of Catholic priests."
- f. The latest development in relations of German Army and civilians who are uncooperative appears in a secret order of the 9 VG Div dated 11 March. Responsible reports by the troops, says the order, show that civilians receive incoming American troops in a fraternizing manner (unbiedernd) and even to some extent are hospitable to them. The civilians, however, take a hostile attitude towards German troops and in most cases passively resist justifiable requests, especially in connection with billeting. While it is understandable that civilians should desire that their property should not be endangered by artillery fire and air attacks in the Eastward movement of the American troops, it must still be required that German troops be supported by every means. This fraternizing behavior of the civilians towards Americans is "shameful" (beschämend) in view of their attitude towards German troops. It is therefore ordered that civilians who refuse legitimate requests of German soldiers, passively resist them, or sabotage, be arrested and handed over to the field police.
- g. A Colonel whose troops were surrounded in a German town received during the night and early in the morning of 3/17 several visits from the local priest and his sister begging him to surrender and to avoid civilian bloodshed. He called together his officers and since all were satisfied that DIE FÖHRUNG DES FÜHRERS WILR ERFÜLLT (the instructions of the Führer (to hold out to the last) had been accomplished) they all surrendered together with the group of civilians and 10 American PWs whom they had taken during the night.
- h. When it was thought that American troops were approaching the town of Underheim, the Volkssturm which had been called out hid in the cellars of the town and in the woods. On the night of 20 March the local garrison moved out. The Volkssturmers remained in hiding, however, and it was the women and girls of Underheim who began to remove the road blocks. A German officer and a detail of men forced them to replace the blocks. The officers then disappeared. The women of Underheim once more removed the road blocks, hung out the white flags, and formed a town committee which greeted the American tanks when they finally rumbled up to the town's boundary line.
- i. An incident which occurred recently in Freiburg-im-Breisgau illustrates the state of morale typical in the towns of southern Germany. Three soldiers, who were on duty in the town and who were carrying arms, encountered a group of women in a queue outside a shop. One of the women called out to the soldiers: "Throw your rifles away and go home, and so end all this misery." The other women testified their approval of these remarks with lively gestures.

- j. PW and his unit went into position near Ippendry, near Bonn. This was on the 4 March, and on the left of the Rhine. The civilians had shown great antagonism. They knew that their being there would mean fighting. They told them "Schiest nicht. Ihr schiesst unsere Wohnungen kaputt." ("Don't shoot, you are destroying our homes.") One civilian had succeeded in hoisting the white flag of surrender on the Water Tower. The officers in charge were furious, but did nothing besides removing the flag.
- k. In Gernand, near Westerburg, 16 saw many people taking the swastika off the flags, cutting out the remaining white part and saying "DIE WISSEL FAHNE DER FRIEDLICHEN KRIEGS- UND WERBUNG DIE AMERIKANER KOMMEN" (the white flag we are going to hoist when the Americans approach). Altogether, neither swastika flags nor pictures of Hitler can be seen any more in right-Rhinish territory.
- l. On the night of 21 March a woman (in Dornstadt) having connections with city employers, entered the big column on which stands the statue of Archduke Ludwig, in the Adolf Hitler Platz, and hung a white flag from the top. She then locked the door at the base. Early on the morning of the 22, the City Commander returned with a detail of soldiers, all weary of the "Hitter-kreuz", blew open the door with hand grenades and pulled down the white flag. This was the last act of resistance by the city.
- m. When they came close to Hatten civilians in the village told them that the town was already taken and admonished them: "WAS WOLLT IHR DENN NOCH? NICHT DOCH KEINE DUMMHEITEN! SCHNEIDET DIE KLACHTEN AB UND LASST ICHN! DESTO LIEBER IST DER KRIEG ENDE. (What do you want around here? Don't be foolish. Throw down your gear and surrender! The sooner the war will be over). The 10 PWs thought that this was good advice and began to strip their belts and weapons. When they were in this act, American soldiers, whom the civilian had summoned, arrived and took the 10 PWs.

2. The Military Collapse.

The following items are useful in demonstrating the nature of the military collapse which Germany is undergoing, a collapse brought on by sheer military force:

- a. A PW of 5 Co. 1st Pz Div., 100 Inf. Div. described the German retreat at Bruckhausen on 24 March in the following language: "We just had taken over our new positions when German soldiers came running along the road in disorder - organized retreat, we call it - from the west. The American MG was popping around us. I asked that leader Schwarz whether I could go to the next building to get some water. When I went there, other soldiers were running along the road crying: 'The Tommy is coming, the Tommy is coming! Go back, go back!' ... moment later, American tanks were in the streets and it was all over."
- b. A PW of 14 Co. 588 Regt., 100 Inf. Div. who wanted to sound out the morale of his men, asked them: "Boys, shall we make a counterattack in our old brave fashion?" A Sergeant and most of the older men replied: "The sacrifice would be in vain; if you think of the strong artillery and airforce opposing us, every minute that we continue to resist is futile." The younger men were too frightened to say anything. There was no counter-attack in the good old style. Instead, the entire outfit surrendered near Mollon on 24 March after receiving an arty barrage.

- c. 20 Pws confirm previous descriptions of utter confusion in the 26 VG Div. Though Gennaj Kokott makes frantic efforts to maintain contact between the remnants of the Div, it has ceased to be a coherent fighting unit. During the last few weeks, the 26 VG Div has frantically tried to fill gaps in its ranks by arresting as many stragglers as the MFs could find. The male residents of the villages through which this Div passed no longer were called up for the Volkssturm, but were immediately drafted into the army and incorporated into units of the 26 VG Div. Kokott deserves the dubious credit for being the first officer to have instituted large scale stealing of soldiers from other Divs. He personally scouted his Divisional area for smaller units, like SS outfits, and assault gun frontlines. In addition, his MFs lurked at every crossroad in a hunt for new cannon fodder. Unfortunately for Kokott, this unwhim has become a general sport of all Divisions. All high ranking German officers are well aware that Germany has more Divisional COs than Divisions or even Regiments. To maintain the appearance of a Division by hook or by crook, is the aim of every Divisional CO, for a General without a Division loses his independence and is at the disposal of Himmler. Consequently, Kokott is still keeping various HQs and trains intact in the hope of getting replacements and keeping his Division.
- d. An officer of the 62 VG Div, was captured 20 March in bed at his CI in Ythweiler. "I'm a broken man," he said. "My estate in Pomerania is occupied by the Russians. My wife and three children are tramping the highways as refugees. I am a prisoner. Germany's cities are in ruins. I am afraid we have lost the war." He stated that he was thoroughly confused after four weeks of desperate fighting. He did not know the location of the Division CI nor the designation of the Corps or Army to which 62 VG Div, belonged. This Lt. has only hatred and contempt for Genfeldt Mdel and charges him with being personally responsible for the present senseless sacrifice of the remnants of German manhood. "This butcher gave orders to hold on to every inch of every single hill, and it is his idea to drive untired and entirely exhausted men into futile counterattacks. Spare me from telling you what I think of Mdel. I hate to spoil my poise as a German officer."
- e. A Lt. of z.b.V. Kie of 81 E MND . Bn. of the Kurhessen barracks in Frankfurt, who was captured on 25 March, reports that the defense of Frankfurt went awfully sour for reasons he does not fully understand. On the night of 24/25 March, the Bn. was ordered out of its barracks and ordered to take up positions at Neu Isenburg for the defense of Frankfurt. The Bn. was under the command of Maj Gelly; the Company was led by Lt. Koch. On 24 March, Koch told his men that the American bridgehead South of Frankfurt had been smashed by KG Range and that only a few American tanks were roving the countryside. For this reason, he said, the Bn. was only going into position as a precautionary measure. Once the tanks were wiped out, they would return to their barracks. This was of course deliberately false information which some unknown source had handed down to Lt. Koch. When it became known the same night that Frankfurt was already encircled, morale dropped to zero. The Mdel had insisted that Frankfurt be made a fortress, and his unit dug in to defend the city from the N. When the Americans came from the South and South west instead, the forty leaders fled, and the Stadtkommandant promptly declared Frankfurt an open city. The flight of the forty leaders embittered the Army officers to such an extent that they were in

no mood to put up a last ditch defence. Lt. Koch himself reacted in the same way as the higher officers. In a speech to his men, he declared: "This is the situation: we are surrounded and I don't know what we can do about it. We must break out of the encirclement and do we therefore want to capitulate?" One officer said that capitulation was out of the question and so the Bn. moved to new positions where there were no defences. Shortly thereafter, the Bn. surrendered en masse without having fired a shot. Lt. Koch was not among the P.O.s. He is believed to have been wounded or killed while trying to escape. Maj Gell is thought to have committed suicide.

f. An officer of 1500 Arty Bn., attached to 180 II, was asked by the Divisional NSFC to submit a report on what the soldiers were thinking about. In his report, the officer made these points:

- (1) The impossibility of a German victory.
- (2) Where are the new weapons?
- (3) Where is the German Air Force?
- (4) The food situation in Germany.

He pointed out to the NSFC that the eternal references to the parallel of the Seven Years' war carry little conviction. Other officers of P.O.'s outfit were less outspoken in their reports. They tried to explain the mood of the men under them in terms of local difficulties, such as the fact that their field pieces were placed too close to the frontlines.

g. Further evidence of disintegration in the Wehrmacht is provided by the recent orders of Hinkel and Hasekowitz against stragglers. (The report that these orders have become effective propaganda causing the Landser to surrender to our troops.) The following statements from other official Wehrmacht orders also provide material for the theme that the Wehrmacht is simply collapsing as a military organization:

- (1) Hk. XIII Army Corps. Corps HQ. 16.11.45.

The issuance of marching orders and travel papers, frequently under false pretexts, and the use of forged papers, has reached such proportions as to seriously endanger the conduct of the war. The Führer has ordered that the most rigid measures must immediately be adopted against these abuses...

- (2) The Quartermaster General. HQ. 11.2.45.

Dept. II a No. 195/45 Secret.

Re: Conduct of members of the Wehrmacht.

Reference: Supreme Command of Army Group B

NS Führung of 7.2.45.

In spite of all the orders issued complaints continue to be received from the civilian population concerning undisciplined conduct of soldiers, particularly as to the following abuses:

Mowing of vehicles in communities resulting in frequent air attacks, even on very small villages. (Leaving vehicles without camouflage, in spite of urgent instructions of the local authorities and requests of the inhabitants).

Driving of Wehrmacht vehicles in the darkness with blazing headlights.

Black purchases of cattle, flour and other foodstuffs, resulting in difficulties in provisioning the civilian population.

Looting and theft in evacuated villages in the combat areas.

The above mentioned points are not isolated incidents, but a serious indication of relaxation of general discipline. Moreover, they impair the reputation of the Wehrmacht....

3. The Importance of the Ruhr.

The importance of the Ruhr for future peace-time Germany can perhaps best be judged by reference to its role in peace-time Germany before Hitler started using its industries to prepare for war.

The 1933 edition of "Der Grosse Brockhaus" (German equivalent of "Encyclopaedia Britannica") describes the Ruhr as "der gewaltigste Industriezirk des Europäischen Festlandes" (the most powerful industrial area on the European continent). In 1932, the Ruhr produced more than 80% of Germany's total coal production, more than 55% of her iron, more than 35% of her finished steel products, more than 85% of her coke, more than 45% of her machine tools, not to mention large amounts of electric power and lead, etc.

After the war, Germany will need coal in great quantities for reconstruction purposes. She will need coal to run her factories, operate her transportation system and heat her homes. Aside from its value as fuel, coal is the raw material for hundreds of chemical products which have become necessities in modern society. It is used in the making of dyes, colors, textiles, glass, pottery, cooking gas, etc. If mine installations in the Ruhr are devastated by land action, the whole basis of German economy will be undermined for an indefinite period.

To restore her railway system, Germany will require millions of tons of rolled steel and iron and steel products. For the production of which the Ruhr industries are essential. And without adequate transport the inevitable food crisis will be heightened.

Also important for Germany's reconstruction will be ploughs and ploughshares, farm machinery of all kinds, and steel products of every variety ranging from sewing needles to girders. With the Ruhr turned into a battlefield and devastated, Germany's capacity to produce these essential tools of peace will be greatly reduced.

Robert A. McClure

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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Ref/0487-10

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

FWP 345

6 April, 1945

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE
WEST.

See (27) for draft

DISCUSSION

1. This directive deals with Phase II of psychological warfare, and expands the section of Directive No. 2 for Psychological Warfare in connection with Offensive Action in the East, dated 15 March 1945, which covered that topic. The following Directive is therefore intended to cover psychological warfare action between the crossing of the Rhine by the Allied forces and the collapse or cessation of any resistance. It should be noted that this directive does not apply in any way to Austria.

BACKGROUND

2. The present Psychological Warfare Situation

- a. The onslaught of 5 Allied Armies driving over and beyond the Rhine, was preceded and accompanied by the special psychological warfare campaign called for in Phase I. For the first time psychological warfare was permitted (a) to look ahead and to build up an imminent offensive and (b) to issue instructions, in advance of the offensive, which were then validated in German eyes by its success. Each area, named an evacuation zone by the Voice of SHAEF became, within a few days of the announcement, an active combat area. Thus the moral authority of the Supreme Commander has been substantially enhanced among soldiers and civilians in areas not yet under his control; and the Voice of SHAEF can now be used even more boldly to impose his will in advance of our armies.

Objective

- b. (i) The overriding objective of all Allied propaganda during Phase II remains the same: (a) to disintegrate the remaining hold of Hitler and the Nazis on the loyalty of the German people, and (b) to impose finally the will of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we shall occupy.
- (ii) Our immediate objectives are:
- (a) To increase to the maximum, and to exploit the moral authority of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we do not yet control, and

CONFIDENTIAL

(33)

- (b) To induce a spirit of order and obedience to the new authority. Our military superiority is now so great that no revolutionary movement in forward areas, or in areas about to be occupied is needed to assure our military victory. Indeed civil war at this stage would only result in embarrassment and added problems for our arms. What we do want from Germans is quick disciplined obedience to the Supreme Commander's orders.

THE WILL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

3. The instructions from the Supreme Commander to German soldiers and civilians and to foreign workers which it is considered advisable to issue at the commencement of Phase II, are found in Appendix 'A' to this directive. They cover

- a. Instructions to members of the Wehrmacht.
- b. Instructions to civilians and members of the Wehrmacht in German ports. (These instructions will be worked out separately with the naval authorities concerned.)
- c. Instructions to German town dwellers.
- d. Instructions to Germans living in the country.
- e. Instructions to foreign workers.

These instructions, like the evacuation campaign which preceded them, are all addressed to persons in areas not yet under our control, where German Military and Civil authority is still in existence. They are, therefore, psychological warfare instructions, and not to be confused with the instructions to be issued on 'A' day. Whereas the latter are designed for conditions when Nazi authority has already collapsed, the former are a weapon designed to give the last blow to crumbling Nazi authority and so to assist military operations. If, for instance, the surrender instructions in Tab A below were carried out even by one unit, a useful service would have been rendered to the Allied armies.

PROPAGANDA TREATMENT

4. General Propaganda Treatment of Military News.

- a. We must drop all long-term strategic arguments in treating military news. The long-term issues are no longer in question, and we must not allow anything to interfere with reporting powerfully the final disintegration of German military might under the blows of all the Allied military forces. Reporting these facts in full detail, with no attempt to draw a propaganda moral, is our surest weapon for impressing indelibly upon the minds of Germans and of the world that German military invincibility is a myth.

As a measure to ensure credibility, we must report factually cases of German resistance where this in fact occurs, including cases which in itself demonstrates the futility of such resistance.

- b. We should make frequent use of such phrases as "The final round" and "The last phase of the war". The Germans must be offered no hope of military respite. The only way out for Germany is through unconditional surrender--and for the individual German soldier and civilian, "Schluss machen".
- c. We must give sustained attention to reporting military news from the East front, so that the Germans are kept constantly aware of the dilemma of the two-front war in which their leader have involved them, and of the objective facts of military unity and coordination among all the Allies.
- d. We should not forget the beleaguered German garrisons left by the German leadership in parts of Western Europe. Tactical propaganda should use the news of the military collapse of Germany as a means to secure the surrender of these garrisons with a minimum of further effort on our part.

5. Instructions to German troops will be along the following lines: "Troops will stay where they are and report to the nearest Allied formation on their arrival. Officers will maintain order and submit to Allied Authority in an orderly fashion."

6. Food Production.

- a. Germany now faces the decision--capitalistic or feudal. Since it is clear from the facts presented by Allied spokesmen (Mr. Churchill on March 31, U.S. Asst. Secretary of War Patterson on March 28, and a 17th spokesman on the same day) that there will not be for some time enough food to go around among all sections of the world, and further, that Germany cannot expect to have a preferred position in the distribution of what is available, Germans must make every effort now to maximize food production for the year. This means that every German who can help in food production, must get now to see that the crops this year are as large as possible. Farmers who are absent from their farms during the spring sowing help to contribute to their famine in Germany later in the year.
- b. Therefore every German who can help in any way in food production must make his personal decision--he does his best in carrying on the war and immediately turn up whatever task he can perform to increase food output.

- c. There should be no indication that the Allies are concerned for the German level of nutrition. The fact that it is inadequate is to be known, by their own efforts, to the utmost to provide for the German people for world food needs. We must likewise make clear the full responsibility for the present state of nutritional affairs which rests on the level of food the clunged Europe into the world and is pulled in by most malnutrition and ill health. At the same time, we must take advantage of this growing effort of the Allies to provide for their own requirements, at the expense of the rest of Germany and Europe.
- d. Germany and occupied areas should help farmers in any way possible. Farmers in the country should particularly note the location of mine fields so as to be able to facilitate their seasonal harvest.

7. The Evacuation Campaign.

- a. The evacuation campaign will continue so long as any of the areas mentioned in the above instructions have not yet been captured by our troops.
- b. Whenever an area is overrun or surrounded by our troops, we must immediately drop direct use of the evacuation instructions, and replace them with the following orders:
 - (i) German soldiers must stop fighting.
 - (ii) German soldiers must stop fighting to use their weapons for other parts, or to use them in a last ditch effort. The fate of the German people and their children is in our hands. We must not let them down. Our artillery, air and ground forces must all work to deal with each other and our troops.
 - (iii) Civilians should note the location of areas, unexploded shells and bomb traps, and report them to our troops as they arrive, so that they can be in the area and plan orderly human evacuation.
 - (iv) Civilians must report the arrival of our troops in secret and by hand, and then report our military government. Civilians are responsible.

5. Resistance by German Civilians.

There will be no incitement of German civilians to organized resistance or insurrection against the Nazis, except such resistance as may be specifically called for by the Supreme Commander.

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,

W. W. Rook
W. W. ROOK,
Colonel, R.S.,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION: P & D 1.

6 April, 1945.

I. VOICE OF SHAME.

Phase II was inaugurated by a "Voice of Shame" as follows:

"The following message dated 31 March is issued at the order of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

"The Allied Armies have crossed the Rhine and are driving ever more deeply into the very heart of Germany.

"The German Government has ceased to exercise effective control over wide areas.

"The German High Command has lost effective control over many units, large and small, of the German forces.

"In these circumstances and in order to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and sacrifice of human life, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force has issued a series of instructions.

"Here are instructions to"

6 April, 1945.

II. INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAINS OF THE WEHRMAKT.

Soldiers of the German Wehrmacht! To save yourselves further useless sacrifice, and loss of life, this is what you must do:

1. Units in contact which no longer receive orders from the German command are to cease hostilities. The units are to be assembled. Until further orders, the present commanding officer of each unit is responsible for the discipline of his men.
2. Surrender of troops takes place by sending an emissary to the nearest Allied command post, under the protection of a white flag. The surrender must take place in an orderly manner and with observance of military discipline.
3. Units out of contact remain under the command of their officers, until further orders. The units are to be assembled. Commanding officers remain responsible for the discipline and supply of the troops under their command until further orders.
4. Scattered units and individual Wehrmacht personnel report to the nearest Allied troop unit while observing the customary signs of surrender, i.e. unarmed and without helmet or web equipment. Collecting points are along the main highways and thoroughfares.

The above instruction takes effect immediately.

6 April, 1945.

III. INSTRUCTIONS TO TOWN DWELLERS.

The following instructions are addressed to German men and women living in towns in Western Germany. They do not apply to those living in the special areas declared danger areas by the Supreme Commander. Those living in these areas must follow the special instructions addressed to them.

Town Dwellers of Western Germany:

1. Cease working. Take refuge with your family in the safest place you can find. The factories, mines and rail centers are death-traps. Get at once. Delay may mean death.
2. Avoid at all costs being enrolled into the Volksturm. Untrained and ill armed, for you the Volksturm will mean a useless last minute death.
3. As the Allied Armies approach the area in which you have taken refuge, follow carefully the instructions in radio and leaflets of the Allied High Command. After the arrival of the Allies, follow carefully the instructions of Allied Military Government.

Town Dwellers: Out of the factories! Away from the railroads and main highways! Hide yourselves and your families! The end is not far off.

6 April 1945

IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL POLISH CITIZENS IN LIBERATED GERMANY.

1. Keep away now from all targets, factories, railroads, marshalling yards and land, etc. Refuse to work in or near such danger spots, in which no one has the right to compel anyone to work.
2. When Allied armies approach, seek out the safest spot you can find. Take refuge away from all military installations, away from factories and railroads; keep off the roads, particularly main highways.
3. Stay in these refuges until the Allied armies arrive and finish mopping up the German units. Then report to Allied Military Government officials who will put you in touch as soon as possible with your own (as required, French-Gzech, etc.) Liaison officer. Send a spokesman for the group.
4. Many of your comrades in the areas liberated by the victorious Russian armies owe their freedom to the fact that they were able to put into practice instructions such as we have just given you. The same is true of the Western front and this will increase as the momentum of our advance gathers way.
5. The Supreme Commander knows your urgent and legitimate desire to return home as soon as possible. By following his instructions, you will speed up your return to your family.


6 April, 1945

V. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LEADER OF COUNTRY DISTRICTS
IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

The instructions which follow are of vital importance not only to you but to the whole German people. To obey them strictly, is your only hope of averting the famine which threatens Germany. If you disobey them, nothing which either you or the Allies can do will prevent a catastrophe in Germany this year.

1. Do everything in your power, whatever the difficulties, to continue the necessary farm work. Go to the field the evacuation from the district areas. They need your help; you need theirs.
2. Refuse at all costs to leave your farm work for service in the Volksturm. If you have been conscripted already, escape at once and return to work on the land.
3. Resist, if necessary by force, attempts by the Party to remove food stocks from the district where you live.
4. Resist, if necessary by force, the slaughter of cattle, pigs and poultry. Preserve your livestock intact.

Remember! For years Germany has relied on plundered food from the occupied territories. Relying on this plundered food, she has mobilized her land workers for the army and failed to feed herself. This year Germany must depend on her own food resources.



510

Approved: 5/10/45

5 APR 45

Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,
Brigadier General, G.D.C.,
Lt. Col. A. McCLURE

For the Director
Approved by DCS
/s/ A. A. A.

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DISCUSSION

This file Division is requested to be placed in the by

RECOMMENDATION

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Even if these plans are not carried out, the operation will be conducted in the area of the
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Plans under consideration for the liberation of Holland
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DISCUSSION

SUBJECT: Black and white photograph of a group of people in Holland.
TO: Chief of Staff, Psychological Warfare Division, G.D.C.

4 APR 45

Psychological Warfare Division
APPROVED BY: [Signature]
SUPERVISOR: [Signature]

TOP SECRET
(S) [Signature]

4 APR

0 011412/3

*x 2000 hours
4 me please*

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

4th April, 1945

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Directive No.3
■ : Chief, Psychological Warfare Division


(2) With regard to your note PWP/56 (Forward) of the
2nd April, 1945 is confirmed that paragraph 2b ii (b) *(27)*
of Directive No.3 shall stand, in spite of the comment
by Ambassador Murphy, which is unacceptable on military
grounds.

F. E. MURDAN
Lieutenant-General

*File
H.A.*

SGS-Staff File No. 191.412/3

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STANDARD HEAD MATRICES
ARMED AND DUTY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)


3rd April 1945.

SUBJECT : Directive No 3 for Psychological Warfare in Connection
with offensive action in the West.

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to our conversation this morning. Attached at this time is a copy of Ambassador Murphy's comments to General Hottel on the Directive No 3.

2. The only question on which Ambassador Murphy takes an issue is that of promoting unrest, and if possible, a rising inside Germany against the Nazi regime. This question was discussed with the representatives of the Staff Divisions. It was agreed then, and subsequently confirmed by the respective Assistant Chiefs of Staff, that it was undesirable to use any disorder in areas about to be occupied by our forces, and the emphasis was laid on such action as was admittedly necessary so as to exclude incident to rebellion in the areas in the immediate path of our advance. On the other hand, the wording of the directive does not preclude more subversive action behind the scenes.



Major J. H. H. H.
Major J. H. H.

For: R. H. H. H.
Brig. Gen. G. H. H.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

530



Chief, P.W. Division,
for
M.A. McJannet
Major
G.S.

2 APR.

5. Pending receipt of your comments and any comments you may wish to make on TAB 14, the policy enunciated therein will be noted upon.
4. Given to Directorate No 2, General McJannet requests to avoid any possibility of voluntary or involuntary misunderstanding, that you indicate your formal approval of the Directorate, and in particular paragraphs 2 and 3.
3. Question has been referred to you for your ruling and you have indicated that the policy as stated in Directorate No 3 should stand.
2. This directive (TAB 14) has been circulated to staff divisions for their comment. It is still desirable to stir up revolutionary activity in Germany. It is considered that he does not wish to commit paragraph 2 of TAB 14 as has indicated from the political adviser, but the political adviser has also indicated general approval of the policy to be followed. Commanders have also stated in writing that staff divisions and the Supreme Commander have been shown to the Supreme Commander. Commanders have been told that the staff divisions at Supreme Headquarters to cover propaganda activity for the period between the crossing of the Rhine in force, and the formal cessation, or disintegration, of enemy resistance.

SUBJECT : Psychological Warfare Directive No 3.
TO : Deputy Chief of Staff.

2nd April 1945.

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Division (Forward)

COPY

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

31 March 1945

1. Anthon- PWD 31
zador Div. Mar.
Murphy Main 1945
Gen.
McClure

1. Reference your memo PWP 385, requesting comment on above directive.

2. I concur in the texts of the instructions to issued by radio and leaflet to various classes of the German population.

3. As regards the general discussion in the directive, I feel that Par. 2b(1)(b) under "Background" and Par. 8 under "Resistance by German Civilians" are too categorical in precluding insurrection against the Nazis. In my view, it is entirely desirable that the population should rise up against their leaders and that the Germans themselves should undertake, in a direct and expeditious manner, some of the purging that will eventually have to be done. I quite appreciate that large-scale disorder would complicate the tasks of military government but at the same time I feel that we should find it of distinct advantage to encourage anti-Nazi to take the law into their own hands in the areas for which we are not yet responsible. I would, in any event, be in a position later to prevent uncontrolled civil war by our establishment of martial law and by orders for the surrender of arms.

4. I therefore suggest that amendments might be made along the following lines in the paragraphs in the directive referred to above:

"2b(1)(b) To induce obedience to the new authority and quick disciplined compliance with the Supreme Commander's orders. While we shall ultimately require a spirit of order and shall indeed enforce it by martial law and a demand for the surrender of arms, encouragement should still be given to insurrection against Nazis and Nazi leaders."

"German Civilians. While it should ultimately disarm all civilians, German people should still be encouraged to make attacks against the Nazis free from Party oppression and terror by which Germany is still

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CONFIDENTIAL
100-100000
100-100000

R. L. Murphy

TAB A to 30

CORRECTION

THIS DOCUMENT
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY

D

A

K

B

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

31 March 1945

1. Ambassador PWD 31
Div. War.
Murphy Memo 1945
Gen.
McClure

1. Reference your memo PWD 385, requesting comment on above directive.

2. I concur in the texts of the instructions to be issued by radio and leaflet to various classes of the German population.

3. As regards the general discussion in the directive, I feel that Par. 2b(11)(b) under "Background" and Par. 11 under "Resistance by German Civilians" are too categorical in precluding insurrection against the Nazis. In my view, it is entirely desirable that the population should rise up against their leaders and that the Germans themselves should undertake, in a direct and expeditious manner, some of the purging that will eventually have to be done. I quite appreciate that large-scale disorder would complicate the tasks of military government but at the same time I feel that we should find it of distinct advantage to encourage anti-Nazis to take the law into their own hands in the areas for which we are not yet responsible. We would, in any event, be in a position later to prevent uncontrolled civil war by our establishment of martial law and by orders for the surrender of arms.

4. I therefore suggest that amendments might be made along the following lines in the paragraphs in the directive referred to above:

"2b(11)(b) To induce obedience to the new authority and quick disciplined compliance with the Supreme Commander's orders. While we shall ultimately require a spirit of order and shall indeed enforce it by martial law and a demand for the surrender of all arms, encouragement should still be given to attacks and insurrection against Nazis and Nazi leaders."

"6. Resistance by German Civilians. While it should be kept in mind that we shall ultimately disarm all civilians and shall enforce order, the German people should still be exhorted to revolt and carry out attacks against the Nazis as a means of freeing themselves from Party oppression and breaking up the machinery of terror by which Germany is still kept in the grip."

R. L. Murphy

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CONFIDENTIAL
16 APR 1945

TAB 'A' to (30)

200/46-10

~~PWP 46-10~~
PWP 46-9

**SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS
ALLIED REPRESENTATIVE FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
(Forward)**

PWP 305

29 March 1945

**SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION WITH
OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST. (Ref PWP 395 of 15 March 1945)**

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 Division
" " " " G-2 "
" " " " G-3 "
" " " " G-5 "
Chief, Public Relations Division
Political Adviser on Germany (US)
Political Adviser on Germany (Br)
ANAL - SHAFSC

1. Attached is a draft of Directive No. 3 for psychological warfare in connection with offensive action in the west. This directive will govern propaganda concerning that phase of military activity on the Western front in which the Allied forces exploit rapidly their bulge across the Rhine, and which culminates in the final military effort of Germany. It is an expansion of the outline policy announced in Directive No. 2 (PWP 385 dated 15 March 1945), and is intended to give more detailed guidance concerning the period preceding the forcing of the Rhine and preceding formal surrender or an enemy collapse.

2. Paragraph 1. of the draft directive gives proposed texts of the instructions to be used as amended at a meeting held at SHAF Forward at 1030 hours, 29 March 1945. An early clearance of these texts will be desirable. G-2 will be expected to give timing on the campaign, for the beginning of which at least three days' notice is requested.

3. In view of the urgency of action, since the military situation is developing so rapidly, it is requested that comment or concurrence be notified to Psychological Warfare Division (Main) not later than 0900 hours, 31 April 1945.

[Signature]
ROBERT A. CASLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

Copies to:

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff -
G-1 Division (Fwd)
G-2 " "
P. " "
PR " "

6 553

[Stamp]
1. 113
10 May 1945
[Dated 10 May 1945]

for original
1-10
29
TAB 5 to

SHAFSC File No. 46-10

29 March

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
(Forward)

PMF 385

29 March 1945

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST.

DISCUSSION.

1. This directive deals with Phase II of psychological warfare, and expands the section of Directive No. 2 for Psychological Warfare in connection with offensive action in the West, dated 15 March 1945, which covered that topic. The following directive is therefore intended to cover psychological warfare action between the crossing of the Rhine by the Allied forces and the collapse or cessation of enemy resistance. It should be noted that this directive does not apply in any way to Austria.

BACKGROUND

2. The present Psychological Warfare Situation

a. The onslaught of 5 Allied armies driving over and beyond the Rhine, was preceded and accompanied by the special psychological warfare campaign called for in Phase II. For the first time psychological warfare (a) has been organized and built up as an independent offensive and (b) has been instructed, in terms of the offensive, which was then initiated in earnest by its success. Each army, upon its announcement, was by the Voice of SHAEF become, within a few days of the announcement, an active combat area. Thus the moral authority of the Supreme Commander has been substantially enhanced among soldiers and civilians in areas not yet under his control; and the Voice of SHAEF can now be used even more boldly to impose his will in advance of our armies.


Objective

b. (i) The overriding objective of all Allied propaganda during Phase II remains the same: (a) to disintegrate the remaining hold of Hitler and the Nazis on the loyalty of the German people, and (b) to impose finally the will of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we shall occupy.

(ii) Our immediate objectives are:

(a) To increase to the maximum, and to exploit the moral authority of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we do not yet control, and

(b) To induce a spirit of order and obedience to the new authority. Our military superiority is now so great that no revolutionary movement in forward areas, or in areas about to be occupied is needed to assure our military victory. Indeed civil war at this stage would only result in endorserment and added problems for our arms. What we do want from Germans is quick disciplined obedience to the Supreme Commander's orders.



THE WILL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

3. The instructions from the Supreme Commander to German soldiers and civilians and to foreign workers which it is considered advisable to issue at the commencement of Phase II, are given in appendix 'A' to this directive. They cover

a. Instructions to members of the Wehrmacht.

b. Instructions to civilians and members of the Wehrmacht in German ports. (These instructions will be worked out separately with the naval authorities concerned.)

- c. Instructions to German town dwellers.
- d. Instructions to Germans living in the country.
- e. Instructions to foreign workers.

These instructions, like the evacuation campaign which preceded them, are all addressed to persons in areas not yet under our control, where German Military and Civil authority is still in existence. They are, therefore, psychological warfare instructions, and not to be confused with the instructions to be issued on 17 May. Whereas the latter are designed for conditions when Nazi authority has already collapsed, the former are a weapon designed to give the last blow to crumbling Nazi authority and so to assist military operations. If, for instance, the surrender instructions in Job A below were carried out even by one unit, a useful service would have been rendered to the Allied armies.

FROM A.P.M. PRESENTS.

1. General Propaganda Treatment of Military News.

- a. We must drop all long-term strategic arguments in treating military news. The long-term issues are no longer in question, and we must not dilute anything to interfere with reporting powerfully the final disintegration of German military might under the blows of all the Allied military forces. Reporting these facts in full detail, with no attempt to dress a propaganda moral, is our surest weapon for impressing indelibly upon the minds of Germans and of the world that German military invincibility is a myth. As a measure to assure credibility, we must report factually cases of fanatical German resistance where this in fact occurs, including news which in itself demonstrates the futility of such resistance.
- b. We should make frequent use of such phrases as "the final round" and "the last phase of the war". The Germans must be allowed no hope of military respite. The only way out for Germany is through unconditional surrender--and for the individual German soldier and civilian, "schluss machen".
- c. We must give sustained attention to reporting military news from the East Front, so that the Germans are kept constantly aware of the dilemma of the two-front war in which their leaders have involved them, and of the objective facts of military unity and coordination among all the Allies.
- d. We should not forget the beleaguered German prisoners left by the German leadership in parts of western Europe. Continued propaganda should use the news of the military collapse of Germany as a means to secure the surrender of these prisoners with a minimum of further effort on our part.

5. Instructions to German troops will be along the following lines: Troops will stay where they are and report to the nearest Allied formation on their arrival. Officers will maintain order and submit to Allied authority in an orderly fashion.

6. Food Production.

- a. Germany now faces the decision--capitulation or famine. Since it is clear from the facts marshalled by Allied spokesmen (Dr. Churchill on March 21, Maj. General of Sir Patterson on March 22, and a RAF spokesman on the same day) that there will not be for some time enough food to "round" even all nations of the world, and further, that Germany cannot expect to have a preferred position in the distribution of what is available, Germans must make every effort now to maximize food production for the year. This means that every German who can help in food production, must set now to see that the crops this year are as large as possible. Farmers who are absent from their farms during the spring sowing help to contribute to their famine in Germany later in the year.

- b. Therefore every German who can help in any way in food production must make his personal decision--to drop his role in carrying on the war and immediately take up whatever task he can perform to increase food output.
- c. There should be no implication that the Allies are responsible for the German level of nutrition. We must make it clear that it is to the Germans, by their own efforts, to do their utmost to provide for their own needs and for world food needs. We must likewise make clear the full responsibility for the present state of nutritional affairs which rests on the Nazi leaders, who plunged Europe into the war which has resulted in present malnutrition and deficiencies. At the same time, we can take advantage of news showing the efforts of the Nazi leaders to provide for their own requirements, at the expense of the rest of Germany and Europe.
- d. Germans who evacuate should help farmers in any way possible. Germans in the country should particularly note the location of minefields by the enemy to facilitate their eventual removal.

7. The Evacuation Campaign.

- a. The evacuation campaign will continue so long as any of the areas mentioned in the SLEEF instructions have not yet been overrun by our troops.
- b. Whenever an area is overrun or surrounded by our troops, we must immediately drop direct use of the evacuation instructions, and replace them with the following orders:
 - (i) German civilians must tell soldiers who are trying to maintain resistance to stop fighting.
 - (ii) They must not allow soldiers to use their homes for sniper posts, or to make them into booty traps. The fate of German houses and towns which have been centers of resistance is only too well known. Our artillery, air and ground forces know well how to deal with such obstacles to our progress. (H.B. It will, however, be appropriate to recall from time to time for other than German audiences the evacuation campaign as an example of our ability to fulfill the command of the Supreme Commander).
 - (iii) Civilians should note the location of mines, unexploded shells and booby traps, and report them to our troops on their arrival, so their towns can again be made safe for orderly human occupation.
 - (iv) Civilians must await the arrival of our troops in an orderly manner, and then carry out Military Government instructions expeditiously.

8. Resistance by German Civilians.

There will be no incitement of German civilians to organized resistance or insurrection against the Nazis, except such resistance as may be specifically called for by the Supreme Commander.

Annex A to
Directive No. 3


UNITED STATES ARMY
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES
Psychological Warfare Division
(Forward)

Radio and Leaflet Texts to be used in Phase II of Psychological Warfare in connection with offensive action in the West

- I. Voice of SHARP. Approved on February 3, 1945, and included in Directive No. 2, P.W. 385, March 15th. This brief preamble will be used to "lead-in" each of the following special instructions.
- II. Instructions to Leaders of the Home Front. * This text is a revise of 2G-100, a leaflet text approved on January 1st, for use when real aims of disintegration have set in. The revisions are necessitated to give it general validity for all German soldiers in the West, whereas 2G-100 was designed for tactical situations.
- III. Instructions to Town Dwellers. This was approved as part of P.W. 2 of Directive No. 2, P.W. 388, March 15th. It was then titled "Instructions to German Civilians to Follow 'Voice of SHARP'." It has been re-worded to differentiate it from V below.
- IV. Instructions to all Warzone workers in Western Germany. This was approved as part of P.W. 2 of Directive No. 2, P.W. 385, March 15th.
- V. Instructions to Inhabitants of Country Districts. * This is a new text designed to incite obedience to Allied armies, by exploitation of fear of famine.
- VI. Instructions to Inhabitants of Certain Ports. * This is a new text, which will require be worked out in consultation with the Allied naval authorities concerned.

Texts of the above instructions are attached.

* New texts to be approved.



~~SECRET~~

29 March, 1945

1. VOICE OF STUFF

This will be inaugurated by a "Voice of STUFF" as follows:-

The following is issued at the order of the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe:


"The Allied forces have defeated the German army and driving over you deeply into the heart of Germany.

"The German Government has ceased to exercise effective control over its army.

"The German High Command has lost effective control over many units, particularly 1, of the German Army.

"In these circumstances, in order to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and a crisis of German life, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force has issued a series of instructions.

"Here are instructions to....."



29 March, 1945

II. INSTRUCTIONS IN TERMS OF THE SURRENDER

1. Units in Contact which no longer receive orders from the German command are to suspend hostilities. The units are to be assembled. Until further orders, the present commanding officer of each unit is responsible for the discipline of his men.
2. Surrender of troop units takes place by sending an emissary to the nearest Allied command post, under the protection of a white flag. The surrender must take place in an orderly manner and with observance of military discipline.
3. Units out of contact remain under the command of their officers, until further orders. The units are to be assembled. Commanding officers remain responsible for the discipline and supply of the troops under their command until further orders.
4. Scattered units and individual aircraft personnel report to the nearest Allied troop unit while observing the customary signs of surrender, i.e., unarmed and without arms or war equipment. Collecting points are along the main highways and thoroughfares.

The above order takes effect immediately.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 March 1945
11 March 1945
11 March 1945

23 March, 1945

III. INSTRUCTIONS TO POLE Dwellers.

1. Cease working. Take refuge with your family in the safest place you can find. The factories, mines and rail centers are death-traps. Get at once. Delay may mean death.
2. Avoid at all costs being enrolled into the Volksturm. Untrained and ill armed, for you the Volksturm will mean a useless last minute death.
3. As the Allied Armies approach the area in which you have taken refuge, follow carefully the instructions in radio and leaflets of the Allied High Command. After the arrival of the Allies, follow carefully the instructions of Allied Military Government.

Town-dwellers of Western Germany! Out of the factories! Away from the railroads and main highways! Hide yourselves and your families! The end is not far off.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Chas. B. ...
Major ...*

29 March, 1945

iv. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL REFUGEES CAPTURED IN GERMAN COUNTRY.

1. Keep away now from all targets: factories, railroads, marshaling yards and bridges. Refuse to work in or near such danger spots, in which no one has the right to compel anyone to work.
2. When Allied armies approach seek out the safest spot you can find. Take refuge away from all military installations, away from factories and railroads, keep off the roads, particularly main high-roads.
3. Stay in those refuges until the Allied armies arrive and finish mopping up the German units. Then report to Allied Military Government officials who will put you in touch as soon as possible with your own (as required French, Czech, etc.) liaison officer. Send a spokesman for a group.
4. Tell of your ordeals in the areas liberated by the victorious Russian armies and their freedom to the fact that they were able to put into practice instructions such as we have just given you. The same is true of the Western front and this will increase as the momentum of our advance gathers way.
5. The Supreme Commander knows your urgent and legitimate desire to return home as soon as possible. By following his instructions, you will speed up your return to your family.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Am. Sup. Com.
M. G. M.*

C


28 March, 1945

V. INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OF COMBINE SYSTEMS.

The instructions which follow are of vital importance not only to you but to the whole German people. If you obey them strictly, it is your only hope of averting the famine which threatens Germany. If you disobey them, nothing which either you or the Allies can do will prevent a catastrophe in Germany this year.

1. Do everything in your power, whatever the difficulties, to continue the necessary farm work. See to the full the syncauses from the larger areas. They need your help; you need theirs.
2. Refuse at all costs to leave your farm work for service in the Volksturm. If you have been conscripted already, escape at once and return to work on the land.
3. Resist, if necessary by force, attempts by the Party to remove food stocks from the district where you live.
4. Resist, if necessary by force, the slaughter of cattle, pigs and poultry. Preserve your livestock intact.

Remember! For years Germany has relied on plundered food from the occupied territories. Relying on this plundered food, she has mobilized her last workers for the army and failed to feed herself. This year Germany must depend on her own food sources.



~~SECRET~~

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PWP 385


27 March, 1945

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE
WEST. (Ref PWP 385 of 15 March, 1945)

1. Attached is a draft of Directive No. 3 for Psychological Warfare in connection with Offensive Action in the West. This directive will govern propaganda concerning the phase of military activity on the Western front in which the Allied forces exploit rapidly their bridgeheads across the Rhine, and which culminates in the final military defeat of Germany.

2. Appendix A. to the draft directive gives proposed texts of the instructions to be used. Texts numbers II. V. VI. need clearance as rapidly as possible. It is expected that G-3 will give timing on the campaign, and at least three days notice given prior to issuance of the initial instruction are highly desirable.

3. In view of the urgency of action, since the military situation is developing so rapidly, it is proposed that a meeting be held at SHAEP Forward on Thursday morning at 1030 hours (specific place to be notified later) to agree on a draft which will embody the views of all interested Staff divisions.



ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

Distribution/
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 Division
" " " " G-2 "
" " " " G-3 "
" " " " G-5 "

PRD
Political Adviser on Germany (US)
Political Adviser on Germany (Br)

SGS-SHAEF File No. 681.4.2/3

27 MAR

~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

KWP 385

27 March 1945

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST.

DISCUSSION.

1. This directive deals with Phase II of psychological warfare, and expands the section of Directive No. 2 for Psychological Warfare in connection with Offensive Action in the West, dated 15 March 1945, which covered that topic.

BACKGROUND.

2. The present Psychological Warfare Situation.

- a. The onslaught of 5 Allied Armies driving over and beyond the Rhine, was preceded and accompanied by the special psychological warfare campaign called for in Phase I. For the first time psychological warfare was permitted (a) to look ahead and to build up an imminent offensive and (b) to issue instructions, in advance of the offensive, which were then validated in German eyes by its success. Each area, named an evacuation zone by the Voice of SHAEF became, within a few days of the announcement, an active combat area. Thus the moral authority of the Supreme Commander has been substantially enhanced among soldiers and civilians in areas not yet under his control; and the Voice of SHAEF can now be used even more boldly to impose his will in advance of our armies.

Objective

- b. (1) The overriding objective of all Allied propaganda during Phase II remains the same: (a) to disintegrate the remaining hold of Hitler and the Nazis on the loyalty of the German people, and (b) to impose finally the will of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we shall occupy.
- (2) Our immediate objectives are:
- (a) To increase to the maximum, and to exploit the moral authority of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we do not yet control, and
- (b) To induce a spirit of order and obedience to the new authority. The time for successful organized resistance or revolution by Germans in aid of the Allied cause has already gone by--if it ever existed. Our military superiority is now so great that no revolutionary movement is needed to assure our speedy military victory. Indeed civil war at this stage would only result in embarrassment and added problems for our army. What we do want from Germans is quick disciplined obedience to the Supreme Commander's orders.

THE WILL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

3. The instructions from the Supreme Commander to German soldiers and civilians and to foreign workers which it is considered advisable to issue at the commencement of Phase II, are found in Appendix 'A' to this directive. They cover

- a. Instructions to members of the Wehrmacht.
- b. Instructions to civilians and members of the Wehrmacht in German ports.
- c. Instructions to German town dwellers.
- d. Instructions to Germans living in the country.
- e. Instructions to foreign workers.

These instructions, like the evacuation campaign which preceded them, are all addressed to persons in areas not yet under our control, where German military and civil authority is still in existence. They are, therefore, psychological warfare instructions, and not to be confused with the instructions to be issued on 'A' day. Whereas the latter are designed for conditions when Nazi authority has already collapsed, the former are a weapon designed to give the last blow to crumbling Nazi authority and so to assist military operations. If, for instance, even in one of the ports, the instructions in Tab A below were carried out, a considerable service would have been rendered in advance of the occupation of the port.

PROPAGANDA TREATMENT.

4. General Propaganda Treatment of Military News.

- a. We must drop all long-term strategic arguments in treating military news. The long-term issues are no longer in question, and we must not allow anything to interfere with reporting dramatically and powerfully the final disintegration of German military might under the blows of all the Allied military forces. Reporting these facts vividly and in full detail, with no attempt to draw a propaganda moral, is our surest weapon for impressing indelibly upon the minds of Germans and of the world that German military invincibility is a myth. As a measure to assure credibility, we must give full play to stories of fanatical German resistance where this in fact occurs.
- b. There is no longer any military reason for pause in the operations which will shortly culminate in complete military victory and unconditional surrender. Propaganda can now drop its usual cautions in telling the story of daily military developments--the enemy and the world should be allowed full scope to draw the implications from daily news of speedy, crushing and final German defeat. There need be no explicit statement of these conclusions, but they should arise inescapably from the content and presentation of news. We should make frequent use of such phrases as "The final round" and "The last phase of the war". The Germans must be allowed no hope of military respite. The only way out for Germany is through unconditional surrender--and for the individual German soldier and civilian, schluss machen.

- c. We must give sustained attention to reporting military news from the East front, so that the Germans are kept constantly aware of the dilemma of the two-front war in which their leaders have involved them, and of the objective facts of military unity and coordination among all the Allies.
- d. We should not forget the beleaguered German garrisons left by the German leadership in parts of western Europe. Tactical propaganda should use the news of the military collapse of Germany as a means to secure the surrender of these garrisons with a minimum of further effort on our part.

5. Instructions to German troops will be along the following lines: Troops will stay where they are and report to the nearest Allied formation at their arrival. Officers will maintain order and submit to Allied authority in an orderly fashion.

6. Food Production.

- a. Germany now faces the decision--capitulation or famine. Since it is clear from the facts marshalled by Allied spokesmen (Mr. Churchill on March 21, U.S. Asst. Secretary of War Patterson on March 22, and a ~~NEW~~ spokesman on the same day) that there will not be for some time enough food to go around among all nations of the world, and further, that Germany cannot expect to have a preferred position in the distribution of what is available, Germans must make every effort now to maximize food production for the year. This means that every German who can help in food production, must act now to see that the crops this year are as large as possible. Farmers who are absent from their farms during the spring sowing help to contribute to near famine in Germany later in the year.
- b. We must stress the following alternatives for Germany:
 - (1) If the war ends before the Spring is over, there will be a reasonably satisfactory nutritional level for Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and the other Allies and liberated territories in Western Europe; somewhat less adequate food for the liberated areas and the former satellites; and something short of famine in Germany.
 - (2) If the war is prolonged into summer, there will be an austerity diet for the major Allies, something less for the liberated territories of Eastern Europe, and former satellites, and near starvation in Germany this winter.
- c. Therefore every German who can help in any way in food production must make his personal decision--to drop his role in carrying on the war and immediately take up whatever task he can perform to increase food output.
- d. There should be no implication that the Allies are responsible for the German level of nutrition. We must make it clear that it is up to the Germans, by their own efforts, to do their utmost to provide for

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

their own needs and for world food needs. We must likewise make clear the full responsibility for the present state of nutritional affairs which rests on the Nazi leaders, who plunged Europe into the war which has resulted in present malfunctioning and deficiencies. At the same time, we can take advantage of news showing the efforts of the Nazi leaders to provide for their own requirements, at the expense of the rest of Germany and Europe.

- e. Germans who evacuate should help farmers in any way possible. Germans in the country should particularly note the location of minefields soon by the enemy to facilitate their eventual removal.

7. The Evacuation Campaign.

- a. The evacuation campaign will continue so long as any of the areas mentioned in the SHAFT instructions have not yet been overrun by our troops.
- b. It is not now contemplated that any new areas will be added to those already selected.
- c. Whenever an area is overrun or surrounded by our troops, we must immediately drop direct use of the evacuation instructions, and replace them with the following orders:
 - (1) German civilians must tell soldiers who are trying to maintain resistance to stop fighting.
 - (2) They must not allow soldiers to use their houses for sniper posts, or to make them into booby traps. The fate of German houses and towns which have been centers of resistance is only too well known. Our artillery, air and ground forces know well how to deal with such obstacles to our progress. (N.B. It will, however, be appropriate to recall from time to time the evacuation campaign as an example of our ability to fulfill the command of the Supreme Commander.)
 - (3) Civilians should note the location of mines, unexploded shells and booby traps, and report them to our troops on their arrival, so their town can again be made safe for orderly human occupation.
 - (4) Civilians must stop all war work, await the arrival of our troops in an orderly manner, and then carry out Military Government instructions expeditiously.
 - (5) There will be no incitement of German civilians to organized resistance or insurrection against the Nazis, except such resistance as is specifically called for by the Supreme Commander.

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Annex A to
Directive No. 3.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

Radio and Leaflet Texts to be used in Phase II
of Psychological Warfare in connection with
offensive action in the West.

- I. Voice of SHAEF. Approved on February 3, 1945, and included in Directive No. 2, PWP 385, March 15th. This brief preamble will be used to "lead-in" each of the following special instructions.
- II. Instructions to Members of the Wehrmacht.*
This text is a revision of ZG-104, a leaflet text approved on January 1st, for use when real signs of disintegration have set in. The revisions are necessitated to give it general validity for all German soldiers in the West, whereas ZG-104 was designed for tactical situations.
- III. Instructions to Town Dwellers. This was approved as part of T.B. A of Directive No. 2, PWP 385, March 15th. It was then titled "Instructions to German Civilians to Follow 'Voice of SHAEF'." It has been re-named to differentiate it from V below.
- IV. Instructions to all Foreign Workers in Western Germany. This was approved as part of T.B. A. of Directive No. 2, PWP 385, March 15th.
- V. Instructions to Inhabitants of Country Districts.*
This is a new text designed to inculcate obedience to Allied Armies, by exploitation of fear of famine.
- VI. Instruction to Inhabitants of Certain Ports.*
This is a new text. In view of the traditions of these ports, it is believed that this might assist considerably in preventing demolitions.

Texts of the above instructions are attached.

* Now texts to be approved.

27 March, 1945

1. NOTICE BY SIGNAL

This will be inaugurated by a "Notice of Surrender" as follows:

The following message is issued at the order of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

"The Allied armies have crossed the Rhine and are driving our way deeply into the very heart of Germany."

"The German Government has ceased to exercise effective control over wide areas."

"The German High Command has lost effective control over any units, large and small, of the German Forces."

"In times of emergency and in order to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and sacrifice of human life, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force has issued a series of instructions."

"Here are instructions to....."

6 589

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27 March, 1945

II. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GERMAN FORCES

1. Units in Contact (which no longer receive orders from the German Government) - a) to avoid hostilities. The units are to be recognized. Up to the moment of surrender, the present commanding officer of each unit is responsible for the discipline of his men.

2. Surrendering units are to place a flag or other sign to the nearest Allied unit and, under the protection of a white flag, the surrendering unit is to be ordered to stand out with its arms raised and without any further delay. The units are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay. The units are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay.

3. Units out of contact remain under the command of their officers, up to the moment of surrender. The units are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay. The units are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay.

4. Surrendering units and individual personnel are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay. The units are to be ordered to stand out with their arms raised and without any further delay.

"The above instructions take effect immediately."

* It is proposed to omit the clause in parenthesis. However, these instructions can be issued both with and without the clause.

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27 March, 1945

III. INSTRUCTIONS TO TOWN DWELLERS.

1. Cease working. Take refuge with your family in the safest place you can find. The factories, mines and rail centers are death-traps. Act at once. Delay may mean death.
2. Avoid at all costs being enrolled into the Volksturm. Untrained and ill armed, for you the Volksturm will mean a useless last minute death.
3. As the Allied Armies approach the area in which you have taken refuge, follow carefully the instructions in radio and leaflets of the Allied High Command. After the arrival of the Allies, follow carefully the instructions of Allied Military Government.

Town-dwellers of Western Germany! Out of the factories! Away from the railroads and main highways! Hide yourselves and your families! The end is not far off.

SECRET

27 March, 1945

IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN GERMANY

1. Keep away now from all targets, factories, railroads, marshalling yards and bridges. Refuse to work in or near such danger spots, in which no one has the right to compel anyone to work.
2. When Allied Armies approach seek out the safest spot you can find. Take refuge away from all military installations, away from factories and railroads, keep off the roads, particularly main highroads.
3. Stay in these refuges until the Allied Armies arrive and finish mopping up the German units. Then report to Allied Military Government officials who will put you in touch as soon as possible with your own (as required French, Czech, etc.) Liaison officer. Send a spokesman for a group.
4. Many of your comrades in the areas liberated by the victorious Russian armies owe their freedom to the fact that they were able to put into practice instructions such as we have just given you. The same is true of the Western front and this will increase as the momentum of our advance gathers way.
5. The Supreme Commander knows your urgent and legitimate desire to return home as soon as possible. By following his instructions, you will speed up your return to your family.

SECRET

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27 March, 1945

V. INSTRUCTIONS TO REHABILITATORS OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS

The instructions which follow are of vital importance not only to you but to the whole German people. If you show them actively, you can still avert the famine which threatens Germany. If you disobey them, famine which either you or the Allies can do will prevent a catastrophe in Germany this year.

1. Do everything in your power, whatever the difficulties, to hasten the necessary food work. You to the rail and truck stations, German and foreign, from the danger areas. THEY need your help; you need theirs.
2. Refuse of all sorts to leave your deep work for service in the Volksturm. If you have been conscripted already, escape at once and return to work on the land.
3. Resist, if necessary by force, attempts by the party to remove food stocks from the districts where you live. Hold on to what you have.
4. Resist, if necessary by force, the slaughter of cattle, pigs and poultry. Preserve livestock.

Remember! For your Germany has relied in plundered food from the occupied territories. Relying on this plundered food, she has mobilized her land workers for the army and failed in food harvest. This year Germany must depend on her own food resources.

Disturbance of country districts. In these last days of the war, help to avert the catastrophe.

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27 March, 1945

VI. INSTRUCTIONS TO REHABILITATORS OF GERMAN PRISONERS

These instructions apply to the inhabitants of Godes, Gittelshausen, Godes, Godeshausen, Godeshausen, Godeshausen and Kiel.

1. The party and its families are planning to destroy, ruin, or get out of action your port installations before they themselves have gone there.

This malicious destruction if accomplished, will cost you your livelihoods; delay will further the misery of your cities and hasten the suffering of the whole German people.

2. In your own interest, therefore, and in that of your country, you must stand firm together to protect your cities and harbors from this malicious attack.
3. Arrestment of civilian personnel who are called upon to carry out essential work must resist such. If necessary to force. The instigator should be arrested and held under guard until the arrival of the Allied forces.

Against the overwhelming power of the party and the Gestapo united action can now be completely successful.

4. A special responsibility falls on those of you who are either officers of the Government or officials of the municipalities, the police and the port authorities. Do not forget that your future depends on how you conduct yourselves now. If you side with the party families, you will share their fate.

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27 March, 1945

VI. INSTRUCTIONS TO INHABITANTS OF CERTAIN

These instructions apply to the inhabitants of Baden, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hamburg and Kiel.

1. The Party and SS fanatics are planning to destroy, sink, or put out of action your port installations before they themselves make good their escape.

This senseless destruction if accomplished, will cost you your livelihood; delay still further the recovery of your cities and increase the sufferings of the whole German people.

2. In your own interest, therefore, and in that of your country, you must band yourselves together to protect your cities and harbours from this futile sabotage.
3. Wehrmacht or civilian personnel who are called upon to carry out demolition orders must resist them, if necessary by force. The instigators should be arrested and held under guard until the arrival of the Allied armies.

Against the dwindling power of the Party and the Gestapo united action can now be completely successful.

4. A special responsibility falls on those of you who are either officers of the Wehrmacht or officials of the municipalities, the police and the port authorities. Do not forget that your future depends on how you conduct yourselves now. If you side with the Party fanatics, you will share their fate.

* * * * *

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

URGENT

TO : AM350 FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
 FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN
 FROM : SHAEF FWD, SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE: SHPWD
 REF NO : PWD-18211 T00: 270930A

Reference your cable 1790 of March 20.

It is not intended that the small scale intruder operations on ASPIDISTRA already sanctioned by this Headquarters should interfere with or prejudice the use of that instrument by the RAF who should have priority.

It is suggested that the RAF might give assistance in driving German stations off the air at times when they do not require ASPIDISTRA in order to make the intruder operations possible.

These operations, which will be limited in number, are designed to cause confusion and strain to the German administration in the rear of the German Armies in the West by giving out false information and orders to civilians. Plans are coordinated by PWD with PWE, who can give details if required.

The possibility of using ASPIDISTRA for a major intruder operation at the moment when the end of enemy resistance in the West is in sight has long been under consideration but far without result. Should a satisfactory plan be evolved, it would require the use of ASPIDISTRA for one or possibly two consecutive nights. If so, the plan would be referred to you for approval.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

PS OUT 1050

TOP SECRET

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57

MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SHAEF File No.

0911/12/5

27 MAR

TOP SECRET

REF NO: FWD-18211

(Continued)

TOO: 270930A

1790 1a FS ■ 2867, 21/3/45, FWD

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: I.A.S. MORRICE
LT COLONEL

INFORMATION :

SGS

G-3

G-2

**

AG RECORDS

COORDINATED: DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF



FS OUT 1050

27 Mar 45

1009A

HFK/lc

REF NO: FWD-18211

TOO : 270930A

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TOP SECRET

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SHAEP FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JLJE

241900A Mar

SHAEP FWD 45/25
TOR 250530A
hgt 250620A Mar

TOP SECRET

URGENT

FROM : MAIN FROM
TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS STAFF
FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, SHAEP FWD
REF NO : 83020, 24 Mar 1945 CITE: SHPWD

SCAF NO. 245

Reference your FACS 158.

We had anticipated your decision put plan in abeyance but we have given authority for the use of intruder technique for small scale operations designed to cause local civic confusion in GERMANY.

Expressly these do not involve deception of our own peoples civil or military on a scale greater than current black output. Nor do they infringe upon of Bomber Command.

EACS 158 is Ref No. W-50932, FS IN 1831, 11-3-45, PWD (GEN MCCLURE)

ACTION : PWD

INFORMATION : SGS
G-3 AG RECORDS
G-2

FS IN 3291 25 March 1945 0632A JOB/feh Ref No: S 83020

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

35/Depot
20/5/44
26/1/45
22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Radio Transmitter 'ASPIDISTRA'

TO : The Chief of Staff

I. DISCUSSION

1. At early as November 1944 I was informed by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart of PWE that 'ASPIDISTRA' could be utilized by SHAEF in the furtherance of military operations upon his concurrence and without further reference to his Ministry after the operation had SHAEF approval. Such use of the instrument was not to have "political" implications.

2. Various plans have been drawn for its use of which Staff Study of 4 December 1944 was sent by you to the British Chiefs of Staff for consideration on 10 December 1944. This proposal was rejected by Combined Chiefs of Staff in their FACS #158 of 10 March. (20) 10 Dec 44

3. A somewhat similar decision had meanwhile been reached by G-3 SHAEF in their letter to this Division of March 1. That same letter, however, did approve the use of 'ASPIDISTRA' on a number of small-scale "intruder" operations designed to create confusion and cause movements of population and transportation. (20) 10 Dec 44

4. While arranging a detailed plan with PWE on 15 March it developed that this instrument had been loaned to Bomber Command and that a conference with the Air Ministry would be necessary in order to coordinate its use. During this conference, which was presided over by Air Chief Marshal Portal, I was asked by telephone for SHAEF's reaction to a proposed cable by the British Chiefs of Staff on this subject. (This cable is #1790 20 March 1945) I advised it was unnecessary to send the cable since I was sure the Supreme Commander would not consider an "intruder" operation by 'ASPIDISTRA' to justify the loss of life or equipment of Bomber Command. The cable was sent and a proposed reply is attached at TAB A. (20) 10 Dec 44

5. Further conversations between the Air Staff in London and PWE indicate that this instrument can be used jointly.

II. RECOMMENDATION

1. It is recommended that the Chief of Staff approve and dispatch the attached cable (TAB A) to the British Chief of Staff. (25)

III. CONCURRENCES

G-3.

/s/ ROBERT A. McCLURE
ROBERT A. McCLURE
Principles General GSC
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

6 573

Approved
P.W.Jorgan, D/C.C.G.

26/2

TOP SECRET

COPY

SGS - SHAEF File No. 2004/4/5

23 March

TOP SECRET

CABLE TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO FOR ACTION: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM : CHAET FWD signed EISENHOWER

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE 1790 OF MARCH 20 IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT THE SMALL SCALE INTRUDER OPERATIONS ON ASPIDISTRA ALREADY SANCTIONED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS SHOULD INTERFERE WITH OR PREJUDICE THE USE OF THAT INSTRUMENT BY THE RAF WHO SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE RAF MIGHT GIVE ASSISTANCE IN BRIVING GERMAN STATIONS OFF THE AIR AT TIMES WHEN THEY DO NOT REQUIRE ASPIDISTRA IN ORDER TO MAKE THE INTRUDER OPERATIONS POSSIBLE.

THESE OPERATIONS, WHICH WILL BE LIMITED IN NUMBER, ARE DESIGNED TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND STRAIN TO THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE REAR OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN THE WEST BY GIVING OUT FALSE INFORMATION AND ORDERS TO CIVILIANS. PLANS ARE COORDINATED BY FWD WITH FWE, WHO CAN GIVE DETAILS IF REQUIRED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF USING ASPIDISTRA FOR A MAJOR INTRUDER OPERATION AT THE MOMENT WHEN THE END OF ENEMY RESISTANCE IN THE WEST IS IN SIGHT HAS LONG BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT SO FAR WITHOUT RESULT. SHOULD A SATISFACTORY PLAN BE EVOLVED, IT WOULD REQUIRE THE USE OF ASPIDISTRA FOR ONE OR POSSIBLY TWO CONSECUTIVE NIGHTS. IF SO, THE PLAN WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO YOU FOR APPROVAL.

Classification: TOP SECRET

Precedence: Urgent

Coordinated with: _____

Distribution:

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TOP SECRET

RSPW

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SECRET

PWP/9374-2

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ARMED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CANT/JS

MINUTES OF MEETING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
STAFF ON 21 MARCH 1945 IN R-4 CONFERENCE
ROOM 11, 1001 PROCESSIONAL SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
A.I.F., FORWARD.

PRESENT: Lieutenant General Sir F.E. Morgan, Dep. Chief of Staff.
Major T.H. Powell. G-1.
General K.W.D. Strong. G-2.
Colonel G.H. Baumer. G-3.
Lieut Col. Clarence E. Lovejoy. G-5.
Lt Col. R.E. Darby. PRD.
Lt Col. R.A. McClure. PWD.
Mr. Steele. Political
Adviser (Br.).
Office of Pol.
Adviser on
Germany (U.S.)
Mr. Jacob Bean. PWD.
Lieut Col. G.A.H. Thomson. PWD.
Lieut Col. N. Garfein. PWD.
Major R.J. Euijsman. PWD.

I. "GO HOME" POLICY.

G-1 representative reported that he was without instructions on this subject. G-3 stated that they had not taken a final decision on this subject, but Ops 'C' had provisionally recommended non-concurrence on security grounds and in view of 'ECLIPSE' plans on disarmament of German Forces. G-2 likewise noted the security difficulties and the divergence from 'ECLIPSE' planning. The British Political Adviser wondered whether it was desirable to accelerate a process likely to take place in any event, which according to present 'ECLIPSE' planning, we do not wish to take place. It was decided that no action on paper would be taken by the meeting, but the paper would proceed through staff channels in the normal way.

II. PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY IN GERMANY.

The proposal was sketched in some detail by PWD, who stated the need for continuing data of this type to permit effective long-term dealing with German public opinion. G-1 reported that the proposal was favorably considered and a previous paper on the subject has been concurred by G-1. G-2 stated that there was no direct G-2 interest in the possible results to come from such survey procedures and did not anticipate assistance from this source. It was thought the probable results would be of primary interest to the Political Advisers, G-5 and PWD. PWD pointed out that the procedure would undoubtedly turn up information about rumours, which would be of interest to G-2. Mr. Bean admitted the desirability of getting the proposed information, but

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
BY [illegible]
DATE 18 AUG 1955

091/412/3

21 MAR

CORRECTION

**THIS DOCUMENT
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**

583 9

Amendment typed - SCAP-1957

KASB

DCS as amended

Please note approval by

For Gen McClellan

(Headquarters)

APPROVED 22/3/58 as amended
F.I. Morgan, DCS for CS

G-3.....

III. CONCURRENCES

That Chief of Staff, AFM, and despatch the attached cable (Tab A) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

II. RECOMMENDATION

Small scale intruder operations.
Approval for the use of the missile technique for a number of
that they were unable to obtain in the current plan, but gave
G-3, Staff, who stated in their letter to this Division (March 1st)
a somewhat similar decision had previously been reached by
technique, should be submitted.
appears to be imminent, a specific plan, based on the missile
involved. They further suggest that when the German collapse
results to be obtained, the missile technique risks to be
warranted, unless it were to be used by the military
criteria of staff states that the proposed plan would not be
In their reply, AFM No. 158 of 10 March, 1945, the Combined
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.
study of a decision, 1944, and subsequently submitted
military operations was conducted in AFM of this Division's
The plan for the use of missiles, in the final phase of

I. DISCUSSION

TO : Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AFM.
SUBJECT : Plan for black radio operation on missiles.

20 March, 1945.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMED FORCES
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION
TOP SECRET
COPY NO. 3

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TOP SECRET

NOV 1945

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TOP SECRET

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AD Records
9-3
9-2
SOS

Distribution:

Classification : TOP SECRET
Precedence : PRIORITY
Coordinated with: CHIEF OF STAFF

Reference your PAGE 158 we had anticipated your decision
and put plan in abeyance. But we have given authority for the
of the intruder technique for small scale operations designed
to cause local civic confusion in Germany. Expressly these do
involve deception of our own peoples civil or military on
a scale greater than current black output. nor do they impinge
upon demands of Bomber Command.

THIS IS SCAP

TO FOR INFO : ANSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

1 SHAF signed EISENHOWER

TO FOR ACTION: ADVAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHAFF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JBT

TOO 202200Z

SHAFF 23/21
MAR
FW, 210506A

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : BRITISH OF STAFF
 TO : SHAFF GENERAL EISENHOWER
 REF NO : 1790, 20 MARCH 1945

1. The Royal Air Force have had use of ASPIDISTRA for the past 15 to jam spoil enemy's use of their broadcasting stations for controlling their night fighters. ASPIDISTRA proved most effective for this work and we feel if it is not available to assist Bomber Command the losses of our night bombers due to interception by night fighters is bound to increase. No other transmitter with the necessary power and flexibility in wavelength changing is available.

2. FWE say they have direction from you to use ASPIDISTRA in 'Intruder' role, i.e. when a broadcasting station goes off the air due to the approach of our night bombers, to take over immediately enemy program by mimicking other stations broadcasting same program and during transmission of enemy program include false instructions and to German population.

3. We feel this 'Intruder' of ASPIDISTRA deceive enemy population if used sparingly but suggest that after the or third time it has used it will be to the enemy authorities who will take action to their population either do not receive these false instructions or if received know they false. This counter to ASPIDISTRA 'Intruder' role could be done by:

PS IN 2867

-1-

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SGS-SHAFF File 13. 091. 412/3

20 MAR

See (238)

(238)

(238)

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SECRET

REF NO : 1790

-2-

SHARP FWD 23/21

A. Not shutting off his broadcasting stations in approach of our night bombers. He does not know why he now shuts down the broadcasting stations are not required by for navigation.

B. Shutting off all broadcasting stations so that no enemy program is available for listening, and therefore no program can be put out which would deceive the population into believing they are receiving German station.

C. Before shutting down any station inform population that they are shutting down and would be off the air for so many hours.

4. We feel you will agree that this valuable instrument ASPIDISTRA should be used for the best purpose in the war effort before deciding that it should be used in 'Intruder' role request you consider the effects. If used in 'Intruder' work we suggest its use should be restricted as follows:

A. To a period of two weeks commencing of PLUNDER.

B. To a total number of 'Intruder' operations during this period.

C. That each 'Intruder' operation should not exceed 1 hour (In practice they would probably be much shorter).

D. That PWT should be free to select the periods for 'Intruder' operations.

5. On the other hand you will appreciate that above restricted use of ASPIDISTRA for 'Intruder' operations might lead to heavy losses in Bomber Command.

6. Request details your plan for using ASPIDISTRA so that Chiefs of Staff may consider whether possible increased bomber casualties justify the advantages to be gained by its use in 'Intruder' role.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

REF NO : INCOMING MESSAGE STAFF FWD 23/21

NOTE: "This message must be thoroughly paraphrased if its text is to be published or communicated outside British or American services or departments. If retransmitted unparaphrased other than through holders of Chiefs of Staffs Cipher Settings the originator must mark the message.

"To be sent in One Time Pads."

RELAYED TO SHAEF MAIN

Attention invited to W-50932 (FACS 158) FS ■ 1831 11/3/45,
PWD (GEN MCCLURE)

ACTION : PWD

INFORMATION : SGS
G-3
G-2
SUSPENSE
**B
AG RECORDS

PS IN 2867 21 March 1945 0630A DWR/xf REF NO:1790

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SCORE

19 March, 1945.

9/14/2/3

James H. Thompson Corp.

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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

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2007 年 11 月 15 日

BOOKS FOR REVIEW ON TECHNOLOGICAL WARFARE
11 March 1993

06:	Legend: 1=Not in Category, 2=Significant Headquarters, A=U.S.				
	Country (Number of Firms in Category)	1	2	A	
	France (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
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	Burma (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Cambodia (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Sierra Leone (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Liberia (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Ivory Coast (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
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	Senegal (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Gambia (100) (100) (100)	0	0	0	0
	Sierra Leone (100) (100) (100)	0	0		

1. The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on my fishmeal and to be held at 1400 hours on Wednesday, 14 June 1957. It is to be held in Room 11, Singapore Airport Hotel, Singapore. (Paper now in circulation).

1. The concentration of H^+ ions both with respect to the rate of the H_2O_2 breakdown and to the rate of the H_2O_2 breakthrough are 1.4 times greater on Hg^{2+} .

~~1. Add the following sentence in Column 1 (See Annex 1A):~~

1942-1943

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ANNEX 'A'

SHAEF HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

10 March 1945

061.2

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Surveys in GERMANY

■ : The Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. In November, 1944, the Chief of Staff ruled that the undertaking of preliminary public opinion surveys in GERMANY should be postponed until our troops reached the RHINE. It is now believed advisable to raise the question of Public Opinion Surveys in GERMANY.

2. It is felt that during the period of SHAEF control of occupied GERMANY, scientific public opinion surveys can supply valuable information to supplement other sources of social and political intelligence. Publicity on such surveys would be controlled, unless the results were found useful for publication. Opinion on subjects of interest to Military Government could be tasted, if Military Government requests such surveys. Other topics on which public opinion surveys could supply information are:

- a. Reactions to Allied propaganda during the war.
- b. Penetration of Nazi propaganda into the thinking of the ordinary German.
- c. Reactions to Allied Information Control.
- d. Civilian reactions to the initial impact of defeat and occupation.
- e. Long term economic and political expectations of the various German social classes.

3. The project would, in no sense, be an attempt to ask the Germans what they desire. It would be conducted solely for purposes of Allied information and the subjects surveyed would be determined in closest co-operation with G-5 and the Political Officers.

4. It cannot be said, without experimentation, whether scientific public opinion sampling will be applicable to conditions in occupied GERMANY. It is felt, however, that unless such surveys are begun early, on an experimental basis, valuable data, not otherwise obtainable, may be lost. Moreover, for the future study of trends in German attitudes, data in the early period will be essential.

II. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

5. That the Chief of Staff approve the undertaking of scientific public opinion surveys in occupied GERMANY by Psychological Warfare Division during the SHAEF period.

III. CONCURRENCES.


G-2

G-3

G-5

Political Officer, (Br)

Political Officer, (US)



ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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(SIR)

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

THE 500

10 March, 1945.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION WITH OFFENSIVE
ACTION IN THE WEST.

AMENDMENTS TO DIRECTIVE.

1. The issue of Directive No. 2, dated 15 March, 1945 (PWE 365) hereby supersedes all previous, where applicable the Directive dated 19 November, 1944, (PWE 340, 412), together with the various Amendments or Special Directives issued with the above mentioned Directive.
2. In particular, it should be noted that Directive No. 2, covers the policy laid down in the Directive dated 15 November, para. 4, c. relating to the "anti-occupation" campaign addressed to German civilians.

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division:

W. H. Roche
W. H. ROCHE
Colonel GS
Executive Officer

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE FORCES
Psychological Warfare Division

DIRECTIVE NO. 2 FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION WITH
OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

1. DISCUSSION

This directive amends and brings up to date the directive for psychological warfare in connection with offensive action in the West, dated 3 February, 1945. It is now possible to be more precise about timing, and it is also necessary to take account of changes in military policy and the military situation.

2. PHASES

Psychological warfare remains divided into two phases as before. Phase I comprises the period up to the time when our armies, having crossed the Rhine in force, are in a position to exploit their penetrations. Phase II begins when this exploitation becomes decisively, on a large scale.

3. TIMING OF PHASE I

Now that our armies stand on the Rhine from Coblenz to Nijmegen, Phase I must be divided into three periods:

- Prior to the issue of a "Voice of SHARP" to the RHR, ordering the German civilians to evacuate.
- Campaign to cause evacuation of the RHR and the FRANKFURT and KARLSRUHE areas, launched by "Voice of SHARP".
- Main crossing of the Rhine by Allied troops.

4. Phase II will commence with a "Voice of SHARP" from the Supreme Commander. No subordinate time periods within this phase are contemplated at present.

5. PROGRAMMED MATERIAL FOR PHASE I

- Prior to general evacuation operations.

(1) Continue our first chief campaign:-

- Denist the Arbeitweg.
- Evade the Volksturm.
- Boil the soldier to stop fighting.

(2) In treating the military situation, feature now of what it is like to be in the midst of modern battle, giving particular prominence to the intensity and devastation of artillery fire. Give deliberate stress to hard news and facts of the difficulties of terrain the Allies must surmount; build up the capabilities of the Rhine line from the standpoint of German defence; and emphasize news showing German determination to defend.

(3) Present an objective view of life under Military Government. Avoid the "stay put" moral being drawn from descriptions and news concerning regions under Allied Military Government. Do not suppress, however,

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but treat objectively, news showing the difficulty of life in Allied occupied territory, the difficulties of housing, food and transport. There is little chance of bettering conditions appreciably until after hostilities cease. Continue to play news showing the devastation to German towns caused by our air and artillery attacks, and our ground operations. Continue also to play news showing our fair play, firmness and justice in a situation where there are almost insuperable present obstacles to restoring any measure of really civilized conditions.

- (4) Continue unchanged our local instructions to foreign workers in battle areas West of the Rhine - in the Moselle and Saar areas. Give no instructions to foreign workers East of the Rhine.

b. Prize areas - aim to foster panic, evacuation from special areas.

Background.

Our objectives in fostering evacuation, panic, movement and confusion on the Western Front are twofold:-

- (1) To cause physical wearout of such nature as to hamper to the maximum the efforts of the German High Command to stave off the final Allied thrust from the West. As a means to achieving this the evacuation campaign will be exclusively directed to areas specially selected by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. The first area will be marked out by named towns in the Ruhr.

- (2) To cause maximum administrative confusion and strain to the German governmental and war machine in the West. This objective is general, and not confined to areas which will be specially addressed.

Treatment

- (1) In conformity, we should make explicit the difference between the situation for German civilians East and West of the Rhine. West of the Rhine, there was a "way out of the war" by staying put; East of the Rhine, there can be no safety anywhere in the combat areas.
- (2) Deliberately encourage the inhabitants of country districts outside the danger areas specified in the "Voices of SHAEF" to harbor refugees and conceal and use them for farm work. Go on the lookout for material to implement the theme; Germany can either fight this year, or raise the food necessary to feed her population. She cannot do both.
- (3) The campaign will be initiated by "Voices of SHAEF" to German civilians and foreign workers in the Ruhr, to be followed by "Voices" to the same classes in Flanders and NW GERMANY (see Radio Evacuation Campaign). Further SHAEF messages will be directed to special classes of the population in the target areas, such as army workers, railwaymen, miners, agricultural and clerical workers, women, doctors and priests, and peasants. Specific districts or cities may be addressed directly, if their special position or circumstances warrant. These SHAEF instructions should be played in prominent positions in all output, and closely linked to news and factual developments which confirm their urgency and strengthen their effect.
- (4) Special advice to Brown soldiers will be issued, telling them to help the German civilians to evacuate by furnishing protection against the SS and Party bands, by helping the police to prevent looting, and by telling civilians to places of safety.
- (5) There will be no direct instructions to specific German population classes outside these limited areas, except to inhabitants of country districts, to assist refugees.

/contd.

(6) No change in propaganda to foreign workers from Phase I (a) except to support the "Voice of GERMANY" to those in the RUHR, FRANKFURT and SAARLAND areas.

(7) For Germany generally, increased emphasis on related themes:

- a. The only real solution for the German people lies in action to stop the war - deflation machine.
- b. The terror machine is losing its grip.
- c. Antagonism grows between population and Wehrmacht on the one hand, and Party and SS on the other. (Nazi. Don't use. Antagonism with the SS, Hitler and supporters of enforced obedience. The military showing all-around brutality and brutality without mercy; the Party and SS, and about all and party leaders who escape from critical areas while telling the workers and the soldiers to hold to the last.)
- d. It is easy for the Wehrmacht to be absent from the battlefield or to surrender; rather than to present and surrender under fire.

e. Main theme of the "Voice of GERMANY".

(1) Continue specific conviction campaign, until further advice.

(2) Maximize the fact that the Nazis, last great barrier to our thrust, is being crushed in force in vital sectors. Give full play to details of the operations with no reservation as to the rate of our advance.

(3) Maintain propaganda aimed at creating maximum administrative confusion in the Reich.

d. Phase II.

(1) This will be inaugurated by a "Voice of GERMANY" as follows:-

"The Allied armies have overrun the Rhine and are driving over into the very heart of Germany."

"The German Government has failed to exercise effective control over all areas."

"The German High Command has lost effective control over many units, large and small, of the German forces."

"In the circumstances and in order to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and sacrifice of German life, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, has issued the following instructions."

"These are instructions to ..."

This will introduce a "Voice of GERMANY" to German civilians and one to German workers. (Transmit to the "HIT").

(2) This "Voice of GERMANY" will be followed by German special instructions to German and foreign workers, to be furnished later.

(3) The over-riding objective of all our propaganda during Phase II is to expose finally the will of the Supreme Commander over those areas of Germany which we shall occupy, disintegrating the morale, hold of Hitler and the Party on the loyalty of the German people, and laying the groundwork for the period of complete control of the German nation.

RUSSIAN FRONT, ALLIED
ARMED IS EDI NONAL FORCE
Czechoslovak Warfare Division

PHASE II. INSTRUCTIONS TO "FREE" CIVILIANS TO FOLLOW
"VOICE OF BRAVE".

To order to avoid losing your life in this last hopeless struggle against the Nazis, you must hurry and take the instructions which the Supreme Allied Commander issues to you in the "VOICE OF BRAVE".

These are your instructions:

1. Cease working. Take refuge with your family in the safest place you can find. The factories, mines and rail centers are death-traps. Act at once. Delay is your death.
2. Avoid at all costs being enrolled into the Volksturm. Untrained and ill armed, for you the Volksturm will mean a useless last minute death.
3. As the Allied Armies approach the area in which you have taken refuge, follow carefully the instructions which the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Military Government then gives you.

Civilians of West in Germany! Out of the factories! Away from the railroads and main highways! Hide yourselves and your families! The end is not far off.

PHASE II. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL FOREIGN

WORKERS IN GERMANY

1. Keep away now from all targets, factories, railroads, marshalling yards and bridges. Refuse to work in or near such danger spots, in which no one has the right to compel anyone to work.
2. When Allied Armies approach seek out the safest spot you can find. Take refuge away from all military installations, away from factories and railroads, keep off the roads, particularly main highways.
3. Stay in these refuges until the Allied Armies arrive and finish mopping up the German units. Then report to Allied Military Government officials who will put you in touch as soon as possible with your own (or required French, Czech, etc.) liaison officer. Send a spokesman for a group.
4. Keep of your families in the areas liberated by the victorious Russian armies and their friends to the fact that they were able to put into practice instructions such as we have just given you. The same is true of the Western Front and this will bring to us the sentiment of our ally and friend, the U.S.S.R.
5. The Supreme Commander knows your wish and desire to return to your homes as soon as possible. By following his instructions, you will speed up your return to your family.

25 March 1945.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHAFF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

000 101906Z Mar

 SHAF 132/10
 TOR 102255A Mar
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TOP SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
 TO FOR ACTION : SHAFF FWD FOR EISENHOWER
 FOR INFO : AMSSO, BRITISH CHIEFS STAFF
 REF : W-50932, 10 Mar 1945

BOOK MESSAGE

FACS 158

combined chiefs of Staff consider that it is
 unwise to implement the proposed plan for employment of
 Aspinette Technique unless there appears to be a high prob-
 ability that the military results derived from it are to
 justify assuming the risk involved.

When the disintegration of GERMANY has pro-
 gressed to a point where you can foresee that collapse is
 imminent, you should consider submitting a specific plan based
 on the Aspinette Technique.

Relayed to SHAFF MAIN.

ACTION : FWD (GEN MCCLURE)
 INFORMATION : G-3 (GEN BULL)
 G-2 (GEN STRONG)
 AG RECORDS
 SOS

FS IN 1831 11 Mar 45 0100A DWR/et Ref No: W 50932
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TOP SECRET

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SHAEF PWPC/9191

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : P & PW 21 ARMY GROUP TO DEBEER, P & PW 6
ARMY GROUP TO CLARK

FOR INFO : HDQS 8 AIR FORCE (GAREY)

FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM MCCLURE SIGNED SCAEF

REF NO : S 81247 TOO: 070900A CITE: SHFND

Chief of Staff directed today new policy for GERMANY East of RHINE. Operational requirement now is to embarrass German High Command by inducing maximum movement German civilians East of RHINE. This means immediately :

Killing new voice of SHAEF to Germans on East Bank: Stopping all leaflets and broadcasts advocating stay put policy East of RHINE: No change in draft instructions to foreign workers on East Bank of RHINE who will continue to be instructed to stop work, get out of town and await Allied Armies.

Meanwhile we are working on new Psychological Warfare plan for propaganda German civilians East of RHINE. In order avoid overt contradiction between new policy and old, plan envisages: Specific instructions to German civilian populations certain specific areas, including RUHR to evacuate totally in order to avoid inevitable destruction: No instructions to populations outside these specific areas other than tactical instructions required by military commanders during our advance: A new Black Plan is being worked out to which ANNIE of course will conform.

Pending receipt detailed directive do not undertake any propaganda on this subject to Germans East of RHINE:

SHC OUT 644

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7 MAR

-2-
S E C R E T

REF NO: S 81247

Furthermore to smooth transition to new policy taper off
stay put policy to G West of RHINE.

ORIGINATOR : FWD
INFORMATION : G-2
 G-3
 SGS
 SHARP FWD
 SUMMARY
 AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: J G GUTWILLIG
Major

SMC OUT 644 7 March 1945 1612A AGD/jes REF NO: S 81247
FOO: 070900A

S E C R E T

031600 A

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

FROM : WADLO LUXEMBOURG FROM BRUSSELS
TO : PNL SHAF BAIN TO MCCLURE FOR CROSSMAN

Special instructions to German civilians of Rhine:

Achtung: Here are special warnings and instructions from General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, to the German civilian population west of the Rhine.

It is vital to their safety to obey at once and absolutely.

Germans, the Allied Armies have broken through the West Wall and are overrunning the territory west of the Rhine. Cities and towns are coming into the battle zone, falling and are being left behind the front too swiftly for it to be possible to continue giving warning and instructions to the population of named individual places.

The following instructions, therefore, apply to all Germans west of the Rhine:

1. Those of you who inhabit areas already overrun by the Allied forces must stay where you are at this moment until you receive orders from the local Allied Commanders to move.

Keep under cover and thus avoid the danger of German artillery fire and of exchanges of small arms fire between Allied troops and encircled Wehrmacht units, and

Above all, keep off the roads. Fast moving Allied tanks and vehicles of all kinds are in full pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht, and any one on the road is in grave danger of being involved in fatal accidents.

Tell German soldiers who have been cut off by the Allied advance to throw away their arms, to take cover and to keep off the roads until it is possible for them to achieve safety as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention and all German army deserters and stragglers who seek shelter with you must be reported to the Allied authorities later, but only when movement is safe.

2. Those of you who are in areas which the Allied Armies are approaching must take shelter at once and stay under cover.

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4.

Any attempt to evacuate eastwards will place you in mortal danger.

All roads and railways to the Rhine and all Rhine crossings will henceforward be packed with retreating German troops under heavy air and artillery bombardment. Women, children and old people who flee eastwards will not only risk death from Allied aircraft and guns, but they will risk also being killed in the stampede of the defeated German army, or by German guns firing from the Eastern bank of the Rhine.

3. Those of you who live in areas where the German High Command is trying to form bridgeheads West of the Rhine to cover the retreat across the river, must do everything in your power to persuade the German soldiers to give up the hopeless struggle and surrender. Otherwise you will become involved in a senseless massacre, for the Allied forces will be compelled to attack these bridgeheads with the full concentration of their immense firepower as long as the German troops continue to defend them.

To sum up, keep off the roads, wherever you are; shelter and stay under cover; tell the German soldiers to surrender and thus avert a senseless massacre in which both you and they will be killed.

Similar instructions are being broadcast to the foreign workers, who you must help.

You have heard instructions to all German civilians West of the Rhine from General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander.

An adaptation of this was put out to foreign workers.

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3 1947, 1947.

MINUTE OF CONFERENCE ON THE PROPOSED
PLAN FOR THE PROPOSED, AS APPROVED, 1947, IN THE 27th


PRESENT:

Mr. General Sir A. H. Macpherson	Deputy Chief of Staff.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	1st.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	2nd.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	3rd.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	4th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	5th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	6th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	7th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	8th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	9th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	10th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	11th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	12th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	13th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	14th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	15th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	16th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	17th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	18th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	19th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	20th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	21st.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	22nd.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	23rd.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	24th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	25th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	26th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	27th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	28th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	29th.
Mr. Colonel G. H. Hamilton	30th.

1. THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE PROPOSED, AS APPROVED, 1947, IN THE 27th

1. It is the object of this instruction to ensure that the proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th
2. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th



1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

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1. 24

2. Special Instructions to the Prop.

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th
2. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

3. Special Instructions to the Prop.

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th
2. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th
3. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

4. Special Instructions to the Prop.

1. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th
2. The proposed plan for the proposed, as approved, 1947, in the 27th

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[illegible][illegible][illegible]

c. There was a high percentage of non-Indians, and their exploitation by the Indians. There was no actual revolt, but a number of Indians were killed in the most recent crops.

There appears to be a place on each side of the brain
which is directly under the control of the brain,
and it is the function of the whole system
to take care of the control of the system.

June 14th 1890.

[illegible]

6. 50-2

ADVICE TO THE GERMAN POLICE TO INTERVIEW GERMAN

The following advice to the German Police in
Western Germany is given on behalf of Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force.

Police of Western Germany: The Allied armies have crossed the Rhine. Bloody parts of the war in which you are responsible for law and order and the security of public and private property have become battle areas.

Policies of Western Germany have been what has already happened. The plan of the Party leaders is also now to force the population to evacuate and then to permit SS and Party troops to loot private houses and to destroy the cities' remaining industrial assets.

It is your task at all times to protect your fellow citizens and their property. When in hostile conditions the effective authority of the State disappears, you - as an organized armed force - alone have the power to defend life and property against Party Terrorists and all contracted agents. And finally, when the battle is lost and the State has died, it is your duty to obey the orders of the new effective authority, Allied Military Government.

It is well understood that you are working under the most difficult conditions, and it is hoped that the efforts of your organization will be more fully appreciated by those in the United States. The protection of your fellow citizens - being also it is the greatest responsibility. This is well understood.

But with courage and confidence each of you can achieve such. Each of you can prevent the vicious destruction of private and public property; you can end the suffering of your town of village and prepare the orderly transfer of authority to Allied Military Government.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
Date 8/6/2015

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO GERMAN MINERS

The following message addressed to German miners has been authorized by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:

Miners! The Allied Armies have smashed the West Wall and are penetrating into Germany. Knowing that it is only a matter of time before your region is occupied, Hitler and the Party fanatics are beginning to put into operation their plan for the forcible evacuation of the whole area and for putting the mines out of order.

The time has therefore come for you to make your decision. Either you obey Hitler's orders, or you decide to stay where you are and protect the mines which are your livelihood, and the homes where you have lived your lives.

In making up your minds, consider carefully the following points:

1. If you allow yourselves to be forcibly evacuated, you will be obliged to leave nearly all your possessions behind you for the SS to loot.
2. If you allow yourselves to be forcibly evacuated, there will be no essential work for you to do in the areas to which you are brought. You will, therefore, be pressed into the Volksturm and have to leave your wives and children to fend for themselves in strange surroundings.
3. If you allow yourselves to be forcibly evacuated, Hitler can carry out his plans for putting your mines out of action. For months, perhaps for years, after the final defeat, there will be no livelihood for you on your return home.
4. If you allow yourselves to be forcibly evacuated, then you must face coming winters without coal for heating, power and lighting.

If, on the other hand, you refuse to be evacuated, protect your mines and maintain them in working order, the results will be these:

1. You will remain in your own homes and with your families and share in the law and order restored by Military Government.
2. You and your families will be spared further air bombardment.

6 605

/page 2.

MESSAGE TO GERMAN MINERS

3. When circumstances permit, German workers will be allowed to form democratic trade unions.
4. By working the mines you will help your people to face this year with a supply of coal.

Miners! There can be no doubt which way your duty lies. Unite to prevent the uprooting of your families from their homes and the wanton sabotaging of the mines which are your means of livelihood.

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PEASANTS AND FARMERS IN WESTERN GERMANY

The following instructions for peasants and farmers in Western Germany are issued by authority of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:

The Allied armies have crossed the Rhine. To slow down their advance and so to prolong a lost war, Hitler, as you well know, is forcing the peasant and farmer to leave his homestead and become a refugee and his officials are seizing the livestock and the stores of food. In this way Hitler is trying to leave a barren desert behind the retreating German armies.

There is now proof positive that Hitler's plan can be successfully frustrated by resolute and independent action. Tens of thousands of peasants and farmers are now living safely under Allied Military Government in their own homesteads. The great majority of them succeeded in keeping their livestock and foodstuffs out of the hands of the Party officials.

Peasants and farmers of Western Germany, profit by the example of your own countrymen. What they have done, you can do if you keep a cool head and make your plans beforehand. Then when the moment for action comes, act on the following instructions which are based on the experience of over fifty thousand German peasants and farmers:

1. Do not openly protest against the evacuation order, or resist physical force when applied. Swade it in concert with the other members of your community, as long as possible.
2. When the Allied armies approach, keep your cattle and sheep as far as possible in secluded fields.
3. When the Allied armies approach, if you are compelled to leave your farms temporarily, turn your cattle loose, after filling their water troughs.
4. When the Allied armies approach, conceal your vehicles, or immobilize them temporarily by hiding essential parts. Build up hidden stores of petrol by such means as drawing the evacuation allowance.
5. If you cannot prevent cattle or sheep from being driven away by the Nazis in any other way, then slaughter them and conceal the carcasses.
6. When the Allied armies approach, distribute foodstuffs to your friends who are refusing to evacuate, so that they can build up reserves of food.

6 807

Peasants and farmers of Western Germany. The advice you have just heard is based on the experience of fifty thousand of your countrymen who are now living in their homesteads safe and sound. What they have done, you can do.

~~SECRET~~

*Supreme
Headquarters*

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO:

Date 1 March

The G.I. Refectories

The attached was brought to
the South by the G.I. Refectories
and may be of interest to
you.

6 600

File 613

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

FROM : RADIO LUXEMBOURG FROM GORDON WALKER

TO : PWD SHAFF MAIN TO CROSSMAN

To be broadcast in all languages, Saturday March
..... in Belgian, French, Dutch, Polish, Italian, transport
workers in Germany. General Eisenhower has given all his
armies in the West orders to go over to the attack and they
have responded magnificently. He has given you, (French,
Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Italian) transport workers in Germany,
orders to stay away, if possible from your work, or if that
is not possible, to do all you can to interfere with and slow
down German transport.

At this moment of crisis for Germany every minute of
work you do for Germany is a shot fired against the advancing
Allied soldiers. Everything that you do at this moment to
damage German trains or railway lines is worth a whole company
to the Allies. You hold a decisive position. French (etc)
transport workers in Germany, do your duty.

Here are six things that railway workers can do:

- (1) Find some way of staying away from work.
Pretend to be ill. If necessary take something
to make you sick. Pretend to have colic,
stomach aches. Injure your hands.
- (2) Loosen the brakes on goods wagons.
- (3) Damage the valves of air brakes.
- (4) Cut the command wires or switches and signals.
- (5) Damage railway line telephones and remove the
direction arrows on the telephone poles. This
will delay calls for aid when trains break down.
- (6) Refuse to transport foreign workers further
back into Germany.

If you who are listening, are not a transport worker,
it is your duty to find some means of passing these orders
from General Eisenhower.

6 600

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201 Halland
301 Smith
301 Thompson

WBS
6 March 1945

SGS-SHAFF FILE NO. 096412/3

6-11-R

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

FROM : RADIO LUXEMBOURG FROM NEWSOME
 TO : PWD SHAFT MAIN TO MCCLURE FOR CROSSMAN

WBS
 6 MAR 1945

Special instructions to German civilians West of Rhine:

Achtung: Here are special warnings and instructions from General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, to the German civilian population west of the Rhine.

It is vital to their safety to obey at once and absolutely.

Germans, the Allied Armies have broken through the West Wall and are overrunning the territory west of the Rhine. Cities and towns are coming into the battle zone, are falling and are being left behind the front too swiftly for it to be possible to continue giving warning and instructions to the population of individual places.

The following instructions, therefore, apply to all Germans west of the Rhine:

1. Those of you who inhabit areas already overrun by the Allied forces must stay where you are at this moment until you receive orders from the local Allied Commanders to move.

Keep under cover and thus avoid the danger of German artillery fire and of exchanges of small arms fire between Allied troops and encircled Wehrmacht units, and

Above all, keep off the roads. Fast moving Allied tanks and vehicles of all kinds are in full pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht, and any on the roads is in grave danger of being involved in fatal accidents.

Tell German soldiers who had been cut off by Allied advance to throw away their arms, to take cover to keep off the roads until it is possible for them to achieve safety as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention and all German Army deserters and stragglers who seek shelter with you must be reported to the Allied authorities later, but only when movement is safe.

2. Those of you who are in areas which the Allied Armies are approaching must take shelter at once and stay under cover.

Any attempt to evacuate eastwards will place you in mortal danger.

All roads and railways to the Rhine and all Rhine crossings will henceforward be packed with retreating German troops under heavy air and artillery bombardment. Women, children and old people who flee eastwards will not only risk death from allied aircraft and guns, but they will risk also being killed in the stampede of the defeated German Army, or by German guns firing from the Eastern bank of the Rhine.

3. Those of you who live in areas where the German High Command is trying to form bridgeheads West of the Rhine to cover the retreat across the river, must do everything in your power to persuade the German soldiers to give up the hopeless struggle and surrender. Otherwise you will become involved in a senseless massacre, for the Allied forces will be compelled to attack these bridgeheads with the full concentration of their immense firepower as long as the German troops continue to defend them.

To — up, keep off the roads, wherever you are; take shelter and stay under cover; tell the German soldiers to surrender and thus avert a senseless massacre in which both you and they will be killed.

Similar instructions are being broadcast to the Foreign Workers, who you must help.

You have heard instructions to all German civilians West of the Rhine from General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander.

An adaptation of this — put out to foreign workers.

ALLIED SUPREME COMMAND
(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)

WBS
CHIEF

WARNING

TO THE GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION ON THE EAST BANK OF THE RHINE.

Allied Supreme Headquarters hereby issues the following warning by the Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The Allied Armies have smashed through the West Wall and are clearing the area west of the Rhine. ~~1945~~ wide stretches of the East bank will be under fire from the ground as well as from the air. *soon*

The Nazi authorities are determined at whatever cost of human life, to keep the war factories and railways going until the last moment before the German Army retreats. This Nazi plan can only result in the greatest possible loss of life and property. If the German civilian obeys these orders and continues to work in what may well become battle areas, he will be exposed day and night not only to air attack but also to artillery fire.

The civilian population, therefore, in all areas immediately in front of the Allied advance are warned in their own interest to themselves immediately from the immediate vicinity of all military installations, factories, roads and railways which may become targets of Allied fire. They are warned to stay away from these targets until the area is occupied by the Allied Armies.

In the second place, the civilian population must realize that the last moment, immediately before the retreat of the German Army, Nazi authorities in many areas affected will probably attempt a forced evacuation. As in the past such last minute attempts are bound to become panic evacuations and end in disaster.

The civil population of the East bank of the Rhine is therefore advised in their own interest:

1. To keep away from military targets and to evade the order to continue work.
2. To evade the order when it comes for forced evacuation.
3. Each individual should decide on the safest place in the vicinity of his home where he and his family can await the advance of the Allied Armies.

WG 39

S.H.A.E.F.
March 1945.

*Leaflets printed
but not yet dropped.*

PAGE 2

3. No effort has been made to address special groups in the Rhineland, except railwaymen, in view of the directive on exploiting the Allied offensive against Germany from the West, approved 1 February, 1945. Railwaymen have been addressed repeatedly in view of the extent and power of our air attacks on German communications targets during the last few weeks.

4. Special leaflet and radio programs for named towns in Eastern Germany has not been attempted, in view of the rate of our advance, and the directive just referred to.

5. However, it is the view of Psychological Warfare Division that the objectives of anti-evacuation propaganda set forth in the policy approved 3 January, are still correct, i.e.:

a. To cause maximum confusion in the administration of German evacuation.

b. To crystallize resentment against the Nazi evacuation policy.

c. To increase in some small degree the supply of skilled labour (especially miners and railway workers) in occupied areas, for G-4 and G-5 purposes.

6. These objectives apply likewise to foreign workers, who are equally the subjects of German evacuation policy.

7. It is considered, however, that some special treatment in propaganda is required to German civilians and foreign workers in the areas of the Rhineland East of the Ruhr, and in the Ruhr, within the general framework of the policy set forth above. It is anticipated that the power and intensity of our bombing effort on military targets in these areas will be increased, consequent to our intensified land operations, so that an unrelieved "stay put" policy might bring on us the onus of telling foreign workers particularly, to stay in places where they would suffer the full brunt of our coordinated air and ground attacks. Therefore the following proposal for an instruction issued by SHAEP, and implemented by radio broadcasts and leaflets, is made.

II. INSTRUCTION TO THE CIVIL POPULATION ON THE EAST BANK OF THE RHINE

6

615 a. "The Allied Armies have smashed through the West Wall and are clearing the area west of the Rhine. Soon wide stretches of the East bank will be under fire from the ground as well as from the air."

TAB "A"

-3-

"The Nazi authorities are determined, at whatever cost of human life, to keep the war factories and railways going until the last moment before the German Army retreats. This Nazi plan can only result in the greatest possible loss of life and property. If the German civilian obeys these orders and continues to work in what have now become battle areas, he will be exposed day and night not only to air attack but also in many areas to artillery fire.

"The civilian population, therefore, in all areas immediately in front of the Allied advance are warned in their own interest to remove themselves immediately from the neighborhood of all military installations, all factories, roads and railways which may become targets of Allied fire. They are warned to stay away from these targets until the area is occupied by the Allied Armies.

"In the second place, the civilian population must realize that at the last moment, immediately before the retreat of the German Army, the Nazi authorities in many areas affected will probably attempt a forced evacuation of useful workers. As in the East such last minute attempts are bound to become panic evacuations and end in disaster.

"The civil population is therefore advised in their own interest to evade both the order to continue work and the order, when it comes, for forced evacuation. Each individual should at once remove himself and his family to the safest place he can find in the vicinity of his home, and stay there awaiting the advance of the Allied Armies.

9. Similar instructions will be issued to foreign workers, by radio and leaflet.

III. TIMING

10. Timing for release of these announcements will be concerted with G-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Chas. J. ...
May 1942*

PHASE II OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION
WITH THE INVASION OF GERMANY BY THE WEST

I. DISCUSSION

1. The directive on this subject, approved by Deputy Supreme Commander, and issued on 3 February, 1945, divides the psychological warfare campaign into two phases.

(a) that which accompanies our unspectacular advance into and through the western defenses of Germany, and

(b) that which exploits the crossing of the Rhine in force.

2. In accordance with 4 (b) of this directive, PWP has prepared and coordinated with the relevant Staff Divisions, special instructions to peasants, doctors, policeman, and miners.

3. In addition, PWP, if the military situation is suitable at the initiation of Phase II, proposes to release simultaneously as a radio broadcast, (Voice of SHAEF) the text of EG 104 which was approved as a leaflet text by Chief of Staff on January 4.

4. These special instructions should be preceded in radio output by a brief general statement, made on behalf of the Supreme Commander.

II. STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE SUPREME
COMMANDER TO OPEN PHASE II OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
EXPLOITING THE CROSSING OF THE RHINE BY THE WEST

5. "The Allied armies have crossed the Rhine and are driving ever more deeply into the very heart of Germany.

"The German government has ceased to exercise effective control over its army.

"The German High Command has lost effective control over many units, large and small, of the German forces.

"In these circumstances and in order to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and sacrifice of human life, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force has issued a series of instructions.

6 617 "Here are instructions to....."

CLASSIFIED BY 617
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
BY AUTHORITY OF CICA
16 AUG 1945

TAB "B"

-2-

6. The text of the approved messages to peasants, doctors, policemen, and miners is as follows:

MESSAGE TO RUHR AND RHINELAND DOCTORS

The following message to doctors of the Ruhr and Rhineland has been authorized by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:

Doctors of the Ruhr and Rhineland! The battle line is moving fearfully east. In a desperate effort to delay the Allied advance, Hitler is trying to force the German doctor to leave his patients to their fate and so create behind the retreating German armies an area of pestilence and disease.

So far Hitler has not succeeded. In Aachen, for instance, more than twenty doctors, true to the code of their profession, refused to leave their patients; and two German hospitals are already working. Elsewhere in the territory under Allied Military Government there is the same story to tell.

You have a clear duty, dictated by your special relationship with your fellow citizens and by the code of your profession, not to desert the sick and the aged, the expectant mother and the wounded. Your fellow citizens in the battle-swept towns and countryside of Western Germany will need your care and attention more than ever this year. If they die because you have permitted yourselves to be advocated, their death will be on your hand.

There is another obligation which the code of your profession imposes on you when your area becomes a theatre for battle. More and more often the Red Cross symbol is being used to protect bunkers and field installations used for military purposes. It is your bounden duty as a doctor to oppose the misuse of your countrymen of the Red Cross with every means in your power and to note the names of the criminals who are guilty of this offence.

Doctors of the Ruhr and Rhineland! Remember as the battle approaches your area, the honorable example of those doctors of Aachen who stood by their patients in the hour of need. When the time comes for you to act, act as bravely as they did.

6 610



• P.J. 7 7 R

[illegible]

that I did not see any signs of the "submerged" people. They were not in the project. He said and meant the people. They were not in the project. They had not prepared a plan for them, so I got many sets of water and clothing; and I did not give to them. I did not give to the 33 people.

[illegible]

It is our understanding that in the fulfillment of your responsibilities, and that you are under the greatest difficulties for the spread on by the National and your own organization, the Government, to be actively supported by them. In March 1941, Germany the fulfillment of your duty is the most clear of your responsibility is - because it is daily the greatest national crisis. These things we will understand.

Get with energy and speed each of you a positive result. In a further memorandum each of you will give the FBI ideas against your fellow citizenry, their personal and/or financial destruction of economic and public property, and how insure an orderly transfer of power, through removal of public enemy, to United Military Government.

By so doing you can do something not only to save the
lot of your time or village in the morning, but also to
increase the good name of the Government which has been
restored to Hsiao and his Government.

Moreover, as in London, at elsewhere, members of the German Security Service do their duty in the hours of danger and are prepared to serve faithfully under Allied Military Government which will be able to take part in the rebuilding of a German Police Force based entirely on Nazism and Militarism.

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$$= 1.75$$

THE LIFE OF THE LATE

The following instructions for parents and teachers in Western Germany are issued by authority of Imperial Headquarters, dated 12 September 1944:

The ill-farmer are also using power but slowly towards the
house, to the door and even then to protest a lock out,
but, as you well know, in forcing the power and water in laws
his interest are becoming a threat and his efforts are making the
house and the streets of the city. In this way the city is trying to
have a better street behind the industry, better and so.

[illegible]

Followers and friends of Thomas Mann, profit by the example of how one can change. What they have done, you can do if you keep a goal and have your plans before you. Then when the moment for action comes, act on the Collins' instructions which are sound in the execution of the thirty thousand (30,000) persons and groups.

1. Do not orally protest against the operation of a vehicle against the law. If you are stopped, remain in the vehicle until the officer has finished his investigation. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.
2. When the officer orders you to get out of the vehicle, do so. Do not resist or argue with the officer. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.
3. When the officer orders you to get out of the vehicle, do so. Do not resist or argue with the officer. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.
4. When the officer orders you to get out of the vehicle, do so. Do not resist or argue with the officer. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.
5. If you are stopped by an officer, do not argue with the officer. Do not resist or argue with the officer. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.
6. When the officer orders you to get out of the vehicle, do so. Do not resist or argue with the officer. Do not leave the vehicle until you are told to do so.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

... und die ...

-8-

7. Minor changes in the above texts will be made to suit changing conditions. e.g. The advice to Saar miners can be easily amended to make it suitable for miners of other regions. Further, the reference, in the instruction for peasants, to a slow advance towards the Rhine, will be modified to suit the conditions of Phase II.

TOP SECRET

SECRET
3416
000.77

OUTGOING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

TO : BCSI EXFOR, ACOS G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP;
ACOS G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

FROM : SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED SCAEF CITE: SHGBI

REF NO : FWD-17374 TOO: 261830A

Black Radio operation "CAPRICORN" commences 1415 hours GMT 26th February and daily thereafter at quarter past the hour from 0815 to 1715 hours GMT inclusive. Each transmission will last about 13 minutes on frequency of 6225 kilocycles (48.19 millimetres).

Operations to consist of CLAUDESTINE radio transmissions with object of undermining German will to resist. Broadcasts in form of talks, military in tone, by a speaker purporting to represent an underground movement in GERMANY which advocates overthrow of Hitlerism as GERMANY's main enemy, the immediate ending of the war by accepting unconditional surrender, and the reconstruction of GERMANY under Allied control.

Essential knowledge of origin of these broadcasts be kept as restricted as possible.

ORIGINATOR : G-2 AUTHENTICATION: J. L. AUSTIN, LT. COL.
INFORMATION : SGS
SHAEP MAIN

SOS		DSC	C5	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR													
BY No.										15									

FS OUT 184 26 FEB 1945 2030A HFK/jdp REF NO: FWD-17374
TOD: 261830A

T O F S E C R E T

6 623

TOP SECRET

COPY NO

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SHAFF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WARZ

TOO 222110Z FEB

SHAFF FWD 101/22
222310A FEB
130 222355A FEB

TOP SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
 TO FOR ACTION: SHAFF FWD FOR PUSPENNOWER
 FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
 REF NO : W-1803, 22 FEBRUARY 1945

BOOK MESSAGE
PAGE 142

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that at present it is unwise to undertake operation MATCHBOX as outlined in your SCAP 166, 5 January, due to adverse effects which the plan might have on the Allied public at this time.

At a later date, when the disintegration of GERMANY has progressed to a point where you can foresee that collapse is imminent, you should consider re-submitting MATCHBOX or a similar plan.

SCAP 166 is ref S-73848, SMC OUT 624, 5/1/45, PWD 10

ACTION : FWD
 INFORMATION : CGS SHAW MAIN
 G-2
 G-3 AG RECORDS

PS IN 251 23 Feb 45 0125A HFK/lf REF NO: W-1803

6 624

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1529 9

The report to SCAP 166
 provided by PW on Jan 5th
 was (B)

898 / 107

13. Feb.

D. W. RICHARDSON,
Major, Infantry,
Duty Officer, SMC.

AUTHENTICATION:

11/16/69

STAFF HAVE BEEN TO LISTEN FROM GOVT UNBORN FORTNIGHT
ANSWER TO OUR SUDAN DASH SEVEN THREE EIGHT FOUR EIGHT CMA SUDAN CHARLIE ABL
FOX SIX SIX CMA IS FORTHCOMING PD WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU
GET ON THIS MATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
PRECEDENCE : URGENT
DATE : 131750Z Feb

LATE : ON CAS
ACQUAH : TO

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Staff Message Control

100-443887-100

Abstract

(b)



TOP SECRET

6 626

100-100000

2/7

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, KCB, CBE, DSO,
Office of the For Captain
West George St.
St. J.

/s/ B. S. H.

The purpose for coordination of action between Supreme Headquarters
and Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart suggested by you is acceptable. Brigadier General
Medley will act as the Supreme Headquarters representative and will maintain
contact with Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart.
The report of the 14 Committee which considered the proposal in
MOA 134 has been examined and immediate implementation is proposed in
agreed.

20 JAN 1965

100-100000/7/65(15)

6 February, 1965
x
x
x

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(15)

6 827

not written at bottom of letter by Dan.

W.B.S.

I may say that no one could be more appreciative for
this than Bruce Lockhart, as we have all worked well with him
before and admire him very much.

Yours faithfully, Robert

Dear Mr. -

6 February

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OFFICERS ONLY

HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED FORCES
G-3 Division (Main)

5 February, 1945

STAFF/172/3/7/Gen(G)
G-3 091.112-5/Gen(G)

SUBJECT: Method of Breaking German Will to Surrender
TO: Chief of Staff

I DISCUSSION

1. The plan in our SCAP 134 (TAB A) has been received from General Ismay who states that:

It has been accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and,

b. The responsible British Departments and Agencies proceed to implement the proposals. (The plan is at TAB 2)

2. Coordination of the above activities with military Supreme Headquarters' is an important concern. General Ismay states that Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Chairman of the Committee, discussed the plan with Brigadier General McClure of Headquarters (TAB 2).

3. At a meeting General Morgan as chairman discussed the method of control of the projects in the Ad Hoc Committee's plan. (TAB 2)

It is

a. The implementation of the proposals British involved,

b. To continue the present method of coordination between Supreme Headquarters and the British agencies, effected by Brigadier Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, respectively.

II RECOMMENDATION

a. That General Sir Hastings Ismay TAB 2 signed.

III CONCURRENCES

Note required.

Letter signed WBS
6.2.45.

H.F. BULL,
Major General, G-3,
AC of S.G-3.

To G-3

6 628

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

FWP 385

3 February, 1947.

DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION
WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

201 The Chief
V. H. H. H.

1. Discussion.

We must keep in mind that the picture of the war in the immediate future will be of spectacular developments on the East front of unspectacular Allied advances on the West. Later on we can expect more spectacular developments on the West. This will probably not occur before we have crossed the Rhine in force.

There is a very natural desire in the present circumstances to attempt to counter-balance the news from the East by blowing up in propaganda our unspectacular successes. It should be realized, however, that an attempt to do this will achieve no end, and its net effect will be to accentuate the contrast between developments in the East and on the West.

In the same way, there is a natural tendency to believe that propaganda, in view of developments in the East, can be employed immediately and effectively against German soldiers and civilians in the West in order to make them act as we require. There is little ground for this assumption. Propaganda by us to Germans in the West will only be effective if and when it accompanies demonstrably successful action. Local successes can be exploited only in tactical propaganda.

2. Phasing of Psychological Warfare Campaign.

For the above reasons it has been decided to divide the psychological warfare campaign into two phases: (a) that which accompanies our unspectacular advance into and through the western defenses of Germany and (b) that which exploits the crossing of the Rhine in force. It is possible that some unforeseen development other than the crossing of the Rhine may justify the switch to phase II. In this case, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. will issue a special directive.

3. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase I.

- a. No attempt should be made artificially to counter-balance the news from the East by propaganda from the West. But continue to link Russian successes with failure of Rundstedt's offensive.
- b. The news of the assault on the western defenses of Germany should be given soberly with no artificial build-up. The difficulty of the terrain and the strength of the defenses should be deliberately stressed.
- c. During this phase, in reporting the air war, we should avoid committing ourselves to cutting off the German air force West of the Rhine by destruction of the Rhine bridges.

Amended 15 FEB.

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CONFIDENTIAL

67-112/3

3 FEB

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-2-

- d. News of life under Allied Military Government should be given even more play than hitherto, but strictly within the policy directives previously issued. There should be an increase of quantity but no change of tone. In connection with this there the standard quotations from Roosevelt and Churchill on the fate of Germany given in Annex A to the Guidance Notes of January 27, 1945 should be constantly repeated.
 - e. Any policy decisions on the post-war fate of Germany published after the conference of the Big Three, will naturally be employed to increase the effectiveness of d. above.
 - f. No campaign of special instructions to German civilians, or to foreign workers will be begun during this Phase. The only exception will be a special advice to German railwaymen and foreign worker railwaymen which may be issued at a time to be decided by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
4. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase II.
- a. The belated shift in psychological warfare themes... concerning our Western offensive maintained during Phase I will be drastically broken on the first day of Phase II. The opening of this Phase will be clearly marked by a dramatic campaign of Dispersed Order of the Day. The timing of Phase II will be the responsibility of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
 - b. The release of the communiqué will give the signal for a new instruction to all civilians in Western Germany and for a series of special instructions and advice to German peasants, doctors, policemen, to be transmitted by radio and leaflet. Drafts of these are now being submitted to the relevant staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
 - c. The anti-evacuation campaign will be sharply intensified and extended to Germans and foreign workers in areas east of the Rhine.
 - d. Propaganda to German soldiers will in suitable circumstances switch from advice to surrender to orders to surrender on the pattern of 20-104, the order by the Supreme Commander which has already been approved by Chief of Staff.
 - e. News on life under Military Government and the use of the Roosevelt-Churchill quotations will be maintained as in Phase I.

ROBERT A. MCQUIRE,
Brig. General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

3 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General SMITH

Subject: Methods of Breaking the GERMAN Will to Resist.

1. On 29 January, a letter addressed to you from General Ismay (TAB A) enclosed a report (TAB B) by an AS Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, which are the results of an examination of a proposal by this Headquarters concerning methods of breaking the German will to resist (SCAF 134 - TAB C).

2. This report has been accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and by His Majesty's Government and the British Agencies concerned have been instructed to implement the proposals.

3. General Ismay suggests that co-ordination of action between SHAEF and the British authorities should be effected through Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart and he wishes to know whether this procedure is agreeable.

4. This report has been seen by the Deputy Chief of Staff and in accordance with his instructions copies were forwarded to General McClure, General Strong, the Political Officers and General Whiteley, and the latter was requested to report how it is proposed to co-ordinate the implementation of the proposals contained in the paper.

5. A meeting is being held at 1430 hours today, 3 February to consider the paper (Agenda - TAB D) and as the result of the meeting a letter to General Ismay, in reply to his letter, will be prepared for your signature.

4 FEB 1945

K. A. S. MORRICE,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.,
Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff,

831

SHAEF File No. 221/42/3

Feb

14

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

3 February 1945.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 19

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

O.K.W. as "Re-occupation" Authority

During the RUMSTEDT counteroffensive the German High Command authorized the posting of proclamations in the re-captured towns of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The general proclamation order was "first of all" that all normal economic activities be resumed and the streets cleared of rubble. Then followed a series of special regulations which established the rule of military law over civilians. A curfew between the hours of 1700 and 0700 hours was established, and all civilian inhabitants over 14 years of age were required to carry a pass with a photograph. All automobile traffic was forbidden and the use of any type of vehicle within 5 kilometers of the front established by each local commandant required express approval by the commandant; circulation beyond this limit was strictly forbidden. Regulations declared any assembly outside the home or shop forbidden and, at the same time announced that all hotels, theaters, movies, and places of recreation were to be closed. German time was re-introduced effective as of the date of the order. A special proclamation ordered that all weapons, ammunition and explosives be surrendered to the nearest German Army HQ. on penalty of death.

Extremely thorough were the requisitioning activities of the [redacted]. All fuel and vehicles were requisitioned by the Army; all essential [redacted] and fodder ("essential" was defined in a separate list) were taken over to assure a full supply for the Army of Occupation and of the inhabitants. This latter is in direct contrast to the procedure of the Allied Armies of Occupation which do not requisition food and which leave the matter of civilian feeding in the hands of local administrators appointed by M.G. officials. A consequence of the Wehrmacht procedure is that it must assume also the responsibility of allocating materials for agricultural use. All State property and, particularly the property of enemy armies, [redacted] requisitioned by the Wehrmacht, and it was announced that anyone withholding such property or information concerning its location would be punished as a saboteur. The proclamation announced finally that all those who [redacted] loyal would be protected by the German Army, while very severe measures would be taken against saboteurs and agitators.

Requisitioning of Civilian Property

A number of reports have been received dealing with the requisition of private civilian property in the occupied areas by M.G. officers, sometimes at the request of tactical commanders in the area. From MERKSTEIN it is reported that an order was issued to the German Bürgermeister to have all private radio sets turned in to the local M.G. detachment. In compliance, some 400 radios are said to have been turned in. Since no reason for this [redacted] was given, considerable speculation was aroused among [redacted] population. Current gossip ranged from belief that it was a security measure to the opinion that it was a retaliatory measure for the confiscation of radios in Holland by the Germans. The latter opinion was held by half of those interviewed, who thought their radios would be given to those Dutch people who had been deprived of their own. The other half believed it [redacted] only a temporary measure and expected that their sets would be returned. Although the collection of radios was accomplished without friction and a spot [redacted] did not reveal disobedience, the order [redacted] generally resented among the population. Several people made bold enough to ask that they be returned. Several members of the community remarked that the order [redacted] contrary to

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General EISENHOWER's statement that private property would be respected. Many said that Radio Luxembourg had been their main source of important information announced by the Allies. Since about 80% of this town is supplied with electric current the people had indeed spent much of their time at their radios, there being little else to do. The Mayor supported this assertion, adding that the station had built up a reputation for reliability among the population.

In HENNINGEN people were permitted to keep their radios but ordered to turn in their bicycles. This confiscation not only caused resentment, but was a genuine handicap in a town where no other means of transportation is available. Most severely handicapped were the approximately 100 miners who live in HENNINGEN but work at the ALSDORF mine and are forced to commute between these towns on their bicycles. The local doctor and the mid-wife complained bitterly that without their bicycles they would be unable to cover the community. Housewives, too, were affected since many women do all their shopping on bicycles; the food stores often being located quite a distance from their homes.

News of the requisition quickly spread throughout other towns in the occupied areas and caused considerable alarm, together with a fairly wild crop of rumors. In MUESELEN, for example, where some 25 civilians were interviewed two weeks after the MUESELEN order, there was an active rumor that sewing machines were to be confiscated. Although no order for collection of radios or bicycles had been published, the townspeople had already worked themselves into a state of excitement on the basis of the rumor. No one in MUESELEN cared particularly about the collection of radios, since there is no electric current in the town, but the people were apprehensive about losing their bicycles, which are the chief recreation as well as the sole means of transportation, and the women particularly were dismayed about the prospect of losing their sewing machines.

The complaints voiced by the Germans are not merely captious. Aside from the value of Allied broadcasts in disseminating the orders and instructions of M.G. authorities, radio listening was the chief means available to Germans of passing the long curfew period which, in most towns, runs from 1730 to 0700, and of supplying news for countering rumors. One interrogator reports that in MUESELEN nobody except the mayor and one person who still had his radio knew about the Russian offensive. In one case where the requisitioning was a clear case of military necessity, it is reported that there was no grumbling among the population whatsoever. Within two days after the announcement that bedsheets were to be collected in ALSDORF, it is reported that a total of 7,000 sheets were gathered, plus a small supply of bolt goods. On the day set for the collection, several hundred people showed up at the M.G. office on foot with their sheets draped over their arms. One explanation for public cooperation in this requisition was that the soldiers who collected the bedsheets explained at each house that they were to be used to provide snow-camouflage for Allied soldiers. In view of the widespread antagonism to the possible return of the Wehrmacht, the hope that Allied troops would be able to fight them off, there is no reason to disbelieve this report. It is likely, too, that an explanation accompanying any requisition order will facilitate cooperation on the part of German civilians.

The matter of radio seizure has been considered on a high level, and confiscation will in future be avoided except for urgent security reasons.

Relief in Occupied Areas

The problem of poor relief has been a thorny one in several towns almost since the start of occupation. Not only do the M.G. authorities have on their hands these people who had been on relief prior to occupation, but also those who had lost everything or nearly everything through the passing over their homes. The fact that the Germans had removed practically

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all official records did not make the task of R.G. any easier, because it was difficult to determine who was eligible for relief. The main problem of the authorities is to raise money for depleted town treasuries. Improvement of the financial situation is being attempted through the following measures* :

(a) Resumption of tax collections. Most of the localities in occupied Germany have by now taken up some kind of tax collection scheme.

(b) Increased employment, which in turn will ease the burden of relief. In this connection increasing military needs for civilian labor are expected to have important results.

(c) Resumption of control by Landkreise (Rural Districts) over their constituent Gemeinden (Urban and Rural Communes). The Landrat of AACHEN has been working on this problem, and collection from the Gemeinden is expected to be resumed shortly.

(d) Temporary expedients, such as the letting of evacuated property and selling of abandoned merchandise (by this latter method, KORNELIENSTEDT alone raised RM 70,000).

Before occupation, social security payments in the coal-mining area fell into the following four classes :

- (a) Normal poor relief
- (b) Allowances to soldiers' wives and families
- (c) Pensions to disabled miners provided by the Miners' Association
- (d) Social insurance benefits in respect to old age, unemployment, ill-health, or accident.

At the present time (c) and (d) are completely suspended : (c) because of the removal of records and funds of the Miners' Association, and (d) because of removal of records and the closing of the post office. Quite naturally (b) is not being continued by occupational authorities and, therefore, all needy persons by necessity are being treated as poor relief cases.

The normal scale of poor relief payments in the Rhine Province is as follows :

Married couple	RM 55	monthly
Dependants over 16	RM 23	"
" under 16	RM 16	"
Persons without dependants	RM 36	"

Despite all efforts being made by the authorities, only AIXDORF has been able to maintain this payment scale. AIXDORF gives small cash payments between RM 25 and 50 to persons in dire need, but in most other localities relief is usually given in kind.

From reports of R.D. interrogators it appears that the weekly expenditure for food of the average family is approximately RM 10 (individual estimates range from RM 7 to 12). This shows that relief payments are adequate for the purchase of food alone. However, this is the only outlay of money necessary in the occupied areas, as it is practically impossible to spend money on anything else. It is to be expected that the situation will improve, especially through opening of the banks, tax collections and also through gradual stabilization of the whole economic situation.

* See SHAFER C-5 C.A. Weekly Summary # 31

2. ENEMY AREAS

The question mark written over Germany last week by the Russian push on to German soil has doubled and underscored this week by the rapid advance of the Russian armies to the Gdansk at a point less than 40 miles from BERLIN. With the point of Russian intentions and enemy capabilities this Summary does not deal. The Russian advance thus far, however, brought to the fore some interesting questions.

How many Refugees?

The German scene is dominated by the trek of four and a half million refugees now estimated to be on the move away from the battle areas. Even in this area of Eastern Germany, where large-scale displacement of population groups is familiar, nothing quite like this hasty and disorganized flight of millions has been known before in the lifetime of these people. The breakdown of refugees by place of origin is estimated as follows by PID:

East Prussia	1,000,000	
Pomerania (Polish Corridor)	300,000	Reichsdeutsche
East Pomerania	1,000,000	
Upper Silesia (Polish)	100,000	
(German)	400,000	
Lower Silesia	850,000	
East Pomerania	400,000	
Brandenburg	50,000	
Gen. Danzig-Westprussia	350,000	

These round figures cannot be taken as conclusive, for they are computations based on deductions from known facts. They are the most reliable estimates available, however.

Broadcast instructions indicate the areas where the confusion caused by the flight of refugees is greatest. Those fleeing from Upper Silesia, apparently heading for Bohemia, are particularly instructed with regard to clearing snow from roads, which is a considerable obstacle to the simultaneous movement on the same roads of both military and civilians. The same area has been told that no special evacuation trains will be provided, and therefore "whenever possible women and children should use the ordinary (schienenmassige) trains, the men are to remain with the columns". This announcement indicates that reports of utter chaos through Eastern Germany are not to be taken too seriously, for perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the transport situation in the East during the present crisis is that it is able to continue even approximately its regular schedule. The flood of refugees through BERLIN has created an enormous problem in registration. An address on 29 January by LANGESTEIN, head of the Central Inquiry Office for Refugees at BERLIN, indicates that the Party is making an effort to keep track of individuals involved in the present migration. Refugees are urged to send their personal data by post-card to LANGESTEIN's office, and a special attempt is also being made to index the refugees as they pass through the railway stations. The regular method of registration with the Police at place of arrival is also emphasized.

How are the Refugees received?

Details of Party plans for handling refugees are not entirely clear yet. But the treatment of refugees by the population in Western Germany is a fairly good indication that despite the Party's good planning the lot of refugees from the East, cast upon a strange town, will not be a happy one.

* A Spitz dispatch of 29 Jan. reported refugees from BRESLAU "being herded toward SCHWELBITZ and HILSCHBERG". From here the only course that remains to the evacuees is through the difficult mountain passes of the RIESENGE-BIRGE. Evacuation to Moravia, which was a central reception area during the attack on CZECHOSLOVAKIA, has probably ceased by now.

DNS has greeted refugees with a directive complicated enough to harass even a fairly happy circumstance. Refugees are ordered to report the Police in person immediately upon arrival. After this they are to report, in person or in writing, and in rapid succession, to the local recruiting office, the Labour Exchange, the Bürgermeister or Kreisleiter, the local Health Insurance Office, and to the local Administrative officer (if employed by the public services). The question of food cards is to be extremely aggravated, particularly for those unfortunate people who have lost their original cards, but in some measure for all. In the Wartheland, for example, the food ration differed from that issued to the rest of Germany but their different cards have now been declared valid everywhere. The Wuppertaler Beobachter indicates that already there are great difficulties of food supply in RECKEN and particularly in the Gau Danzig Westpreussen. The refugees, of course, are interested mainly in getting fed and not particularly in food supply as a "situation". Reports are heard complaining that refugees have been going from one soup kitchen to another, getting as much of a meal at each as can be gotten. Although a good deal of this sort of talk about refugees is probably untrue, for the sentiment in many reception centers is notoriously anti-refugee, yet there seems no reason for not believing that hungry people would act in this way.

Friction between refugees and the indigenous population has been serious in many parts of the West. Food shortages, transport shortages, forced billeting, over-crowding, and unfamiliarity with the dialect and manners of the newcomers were the chief reasons. This seems to have due partly to the "us first" attitude which appears prevalent today among the broad strata of German people. Many German prisoners and civilians have reported a growth of selfishness in the German character and, while such statements are tenuous for purposes of evaluation, yet undisciplined egocentrism may be a most serious cause of the disintegration of morale. The conflict between the call to "patriotic" devotion to one's uninvited guest, and the personal unwillingness to receive such guests, is resolved in many cases against the guest.

Some indication that the Party leaders were extremely nervous about the ill-feeling which might arise during the resettling of refugees among the various Gaue comes from the description of a Party meeting at ESSEN, reported in the National Zeitung of 17 January. This meeting preceded the great stream of Eastern refugees through RECKEN, but already those present "severely criticized the undisciplined arrival of people from other areas in the RECKEN reception areas" who "deprived our NSV (Hitler's agency) evolutions of their accommodation". Hostility toward "outsiders" has surely been aggravated by the recent flood, for it is estimated that over a million (more than one out of four) of the new refugees will be regarded as "foreigners", or at best Volksdeutsche of uncouth speech and manners, in the Old Reich.

A further possible effect, which it is difficult to predict in advance, is the defection which those refugees may spread among the population of Central and Western Germany. These refugees, many of whom got out of town just as the Red army tanks were approaching, have seen the ineffectiveness of the Wehrmacht and the Volksturm, and may, in their misery, spread a feeling of Russian invincibility. Since very many of these refugees will be coming from areas which have never been bombed before, into areas where tremendous bombings are a normal feature of daily life, their "fear and trembling" may be a more effective silent guide to defection than the most articulate statements concerning the power of the Red Army and the hopelessness of continued resistance.

It is unlikely that the petulance of natives in the reception areas will win much sympathy from the refugees, who have themselves been passing through extreme hardships. From DANZIG and East Prussia refugees generally given only two hours notice to pack, and in some places "not even half an hour". A Swedish correspondent from this area says: "Women gave birth to children without medical help, and were forced to be

the road for over ■ hours with these new-born babes, before they found their first shelter. Too, the refugees obviously will want to go home. The only way ■ will get home, knowing defeat ■ certain, is by the ending of the war. He will be on the side of those who want the war to stop at any cost. Hardly less zealous should be the crowded dweller in the interior of Germany who sees respite from overcrowding by uninvited guests only when they do go home. The antagonism between "hosts" and "guests" should, paradoxically, run the same. As is usual in cases where both parties consider themselves aggrieved, one word is likely to lead to another.

On the assumption that the reception areas are the same as those described up to May 1944, the greatest number of Eastern refugees would ultimately be located in and around the following cities: HANNOVER, KASSEL, KIEL, MAGERBURG, MANNHEIM, MÜNSTER, STUTTGART and WERDEN. It is unlikely at this late date that the re-location authorities have continued to use such former reception areas as BLANDENBURG, SCHERIN and STETTIN, except possibly ■ overnight resting places for the trekking.

Will the Germans Revolt?

The Gauleiters are worried, the inhabitants of reception areas are irritated, and the refugees are cold, tired, hungry and miserable. Also, never before in the decade of Nazi rule has there been such an opportunity for individuals to discard their identity and slip away from the official eye, as during this wholesale migration with all the re-registration and re-identification which is involved. The questions are: Will the refugees and their "hosts" resist the local Party leaders? Will the long-standing or newly-converted anti-Nazi fighters take advantage of their opportunity to plan and organize a systematic attack upon the Nazis and the sources of their power? On the basis of what has happened in Germany during the past six months, one can pretty confidently say "Yes" to the first question. After heavy bombings, after the evacuation orders, after serious local crises of various kinds, there has been resistance to Party orders and groups of outraged citizens in different places have even attacked local Party officials. Such outbreaks, however, are temporary and local, and from the long-run political point of view meaningful only as a contribution to the sustained attrition of Party control over the population. The ■ to the second and more important question, on the basis of available evidence, must be "No". The aggressive elements in Germany today, ■ during the last 30 years, are still the nationalists. The "last ditch" Nazis still conceive of the war in the terms of the greater glory of Deutschland: for this "hard core" an end to resistance is possible only when the Party orders it. Too, these people have nothing to gain and a great deal to lose from an allied victory. They are followed by ■ lukewarm Nazis and the fellow travellers who lack the physical courage ■ fight fiercely with them and the moral courage to come out openly against them. So long as the Party controls - Gestapo, SS, SA ■ Wehrmacht - continue to serve as coercive agencies of the Party, there will be ■ of heart among these groups. Among the majority of the German population, the predominant feeling is apathy and apathy is the motivation least conducive to action of any type, particularly action which is likely ■ be violent and possibly fatal. The galvanizing spark, which could come only from an organized and disciplined underground, is lacking. Story after story told to allied interrogators by members, or near-members, of the Communist underground indicate that there is, in fact, no real underground able to cope with the power of Nazi controls. The majority of their leaders have long since been killed or imprisoned, and those remaining have been forced to work in small cells of 3 or 4 men. Even these were in many ■ discovered and imprisoned, and nowhere is there any reliable evidence of any effective liaison among the various cells. It is clear from these reports that occupying authorities after the surrender will find a small Communist party functioning in Germany, but there seems ■ possibility that this underground, or any other, can hope to show its hand before the defeat of the Wehrmacht and survive.

The possibility of organized and violent revolt against the Nazis exists strongly in only one quarter - among the foreign workers. This possibility should not be exaggerated, for the many rumors that Russian and French workers have been concealing caches of arms and ammunition must be heavily discounted. A Swedish report from BERLIN says that everywhere within the inner parts of the city one sees groups of Russian prisoners "whose behavior clearly shows that they already feel like masters in the country", and adds that many Berliners fear there will be open revolt when the Red Army has got closer.

What are the Germans Saying?

The announcements of the High Command and Propaganda Ministry continue along the line of "crisis propaganda", making unprecedented admissions concerning the gravity of the situation. In part this is the obvious propaganda line to take whenever the enemy makes a large-scale attempt, for if you exaggerate his intention you are in a favorable position when it fails to come off. In part, however, and particularly in relation to the announcements of the OKW, it is clear that admissions today are graver than ever before simply because there are grave admissions to make. The OKW has made no hedges in its admissions that such cities as LODZ and BRACOW have been lost in spite of desperate resistance. In regard to WARSAW, the embarrassment of the High Command was revealed by its almost surreptitious announcement of the evacuation of that city, without any explanation. In other places the OKW has followed its more usual publicity policy of rear-guard defence. It is claimed nearly every day that the enemy has been halted or checked at this place or that. These claims are never made too strongly but only as a day-to-day attempt to prevent the panicky feeling that the flood gates are open. The military commentators, despite an undertone of gravity, have managed to make some general reassurances. GUMERLIN, for example, made a great point of his announcement that the High Command was in control of communications throughout the armies, that it possessed a clear picture of the front and the defensive strategy involved, that a single Wehrmacht unit had yet surrendered itself whole. Such claims being unverifiable, can be maintained for a considerable period. Tactical claims have been made modestly and then withdrawn by omission when they become untenable - e.g. the claim that in East Prussia and north of WARSAW a coherent front had been established. Top commentators, like DITTLER, have carefully omitted reference to tactical details on the Eastern front and confined themselves mainly to the strategic point of view: "For the first time in a long period, the German Command has been in a position to operate - at least at the point of immediate decision - with a considerable degree of freedom from that shortage of materials which was so often a drag on its decisions".

GOEBBELS has been in an extremely unhappy position. The flood of at the turn of the year that Germany had survived its worst peril and that she was now prepared against the foe came at the worst possible moment, as it turned out. The best he can do now, when reporting that STALIN intends to reach BERLIN, is to remind his listeners that the Anglo-Americans in the West once had similar intentions, and that though for a time these seemed very promising, at the decisive moment they were frustrated. GOEBBELS, too, is making no local and tactical claims at the moment. The broadcast for Europe of 19 January which declared that "in East Prussia stabilization is absolute" has turned out just a little too embarrassing. For the most part now German propagandists have limited themselves to appeals for heroism and still more heroism in the Volksturm, among the workers, among the women and in the Wehrmacht.

HITLER's speech of 30 January fell into the same general pattern as the others. He failed to produce a single assurance that there was any reasonable military ground for confidence; he simply expressed his confidence in ultimate German success, and exhorted the German people to rally. Although there is reason to assure that HITLER does actually believe in success, it is doubtful whether most of his listeners do. Perhaps

because the Great Man is aware of this, he, like the others, emphasized determination of the leadership to fight to the last man and underlined the threat to exterminate weaklings who wished otherwise. Characteristically, HITLER failed to utter any word of understanding for the plight of the refugees and others who are suffering from the present crisis.

What are the Russians Saying?

Russian propaganda has been quick to seize upon the points of weakness in the present German situation. Moscow radio has followed 3 main themes: it has pointed out, day after day, that the war is now fought on German soil; it has issued calls for resistance both in general terms and to specific groups; it has combined both these in a persistent campaign to break down evacuation from the East.

The Soviets have recalled all the earlier Nazi promises that Slavs would never tread on German soil. Moscow radio picks up in particular of HITLER's speech on 8 November 1942 when he said that the war would be fought 1,000 and, if necessary, 2,000 kilometers from the homeland. Here, as in all else, HITLER's genius has failed, and the Russian radio points out that both in the East and in the West continued war means continued destruction to German homes, villages and soil. Calls for resistance are addressed mainly to the women. The women are urged to keep their young boys and old men from the Volkssturm "because Volkssturm is Volksmord" (mass murder), to encourage soldiers to quit fighting, to fight themselves against Hitlerite orders, (e.g. "Take up the fight against the Nazi gang leaders with the war workers who are still in the towns and villages"). Appeals for resistance are based in part upon the "guilt complex" which observers have detected in the German personality structure:

"What you have neglected to do so far, you should make up for, German women. It is still time. Not all towns and villages have been burned by HITLER - such can still be saved in Germany. What must German women do to bring the end of this war? You must no longer fight with HITLER, you must fight against HITLER."

Incessantly Moscow radio hammers away on the point of resistance to evacuation. The farmers are told to hide their cattle, the women folk by a food stock, and the terrors of attempted evacuation are made painfully clear to all German listeners. In this connection, Russian propaganda's direct attack upon HITLER is emphasized in nearly every sentence. After the description of each evacuated German town which has been destroyed during the present offensive comes the sentence "That is HITLER's world". Listeners are told that:

"German provinces are being destroyed on his orders, on his orders the property of the German people is being destroyed, and SS gangs are specially picked for burning everything."

Russian broadcasts for the Wehrmacht are largely confined to newscasts, which almost invariably are attributed to "news from neutral sources". They deal mainly with bad news from home. On 24 January German soldiers were told of the vast danger during this critical time from foreign workers who, in many key industrial cities, form some 75% of the population, the other 25% being women in war work. (Strangely Moscow radio includes a "report from Geneva" that there has been an enormous increase of desertions among Hungarians in the Wehrmacht and that these are now hiding in the Austrian mountains and actively cooperating with the patriots in these regions in battles against the Nazi soldiers). On the following day Moscow radio told the German soldiers of the great political tension within Germany, emphasizing the panic of the population, the ruthlessness of the SS and the SA in their treatment of civilians.

*These two officials did not bother to court the loss of men-
and-motels which they had borrowed during their protests.
The minutes for the meeting set to be a quick time for the meeting.

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References

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References

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References

The facts are well known. Many alert P/W complains the comradeship of former days is now largely absent from the Wehrmacht; each man has become primarily interested in his own personal survival. Food is a key concern, and the former efficiency in the procurement and distribution of food is often supplanted by general "scrounging" and semi-organized looting, a practice which cannot help but undermine discipline. The extreme cold, aggravated by a lack of clothes and difficulties of medical aid has made the problem of personal health a most difficult one.

Further deterioration can be seen in the increase of infractions of discipline and military law. Captured soldiers constantly speak of the necessity of enforcing the salute, stern against looting, misuse of arms and property and the like. In addition, the enforcement of military law depends on the presence and effectiveness of junior soldiers. In previous reports, the persistence of high morale has been pointed out. But nevertheless, P/W more and more frequently report that they feel cut off from their officers whom they claim they hardly ever see. (Questionnaire of P/W captured by a U.S. Army Corps during the period 22 Dec - 21 Jan revealed that about one-half the amount of officers expected were encountered. Although these results may merely reflect a purely local situation, they seem to indicate that the reports of P/W are justified to some degree).

It is of course obvious that these difficulties are common to all armies, and that P/W are likely to stress them. There is no question that service conditions in the German army will continue to deteriorate until ultimate defeat. No amount of deterioration of conditions is likely of itself to cause a breakdown of the Wehrmacht. The stage is set but only military difficulties caused by our progress will give the coup de grace. It is interesting to note that even after the failure of the Hunsdorf counter-attack, no startling increase in desertion of German soldiers because of the difficulties of service conditions has been encountered. This is even the case on sectors where through German withdrawals there are increased opportunities for desertion. A recent study of the desertions of 17 P/W indicated that ideological reasons still needed to bring about desertion. Most of these desertions were not simply "cross the lines" desertions but the result of long premeditated plans, which frequently involved assistance from civilians. However, there is some evidence that more desertions are being caused by the threat of court martial for such crimes as AWOL, failure to obey orders and infractions of military law not based on apparent ideological grounds.

The most positive reaction generated among German soldiers six years of is simply a powerful desire to return to what is left of their families and homes. It might therefore be expected that the thought of the shortest way home is through Anglo-American P/W Camps might stimulate desertion or at least token resistance, short of actually being overhauled. But now with the shifting the battle to German soil, the question arises whether the German soldier actually thinks that the Anglo-American P/W Camp is the shortest way home. Accurate information on this subject is difficult to obtain. In general, most soldiers have no fixed ideas on the subject, but of a limited number of P/W questioned on this point, many seem to believe that when the war is over those left in the German army will return home directly, as was the case the demobilization of the last war. The threat of conscription of labor in defeated Germany, they believe will come only after demobilization. Those who have definite ideas on the subject seem to feel that captivity is a direct route to forced labor and an even longer separation from their families. Anti-Nazi P/W hope for differential treatment in many cases. It has never occurred to most that those who remain in the Wehrmacht at the end of hostilities might possibly be interned and as a result there is little stimulus now to desert or surrender for that particular reason.

3. FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE

(a) Description of Prisoners Interrogated

A group of 48 P/W captured between the 1 and 15 January were interrogated on their reactions to the Free Germany Committee. Although such

a small group cannot be termed representative, these Pz/W did not possess any striking peculiarities. All ranks were included. From the point of view of age, the group was composed mainly of those under 25 and those over 30.

Although about half of the Pz/W had heard of the Free Germany Committee, or its leaders, Von Paulus and Seydlitz, only about one-third of them knew anything of the "Free Germany's" propaganda or its intentions. In fact about 10% had only slight knowledge, while the remaining 20% were rather fully informed about the movement.

(b) Contact with Free Germany Propaganda

Detailed questioning on the manner in which the Pz/W heard of the Free Germany Movement reveals strikingly the extent to which this device of Russian political propaganda has become a subject of conversation in the Wehrmacht. Service on the Russian front was quite sharply related to knowledge of the Free Germany Committee on the part of the Pz/W interrogated. All but four of the Pz/W who had served on the Russian front had heard of the Free Germany Committee. Almost half of the Pz/W who knew about the Committee learned of it through conversations with their comrades; five read about the Committee in leaflets on the Russian front and one heard about it on the radio.

Some of those who heard about it through conversations reported that they frequently discussed the Free Germany Committee with civilians while on leave. While others employed phrases which suggested even wider interest in the Committee: "we are all German bastards" (It is known generally). It is interesting to note that two Pz/W had learned of the Committee through attacks on it in official Nazi sources.

(c) No Knowledge of "Free Germany"

Those who had no knowledge of the Committee were either young lads under the age of 25 who came mainly from rural areas or were recently mobilized, older men over 30, who were particularly unpolitical in their outlook. Two professional soldiers were only mildly Nazi but extremely nationalistic and still believed in the Wehrmacht. They also claimed to have no knowledge of the Free Germany Committee. Their statements, however, indicated not so much simple ignorance, but rather a solidified avoidance of political discussion.

(d) Reasons for Support

The limited amount of opinion given knowledge of the Committee can be seen in the fact that of the 26 Pz/W who knew of its existence and its goals, only two felt confident enough to express approval to American interrogators. Both were men over 40 years of age with long records in Communist Party activity. Their statements mirrored a genuine conviction that the war was pointless as well as lost and the program of the Free Germany Committee a veritable alternative.

Four other Pz/W expressed some vague measure of acceptance of the Committee, in the main, because they felt it was an effort to bring to an end a lost war. Their allegiance to the Free Germany Committee could be summed up by the statement of one who said Von Seydlitz certainly is not a traitor; but one must wait and see how the whole matter will turn out since we do not know to what extent the Russians are merely using him for propaganda. One particularly alert student, aged 25, a Volksdeutsche from Rumania, who considered himself a Rumanian rather than a German, reported that he had heard many discussions on the Free Germany Committee while studying chemistry in Banich. From his discussions he found that the young Germans who spoke of the Committee had few fixed ideas about it, but many older men were sympathetic with it since it meant the end of the war, and that was their main wish. This did not mean, he added, that these people would do anything to bring about the end of the war. However, many of them would certainly support a new German Government formed by the Free Germany Committee after the occupation.

The six Ps/W who had definite opinions in opposing the Free Germany Committee and its leaders, whom they named simply as traitors, were typical Nazi hard core of the Wehrmacht. Their knowledge of the aims of the Committee were exceedingly comprehensive and they articulated in great detail counter arguments.

About one-half who heard of the Committee had no precise opinions on the subject. These were mainly young soldiers under the age of 25 who were alert enough to have come in contact with the subject, but still lacking in political responsibility as not to dare to venture an opinion. There were five men over 30, fairly well informed on the aims of Free Germany whose main interest in personal economic security was so strong that they felt it meant little whether it was Seydlitz or Hitler; the main thing was peace and order for them.

(f) Conclusion

These PW interrogations indicate that although the existence of the Free Germany Committee is quite well known in the Wehrmacht, only the isolated former Communist party members openly accept its program. Most Ps/W performing their role as Kleiner Mann (small man) view the movement and its aims with general apathy. However, among some of the older informed Ps/W there is a certain, almost passive, receptivity simply based on the fact that the Committee stands for the termination of hostilities.

4. Propaganda to the Wehrmacht

(a) Allied Leaflets

The number of recent Ps/W who have current Anglo-American leaflets remains relatively constant. A difficulty reported by the 87 Combat Team on the First US Army has been inclement weather and heavy snowfall which make the discovery of leaflets more difficult. Another difficulty has been the continuous shifting and steady arrival of new troops. Nevertheless, tabulation reports that of a group of about 100 Ps/W captured during month of January, about 20 percent had seen leaflets during the last three or four weeks. The cumulative exposure to Anglo-American leaflets is better shown in a First US Army survey of 60 Ps/W which reports that about 50 percent of the Ps/W profess having seen leaflets at some time on the Western front.

(b) German Efforts

In addition to the above mentioned line by Front und Heimat and NSFO to counter criticism of the Rundstedt offensive, the German forces have been reassured that children evacuation in the East has been successful. A newly found leaflet explains Allied policy in keeping German Ps/W in France as due to the fact that these prisoners are needed to build up supply lines since German soldiers are still blocking some Channel ports while other ports have been destroyed by V weapons. Moreover, the way to Siberia is shorter from France than from America.

M. J. Gurfain
M. J. GURFAIN,
Lt Col, AUS,
Chief, Intelligence Section
for
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

14.

Distribution:

General McClure
Colonel Kehn
Mr Jackson
Mr Crossman
Major Minary
Major Naples
Major Fuhr
Lt Cmdr. Molochian
Mr Krassig
Major Herz
Lt Magary
Lt Rosenberg
Intelligence (3)
Plans & Directives (2)
Leaflets

Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAFF (Main)
Political Advisors, SHAFF (2)
Political Officers, SHAFF (2)
AO of S, A-2, SHAFF (Mr) S/L Ormonde (2)
SHAFF (Main) G-2
" " G-2, CIO, Security Section
" " G-3
" " G-4
" " G-5 (6)
P & D, 6 A.G. (6)
P & D, 12 A.G. (6)
P & D, 72 A.G. (6)
CDS, Mr Schlesinger (3)
CPI, Paris (2)
Radio Luxembourg (3)
Major O'Brien, P.D., Intelligence (Rear)
For further distribution in London.

3 February, 1947

25.530T

7. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS

12. In discussing the draft directive, the following points were brought out:

10. It is necessary to avoid a too severe treatment of moves of military operations on the Western Front. Public Relations Division points out that their criticism at this subject was governed by US Army Group policy, which had not selectively recommended that such moves should be severely localized, with stresses on destruction of terrain and weather. It was further noted that it had been decided against calling these operations a "major offensive" in official command ques-

He stopped around 11:30 AM to return to his Service and the OSI in the PM. [PM] was in contact with the American group of 5-6 EIC judges on the weekend of Aug. 1978. This is particularly true of RSC Hans Feibach, which is widely heard in areas covered by RSC Foreign Service, OSI and Intelligence Division. He has been in contact with RSC and has requested more information available to RSC, also specifically the American judges involved in giving critical assistance to EIC, whose judgments were presented to the major commercial law negotiations, and the OSI. He has only two more judgments should be submitted to the Ministry of Information for transmission to RSC and to the Office of War Information for transmission to the OSI. He is in contact with the American judges.

5. The Chairman did not think that refugees who had been told of the German failure in the defense of Moscow, Berlin and were sent to a neighboring nation, being prepared by 5-8 and 11-13 but that the SWP's Committee was interested which took steps of the overall security of this nation. It was agreed that this study should make the point that the Soviet displacement was shifted to the Eastern Front which was

hatted people, due to our address, which showed unequivocally that we were not in a fashionable area.

3. It was stated that in implementing para 9. d. of the draft directive, there should be no effort to present conditions in skilled-occupied Germany as a land of roses; it should rather be stressed that conditions there were tough, but not nearly as difficult as conditions in those areas that Germany continued to fight.

2. The draft agreement is subject to, subject to approval of the Board of Directors of the Company.

It was decided that no such instructions would govern a negoti-

Mr. HUGHES, JR., PHOENIX.

2. The following points were a further discussion of the
 subject matter of the above in the course of the

as Braxton are considered to be much more important
as a weapon designed to inflict injury and to create a foundation
for more successful rebellion than as an agent for
happily physical destruction.

By YACOV to no objection to the neglect of
in small quantities, and, [redacted] victims of terrorism coupled
with psychological warfare. It is considered that in view of
para 10, [redacted] should, not be used as a major weapon,
is automatically rejected by SOI, but should be used in a
minor fashion as to [redacted] on the part of an enemy. The
destruction of [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] of this [redacted]
For a minor operation.

It was noted that the various foreign governments have nationalities; affected right will be notified. It was stated that the United States will notify only the Secretary of State, who will raise no objection to the use of the word "provided they are notified in advance. Other governments will not be so regarded. The proposed amendment of the United Nations Charter, the great objectives which would be properly urged by the various governments is 82,750,000 was used as a prior weapon.

2a. It was agreed that U-3 should inform both of the proposed use of [redacted] and [redacted] thinking with other [redacted] objectives.

7. It was agreed that the work may be dealt with under name would be to bring the list suggested in the foregoing meeting (24/3/44) ~~into~~ ^{into} effect. Staff should take account of such work as far as possible in their organization of the day.

On Map of Brown Berets in 1968 regarding:

1. It was agreed that this subject should be considered at the Deputy Chief of Staff Meeting, January, 3 following.

I. Announcement to German soldiers that they would all become prisoners of War at the end of hostilities.

1. It was decided to make no such announcement, since its effects could be unpredictable and might easily be very harmful.
2. The EWD proposal to issue a special instruction to German railway workers under CHURCH conditions as a message from STAFF (but not as a Voice of STAFF or Voice of Military Government) at a time given by Air Staff, was agreed to.

II. Completion of radio sets from German civilians in occupied areas

1. The EWD draft of a cable stating STAFF policy on this subject, to be sent to the Army Groups by the Adjutant General, was revised and agreed to.

ROBERT A. McCLURE,
Brig. General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Div.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

PWP 385

9 February, 1945.

DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION
WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

1. Discussion.

We must keep in mind that the picture of the war in the immediate future will be of spectacular developments on the East and of unspectacular Allied advances on the West. Later on we can expect more spectacular developments on the West. This will probably not occur before we have crossed the Rhine in force.

There is a very natural desire in the present circumstances to attempt to counter-balance the news from the East by blowing up in propaganda our unspectacular successes. It should be realized, however, that an attempt to do this will deceive no one, and its net effect will be to accentuate the contrast between developments in the East and on the West.

In the same way, there is a natural tendency to believe that propaganda, in view of developments in the East, can be employed immediately and effectively against German soldiers and civilians in the West in order to make them act as we require. There is little ground for this assumption. Propaganda by us to Germans in the West will only be effective if and when it accompanies demonstrably successful action. Local successes can be exploited only in tactical propaganda.

2. Phasing of Psychological Warfare Campaign.

For the above reasons it has been decided to divide the psychological warfare campaign into two phases; (a) that which accompanies our unspectacular advance into and through the western defenses of Germany and (b) that which exploits the crossing of the Rhine in force. It is possible that some unforeseen development other than the crossing of the Rhine may justify the switch to phase II. In this case, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. will issue a special directive.

3. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase I.

- a. No attempt should be made artificially to counter-balance the news from the East by propaganda from the West. But continue to link Russian successes with failure of Rundstedt's offensive.
- b. The news of the assault on the western defenses of Germany should be given soberly with an artificial build-up. The difficulty of the terrain and the strength of the defenses should be deliberately stressed.
- c. During this phase, in reporting the air war, we should avoid committing ourselves to cutting off the German armies West of the Rhine by destruction of the Rhine bridges.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- d. News of life under Allied Military Government should be given even more play than hitherto, but strictly within the policy directives previously issued. There should be an increase of quantity but no change of tone. In connection with this there the standard quotations from Roosevelt and Churchill on the fate of Germany given in Annex A to the Guidance Notes of January 27, 1945 should be constantly repeated.
 - e. Any policy decisions on the post-war fate of Germany published after the conference of the Big Three, will naturally be employed to increase the effectiveness of d. above.
 - f. No campaign of special instructions to German civilians, to foreign workers will be begun during this Phase. The only exception will be a special advice to German railwaymen and foreign worker railwaymen which may be issued at a time to be decided by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
4. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase II.
- a. The deliberate lull in psychological warfare there... concerning our Western offensive maintained during Phase I will be dramatically broken on the first day of Phase II. The opening of this Phase will be clearly marked by a dramatic communique or Eisenhower Order of the Day. The timing of Phase II will be the responsibility of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
 - b. The release of the communique will give the signal for a new instruction to all civilians in Western Germany and for a series of special instructions and advice to German peasants, doctors, policemen, to be transmitted by radio and leaflet. Drafts of these are now being submitted to the relevant staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
 - c. The anti-evacuation campaign will be sharply intensified and extended to Germans and foreign workers in areas east of the Rhine.
 - d. Propaganda to German soldiers will in suitable circumstances switch from advice to surrender to orders to surrender on the pattern of ZG-194, the order by the Supreme Commander which has already been approved by Chief of Staff.
 - e. News on life under Military Government and the use of the Roosevelt-Churchill quotations will be maintained in Phase I.

ROBERT A. MACHURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

OFFICERS ONLY

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

SECRET/17249/7/Cps(C)
GCT/091.412-9/Cps(C)

2 February, 1946

SUBJECT : ■ ■ ■ Breaking the ■ ■ ■ Will to Resist

TO : ■ ■ ■ S, G-2,
Chief, RV Division,
Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, C-3,
Political Officer (Br),
Political Officer (US).

1. Reference the plan on the above subject forwarded by General
Ismy (copy ■ ■ ■ for Colonel Ald).

■ ■ ■ There will be a meeting under the chairmanship of ■ ■ ■ Deputy
Chief of Staff in Room 29, Trinson Palace on 3 February ■ ■ ■ 1430 hours.
Addressees ■ ■ ■ requested to attend.

24
3. An agenda is attached as Appendix A.

J.F.M. CHUTELEY,
Major-General, GS,
DAS ■ ■ ■ S, G-3.

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of

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OFFICERS ONLY

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX A
to SECRET/17249/7/0 (C)
to SECRET/091.412-2/0 (C)
dated 2 February, 1944

SUBJECT: Methods of Breaking German Will to —
Directions Required for Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart.

AGENDA

1. TIMING OF THE PROPOSED PLANS

a. Plans effective in themselves (see paragraph 3 of the paper) should therefore be related to forthcoming offensives. What date shall they be?

b. Assuming that all the proposed plans are capable of building up to a moment of climax, shall all the plans have the same moment of climax?

c. Do we require that any of the plans shall have particular either or some foreseeable time? Or, alternatively, we allow all the plans to begin and, judging from time to time they are building up, direct Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart as to timing requirements?

d. Superimposing 'ASPIDISTRA', 'MATCHBOX' 'BRADDOCK II'.

2. CONTROL

a. General Ismay states the responsible Departments Agencies in the have been instructed to proceed to implement the proposals. He suggests that Sir obtain direction for coordination through General McClure. Is this agreed?

3. Agree the desirability of 'SECRETITE' Plan.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

SHAEF/17149/7/Ops(C)
GCT DB1.412-9/Ops(C)

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] of Breaking [REDACTED] German Will to Resist

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff

I - DISCUSSION

1. The plan requested in our SCAP 134 (TAB A) has [REDACTED] received from General Lemay who states that it has been accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (TAB B).

2. The plan itself (TAB C) contains various proposals in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 which are [REDACTED] be worked on a background of propaganda mentioned in paragraph 7 [REDACTED] A and B.

3. In view of the fact that the Departments [REDACTED] Agencies in the UNITED KINGDOM have been ordered to proceed to implement the plan, [REDACTED] following decisions are required:

a. Timing

b. Method of control by Supreme Headquarters.

4. It is thought that these decisions can but be made in conference and it is requested that you hold a meeting attended by [REDACTED] of S, G-2 and G-3, Chief of PW Division and Colonel Wild and Political Officers.

II - RECOMMENDATION

5. That [REDACTED] letter at TAB D [REDACTED] approved.

J. F. M. WHITEBLY,
Major General, GS
DAC of S, G-3

b 653

13B

1 February 1945

1. Reference Agenda for PW Policy Meeting, Thursday, February 1st at 1530 hrs., para 1 (b).

2. (a) A report has been received from PW Officers, 9th U.S. Army that, by order of the local AG Officer, civilian wireless receiving sets at Karlsruhe have been confiscated. No reason is given.

(b) Such confiscation is contrary to the very basis of our operations. It is essential that German civilians should listen to our radio program and to wireless order and instructions. To prevent them from listening to Radio Moscow, etc., is such like forbidding them to read our newspapers or newspapers.

(c) AG Law 76, Art. 11, para. 5 reads: "All wireless communication sets, such as pigeons and other privately owned means of communication, will be surrendered against receipt, in accordance with notices published by AG in each locality." This law thus specifically refers to transmission and not to receiving sets.

(d) There may have been some reason for confiscation which has not emerged, but to justify such a course the reason would have to be substantial. Confiscation of this nature would not only disrupt PW operations, but create a serious army discipline problem.

(e) It is possible that the local AG officer misinterpreted the AG Law quoted above as including receiving sets. If so, this instruction should be directed to avoid such a misinterpretation.

3. Recommendation: That the attached draft policy be approved by AG to Army Groups.

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TO : AG
1201 AG
21st AG

IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT INHABITANTS OF OCCUPIED AREAS OF GERMANY HAVE IN SOME CASES BEEN ORDERED TO TURN IN THEIR PRIVATELY OWNED RADIO SETS TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT LAW SEVENTY SIX ARTICLE TWO PARAGRAPH FIVE DOES NOT REQUIRE SUCH CONFISCATION IN ALLIED BROADCASTING STATIONS SUCH AS BBC OR ARSIE AND RADIO LUXEMBOURG ARE EMPLOYED IN URGENTLY IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SUPREME COMMANDER AND IN TRANSMITTING WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IN AVOIDING MISUSE AND SUBVERSION AND IN OPERATING FALSIFIED OR FORGED GERMANY NEWS SOURCES IN AVAILABILITY OF SUCH SETS ALSO GIVES COMMANDER A MEANS OF DISSEMINATING ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS PROMPTLY AS IT IS CONSIDERED THAT CONFISCATION OF RADIO SETS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A THREAT TO THE POWER OF GERMANY PROHIBITION IN LOCAL ORDINANCES SHOULD BE ISSUED THAT ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST LOCAL MILITARY NEEDS BEFORE CONFISCATION OF SUCH SETS IS ORDERED IN SHORT POLICY IS TO CONFISCATE SUCH SETS ONLY IN CASE OF UNUSUAL MILITARY NEEDS THAT REQUIRE INSTRUCTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO BE RECEIVED BY MILITARY USE OF THE ORDERS IN AUTHORITY FOR CONFISCATION SUCH CONFISCATION SHOULD NOT BE DELEGATED BELOW DIVISION

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PWP 585

1 February 1945

DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONNECTION
WITH OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE WEST

1. Discussion

It is assumed that:

(a) in the First and Third Army sector our advance will be slow and unspectacular until we get through the mountains and can deploy in the easier country beyond.

(b) in the British sector, nothing more than the clearing of the country west of the Rhine can be expected before the First and Third Armies get through the mountains.

(c) the Sixth Panzer Army is on its way to Russia. The Fifth Panzer Army will probably be held, at least in part, as a strategic reserve in the West.

In view of the above considerations we must keep in mind that the picture of the war in the immediate future will be of spectacular developments on the East and of unspectacular Allied advances on the West. On the other hand, once the First and Third Armies have broken through the mountains and reached the plain west of the Rhine; or alternatively, once 21st Army Group has cleared the ground west of the Rhine and established bridgeheads across it, we can expect spectacular developments on the West at least equal to those on the East.


There is a very natural desire in the present circumstances to attempt to counter-balance the news from the East by blowing up in propaganda our unspectacular successes. It should be realized, however, that an attempt to do this will deceive no one, and its net effect will be to accentuate the contrast between developments in the East and on the West.

In the same way there is a natural tendency to believe that propaganda, in view of developments in the East can be employed immediately and effectively against German soldiers and civilians in the West in order to make them act as we require. There is little ground for this assumption. Propaganda by us to Germans in the West will only be effective if and when it accompanies demonstrably successful action. Local successes can be exploited only in tactical propaganda.

Phasing of Psychological Warfare Campaign

For the above reasons it has been decided to divide the psychological warfare campaign into two phases, (a) that which accompanies our unspectacular advance into and through the western defenses of Germany. (b) that which exploits the demonstrable fact that we have broken through the western defenses, and are on the move.

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The model for such phasing of psychological warfare was given in the battle of Alamein. The dramatic effect of the final communique announcing the rout of Rommel was immediately appreciated by the fact that it was preceded by many days of minor communications reporting the British victory, the blue-sky situation, and the capture of the German tank. The final communique, with a forecast of triumph, was only to be followed by a long series of communications reporting local successes, - this effect would have been greatly reduced.

3.5. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase I

- (a) No attempt should be made artificially to counter-balance the news from the East by propaganda from the West.
- (b) The news of the assault on the western defenses of Germany should be given exactly with no artificial bias. The difficulty of the terrain and the strength of the defenses should be realistically described.
- (c) During this period, in reporting the air war, we should avoid committing ourselves to cutting off the German supply East of the Rhine by destruction of the Rhine bridges. This theme should be left for use, if suitable, in Phase II.
- (d) News of life under Allied Military Government should be given when and play their allotted, but strictly within the policy directives previously issued. There should be an increase of quantity but no change of tone. In connection with this theme, a statement published from Roosevelt and Churchill on the radio of January 27, 1945, should be constantly repeated.
- (e) Any policy decisions on the post-war fate of Germany published after the conference of the Big Three, this naturally is intended to increase the effectiveness of (d) above.
- (f) No campaign of special instructions to German civilians, or to foreign workers will be begun during this phase. The only exception will be the advice to German civilians and foreign workers to be issued in connection with ELARION, if ELARION occurs at this period.

3.6. Directive for Psychological Warfare in Phase II

- (a) The deliberate halt in psychological warfare maintained during Phase I will be dramatically broken on the first day of Phase II.

It will be of the greatest advantage if the opening of this phase can be clearly marked by a communique which includes the statement that the new phase through the winter, the timing of the opening of Phase II will be the responsibility of G-2 SHARP.

April 2.

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- (b) The release of the communique will give the signal for a new instruction to all civilians in German Germany and for a series of special instructions and advice to German prisoners, workers, politicians, to be transmitted by radio and leaflet. Orders of these are now being submitted to the relevant staff divisions of SHARP.

- (c) The anti-evacuation campaign will be sharply intensified and extended to Germans and foreign workers in the East of the Rhine.

- (d) Propaganda to German soldiers will in suitable circumstances switch from advice to surrender to orders to surrender on the basis of the offer by the German Government which has already been approved by Chief of Staff.

- (e) News on life under Military Government and the use of the "Hamburg/Churchill" quotations will be maintained at the Phase I.

The above directives concern exclusively "white" radio and leaflets. A special directive will be issued on "black" and "grey" radio and leaflets.

* * * * *

General Principles

CHG1/JS



TO: Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
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The Chief, Public Relations Division, " "
The Political Advisor (U.S.), " "
The Political Advisor (Fr.), " "

- a. Current Psychological Warfare Problems.
- b. Confiscation of radio sets from German civilians in occupied areas.



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DRAFT

29 January 1945

Current Psychological Warfare Problems

1. Exploitation Russian Offensive. At present this is being done by maximum distribution straight news in the leaflet newspapers and in special tactical leaflets. Radio Coteis and the related German Troop Newspaper is elaborating on the news in their usual style. The central theme is "the last effort on the West petered out, then came the smash from the East".

After considering that further exploitation is possible in the period before the conference of the Big Three, FWD puts forward the following questions:

(a) Should any official warning be issued by SCAEF to the Germans on the treatment of our i.Ws in areas threatened by the Russian advance? *Ad*

(b) Should any instructions be given to foreign workers designed to heighten the war of nerves? In the view of FWD this is probably too difficult and we should be wise to limit ourselves to advice to foreign workers in our own theatre of operations. *Adendum*

(c) Should not Bradlocks be employed now regularly in small quantities? They could be carried by the special leaflet Squadron, replacing not bombs but leaflets, as well as by R.A.F.

In view of FWD their chance of success in straining administration and heartening foreign workers grown with each new report of a sensational Russian success. Radio Coteis could heighten their effect by colorful reporting of the fires it saw them cause.

N.B. Hard evidence has now been made available to G-3 on German anxiety about Bradlocks, caused by their only prior use.

(d) What propaganda use, if any, should be made of German withdrawals from the West to the East. At present FWD has banned any reference to the subject. It must be realized however that sooner or later the Russians will break the news. *X*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Approved
by
[Signature]
[Date]

[Signature]
[Date]

1-2-45

In the absence of Allied activity in the West, it is felt that little more can be done than reporting Russian successes, reporting repeatedly the Roosevelt statement of October, and the recent Churchill statement on unconditional surrender, and linking the Russian offensive as closely as possible with the defeat of Rundstedt's counter-offensive in the West.

2. Propaganda Preparations for Western Offensive Action. It remains to be considered what propaganda softening up is possible to prepare for and assist major offensive action in the West, other than and additional to any statement released after the imminent conference of the Big Three.

FWD advises:

a. that no advice or instructions be issued either to foreign workers or to German civilians except and unless accompanied by offensive action.

Particularly at the present moment, when the Russians are doing all the action, it seems unusually important to avoid the impression that we merely talk and instruct while the Russians act.

b. On the other hand, the proposal contained in Clause II of the British Chief of Staff's reply to the Supreme Commander's cable on the subject of "Methods of Breaking Down German Will to Resist" that another effort should be made to extract a helpful statement out of the German Generals in our hands, has much to commend it at this moment. It may well be considered whether an appeal by these Generals to von Rundstedt, copies of which could be showered on the German troops, might not prove an effective softener of morale.

c. It should also be considered whether the time has not come for a statement as to the status of German soldiers, not previously made prisoners of war, after the cessation of hostilities.

There is tendency for German soldiers to avoid surrender when they think the end of the war is near. They do this because they feel that if they are taken prisoner when the end is imminent

-3- ~~SECRET~~

all German soldiers in arms at the conclusion of hostilities would become prisoners of war, this incentive to avoid surrender would be removed.

3. If Operation "CLARION" occurs in the near future, it will provide an opportunity to release the special instruction to foreign workers working on the German railways and to German railway workers, which was approved in revised form some weeks ago. It is proposed to issue these two messages not as a Voice of SHAEF or of Military Government, but simply under the release line "the following message to railway workers has been issued tonight by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force."

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Y201 Peake
Y201 Burgess

29 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: ■■■■■ (PERSONAL)

SUBJECT: Methods of Breaking Down GERMAN Will to Resist.

1. Copy of ■■■■■ report by an Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert ■■■■■ Lookhart, together with a covering letter ■■■■■ General Ismay ■■■■■ the Chief of Staff, is forwarded ■■■■■ for information.
2. A copy has been sent to General Whitely for necessary action, ■■■■■ General MacLure, General Strong ■■■■■ Mr ■■■■■ information.
3. General Whitely has been asked to submit a report for the ■■■■■ of ■■■■■ Deputy ■■■■■ to how it is proposed to coordinate the implementation of the proposals contained ■■■■■ the attached paper.
4. It is assumed that ■■■■■ will be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming ■■■■■, although ■■■■■ report was received after the departure of representatives from this Headquarters.

CARTER L. BURGESS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

FOR RECORD

ALL MEMOS DELIVERED BY HAND OF OFFICER EXCEPT
GENERAL MEMOS WHICH WAS SENT S.O.R. 1200 29/1/45.

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X201 Review
X201 Runglen

29 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr RIGER (PERSONAL)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] of Breaking [REDACTED] GERMAN [REDACTED]
to Resist.

1. Copy [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] report by an Ad [REDACTED] Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, together with a covering letter from [REDACTED] Lenny addressed [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] of Staff, is [REDACTED] to you for information.

2. A copy [REDACTED] been sent to General Whitely for necessary action, and to General McClure, General Strong and Mr Peake for information.

[REDACTED] General Whitely has been asked to submit a report [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] of the Deputy Chief of Staff [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is proposed to coordinate the implementation of the proposals contained [REDACTED] the attached paper.

[REDACTED] It [REDACTED] [REDACTED] this matter will be [REDACTED] subject [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the forthcoming [REDACTED] conference, although this [REDACTED] [REDACTED] after the departure of representatives [REDACTED] Headquarters.

CARTER L. BURGESS,
Colonel, C.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, [REDACTED] Staff.

6 684

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: General [REDACTED] (PERSONAL)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Re: Breaking [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Will

- 29 June

CARTER L. [REDACTED],
Colonel, O.S.G.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

TOP SECRET

1201 Adair
1201 Bingham

29 January 1945

WHITLEY (PERSONAL)

SUBJECT: Methods of Breaking GERMAN Will to Resist.

1. Copy of the report by the Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, together with a covering letter from General Lacey addressed to the Chief of Staff, is forwarded to you for information.
2. Copies have been sent to General Strong, Major General Political Officers.
3. This report was sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff and you are asked to submit a report, for information, it is proposed to coordinate the implementation of proposals contained in the report.
4. It is assumed that this will be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming ORIENT conference, although the report was received after the departure of representatives from Headquarters.

HAROLD L. BURGESS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

6 686

TOP SECRET

1201 Adair
1201 Bingham

29 January 1945

WHITLEY (PERSONAL)

SUBJECT: Methods of Breaking GERMAN Will to Resist.

1. Copy of the report by the Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, together with a covering letter from General Lacey addressed to the Chief of Staff, is forwarded to you for information.
2. A copy has been sent to General Whitley for information, and to General Lockhart and the Political Officers for information.
3. General Whitley has been asked to submit a report for the information of the Deputy Chief of Staff as to how it is proposed to coordinate the implementation of the proposals contained in the attached report.
4. It is assumed that this will be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming ORIENT conference, although the report was received after the departure of representatives from Headquarters.

HAROLD L. BURGESS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

6 687

27 January 1945.

OFFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPLY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 18

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

The great question mark in regard to Germany and the Germans this week is the outcome of the present Russian drive in the East. Reports from Germany of the past few days have a tentative air about them, as though all measures are makeshift until it is clear whether, and if, the Red Army is going to stop. It is clear that the speed of the Russian advance has caught the home front psychologically unprepared. Whether the critical transport situation in the East can be solved, whether the Volksturm can be organized in time, whether sufficient equipment can be brought up, whether the people can be evacuated - all these and similar questions admit of no solution until an affirmative answer is given to the question "Have the Russians been stopped yet?" For the predominant feeling that seems to emerge is that so long as one says "No" to this question the answers to the other questions can hardly matter. It is within the context of this big question mark that we must read the news of the week from Germany, for any report written before the last 3 days must otherwise seem stale and a little irrelevant.

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Soldier and Civilian

The Russian advance has sharply again the question which was posed earlier by the Allied entry on to German soil in the West: what effect does the returning soldier have upon the morale of his civilian compatriot, and how does contact with civilians affect the soldier? The question is extremely complicated but several factors have become clear during the course of occupation in the West. Certain frictions between soldier and civilian were inevitable, particularly during the great Wehrmacht confusion in the early weeks of September - a period to which the German press attached the label "Flight of Hapenschwinn". Lost soldiers, remnants of units, groups of deserters, took over the small towns of Western Germany - and their heavy drinking, noisiness and vandalism caused considerable irritation to the civilians. Even as the Wehrmacht recovered its poise, the natural tendency of soldiers in uniform to push civilians around remained a source of friction. Although many individual soldiers assisted civilians to evade evacuation, the official authority of the Wehrmacht was on several occasions used to enforce it. Was this formal participation of the army in measures ordered by the Party was perhaps the sharpest focus of dissension. Despite all this, it was clear that civilians did not entirely blame their soldiers, and that the average German's sentimental affection toward the Wehrmacht remained approximately the same as the American's toward the G.I. or the Briton's toward the Tommy. Cases of irritation toward individual soldiers or small groups were frequently violent but scarcely was attached mainly to the officialdom of the Wehrmacht.

This feeling of community frequently led the civilians to urge the soldiers to stop resisting. It is difficult to say to what extent civilian encouragement led to actual desertion, but a good many deserters to this day continue to be found in civilian homes within the occupied Rhineland, and many prisoners have referred to the fact that they were encouraged by civilians to quit.

In the East, the situation differs from that which obtained in the West. The Russian advance eliminates, at the moment, the

TO: **CONFIDENTIAL**
By: *R. M. [illegible]*
Date: 16 JAN 1945

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Red Army slows down and regular contact between soldier and civilian becomes possible, the Silésians are not likely to react as did the Rhinelanders. For the latter are facing the hated Russians and dreaded Poles. Their fears of the occupying forces and their own guilt fears, for Nazism was strong in Silésia, will make them think twice before giving up or urging the soldiers to surrender. But even if the Silésians were inclined to urge soldiers to quit, they will probably not have the opportunity. Whereas Party attempts to control relations between soldiers and civilians in the West were largely a matter of Wehrmacht orders which could not be enforced, in the East the Party now has at its disposal the Volksturm, which is an excellent device for bringing civilians under the control of a few selected hard-core KDO's. And the indications this week are that the Party means to make full use of this device in Silésia. (See Part B of this Summary).

The Political Question

Any attempt to estimate political sentiment in occupied Germany must take careful account of two facts: that those who remained behind are the Rhineland non-Nazis and that the questions are being asked by men in Allied uniforms. So weighting in the appreciation of bare statistical results must derive from our knowledge of what the Germans think the Allies want to hear and, in no case, can the results be applied to Germany as a whole. With these cautions, and in view of the trends in individual interrogations, it can be said that the majority of Germans now living under Allied rule are "left-of-center" in their political sentiments. Three surveys, conducted at intervals of approximately one month, reveal this trend of political desires among the Germans in occupied areas. The surveys were not based on stratified sampling, but were purely random and hence make no pretense to be adequate samples of the community as a whole.

The first survey, conducted on 28 November among 66 people in the town of STOLPZ, showed a slight majority in favor of democratic government along the lines of the Weimar Republic. Most of the others favored some sort of democracy but not the symbol "Weimar". (Only 2 of the 66 interrogees mentioned any alternative - e.g., constitutional monarchy). Along the same lines, a large majority were in favor of a Rhineland independent of Prussia, the implication of "Prussia" being clearly militarism and autocracy. About half of this predominantly Catholic population expressed the desire that the Church remain completely apart from politics and that the Catholic Zentrum Party play a smaller role than it has so far under occupational authority.

A second survey, conducted among 43 German civilians in the VOGHT Internment Camp on 29 December, revealed a similar tendency. The line of questioning was here less sharply defined and for this reason it is perhaps more significant that slightly more than half of those questioned spoke clearly for a democratic type of post-war government. It is noteworthy that one-fourth, instead of speaking directly for a democratic German government insisted on the primary need for a strict post-war military government by the Allies. Reliance on the Allies has most frequently been linked with fear that democratic tendencies within Germany may not of themselves be strong enough to support a spontaneous native democracy. (In this survey, too, a lone monarchist made his inevitable appearance, this one even specifying Prince Louis Ferdinand as the monarch he desired).

The third, and most satisfactory survey, was conducted among 136 people in AACHEN on 15 January. Those surveyed were asked only one question and that very specific: how they would vote if there were elections with the same contending parties as before 1933. The replies were as follows:

39	Communists
62	Social Democrats
16	Christians
19	Volkspartei

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The prevailing attitude is clearly to the left, in the sense that 101 of the total votes went to the two Marxist parties. A breakdown by sexes reveals an interesting ratio among those voting for the Marxist parties: 83% women, 70% men. (Women, in the past, have been considered stronger Nazis than the men). This one is considerably firmer than the two earlier surveys, because the number of people included is much larger, and because conditions in MACHEN have become fairly settled during three months of efficient administration. MACHEN, being "big city" folk, would normally be expected to be more articulate on political questions than a random sample in GERMANY, or the regular denizens of an internment camp.

Even putting the results of all three surveys together, however, one is able to draw only two general conclusions:

- (1) That German propaganda has not succeeded in identifying Marxism with the Devil's coat in the average German mind. Germans have always known thoroughly respectable Social Democrats and even Communists in their home towns and the stigma of "Satanization" are therefore hard to stick. A little stigmatization applied to the man next door. (In regard to Russia, the attempt has been far more successful, but it is interesting to note in this connection that among prisoners and civilians who have been in Russia during the war GOEBBELS' program of identifying STALIN with Satan and Russia with Purgatory has largely broken down).
- (2) That the majority of people now in the occupied areas would, in an election conducted under Allied authority, probably vote for the left parties.

These conclusions cannot be extended beyond the occupied areas, however, because of the special conditions discussed in the first paragraph which attach to any survey made under present conditions. That interrogation of former Nazis and pro-Nazis and sympathetic non-Nazis within the interior of Germany is likely to reveal cannot be predicted from the present samples.

It is curious to note Herr GOEBBELS' version of the results of the STOLBERG survey which appeared in his Das Reich article of 12 January. Instead of a team of American surgeons and 50 people whom they met at random in the town, the affair became "a public opinion survey conducted by the American Gallup Institute to determine what the feeling was for a reintroduction of the Weimar Republic". "Das Reich" said Dr. GOEBBELS, "war fuer die Feindschaft umherstehend hinderschattend" (The results were really disastrous for the end). Despite the fact that "the Allies left no stone unturned to convince interrogated of the benefits of democracy, not even 5% favored such a course for Germany". The facts, as noted above, are that well over 50% actually expressed preference for a democratic form of government, and interrogators made no attempt to win converts to democracy, either of the Weimar or American pattern.

Wachener Nachrichten (The Aachen News)

The German counteroffensive in the WESTPHALIA revealed, among other things, the need for a regular Allied channel of information to the population under our authority. With the lack of electric current in many towns throughout the occupied area the people depend more heavily than elsewhere upon newspaper information. The Wachener Nachrichten of P & P, 12 A.C. did a gallant job of distribution during the counteroffensive and played a considerable role in forestalling the circulation of wild rumors concerning the success of German operations. Unfortunately, the attack was first announced on 15 December, the day Wachener Nachrichten appeared, and since the

paper is a weekly it was not until 25 December that the first issue containing authoritative news reached the nervous and unhappy Germans. The Aachener Nachrichten is the first German-managed, Allied-controlled newspaper in the occupied areas. A press control team has completed procurement and requisitioning activities, has secured the German personnel necessary to make a start in publishing the paper, and put its first issue on the street on 24 January.

Conceived as a weekly and priced at 20 pfennig, the paper will be welcome to the news-hungry German population. Some indication of popularity of German-language news is indicated by the small "black market" which a group of enterprising lads have set up in AACHEN with Die Mitteilungs. On 16 January these lads got hold of some 50 copies of the paper, which is distributed gratis by 12 A.G., and quickly peddled them off at 50 pfennigs a copy among the civilians who were happy to pay for the quicker service. It is likely that the Aachener Nachrichten will be issued as a bi-weekly as soon as printing facilities and personnel permit, and perhaps eventually as a daily.

The front page gives authoritative news of both European fronts and briefer accounts of the action at LUXEM and the Allied bombing of DUISBURG. A boxed announcement informs the population that the curfew hour has been advanced from 1/30 to 1800 hours. And the "feature" article on the page deals with the sentence of an umbrella-manufacturer and his wife to 9 months' imprisonment for hoarding food and concealing this from American authorities. Articles of this latter type are particularly welcome to A.G. officers, who have been faced with the difficult problem of disseminating information and are convinced that many violations of A.G. ordinances are due simply to ignorance on the part of the population. A letter from Major JONES, A.G. Commandant at AACHEN, is printed in the first issue and expresses a warm welcome to Aachener Nachrichten on behalf of the Military Government.

A. HENCKS, AACHEN

The Red Army's Advance

With the Russians occupying most of East Prussia, which has been cut off from the rest of the Reich, and the main industrial areas of Silesia, it is illuminating to note the commentaries of the leaders of German opinion. German propaganda has centered mainly upon the primary necessity of preventing panic. The authority of Clausewitz is called upon to assure the public that no battle is lost before it is finally ended. This line, negative as it is, is the dominating tone of the week's propaganda output. It is clearly admitted that a great emergency is at hand, even indicated that things are likely to be worse, and no attempt is made to minimize the potential threat. Reassurance mainly takes the form of trying to allay fears that the High Command has lost control, or that large-scale counter-measures have already been tried and have failed. BRENNER on 25 January admitted that things in the East hang in the balance but specifically denied that counter-measures on a final scale had yet been undertaken. He prepared the public for the loss of East Prussia and Upper Silesia by showing that these losses would take place before the planned German counter-measures could begin to be effective. East Prussia he referred to as a temporary bastion, but he made no mention of either new reserves or entrenchments upon which a major defensive operation would have to rely. The most striking thing in his address was its vagueness and the weakness of his assurances. The following day von RECK, speaking for HIMMLER, admitted less openly than BRENNER the unprecedented gravity of the situation, but his assurances were even weaker. He devoted considerable attention to the theme of "You'll be sorry" - maintaining that the Red Army's threat brought home finally to all other leaders what the German leaders had long known: that should the Reich's structure crumble its ruin would spread over the earth.

"We always know the deadly seriousness of this war. Now at last may the whole of mankind become aware of its deadly seriousness, and may those who have even a slight sense of responsibility ask themselves how much more the bread of peace must be soaked in blood before it may be eaten, for they must see and know that we Germans will never give up our freedom, our soil and our way of life".

The Russian advance affected even former German claims of the "strategic success" of the ARDENNES offensive. The line by last week had given up all attempts to claim von RUMPELT's counter-offensive as a genuine victory in any measure, contenting itself with assurances that it had been necessary to "disarrange" the Western Front before the Russians launched their "expected" drive in the East. In this, the German radio was saying last week, they had succeeded and were now in a position to turn their attention to "disarranging" the Red Army's front. By this time the line would look a little ridiculous and it has been dropped altogether. Only DITTMER, among the top commentators, dealt with the ARDENNES offensive at all, and he was both brief and unenthusiastic. DITTMER went even further, intimating that a new large-scale Allied attack in the West was in prospect. Listening to the radio this week could hardly have been a good way for a German to lift his morale.

The Transport Crisis and Evacuation

The Red Army's offensive aggravates still further the already critical position of German transport, particularly in the East. The dislocation of large sections of the Reich transport system, and the increased demands upon the remaining facilities, both rail and road, has already made itself felt in the daily life of many Germans. The system of inter-regional food distribution which ensured each part of the Reich's planned food supply through the exchange of surpluses for shortages has already, according to recent announcements of BODE, disintegrated in this manner, partially broken down. Another result, probably felt by Germans even more deeply than the lack of a balanced diet, has been the breakdown of the postal system. Cooperatively few families have been left completely untouched by the enormous displacement of persons within present-day Germany. Families have depended very largely upon letters to maintain contact with one another. Now comes a "total ban" on private letters and parcels, announced on 22 January. The ban is not, in fact, total, for field post and foreign letters are not affected by the ruling. And to soften the blow for purely civilian correspondence, post-cards and even letters are permitted to circulate between two towns with favorable transport conditions.

The first sentence of the announcement states the reason frankly:

"The whole machinery of the German Reichsbahn is needed to strengthen the German front in the East".

It is in the East, of course, that the lack of adequate transport facilities has now become literally a matter of life or death.

It is reported that NAUMANN of the Propaganda Ministry, in a speech at POSSEN, informed unhappy citizens of that town that they must "fall at their posts". The local newspaper, according to a Swedish report, announced that only invalids, children under 12 and oldsters over 60, and those unfit to fight, have "the right to leave" the town. All previous official evacuation orders have recently assumed that all males of Volksturm age (16-60) must stay behind. But this announcement makes two startling exceptions:

- (1) the age limit of children forced to remain is revised downward from 16 to 12,
- (2) families are included on the same basis as males.

This measure is very likely the result of the practical impossibility of organizing a full-scale evacuation, due equally to the shortage of transport and the rapidity of the Russian advance. It is unlikely that the order to remain will deter those who are able to escape from the town by private means. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 22 January said that great numbers of refugees have, in fact, already left East Prussia and Silesia, and this is confirmed by a Moscow report of 24 January which says that Russian aircraft have observed streams of refugees jamming the roads leading westward. Even the German Home Service has been broadcasting accounts of hasty evacuation in bitter cold. A typical broadcast, on 25 January, reported that in the preceding days some 300,000 people had left BRESLAU. The fortunate ones rode in open carts and lorries; but wherever transport was not sufficient women and children marched in columns to safety, thankful that the icy winds had abated somewhat. The best Front and Heimat could offer worried soldiers from the East in the way of reassurance was that "this German evacuation bears no resemblance to the French refugee flood of 1940". One settler from London has calculated that the number of refugees on the move probably considerably exceeds 3 million.

The Volksturm is Staggered

The lot of those Germans on the road or already evacuated to strange places is hard enough, but the gravest hardship, and the most significant test of the fighting morale of the German people, is that imposed upon the civilians mobilized into the Volksturm battalions of Eastern Germany. It has become clear during the past two months that the Volksturm has gone considerably beyond the comic opera level which characterized many aspects of its initial efforts. The series of orders issued by Martin BORMANN alone is some evidence of the party's intention to employ the Volksturm as a military formation wherever possible. BORMANN made it clear, three months ago, that the Volksturm was not to be regarded as just another Nazi Verein. To requests from the leaders of the Volksturm to be permitted to form their own Volksturm units, BORMANN replied that they be permitted to form their own Volksturm units. This is the most profound nonsense, a contradiction in terms, and a contradiction in the articulation and underlining of the Volksturm is a welding into one. On a less elevated level of personnel, policy BORMANN has directed that retired Generals and other officers are to be used in the Volksturm according to their training and capacity, and that he personally will be in each case when an officer of this type is called upon. On another occasion he ordered that, with the exception of priests at home, the induction of priests either into the Volksturm or the Volksturm was prohibited. In a specially "confidential" order by BORMANN, issued in agreement with "H.F.S.S. HILFEN" instructed all Volksturm commanders how to handle former criminal elements within their commands. The main thing was that criminals were to be given a fair chance and be treated like any other Volksturm soldier until they gave grounds for other treatment. The same order, even more significantly, dealt with the specific question of political "criminals" who were not to be treated with suspicion "simply because of previous convictions or their bad reputation".

Further evidence that the Volksturm has, in fact, been called up extensively in the eastern parts of Germany is contained in the German newspapers which daily announce the call-up of new units from one town or another. Whereas in the West no Volksturm unit larger than a battalion has yet been encountered, in East Prussia organization of the Volksturm on a regimental basis has been frequently reported, and it seems likely that the Volksturm has actually performed better on the Eastern front than it has done in the West. Although accounts of Volksturm heroism in the East are probably exaggerated, the special conditions which harden the morale of people in that area are indicated in these sentences from a speech by a

CORRECTION

**THIS DOCUMENT
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**

This measure is very likely the result of the practical impossibility of organizing a full-scale evacuation, due equally to the shortage of transport and the rapidity of the Russian advance. It is unlikely that the order to remain will deter those who are able to escape from the town by private means. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 22 January said that great numbers of refugees have, in fact, already left East Prussia and Silesia, and this is confirmed by a Moscow report of 24 January which says that Russian aircraft have observed streams of refugees jamming the roads leading westward. Even the German Home Service has been broadcasting accounts of hasty evacuation in bitter cold. A typical broadcast, on 25 January, reported that in the preceding days some 300,000 people had left BRESLAU. The fortunate ones rode in open carts and lorries; but wherever transport was not sufficient women and children marched in columns to safety, thankful that the icy winds had abated somewhat. The best Front und Heist could offer worried soldiers from the East in the way of reassurance was that "this German evacuation bears no resemblance to the French refugee flood of 1940". One estimate from London has calculated that the number of refugees on the move probably considerably exceeds 3 million.

The Volksturm is Summoned

The lot of those Germans on the road or already evacuated to strange places is hard enough, but the greatest hardship, and the most significant test of the fighting morale of the German people, is that imposed upon the civilians mobilized into the Volksturm battalions of Eastern Germany. It has become clear during the past two months that the Volksturm has gone considerably beyond the comic opera level which characterized many aspects of its initial efforts. The series of orders issued by Martin BORMANN alone is some evidence of the Party's intention to employ the Volksturm as a military formation wherever possible. BORMANN made it clear, three months ago, that the Volksturm was not to be regarded as just another Nazi Verein. To requests from the leaders of various organizations that they be permitted to form their own Volksturm units he replied: "A baker's Volksturm is nonsense, a contradiction in terms... The Volksturm is the most profound articulation and underlining of German unity... The Volksturm is a welding into one". On a less elevated but more practical level of personnel policy BORMANN has directed his Gauleiters that all retired Generals and other officers are to be used in the Volksturm according to their training and capacity, and that he personally is to be informed in each case when an officer of this type is denied a position of command. On another occasion he ordered that, due to the shortage of priests at home, the induction of priests either into the Wehrmacht or the Volksturm was prohibited. An especially "considerate" order by BORMANN, issued in agreement with "H.F.S.S. Hitler" instructed all Volksturm commanders how to handle former criminal elements within their command. The main thing was that criminals were to be given a fair chance and be treated like any other Volksturm soldier until they gave grounds for other treatment. The same order, even more significantly, dealt with the specific question of political "criminals" who were not to be treated with suspicion "simply because of previous convictions or their bad reputation".

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Abstract

I GENERAL

THE OFFICERS of the Russian drive on the heels of German troops fighting in the East has not yet been reported. Interceptions of Luftwaffe on the first and last Luftwaffe flights during the first days of the Russian offensive show the German aircraft have been shot down. But this is only a part of the extent of the tactical implications of the drive. The first reported reports of Luftwaffe who knew about the offensive before it was launched, provide in fact for generalization, but without any basis of reaction. Some of these Luftwaffe admitted that the end was only a matter of weeks. It was obvious to me 30 years ago as a professional pilot, that Germany can not any longer hold off the inevitable. As the Luftwaffe will look ridiculous from the Eastern front, the Germans will break through. I am extremely proud of our soldiers and our Air Force. The drive and it showed that the German front could be shattered. Luftwaffe already in an allied commander and was informed of the Russian drive rather in the East to believe the facts of the Russian successes was left to them by interceptors. Does the German Air Force really sufficient to desperate the situation as we have seen? Germany's economic and the drive of the German aircraft in the threatened areas. And very a good still spoke seriously and pragmatic reality of the necessity for continuing flight to the very end.

In the meantime, the Germans continue their systematic infiltration in the Andean sector. The 1st Bolivian Corps, operating on this front, reports on 20 May 1965 that the guerrillas are due to the steady retreat and to the increasing intensity of military harassment. Experienced officers and men complain after capture of the lack of information about the tactics of the subversion. Some incidents of guerrillas being lost because of higher headquarters' lack of information are being lost responsibility. Losses continue to be high, and many of the counter-attacks which have been carried out have resulted in the destruction of entire units. However, no reports are circulating at this time of military setbacks or intensity in the continuing a high percentage of volunteers who are conscientiously training.

German troops difficulties, waste and dissipation of the troops in the last summer was enough to make possible effective withdrawals. The feeling of the German high command and officers against retreat in large measure only the tactical situation in which they find themselves. But each commander in Berlin believed for the German High Command has again developed its abilities to retreat with success.

In the absence of a general order to surrender, which seems most unlikely, the signs of actual collapse, which most officers of broken formations are likely to find in an individual in the position of broken resistance are detectors, the surrender of one soldier, or even the death of an officer, and a rising tendency to retreat. These signs are the assumption that the war will be over soon. During the period of the German general retreat France did not push back the broken units. This policy was probably intended to have developed to some extent, especially in the case of units which have been overrun or directly thrusted back to the Allied forces. It will be usually to seek to bring about a general retreat. But looking by most signs of their retreat, however it is actually, German soldiers will not give up the fight with any real expediency, until a complete surrender has been made and their lives and equipment are saved or threatened.

on the South U.S. Army front, the lack of any widespread military activity has kept morale relatively unchanged. Reports speak of some attempts to recruit the mass of the poor peasants in counter-attacks of the fronts of the lack of a consistent program. In the Americas, no special reports have been received on P/R taken on the Atlantic fronts.

II OFFICER MORALE

For the first time since the beginning of the Rundstedt offensive, reports of bad leadership, in the form of inexperienced officers, and even cases of cowardice are being encountered with some frequency. The typical story is that of officers who, while exhorting their men to fight to the last bullet, removed themselves to rear at the first opportunity. It still appears nevertheless that these stories of cowardly behaviour of officers deal with isolated cases, insufficient to indicate any serious misconduct by junior officers, even general dissatisfaction with their conduct on the part of the Landsor.

Interrogations of many junior officers captured recently in the Ardennes, indicate that among them the feeling that time is on the side of Germany, is still strong and elaborately articulated. The Rundstedt offensive is viewed in that light. One captain, a regular army officer of Prussian family, summarised his position in a fashion typical of many other junior officers. For him the offensive was a complete success. Time works in the favor of Germany and he is convinced that if only the Allies do not finish off Germany too quickly, the Germans will mass forces for bigger and more powerful counter-attacks. The present German government will fight it out to the bitter end regardless of the consequences. He criticised the allegedly cautious tactics, and was surprised that we are not exploiting the present situation in the Ardennes to greater advantage. The Germans have wide experience of retreats and defensive warfare and therefore they can always recuperate in a short time unless one keeps stepping on their heels constantly. When told of the present Russian offensive, he conceded that it might change the situation. But he still claimed that the High Command hopes to reach a stalemate in the West. Their basic idea is that the American soldier is tired of war, that he does not know what he is fighting for, and that when public opinion in the USA discovers that the war in Europe is costly in lives, it will demand peace. Although many other junior officers may not have formulated so clearly reasons for continued resistance, it is obvious that for the majority of them there still seems to be real purpose in fighting on. This, plus their soldierly training and heavy weapons, then determined opponents.

III CONTACT WITH GERMAN CIVILIANS

German civilians who lived in the areas occupied by the Allies had opportunities to speak to German soldiers during the early days of the Ardennes counter-offensive as the troops pushed through. The effects of these conversations seems hardly to have strengthened Nazi propaganda claims to German troops that life under Allied occupation would be unbearable. These civilians, according to German soldiers who later became POWs, spoke of the fair treatment they had received at the hands of Allied military government. In fact some POWs spoke of actual outspoken resentment towards the German troops. "Warum sind sie zurückgekehrt?" (Why have you returned?) Much was made of the fact that American troops were not billeted in private homes while the returning German soldiers took this practice for granted.

It is reasonable that the hostility of the civilians was in part generated simply by the fact that they were once more in the battle zone and that they again faced the threat of evacuation. But for the German soldier it was concrete evidence of fair treatment of civilians by the Anglo-Americans. The influence of this sort of propaganda was of course limited by the fact that only a very small number of troops had the opportunity to come into contact directly with German civilians in these areas, but there is reason to believe that stories of these conversations were circulated in the ranks of the Wehrmacht.

IV MORALE OF VOLKSTURME

It has been clearly shown that ever since Normandy Volksturm with few real German ties are most likely to be taken resistance or even deserters. Most of them (lists III and IV) were :

never received into the Wehrmacht with any degree of equality and for them the prospect of a German victory does not seem indispensable to their own personal existence. However, it would be wrong to assume that all Volksgenossen soldiers are of this state of mind. Many of them have a strong German heritage and have through five years of war become quite thoroughly assimilated into the Wehrmacht. They have become completely professional soldiers. For some of them a German victory is an important goal. In the event of a German defeat, they can never return to Russia, the Baltic states, Poland or whatever country they came from. During the days of Nazi conquest they or their families frequently shared in the spoils of aggression, and in order for them to retain these or even to be assured of any economic security, a German victory is essential.

Others of these Germans have become extremely apathetic and fatalistic. They have come to believe that nothing they do can affect their own personal future. Uprooting from their homes and coercion into service, has destroyed any sense of initiative. As a result they fight or with simple mechanical motivation, and without any clear cut reasons for doing otherwise. Nevertheless, the Volksgenossen in the Wehrmacht, as a class, continue to constitute an excellent propaganda target.

V PROPAGANDA TO THE SOLDIER

Efforts to probe the state of mind of the German soldier while actually in the fighting line predominantly indicate that concern with personal safety and personal comforts overshadow all other considerations. As a result, the classes of propaganda and counter-propaganda about problems which he cannot immediately visualize, receive little attention.

One foreign observer states the case in extreme fashion when he declares that as far as the average Wehrmacht soldier is concerned:

"He notices that the front-line soldier doesn't give a damn if his Führer either speaks for six months or not or if strong-men (himself or somebody else) is holding the whip over him. He doesn't care if Germany has fallen or not, and he knows less about the destruction of Germany's oil production since he doesn't see the connection between this fact and his lack of food... Of course he curses the German artillery for falling short and for not firing as many rounds as we, but has no idea about the cause. He misses the Luftwaffe, makes jokes about bombing, but he is happy again if he sees the German planes in the sky, although he has no idea about the overall picture and cares even less. If he thinks the war is lost, he doesn't stop to worry while he is in his foxhole about what is going to happen to Germany, or who is going to be his boss as long as the war is over for him and he can work again".

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that when the soldier is in reserve, away from the immediate drama of the battle, his preoccupation of time for relaxation and consequently, for thinking, has been as more susceptible to propaganda. There is time to reconsider the objectives of the battle and even to speculate on the ultimate outcome of the war; likewise there is time to absorb propaganda, the basic arguments of Nazi propaganda.

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Nazi policy in their propaganda to German troops continues to avoid an answer to Allied factual statements of the failure of the counter-offensive in the West. Instead, new leaflets to the Wehrmacht stress the (falsified) contrast between the American soldier who is a mass-killer and the German soldier who fights for civilization. They are designed to counter-act feelings that the American soldier is a fair soldier; instead he is portrayed as an indiscriminate murderer who uses air power to kill mothers, wives and children. The German soldier is portrayed as a defender of civilization.

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Y 201 Summary
Y 201 Smith
Y 201 Lockhart
Y 201 McClure

TOP SECRET

26th January, 1945

Mr. Gen. Bedell

We have now completed our examination of your proposal in SCAP 134 about methods of breaking the will to resist. attached report has been accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and by His Majesty's Government, and the responsible Departments and Agencies in this country have been instructed to proceed to implement the proposals therein.

I suggest that co-ordination of action and the authorities in this country should be effected through Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Director General of the Political Warfare Executive. Sir is, of course, in touch with Brigadier-General McClure of the Political Warfare Division at your Headquarters.

Please let me know if this procedure is agreeable to you and if there is any further help which we can afford in giving effect to the plan.

*Yours ever
Hastings*
28/1

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Lt-General W. Bedell Smith,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force.

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TOP SECRET

METHODS OF INFLUENCING THE GERMAN WILL TO RESIST

Report by the Committee under Chairmanship of
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart

In a telegram dated 20th November, 1944, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his opinion that we should "redouble our efforts to find a solution to the problem of reducing the German will to resist and then bring every appropriate weapon to bear to achieve this end". The British Chiefs of Staff accordingly arranged for the problems to be examined. The United States Chiefs of Staff have concurred in these arrangements and asked that any recommendations resulting from our enquiry should be submitted for final approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. Much is already being done by political warfare in the direction desired by General Eisenhower. A summary of the present activities in this field is contained in the annexes to this report, and it will be seen that some of our proposals are no more than elaborations of the existing policy which appears to us to be correct.

3. We desire, at the outset, to state our firm belief that no one of the proposals we make below, nor any combination of them, provides a substitute for military victory. We deal here with auxiliary weapons only. They should, however, make victory easier to achieve; and they should hasten the collapse of resistance that must follow victory.

THE PROBLEM

4. We believe that few, if any, responsible Germans believe that they can now "win the war". Germans, however, continue to struggle for a variety of reasons, e.g.:-

- (a) The Nazi leaders believe that they have everything to lose by surrender and nothing to gain.
- (b) At best they hope that if the struggle is prolonged disension among the Allies will increase and will intensify war weariness among their peoples to such an extent that a negotiated peace may become possible.
- (c) They hope that even if complete disaster overtakes Germany, a prolongation of the struggle will enable them to build up an effective underground organisation in which they can take refuge and prepare for the day when they can throw off the enemy occupation.

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+ SCAP 134.

20 Nov 1944
J.B.L.

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(d) They have been able to convince their people at home, and those fighting them that there is no alternative but to fight on; and that their enemies are bent on their destruction. "Victory or Hitler" is a slogan of great power for a desperate people. The Nazi leaders are able to make most effective use in their propaganda of public utterances by prominent people among the Allies regarding the treatment reserved for Germany in Germany after the war.

(e) The spectacle of liberated islands, Greece, Holland and Belgium, and the aftermath of unconditional surrender in Italy, Bulgaria, Finland and Romania all provide useful material to the German propagandist in his efforts to keep alive the will to resist.

(f) The Party machine in Germany is still too powerful for any opposition movement - except possibly in Austria - to have any chance of success.

OBJECTIONS

5. In the above rough analysis of the most important moral factors contributing to Germany's continued resistance is correct our object in this case.

(i) To destroy the unity of purpose of the Nazi leaders, and consequently the effectiveness of their control over the fighting men and the people at home.

(ii) To show the German leaders and people that "unconditional surrender" is not a synonym for extermination.

THE NAZI LEADERS

6. History provides many examples of the collapse of powerful regimes after the elimination of their founders. Without Hitler, the most powerful factor uniting the leaders of Germany today, is their belief that they must all hang together or they will hang separately. It is now reasonably certain that Hitler has recently weakened his control over the German administration. It is less certain, but probable, that Hitler's own position is greatly weakened. He may, or may not be a very sick man, but his long illness has invisibly during Germany's darkest hour, and in an opportunity which we have not had. Hundreds of people have been divided among the Nazi leaders. However able and efficient the chief of Hitler and Goebbels may be, they cannot inspire the devotion and fidelity that Hitler has inspired in his people. Moreover, feelings of envy and hatred against these leaders, who have failed or are failing to succeed in Hitler's name, can now be exploited. Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl have lost all faith in power and prestige. If all or any of these could be persuaded that similar intentions of destruction, and that they had some chance of survival if they lost their following, say from Hitler, a serious split in the unity or purpose of the leaders of Germany would be brought about, which could not fail to be reflected in the resistance offered to our forces. With this end in view, it is therefore, we have the following proposals:-

-6-

- (2) That every possible step should be taken to find out whether any funds are or have been deposited by any of the Nazi leaders in neutral countries. If evidence of this kind is forthcoming we should exploit it to the greatest possible extent. At an appropriate moment, the British and U.S. Governments might represent to the neutral Governments concerned that they had received information that money was held for the Nazi leaders in question, and would invite them to cause investigations to be made. The effort will be both to discredit the leaders in a nation amongst the Germans generally and to sow doubt and dissension within the higher ranks of the Nazi Party.
- (3) That we should accept by broadcast, by leaflet, or by other means, that Hitler was no longer a free agent, that Hitler and Goebbels were in control of German decisions, that they, now that any doubts, personified the element in the Nazi system that the Allies were determined to destroy, and that the lives of the other Nazi leaders and of the high commanders in the German forces were in danger.

WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE

7. It has been decided on a high level that any public declaration by the leaders of the Great Allied Powers on the future of Germany after "unconditional surrender" would be unwise, and would almost certainly be interpreted and exploited by the enemy as a sign of weakness. With this decision, we respectfully agree. Had the loss, we believe, as we have stated above, that the fear of the consequences of surrender is giving the German leaders and people the courage of despair, and that there is much that can legitimately be done at a lower level to allay that fear. Decisions have been made public that the Allies intend to occupy German territory for a long period after the end of the war. However severe the conditions it is ultimately intended to impose on the enemy, the fact remains that it is not possible to occupy a defeated country and, at the same time, permanently to destroy law, order and life in the occupied area. It is quite unnecessary that Hitler and Goebbels should be allowed the benefit of freedom to paint a picture of the horrors of life in Germany after defeat while we deny ourselves the opportunity of pointing out to the German people that that picture may be false. It is on this basis that we use the following proposals:-

- (a) That in the sphere of economic and financial cooperation and relations between the United Kingdom and the United States on the one hand and neutral countries on the other, the representatives of Britain and the United States should, unofficially and in course of conversation, allow the impression to be gained that our plans contemplate that German production capacity will be used for rehabilitating the devastated regions of Europe. The word would get round in neutral circles and chance to German industrialists and encourage them to work for an early end to hostilities before their plants and equipment are completely destroyed by military action. Full use of this theme would also be made in propaganda.

(1) It is suggested that the information as possible should be put into the hands of the enemy by articles in the press here and in neutral and enemy countries of the facts of Allied military cooperation. German territory that has already fallen under the occupation of General Henschel's forces is being properly administered, and life is proceeding in an orderly fashion. Factual evidence of this kind is particularly more valuable than anything else in countering the enemy peoples of our intentions. At the same time by propaganda, we should try to ensure that German industrialists and others should gain the impression that through their own efforts to create and maintain these conditions once unconditional surrender has been placed. This would involve the institution of strict economic controls.

(2) Another point to be considered by discussion with the Government of the three major Allies to adopt a common policy of discouraging public affairs and prominent persons suggesting that we intended to spread a far reaching peace on Germany and its subjects. It is proposed that this be done at the next meeting of the Council of the Governments of the three major Allies.

(3) Another subject is more vulnerable than any other part of the Reich to moral attack. The Moscow Declaration published in the autumn of 1943 laid down that it was the intention of the Allies to ensure that there should be a free, democratic and peaceful Germany. There has been no lack of publicity attached to the subject. It is suggested that our policy as regards Russia should be settled by the European military Council as soon as possible, and that the facts of Allied intentions should be published. Once that has been done we believe that it will be possible to create resistance in this part of the Reich. The terms of a joint declaration could also be published to the public of each of the Governments.

(4) A confidential and entirely unofficial approach should be made to the religious community at the various religious bodies suggesting that organized religion would naturally have a large part to play in the reconstruction of Germany after defeat and in the building of a new Germany.

(5) It is suggested that the official records in British and American news sheets to give the impression that we will need their services, during the period of Allied occupation after unconditional surrender. The reputation of these prisoners of war should be carried to other lands, passing on this information which is to them spread in Germany itself.

German soldiers in uniform of war

The creation of an inter-Allied-control Gloucestershire
Organisation has been agreed

A national "university"

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARY

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1997 DECEMBER, 1997+

DATE RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1. CRIMINAL. The defendant has irreparably lost the war

2. Intelligibility of Messages: Express the hopes encouraged by the Bible in V weapons, weakening of the ill will, intent, or disability between the sides.

1. Germany's "Iron" Road: best qualified
to determine the situation of Germany, the
United States and the satellite leaders, have
anywhere in their actions that Germany's
road to recovery and non-existence. The
policy of the United States in the East shows that
Germany will have, from the same conclusion.

THEMES: 1. Realism: Prolongation of the war means the suffering of Germany's victim generation.

7. new political ecology of the war on Germany. It led to the devastation of war and the destruction imposed by the policy of war.

1ST. OBJECT: Establish the Nazi leadership

THESE:

1. To establish the war was not only for a
few but for all. Self-interests are those who
have not only not practiced acts
of violence since 1918.

2. To establish the war was not only for a
few but for all. Self-interests are those who
have not only not practiced acts
of violence since 1918.

3. To establish the war was not only for a
few but for all. Self-interests are those who
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4. To establish the war was not only for a
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6. To establish the war was not only for a
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IV. OBJECT:

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of violence since 1918.

2. To establish the war was not only for a
few but for all. Self-interests are those who
have not only not practiced acts
of violence since 1918.

17. Germany

17. Germany - Germany lost unconditional
surrender is characteristic in the representation
of Germany.

18. Germany

18. Germany - Germany - Germany Report
of the German Government of peace and
the German Military Government
of the German Government by the Allies.

19. Germany - Germany - Germany Report
of the German Government of peace and the measures
taken for the restoration in liberated Europe.

20. Germany - Germany - Germany Report
of the German Government of peace and the measures
taken for the restoration in liberated Europe.
The German Government of peace and the measures
taken for the restoration in liberated Europe.
The German Government of peace and the measures
taken for the restoration in liberated Europe.

21. Germany - Germany - Germany Report
of the German Government of peace and the measures
taken for the restoration in liberated Europe.

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE FBI WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

1. INTRODUCTION

11. Such operations can be carried out by penetrating and interrogating the enemy in a cumulative manner. It can enhance the effect of important military operations by increasing their shock and surprise effect on the German public. By the use of heraldic air attacks, and by joint operations with S.O.M., it can help to speed cumulative blows and material. It can augment the effect and of the aerial forces all special sabotage if its contribution is considered in the early stages of war. The "Blitz" can be carried out while can achieve the objectives of the war in some conventional war operation against the enemy in which it is agreed that friend and foe alike will be surprised.

T. J. O'Connell

To resist ill-timed suggestions by softening the spirit of resistance, and to direct the labor movement activities, by example, in the right direction, continued participation at the expense of the labor movement, and by violent class action in conflict with the interests and the needs.

11. 2000

(1) During the 1940s, the expression "DECEASED" was mainly used to "black" people and to concentrate the attention of the German soldiers on the main victim (Party authorities) rather than on the other victims. It was emphasized throughout the military trials, especially the first, the criminal weakness of General von Weizsäcker, the weakness of Himmler, blockade and unnecessary civilian deaths, the weakness of the German Air Force over the battle of Britain, the weakness of the German command of authority, the weakness of police and courts, and the consequently increasing loss of life which the Luftwaffe had suffered.

(1) Policy may be divided into long-term and short-term.

[illegible]

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new, a midnight sun. This is dropped within the next 18 hours in order to give the enemy selected leaflets in and behind the German lines. However, besides, the newspaper is also dropped in order to give the enemy inside Germany or behind the German lines. The daily distribution cited at in coming weeks is two million. This has been decided in consultation with S.I.A.S. and the Army Group.

C. Leaflets

Leaflets are dropped from this country (but shortly to be despatched from Germany) and are given to the enemy. Leaflets are also distributed in the German front line and inside Germany, and are of an entirely German origin. Counterfeit leaflets, with agitatory slogans and handbooks giving instructions on military life, desertion and other forms of defiant behaviour. These "black" leaflets now in preparation or distribution are described briefly below.

(i) The latest black leaflet operation is to counterfeit leaflets which have been dropped by German aircraft to their own troops in the past. These leaflets purport to answer questions asked by front soldiers. The answers are given in a forceful, dramatic style, calling on the man to show a do-or-die spirit. The counterfeit leaflets being distributed by Allied aircraft are written in the same style, but include subversive suggestions that desertion is the way out, that soldiers and K.C.O.'s are shooting their officers and killing away with it, and that it is the High Command's intention to search every foot of German earth.

(ii) Similar leaflets to the above, but with slogans which look like the black leaflets, have been dropped. These have been stuck up in front of the German lines.

(iii) In various leaflets, such as Protestant hymn books, which are distributed, military handbooks and song books, expert and detailed instructions on desertion and defection have been widely distributed.

(iv) In order to give the enemy a false propaganda boost, leaflets are dropped in the German front line which are designed to encourage desertion and defection. These leaflets are in the form of discharge sheets and leave certificates, which are given to the enemy.

(v) In order to give the enemy a false propaganda boost, leaflets are dropped in the German front line which are designed to encourage desertion and defection. These leaflets are in the form of discharge sheets and leave certificates, which are given to the enemy.

D. Propaganda Leaflets

German propaganda leaflets, such as those and other material likely to be of interest to the enemy, are distributed in Germany. Counterfeits of German propaganda leaflets, such as those and other material likely to be of interest to the enemy, are distributed in Germany. Counterfeits of German propaganda leaflets, such as those and other material likely to be of interest to the enemy, are distributed in Germany.

THIS A

COPY

24 January 1945

FOR: Brig, General Robert A. McClure,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.
SUBJECT : Propaganda to GERMANY.

X201 mic to line
X201 mic to line

With reference to PWP 091,412 of January 12, 1945, requesting a policy ruling as to the use in propaganda of Allied Statements of intention toward individual Germans, I confirm today's [redacted] with General McClure, Colonel Thompson [redacted] Mr. Crossman [redacted] which I suggested the elimination from the above [redacted] of any distinction, express or implied, between elements of the German population. It is my opinion that it would be unwise to open the door to the [redacted] people [redacted] enable them to develop a basis for the assertion that [redacted] admit that they, the Germans, [redacted] individuals, are not responsible for what has happened. [redacted] begin now, with statements that the Germans [redacted] individuals are preferred over their Government, the German High Command and the Party, [redacted] distinction will crystallize it [redacted] to [redacted] inevitably that [redacted] the Germans as individuals are not responsible for this war. We want it [redacted] quite clear that they are responsible, and [redacted] do not want a record built up now which years hence will be cited by the Germans [redacted] evidence that [redacted] acted in [redacted] faith.

I also stated to you, I consider it far preferable, [redacted] I believe it just [redacted] effective propaganda, to couch our [redacted] in terms of [redacted] is happening rather than in terms of [redacted] intentions [redacted] future. [redacted] your working that the Allies, "have established firmly their intention of behaving in certain ways toward the German people - both soldiers and civilians" does not appeal to [redacted] as effective [redacted] the [redacted] of statements of what actually is being done leaving implications regarding [redacted] future to the German imagination. Statements of intention are [redacted] to ripen into statements of obligation. [redacted] should, I believe, avoid repetition of statements which are susceptible of construction [redacted] obligations. [redacted] do not wish to convey to the Germans that we [redacted] any obligation [redacted] explain matters to them; if we continue in that vein [redacted] shall [redacted] be making excuses to them.

24 Jan

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED	
TO CONFIDENTIAL	
By [redacted] of CALA	
[redacted] [redacted]	
Date	6 AUG 1945

(Sgd.) ROBERT MURPHY

C/

6 891

COPY 7A

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff.

21st January 1945

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare against German Commanders
of Surrounded Garrisons.


TO: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division. *V301 Morgan*
V201 McArthur

1. Your proposal is not approved in its present form. It is thought that for the time being the results of your studies should be disseminated through P.W. channels.

2. As is stated in your paper, action on the lines you indicate can only be of profit in conjunction with "overwhelming military pressure". It is not likely that pressure of this nature will be applied to any of the points in question in the near future. But when such may be the case in future you should bring the matter forward for consideration.

F. E. MORGAN
Lieut. General.

CONFIDENTIAL



(7)

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 212100Z JAN

SHAEP 263/21
TOR 212240A JAN
MOE 212330A

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : AGMAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP MAIN FOR EISENHOWER
FOR INFO : BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION FOR BRITISH
CHIEFS OF STAFF
REF NO : W-24634, 21 JANUARY 1945

BOOK MESSAGE

FACS 126

Answering SCAP 178 (5)

A plan on the lines suggested in your
SCAP-134 has been produced and is now under active consideration
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SCAP-178 Ref No: S-75767 is SMC OUT 2563, 19/1/45, G-3
SCAP-134, Ref No: S-67648 is SMC OUT 6582, 20/10/44, G-3

ACTION: G-3

INFORMATION: SCS GOM ZONE
G-2
PMD AG-RECORDS

SMC IN 7965 22 Jan. 1945 0036A AGD/YOU Ref No: W-24634

6 693

SECRET

COPY NO 11

SGS-SHAEP File No. 091.412/3

21 Jan

(OH)

SECRET
SOUTHERN FRONT OFFENSIVE
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

20 January 1945. *FILE*

PCWP/5100-5

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHONOMIC WARFARE # 17

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The Counteroffensive

Reports from 13 German towns in the occupied areas agree on several main attitudes held in common by the inhabitants of those towns. With very few exceptions, the people did not welcome the prospect of the Wehrmacht's return. The reasons for this were various indeed. A few genuine anti-Nazis were concerned about the Army's offensive as a source of strength to the Party. A few pro-Nazis were glad to see the Wehrmacht again and expressed to Landser (now in the) the hope that they would drive the enemy from the soil of the Reich. By far the greatest number, however, were not concerned with the political significance of the counteroffensive, either pro- or anti-Nazi, but only with its significance as a clear and present danger to their own lives and property. Really this attitude was related to the widespread feeling that this was "der letzte Kampf" (the last spasm) and that the Wehrmacht would succeed not in driving the Allied out but only in killing many Germans and destroying their homes in the attempt.


Nowhere did interrogators find any perceptible lift in civilian morale occasioned by the start of the counteroffensive or its prospects, either among those who hoped for its success or among those who hoped it would fail. The same lack of interest toward all public events which so frequently been noted by interrogators as the predominant attitude in Germany, was displayed toward the military operations of the Wehrmacht. The findings of interrogators were confirmed this week by a survey of 58 letters from German civilians to soldiers at the West Front during the first week of the offensive (18-25 December). The most striking fact revealed by the survey is the complete lack of interest: in only 9 of the letters is the offensive mentioned at all. Almost as striking is the complete lack of enthusiasm: only 1 letter shows genuine delight at the news, and that a letter from a woman to her soldier-husband: "Our soldiers in the West have gone on the offensive. We learned the news last night with great joy. Something will surely come of it. We have great expectations from coming events". The other 6 correspondents who mention the offensive at all are mainly concerned over the safety of their boys at the front. Typical comments from 3 letters are: "We are fearful for you" - "We hope that you're not in it" - "It is not pleasant to think that you may be in the most dangerous area".

It is unwise to draw firm conclusions from such evidence. Widespread fear of discussing military subjects in letters may help account for the fact that less than 1 in 6 correspondents mentioned the offensive. Justified fear of expressing skeptical or "anti" sentiments may account for the silence of others. It is possible to say, however, that there is no evidence from this collection of letters that the morale of German civilians was raised to any considerable extent by news of the counteroffensive.

6

ALSO see the Reich

Considerable confirmatory light on the attitude of Aleations to the Reich comes from a document turned up in STURZENEGGER (which reveals, incidentally, the tough-mindedness of German intelligence officers). The document reports the conclusions drawn from a survey among SD officials conducted in November 1944 by the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) of the SS to determine the reactions to the Volksturm in ALSCG. The responses of 12 local SD officials to a questionnaire on this subject from the



regional office led to several interesting conclusions. Approximately 70 per cent of Alsace was considered hostile to Germany, and the VS was considered by Alsatians as a last desperate resort of the Reich. Early orders for the men to register had been generally complied with but in various local groups not over 25 per cent of the men eligible for conscription had reported for duty. The Gauleiter's appeal for volunteers was not well received, and the German press accounts representing the Alsatians as enthusiastic about the VS were criticized. Some local reports attributed the lack of volunteers to the fact that Alsatian youth had been under French influence and had not enjoyed the benefits of Nazi training. Others said that since all other age-groups were automatically called up, volunteers were usually either too young or too old. A few local reports stated flatly that there had been a complete lack of volunteers.

In general, the reports revealed an awareness that 4 years of German occupation had not converted ALSACE to the Nazi faith. Except for the old-time Germanophiles and more recent collaborationists, ALSACE was either Francophile or indifferent. It was considered that Alsatians had no desire to fight for Germany or anybody else; nor would they "defend" their soil against the allies. Several reporters felt that they might resist the Americans "if the latter became guilty of cruelties" but that in no case would they resist the French.

These reports agree in essential points with evidence from other sources. Pro-allyed sentiment is perhaps a bit less now than during the first weeks of November, when these German reports were written. At that time most of East Germany was caught in a mood of defeatism, and German stock in ALSACE was very low indeed, with the victorious Allied armies knocking at the gates. Recent events - the long stalemate, the German counterattack in ALSACE, the absence of tangible benefits of Allied occupation - have probably deepened characteristic Alsatian reserve toward all outsiders.

Workers

A 195 camp liaison of difficulties encountered in obtaining civilian labor in the SAAR area, as reported by A.G. officers, reveals several important facts concerning conditions among workmen that apply generally in the occupied areas. The difficulty most frequently encountered is that workers are mainly preoccupied with the reconstruction of their own homes. Since nearly every house has a leaky roof and blown-out windows, workers are anxious to make repairs which will keep out the dreadful weather and prevent further damage to their property. A considerable number of daylight hours is spent in looking for food and clothing in the ruins of their own or their relatives' homes. Too many are unwilling to leave their homes for fear of looting. Or in the event of the military requisitioning their homes for billets, they want to be on hand to move furniture and other possessions. ("Many complain", says the G-5 SHARP Weekly # 31, "have been received of furniture being used as firewood and 'souvenirs' being taken").

Many of these left behind are not good physical specimens, for the able-bodied man apt in the SAAR area has been evacuated. In SAAR, as a result of Wehrmacht conscription and evacuation, there are now 3 able-bodied women to 1 able-bodied man. The difficult conditions of work in occupied Germany are, also, an extremely important factor. Lack of transport for workers forces them to walk long distances to work, and many of the physically unfit find this difficult. Particularly in the present bitter cold, this discourages even those who would be willing to work. Clothing, and especially footwear, is inadequate against the winter. Some civilians have completely ruined their last pair of shoes after 3 days of potato digging. Food, too, is inadequate for outdoor work: the STALLARD food kitchen, for example, is supplying less than 1000 calories per day.

In addition there are several problems of morale. After years of forced labor, the workers have come to hate the Arbeitsamt. I.G. officers have reported reluctance by workers to comply with its orders as they had expected the coming of a changed policy which would give them a choice of work. Skilled mechanics, particularly, are unwilling to report for such work as road-repair and farming.

A key factor is the peculiar role of money in occupied Germany. This Scharf has indicated in the past that many areas of Germany are approaching a "barter-economy", and the constant regulations promulgated against barter within the Reich are a rough gauge of its extent. In the occupied zones, where the destruction caused by combat has created a shortage of the most essential civilian goods (and even of the "means of production" of which they may be supplied), money has largely ceased to have any value at all. For it cannot buy anything, except the allotted food ration which is within everybody's means in any case. The incentive for work is thus absent and the means of compulsion are lacking. Lack of communications makes it hard to notify available labor. In AACH messengers are used but this is time-consuming because of the size of the city. It is also easy "not to be at work" under such a system. There are not enough police to enforce a work order.

B. ELIOT ALLEN

Old Clothes

The campaign for salvage of old clothing and uniforms started quietly, then was publicized as front-page news (at least partly, it would seem, to distract attention from the military failure of the counteroffensive in the West), and has now become an added feature of life in the Third Reich. It operates at present under the slogan "The People's Sacrifice". At the start it seemed merely a routine salvage campaign among soldiers such as is periodically conducted in every Army, with the added feature that soldiers were asked to surrender their civilian clothes. It soon became clear, however, that the plan was more extensive. It is now necessary for relatives of soldiers to surrender their civilian clothes without waiting for permission of the owner. This is a change from the original stipulation that permission was required, for IMCK, the delegate for collection, had announced on 5 January that soldiers would have to send home an authorization. Apparently the change was caused by resistance to collection among the soldiers' relatives. For an OKW order of 10 January indicated that henceforth collection among civilians would proceed without permission, and the decree was published inside Germany by IMCK.

The civilian clothes of soldiers are reported to be the last important reserve of clothing in Germany (apart from stocks held by the Party and its formations) and IMCK had said it was "precisely there which we want". In addition, the statement in the later OKW order of 10 January that those "not at present engaged in active service" and "in offices" must give up all equipment and uniforms exceeding "the present maximum" suggests that the Wehrmacht may be preparing to "cannibalize" its own salvage by stripping its less essential members. Even from training camps have come letters which show the inadequacy of clothing and equipment. It is probably felt that German Army "office workers" could better bear the burden.

On 12 January DNB quoted another OKW order to the effect that honorably discharged members of the Wehrmacht have "the right to wear uniform". The privilege becomes somewhat theoretical in view of the next sentence which declares that this right is "independent of the fact created by the People's sacrifice that in practice uniform may be worn only by persons required to do so in the execution of their duties". The net result therefore is that a discharged soldier must turn in the uniform which he is "entitled to wear". It appears that the call for a "People's Sacrifice"

has not thus far met with wild enthusiasm. On 17 January DNB announced that "since work and duties prevent many people from taking their contributions to the collecting centers" certain designated officials would call for them at households on 21 and 23 January. Translated out of Goebbels' speech this means that "the squeeze is on".

In connection with the Clothes Collection campaign, one should note an extremely unusual statement on war material broadcast to German troops in Italy on 10 January:

"During last summer we lost substantial quantities of war material. The newly formed divisions could not be supplied from existing stores. At the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th year of the war SSERBIV, engaged in a war on 2 fronts, had no stocks whatsoever beyond the immediate short-term needs of the fronts. Thus the material which enabled our fronts to consolidate and our offensive to be launched has been supplied by current production."

The Release of Jewish Doctors

As in all countries at war, there has been a felt shortage of doctors in Germany. The large number of doctors killed, captured, or incapacitated in action during five years of war, plus the draining off of prospective medical students into other fields, has aggravated the shortage. And HITLER's Reich, particularly, has suffered for its racist mythology by depriving itself of the services of the large number of Jewish doctors who practised throughout Germany in pre-Nazi days. Since military requirements always take the first priority in wartime, the civilian population has been hardest hit by the lack of medical care. In BERLIN it has been found necessary to make available at the reserve military hospitals consulting hours for the civilian population (probably a clinic for Out-patients only). And in the occupied areas of Germany, fear of lack of medical care in a strange city has even been advanced by several people as a reason why they refused to evacuate.

These people have occasionally volunteered the information that if the Nazis had not removed all the Jewish doctors the situation would not now be so drastic. And the same observation has not infrequently been reported from the interior of Germany. Now appears a German press report which amply confirms the increasing shortage of qualified medical men in Germany, and adds that it is proposed to release a certain number of Jewish doctors from concentration camps to assist in the treatment of infectious diseases, particularly diphtheria.

ARIZ - LASSERHEIM (ARIZ Measures)*

ARIZ stands for Auflockerung, Räumung, Lachung, and Zerstörung (dispersion, evacuation, paralyzing and destruction), and is the name given to a program of economic sabotage prepared early in September 1944, when the rapid advance of Allied armies threatened an early occupation of Western Germany. The aim of the program was to reduce or destroy the productive capacity of areas in the path of the approaching forces, thereby reducing their military value for the Allies and laying additional difficulties on Allied administration of this territory. The general program applied to persons as well as materials, and under the "Dispersion" and "paralyzing" aspects of the plan came the evacuation of German civilians into the Reich during the early autumn months. In handling materials and industries, "decentralization" was to be preferred over "paralyzing" or "destruction". Each method was designed to fit a particular set of circumstances, and the decision was no doubt left largely to the man in charge of the local situation.

*See special G-2 DOCS report on this subject

Decentralization of materials was aimed at breaking up large concentrations of supplies which offered targets for air attack. The aim of paralyzing was to keep the Allies from immediate use of a plant by removing essential parts of its machinery. (Industrial managers of the Ruhr district were asked early in September to prepare detailed plans for paralyzing and for speedy repair in the event of return). Destruction was to be regarded as a last resort if an alternative exists, and if used, maximum production is to be maintained until the last day.

A priority list issued on 6 September classified all objects affected by ALZ-measures into 2 groups: (1) Goods and installations belonging to the Wehrmacht (including Police, etc.); (2) Economic Goods (industrial and agricultural equipment, livestock, foodstuffs, etc.)

An interesting Fachbereichs of 27 September ordered that the entire livestock of a district was to be removed in the event of evacuation. A directive issued by the Landesbauernschaft Landesbauernschaft in October went further, directing that at least 50 per cent of livestock was to be removed preparatory to an economic evacuation. It is clear that this order was frequently carried out, but not always by the rightful owner of the livestock, for our interrogators have innumerable charges by outraged farmers against iniquitous Party officials and Landowners who took away their livestock before ordering the Wehrmacht's retreat.

Three grades of priorities were established for anyone of the four ALZ-measures on military material. The first comprised "scarce goods" (knappheitsgegenstände) and specified such objects as petrol, ammunition, weapons, optical instruments, spare parts, special tools, tires, and breeding stock. The second priority was assigned to less essential goods, which would yet be useful to the Allies. The third priority included articles of little or no use for the conduct of the war. The responsibility for ordering and executing ALZ-measures, as shown in the last Summary, was divided among civil and military authorities, according to both the type of goods and their location. The Army Commander was made responsible for Army goods in the Combat Zone and the Lehrkreis Commander for Army goods in the Zone of the Interior. The civilian interests were represented by the Gauleiter and the Reichsverteidigungskommissare, who were designated as the central authorities for ALZ-measures within their respective districts. Although military authorities were specifically excluded from executive power, within the civil sector of the Zone of Interior they were nevertheless charged with lending assistance to the civil authorities by giving information on the situation and by assigning troops for special tasks. Since the Army controlled the all-important transport without which ALZ-measures could hardly be undertaken, this was another factor to strengthen the hand of the Wehrmacht.

How GOEBBELS Prepared

A letter from the Propaganda Ministry dated 16 November reveals the foresight with which GOEBBELS prepares his line on all Reich activities. Written a month before the counteroffensive jumped off, the letter requests the Reichspropaganda Reichspropaganda to "make the necessary preparations for securing the forwarding" of propaganda material from "German towns and villages after their recapture from the enemy", including "all proclamations of the enemy army of Occupation". This was clearly a preparation for "the atrocity campaign in occupied Germany" which was released early in January, and since the captured proclamations actually revealed very little,

II. REACTIONS TO FAILURE IN THE WEST

The propaganda which has always been mentioned has done much to cushion reactions to the closing stages of Rundstedt's effort in the West. Prisoners, both from the counter-attack sector itself and from other parts of the line, have known too little about what was happening to realize the significance of events. To a limited extent this makes possible the circulation of rumours, many of which are propagated by officers and designed to bolster morale. But on the whole morale is not being actively bolstered to meet the shock of events; in the absence of specific information, discipline and obedience are left to operate under automatic authority unaffected by the recent course of events. The Nazis do not even seem to have felt the need for any special efforts in the form of leaflets or indoctrination talks to interpret recent events for front-line troops; at any rate, combat teams from First U.S. Army have encountered no trace of such material. Instead, current propaganda centres largely about security indoctrination and warnings against Allied mistreatment of prisoners. (cf Para below).

It must be added, however, that with the dying down of the attack, the confident offensive spirit noted among Pz/T at its outset is no longer being encountered. After capture defeatism is pronounced but in some respects — more so than that encountered during the Normandy campaign. (For example of a group of 60 Pz/T captured since January 1 in the counterattack sector, only 15% still believed in victory while 60% admitted defeat; another 20% held attitudes of doubtful hero which seemed to afford a basis for good battle behaviour). On the other hand, defeatist sentiments expressed after capture are no sure clue to the ignorant automatic state of mind in which the German soldier fights.

In connection with all that has been said about soldiers' ignorance, two recent remarks deserve note. The official news service for the troops admitted with apparent regret on December 27 that:—

"Communications between the homeland and the front are sometimes very difficult and after an air attack on his home town the soldier has to wait for weeks before he learns whether his family is safe."

Rather than facilitate such communications, instructions have now been issued that telegraph offices are only to accept telegrams to members of the forces which contain information on bomb damage when these have been passed by the Party authorities. Soldiers seeking information on the welfare of families evacuated from threatened areas have been told to write to the offices of the local Party Kreisleitung, even in the case of areas actually occupied by the Allies.

Such systematic isolation from the homeland and the world must have adverse effects, such as the creation of anxiety and states of mind susceptible to alarmist rumours. Sometimes the isolation has extended to junior officers and confidence has been shaken in such leaders who were patently uninformed. But the Nazi leadership seems ready to risk these adverse effects, either counting on the general coercive apparatus to keep them under control, or else fearing that any attempt at enlightenment might help the truth to leak through and do more harm than good.

III. WAFFEN SS v. WEHRMACHT

The claim has been made that poor leadership by Waffen SS generals and the sacrificing of infantry in the offensive to protect S.S. armoured units has resulted in an intensification of feeling between the S.S. and the ordinary soldiers. But, even if the facts quoted are correct, there is little evidence that the average soldier is aware of them; for example of one group of Volksgrenadiere who participated in the offensive, scarcely any had so much as heard the name of Sepp Dietrich, the Waffen S.S. General, commanding the S.S. Army involved in the operation.

Moreover, soldiers are probably becoming increasingly aware that men are drafted into the Waffen S.S. quite as much as into the regular army. This may not prevent regular soldiers from resenting any privileges accorded to Waffen S.S. members, since soldiers of all armies are prone to look out for and resent preferential treatment of anyone except themselves. But there is no evidence of friction having increased recently or of its approaching a pitch at which it might interfere with military operations. Pz/R sometimes display fear of being held responsible for atrocities, and even blame the Waffen S.S. vehemently for committing them but only in rare cases do they advance disgust with the S.S. as a reason for surrender. Moreover, they more frequently report that they had to fight because they were told, in case they thought of retreating, that the Waffen S.S. were at their backs.

* In many cases, however, atrocities are ascribed to the S.S. rather than Waffen S.S.

IV. SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES

Complaints by Pz/R taken recently in the sector of the counterattack about difficulties of supply indicate that Pz/R in general feel that it is at least adequate. Food remains the most important problem. Complaints about the lack of ammunition are rare, and from Pz/R statements the concern over gasoline supplies is less frequent, possibly due to the fact that Pz/R interrogated were largely from infantry units. Medical aid is of course a difficult problem, but any impression of widespread break down of front line facilities as might be deduced from reports of certain sectors during the first phase of the counter-attack seem largely unwarranted.

Weather conditions make life at the front obviously extremely difficult. Special issues of clothing however were made just before the start of the offensive. There is some evidence also that special efforts were made to deliver mail around Christmas, and the results were that the majority of the soldiers received mail at least once since the offensive started.

V. BRIEF PROPAGANDA TO THE WEHRMACHT

The PW Combat Team operating with the Ninth Army reports increased reluctance to talk on the part of recently captured Pz/R. This increase in security consciousness is not ascribed to a rise in morale but rather to the effectiveness of weekly indoctrination about how to behave in captivity. Pz/R obviously are conscious that their statements might be used in our propaganda; they fear subsequent identification and reprisals against their families. Evidence of increased security consciousness is not reported by other psychological warfare interrogators. Nevertheless, German countermeasures to Allied leaflets, continuing details of military formations, reported from this sector offered an opportunity for threats of reprisals. The CO of the 159th Engineer BN, 59th Infantry Div is reported to have said that he and the Battalion were mentioned in British broadcasts and that the family of anyone giving information to the enemy would be shot.

The men were further told that German agents in American Pz/R enclosures would report any violations of security. A Wehrmacht leaflet to their own soldiers, mentioning the names of two deserters and quoting information that these two men had supposedly divulged, dealt with a situation in the 980th V Gr. and stated that the men's families would have to suffer the consequences such as jail sentences, loss of property ration cards etc.

M. Surpin

R.J. GEFERIN
Lt. Col. A.O.S.
Chief, Intelligence Section
For
ROBERT A. McCLORE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

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Political Officers, SHAEF (2)
SHAEF (Main) G-2
" " G-2, G.I. Civil Security Section
" " G-4
" " G-4
" " G-2 (6)
P.O. #1, G.I.G. (3)
P.O. #1, 12 A.G. (6)
P.O. #1, 21 A.G. (6)
OSS, Mr. Schlesinger (3)
Radio Luxembourg (3)
Major O'Brien, PWD, Intelligence (Rear)
for further distribution in London.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ✓

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY


TO : ACHAF FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : AF300 FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
FROM : SHAEF / AF3, MICHAEL BRUNNENHOFER
REF NO : 847570 TOO : 191900A

SCAF No. 178

Would be glad to know whether it has been found possible to devise a plan on the lines suggested in my SCAF 134.

SCAF 134, REF NO. 8-64568, OF SEC ONE 3582, 20/11/44, G-3

ORIGINATOR : G-3 AUTHENTICATION: J.F.K. WHELELEY
MAJOR GENERAL
INFORMATION : AGO COORDINATED: CHIEF OF STAFF
G-3
AGO
COM-2000
AG-2000



SEC ONE 3582 11/2 1944 REF/IC REF NO: 8-75767
TOO : 191900A

6 704

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 1

X. file sub
091.412
201 Trust
201 The Church

SUMMER HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCISE FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

10 January 1945

PAR 385

Subject: Psychological Warfare Against German Commanders of
Surrounded Garrisons.

To : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

The paper attached (TAB A) has been called for by letter AG TAB B
091.412-1 OCT-RM of 27 November 1944, subject: "Psychological War-
fare Operations Against German Army Commanders to Induce Surrender".


The paper sets forth that while ultimatums have for failed
hasten the surrender of surrounded garrisons, parleys appear to have a
much better chance, judging from an analysis of German surrenders in
the West since D-Day. The undesirability of ultimatums is demonstrated
by several examples, which are analyzed in TAB C.

It is possible to establish personal contact with the enemy
commander by means other than a peremptory demand for surrender. If
contact is established, the subject of surrender should not be breached
until a clear-cut tactical success has impressed him with our superiority,
our determination, and the hopelessness of his position.

At this point, and after a careful preparation which consists
of gathering certain intelligence and drafting a surrender document, the
conversations should be kept to details of the actual surrender - dis-
cussing not the "whether" but the "how" of surrender. Without affect-
ing the "unconditional" character of the surrender, the actual details
of it afford many opportunities for making apparent concessions and
salving the military honor of the German commander.

II. RECOMMENDATION

That the Adjutant General, SUMMIT, distribute the paper
as TAB A, "Psychological Warfare Against German Commanders of Surrounded
Garrisons," to the commanders of major SUMMIT tactical ground force units
to and including divisions.



ROBERT A. MOULDER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

CONCURRENCES

G-2 and G-3 concurrence has been obtained on the original study,
subject to changes in wording and in the channels for dissemination
which have been incorporated in this amended study. The U.S. political
officer has stated that the question as here presented required comment
from the political officers.

TAB A

STAFF HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

15 January 1945

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST GERMAN

COMMANDERS OF SURROUNDED GARRISONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The issue of ultimatums to German commanders has in most cases proved certainly ineffective and possibly harmful. It appears that the act of rejecting an ultimatum confirms a commander his desire to hold out or delays his decision to surrender (See TAB B). On the other hand, cases of successful parleys are on record, when the enemy's surrender was brought about earlier than if the first step had been left to him. There is an important difference, therefore, between ultimatums and parleys. It is the purpose of this paper to point out some of the psychological points that suggest themselves from a study of surrenders in this war, and to outline a psychological warfare program for surrounded German garrisons. The Allied Governments have directed that the terms for all German Commanders be "unconditional surrender". This paper is not concerned with the details of surrender, which in every case are to be unconditional. It is solely concerned with the formal arrangements and the mechanical details of the act of unconditional surrender.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Psychological warfare operations against surrounded garrisons are of two distinct types, which must be harmonized:

a. Operations undertaken, directly or indirectly, against the main body of troops, with the object of inducing as many of them as possible to surrender individually or in groups.

b. Operations directed against the German commander in person, with the object of inducing him to surrender the bulk of his forces as early as possible.

3. The evidence from operations against surrounded garrisons during the present campaign indicates that psychological warfare against the German commander not only requires planning and coordination with military operations, but should take precedence over routine propaganda. For routine combat propaganda, though producing its dividend of individual surrenders, may actually stiffen the will of the commander upon whose decision the surrender of the residual force will ultimately in the end depend. In such cases so far this residual force, which surrendered on order, is larger than the number of individuals taken in the course of the action. It is believed that a sound psychological approach to the commander can in many cases speed up this surrender, but that ultimatums do not constitute that approach.

4. The German commander's desire to fight on or to surrender is influenced by the following calculable factors:

a. Directive from his superiors. In only one case so far, the German commander has received a direct order from his superiors to surrender (which being

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amorphous and exposed, was not a surrounded garrison proper), has a commander surrendered without even the appearance of resistance. In all other cases, at least the letter, if not always the spirit, of the order to resist is obeyed. It may be presumed that usually a point is reached when the commander informs his superiors that surrender is inevitable and is in turn told to give up as late as possible, the precise moment being left to him.

b. Military pressure. In an extreme case, such as that of BORMEREN, the commander was in the end willing to surrender after token pressure had been applied. At CHENBOURG, after reduction of most of the port, token shelling by phosphorus shells produced the surrender of one junior German commander. Generally, however, overwhelming military pressure will have to be applied before psychological warfare methods can take effect in speeding up the commander's surrender.

c. Staff officers. Their quality and background is an important element. In at least one instance, surrender was decided upon after a round-table discussion. The general attitude of the staff, as well as that of the commander, is therefore important.

d. Threats against the commander's family. This has lately become an increasingly important factor. Colonel WILK (commander of LA ROCHELLE), prompted by fear of reprisals against his family, inserted in the surrender document a clause to the effect that his food and ammunition were exhausted, in order to justify his surrender. AULACH (commanding ST. JEAN) wired Hitler to the same effect before surrendering.

e. The tactical situation per se, and the tactical and supply situation as reported in the German home press. Obviously, German commanders cannot be expected to surrender in a tactically promising situation. Allied reports of terrific German resistance, short supplies, etc., if picked up by the German press, are an important factor. The surrender or desertion of small groups of German soldiers may sometimes influence the tactical situation, but it does not greatly influence the commander.

f. Personal Character and History. The commander's political and military background, his relations with his superiors, and his own temperament, as evidenced by previous orders, etc., are important. Any conflict, such as is known to have existed between VON THOMA and ROSELM, or between ROSELM and VON RECKSTEUER, is useful information for a negotiator.

CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY COMMANDER

5. The ill effects of ultimatums have been stated in para. 1 and are illustrated in PAR 8. The Allied commander might be well advised to take the opposite line and try to establish a psychological rapport by asking the German commander a favor - such as an exchange of prisoners, a truce for evacuation of civilians, or a mutually profitable deal. Such an agreement was actually reached with Admiral SCHIRMEZ at LA PALICE (LA ROCHELLE), relating to the non-destruction of the port provided there was no Allied air action. Once contact with the enemy commander is established, every effort should be made to maintain it.

6. Operations should be planned where it is desired to make the German command reinforcements and generally, to focus attention on the particular locality. Such problems should then be given to the situation as they arise in the course of the attack and defense.

7. At the time of the initial assault, efforts should be made to ascertain if possible the degree of resistance the enemy commander is willing to put up and the extent to which he can be influenced by enemy actions (see para. 3) and a "good report" (see para. 3). No surrender can be expected at the time of initial contact. If there is conclusive evidence that the enemy commander is on the brink of surrender, that the steps suggested under para. 10 below can be taken at the initial stage.

8. Background information should be obtained about the enemy commander and his staff officers identified in the first contact. A-2 (G-2) and J-2 (through special sources) can make such information available upon request. In interrogations in the course of the initial action and furnish reliable supplementary data.

9. Understanding military procedure being indispensable for affecting an early surrender (see para. 10), it is desirable to be in a low-grade initial preparation stage with a large-scale initial tactical operations. Neither propaganda nor parades are profitable before attack is obviously imminent or already about. If the first major attack requires no appreciable tactical success, little can probably be gained by "showing" contact with the German commander. On the other hand, a distinct tactical success, significantly reported by A-2 and J-2, would be an indication of the possibility of the German commander's position, could be a strong inducement for him to surrender any further he may have had with us.

10. In dealing with the German commander at this stage, the following points are likely to be helpful:

a. While flattery, obsequiousness, deference and refusal to compromise must be shown in any dealing with him, it is essential that the character of a negotiation be retained to the discussion of the mechanical details of the actual surrender. The German Convention and particular parts of the Hague Convention specify the particular manner in which surrenders are effected, but furnish no essential basis for the discussion of particular points of detail, so long as the German attack is imminent.

b. Within the framework of the above restrictions, which restricts the limits of unconditional surrender, a person's interests are on the line in the initial arrangements for surrender - such as negotiation of a truce, out of sight of their enlisted men; immediate treatment for wounded, packing of medical supplies for a period; immediate provision of artificial medical items, flag, acceptance, reviving of supplies, decorations, the handing over of other items of value and supply to officers of equal rank, etc. go into "surrender" (the only used in previous paragraphs), would affect the unconditional character of the surrender. They are details of surrender, not conditions for it.

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11. When the German commander is approached in this manner, the basis for discussion should be a detailed written outline of the mechanism of surrender, including, in addition to points outlined in 9 above, points on assembling or surrendering troops, units, depositing of arms, time and location of meeting with allied officers and receiving troops, handling of wounded, officers, female personnel, provision of food, etc. If a document of this kind can be made acceptable as a basis for discussion, the military psychological obstacles have been handled and the way is open for the stage of surrender to be discussed (see para. 12).

12. The negotiator must know in mind that he is his chief purpose to make the German commander's stage of military surrender should be made (but cannot usually suggest) that taken seriously, such as when dealing in particular details (see para. 9) might overcome the commander's reluctance. After the basis for the negotiation has been established as outlined above, a frank discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both parties could come to bring out the particular local angle of allied superiority and German weakness, which might lead itself to a suggestion by an expert team operator to achieve the surrender. This would take the form of a demonstration by expert, intense handling of a particularly valuable unit, or the commitment of several flame-throwers against a "sample" pillbox.

13. The situation at this stage, of tentative efforts and weakness serves also the useful purpose of driving home, by implication, the fact that the allies are obviously prepared to carry the place by storm, if necessary. There should be no need to say this aloud, but the commander should be aware of it. Obviously this element alone, as in the case of an ultimatum, is hardly enough. It must be remembered that personally, the German commander is probably quite safe in the command tunnel or bunker, as well as usually safe in the possession of "bullet" proof armor. Allied efforts in the determination to achieve the surrender are chiefly demonstrated by the repeated tactical success of the initial action (see para. 7) and by the handling of the negotiator.

14. Background information (see para. 8 and 9). While helpful in guiding communications to profitable topics, should not be disclosed to the enemy commander. Disclosure of the fact that special studies efforts are being made to exert psychological pressure on him, are likely to jeopardize the entire project.

15. It is obvious that the steps suggested above (especially para. 8 and 10) require time to implement, demand more advance staff planning and incidentally, drive the German commander him for making his own preparations, including the destruction of records and supplies. It is nevertheless believed that an early surrender is more likely to be achieved by these means than by leaving the initiative entirely with the German commander.

REMARKS ON PRACTICE

16. It is especially important to attack the enemy commander.

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even to give him special play in our propaganda. Experience with Col. AULICH (who was extensively interrogated after his surrender at ST. MALO) shows that the publicity he received was a factor in prolonging his resistance. He believes, in fact, that the publicity and his promotion to Major General was a direct outcome of this publicity. He takes special delight in introducing himself to Allied interrogating officers as "The mad colonel of St. Malo."

13. Propaganda should not publicize the fact that previous commanders, in similar circumstances, surrendered after claiming they would not.

a. This would be tantamount to an assertion that they were so earlier than they should have. The German commander nor his troops would believe this. RAJEC and AULICH, for instance, have very high prestige among German soldiers. If interrogation shows that the ultimate surrender is considered contrary to orders to hold out, the commander's orders are not held to apply to hopeless ("pistols against tanks") situations such as prevailed in the last days of the BREZON Peninsula (BREZON) campaign.

b. This would create a spirit of competition in which the commander tried to hold out longer than another garrison did. Moreover, it might give troops the hope that their commander, too, might "surrender earlier than necessary," which would be a reason for holding out in the meantime. For troops prefer an official surrender by a commander, and would be encouraged to hold out "a little longer" if there was hope that that would occur soon.

c. It attaches a negative note to surrender, implying that the commander despises the enemy for surrendering after saying they would not. This impression would be fatal. It is more profitable, far more so both the commander and the troops are concerned, to play on the honorable, ceremonious and chivalrous of the commander.

CONCLUSION

14. It appears, from the above discussion in paragraphs 11, that the psychological handling of the commander and should be part of G-3 planning in operations against surrounded garrisons. The procedure outlined in paragraphs 5 to 10 requires specialized knowledge than an understanding of human nature, common sense and a sound knowledge of German character. Personnel with such qualifications are likely to be available in G-2 and Psychological Warfare of lower echelons and should be consulted in planning of such operations, after familiarization with the points of this paper. If such personnel is available, this division could be a specialist in this subject to a lower headquarters, temporary duty, as the occasion might require.

TAB C

ANALYSIS OF REJECTED ULTIMATA

AND SURRENDER APPEALS

Exhibit No. 1

The ultimatum of (then) Col. Gen. ROMMEL to French troops at BIR HACHIM (Egypt). This is likely to be the document which provoked French commander, (then) Col. KORNIG to send the answer "Merde". KORNIG's [redacted] made [redacted] a romantic symbol of French resistance.

E. 5000	
Subject	Date
Le Colonel Rommel	10 mai 1942
<p>Le Colonel Rommel, je vous envoie ce message pour vous dire que les troupes françaises de Bir Hachim ont été vaincues. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de munitions. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de nourriture. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de vêtements. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de chaussures. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de médicaments. Les troupes françaises ont été vaincues parce qu'elles n'ont pas eu de tout.</p>	
<p>(signed) ROMMEL, Col. Gen.</p>	

"further resistance means senseless bloodshed. You will suffer the same fate as the two British brigades at OT JALIB which were destroyed day before yesterday. We [redacted] if you show [redacted] flags and [redacted] to us without arms." (signed) ROMMEL, Col. Gen.

Comments on ROMMEL's surrender appeal. [redacted] example of mistakes to be avoided in addressing enemy commanders:

1. The message is in German. All messages of this kind should be in the enemy's language.
2. Being presumably written for delivery to French commander, [redacted] neither addresses him, nor specifies [redacted] which [redacted] can effect the surrender. (See par. 10.3 of this paper). "To come [redacted] without weapons" as [redacted] exhortation to Colonel KORNIG could not have produced any other reaction than "Merde".

Exhibit No. 1 (continued)

3. It contains a threat of annihilation which cannot irritate the sense of honor of the recipient. (The ultimatum, while unproductive of ultimates generally - see par. 1 of paper and Exhibit 9 - did avoid this extent, by taking as its occasion a new fact, viz., that LACHEN was surrounded.)
4. Being a peremptory message, presumably delivered by a messenger only, it permitted only of acceptance or rejection, not of discussion. It is an excellent example of this fatal shortcoming.

Exhibit No. 2

Mass-surrender appeal by Japanese to Americans on CORREIDOR.

TO THE
OF CORREIDOR

Between Corridor is about 1000 men, important
point of interest (see between Corridor and Hangeh
see in the hands of Japanese forces and troops of Hangeh
Bay is under complete control of the Japanese Navy.
Japan for the purpose of surrendering an ultimatum to the
The city of Corridor is under attack.

If you refuse to yield, the Japanese forces will by
every possible means destroy Corridor Island and an-
nihilate your forces ruthlessly to the last man.

This is your final chance to avoid destruction. Further
resistance is completely useless.

Your commander will accept every man and in the
end will surrender in order to save his life.

You, dear soldiers, take it into consideration and give
up your arms and stop resistance at once.

Commander-in-Chief of
Imperial Japanese Forces

Comments on this unacceptable surrender appeal.

1. Troops on island, more than a surrounded garrison, are incapable of giving to the enemy.
2. The effect on American commander, who was the only person capable of surrendering CORREIDOR, can only have been adverse in the extreme. General WAINWRIGHT presumably had authority from the War Department to choose the when was unavoidable. Accusing of "sacrificing every and in and surrendering in order to save his life" unlikely im-press him with the fairness of his opponent.
3. The threat of complete annihilation contributes to making appeal utterly unacceptable to an honorable soldier.

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Publication by Commanding General, First U.S. Army, to the German command
of the City of Aachen, on 20 October 1944.

"The city of Aachen is not completely surrounded by
German forces, who are sufficiently equipped with
both air power and artillery to destroy the city if
necessary."

"We shall take the city either by force, the threat
of unconditional surrender or by attacking and
destroying it. In other words, there is no middle
course."

"You will either unconditionally surrender the city
with everything in it, thus avoiding needless loss
of German blood and property, or you may refuse and
await its complete destruction. The choice and the
responsibility are yours."

"Your answer must be delivered within 24 hours of the
publication of this paper."

Comments on the AACHEN ultimatum.

It now appears that this ultimatum was part of a strategic
plan designed to give German reinforcements to the AACHEN area. In
terms of this objective, the ultimatum was successful. It does, how-
ever, demonstrate a good example of the preliminary kind of negotia-
tion (see para. 1 of paper) which is unsatisfactory to a commanding
officer and in fact most unlikely to result in negotiations.

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OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
RECORDS SECTION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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25 January 1946

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The reports from different camps for displaced persons provide an interesting sidelight on the reactions to the counteroffensive. In the camp at SUSSES 210 people, most of them Germans formerly residing in LORRAINE, were questioned on the point: 35% expressed anxiety for themselves and their families; 5% who are openly pro-Nazi hope the Wehrmacht will return; the rest expressed indifference. The sample was random and small, but the results approximate those which emerge from large numbers of individual interrogations of German civilians who remained in occupied towns. In evaluating both the interrogations and the poll, however, it is probably wise to treble the number of pro-Nazis, for the fact that one is facing an interrogator in American uniform has a considerable softening effect upon many "hard core" Nazis. The second report concerns a large group of Russians (former Peasants or workers in Germany) uncaptured in LUXEMBOURG. Their representative, a Russian 1st Lt, now acting as Camp leader, came to American interrogators when the Wehrmacht's approach was reported and requested arms for his men. When told that such a request could not be granted, or that at best they could only hope to be armed with rifles, which would be suicidal against German heavy tanks, the Lt. replied that his men would rather get a shot at the Germans and be killed than just be killed. The interrogator evaluates these sentiments as due primarily to three factors: hatred for the Germans, desire to "vindicate" themselves in the eyes of the Soviet Government, and a recent visit from 2 Russian officers who advised these "displaced persons" that they were still citizens of the U.S.S.R. in good standing, which statement had a notably stimulating effect on morale in the camp.

The Mark and the Dollar

The Bürgermeister of NEUBACH explains why his constituency is so pleasantly surprised that their money retained any value after the occupation. Many Germans began to lose faith in the Reichsmark during 1943, he explains, and particularly after Stettin. Savings in that community went into the "family stocking" instead of the bank account, and soon thereafter came the wholesale conversion to real property, and to furniture and agricultural machinery, but many were willing to exchange currency for any type of goods. The growing shortage of consumer goods helped spread the feeling that paper money was worthless. Hence people were greatly surprised to find the U.S. Army paying out marks and honoring the old currency. People are very satisfied with the present exchange rate, which exceeds their expectation. The Bürgermeister thinks that even this rate (10 \$ per mark) will be too high to maintain after the war in the face of Germany's tremendous burden of debt.

Nazi Propaganda to Alsace

The enemy's "black" propaganda campaign in ALSACE, reported in Summary # 12, has been intensified and broadened to include "gray" material in leaflet form. One pornographic specimen, written in French and entitled "Comez chez soi" (Just like home), notes a dispatch allegedly written by an American correspondent to the effect that G.I.s are "having wonderful time" with Paris females. The reverse side illustrates the point with loud drawings of jeep rides and wild parties. The German news service to French troops is rather more straightforward, but out of date. A copy of "Die Nacht", dated 22 November, dealing with such subjects as the Allied attack on ARDEN and Separatism in Sicily, was not dropped over the French lines until 20 December, four days after the German's own counteroffensive jumped off. Another paper in French, called "Face a face" and sporting the device of a French and a German helmet laid face to face, is lighter in tone - again playing fortissimo its sappy cartoons.

Definition of Politics

Interrogators have frequently noted the strange phenomenon of Germans who declare themselves to be "unpolitisch" and then go on to develop all sorts of complex political ideas. Lately it has become clear that to Germans the term "politics" is synonymous with the comparatively restricted view implied in the American term "racket" or the British term "gang". For the broader

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Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word "politics" the German reserves "Hellschauung". To be "unpolitisch" means not that one has no political ideas, but that one has never had a sincere in the Party machinery. The normal term for the governing body is "Politik", and the general view, as expressed by one young Nazi, is "Politics is all lies". The same youngster informed interrogators of the popular test as to the outcome of the war: "We say among ourselves 'whoever wins the war will win the war'. I think it is the war that makes people lie so much." In the Rhineland, particularly, it is reported that the term "Nazi" is applied only to "outsiders", people who were sent by the Party from towns in Germany or even from Berlin, to take up positions of power. The Nazi, in German eyes, is not the man next door who joined the Party to keep his job, or to improve his position, but the man with delegated authority to withhold ration cards, collect special war taxes, make people go to meetings, or to send them to concentration camps. This somewhat misguided point of view helps account for the feeling among Rhinelanders who remain in the occupied areas that they have nothing to fear from the Nazis even though they are Party members of long standing, and coincides with the complete lack of political responsibility advanced by the "kleiner Mann" as justification for all he has done or left undone in the field of political activity. In many cases, it is clear, such naivete is more simulated than real.

B. EMERGENCY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

DUSSeldorf: A large number of Poles from this city recently interrogated gave several interesting items of information on the attitudes of civilians. One who spent an end-November rationing at home reports that "most" people have remained in the badly damaged town. Destruction of the inner city, as of 1 December, was estimated at 75%. The housing shortage is critical: many of the bombed-out live in cellars; others live in Einzelwohnungen (emergency homes) which they built themselves from food supplied by the city. The Party, said one anti-Nazi Pole, has done good work in aiding the bombed-out, which is said to be a pleasant surprise after the rumors about Party inaction in AACHEN and STUTTGART. For example, the Party has arranged a low ceiling price on food and a strict control system which enables people to get what their ration cards call for. Since this is an important industrial city, officials are anxious to keep workers content and on the job. As yet no general evacuation orders have been issued, but it is expected that when they are issued, there is likely to be considerable resistance. One, for example, reports that his parents had determined never to leave the town - not because they love the Germans or are opposed to the Nazis, but simply because they want to remain in their homes, or at least their home towns, no matter what happens. They have planned to hide in woods if need be in order to evade evacuation. This is linked to the feeling reported by Poles that the arrival of Allied forces would be welcome if only because they would spell the end of the war and bombing.

A British Army Intelligence Summary reported that the Volkssturm in DUSSeldorf is controlled by a strictly political chain of command leading from Gauleiter to Kreisleiter, whose duties include the recruiting of personnel. An anti-Nazi official comprises the officers corps, and the former is in charge of training. Uniforms have not, as yet, been generally issued, and members are reported to be saying openly that they would refuse to fight in civilian clothes. (This coincides with earlier reports that fear of fighting in civilian clothes is widespread among Wehrmacht members). Proclamations posted in the city state that the Wehrmacht is to be used for the following purposes:

- (a) to relieve front line units during rest periods.
- (b) to strengthen certain sectors in the front line.
- (c) to defend German cities in the last and two last hours.

This is the first report of a public announcement that Wehrmacht will be used in the line. Training has been fixed for a three-hour period during the week and an

eight-hour period on Sunday, about which many members are said to be already grumbling. In ROTTERDAM, contrary to the practice in most other cities, the stadtwacht continues in existence alongside the Volkswacht. They are training for use as auxiliary police in case of emergencies, and during the airborne landings in HOLLAND it is reported that this organization, wearing white armbands with the inscription stadtwacht and the police district number, were used to relieve the police for a period of 3 days while the latter were moved to the threatened area.

COLONIES: The prevailing sentiment reported by Pe/1 is that any man in this city "list from wenn er sein bisschen Leben bekommt" (is happy if he can live his own little life). Some 60% of all buildings in the city are reported to be badly damaged; destruction of the inner city, especially in the "Ring" and "Plauer Markt" sections is reported as "nearly complete". Electricity and gas are available only at stated intervals, and water only at designated points. Although ceiling prices for ration card food are low, transport difficulties and occasionally besatzungsbesitz (military domain) exercised by Party officials have caused shortages. In such cases one must have recourse to the black market which is customarily called UF, abbreviation for Unter der Hand (under the counter), where prices are high indeed. A slightly revised estimate from that given in an earlier Summary includes the following prices:

1 lb coffee	-	400 RM
1 lb butter	-	22 RM
1 lb meat	-	65 RM
1 cigar	-	2.70 RM (20 pfennig with coupon)
1 cigarette	-	1.25 RM (3-4 pfennig with coupon)

The Koalitionzeitung of 12 December prints a letter attacking it for praising the murder of German collaborationists with the Allies, while Belgian collaborationists with the Germans had been applauded. It seems likely that this particular letter to the editor is a "plant", for the answer given is very pat indeed. The first argument is a legal one: Belgium was "completely occupied and had capitulated". This is not the case in occupied Germany: "For us DEUTSCHLAND was an occupied town whereas BRUXELLES was, officially stated that AACHEN is a conquered town". The second argument is that Germany had no intention of destroying the Flemings and Walloons, but had offered Belgium a "sound development" while the U.S. merely "brings distress and misery and offends German honor".

FRANKFURT: It is reported from this city that the official estimate of killed during the 27 November raid is now 21,640 though many persons are still missing. More than 20,000 of the killed are said to have been members either of the Sturmabteilung or the Volkssturm. The number of injured was relatively low owing to the extremely heavy bombs used. The local officials are unsatisfied with the explanation that the first bomb destroyed the alarm system so that no alarm was given. They believe sabotage played a role. The FRANKFURTER chief of civil defense, his two assistants, a doctor, a lawyer and six members of an observation post have been arrested so far. The Gauleiter is personally supervising an investigation. People in FRANKFURT do not complain against the Allies, according to a Swiss reporter, but merely decry the misery of war and ask why they have merited such punishment. The population seem to have no fear of Allied troops, mainly because they want to see the war ended and believe things cannot become worse than they are now.

SARREBRUCK: Pe/1 who passed through the SARRE region shortly before capture, claims that the population is deeply resentful of their treatment by the Nazis. Party officials sat safely in the Reich, taking all their belongings with them, while in BRUNNEN, for example, the property of evacuees was left on the town square to deteriorate in the rain instead of being forwarded to the owners as promised. Several Pe/1 from a VG Division, who were home only recently, described the plight of SARREBRUCKERS as "terrible beyond description". Because of the persistent air raids they spend "their whole life" in the cellar.

They have nothing to eat, and if they obtain food cannot cook it as they have to stay in their shelters most of the time. People say openly "If only the 15 years of slavery were here again!" than abusing HITLER's favorite definition of the "Fascist Republic". This report is quite clearly exaggerated, but it does tally with other recent reports from the GDR, which most reporters as late as October 1944 considered firmly pro-Nazi.

The policy of causing mine workers to remain at work in areas slightly behind the lines is again illustrated. Thus, a SAAR newspaper of 21 December prints a strong appeal from the mining firm Saargruben AG, to their workers and miners to "face the future of Germany, your work guarantees and you will save your family from disadvantages and simultaneously serve your Fatherland". The appeal is more conciliatory than other widespread appeals to miners to register, but a threat is quite clearly conveyed in the warning about familial welfare (presumably withholding of ration cards). That this was a Party order rather than that of a private firm is indicated by the fact that the order was signed by the Unternehmensleiter as well as the works leader.

Georg-August-Lager

A Gestapo report of 9-10 November 1944, gives the statistics of arrests in BATH for breach of labor contract, shirking work, and similar offenses: 15 Reichsdeutsche, 53 Frenchmen, 45 Italians, 27 Eastern workers, 22 Poles, 7 Dutchmen, 3 Greeks, 3 Russians, 2 Volksdeutsche, 1 Alsatian, 1 Croat and 1 Spaniard. Remarks in this report are the number of arrests during one week, and the fact that the Gestapo is charged with handling such cases. Two Russian girls, who have worked in various sections of Eastern Germany, say that many German workers were "good people" and did their best to help them, in spite of the order prohibiting all contact between Germans and Russians. The foreman of a mine in which they worked would tell them about the latest political and military developments and would often say "you work too hard, take it easy, work only when the Commandant comes around". They believe he was a Communist sympathizer.

The center of BATH has been reported almost completely destroyed by the R.A.F. raids of 4/5 November. One reliable source estimates 90% destruction in the fully built-up area and 35% in the residential section. This represents a higher rate of destruction than that reported previously in any major city (pre-war population 325,000), and explains recent statements from that area that the Gestapo had declared BATH a "dead city".

A secret order delineated Palmer Hauptquartier, 19 September, confirms previous reports of the division of responsibility between Wehrmacht and Party in REZ measures in Eastern Germany (REZ signifies Airlankerkings, Rauswangs, Lachwangs, and Rauswangs-Lachwangs, or dismantling, removal, stoppage and demolition of installations). The Wehrmacht is responsible for REZ measures in the Military Zone only, which includes only the area immediately involved in the battle. In the civilian zone the responsibility rests with the civil authorities, usually the Reichs Defense Commissioner.

A few restive Germans within the Contact Zone look forward to the arrival of Allied troops for rather special reasons. A letter written by a house-wife in LACH contains the following remarks, which ought to be read as a statement of irritations rather than intentions:

"I wish the 'liberators' would come, so we could clean up. I too could kill a few, there is one, for example, whose throat I could cut at any time - don't laugh at me - your wife can become very brutal when she is provoked. Listen to me: I have a Blockleiter (small Party man) here who keeps pestering me. Four times he has asked me to work at the Westwall. Today I received another request, telling me that my reasons for not going are not valid; at least I should be willing to work a week. The second one even threatened me with punishment. You can imagine how furious I am. But I don't permit myself to be intimidated. I shall stay right at home ..."

(2) The Interior

Industry: Assignment of top priority to Flak production, reported in last week's summary, is confirmed by a letter of 12 November from G.R. SAHR (Head of Armaments and Munitions in SPEER's Ministry) to all war production plants, boards and inspectors:

"In a conversation tonight the Fuehrer finally reiterated, as you were notified on 4 November by Reichminister SPEER, that the production of AA equipment ranks highest among all essential war products. It must be given priority over all other considerations."

This change in priorities is rather drastic, in as much as it supersedes the previous priority of "Goeben Plan" for repair of oil plants, and possibly the production of V weapons. It may be due to the recognition that vital targets, especially oil, cannot be protected against precision bombing by present or prospective methods (e.g. fighter cover), or that the present priority given to their repair in the GOCIP.

A shortage of industrial materials in various parts of the Reich is said by Ps/1 to have caused a serious lag in employment in terms of man-hours worked. One said that some industries in Silesia are working only 3 hours a day, 5 days a week; another claims that Polish workers, who formerly did a 12-16 hour shift 7 days a week, now work 7-8 hours 4 days a week. It is not made clear just which materials are short in which industries, and it is doubtful that shortages are the main reason for the lag. More reliable sources have previously reported critical shortages, particularly of metals used in the manufacture of bearings, but it is notable that these reports are usually accompanied by the name of the substitute which the Germans, with characteristic speed, had already devised to meet the shortage. It is likely that priority allocation of materials for war production, the bombing or transfer of industrial plant, or fuel shortages, may have caused a temporary lag in several industries, but authoritative sources agree that there is unlikely to be any marked shortage in the production of war-essential equipment in the near future.

That there has been some employment lag, particularly after GOEBBELS' total mobilization measures, has been clear from the anonymous expressions of discontent during the past two months. In some cases people have been mobilized only to "hurry up and wait". Or if not to wait, then to occupy themselves with irritating busy work and training programs. A girl in the labour service, for example, complains in two letters to her "Liebchen" about the lack of time off, lack of sleep, and then reveals that she is being mainly occupied, not with production but with such things as a "20 kilometer march in pouring rain". Calling her group "a sorry bunch", she announces that she herself has passed the point of worrying about "appeals".

Shortages: The industrial position has been considerably affected in the overall view by shortages mainly of fuel and transport. The Deutsche Verkehrszeitung of 27 December, in quoting a sentence for failure to register petrol and diesel fuel writes: "The fuel supply has become the central point in the conduct of the war". This is a rare admission in the German press, even in such a technical paper of limited circulation. The transport situation has been a considerable headache for many months now. Its effect on heavy industry, however, has been less than upon small businessmen and consumers. At a session of the Hamburg Gau Economic Chamber on 21 November, reported by its own confidential publication, a committee on Trade problems discussed the question of "Deliveries to and from areas threatened by the enemy", in terms of the difficulties of transport, the possibilities of long delay or destruction by bombing en route, and the consequent effects upon payment. The outcome seems to have been a refusal to deliver goods to the west without some guarantee of early transport and early payment, which guarantees have not yet been forthcoming. The result of such decisions is to deprive consumers, particularly in threatened areas, of essential articles. The German system of provisioning has been disrupted by the transportation crisis to the point where the Ministry has abolished, to a large extent, all exchange of provisions between so-called

surplus and under-supplied regions (Überschuss and Unterschuss Gebiete). This move was announced in several speeches by SAHRF, that each region would have to rely on its own products. The result is that certain regions have too many potatoes but lack meat, others have too much meat but lack vegetables. The whole question of food distribution seems to have become a political football. The Labour Front, Arbeitsfront, has prepared "Plans based on the idea of transporting the whole food distribution apparatus to itself". This is a high-handed piece of bureaucratic imperialism by the Labour Front which has already been declared "impracticable and unsuitable" by the Reich Group Trade Committee.

It is clear that the transport crisis has had some effect upon heavy industry, despite its priorities. It has been reported that all major railroad centers in Germany have several thousand Wagen available, whose only duty consists in repairing damaged rail installations. It is said that, in the past, direct damage has generally been repaired within one day, but it seems likely that continued bombing has begun to produce a more lasting effect on the conditions of the railroads. A joint order by the Reich Transport Minister, Food Minister and Postal Minister, has been published by BS (10 January) which requires "immediate direction of all not fully employed horses to more important tasks". (Race horses and others specially reserved for breeding are exempt). Nor is the use of horses to be taken as evidence of a complete breakdown of the German transport system, for this is by no means the case. Horse-drawn transport, which drew upon the war lost imports of Hungarian horses, has been sustained in Germany. It is important to note that the order was signed jointly by the three ministers mentioned above as a further indication that control of transport has not yet been completely centralized within one authority.

Shortages which directly affect the consumer are increasingly evident. The acute oil-based shortage announced by SAHRF two months ago has now had a direct effect on the carpeting ration available. It has been announced that during the rationing period beginning 1 January, carpeting will be replaced by lard. Another announcement by SAHRF (8 January) indicates that the soap powder ration for children has been cut by half for a period extending to March. All these shortages have led to a great increase in black market activity. The Schwarze Welle of 28 October writes: "It is intolerable that black market prices, imposed at as exorbitant a rate one year ago, have an almost official tinge today, that in restaurants and canteens they are hardly whispered any longer, that rubbish offered in departmental stores at the most shameful prices loudly proclaims money's depreciation". This is the most open official admission to date of the extent of black market activity in Germany. It is suggested by the same newspaper that the efficiency of price control has broken down considerably. This would be a natural result of the diversion of police to other tasks, at the very time when shortages of consumer goods exert increased pressure.

Opposition: A report from Switzerland attributes to the opposition within Germany the view that the Gestapo is directing most of its efforts to tracking down members of the Centre and Socialist parties, while the Communists are less bothered than at any time during the past decade. It is claimed that uniformed men of the SA helped distribute some of the Communist tracts which were recently scattered in Berlin. This fantastic-sounding story is advanced on a theory of Haut-Politique which claims, without producing any real evidence, that top Nazis believe a settlement with Hitler is possible. As one consequence of this view, it is urged by members of the German opposition that the Communists are becoming increasingly active and strong within the Reich. All such reports require considerable skepticism, however, on the basis of the notable lack of hard facts. The Nazi leadership has announced that 20 July marked the end of effective opposition, and we have no serious evidence that this is not true. Stories of anti-Nazi organizations which circulated widely during the four months of 1944, have now fallen off. The Polenliga, it seems clear, is not to be regarded as anything like a large organization with an active and serious political program. Organizations like the Schwarze Front and the Schwarze Partei have recently been reported only in

connection with isolated incidents of small consequence. The view of serious students of the anti-Nazi movements, both within and outside Germany, has always been that no organized revolt was possible without the cooperation of large segments within the Wehrmacht. It is hard to think that this latter condition can be fulfilled, for the army has, since D-day, on the whole accepted thorough penetration by the SS and the Party. A curious item in this connection is a report written on 14 November by a representative of the SS on conditions in armed units near BERNHARD. The report includes severe strictures on the whole military leadership, on the Officers Corps, on propaganda in the Wehrmacht, and on the unsuitability of NS guidance officers. The writer is clearly a member of the "radical" wing of the SS, and too much significance cannot be attached to his report, but the fact that he should be allowed freely to commit such opinions to paper in an official report is indicative of the extraordinary powers with which SS members may be invested. It must be remembered, too, that if guidance officers are ineffective and frequently inept as morale builders among troops, they may nevertheless be effective observation posts planted by the Party within the Wehrmacht.

German Propaganda: The tone of propaganda output concerning the counteroffensive in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG has softened considerably during the past week. From earlier indications of grand objectives, and claims of strategic victory already achieved, the line has changed to admissions that the counteroffensive has become a "battle of attrition" and that the attacking forces have, at several points, been forced on to the defensive. One of the strategic victories claimed is the achievement of a second counterattack in the AARSCHE sector. It is held that the southern stroke was made possible by the forced Allied deployment to meet the northern attack. It is not made clear, however, what the southern attack is intended to achieve.

Considerable emphasis continues on the theme of disunity among the Allies from the long-range point of view, attention being particularly directed once more to events in GREECE and, more particularly, in ITALY. The Allies are reported to be united on only one intention, which is summed up by DMB (9 January) in these terms:

"Various recent discussions among the Allied public indicates that a new historical deception on a gigantic scale, after the pattern of Hitler's 24 points, has been planned in the Allied campaign. The victim is to be the German people."

PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE

1. Morale in Ardennes Sector.

The confident spirit of offensive which was reported declining among the German troops engaged in the Northern counter-offensive has continued to decline and is now largely absent among Ps/W captured by Allied counter-drives in this area. Although lacking specific psychological priming for an all out decision, these soldiers in the main, fought with great determination and offered stiff resistance. Their knowledge of the extent and implications of the German counter-offensive in this sector varied depending on local circumstances. But, with the exception of a small minority of longstanding extreme defeatists (as well as Volksdeutsche and foreigners), the failure of the drive to achieve a deep geographical penetration has not caused a precipitate break in unit morale, although many reports indicate profound defeatism among Ps/W after capture.

Ps/W have been taken during the last days who were ordered to hold their positions for the winter. Whatever disillusionment they may have experienced over the failure of the reports of the capture of Metz and the crossing of the Moselle to nature, these soldiers displayed the traditional willingness and skill to carry out effective holding actions. Individual field interrogations for morale purposes bring to light lack of training among replacements in certain units, a dissatisfaction among some Ps/ in this respect as well as other signs of after capture defeatism. But it is important to remember that German soldiers have displayed unbelievable persistence during former periods of holding operations while the main body of troops was being regrouped. Thus far, the elements of military discipline and automatic obedience which have made such performance possible in the past do not appear to have been altered.

Desertions continue to remain few in the sector of the counter-attack, and in almost all cases motivated by some special longstanding personality factors, at times influenced by our leaflets. That foreigners and Volksdeutsche are more prone to desert is well-known. But the current use of White containing such personnel has not been on a scale as to cause any new problems for the Wehrmacht.

No comprehensive reports on the morale of troops in the counter-offensive in the Saar sector have been received.

2. Faith in Hitler.

The long absence of Hitler from the public scene before his New Year's speech raised the question whether there is developing an attitude of less confidence in the Führer. Hitler, "the great social leader and the advocate of the ordinary German", has been frequently cited by Ps/W as an important source of continued faith in the German cause. During the last weeks rumors have been encountered with increased frequency about the death or removal of Hitler which his silence tended to support. Despite such rumors, detailed examination of a group of Ps/W captured during the counter-offensive indicates clearly that the traditional attachment to Hitler as a German leader has remained intact. Of 60 Ps/W interrogated in detail on this subject about half expressed some measure of approval for the Führer. This percentage significantly has remained relatively constant throughout the entire period of the Western campaign. A survey by P.W. SHAFF of about 450 Ps/W captured just before the counter-attack reveals an even higher figure of trust in the Führer, (65%). Scepticism of Hitler as a military leader is clearly discerned, as well as criticism of some of his underlings. But the belief still exists that he is a man who would not continue the war or launch a counter-attack unless there were justified political reasons for so doing.

The general isolation of the front line soldier from the political events of the homefront has made it possible for former patterns of ideas to persist. The argument that Hitler is too busy to make speeches, which is currently offered to the troops, suffices for those followers who are bothered by the problem.

3. Faith in the High Command.

The question will also be raised of whether confidence in the High Command has been undermined by recent events. No quantitative studies on this point have yet been made, but there is a trend of individual interrogations touching on the point. This trend indicates that thus far faith in the High Command has not been substantially shaken. This is partly due to the blind obedience of the German soldier often noted here. The ultimate impact of a great defeat, if such should occur, might have disastrous effects, but probably not in the measurably short run.

One effect of the offensive may tend to vitiate in future, however, one of the strong points of German morale. The feeling on the part of the Landser that the American infantryman was not in his watch has been periodically reported from many interrogation sources. In this offensive, contrariwise, a new respect for the American infantry appears to have emerged. The exaggerated propaganda indoctrination leading to under-estimate the American infantry, followed by the startling tenacity and skill of their defense, has caused articulate disillusionment on the part of German prisoners of war. It would not be accurate to state that the German self-pride so often evident, even in interrogation, has been badly bruised. All that can be said is that the Wehrmacht is again realizing that the American soldier is a foe worth of his steel.

4. Reactions to Allied Propaganda.

The decision not to drop leaflets on German troops during the early phase of the counter attack and bad weather hampering air drops in other sectors have lowered the percentage of Ps/W who report having seen our printed propaganda. Moreover, a good proportion of the current Ps/W were taken from units which have arrived only recently at the front and therefore have had little opportunity for exposure to our leaflets.

Tabulations of over 150 Ps/W captured during the last two weeks in December on the 1, 2, 9 US Army fronts reveal that about 50 per cent report having seen leaflets. Not all such leaflets were seen recently. The figure of 50 per cent was made up in part of mentions of contact with our leaflets during previous months in some cases even as far back as Normandy.

5. Fear of Anglo-American Occupation.

Recent studies by FMJ, SHAEF of 450 prisoners of war confirms the marked lack of hostility towards and fear of Anglo-American occupation. In appraising this study, however, it must be recognized that many Germans, who are unafraid of our occupation, do not actively desire it to come to pass.

The prisoners were asked whether they thought Anglo-American troops are imbued with a spirit of revenge towards the German population, and whether they would show a hostile attitude to the population. Only 11 per cent of all the prisoners thought that there would be a spirit of revenge and only 18 per cent that a hostile attitude would be exhibited to the population. These figures should be raised somewhat because the poll was taken in an American enclosure, and a certain number of Ps/W undoubtedly aim to please even though the questionnaires were anonymous. These quantitative results, in the main, however, are confirmed by interrogations made by the FMJ Interrogation Team. There is little fear, the survey reveals, of looting, wilful destruction of private property or the neglectation of German women, on the part of Anglo-American troops.

The survey further attempted to study the effect of that part of the "Strength through Fear" propaganda which implies that life would be intolerable for the average German under occupation. It appeared that less than 20 per cent of the Ps/W believe that life in general, under Anglo-American occupation, would be so hard as to be unendurable, although 50 per cent recognize that life would, indeed, be hard.

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JANUARY 1945

TO : The Chief of Staff

09/11/2/13

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5. That the principle be reaffirmed that in propaganda to Germany, full use should be made in the future of the facts:

REST
AIR 280-3
SCAF

COPY

copy

- a. That **■** intend to respect the Geneva Convention;
- b. That **■** intend to carry into practice in Germany the principles promulgated from time to time in the **■** of the Supreme Commander and explained in simple language in the series of statements by the Spokesman of Military Government.

/s/ ROBERT A. McCLURE
/t/ ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

CONCURRENCES

G-1	RWB
G-2	WB
G-3	AAN
G-5	FJMcS
PO	MJB (?)
British Political Adviser	■ (?)
American Political Adviser	A.M.

Initials:

RWB
WB
AAN
FJMcS
MJB (?)

A.M. See my memorandum of Jan. 24, 1945, attached
I concur in recommendation.

A.M.

■ 'A'
7A

Date 1/2/45

Approved

F.E. Morgan
D/COS

JV

copy

SECRET

SECRET

SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DPL

TOO 082116Z JAN

SHAFF 85/09

FOR 030905A JAN

1G -090908A JAN

THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF A COM ZONE INCOMING MESSAGE.

SECRET

R Q U T I A N E

FROM : AGWAR FROM BARRETT THROUGH WDGBI SIGNED ULIO
 TO : LTUSA TO BOCLURE
 PASSED TO : SHAFF MAIN FOR ACTION
 REF NO : W-88619 3 January 1945.

Answering your question concerning 13 SHAFF messages, ONI people recommend them as valuable propaganda material at a time when German people needed some safe reassurances. ONI also understands need for their careful handling so as not to promise more than we can furnish.

German Desk State Department evidently approves since no objections indicated. OAD Officials doubtful of making further extensive use of messages. They believe there is great danger of committing ourselves to more than we can carry out. They stress that while we are attempting to accomplish certain things, extreme care should be taken about leading Germans to believe those things will be accomplished definitely.

Will hold further discussions and advise you accordingly.

ACTION: MID(SHAFF)
 INFORMATION: SGS
 C-2
 POLITICAL OFFICERS
 MR MURPHY
 AG RECORDS

SMC IN 3092 9 Jan. 1945 0942A DWR/rob Ref. No: W-88619

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SHAFF File No. 091419/3

8 JAN

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

~~SECRET~~

WMO/JS

PWP 334

1 January, 1945.


SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting - Psychological Warfare, 1 Jan. 1945.

TO: The Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
" " " " " G-2 " "
" " " " " G-3 " "
" " " " " G-5 " "
The Chief, Public Relations Division, " "
The Political Adviser (U.S.), " "
The Political Adviser (Br.), " "

The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare to be held at Room 25, Hotel Trianon - 10 January, 1945 at 1430.

Consideration of the - in propaganda of existent commitments to the German people as individuals (see appended Staff Study, "Psychological Warfare Division Propaganda to Germany").

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE.
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Div.



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C914/2/3

8 JAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Psychological Warfare Division

January 1945

SPECIAL GUIDANCE ON SITUATION IN WEST GERMANY.

RECOMMEND.

The enemy is now in process of conducting a planned withdrawal of his major units - especially armored units - from the ridge area. The withdrawal is following standard lines - Wg and infantry units are being left behind to cover the withdrawal of SS and Panzer formations; the enemy is making his usual strenuous efforts to keep open the shoulders of his escape route, after having failed to recapture BASSENGNE and provide the communications essential for a continuance of either attack or defense in the areas which he is now abandoning under our pressure. It is not to be expected, however, that our troops will be able to do more in the immediate future than to force the enemy back to the lines held prior to 16 December.

DISSEMINATION.

In propaganda, we must act immediately to extract the full benefit from the enemy's decision, and the situation in which he has placed himself, even though our own military exploitation may not be immediately far-reaching. We must forestall any Nazi attempt to make a propaganda victory out of the total December offensive by claiming that the Allied plans for a winter offensive have been halted, and that German units stand intact after having gained months of time for the Army and Party.

GUIDANCE.

1. In carrying the news, we should give full play to the military operations, featuring all evidence
 - a. of our successful advance - in particular, any hard or plausible stories of disruption of German attempts to withdraw in orderly fashion, with armor and equipment, from their forward position;
 - b. of German losses in manpower and material.
 - c. of German surrenders, and ~~if our best treatment of~~ prisoners (?)
2. In talks and commentaries, as well as by selection of news, we should act vigorously
 - a. to cash all the commitments which we have basily pinned on the German leadership in the course of the last few weeks - the failure to take LIEGE, BRUSSELS, ANTWERP, or VERDUN; the failure to split the Allied armies, to destroy their offensive capabilities, or to eliminate them from the military picture; the failure to clear Allied troops from German soil.
 - b. to demonstrate
 - (1) the failure of the Luftwaffe, and of V-1 and V-2 to perform as adequate substitutes for artillery or bombs.
 - (2) the failure of the SS leaders and units to do their part.
3. We must show the German people - soldiers and civilians - the three-fold responsibility for this costly gaffe -
 - a. Hitler was responsible for the conception of the idea.

~~SECRET~~

In September, he decided the war had to go on, planning resistance on German soil. This he found was impossible, so was forced to decide to give the German Nibelungen their Gotterdammerung outside Germany;

- b. Hitler was responsible for all the measures of oppression and squeeze-out to produce the material and manpower necessary to launch the offensive;
- c. Rastdorf threw in his lot with his political leaders, and lent all his military talents to the mounting and execution of a hopeless operation, in which German troops, unable to stand attrition in the relative security of the Westwall, were brought into far costlier engagements in the open.

4. Thus we can use the whole episode to underline both the political irresponsibility and the military bankruptcy of Germany's position - no Germany's leaders, forced into reckless gambling in a vain hope of pulling out a victory not in the cards.

5. Despite all Germany's losses and investments in a desperate attempt to relieve the pressure of the sixth winter of the war, the Allied action approach her depleted defenses on the West; the Russians are hammering at her South-eastern gates; the Allied armies are tying down important German troops in Italy, while from North-west, West, South and East, the bombing of the homeland continues implacable and more intense.

6. Here then ever, German resistance is hopeless. Each day the war-prolongers keep her in the struggle, the longer the commencement of reconstruction is postponed, and the more difficult Germany's task of reconstruction will be.

7. We should be prepared to resume the following campaigns as soon as the last territory has been recaptured and additional advances begin.

- a. on anti-occupation and Military Government; ✓
- b. of showing conditions of life and attitude of people in Allied-occupied Germany;
- ✓ c. of special appeals to key classes - railway workers, peasants, etc.

8. Cautions. Until subsequent guidance is issued, we should observe the following instructions carefully:

- a. There must be no commitment of the Allied troops to take territory beyond the lines of December 15th;
- ✓ b. he should not yet say - ~~though the increasing propaganda times may be interpreted as -~~ that the war has been shortened by the abortive German drive; (?) ✓
- ✓ c. we should not speculate on what effect these developments will have on the war situation, which may provide further difficulties for us if the Germans try to recoup their defeats by renewed fanatical attacks in the secondary sector. ✓

ROBERT A. MOULDER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

~~SECRET~~

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

091.412.

1 January 1944

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Division Propaganda to Germany.

TO: The Chief of Staff.

DISCUSSION.

1. The view is held by the American Political Adviser, Mr. Murphy, that the use of any commitments to Germans as individuals in propaganda implicitly violates the principle of unconditional surrender.

2. It is brought out in the attached study TAB 'A', however, that American and British Governments, while adhering to their policy of making no commitments to any German government, party, or movement, have entered into certain definite commitments with respect to German people, regarded as individuals, as a result of:

- a. Adherence of our governments to the Geneva Convention; in particular, clauses relating to the return of prisoners of war after the end of hostilities.
- b. The issuance of a series of proclamations by G-5, SHAEF, stating the principles and procedures of Military Government and including announcements on policy, education policy, attitude to trade unions, judicial procedure, etc. (Full governmental sanction for the use in propaganda of this series of proclamations is contained in a directive from the State and War Departments and Office of War Information, concurred in by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office.)

3. For obvious reasons we cannot afford to disregard the clear advantages to be gained by the full exploitation of these established facts of British and American policy in our propaganda.

4. That the principle be reaffirmed that, in propaganda to Germany, full should be made in the future, as it has been in the past, of the themes:

- a. That we are fully committed to respect the Geneva Convention.
- b. That we are fully committed to carry into practice in all areas of Germany, which fall under Allied Military Government, the principles and regulations promulgated in the name of the Supreme Commander and explained and expanded in simple language in the series of Statements by the Spokesman of Military Government.

DISTRIBUTION.

British Political Adviser.
American Political Adviser.

G-5.

G-2.

G-3.

PD.

G-1.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
RESTRICTED
16 AUG 1945
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Division.

6 731

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY [REDACTED]
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'A'

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION PROPAGANDA POLICY TO GERMANY.

1. Psychological Warfare Division Policy to Germany is based
■ a series of documents of which the most important are:

- a. A Directive from the State Department, War Department and Office of War Information, concurred in by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office (See ■ message Ref. No. ■ 56779, 3 November 1944) reading in partial paraphrase as follows: "All Allied output should ■ clear that ■ intend to establish firm and orderly administration in each area, but ■ the well-being of each community will depend largely ■ the behavior of the Germans. ■ should ■ our complete ability to cope with any non-cooperation by Germans and ■ corresponding indifference ■ the degree of cooperation which they give Allied authorities; ■ Germans decline to cooperate it is they and ■ Allies ■ will suffer.


The average German, however, may properly ■ reassured to the following extent:

- (1) We are determined to punish severely all those guilty of war crimes.
(2) ■ are completely determined to eliminate the Gestapo, ■ SS, the Nazi Party ■ ■ militarists.
(3) At ■ time, the average German and his family will have opportunity to live and work peacefully ■ without molestation if they have committed no crimes, if they demonstrate willingness to work their way back into the family of Nations ■ if they abide by Allied regulations."

- b. Directive on ■ Treatment in propaganda of Military Government, issued by the Chief of Staff after ■ concurrence by all Staff Divisions and by both Political Advisers; (TAB 'B')

- c. Text of a series of Statements by the Spokesman of Military Government, concurred in by Staff Divisions and by both Political Advisers and issued under the authority of the Chief of Staff. ■ (C)

2. ■ implementing ■ the policy contained in these documents, Psychological Warfare Division has felt itself bound ■ an over-all directive that no propaganda to Germany ■ contain any promises or assurances either to the German Government or to ■ political party or movement such as would commit the British and American Governments ■ post-war policy to which they ■ been previously committed.



3. It is clear, however, from the text of the documents cited in paragraph 1 that the broad ban on promises and commitments has been qualified

a. Inasmuch as a number of proclamations have been issued by G-5, stating the principles and procedures of Allied Military Government. These proclamations are simplified, explained and enlarged in the series of broadcasts by the spokesman of Allied Military Government. These statements included announcements on wage policy, education policy, attitude to Trade Unions, judicial procedure, etc.

b. Inasmuch as the British and American Governments together with the German Government are bound by the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. Propaganda to combat troops has very largely concentrated on reassuring Germans that they will be treated according to the terms of this convention if captured; in particular, that they will receive good food, be permitted to write letters and - most important of all - will return home as soon as possible after the war.

4. In the light of the above considerations, it would be wishful thinking to persuade oneself that the British and American Governments have not already undertaken certain commitments vis-a-vis the German people. Apart from the special commitments of the Geneva Convention, political commitments were first made in general terms by the President, Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin when in various speeches they stated their determination to eradicate National Socialism and Militarism. Moreover, each of them has entered into a negative commitment in more or less precise terms, not to destroy the German people as such. These general statements of intentions were reiterated more specifically on behalf of the British and American Governments in their Proclamations on Military Government and the Statements by the Spokesman of Military Government. They are briefly as a commitment to destroy National Socialism and Militarism, to restore certain elemental rights in areas which fall under their control, the Supreme Command, and to abide faithfully by the Geneva Convention, including those clauses which regulate the return of prisoners of war to their home countries on conclusion of hostilities.

5. It should be noted, however, that - apart from the Atlantic Charter, which, since its publication, has been held to apply to Germany - the commitments entered into do not in any way resemble those of President Wilson's 14 Points, for:

- a. The British and American Governments made no commitments vis-a-vis Germany regarding frontiers or the principle of self-determination;
- b. They have not committed themselves against the policy of dismemberment;
- c. They have not committed themselves to support any particular form of government, though they have committed themselves to destroy the present form of government (i.e. they have avoided committing themselves to supporting any political party or movement in Germany)

6. In brief, the commitments entered into are not commitments to Germany as a state or nation, nor to any German government present or future. They are only commitments to Germans, regarded as individual beings. Moreover, all the commitments entered into under the authority of the Supreme Commander are relative only to such individual Germans as fall into our hands either as prisoners of war or as civilians living under Allied Military Government.

7. It has recently been suggested by the American Political Adviser, Mr. Murphy, that the use of these commitments in propaganda to Germany offends against the over-all governmental policy of no commitments, and thereby implicitly violates the principle of unconditional surrender.

8. In the view of this Division the position adopted by the American Political Adviser is untenable for the following reasons:

- a. Unconditional surrender applies to the German High Command and to the German government. It does not and cannot apply to the individual German soldier or civilian. The individual German soldier, taken in combat, does not make an unconditional surrender. He makes a surrender which he and we mutually recognize as conditional on our treatment of him as a prisoner of war according to the Geneva Convention. Equally, when a German town is overrun the individual German citizen has not surrendered unconditionally. He has become subject to Military Government; and his human rights are immediately defended by the laws and regulations of Military Government.
- b. It is to be noted, that whereas the German soldier falls under the protection of an international convention to which the American, British and German governments are committed, the German civilian is protected only by laws and regulations promulgated by the Supreme Commander under the authority of the British and American Governments. This does not, however, affect the issue that in our relations both with the German soldier and with the German civilian, we have committed ourselves to a whole series of limitations upon the treatment which we shall impose.
- c. These facts are fully realized in the joint State Department, War Department, Office of War Information Directive, concurred in by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office under which Psychological Warfare Division propaganda works. In this Directive there is no suggestion that we should not commit ourselves most solemnly both to the destruction of Nazism and Militarism and to the restoration of those human rights of which "the law-abiding German" has been deprived since 1933.

CONCLUSION:

9. In view of the actual situation which exists, Anglo-American propaganda would be needlessly foregoing one of its potentially most effective weapons if it did not make fullest use of these themes.

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- 4 -

TAB 'A'

- a. That ~~we are committed~~ ^{intend} to respect the Geneva Convention.
- b. That we ~~are committed~~ ^{intend} to carry into practice in ~~all areas of Germany, which have been placed under Military Government,~~ the principles ~~and regulations~~ promulgated ^{frontiers} in the name of the Supreme Commander and explained ~~and~~ ^{to him} in simple language in the series of Statements by the Spokesman of Military Government.

COPY, 13.11.44.

**SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARTILLERY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division**

TAB 'B'

GRON/JS

24 October, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
Memorandum - 10.1.

1. POLICY.

Guidance to Army G. O. N. 1.

- a. The following directive has been issued by Supreme Commander. It provides the standard instructions for the treatment of Military Government in our propaganda to Germany. It is of primary importance and all those concerned with radio and leaflet work should be fully informed of its contents and should observe it strictly. If there are any points of doubt or any points not covered, they should be referred immediately:

a1. The treatment of military government in propaganda to Germany will be guided by the following overall directives:

(a) The Germans should be told that how they fare under Military Government depends very largely on their own behaviour both before and after occupation; e.g. if they destroy or permit to be destroyed vital transport and communications facilities, installations and stores, they will suffer accordingly. It should be made quite clear that economically they will have to fend for themselves.

(b) No promises should be made of material help or assistance. The activities of the Allied armies in Germany and of Military Government will be motivated strictly by military requirements. Once the surge of the Axis has been completed in every area, and military requirements have been met, Military Government will permit the German, if they do as they are told, to behave normally, to benefit from their own resources. Consequently the individual German's standard of life in the occupied territory depends directly upon the preservation of existing resources.

(c) In particular no promise of any sort should be given that food will be imported into Germany.

(d) No attention that could possibly be construed as political recognition should be given in propaganda to any party or group.

2. Strictly within the above overall Directive, propaganda may discuss the following aspects of Military Government and illustrate them, where possible, by concrete illustrations from areas under Military Government:

(a) Military Government destroys Nazi and Gestapo rule; it abolishes all laws and institutions discriminating on grounds of party, race or creed; it restores to the individual justice, law and order.

(b) Military Government eradicates authoritarianism from every position of authority and influence. Subject to its own absolute control, it authorises responsible Germans to replace the ousted Nazis in administrative posts.

(c) Military Government will purge German schools, universities and youth organisations of militarism.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By *[Signature]*
Date 16 AUG 1946

As soon as circumstances permit, schools will be reopened.

(d) Military Government restores freedom of religion and will recognize the legitimate claims of the German churches to the restoration of Church property seized by the Nazis.

(e) Military Government destroys the Nazi labour front ■ it destroys all other Nazi organizations and authorizes the reestablishment of Trade Unions as conditions will permit. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden.

(f) Military Government gives an absolute priority to the food requirements of the liberated people.

(g) The Allied armies will import the bulk of their own food supplies.

(h) Military Government requires measures to be taken by the German authorities and by German courts:

- (i) to stamp out food hoarding and black market activity,
- (ii) to maintain German food production at the highest possible level,
- (iii) to assure efficient distribution of German food stocks by rationing and price control."

b. The following letter has been addressed by Chief of Staff to Public Relations Division in order to ensure their cooperation:

1. Attached to this letter is a copy of a directive to Psychological Warfare Division covering the propaganda treatment of Military Government.

2. This directive is designed to initiate action which will:

- a. soften enemy resistance,
- b. prevent the destruction of important installations and resources in Germany.

3. It is most important that press correspondents should not make use of material put out by P.W.D. as the result of this directive to suggest that we are being unnecessarily humane about Germany. Such action would inevitably nullify the propaganda campaign and might lead to friction with Allied Nations.

4. In particular, press correspondents should be impressed that:

- a. humane treatment of the Germans should not be featured as "Allied Humanity" but reported straight and closely linked to military requirements,
- b. anti-Nazi activity among Germans should not be overplayed,
- c. if Military Government should find it necessary to import food into a given locality this should be reported factually and without generalization,
- d. if owing to military requirements a village has to be destroyed this should be reported factually and not generalized. (See also B.I.M. 10.3. 11).

- a. if use is made of a particular faction in any one locality this should not be interpreted to represent general recognition of the faction in question,
- f. if military necessity results in the employment of an official who has been a member of the Nazi party this is exceptional and purely temporary in character."
- c. The following points arising out of Brig. General Holmes' Press Conference of 18 October, 1944 need elucidation:
 - (1) German partisans and possible German "maquis". Chief of Staff's memorandum of September, 1944 to 12 Army Group, 21 Army Group and 17th Army still holds good. Avoid all reference to this subject, whatever the provocation by German propaganda.
 - (2) Hostages. The question of hostages should not be touched.
 - (3) The use of English as the official language of Military Government. Ordinance No. 3 states:
 "All official pronouncements and all documents issued or made by or under authority of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force will be drawn in the English language. If translations into German or any other language are furnished, the English text shall in every instance prevail."
 - (4) Non-Fraternization. A.I.M. No. 1, I. a. still holds:
 "Propaganda should not refer to our policy of non-fraternization with the German populace."
 G-1 strongly concurs in view that propaganda should not touch this topic.
 - (5) Political parties. The derogation of the Nazi law forbidding political parties must not be interpreted as meaning that we shall permit them to start as soon as military government is established. That is not at present our policy.

(SRD) ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
 Brigadier General, U.S.C.,
 Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Distribution:

For action:

21 P.W., 21 Army Group (3)
 21 P.W., 12 Army Group (3)
 C. of S., 6 Army Group, for A.I.C. (3)
 O.S.S., Signal Base Section (3: attention Mr. Howard Baldr)
 Radio Luxembourg (3: 1 for H.Q., 2 for D. Det.)
 P.W.D. Base (15: 1 to LID Country, Mr. Dalkor)

For Information:

G-1 (1)
 G-2 (1)
 G-3 (1)
 G-4 (1)
 G-5 (1)
 SRD (2: 1 to Staffing Branch,
 S.W. Military Mission to A.I.C.,
 " " " " BLANCHET,
 " " " " KEMERLANDS.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 1

ANNOUNCER: You will now hear a message about the military government of Germany. This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander.

VOICE: Germans: This is the voice of the Military Government. This message comes to you from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

Your armed forces will be defeated, and and more of your territory will be occupied by the Allied forces until eventually your government and its armed forces finally surrender or are

You will be under a military occupation, and your country will be governed by a military government. Already there are Germans living under this Military Government.

In this series of thirteen broadcasts, you will be told how military government will affect you and how the Supreme Commander will conduct it. You will be told how you should conduct yourselves under military occupation and Military Government.

1. Under the law of nations, the commander of the occupying forces is clothed with supreme executive, legislative and judicial power in the occupied area. This power, vested in the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force as Military Governor, will be exercised by him in accordance with the dictates of humanity, justice and civilized standards.

2. The Military Government of Occupied Germany will be firm and strict, and just. Its aim will be the destruction of the Nazi system and the militaristic system of armed aggression.

3. The Military Government will be conducted by soldiers, who will be guided by written rules of law. In the military government you will be spared corruption, personal greed, falsehood and barbarity of your present rulers.

4. The laws of the Military Government will be promulgated and published so that all will know what is law. Except when in conflict with these new laws, the existing laws will remain in effect. The laws of the Military Government will be strictly enforced. Their meaning will be plain you must observe obediently once.

5. The courts of the Military Government will be conducted with fairness and promptness. Punishment for violations of will be orderly swift. No punishment will be ordered without a trial.

Listen carefully to the next of these broadcasts tomorrow at this time. You will be told the principles of Military Government of Germany and you will be told you must yourselves under military occupation.

This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in his capacity as Military Governor of the areas of Germany occupied by the under his command.

This is the Voice of the Military Government.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 2

(Open and close with set formula as in No. 1)

1. The German people's hopes of avoiding economic breakdown after defeat depend to a great extent on their will to resist the Nazis' plans to destroy German property and resources in the path of the advancing Allied armies. The policy of "scorched earth" cannot harm the Allies, who will bring their own supplies with them, but it must cause great suffering to the German people.
2. Military government will not replace utilities, buildings, stocks of materials or mining and industrial equipment destroyed by Germans under the policy of "scorched earth".
3. The Allied air and land forces will inevitably cause great damage so long as the German Wehrmacht continues to carry out the Nazis' orders for useless resistance. The hardships caused by this must be increased manifold if Nazi plans to make Germany into a desert are fulfilled by the action of the German people themselves.
4. In particular, stocks of food, seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery must be preserved in danger is not to follow defeat. Farmers must take every possible step to prevent their livestock from being driven away by the Nazis as the Allied armies approach. They must do all they can to keep their farms in order so that they will be capable of the maximum production. The German people must not expect the Military Government to provide food, fuel or clothing. They must rely on their own resources.
5. While hoarding of foodstuffs and support for the black market is understandable under Nazi rule and may help to soften the last war machine and so accelerate the end of bloodshed, it is now necessary under Allied occupation. The Military Government will confiscate hidden surpluses of food and other goods and have them distributed to those in need. Farmers will, therefore, be able to bring supplies, which they have hidden, to the markets established by Military Government and sell them there at the fixed prices, that all may obtain a fair ration.
6. The Allied forces will import the bulk of their own needed supplies, but any aid which they can give to the people in Europe will be given first to the people of the countries devastated and plundered by the German armies. Germany will have to stand on her own resources, and it is essential that these shall not be destroyed by the Nazi policy of "scorched earth".

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

(Upon the order of the Military Government, as in 1945)

1. Your first duty will be to remain peaceful and orderly. You should continue your daily work, even if you are engaged in a lawful pursuit. Be obedient to the orders of the occupying forces of the Military Government.

2. The occupying forces after their arrival in the city of Berlin will be responsible for the security of their own forces.

3. Subject to Military Government, your right to your own property will be respected, but you will not be permitted to resist in any way the orders of the Military Government.

4. The occupying forces will not, however, be obliged by them to provide any facilities for the use of the occupying forces or any of its personnel. The occupying forces will not be obliged to provide any facilities for the use of the occupying forces.

5. You must aid the Military Government in restoring order and maintaining the peace.

6. You must avoid any suspicion of being involved in any effort to obstruct the Military Government. Any aid and assistance to any person who is engaged in any effort to obstruct the Military Government will be severely punished. Any aid and assistance to the Military Government will be severely punished.

7. Above all, you must refrain from taking part in any effort, whether organized or unorganized, to resist or to oppose the occupying forces of the Military Government.

STATES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY.
S. 1.

(Open and close with next formula, as in No. 1)

1. Beware of joining or causing others to join para-military organizations. Any effort or complicity by such means the military which must be strictly out in Germany will meet with severe punishment by the Military Government.
2. You will be required by regulations and ordinances of the Military Government to surrender and deliver up to the authorities all articles which have military significance. These include weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitters, and other equipment. You must acquaint yourselves with all regulations governing illicit possessions and obey them scrupulously, on pain of severe penalties.
3. Your cooperation with Military Government in these necessary procedures for the demilitarization of your country will facilitate the task of Military Government in the necessary performance of its duties in maintaining order in your country.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 6.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. The rule of justice and equality before the law is to be established in Germany. In the Military Government courts established to enforce legislation enacted by Military Government and to punish offenders against the interests of the Allied forces and the United Nations, the accused person will be entitled to have in advance of trial a copy of the charges against him, to give evidence and cross-examine any witness, to consult a lawyer before trial and to choose an advocate to defend him, to call his own witnesses and, if convicted, to lodge an appeal to a Military Government reviewing authority. No death sentence will be carried out without written confirmation by the Supreme Commander or a representative nominated by him.

2. The criminal and civil court systems of Germany when purged of Nazi and otherwise undesirable elements, will be permitted to reopen in due time under supervision and control. Violation of approved German laws by Germans and foreigners, other than members of the Allied forces and United Nations displaced persons, will normally be tried in German courts.

3. Special courts associated with the Nazi regime, such as the People's Court and S.S. Police Courts, will be abolished.

4. All laws aimed at enforcing Nazi doctrines and practices will be null and void. All sentences of death or corporal punishment imposed by German courts shall be suspended pending review by the Military Government. Other existing German laws will be recognised where they do not conflict with the policies or legislation of the Military Government.

5. Every German judge, prosecutor, notary or lawyer, will be required to take the following oath:-

"I swear by Almighty God that I will at all times
fairly and adequately serve the law without fear or favour
and with justice and equity to all persons of whatever
 creed, race or political opinion they may be; that I
will obey the laws of Germany and all enactments of
the Military Government in spirit as well as in letter,
and will constantly endeavour to establish equal
justice under the law for all persons. So help me God."

6. The Military Government is empowered to attend the hearings of any German court, to nullify, suspend, commute or otherwise modify any finding, sentence or judgment, to disqualify or suspend any judge or official and to transfer any case to the jurisdiction of the Military Government courts.

7. No sentence of death passed by a German court will be executed without previous confirmation by the Military Government.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 7.

(Open and close with a set formula, as in No. 1)

1. For over 10 years, you have been existing under a regime which made unjust discrimination against innocent people into a system of law. Such laws are abhorrent to every sense of justice. They will not be tolerated by the Military Government.
2. The Military Government will strike down and abolish all Nazi-made laws which discriminate against and penalise any person or group on the ground of religion, race, nationality, language or political opinion.
3. Freedom to follow your own religious beliefs is returned to you by Military Government. Places of religious worship will be reopened and may remain open. It is for you to preserve the sanctity of religious worship by preventing the abuse of this natural right. You will forfeit it if you allow religious gatherings to be misused for political purposes.
4. Military Government will recognise the just claims of religious organisations for the restoration of property stolen by Nazi organisations or persons either under the colour of law or otherwise.
5. Nazis who have penetrated into positions of authority in any church organisation will be removed and the churches purged of Nazi influence. Freedom of religion will be given to you, free of hidden terror and restraints.
6. Not only the laws but also the agencies and the many devices which the Nazis have created to carry out their policies of unjust discrimination on the grounds of race or religion, or nationality or political opinion, will be wiped out.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 8

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Under Allied Military Government existing legal tender German currency will be continued to the extent allowed by German law. In addition, Allied Military Marks will be made legal tender and must be accepted on the same basis as Reichsmarks. It will be an offence to discriminate between Allied Military Marks and German legal tender. British sterling currency and United States dollars will not be legal tender.
2. Financial laws, regulations and practices discriminating against any person on account of race, religious belief or political opinion, will be abrogated and all will be treated with equal justice under the law.
3. German public authorities will continue to collect taxes and to pay for local public expenses which do not prejudice the Military Government or its policies.
4. German officials will be instructed to continue German measures against inflation such as rationing, price control, prohibition of dealings in black markets and so forth. The effectiveness of such measures always depends upon the spirit in which they are carried out and it will be for the German people to show whether they can and wish to prevent an inflation which can only bring ruin upon the German people themselves.
5. The Military Government does not propose to close financial institutions. Banks will be closed only if absolutely necessary and in that event only long enough to introduce satisfactory controls, to provide adequate facilities for military needs and to ensure that Military Government instructions and regulations are observed.
6. As under German administration, so too under Military Government, foreign exchange transactions will be regulated. It is the intention of Military Government to preserve the status quo of all properties which may be the subject of disputes concerning ownership or possession, until these matters can be properly determined. Persons who seek to evade such provisions will find that the measures which they take are unavailing and will be subject to punishment by Military Government Courts. This includes persons who deal with or receive such properties.
7. In other words, the aim of the Allied Military Government in the financial field is to establish financial order and to protect the rightful owners of property and assets.

STATES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF A. H. H. H.
1941.

(Continued from page 1 of 1)

1. The Allied Military Government proposes to block all property of the Nazi Party, its leading officials and supporters. The property of the Nazi Party and its leading officials will be protected and preserved for the use of the Allied Military Government.
2. The leading officials of the Nazi Party are required to hold and preserve their property, subject to the instructions of the Allied Military Government.
3. The Allied Military Government proposes to block all property of the Nazi Party and its leading officials, and to prevent the use of such property for the benefit of the Nazi Party and its leading officials.
4. The Allied Military Government proposes to block all property of the Nazi Party and its leading officials, and to prevent the use of such property for the benefit of the Nazi Party and its leading officials.
5. The Allied Military Government proposes to block all property of the Nazi Party and its leading officials, and to prevent the use of such property for the benefit of the Nazi Party and its leading officials.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 10.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Nazi concentration camps will be taken over at once, and used for the detention of arrested Nazis after the release of their innocent victims.
2. The Military Government will set up conditions to consider as rapidly as possible the cases of ill-treatment so that every person who has been wrongfully detained by the Nazis shall be released.
3. While these inquiries are in progress the camps will be controlled by Allied troops.
4. The Military Government will take over control of all prisons and remove all Nazi and other undesirable prison officials.
5. In general, the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Germany will belong to the local German police under the supervision of the Military Government.
6. The SS police and the Gestapo will be liquidated at once and all Nazi principles and actions will be eliminated from the direction of police operations.
7. No military training will be allowed in the German police forces, which will be unarmed except in special cases of emergency when certain detachments will be permitted small arms and strictly limited armament.
8. The police force will be decentralized and reorganized on a Regional basis and local basis.
9. The decentralized local police forces will be under executive chiefs approved by the Military Government and the general responsibility for the administration of the local police will be vested in the German Civil Head of each town or city or in the Regional President.
10. The criminal police will be abolished as a separate branch of the National Police and will be merged with the local units of ordinary police. The heavily armed detachments of the Schutzpolizei will be dissolved. Recruiting for the police will be open to all citizens without regard for past military or other State service.
11. The Landwehr and the Stairwehr will be disbanded.
12. Military Government officers and the Allied Military Police will ensure that the German police procedure conform with the

SERIES ■ MILITARY GOVERNMENT ■ GERMAN
NO. 11

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Works of art and objects of scientific or historical importance which have been looted by Germany from Allied countries will be recovered and restored to their rightful owners and it is the responsibility of every German who wishes to make restitution for the wrongs done by his country to assist in their location and delivery to the Military Government.
2. All sales and movements of such objects will be forbidden and destruction or concealment of them will be severely punished.
3. Every effort will be made to avoid, as far as military necessity allows damage to any building, monument, document or other object of cultural, artistic, archaeological or historical value, which rightfully belongs to Germans.
4. The Military Government has compiled a list of monuments which must not be used for military purposes unless military necessity requires the commander on the spot to make an exception. Commanders will, in general, put these buildings out of bounds for Allied troops.
5. Steps will be taken to preserve in safe keeping all German records, documents and archives of value.
6. It is the responsibility of Germans to refuse to take part in the policy of "scorched earth", which the Nazis plan to carry out. "Scorched earth" implies a policy in connection with "revenge". There are the Germans protesting to you.

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 12.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. When circumstances permit German workers will be allowed to form democratic trade unions to replace the Nazi-controlled labor front and their Party organizations, which will be abolished. These will consist of free workers' associations and organizations of political prisoners, provided that they do not come into conflict with military discipline.
2. The constitution of this Party will admit only the basis of a political party. It will be a political party, but not a party, directly or indirectly, with a political aim. It will be a party.
3. For the time being, you will maintain your rights as wages under the most recent German regulations.
4. All deductions of pay at the source of collections from the workers for the benefit of the RDA or any of its affiliated dissolved organizations will cease. Deductions of pay for social insurance, and for other forms of insurance, or for other forms of insurance will be continued.
5. Existing laws, decrees and regulations regarding the registration of labor will continue to remain in effect. That is to say, workers must have their employment status examined and recorded, and their work books verified and re-registered. All workers, male or female, in employment must have their work books verified and re-registered. They must have their work books verified and re-registered.
6. The division of our repair units of the military forces will be given the most priority, but the division will be given to the military and to the military services, and to the military services. The division will be given to the military and to the military services.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

No. 13

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. It is the policy of the Supreme Commander ■
eradicate Nazism and German militarism in all their
aspects from the German educational system. All active
Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers and militarists will
be removed from educational positions and all educational
institutions (except boarding schools and orphanages)
will be closed until Nazism has been eliminated.

2. Elementary schools will first be reopened. School
supplies and facilities must be furnished from your ■
resources. The existing German educational system,
subject to Military Government control, will be employed
as far as possible after purging of Nazi and militaristic
elements. No appointment or reinstatement made to any
position in the German educational system will be
considered permanent.

3. Steps to reopen secondary schools and higher German
educational institutions will be taken as soon as practicable.
You will be directed to make emergency repairs to school
buildings.

4. All Nazi Party organizations and their affiliates
in schools, all special Nazi schools (including Adolph Hitler
Schulen, Kampfas and Ordensburgen), all Nazi Youth orga-
nizations (including Jungvolk, Hitler-Jugend, Jungmädel,
and Bund Deutscher Mädel) and the Nazi adult education
organization (Deutsche Volkshilfsgemeinschaft) will be abolished.
New organizations may not be founded without permission
of Military Government.

5. German teachers will be instructed to eliminate from
their teaching anything which -

a. Glorifies militarism, expands the practice of
war or of mobilization and preparation for war, whether
in the scientific, economic or industrial fields or
the study of military geography.

b. Seeks to propagate, revive or justify the
doctrines of Nazism or to extoll the achievements of Nazi
leaders.

c. Favours a policy of discrimination on grounds
of race or religion.

d. Is hostile to, or seeks to disturb the relations
between any of the United Nations.

Any infringement of these provisions will be cause for
immediate dismissal and punishment.

6. Military Government will not intervene in questions
of denominational control of German schools or religious
instruction in German schools except insofar as may be
necessary to insure that religious instruction and the
administration of such schools conform to such regulations
as are or may be established for all subjects and all
schools.

SECRET SHAEF SECRET

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DELS

TOO 001000Z JAN

SHAEP 04/05

FOR 090000Z JAN

CIN - 090000Z JAN

THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF A COM ZONE INCOMING MESSAGE.

SECRET

M D D Z I N E

FROM : AGIAN FROM BARRETT SIGNED Q140
 TO : PICUSA TO BARRETT
 PASSED TO : SHARP 1000Z FOR ACTION
 FROM TO : W-08521 03 January 1945. CITE WDHNS, WAPAA-0648

Extracted without delay to target on statements promising to release German prisoners against after negotiations.

Usual desire is to avoid making commitments on this before we positive we will be in position to execute commitments.

If you will send exact quotes of present statements along with time we will provide further. Also recommend quotes be included as to what you want to continue to say regarding instructions above.

ACTION : : END (SHAEP)

CLASSIFICATION : SEC
 O-2
 SHARP
 FOR 1000Z
 FOR
 SUSPENSE
 NO RELEASE

END OF MESSAGE 8 JAN 1945 0955A CITE/Sec REFNO: W-08521

SECRET

COPY 10

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
 ALLIED EXERCISES
 Psychological Warfare Division
 INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1.5.101.

6 January 1945.

TO : Chief of Division.

CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL

TO : CONFIDENTIAL

By order of : [Signature]

DATE : 6 AUG 1945

BY : [Signature]

DATE : 6 AUG 1945

BY : [Signature]

Reports from the areas affected by the counteroffensive show that some conditions varied with the local situation from town to town. Certain basic conditions, however, were shared by a large number of people in all the towns covered.

ALONG, MESSING, HERZINGEN, HELLINGEN : The counteroffensive produced no real change in the situation in these four towns, but was pretty close to turning back of the same situation. In fact, the towns they heard nothing but were not much worse. The first footnote of the town was **ALONG**, where a radio broadcast at the time it gave the majority of townspeople began to hear it only a small number of townspeople. There, too, the weekly newspaper **ALONG**, published by 1 & 2 of 13, was available on the day it appeared (13 January). Approximately one copy per family was available from the office in the town, and at local stores. The main reason here, that **ALONG** had been attacked and captured, was seen reflected by reports that **ALONG** was being picked up at the time. The least concrete town seems to have been **HERZINGEN**. There rumors spread to the effect that 13 German prisoners had driven into the Allied lines, that **HERZINGEN** was taken. No radio news was available in town, and it was not until 27 January that the first official confirmation that a counteroffensive had taken place was received via **ALONG**. The result of ignorance was not high, but great fear of the towns' return and of their threatened retaliation. Many prepared to leave at the approach of the movement and expressed the hope that the Americans would let them go along if a retreat became necessary.

By 27 January things were looking up again. Many felt that this was the last long-term corner, though to expect and disrupt the Allied advance. All knew that the **HERZINGEN** drive had been halted and in some regions. "The people are now recovered and confident", says a report of last date from these towns.

HERZINGEN, HELLINGEN, MESSING : These towns describe a situation generally similar to that in the four towns mentioned above. Although better informed, the inhabitants were equally fearful and anxious to learn the news. There was considerable fear, and a desire to leave with the Americans, particularly among German men and children. Four of them said they expected to be killed if the Germans returned and one had even pictured the scene of execution : "If they come back they will take me out in front of the **HERZINGEN** and shoot me". A possible escape plan was the "Wayward old Sergeant" of **HELLINGEN** : "If they come back - an old man to try to resist, or want to resist".

HERZINGEN : An illuminating report on the effects of the counteroffensive in the town of **HERZINGEN** at **HERZINGEN**, covering the period 16-28 January. Although it was from **HERZINGEN** that the offensive started, and for a time part of the town was under the German, the city remained "neutral and cooperative" despite their "unpleasant" over reported German advances. Throughout the period German propaganda was maintained with the cooperation of German civilians, including Lt Col van der **HELLINGEN** who commanded the paratroops on this sector. The M.G. detachment call out of

MONSIEUR. On the second day, the detachment officers discussed the advisability of removal from the town. The decision was to stay, because the detachment had been requested by the tactical units (with whom cooperation was excellent) to retain control of the townspeople, and because "our departure would be obvious to the local populace ... and would have a serious effect on civilian morale". The third reason indicates a keen sense of responsibility, both toward their mission and their charges:

"Military Government would in the future be handicapped in this Kreis, if this unit departed, leaving behind to the mercy of civilian opportunists, and possibly German military personnel, those who had actually cooperated in our administration".

In only one case, be it noted, did the counteroffensive M.G. operations - at MINTESCHEN, where the detachment was moved out with the retiring troops.

Several of these reports indicate two weak points in Allied control whose importance were emphasized by the counteroffensive. The first, due largely to the lack of electric current for radios, is inadequate dissemination of important information. The security office at ALSPOFF is attempting to ensure wider circulation of Mittelkurgan by utilizing the churches. The second flaw is described thus by field reporters:

"A great deal of apprehension on the part of the people is caused by the knowledge that known Nazis have remained behind and would be able to denounce those who have cooperated wholeheartedly with the Americans."

Hard data on the number of Nazis left behind, and the functions they actually perform, is lacking. But the hostile and fearful attitude of most residents is reported by other interrogators working in other towns. Everywhere, the majority of those who stayed behind - often violating Party Orders and coercion at considerable risk to themselves - are non-Nazi or anti-Nazi. Yet, they feel, no distinction is made by the Allies between them and the Nazis, or those opportunists who prospered under the Nazis, and protests against Allied "injustice" in this respect have been heard. The S.H.A.R.F. G-5 Summary (20 Dec. 44) cites a report from STOLBERG: "There is no disobedience to M.G. orders but there are definite signs of fear and resentment in the general attitude of the population". In MUEBLEN, an extremely pro-Allied miners' town, the miners would like to work for the Americans but are resentful that the management is still Nazi (many "experts" were left behind to keep the mines going and these elements have not yet been cleaned out). Said one miner to the M.G.O.: "I will not work for the Nazis in the mine. I've been fighting them for 11 years and I will not work for them now". This problem has not arisen in towns occupied by the British 2nd Army, as thus far, all civilians have been evacuated from the towns to detention centers.

Further steps towards coordinating control of German towns at higher administrative levels are being taken. The Bürgermeister of SCHERFENSEL has been appointed Oberbürgermeister of 5 neighboring towns as well, with the concurrence of all M.G.O.s concerned. It is expected that this arrangement will make for uniformity of local curfew hours, circulation restrictions, registration, collection of weapons and radio transmitters, and will generally speed up the posting of M.G. announcements. A similar plan is being worked to bring BUCHEN and SOUP under the jurisdiction of the Bürgermeister of STOLBERG, as they were prior to Allied occupation.

BACHEN: At the start of the occupation, unpaid volunteers were used to fill all posts necessary to the administration of the town. As of 1 December 1944 there were 149 civilian employees on the city payroll of BACHEN. These people have agreed to waive all rights to payment for work performed prior to this date. M.G. operations in the city may be considerably aided by the discovery of a complete card index of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF). A former German policeman in BACHEN, who was dismissed from the force by M.G. officials, was later found in the police headquarters destroying records from

the files. He was tried before an Intermediate M.G. court in AACHEN: the sentence was 10 years imprisonment.

An interesting sidelight on reactions to the counteroffensive comes from a report on several communities in LUXEMBOURG reconquered by the Germans for 1-6 days (and subsequently re-liberated). Soldiers took all the food and cigarettes they could find. The troops were followed by regular "Robbing Units" of German women who collected all that the soldiers could not carry, including radios and linen. In EPPENDORF the Germans arrived half-starved (not having eaten in four days). The local priest quickly burned the British and American flags and advised the people to be kind to the Germans. Bloodshed was avoided.

B. WEST AREA

(1) The German Combat Zone

The counteroffensive, and consequent redistribution of Allied troops, may have eased some of the immediate pressures upon the areas west of the Rhine which had been threatened by their occupation. But no long-term benefits to the population of these areas is yet evident: bombing, digging, evacuating, feeding all continue to present people with difficult problems of day-to-day living. Indeed, things are likely to get worse. With the halting of the Wehrmacht drive, a proportion of morale is likely to set in which is sure to be aggravated by the critical problems raised as the Allied troops advance again. A P/W from a village near Godesberg, interrogated four days after the Wehrmacht attack, told how his son was almost dropped off to die during his last night home. Since he was just there on 14/15, the P/W was able to save him, but the boy was threatened with a "haircut" - the usual punishment meted out by SS leaders to boys who didn't want to die. "The work was not easy for these 15-16 year old boys", said the P/W. "In the morning they marched to work at 6.30 a.m. and didn't return until 6.00 p.m. They even brought us from Godesberg for the digging".

Father worried about son is an old story. A reversal of the situation appears in a letter written by a young dad from EUSCHSELN:

"Father has just been discharged from the Volksturm because of his sickness ... Now the leaders of the VS remind the people: Father get a notice to show up in EUSCHSELN with work clothes and food for two days. Everybody believes they would work there two days and then come home. But these cratty guys took them into the VS instead, such a scandal".

The Volksturm is a source of irritation to the older men. Even among railwaymen, who regard their occupation as among "the most difficult and dangerous in Germany today", the Volksturm is not regarded as a pleasant change. Said one railway worker:

"The soldiers really are pretty well off: they are still regarded as honorable fighters. We are being trained to shoot now, but they want to make something like partisans out of us - and partisans are usually handled quite differently than regular soldiers".

To date, the Volksturm has been reported as fighting particularly well in only one place - Sauerland. In this connection, it is interesting to note more recent statements by civilians residing in the town that the VS was actually a great flop there. According to these civilians only 15 men showed up on the first day of mobilization instead of the 300 who had been ordered to do so. The fighting, they claim, was actually done by G.S. men in civilian clothes, wearing the VS armband. That so a man apparently belonging to the VS did give battle is clear from G-2 reports on the action. Quite possibly some members of this group were G.S. men in disguise. In either case the evidence does not

and to justify checking up on other movements, each has a moral victory, for the Volksturm in SAARDON.

A report from 9 US Army relates that at a recent roll-call of the Volksturm, three men were absent. Later, the following excuses were offered: one was celebrating his golden wedding anniversary, another had had to get his Freiheitskarte (Certificate of Illness), and the third was being eingespart (confined in celebration of his 14th birthday). While amusing, the incident can hardly represent the average personnel of the Volksturm.

Allied bombing continues to provide Reich officialdom with a major headache, for attempts to cope with air raids inevitably trench upon problems of war production, transport, manpower. Interesting light is thrown on this problem by an OKW letter of December 1944 addressed to the Strassburger Industriekammer, which affords highest priority to the Flak program:

"On 4 November 1944, the Fuehrer ordered an immediate increase in the Flak program. There must be no transfer of personnel employed in the production of Flak into the army, air force, S.S.P. or special police outside their factories, nor for VEBO, or the GEWERBENING (oil plant repair) program. Employees who belong to the Volksturm must be returned to Class II. All reserved employees engaged in the Flak program are, until further orders, entirely excluded from conscription lists. All arms and ammunition factories must work to capacity and aim at maximum production".

In an appendix to the letter is a Reichswehr-Feind which notifies all concerned that all transport necessary for the Flak program is to be given priority "in spite of present traffic restrictions". Power supply for Flak factories must be maintained "if necessary, by rigorously cutting the supplies of other consumers".

Recent reports on the activities of foreign workers in the West indicate that politics does not preclude humor. A sign on the door of a foreign workers' canteen in REIMSUNG read simply "We should care more and work less" and was signed "HAIL ...". This version of the class-struggle, though much more concise than the old master's, was equally irritating to the authorities. But the culprits were not found. A rather more sinister affair was a secret report on the "Communist" activities of foreign workers in KARLSRUHE made by the local Gestapo to the head office in BERLIN. By "Communist" activities is probably meant such things as the scribbling on an advertising placard of slogans like "HITLER the enemy of the people!" and "VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT are our last refuge. Down with the bloodhound (probably HEIDEL)!".

One important reason for the strong efforts to enforce evacuation of COLOGNE was revealed during the counteroffensive, when the Wehrmacht used that city as a center for heavy supplies coming from the north for the EIFEL battle. Earlier estimates that the city held only 20,000 people, reported as dubious in this Summary, must now be regarded as inaccurate. While exact figures cannot be secured, the most reliable recent estimate, which takes account of the complex suburban structure of the city, puts the present population of COLOGNE at approximately 200,000 by day, although it may be less than 50,000 by night. Reports continue to come in, particularly from Paris, that yet another "final evacuation" of COLOGNE has begun.

A new burden has been added to the heavy life of people who live in the EIFEL, in the form of V-1s which fall short. Since this is a not infrequent occurrence, these people are in the irritating position of being "terrorized" by both sides at once. One Paris says that the population, listening to the sound of the engine and hoping it will not stop overhead, has already developed a "V-1 ear" (an Londoner told during "Goodbye" days).

One story received this week helps explain oft reported bitterness of ROSTER people toward the local Nazis, particularly their Polizeipräsident and acting Gauleiter SCHLESSEN. This worthy is taking hay in large stacks while the sun shines. A P.M. who took advantage of an unguarded moment during an air raid to look around SCHLESSEN's private shelter reports luxurious furnishings and walls lined with such delicacies as "Kaviar, Semelawurst, Speck". He was detected on the way out and told the food was an emergency reserve not intended for the Herr Polizeipräsident alone, and besides he had better keep his trap shut about what he had seen. Sadi now, naturally, gets around despite warnings. Small wonder then that ROSTER, a workers' town, looks with a jaundiced eye upon SCHLESSEN HIM, the former Jung mechanic who now lives in a villa. Small wonder, too, that the workers' section is frequently covered with bitter little verses like: "S... b... d... Tressen, ihr haben nichts zu essen" (S.A. wears golden epaulettes, we have nothing to eat).

(2) The Interior

The most spectacular single event of the week was HITLER's speech. Preceded by an elaborate build-up, chiefly the superlative paeon of GOEBBELS which occupied publicity channels for three days, at the dramatic hour of five minutes past midnight - the Fuehrer spoke. Expert opinion holds that the style, delivery, and voice were characteristic of HITLER, and there is no reason to suppose that any one of these was not. To hear the Fuehrer's voice again, after so long a silence, must of itself have been a joy to many Germans. The public probably derived some comfort, too, from hearing the Fuehrer say he was as confident as ever in victory, was planning a just social state with cities more beautiful than ever before. Many workers must have been touched by HITLER's thanks for their steadfastness and achievements - trained listeners state that this passage "was delivered with more expression than the rest of the speech".

And yet, for thoughtful listeners the speech must have been something of a disappointment. Even joy at hearing the Voice could not entirely obscure the fact that it said little. A P.M. special study of the speech, comparing it with past year's speeches, concludes: "As far as the general public would perceive, the Fuehrer said nothing that had not been said a hundred times before, except for a hint of victory by winter 1946". HITLER completely avoided discussion of the counteroffensive. In fact he carefully avoided all factual aspects of the current situation, confining himself to repeated assertions that Germany would never capitulate, would be victorious because she must be.

A similar omission occurs, more surprisingly, in von RIBBENTROP's own New Year Order of the Day for soldiers in the West. The Order, issued by DNB for publication in the Western Gaus, dealt only in general terms with the determination to fight on, in attack or defense, until the enemy was beaten and did not mention the present offensive at all. This omission is perhaps the result of the softened propaganda line on the offensive which became apparent this week. The main claim now made is that the operation was a "great success ... whatever the further development of the fighting". The arguments used to support this view are not unconvincing - e.g., "The great Allied plan, which at a dramatic threat to Germany's valuable Western territory, had been frustrated". To make the point still firmer, the cautious prediction is added that US divisions "cannot be rallied in a short time for an offensive".

New Year messages from the other leaders could scarcely have filled the German people with new courage. HIMMLER emphasized his own climb to power by issuing three messages, an additional one in his capacity as Minister of Interior. GIBLER did not even bother to repeat his last year's exhortation to workers to increase war production. MAGK, never rash, called for the utmost efforts even to maintain the food supply. And LAI, with his characteristic quick grasp of the situation, claimed that the year 1944 was a victory because it gave the Party ascendancy over all else.

During the latter part of the week the theme of Allied disunity as a source of German victory reappeared in the press. The emphasis was on the conflicting interests of Britain and Russia. The Greek problem is held to be no nearer solution, and British allegations to the contrary are said to be a cover for "Churchill's great secret". Considerable space was devoted to the establishment of the "First Provisional Government of Poland" which "a 'Belgrade' spokesman" described as the most important news in recent days. It was maintained that HCGCOT, after giving a free hand to the British in Greece, is now behaving with greater independence in the Polish question on the ground that an informed observer must read HCGCOT for LUBLIN. One account of Churchill's 16 December speech said it caused a "terrible, icy and oppressive silence in the House of Commons", and cited Ivor THOMAS' comment that the speech undoubtedly contained the seeds of future wars. Comment on America was confined to the remark that the U.S.A. would probably be prepared "to play the part of Pilate" in the Polish problem as well as in the Greek.

T. J. DE WILDE, JR. and J. H. HOFFMAN, JR.

and $\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, \dots, A_n\}$ is a family of n subsets of \mathcal{A} , then

the detainees' status as off-duty revolutionaries in German troops captured during the final stage of the anti-air war. It is applied to have access to the effective and the forces is could be suggested about American counter measures and damage reduction to the concerned Post, but not and claim that did not actually bring to harm, even if a major was involved. The last sentence of the document from this document, from a local position, to the Commission, which would not that the body is not as a source, it is not a fact and also not a fact, but the lack of supplying itself as a source will be critical. There are two other aspects.

At the 1949-50 meetings of the Society, a definite trend of disaffection and a lowering of morale could be seen. At the 15th Annual Meeting held at the Point to Point Club in November, 1949, the first of a series of changes in the methods of human relations was announced. The following year, 1950, a similar change in the method of presentation of the papers was made. It had been found that the 1949-50 Club members had a definite feeling of disaffection and a disorientation in regard to the Society. Connected with this was a feeling of uneasiness which was described as being

A final group of 14 captured Iraqi POWs, after the German attack was stopped and the British captured the city of Tikrit, alluded to the presence in this area of a "massacre of civilians" from a neighboring town. The quality of the troops involved, the effect of the role of the fighting in this group was hard to discern from the fragmentary descriptions of the state of the fronts. However, these troops are given no psychological picture of their attitudes, no attempt was made to inform them of their role in the war, or to inform them of the progress and results of the war, or to inform them of the state of the world.

[illegible]

"I do not know how strong the divisions are that were employed on the many tasks since 1935. I do not know how the supply situation stands. I am glad to hear that the conditions will assist the more young in the army to bring out the young with a bag when they are not too young. But in the way they are being an excellent center."

[illegible]

6 753

In his discussion with this official, the subject stressed him to be a non-
completely confident of Germany's ability to defeat the allies. Although perhaps
there was an element of false bravado in the statement of this subject, it was
as he spoke to a captured American officer, the reasons he gave for German
winning are worthy of note as they are logical of the conditions leading away
from German defeat. He said that it lay in victory. He said that Hitler's
man must be very difficult to understand and as a Christian, he felt natural and other-
wise he believed there was a new machine working was also opening up and he had
been told that there had been considerable damage done in the German capital
city. The subject said that he would have more than what they had seen. He
admitted that he was not a member of the German army and he was not a member of
any and said that he had been in the German army and he had been in the
British and other to the German army.

2) **Тут** **не** **существует**

On point four the 14th Air Group, based on an uncorroborated number of 14, alleges that the work of the operations conducted by the 38 troops is "definitely showing a trend on a fairly large of true fair retaliation." It is not clear what this means in relation to the fact of men on the part of American military forces on the 14th Air Group and the 38 troops. This is the first, although almost expected report to the command.

[illegible]

2) subject of offense or crime in other sentence

Reports of the moral effect of the execution of George George Fleming in other quarters was limited largely to those from the Third Army front, and over this, they are preliminary. The command throughout seems to be that the German soldiers on the line, who are "all prisoners" were badly informed about the execution and that these are kind of it should be repeated. This is, at a first instant, a reflection of the normal apathy so often reported in this service.

[illegible]

630

Among the German soldiers who participated in the offensive statements have been occasionally encountered declaring that the drive was a Hitler drive; organized, led and carried out for the benefit of Hitler's preservation. Such statements appear to be limited to the long-standing anti-Nazi minority and hardly represents a growth of alertness on the part of the ordinary soldiers about the intention of his leadership. Also, a small minority of Wehr expressed the feeling that the Germans risked too much men and material in this single offensive. Such Wehr claim that the German Army was too weak to sustain a large scale offensive and that they were inviting disaster. It is obviously too early to forecast accurately the effect upon the morale of the Wehrmacht of the counter-offensive when it becomes a matter of history. There is evidence at hand that automatic discipline and obedience are remaining fairly constant. The general ability of thought and interest as often reflected in interrogation will continue to be important in determining future Wehrmacht morale. But further interrogation material is required before the full effects can be judged.

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 REF NO : S-73845

SCAF 186

The following proposed Psychological Warfare operation (code name BATHING) is designed to undermine German resistance knit together through Wehrmacht discipline, party control and "strength through fear" propaganda, by providing evidence of existence of powerful faction inside GERMANY defying this control and anxious to end war at once from patriotic motives. The medium is a "black" radio station ostensibly situated inside GERMANY and operated by a group representing Wehrmacht, industry, and other important elements who have reached conclusion that the war is irretrievably lost, that continuation will ruin German human and material resources and only increase harshness of Allied terms and that GERMANY's future is entirely bound up with the attitude and decisions of the Allies.

The group will seek that a great internal struggle is proceeding between two opposing factions. The one for which it speaks demands peace now from realistic and patriotic motives. The other represented by the HITLER group is guided by self-interest. Realizing that its member's past actions make dealings with the Allies impossible it is determined to fight to the last even though this means the utter destruction of GERMANY.

Broadcasts will be made in German and English. The object of the latter is cover to support and substantiate the real aim which is to convince Wehrmacht and civilians that internal

SAC COT 60

TOP SECRET


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TAB C
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SHAFF File No. 271.41213

5 JAN

REF NO: 3-73848



Persons of wide and varied opinion is essential to make peace now, and that propaganda and action must be such Allied world to this end.

This operation can only succeed if audience is convinced of its genuineness. To achieve this broadcasts will go out on shortwave giving impression of coming from mobile military headquarters; knowledge of operation will be confined to smallest possible circle; no request will be made for D.C. (censorship) thus allowing free recording of broadcasts which will increase station's verisimilitude (it is however pointed out that these broadcasts would be picked up in Britain and probably also in the United States. A D stop would prevent comment by press and radio in Britain, but no such censorship is possible in the United States. For could publicity in Britain be avoided if reports of broadcasts came from the United States or neutral countries. Open discussion of these broadcasts might cause following reactions:

To engender the belief among Allied civilians and troops that a breach now exists between the Wehrmacht and the party, and that an early collapse is imminent. This belief might slow down production and lessen the will to fight of our troops.

To stimulate "soft peace" discussions in Allied political quarters in the belief that there was a sufficiently powerful group in GERMANY capable of suing for peace now.

Operation HATCHBOX is conceived in by Chief of Staff SHAFF subject to your approval particularly in regard to possible political reactions in the United States and Britain. Chief of Staff SHAFF is satisfied that danger of ill-effects on Allied troop morale in this Theatre can be dealt with here.

This whole problem, because of its possible far reaching effects, is forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff because it crosses fields of interest to the highest governmental authorities. The Russians also might be affected. So far as our own operations are concerned it appears to be promising and if other considerations do not outweigh this fact, its approval is recommended.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
BRIGADIER GENERAL

INFORMATION : SCS

COORDINATED : C/S

G-2
G-3 AC WOODS

6 763
SND OUT 624

5 Jan 45

21000

127/10

REF NO: 3-73848
FOO: 051800A

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

MAC/ejb

RWP 334

11 January 1945

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE HEAD
 AT 1430 HOURS ON 10TH JANUARY, 1945, IN ROOM 25, TRIUMPH.

PRESENT:

Lieut. General Sir F. E. Morgan	Chairman
Major General R. W. Barker	G-1
Lt. Col. Francis P. Miller	G-2
Brig. General A. S. Davies	G-3
Lt. Col. W. H. Baumer, Jr.	G-3
Brigadier G. D. C. Rogers	G-5
Colonel P. H. Dupuy	P.R.D.
Brig. General Robert A. Thompson	P.W.D.
Mr. Samuel H. West	Political Adviser (US)
Mr. Charles F. Hays	Political Adviser (Br.)
Mr. Robert Murphy	Political Adviser (US)
Mr. Wallace Duell	Political Adviser (US)
Lt. Col. C. A. H. Thomson	P.W.D.
Lt. Col. W. H. Connor, Jr.	P.W.D., Secretary

F. Staff Study: "Psychological Warfare Division Propaganda to Germany".

1. A full discussion of this paper brought out:

a. That the word "commitment" as used therein to indicate the cumulative results of a propaganda line was dangerous in that, if taken as implying specific agreement on the part of the Allied Governments, it would weaken the principle of unconditional surrender.

b. That this principle should not be further opened to question by discussion in this paper of distinctions between promises made to the German Government and assurances given to individuals which might provoke general discussion of the matter, apart from its reference to the study in question.

c. That the "Voices of Military Government" constituted statements of intention and not promises; they could be used in propaganda in connection with factual stories giving point to them, but could not be expanded without a specific policy ruling in each case.

d. That it was unnecessary at this time to modify our statements in the surrender leaflets with regard to treatment of prisoners of war.

2. It was therefore agreed:

a. That the "Voices of Military Government" announcements do not constitute promises but only a statement of the intentions of Allied Military Government.

b. That these talks could be referred to in Psychological Warfare Division propaganda in connection with appropriate factual details of life under military government tending to bear them out.

c. That propaganda use of this theme would otherwise confine itself to the publication of such facts on territory under Allied control as would illustrate the points we wished to make, except in the case covered in d. below, where it might be desired to expand one of the "Voices of Military Government".

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 TO CONFIDENTIAL
 BY AUTHORITY OF C.A.B.
 BY *CMC/Smith*
Myrial
 Date 16 AUG 1945

- d. That where Psychological Warfare Division desires ■ initiate proposed expansions of their themes which would be useful in propaganda, but which go beyond the scope of the existing talks, it will bring these proposals up for proper policy clearance with the ■.
- e. That the ■ staff study would be reworked to conform to the above points and would be resubmitted for concurrence and presentation to the Chief of Staff in the normal manner.

II. "Special Guidance on Situation in the Rifel Sector". (Presented at the Meeting).

The changes suggested in the proposed draft of Psychological Warfare guidance covering the current German withdrawal are incorporated in the attached revised draft. It was decided that Psychological Warfare Division would maintain contact with G-3 for word ■ to the proper time for release of this guidance.

W. M. Connor, Jr.
WILLIAM M. CONNOR, JR.
Lieut. Colonel, P. A.
Secretary.

1 Encl.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

January 1945

SPECIAL GUIDANCE ON SITUATION IN WESTERN SECTOR.

BACKGROUND.

The enemy is now in process of conducting a planned withdrawal of his major units - especially armored units - from the Bulge area. The withdrawal is following standard lines - VC and infantry units are being left behind to cover the withdrawal of SS and Panzer formations; the enemy is making his usual strenuous efforts to keep open the shoulders of his escape route, after having failed to recapture BASTOGNE and thus re-establish the communications essential for a continuance of either attack or defense in the areas which he is now abandoning under our pressure. It is not to be expected, however, that our troops will be able to do more in the immediate future than to force the enemy back to the lines held prior to 16 December.

OBJECTIVES.

In propaganda, we must act immediately to extract the full benefit from the enemy's decision, and the situation in which he has placed himself, even though our own military exploitation may not be immediately far-reaching. We must forestall any Nazi attempt to make a propaganda victory out of the total December offensive by claiming for example that the Allied plans for a winter offensive have been disrupted, and that German units stand intact after having gained months of time for the Army and Luftwaffe.

GUIDANCE.

1. In carrying the news, we should give full play to the military operations, featuring all evidence
 - a. of our successful advance - in particular, any hard or plausible stories of disruption of German attempts to withdraw in orderly fashion, with armor and equipment, from their forward positions;
 - b. of German losses in manpower and material;
 - c. of German surrenders.
2. In talks and commentaries, as well as by selection of news, we should act vigorously
 - a. to cash all the commitments which we have pinned on the German leadership in the course of the last few weeks in connection with the Bulge offensive - the failure to take LUXEM, BRESCIA, METZ, or VIMY; the failure to split the Allied armies, to destroy their offensive capabilities, or to eliminate them from the military picture; the failure to clear Allied troops from German soil;
 - b. to demonstrate
 - (1) the failure of the Luftwaffe, and of V-1 and V-2 to perform as adequate tactical substitutes for artillery or bombs.
 - (2) the failure of the SS leaders and units to do their part.
3. We must show the German people - soldiers and civilians - the three-fold responsibility for this carefully-planned but costly gamble:
 - a. Hitler was responsible for the conception of the idea.

In September, he decided the war had to go on, planning resistance on German soil. This he found was impossible, so was forced to decide to give the German Mischelungen their Gotterdammerung outside Germany. (W.B. we must not imply that we expect German resistance to crumble once we have penetrated deeper into the Reich.)

- b. Hitler was responsible for all the measures of oppression and repression to produce the material and man power necessary to launch the offensive;
- c. Hitler threw in his lot with his political leaders, and lent all his military talents to the mounting and execution of a hopeless operation, in which German troops, unable to stand attrition in the relative security of the Westwall, were brought into far costlier engagements in the open.

4. Thus we can use the whole episode to underline both the political irresponsibility and the military bankruptcy of Germany's position as Germany's leaders were forced into reckless gambling in a vain hope of pulling out a victory not in the cards.

5. Despite all Germany's losses and investments in a desperate attempt to relieve the pressure of the sixth winter of the war, the Allied armies approach her depleted defenses on the West; the Russians are hammering at her South-Western gates. The Allied armies are tying down important German troops in Italy, while from North-West, West, South and East, the bombing of the Reich continues relentless and more intense than ever.

6. Here then over, German resistance is hopeless. Each day the war-prolongers keep her in the struggle, the longer the commencement of reconstruction is postponed, and the more difficult Germany's task of reconstruction will be.

7. We should be prepared to launch the following propaganda campaign as soon as the first territory has been recaptured and additional advances begin:

- a. on anti-occupation and military Government;
- b. on showing conditions of life and attitude of people in Axis-occupied Germany;
- c. of special appeal to key classes - railway workers; peasants, etc.

8. Caution. Until subsequent guidance is issued, we should observe the following instructions carefully:

- a. There must be no comment of the Allied troops to take territory beyond the lines of December 16th;
- b. we should avoid any reference to the effect of this campaign on lengthening or shortening the war;
- c. we should not speculate on what effect these developments will have on the German situation, which may provide further difficulties for us if the Germans try to recoup their defeats by renewed fanatical attacks in the secondary sector;
- d. we should not go beyond the facts in stating the extent to which the Germans have gotten out their winter, nor should we yet say or imply they are no longer capable of strong counter-offensive action.

R. H. Jackson
Major General, G.S.G.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET

WMC/JS

WAF 33-

4 January, 1946

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE HELD
AT 1:30 HOURS ON 3RD JANUARY 1946, IN ROOM 25, TRIANON.
JANUARY 1946

PRESENT:

Lieut. General Sir R.M. Morgan.	Chairman.
Brig. General Robert A. McClure.	P.W.D.
Brigadier T.J.H. Bosville.	G-1.
Lieut. Colonel W.P. Miller.	G-2.
Brig. General A.S. Kovine.	G-3.
Colonel J.H. Alke.	G-4.
Brigadier G.D.C. Hayman.	G-5.
Colonel R.E. Dupuy.	P.R.D.
Mr. Charles Focke.	Political Adviser.
Mr. R.H.S. Crossin.	P.W.D.
Lieut. Colonel G.H.H. Thomson.	P.W.D.
Lieut. Colonel W. Connor Jr.	P.W.D., Secretary.

a. The recommendations of Psychological Warfare Division on
"Psychological Warfare Policy with regard to German Evacuation Plans"
[T.D. 'C' for Agenda of Meeting of 27 December, 1944] were approved.

b. Questions on Current Policy.

1. (a) A revised "Voice of SHAEF" stressing the fact that
the misuse of American uniforms, for which German troops
were being executed, had occurred in combat, was ap-
proved, subject to reference of the wording to London
by Mr. Focke.
- (b) The proposed release was likewise approved, subject
to amendment to avoid the illegal connotations of the
phrase "currently dealt with", action to be deferred
pending approval of the "Voice of SHAEF" in London.
2. It was decided that there was no further advantage to preserving
Rundstedt's good name in 'white' propaganda in the hope of later
using his name for our ends in 'black' propaganda. It was also
agreed that blackening Rundstedt's reputation with any allega-
tions beyond complicity in the misuse of American uniforms
[see 1 (b) above] should await a more favorable occasion.
3. It was decided that no propaganda should be based on details of
our successful operation of Antwerp. Antwerp may be mentioned
as an objective of still possible enemy thrusts but that it
should not be stressed.
4. It was agreed to present the German Saar offensive as
Rundstedt's second major stroke.
5. The release of the story of the SS "Wallonia" was approved,
provided that this release be made when any possible threat
to the Belgians has been removed.

c. The use of General Eisenhower's signature on the proposed "Surrender
Order" leaflet was authorized. It was agreed that special instructions
could be given to Army Groups as to the significance of General
Eisenhower's signature and as to the care which the use of the leaflets
consequently demanded.

6 768

WILLIAM A. CONNOR, JR.
Lieut. Colonel, P.W.D.

~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

1WP 385

3 January 1945

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with Regard
to German Evacuation Plans.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-CONCURRENCE.

1. The proposed policy of urging, in white propaganda, German civilians to avoid forced evacuation has been concurred in by G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5. The U. S. Political Advisor, Mr. Murphy, has recommended that German civilians be urged by black propaganda means to evacuate eastward.


2. Mr. Murphy's proposal is already in force in black propaganda.

3. With regard to white propaganda, on which Mr. Murphy makes no proposal, PWG adheres to the argument that a white anti-evacuation line will promote maximum confusion in the German evacuation plan and so achieve more of the objectives which Mr. Murphy attaches to his plan than effectively than any overt attempt to spread panic.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. That the proposals in the basic paper be approved.

5. That the present anti-evacuation line now being followed in black propaganda be confirmed.



ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.D.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

WMC/JS


1 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting on Psychological Warfare, 3 January, 1945.

TO: The Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
" " " " " G-2 " "
" " " " " G-3 " "
" " " " " G-5 " "
The Chief, Public Relations Division, "
The Political Advisor (U.S.), " "
The Political Advisor (B.), " "

1. The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare to be held at Room 25, Hotel Trianon on 3 January, 1945, at 1430.

- Psychological Warfare policy with regard to German Evacuation Plans (see TAB 'C' of previous Agenda).
- Questions on Current Policy (TAB 'A' and TAB 'B').
- Staff Study on Surrender Order Leaflet (TAB 'D').



Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

ENCs: TABS A, B & C.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET

WKC/JS

WMP 336

4 January, 1945

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE HELD
AT 1500 HOURS ON 3RD JANUARY 1945, IN ROOM 25, TRIAXON.
JANUARY 1945

PRESENT:

Lieut. General Sir P.E. Morgan.	Chairman.
Brig. General Robert A. McClure.	P.W.D.
Brigadier T.J.B. Bosville.	G-1.
Lieut. Colonel W.F. Miller.	G-2.
Brig. General A.S. Davies.	G-3.
Colonel J.H. Alms.	G-4.
Brigadier G.D.C. Hyman.	G-5.
Colonel R.L. Dupuy.	P.W.D.
Mr. Charles Becker.	Political Adviser.
Mr. R.H.S. Crossman.	P.W.D.
Lieut. Colonel C.A.H. Thomson.	P.W.D.
Lieut. Colonel Wm. Connor Jr.	P.W.D., Secretary.

a. The recommendations of Psychological Warfare Division on "Psychological Warfare Policy with regard to German Evacuation Plans" (T.S. 'C' for Agenda of Meeting of 27 December, 1944) were approved.

b. Questions on Current Policy.

- (a) A revised "Voice of SHARP" stressing the fact that the release of American uniforms, for which German troops were being executed, had occurred in combat, was approved, subject to reference of the wording to London by Mr. Becker.

(b) The proposed release was likewise approved, subject to amendment to avoid the illegal connotations of the phrase "currently dealt with", action to be deferred pending approval of the "Voice of SHARP" in London.
- It was decided that there was no further advantage to preserving Rundstedt's good name in 'white' propaganda in the hope of later using his name for our ends in 'black' propaganda. It was also agreed that blackening Rundstedt's reputation with any allegations beyond simplicity in the release of American uniforms (see 1 (b) above) should await more favorable occasion.
- It was decided that no propaganda should be based on details of our successful operation of Antwerp. Antwerp may be mentioned as an objective of still possible enemy thrusts but that it should not be stressed.
- It was agreed to present the German Saar offensive as Rundstedt's second major stroke.
- The release of the story of the SS "Wallonia" was approved, provided that this release be made when any possible threat to the Belgians has been removed.

c. The use of General Eisenhower's signature on the proposed "Surrender Order" leaflet was authorized. It was agreed that special instructions would be given to Army Groups as to the significance of General Eisenhower's signature and as to the care which the use of the leaflets consequently demanded.

6 768

WILLIAM K. CONNOR, JR.
Lieut. Colonel, P.W.D.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

REF 385

3 January 1945

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with Regard
to German Evacuation Plans.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-CONCURRENCE.

1. The proposal policy of urging, in white propaganda, German civilians to avoid forced evacuation has been occurred in by G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5. The U. S. Political Advisor, Mr. Murphy, has recommended that German civilians be urged by black propaganda means to evacuate eastward.


2. Mr. Murphy's proposal is already in force in black propaganda.

3. With regard to white propaganda, on which Mr. Murphy makes no proposals, PW Division adheres to the argument that a white anti-evacuation line will promote maximum confusion in the German evacuation plan and accomplish most of the objectives which Mr. Murphy outlines in his paper more effectively than any overt attempt to spread panic.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. That the proposals in the basic paper be approved.

5. That the present anti-evacuation line now being followed in black propaganda be confirmed.



ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General, G.D.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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SUPERIOR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

WMO/JS


1 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting - Psychological Warfare, 3 January, 1945.

TO: The Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
" " " " " G-2 " "
" " " " " G-3 " "
" " " " " G-5 " "
The Chief, Public Relations Division, " "
The Political Advisor (U.S.), " "
The Political Advisor (B.), " "

1. The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare to be held at Room 25, Hotel Trianon on 3 January, 1945, at 1430.

- Psychological Warfare policy with regard to German Evacuation Plans (see TAB 'C' of previous Agenda).
- Questions on Current Policy (TAB 'A' and TAB 'B').
- Staff Study on Surrender Order Leaflet (TAB 'D').



Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

WMO: TABS A, B & C.

QUESTIONS ON CURRENT POLICY.

1. Treatment of Operation 'GRUP'. Psychological Warfare Division recommends the issue of:

- a. A "Voice of SHARP" announcement (TAB 'B').
- b. A Press Release (including photographs of captured prisoners and, if possible, corpses, and photostat reproductions of the relative documents) through the cooperation of G-2 and Public Relations Division. This release should stress the following points:
 - (1) The original inspiration was Hitler's.
 - (2) The German High Command, and in particular Rundstedt and Model, fully acquiesced and co-operated in the plan.
 - (3) The plan was a pitiable failure, partly owing to the morale of many of the personnel, who were conscripted for the task.
 - (4) All German personnel involved and captured are being ~~generally~~ dealt with, whether they took part voluntarily or not.

2. Attitude to Rundstedt. Psychological Warfare Division requires a ruling as to whether it is now regarded as useful to 'black' and/or 'white' propaganda for the purpose of showing dissonance between Rundstedt and the SHARP and discrediting Rundstedt in the eyes of Hitler and Himmler. This question is raised particularly in view of the previous discussions of 'black' propaganda plan designed to suggest that Rundstedt was still considering the possibility of secret negotiations on behalf of the High Command. If, as is recommended above, it is decided to incriminate him fully in complicity in operation 'GRUP', these previous 'black' plans are considerably affected.

3. Psychological Warfare Division requires guidance on how far we can afford to build up the successful operation of the port Antwerp, in view of possible German operations to prevent its use.

It would naturally be advantageous, in order to show the complete failure of the Rundstedt counter-offensive, to release facts and figures on the supplies pouring through Antwerp. This, however, can only safely be done if complete confidence is felt that present future German operations will not reduce the flow of supplies.

4. Psychological Warfare Division requires guidance on the Saar front should be treated. In particular, should it expect withdrawals on our part in this area?

If we can be confident that there will be no withdrawals on our part on the Saar and other sectors, quiet at present, then the natural line would be to stress that Rundstedt's offensive has forced a drastic reduction of German manpower elsewhere, with the result that valuable ground can no longer even be defended with the men available. If, however, there is any chance of a withdrawal on our part, this line cannot be taken and a specific directive must be issued to this effect. The same applies to the Colmar pocket.

3. Psychological Warfare Division recommends that material be prepared for release by a suitable title in the German press the sending the SS Wollack in behind Dunkelwell's MARCHING orders for a political strategy.

This story will have an excellent effect on Belgian morale provided it is released at a time when any possible report to the Belgians has been received.

6 772

CONFIDENTIAL

WARNING BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT,
ARMED RECONSTRUCTION FORCES.

In flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention and of the Rules of Land Warfare, the German High Command, in recent weeks, has sent German soldiers across the lines wearing American uniforms and identification tags and using Allied vehicles. These men have been captured and, in accordance with the recognized rules of war, have been court-martialed and lawfully executed.

All enemy troops wearing recognized enemy uniforms will be treated as prisoners of war. This announcement is made as a warning to all German and German-controlled troops or persons who wear Allied uniforms, identification tags and marks, or who use improperly marked Allied vehicles and equipment. Such persons will suffer the same fate as their predecessors of the past. The warning is made within a few hours of their execution.

W. DWIGHT D. HENNINGER
W. DWIGHT D. HENNINGER
Major General
Armed Reconstruction Forces.

The text of this draft Order of War has been submitted by Psychological Warfare, First U.S. Army, in agreement with G-2, First U.S. Army. It was forwarded to Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.G.F., by Psychological Warfare, 21 Army Group with approval.

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DECLASSIFICATION
DATE 10/1/00 BY 100-100-100-100

6 772

TAB 'C'

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PWE 415

1 January, 1945.

SUBJECT: "Surrender Order" Leaflet.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

DISCUSSION.

In the limited experimental use of the attached leaflet (TAB 'A') so far, numerous prisoners of war have made very significant comments showing that this leaflet is potentially extremely effective. It is intended for use only in situations where the fabric of the German Army is disintegrating and the chain of command has been disrupted; this leaflet being in the form of an order is designed to take advantage of the gap in the normal instructions from above, and to impose Allied authority directly on the German soldier.

Being in the nature of a "surrender order", this leaflet should go all the way. The changes shown in ink have been proposed in the interests of strengthening it further. In order to give the full measure of emphasis and authority to this leaflet it is desired to use General Eisenhower's signature at the bottom.

RECOMMENDATION.

That the Chief of Staff authorize the use of General Eisenhower's signature on the face of the proposed leaflet at TAB 'A'.

COPIES
1. Chief of Staff
1. Psychological Warfare Division
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Robert H. McClure
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

ENC: TAB 'A'.

Verhaltensmassregeln

GRUPPENÜBERGABE:

Sofern die Übergabe in kleinen Gruppen erfolgt, gelten dieselben Bestimmungen wie oben. Für grössere Einheiten ist laus Haager Konvention vorgesehen, dass Offiziere ihre Mannschaft unter einem Zeichen der weissen Fahne an den nächsten alliierten Offizier (wenn möglich, ebenbürtigen Ranges) übergeben. Sind Besprechungen erforderlich, so können beglaubigte Parlamentäre sich mit dem nächsten alliierten Gefechtsstand in persönliche Verbindung setzen.

EINZELÜBERGABE:

Kleine Gruppen von nicht über 5 Mann ergeben sich, indem sie Waffen, Helm und Koppel ablegen, die Hände hochheben und entweder ein Taschentuch oder ein Flugblatt schwenken. Sind alliierte Soldaten in unmittelbarer Nähe, so sind diese anzurufen. Passierscheine, wenn gleich nützlich, sind nicht unbedingt erforderlich. Sammelplätze für Kriegsgefangene befinden sich entlang den Haupt- und Durchgangsstrassen.

PLEASE INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO CONFORM TO THOSE ON THE ATTACHED SHEET.

ALLIIERTES KOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters)

(Expeditionary Force)



BEFEHL

An die versprengten deutschen Truppenteile!

Das schnelle Vordringen der Alliierten hat es mit sich gebracht, dass zahlreiche deutsche Einheiten versprengt und aufgelöst worden sind und daher von zuständiger deutscher Seite keine Befehle mehr erhalten können.

Um nutzlose Opfer an Menschenleben zu vermeiden, wird daher verfügt: *befohlen*

1. Deutsche Soldaten, die abgeschnitten oder versprengt wurden, sowie Einheiten, die vom deutschen Kommando keine Befehle mehr erhalten, haben sich beim nächstgelegenen alliierten Truppenteil zu ergeben.
2. Der jeweils rangälteste Offizier Unteroffizier bleibt bis dahin für die Disziplin seiner Mannschaft verantwortlich. Einzelne versprengte Soldaten melden sich unter Befolgung der umstehenden Vorschriften zur Übergabe zu melden.



HEUTE LEBST DU NOCH. Du kämpfst ☐ unzureichen-
☐ Waffen, mit mangelhafter Ausrüstung, von ☐
 schulten Einheiten umgeben. Aber — Du lebst.
 Deiner Kameraden, ☐ Deiner eigenen Freunde ☐
 gefallen. ☐ war schlimm, aber Du bist noch entkommen.
 Du lebst. Deine Offiziere verwerfen Deine Gedanken,
 das nur ☐ Kampfpause ist. Es besteht Hoffnung, d-
 — Du lebst.

HEUTE LEBST DU NOCH. Du kämpfst ☐ unzureichen-
☐ Waffen, mit mangelhafter Ausrüstung, von ☐
 schulten Einheiten umgeben. Aber — Du lebst.
 Deiner Kameraden, ☐ Deiner eigenen Freunde ☐
 gefallen. ☐ war schlimm, aber Du bist noch entkommen.
 Du lebst. Deine Offiziere verwerfen Deine Gedanken,
 das nur ☐ Kampfpause ist. Es besteht Hoffnung, d-
 — Du lebst.

ÜBERMORGEN ☐ ES AUS SEIN, ☐ bist
☐ er tot, ein Krüppel oder Kriegsgefangener. Die
 Entscheidung darüber liegt vielleicht an Dir ☐. Das-
☐ bedenke jetzt, was ☐ wirst, wenn Du noch am
 Leben bist, wenn die ☐ über ☐ hinwegrollt.
☐ Gelegenheit. Dein Leben zu
 retten. Viele werden ☐ ergeben ☐. So mancher ☐
 aber ☐ müssen, ☐ — ☐ spät getroffen ☐

WELCHE WAHL TRIFFST DU?

ZG 02

6 771

Was ist zu tun?

Lies die nachstehenden Anweisungen genau. Wenn es klappt, wirst Du sie brauchen, Du nicht nutzlos sterben willst. Der moderne Krieg ruft manchmal so schnell vorwärts, das Stellungen vernichtet werden, ehe Du Gelegenheit hast, zu überlegen. Versuche daher, alle Anordnungen möglichst genau zu befolgen:

EINZELÜBERGABE: Einzelne Soldaten oder kleine Gruppen ergeben sich, indem sie Waffen, Helm und Koppel ablegen, die Hände hochheben und entweder ein ein Flugblatt schwanken. Sind alliierte Soldaten in unmittelbarer Nähe, so sind diese anzurufen. Panzerschnecke, wenn möglich nützlich, sind nicht unbedingt erforderlich. Sammelplätze für Kriegsgefangene befinden entlang den Haupt- und Durchgangsstraßen.

GRUPPENÜBERGABE: die Übergabe in Gruppen erfolgt, hat sie unter Beachtung Disziplin durchgeführt zu werden. jeweils befähigende Unteroffizier ist verantwortlich für die ordnungsgemäße Durchführung. Offiziere übergeben ihre Einheiten möglichst in alliierten Offizier einbürtigen Ränge. Sind Besprechungen erforderlich, so sich sich Konvention, beglaubigte Parlamentäre mit dem nächstgelegenen alliierten Gelechtsstand in persönliche Verbindung setzen.

ACHTUNG: Zur Vermeidung folgeschweren Missverständnisses ist die weiße Fahne deutlich sichtbar zu schwenken.

Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen

1. **SOFORTIGE ENTERNUNG** zur der Kampfzone. Stammlager stehen in Westeuropa bereit.
2. **ANSTÄNDIGE BEHANDLUNG.** Auf Grund Genfer Konvention werden ihr wie Soldaten behandelt.
3. **GUTE VERPFLEGUNG.** Ihr erhaltet Kost und bestverpfligte der Welt.
4. **BEHANDLUNG VON VERWUNDETEN UND KRANKEN** werden genau behandelt wie unruhigen.
5. **SCHREIBGELEGENHEIT.** in und 4 Briefe per Monat nach Hause schreiben.
6. **RÜCKKEHR.** Nach Kriegsende werden ihr so bald möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ORDER

To German units separated from their command

The rapid advance of the Allies has resulted in numerous German units being separated from their command and split up, thereby being unable to receive orders from their German superiors.

In order to avoid needless of human lives, it is hereby ordered:

1. German soldiers who are cut off or separated from their units, as well as separated from their higher echelons, are to give themselves up to the Allied
2. The highest ranking officer or commissioned officer at present remains responsible for the discipline of his individual stragglers to report with signs of surrendering, deside.

Rules of Conduct

INDIVIDUAL SURRENDER:

Small groups of not more than five men surrender by putting away weapons, helmet and belt, raising their arms and waving either a handkerchief or a leaflet. If Allied soldiers are in the immediate vicinity they are to be called Safe Conducts, though helpful, are not absolutely necessary. Collection points for prisoners-of-war are to be found along the main highways and thoroughfares.

GROUP SURRENDER:

Insofar as the surrender is accomplished in small groups, the same rules as above apply. For larger units, it is provided in the Hague Convention that officers may surrender their men under the sign of a white flag to the nearest Allied officer, if possible of the same rank. If parleys are necessary, accredited parlementaires may communicate personally with the nearest Allied command post.

THREE INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO CONFORM TO THOSE ON THE ATTACHED SHEET

What is to be done?

Read the following instructions carefully. Things that you will need to know them, if you don't want to die in vain. Modern warfare sometimes rolls forward so that positions are destroyed before you have a chance to make a decision. Try, therefore, to thoroughly impress upon your mind the following instructions:


INDIVIDUAL SURRENDER: Single in small groups surrender by removing weapons, and belt, raising their hands, and waving either a handkerchief or leaflet. If allied are in the immediate vicinity, they are to be called. Safe Conducts, although helpful, are not absolutely essential. Prisoner of collecting points along the thoroughfare.

GROUP SURRENDER: In larger group surrender, this to be carried out while observing military discipline. The ranking non-commissioned is responsible for its orderly execution. Surrender units in a body, if possible, to Allied officer of equal rank. Parleys are required, authorized parleys may be sent according to the Hague Convention, to contact the nearest Allied Command Post.

NOTE: In order to avoid dangerous misunderstandings, the white flag should be waved clearly.

Treatment of Prisoners

1. **IMMEDIATE REMOVAL** from battle-zone. Base camps are ready in Western Europe.
2. **DECENT TREATMENT.** According to Geneva Convention, you are treated like soldiers.
3. **GOOD FOOD.** You receive the same nourishment as we, the best-fed army in the world.
4. **HOSPITAL CARE.** Your wounded and sick are treated just like our own.
5. **MAIL CONNECTION.** You can write four post cards and four letters home per man per month.
6. **RETURN.** After the war you are returned home/as soon as possible.



TODAY YOU ARE STILL ALIVE. You fight in-
sufficient weapons, poorly equipped, surrounded by half-
trained units. But—you are alive. Thousands of your
comrades, many of your friends, have died. It is
bad, but so you have escaped. You are alive. Your
officers dismiss your thought that this is only a lull. There
is hope, for—you are alive.

TOMORROW MAY BE YOUR LAST DAY.
You will be either dead, a cripple, or a prisoner of war.
The decision about that is perhaps in your own hands. Consider,
therefore, what you will do if you are still alive when the
Materialschlacht (battle of material) has raged over you.
Then there may be an opportunity for you to save your life.
Many will be forced to surrender. Many another will
die, however, because he made his choice late.

DAY AFTER TOMORROW IT WILL BE OVER. You
will be either dead, a cripple, or a prisoner of war.
The decision about that is perhaps in your own hands. Consider,
therefore, what you will do if you are still alive when the
Materialschlacht (battle of material) has raged over you.
Then there may be an opportunity for you to save your life.
Many will be forced to surrender. Many another will
die, however, because he made his choice late.

WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?

A NOTE ABOUT THE LEAFLET: Written especially for an Army Group, to be used
as their signal and targets specified to them only.

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

30 December 1944.

Y.S.280.

PWP/4331-2

TO : Chief of Division,
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 1A

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Reports from inside Germany, though still scanty, do indicate that the counter-attack has not made the war more popular with Germans under Allied rule, nor does it seem to have changed their opinion of the outcome. To many of these people, who long ago tired of the war and gave it up for lost as far back as STALINAGRA, the counter-attack really prolongs a painful process. Then, too, there is an element of immediate personal fear. Although no German town has yet been retaken, the residents of the general MORSCHAU-AACHEN area are once again within looting and shooting distance of the Wehrmacht. There is a clear and present danger that the Wehrmacht may take over - a prospect which they cannot but view with alarm, in consequence of the recent Nazi propaganda of terror against "collaborators". Any German in any town can be considered, by definition, a collaborator - his presence convicts him of disobeying evacuation orders, thereby defying the Reich and placing himself under the authority of its enemy. The threat is particularly acute to those who have served as officials under Military Government, and it is against these that Nazi threats have been specifically directed. There can be little doubt that should the Nazis return, some of them would be killed as "examples". One reporter noted that "most were alarmed at the possibility of reprisals" but despite their fears there has been no tendency to evacuate. A case in point is the Mayor of AACHEN, "obviously very frightened", who said that he and his associates were risking their lives by staying on but were glad to do so because it was the only way to rebuild Germany.

These remarks do not bespeak an undying loyalty to the Allies: the collaborators are, perforce, committed to us for their own safety. But it is notable that fear engendered by the counter-attack, despite lack of news and the spread of false rumors, has not led to panic - and this is due largely to a sense of confidence in Allied stability and strength. People turn to those in Allied uniform for reassurance (with the question "The Nazis won't come back?" and guidance). In DUESSELDORF population and officials alike remain cooperative: on 13 December some Nazi records and files were handed over to Allied authorities; on the 20th a Wehrmacht deserter was turned in; three German parachutists who came through the town were reported by the citizens; the German police have faithfully carried out their duties. A report from AACHEN, HERZOGENTUM, and MUDOLF comments: "Military Government has not experienced any major difficulties as a result of the enemy's proximity. The people behave toward Americans as always... In the occupied towns there is confidence that the Allies will be able to deal with the German attack".

6 783 This reflects only a limited success for German propaganda on the counter-attack to the occupied areas. The line that this is an all-out attack "to drive the enemy from the soil of the Reich" is echoed by a response of uncertainty, but not assent, among Germans under our control. The terrorist "attack against collaborators" has caused fright among officials, but has had little effect on the collaborators, knowing full well what the Nazis plan to do - to continue collaborating. No tendency to

CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of CALA
By A. W. G. G. G.
MAY 1945

~~SECRET~~

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run has been shown, but the desire to run would in any case be frustrated by the fact of no place to go and no way of getting there. The — of nerves has thus had the limited value of "nauseance raids", primarily designed to intensify the natural feeling of insecurity in newly-occupied territories.

In ALSACE, particularly, has this been the case. Simultaneously with the counter-attack in the 12 A.G. sector, an intensive rumor campaign was started in the 6 A.G. sector. Whispers were heard in ALSACE that U.S. and French troops had suffered very heavy losses north-west of COLMAR and around MULHOUSE, that MULHOUSE itself was cut off; that two German spearheads were advancing westward from the HUNT, led by very powerful new tanks (possibly a reference to the Jagdpanther, which has been in operation for some time). These rumors have been supplemented by "plants" in newscasts over the Swiss radio, from which the area mainly gets its news, concerning DOK strategic plans in ALSACE and false announcements of German gains in the pocket. This concentration of "plants" on Swiss Radio, which in the past has generally been reliable, moved an Intelligence Officer in the area to remark: "Seldom have so many mouthpieces been found, as during the past two weeks, to relay the most untrustworthy bits of rumor and misinformation".

This subversive propaganda, stressing the enemy's strength in the ALSACE area and his intention to return, ties in with propaganda directed straight at the Alsations by German radio. A broadcast over the SAARBRUECKEN and STUTTGART stations (23 December) reported the formation of an "Alsatian Freedom Front" claiming that thousands have joined already. The return of the Germans is here identified with the "liberation" of ALSACE, and those Alsatian Volksgenossen who are now under "the harsh yoke of alien domination" are told to: "Bear your hard lot with calm confidence! You are not unprotected. Everyone who harms you or your property must know that he will one day have to answer for it and will be punished by merciless judges". This theme recurs in another report, from Switzerland, according to which the Records Division of the Foreign Office has been instructed by the Foreign Minister to collect, sort, and prepare for publication, all documents on cruelties committed by Anglo-American forces.

Information from psychological warfare and civil affairs sources indicates that the sturdy residents of ALSACE may not be so glad to see the Nazis as they think, that the Nazi propagandists are indeed be whistling in the dark at this point. The opinion is held by every observer in the field that the complete reversal of feeling against the Germans has provided France with the golden opportunity to make friends and influence people through the ALSACE-LOTHARING area. And slightly north, in the LOHRAINE area, ECAD reports: "the consensus of opinion is that Germany is doomed and the sooner she is defeated the sooner reconstruction will begin".

In other occupied areas a certain administrative vigot was evident. A conference held at SENZGEMUTH attended by E.O. officials, 5 burgomeisters of nearby towns, and the newly appointed Landrat of AUCHEN considered problems of inter-regional food distribution raised by circulation restrictions. This conference was regarded as a step toward obtaining over-all food control on the Regierungsbezirk level. At a meeting of some 40 local farmers, called by the Burgomeister of MERRSTEIN (7 December), "planned agriculture" was introduced. Each farmer was given a quota of potatoes which he is required to sell to the Gemeinde, plus an additional amount of butter fats to be rationed solely to miners. All sugar beets are to be collected and stored by the farmers until a processing plant is uncovered by army troops. An interesting arrangement was made concerning the land of evacuated peasants, which authorized those who remained to work the land of those who had gone. If the evacuee returned, the man who worked his land would receive half of the harvest; if not, he would receive it all.

A summary of the activity of "G.I. courts" in the First U.S. Army area during the last week of November presents several items of interest: 2 General, 4 Intermediate, and 6 Summary M.T. courts were in session. Trials involved 48 persons. Of 102 charges laid, 5 cases involved breach of circulation orders, 7 involved unauthorized entry, 6 each involved looting and harboring enemy soldiers. Of the total, 20 resulted in findings of "not guilty".

Among the hazards of life in the occupied areas are the mines and booby-traps left behind by the Germans. One report from MUESSELEN reports: "It is hazardous to walk along the sidewalks and fatal to enter many houses. Only the streets have been cleared of mines. Daily some German civilian gets blown up. Since the occupation on 21 November, MUESSELEN has suffered an average of about three casualties a day, some of them fatal." This is a particularly bad case, for during the 8-week battle for the town the Wehrmacht had time to sow mines and booby-traps everywhere. Even vegetable gardens have been mined and food now lies rotting while the hungry inhabitants dare not pick it up. American troops, including their sappers, have moved forward and the half-dozen soldiers left behind are occupied with more pressing matters. Resentment is directed mainly against the Wehrmacht, for it is clear to the residents that the Allied forces must give priority to combat requirements. A young Communist, who volunteered for the unpaid job of minesweeper, helped interrogators pick their way among the infernal engines circling the Nazis and insisting that not one German life should be lost unnecessarily.

B. REAR ZONE

(1) The German Combat Zone

An unusual situation in the small town of MUELLACH, on the west bank of the Rhine a short way north of KOBLENZ, is described by one P/. Unlike the larger cities of the Combat Zone, life has remained fairly comfortable for the people of MUELLACH. The few bombs dropped on the town fell mostly in the fields, and in a recent letter P/ was informed it had been declared an "international hospital town". The food ration is quite sufficient, although there is something of a delay of three days on butter and fat, but no Black Market is operating. Electricity, water, and gas services are functioning. True, P/'s household has increased from 5 to 7 by refugees from COLOGNE (most refugees are from that city said P/), but MUELLACH is not crowded and no evacuation orders have been issued. Some people want the Wehrmacht to quit, but are certainly not hostile to it. The Party is censured for most difficulties and particularly for false promises, but Hitler is not blamed, nor the local Ortsgruppenleiter unpopular. Pfarrer Adolf ROSCH was arrested several times for political preaching, and people thought he should keep quiet. P/ and his family do not listen to Allied radio and none of his acquaintances admits to listening.

One inclines to the view that conditions of life and opinions much like these are to be found in many small towns throughout Germany which have been bypassed by the war. Elsewhere in the Combat Zone, the "strenuous life" continues under conditions less pacific. The terrific morale effects of sustained mass-bombing, as distinguished from sporadic bombing which frequently has little effect and sometimes even strengthens determination to stick it out, is shown again by the evidence from COLOGNE. The *Koelnische Zeitung* (8 December) shows how eagerly the bombed west prizes on promises of relief from air attack, saying "The west listens to every word promising it relief from its most torturing pest, i.e., the enemy air terror". Quoting SPER and GANZMEYER's recent promises the paper says: "There may still be delays in date, our times of suffering are not yet over, but the day of relief is not far off." An attack upon this attitude is made by the N.S. of OBERTHAUSEN, 29 November, which considers it dangerous that rumors should circulate saying that a definite date has been given for the end of the air war. The paper writes that evacuation will continue, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

"Nothing is more erroneous than to operate with dates, and nothing is sillier than to infer that one can safely stay at home during the short time it will last till things are all right".

From COLOGNE, too, come further reports of riots and disturbances, due primarily to attempts to force evacuation of the city. Their date is uncertain and they probably refer to the disturbed period in October about which so many stories have been received. While the details of such stories are always dubious, the circulation of the tale is a further indication of the extent of public reaction against bombing and evacuation measures in COLOGNE. One slightly new version tells of the killing of 4 SA men by civilians in reprisal 50 men from the 16-60 age group, picked at random as hostages, were shot. A P/W repeats the story, told of many German towns, of slogans written in crayon on the pavements alongside devastated streets: "Das haben wir unseren Fuehrer zu verdanken" (We can thank our Fuehrer for this). Another P/W, resident of COLOGNE, tells that the SAELTSS have been very active and have taken advantage of the opportunity to secure arms by saluting in the Volksturm. He quoted a recent letter from his wife to the effect that several Politische Leiter had been shot, presumably by members of the SAELTSS. The same P/W claims to have seen the bodies of eleven civilians hanging on a gallows in the KUNSTHAUSEN station, a story which in most previous versions counted twelve corpses. Another P/W, from DUSSELDORF, who claimed membership in SAELTSS, said that the group was quite strong in the surrounding villages. All the boys he knew in it were, or had been, SA members and their aim was quite definitely to cause trouble for the SA. He told of one case in COLOGNE where two policemen who tried to stop a fight were killed by the SAELTSS boys. P/W felt sure that the organization was directed by older men, although he did not know such leaders. He explained his dislike of the regime quite clearly - mentioning the abolition of personal thinking, the suppression of political liberties, and similar cogent points. Interrogators felt, on the basis of his articulate political opinions, that "some educational work was done in this organization".

From another source an anti-Nazi P/W from COLOGNE gives an interesting list of Black Market prices in that city in July: 500 grams coffee for 600 RM; a single cigarette for 1 - 1.50 RM; 500 grams butter for 80 RM; and Toilet Soap for 15 RM. The same P/W also read in the Westdeutsche Beobachter that "Americans had confiscated all food supplies in occupied areas and left the civilian population to shift for itself". The population of JUELICH was estimated to be 13,000 at the end of October by a P/W. He reports that people grumble about being constantly stopped on the street for identification, and that Party functionaries have arrived from TREVEREN (those from JUELICH having departed) and instituted a more rigorous system of controls. The citizens do not blame the Wehrmacht for evacuation orders, but sympathize with the soldiers and place all blame on the Goldfische. He claims that they are anxiously awaiting the Americans and that Bürgermeister KINTZEN has said that he will surrender the city without a battle. ECAD cites a report (10 December) that a group of 1,050 workers of all nationalities has been sheltered in a paper mill in JUELICH since 4 December 1944.

A P/W from TREVEREN-GLIERACH, carrying German passion for precision rather far, estimated destruction there at 97%. At any rate we can safely assume there has been considerable damage. The town was an important textile center with a normal population estimated at 140,000 before the bombing. The P/W who was granted emergency leave when his own home was completely destroyed, reports that curses upon HITLER and his regime for not giving in were frequently heard. A tag to recent stories of wholesale transfer of industry from the RUHR is a cautious report that the Rheinmetall-Borsig Works at DUESSELDORF have started transferring the machinery, engineers, and workers of several departments to VON LINDE, about 15 km. to the east. Local dispersal of this type is likely because of the relative ease of housing the workers; many of whom could still live in their own homes. The Russian P/W told of the panic that gripped the border areas of Germany during the swift approach of Allied armies in September. The feeling that the end was imminent was aggravated by soldiers asking civilians to give them civvy clothes, by rumors that the government had proclaimed the Rhine region untenable and had decided to establish the MLR east of the Rhine. The order for civilian evacuation confirmed popular belief and for a time "chaos was complete".

All foreign workers in the RIFEL area were evacuated on foot to KOBLENZ, where they were to build fortifications in depth. They stayed in KOBLENZ only one day or so, after which they were returned to RIFEL, formed into labor companies to build fortifications and sent to the LUXEMBOURG frontier. Although German organization of the areas behind their lines has doubt improved considerably since those September days, a passage in a letter written as late as 26 November from ELI (near SAARLAUTERN) suggests that confusion reappears with the approach of the enemy: "Everything is upside down. Refugees, army, everybody is in our house. The Party and the Army are giving orders which contradict each other".

(2) The Interior

An extremely interesting document transmitted by 1 French Army contains a confidential report on Wehrmacht and civilian morale by the German Postal authorities, who seem to have a special bureau assigned to reading personal mail for this purpose. Although the conclusions naturally show some divergence from Allied estimates it is gratifying to note that the subjects treated and the emphases coincide exactly with those of Allied investigations. A paragraph of interest is the following:

"Man hofft und wartet auf die neuen Waffen, die Erlosung vom feindlichen Druck bringen sollen. Verschiedentlich wird aber gemutmaßt, dass die Versprechungen über den Einsatz der neuen Waffen nur leere Versprechungen seien und wir nur auf Mut und Tapferkeit der Soldaten gestellt blieben. Ein Grossteil der Briefe handelt von Bombenterror, dass es so nicht weitergehen könne und eine wirksame Abwehr gefunden werden müsse. Am meisten niederdrückend wirkt die Menschenjagd der Weffliager. Die Grenzbevölkerung berichtet von Schanzarbeiten, der Nähe des Feindes und der Möglichkeit, die Heimat verlassen zu müssen, was nur ungern geschehen würde."

(One hopes and waits for the new weapons, which will bring deliverance from the enemy pressure. Apparently, however, it is assumed that promises concerning the introduction of new weapons are only empty promises and we must continue to depend upon the spirit and courage of the soldiers. A large number of the letters deal with the terror bombings, that things cannot go on this way and that an effective defense must be found. Most depressing of all is the strafing of civilians by low-level fliers. The border population discusses trench-digging, the proximity of the enemy and the possibility of having to leave their homes (i.e., evacuation) which they would be most unhappy to do.)

This report, dealing largely with weak points in the enemy's morale, pictures a fairly low state of mind among the civilian population. Introduced as strong points of civilian morale are trust in the Führer and faith in Final Victory. These two sentiments are strong points indeed for those who genuinely feel them. That they are still widely felt among Germans is not at all certain; somewhat more certain is it that they are not felt by those who are most irritated by bombing, overcrowding, food shortages, circulation restrictions and evacuation.

An interesting answer to the question "What keeps the Germans going?" is given by a native Russian P.O., formerly a political education officer in the Red Army, who spent several years at labor for the Germans and watched them while he worked. His analysis is prefaced by the observation that not all Germans have "kept going", that many hope for the overthrow of the Nazis, and continues along these lines: Apart from a few early objectors, the whole of the German nation has a strong feeling of guilt. The Germans know full well what Germany did to the conquered nations, and are well aware of the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht in Russia and Poland. They realize that the whole German economic program was based on a systematic exploitation of the occupied nations and the enslavement of the conquered people. With their own eyes they witnessed how Russian women were forced to spit rails and were used on other hard labors. They fully endorsed the

Nazis while the going was good and as a result have a collective feeling of responsibility. In spite of these facts they still consider themselves a nation with "Kultur" and shudder at the thought of what nations with a far lower "Kultur" will do to them in retaliation. They have heard that the U.S., England and Russia have reached an agreement whereby the German nation will be held responsible for all the destruction and used to re-build Europe and Russia. As a result of this people are individually afraid and feel that they have nothing to lose any more.

These are surely most potent factors in the maintenance of a certain psychic unity. A collective sense of guilt, strengthened by fear of a ruthless retaliation by less-civilized nations, and apparently supported by the announced intentions (as announced by Dr. GOEBBELS, if any rate) of these nations scarcely leaves an alternative to a stiff upper lip. It must be noted, too, that life in the Reich — by no means unbearable for the majority of people. During the years of war-production industrialists and workers in Germany, as in all industrial countries, have prospered rather more widely than during the years of the depression decade. The sixth year of the war finds money of little value in Nazi Germany, with a consequent increase in Black Market and barter activity, and here workers do less well than propertied classes (including farmers). But the rationing system continues to operate workers are assured of a subsistence diet at least. Bombing has destroyed houses and people, but those who survive have been given shelter somewhere. The shortage of consumer goods means that in BERLIN fashion, or what was formerly meant by this term, no longer exists. But people are still neatly clothed — even, to the surprise of field reporters, in those areas of occupied Germany which have taken the most severe pounding of all. Sober consideration of these facts is required to balance frequent hopes, and occasional tales, of internal collapse in Germany. Life in the Reich is undoubtedly a daily strain, with disastrous neural effects upon a considerable number of individuals, but under the nearly omnipotent controls of the Party life goes on and things get done. And in the absence of a strong organized opposition, which alone could make serious headway against the Party, life will more than likely continue to go on.

PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE.

1. Morale of the Counter-Attacking Troops.

a. First P/W Interrogations.

Such interrogations for morale purposes as have been received suggest that the success of the present German offensive was not limited by any lack of will to counter-attack on the part of almost all the troops engaged in forward elements. The paratroopers jumped and fought with their traditional fanaticism even though their efforts were quickly checked. Interrogations of a number of P/W taken from the SS Panzer units who bore the brunt of the push in the central sector of the attack, showed them to be soldiers of good morale or even ones fanatically determined to carry out orders. Among formations the VolksGrenadier Divisions assigned to secure the flanks of the attack, some signs of defeatism were encountered. Nevertheless, a 12 AG consolidated report dealing with P/W from the 212 VolksGrenadier Division captured in the Luxembourg sector, described their morale as good. Renewed aggressive spirit was also reported in other VolksGrenadier Divisions in this sector. Only in isolated cases did VolksGrenadiers use the offensive as an opportunity to desert.

POW-SIAF interrogators commented on the remarkable difference between group of P/W captured during the first days of the offensive and those interrogated during the preceding few months. Their younger age, their better physical condition, their higher fighting spirit and wider battle experience were all notable.

Reports so far received are too few to warrant any conjecture as to how far the P/W captured during the initial phase are representative of the larger bulk of troops involved in the drive. The vigour of their efforts makes it reasonable to assume that their morale was as good or better than that of the units who before the counter-attack were offering determined resistance to Allied operations. Similarly, adequate information has been received about the extent to which the German troops encountered during the last few days, when the drive began to spend its force, continued to display stiff morale. (See below: How the Troops reacted to the offensive.)

b. What the Troops were told.

The offensive was launched with a reported address by Hitler to his battle commanders, as well as special orders of the day by Rundstedt, Model and Mantoufrel. The contents of Hitler's appeal have not yet been ascertained since it was not broadcast generally. However, according to a few P/W reported having heard it while being relayed to their units, it contained a strong note to the effect that the final decision had come. According to one source, the Fuehrer declared that, like Frederick the Great, in the battle of Koenigsberg, he had decided to throw all his forces into this winter offensive in the West to achieve a final decision. Whether these reports are correct or not, Rundstedt's order of the day openly declared that "everything is at stake." These statements appear to have become the groundwork of all-out psychological preparation of the troops by their commanders. On the basis of scattered statements it appears that the message passed down the line by company commanders, it was recent and elaborated in many varied ways, all generally giving the same impression of an all out effort now at hand. Typical was the exhortation to the I SS Div. (Feldmarschall Adolf Hitler) as it went into battle that Ike was to be given to the Fuehrer as a Christmas present. A breakthrough to Paris was indicated and air support of 800 planes was promised. The troops of the 116 Panzer Division were told that they had 90 tanks in support and that their objective was Antwerp. Similar statements were made to the VolksGrenadier units. The CO of the 276 Division told his men that the Wehrmacht had started the decisive attack of the war; operations from Aachen to the Atlantic Wall were underway. The 362 VolksGrenadier Division received a "Fuehrerbefehl" that this was the decisive battle from Holland to Switzerland. However, as is apt to happen in many armies at such a time a great many troops went into battle without any general morale preparation except for being told that an attack was underway. In one case at least it seemed necessary to play down the scope

of the offensive; a P/W from the 212 Div. reported that the men in his unit were told that this attack was only to test the strength of the enemy. Some paratroopers believed that they were only on a practice jump until just shortly before going into action.

There is evidence that a few tactical units went into the [redacted] with only the scantiest briefing as to their immediate objectives [redacted] the [redacted] of American troops. This may be ascribed to reasonable security [redacted]. However, P/W, in scattered cases, insisted that they were not given any information [redacted] their mission with the effect that they believed the attack [redacted] be hastily organized and doomed to failure from the very start. A paratrooper reported that in view of the poor showing of the pilots in delivering their airborne soldiers to their objectives, [redacted] personally believed that the pilots had not been told of their destination.

c. How the troops reacted to the offensive.

In spite of the briefing given to the troops before attacking, a natural increase in spirit was felt [redacted] the drive got under way. This [redacted] in part simply due to the fact that they [redacted] now attacking, after long periods of defensive fighting. They had been promised adequate weapons and these promises were fulfilled in large measure. The presence of the [redacted] could be seen when the weather permitted and during bad weather the Allied superiority was absent. Armour was present in great strength. Quantities of semi-automatic and light weapons were supplied, especially to the Volksgrenadiers Div; many a P/W reported great enthusiasm over these arms in their units.

Obviously, a basis was supplied for the feeling of heightened confidence by the penetrations achieved during the beginning of the drive. Efforts [redacted] made by official German propaganda releases to the troops to support this feeling, but no Allied leaflets were dropped. The Wehrmachtberichte of [redacted] December declared that the Germans had crossed the road leading to Liège [redacted] were pursuing the enemy across the Meuse. A special mimeographed edition of "Mitteilungen fuer die Truppe" informed the men that 40,000 Americans had been killed in the Aachen sector. News was broadcast to all troops on all fronts, [redacted] far down [redacted] the company level. Such announcements probably received little attention among the troops actually engaged in the counter-offensive because of the well-known difficulties in disseminating propaganda to fighting troops. They were designed in part for troops [redacted] other sectors [redacted] busily engaged; there are preliminary indications that [redacted] bulk of these troops received the [redacted] with great hopes.

High morale over the short run was helped by the spread of [redacted] about the successes achieved. In part, there is some evidence [redacted] these rumours were systematically spread by German officials. But it is to be expected that rumours will spring up of their own accord in such a situation where the battle shifts quickly and hard [redacted] is absent. Liège was soon occupied by paratroopers, according to rumours; Brussels [redacted] Aachen were threatened. The fall of Paris by Christmas was even predicted. Totals for planes shot down reached 1800. Allied reserves were near the exhaustion point.

A small minority of the P/W seem to have entered the offensive with reserve and doubt as to its outcome, doubts which in many [redacted] were strengthened as the American counter measures proved [redacted] formidable. A feeling that we encountered among Infantry soldiers who fought well [redacted] expressed by a P/W: At first [redacted] were hopeful since [redacted] had been relatively quiet on our sector during the last couple of days. When we reached [redacted] American lines and received their fire, we realized that we had been too confident. Another disrupting factor which set in on some sectors was a shortage of food due to the difficulties of supply. P/W were encountered who mentioned not having received any food at all during the entire period of their offensive action.

However, German soldiers who took part in the offensive [redacted] captured declare, now that they are prisoners, that if the offensive were to fail, the entire fate of Germany would be decided. Such an attitude on the part of P/W is, of course, far from indicating a collapse [redacted] the will to re-

on the part of the remainder of the Wehrmacht after the counter-attack spends itself. It would, however, be natural to expect a sharp depression of morale if the German army fails to reach any outstanding and clear-cut geographical objectives. On the other hand, German propaganda may then be able to interpret the situation in such a way as to prevent a further breach from developing between the Fuehrer and the average German soldier. If the present battle line with its penetration in the Allied position is held, even if a withdrawal without any undue loss of men and material is accomplished, the drive can be presented as a successful diversionary and delaying action with important political repercussions and so used as a foundation for justifying continued resistance. It will be claimed that the High Command never intended to drive the Allies out of Europe. Even more important, Allied plans for the invasion of the Fatherland have been upset, and more time gained for further total mobilization and the production of new weapons. Allied losses will be reported as heavy and the increase in the war weariness of the enemy noted. (This line is already being employed in German Overseas propaganda.) These arguments are likely to have a certain amount of success. Moreover, a considerable number of soldiers have in the past fought while despairing of victory in the hope that continued resistance would produce better terms than can possibly be obtained at present; these men will still continue to hold the same opinion. In so far as any conjecture can yet be risked as to the results of the present fighting, it seems that only an unmistakable disaster such as the capture of large German forces by Allied counter-measures will leave Wehrmacht morale markedly worse after the offensive than it was beforehand.

d. Fear of Mistreatment as a P/W.

None of the P/W interrogated by PWI interrogators on the subject were aware of the shooting of American P/W by German tank crews and in this respect their attitude towards captivity did not differ from those P/W captured previous to the offensive. Likewise, all P/W questioned denied any knowledge of the use of US uniforms by German troops, although in a few cases they learned about it after capture. They knew that such practices would result in death and professed to consider this just.

It should, however, be added that German soldiers who do fear mistreatment may well be fighting to the bitter end. Reports that we are taking less prisoners may be related to this. Moreover, it is impossible to judge until further interrogations have been received whether German soldiers still lack any fear of being mistreated as P/W.

e. Morale of Pilots.

The large number of pilots shot down during recent days in our lines makes possible for the first time in many months an evaluation of their morale. One source points out that the pilots of Fourth Fighter Group are comparatively new. They appear to face their dangerous and difficult task without flinching. Their morale was, if not exuberantly high, at least determined and unyielding. There was little of the arrogance noted among Luftwaffe pilots in the early years of the war, but there was a determination bordering on desperation.

II. Volksturm in Action.

a. Saarbrücken Volksturm.

Interrogation of the Commanding Officer 1st Company, Volksturm in Saarbrücken-Stadt reveals the unsurmountable difficulties he encountered in attempting to employ his men in support of the Wehrmacht forces operating in his area. The Wehrmacht in this particular case seemed to be rather indifferent as to the potentialities and the fate of its Volksturm auxiliary.

Coordination was lacking from the very inception of the formation. The recruits were issued an order on 19 November to assemble for an Befassungsappell (roll call) which they were told would last for a few hours. But the

Volodymyr Volynskyi who performed the induction proceedings and announced that with his fellow inmates, he had been elected the Volynskysta. Volynskysta said that he was presently Volynskyi and it was necessary to explain his action as well as that of his categorization as a "Volynskysta" (insider and self-confessed) is essential to have really the Volynskysta. He also said because we know that of 500,000 Ukrainians who were shot at Sobibor, the majority were Ukrainians. Volynskysta said that he was not the only party initiative that party members are to join the Volynskysta (see above).

[illegible]

On 3 December, the Company's management attended a briefing conference with the FBI's Laboratory staff to discuss the question of whether the "blackboard" and "whiteboard" were indeed railroad lines. It was also known that the FBI's Laboratory staff were still in the process of examining the "blackboard" and "whiteboard" and that the FBI's Laboratory staff were still in the process of examining the "blackboard" and "whiteboard".

[illegible][illegible]

making determination the SO described the action taken as inappropriate. The Production Manager is probably the one responsible for this error since he wanted to show only:

2.4. *Ukullaputun, um tñem ñawñaw*

[illegible][illegible]

A further indication that the Volksturm is to be used in other local defense is seen in the organization calling for the establishment of a national camp in every city from which before the war the population in case of mobilization would exceed 100,000. These camps are directed to give military training to Volksturm soldiers on an as-needed basis when there are mobilizations in local defense regions.

It is fully recognized that the majority of the labor force in the USSR is employed in the heavy and machine building industries. It is also recognized that the majority of the labor force in the USSR is employed in the heavy and machine building industries. It is also recognized that the majority of the labor force in the USSR is employed in the heavy and machine building industries.

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100P/4229-1

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
LAND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

WMC/JS

PWF 234

28 December, 1944.

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE HELD
AT 1430 HOURS, 27 DECEMBER, 1944, IN ROOM 25, TRIANON.

PRESENT:

Lieutenant General Sir F.E. Morgan.	Chairman.
Brig. General Robert A. McClure.	P.W.D.
Brigadier J.B. Beaville	G-1
Brig. General T.J. Dotts.	G-2
Lieut. Colonel W.J. Baumer.	G-3
Brigadier G.D.C. Boyman.	G-5
Colonel R.L. Dupuy.	P.R.D.
Mr. Charles Parker.	Political Adviser.
Mr. Samuel Robert.	Political Adviser.
Mr. H.H.S. Grossman.	P.W.D.
Lieut. Colonel W.L. Connor, Jr.	P.W.D., Secretary.

1. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CURRENT BELIEFS. (TAB 'A' of Agenda).

The assumptions of this paper and the current lines of action therein were approved in detail.

2. POLICY QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO CURRENT PROPAGANDA. (TAB 'B' of Agenda).

The assumptions behind the 'white' propaganda treatment of current operations were approved.

The following points of policy were decided:

'White' Propaganda.


a. That the direction of the German counter-offensive should be attributed to Rundstedt and not Hitler, with the long-term objective of killing now any subsequent German hope that a purely military offensive, without political interferences, could bring success.

b. (1) That nothing whatever will be said of American reluctance to take prisoners as a result of German misuse of American uniforms.

(2) That this German misuse will be reported factually.

That G-2 will turn over to Public Relations Division the necessary documents on which to base a press release connecting Hitler with this misuse of American uniforms.

c. That details of the air war should be played down as proposed.



~~SECRET~~

'Black' Propaganda.

- d. That the time is not yet ripe for hints as to the threat of a Russian offensive.
- e. That the Fuehrer and the Party should be blamed for forcing a morale-raising offensive, and that the failure may be attributed to inadequate material, training and manpower. Rundstedt, however, should not yet be blamed for a miscalculation.
- f. That VI and ■ may be stated to be tactically inadequate, but that on no account should it be implied that all future secret weapons will ■ ineffective.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICY AND METHODS WITH REGARD TO GERMAN EVACUATION PLANS. (T.S. 'C' of Agenda).

It was explained that this paper had been submitted in order to obtain a firm ruling on our current policy of inciting Germans to resist the Nazi evacuation orders. Leaflets to this effect ■ still being dropped, pending approval of the Staff Study, to avoid the appearance of any lack of Allied confidence at this time.

Action was deferred until the following week, to allow time for the study to complete its circulation among the interested staff divisions.

The meeting adjourned at 1345 hours. Subsequent meetings are to take place on all Wednesdays at the same hour and place.

WILLIAM M. CONNOR, JR.,
Lieut. Colonel, F.A.
Secretary.

vnc/59

SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting on Psychological Warfare,
27 December, 1944.

TO:	The Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
	The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
	" " " " G-2 " "
	" " " " G-3 " "
	" " " " G-5 " "
	The Chief, Public Relations Division, " "
	The Political Advisor (U.S.), " "
	The Political Advisor (Fr.), " "

1. The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare to be held at 27 December, 1944, in Room

- a. Report on propaganda treatment of the current German offensive. (An outline of the instructions being issued is appended for information as TAB 'A').
- b. Policy questions with regard to current propaganda [TAB 'B'].
- c. Action arising from the paper "Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with regard to German Evacuation Plans" (TAB 'C'), now before the General Staff and the Political advisers for final concurrence.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
By authority of CALA
By *Em Dwyer*
Date **16 AUG 1945**

ROBERT L. MOORE,
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Psychological Warfare Division.

WCS; TARS A. B. & C.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'A'

25 December, 1944.

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT LAWFLETS.

1. The following are the possibilities:

- (a) The Germans succeed in reaching their objectives. These can be defined in sober military terms as Liège/Verviers. For propaganda, they can be defined as Liège/Verviers by the Fox Road. By adding Verviers, we cover ourselves against the possibility that if the Northern thrust is stifled they may switch to a Southern thrust in the Verdun direction.
- (b) The Germans do not reach their objectives, but retain a bulge into the Ardennes, withdrawing in good order with their armour secure.
- (c) The Germans are thrown back to the frontier, but get much of their armour back.
- (d) The Germans are thrust back and their armour is cut off, enabling us to launch an offensive.

Of these four possibilities, (a) is very unlikely; (d) is unlikely unless fine weather holds; (b) and (c) are the most probable.

2. We should ensure, therefore, at present, an indecisive battle in which we drive the Germans back most of the way and inflict heavy losses on their armour. But in that case, the Germans will have succeeded in one of their objectives - failing our winter offensive. The only question will be the least worse. This will be an open question of little value in propaganda.

3. We cannot make any bolder assumption at present, since if we presume in our leaflets that we shall cut off the German armour, we shall commit ourselves to something we may not achieve.


4. The line to non-effective sectors of the front should therefore be:

- (a) They failed in their primary objectives - Liège and Verviers, as a New Year present.
- (b) They failed in their secondary objective - to break the ring of steel and to put a stop to the battle of attrition, under which Germany was cracking.

These two are perfectly safe for any contingency, except complete German success.

(c) The reason for the failure was:

- (i) Despite brilliant planning and timing and the luck of the weather, the operation was too large for the number of troops available.



- (2) Apart from the armored divisions, the troops were not well enough trained and so not up to the job.
- (3) The SS Leader Sepp Dietrich's Panzer army let himself get down. (This may be only suitable for 'black').
- (4) American toughness.
- (5) Inadequate air power (especially bombers). Failure of VI as tactical weapon.

800

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

T.A. 'a'

25 December, 1944.

WHITE PROPAGANDA.

1. White propaganda treatment of current operations is based on the following assumptions:

- a. That the Germans will continue with some success their northwesterly thrust to the Meuse but will not take Liège.
- b. The major Allied counter-action may be slow in developing, though we shall impose heavy losses of men and material.
- c. That the Germans will fail in their major objective - the capture of Liège - though it is still uncertain how far they will succeed in their secondary objective of setting back our operations.

2. In line with the above assumptions, policy rulings are desired with regard to the following questions:

- a. Do we still deal with Rundstedt, or do we bring Hitler into the picture?
- b. What line do we adopt on the use of American uniforms and the resulting American reluctance to take prisoners?

The Division suggests that no prominence be given to this, since the opportunity will come for extensive German surrenders and we do not wish to scare them into a fight to the last.

- c. Emphasis on the air war.

The Division feels that this should be played down, so that the Germans will not be encouraged by successes they may manage to score in spite of "all out" air efforts.

BLACK PROPAGANDA.

1. One of our most effective lines during any crisis in the West has been to build up the threat of a renewed Russian offensive. Although impossible to do on White, without the authority of Russian statements, it can be done on black in all kinds of ways.

Question: Is this a good moment to start hinting that the threat is imminent? If the time is not ripe now, when will it be?

2. We have to prepare in advance the indictment of those responsible for the failure or limited success of the German offensive. So far we have confined ourselves to criticisms of tactical failures, e.g. the dislocation of Sepp Dietrich's advance and the costly operations with paratroops.

Question: Is it recommended that we concentrate on blaming the Fuhrer and the Party for a morale-raising offensive; or on blaming Rundstedt for a miscalculation; or on attributing the failure to inadequate material, training and manpower?

3. The enemy appears to have had considerable confidence in the tactical effects of new "secret weapons". So far we have had only of intensive local effort with V.1 and V.2 and with a type of long-range artillery.

Question: Can we attack this confidence as misplaced?

TAB 'C'

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET

REF 385

20 December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with
Regard to German Evacuation Plans.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

I. DISCUSSION.

It is desired to obtain a final policy ruling as to one basic theme of Allied propaganda to be directed to the German population in the key Saar, Ruhr, and Rhineland areas during the present stage of operations.

The attached study, TAB 'A', indicates that our propaganda to German civilians in areas near the front should, through appeals to their self-interest and human inclinations, induce them to resist the German evacuation orders by all possible means. Such a course of action will:

- a. Cause maximum confusion in the administration of the German evacuation.
- b. Crystallize resentment against the Nazi evacuation policy.
- c. Increase to some small degree the supply of skilled labour (in particular, miners and railway workers) in occupied areas, for G-2 and G-5 purposes.

II. RECOMMENDATION.

That the Chief of Staff approve a policy to the effect that Psychological Warfare Division should:

- a. Continue, ~~in accordance with~~ in line with G-3, to advise and warn the German civilians generally in the areas mentioned above to avoid evacuation.
- b. Issue by radio and leaflet special advice and instructions, without commitments, to railwaymen, miners, policemen, doctors and peasants, the timing of the release to be coordinated with G-3.
- c. In concert with G-3, develop special radio and leaflet propaganda to mixed teams, to meet current developments. This propaganda to be coordinated with the Army Group concerned.

ROBERT. A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

CONFERRED BY S.

G-3 _____

G-4 _____

G-5 _____

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802

Political Advisor (U.S.) _____

Political Advisor (Br.) _____

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division**

WMC/JS


25 December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting on Psychological Warfare,
27 December, 1944.

TO: The Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
" " " " " G-2 " "
" " " " " G-3 " "
" " " " " G-5 " "
The Chief, Public Relations Division, " "
The Political Advisor (U.S.), " "
The Political Advisor (Br.), " "

1. The following is the proposed agenda for the Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare to be held at 1430 hours 27 December, 1944, in Room 25, TELERON.

- a. Report on propaganda treatment of the current German offensive. (An outline of the instructions being issued is appended for information - TAB 'A').
- b. Policy questions with regard to current propaganda (TAB 'B').
- c. Action arising from the paper "Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with regard to German Evacuation Plans" (TAB 'C'), now before the General Staff and the Political Advisors for final concurrence.



Robert M. McGuire
ROBERT M. MCGUIRE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

ENCS, TABS A, B & C.

691.42/3

25 DEC

27/12

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'A'

23 December, 1944.

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT MEMPLETS.

1. The following are the possibilities:

- (a) The Germans succeed in reaching their objectives. These can be defined in sober military terms as Liège/Meuse. For propaganda, they can be defined as Liège/Verdun by the New Year. By adding Verdun, we cover ourselves against the possibility that if the Northern thrust is stifled they may switch to a Southern thrust in the Verdun direction.
- (b) The Germans do not reach their objectives, but retreat in bulge into the Ardennes, withdrawing in good order with their armour secure.
- (c) The Germans are thrown back to the frontier, but get much of their armour back.
- (d) The Germans are thrust back and their armour is cut off, enabling us to launch an offensive.

✓ Of these four possibilities, (a) is very unlikely; (d) is unlikely unless fine weather holds; (b) and (c) are the most probable.

✓ 2. We should assume, therefore, at present, an indecisive battle in which we drive the Germans back most of the way and inflict heavy losses on their armour. But in that case, the Germans will have succeeded in one of their objectives - failing our winter offensive. The only question will be who lost more. This will be an open question of little value in propaganda.

✓ 3. We cannot make any bolder assumption at present, since if — presume in our leaflets that we shall cut off the German armour, we shall commit ourselves to something we may not achieve.

4. The line to non-offensive sectors of the front should therefore be:


- (a) They failed in their primary objectives - Liège and Verdun, as a New Year present.
- (b) They failed in their secondary objective - to break the ring of steel and to put a stop to the battle of attrition, under which Germany was cracking.

These two are perfectly safe for any contingency, except complete German success.

(c) The reason for the failure was:

- (1) Despite brilliant planning and timing and the luck of the weather, the operation was too large for the number of troops available.

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- (2) Apart from the armored divisions, the troops were not well enough trained and so not up to the job.
- (3) The SS leader Sapp Dietrich's Panzer army lot blundered down. (This may be only suitable for "blunder").
- (4) American toughness.
- (5) Inadequate air power (especially bombers). Failure of VI as tactical weapon.

EXERCISE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'B'

25 December, 1944.

WHITE PROPAGANDA

1. White propaganda treatment of current operations is based on the following assumptions:

- a. That the Germans will continue with some success their northwesterly thrust to the Meuse but will not take Liège.
- b. The major Allied counter-action may be slow in developing, though we shall impose heavy losses of men and material.
- c. That the Germans will fail in their major objective - the capture of Liège - though it is still uncertain how far they will succeed in their secondary objective of setting back our operations.

2. In line with the above assumptions, policy rulings are with regard to the following questions:

- a. Do we still deal with Rundstedt, or do we bring Hitler into the picture?
- b. What line do we adopt on the use of American uniforms and the resulting American reluctance to take prisoners?

The Division suggests that no prominence be given to this, since the opportunity will come for extensive German surrenders and we do not wish to scare them into a fight to the last.

- c. Emphasis on the air war.

The Division feels that this should be played down, that the Germans will not be encouraged by successes they may manage to score in spite of "all out" air efforts.

BLACK PROPAGANDA

1. One of our most effective lines during any crisis in the West has been to build up the threat of a renewed Russian offensive. Although impossible to do on White, without the authority of Russian statements, it can be done on black in all kinds of ways.

Question: Is this a good moment to start hinting that the threat is imminent? If the time is not ripe now, when will it be?

2. We have to prepare in advance the indictment of those responsible for the failure or limited success of the German offensive. So far we have confined ourselves to criticisms of tactical failures, e.g. the dislocation of Sopp Dietrich's advance and the costly operations with paratroops.

Question: Is it recommended that we concentrate on blaming the Führer and the Party for a morale-raising offensive; or on blaming Rundstedt for a miscalculation; or on attributing the failure to inadequate material, training and manpower?

3. The enemy appears to have had considerable confidence in the tactical effects of "short weapons". So far we have had none only of intensive local effort with V.1 and V.2 and with a new type of long-range artillery.

Question: Can we attack this confidence as it applies to

He - on particular type of weapon used

PAB 'C'

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Psychological Warfare Division

NR 385

20 December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy and Methods with
Regard to German Evacuation Plans.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

I. DISCUSSION.

It is desired to obtain a final policy ruling as to the basic theme of Allied propaganda to be directed to the German population in the key Saar, Ruhr, and Rhineland areas during the present stage of operations.

The attached study, TAB 'A', indicates that our propaganda to German civilians in areas near the front should, through appeals to their self-interest and human inclinations, induce them to resist the German evacuation orders by all possible means. Such a course of action will:


- a. Cause maximum confusion in the administration of the German evacuation.
- b. Crystallize resentment against the Nazi evacuation policy.
- c. Increase to some small degree the supply of skilled labor (in particular, miners and railway workers) in occupied areas, for G-2 and G-3 purposes.

II. RECOMMENDATION.

That the Chief of Staff approve a policy to the effect that Psychological Warfare Division should:

- a. Continue, guided as to timing by G-3, to advise and warn the German civilians generally in the areas mentioned above to avoid evacuation.
- b. Issue by radio and leaflet special advice and instructions, without commitments, to railwaymen, miners, policemen, doctors and parents, the timing of the release to be co-ordinated with G-3.

In concert with G-3, develop special radio and leaflet propaganda to named towns, to meet current developments. This propaganda to be co-ordinated with the Army Group concerned.



ROBERT. A. McCLURE.
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

CONCURRENCES.

G-3 _____
G-4 _____
G-5 _____

Political Advisor (U.S.) _____

6 850 Political Advisor (Br.) _____

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 2..

23rd December, 1944.

SUBJECT: [redacted] black radio operation "MATCHBOX".

TO : Chief [redacted] Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF.

I. DISCUSSION

At Tab A will be found details of a proposed black radio operation, the object of which is to undermine German resistance by providing evidence of the existence of a powerful faction inside Germany to end the war now [redacted] strong enough to defy the Party's stranglehold.

Further details [redacted] the content of the programme will be found [redacted] TAB B. [redacted]

Due to the present tactical situation the time for beginning [redacted] operation will be agreed with G-2 and G-3. However, since the political consideration must be cleared and will take some time, the paper should [redacted] referred to [redacted] of Staff [redacted] once.

II. RECOMMENDATION

- a) That Chief of Staff [redacted] approve and [redacted] the attached SCAF [redacted] cable (TAB C) to Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- b) That P.W. Division start this operation [redacted] clearance be given by Combined Chiefs of Staff [redacted] G-3 S.H.A.E.F.

III. CIRCULARS

- G-2 (attached). [redacted]
- G-3 (attached). [redacted]

ROBERT A. [redacted]
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

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1. The broadcasts will go out on shortwave, giving the impression that they emanate from a mobile military transmitter difficult to locate.
2. The strictest security will be maintained by [redacted] all knowledge of this operation to [redacted] possible circle.
3. No request will be made for a D-stop. This will allow [redacted] reporting of the broadcasts and [redacted] impression that the station is genuine.

It should be pointed out, however, that these broadcasts will undoubtedly be picked up [redacted] or later in Britain, and almost certainly in the [redacted] States as well. In Britain a D-stop could be imposed which would prevent these broadcasts being used for press purposes, but no such censorship [redacted] be imposed in the U.S.A. Nor is it possible to prevent the British press using material that has already appeared in the American press.

Open discussion of these broadcasts might cause the following reactions:

- a) To engender the belief among Allied civilians and troops that a breach now exists between the Wehrmacht and the Party, and that an enemy collapse is imminent. This belief might slow down production and lessen the will to fight of our troops.
- b) To stimulate "soft peace" discussions [redacted] Allied political quarters in the belief that [redacted] a sufficiently powerful group in Germany capable of suing for peace now.

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PROGRAMME FOR PROPOSED BLACK RADIO OPERATION

TAB B

"BLACKBOX"

1. The main speaker in German, from his tone and tion, is obviously a member of the ruling Wehrmacht clique, not himself a general officer. No German general still in power would dare come on the radio because he would be recognised and destroyed. But in the light of present events, such a group of realistic "peace-now" generals, etc. would designate someone close to them who could speak in safety. His character, tone and references reveal an knowledge and contact with very high sources.

2. The main line of approach is:

a) speaking for a group of Wehrmacht officers who, during the past have been able to adapt themselves realistically to developments of a military political nature; our opinions happen to coincide with those many key commanders in the Armed Forces and certain "clear-thinking realists" in industrial, financial power Germany.

b) We cannot escape the consequences the post, but we can avert total ruin, annihilation and national suicide.

c) In the light of a war already lost, we recognise that the Allies must be dealt with.

d) Like any professional army, the Wehrmacht has fought while prospect of victory remained. But from a military point of view, further battle is useless, been useless for a long time. Wehrmacht leaders taken steps to end the war, both through protests (hence the removal of generals), and through action (July affair). The Wehrmacht has never supported ideological war of this nature.

e) We want the outside world to know our position, and urge that our position be recognised as a real one within Germany, to be considered and supported.

3. In addition, the German part of the broadcast will elaborate on the above and beyond:

a) The attempts to make contact directly with the Allies and Allied public opinion is attempt to save Germany from total destruction which is inevitable if the fanatical Hitler group is permitted to stay power.

b) "Unconditional surrender" will mean thing if the N.S.D.A.P. is still in power when arms are laid down and quite another thing if the Wehrmacht plus the German people clean house first.

4. The broadcasts in English will be spoken by German educated abroad and will in part repeat what has been said German.

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DRAFT CABLE TO C. C. 3.

THAB C

this is SCAF

following proposed psychological warfare operation (code MATHEBOK) designed to undermine resistance knit together through Wehrmacht discipline, Party control and "strength through propaganda, by providing evidence of existence of powerful inside Germany defying this control and anxious to come from patriotic motives. The medium is a "black" radio station ostensibly situated inside Germany operated by a group representing industrial other important elements who reached conclusion that the war is irretrievably lost, that continuation will and material resources and only increase harshness of Allied terms and that Germany's future is entirely bound with the attitude decisions of Allies.

The group will show that a great internal struggle is proceeding between two opposing factions. The one for which it speaks demands peace now from realistic and patriotic motives. The other represented by the group is guided by self-motive. Realizing that members' past actions make dealings with the Allies impossible it is determined to fight to the last even though this destruction Germany.

Broadcasts will be made in German and English. The object of the latter is to support and substantiate the real aim which is to convince Wehrmacht civilians internal forces already exist sufficiently powerful to make peace now, and that attempts are being to reach Allied warlike this

This operation can easily succeed audience is convinced of its genuineness. To achieve this broadcasts will go out on shortwave giving impression emanating from mobile military transmitter; knowledge of operation will be confined to smallest possible circle; no request will be made for stop, thus allowing free reporting of broadcasts which will increase station's verisimilitude.

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is however pointed out that these broadcasts would be picked up in Britain, probably also in the United States. A step to prevent comment by press and radio in Britain, but no censorship possible in the United States. Nor could publicity in Britain be kept out of reports of broadcasts come from the United States or neutral countries. Open discussion of these broadcasts might have the following reactions:

1. engender the belief among Allied civilians and troops that a breach exists between the Wehrmacht and the Party, and that an enemy collapse is imminent. This belief might also demoralize and lessen the will to fight of our troops.

2. stimulate "soft peace" discussions in Allied political quarters in the belief that there was a sufficiently powerful Germany capable of suing for peace now.

Operation MATCHBOX is considered in by Staff, S.H.A.E.F. subject to your approval particularly in regard to possible political reactions in the United States and Britain. Chief of Staff S.H.A.E.F. is satisfied that dangers of ill-effects on Allied troop morale in this theatre can be dealt with here.

Recommended that MATCHBOX be approved subject to the timing being agreed with G-2 and G-3, S.H.A.E.F.

Changes Handwritten:
This whole problem, because of its possible far reaching effects, is forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff because it crosses fields of interest to the highest governmental authorities. The Russians also might be affected. So far as our own operations are concerned it appears to be promising and if other considerations do not weigh this fact, its approval is recommended.



~~SECRET~~

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

I.S.280.

23 December 1944

TO : Chief of Division,
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of C.A.L.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PART I - GERMANY HOME FRONT, 16 AUG 1945

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The most striking event of the week, of course, was the counter-attack. Reports from the occupied areas not directly affected are not yet available, though it seems clear that such a large-scale show of strength by the Wehrmacht must make a considerable impression upon the population of the Occupied Zone. Since the prevailing sentiment found among these people has been relief that for them the war was over, such a clear indication that this is not the case - that, in fact, they are likely to be mixed up in the hottest part of the war for some time to come - may make a considerable amount of the good work begun by the citizenry under the "Reichs-Industrie" policy of Military Government. Such a result may be in the cards for BIELEFELD, previously regarded as a model M.G. town, which has now been used by the Wehrmacht as a jumping-off point in the counter-attack. At the present writing, BIELEFELD is again in American hands and no German town has yet been taken by the Germans.

German propaganda on the counter-attack deliberately creates the impression that this is a very large-scale operation, prepared for months, by using such phrases as "the famous winter offensive", and omitting any suggestion that it is limited in scope. The one objective thus far indicated, by Deputy Press Chief BUCHHEIMANN, is "to drive the enemy from the soil of the Reich". There is a clear connection between the counter-attack and the use made of it in propaganda to the occupied areas. In the operational zone, panic propaganda is being broadcast, designed to paralyze Allied communications by flooding roads with refugees and by inciting resistance to stop work. A new version of the old Nazi "strategy of terror" is being directed specifically at the residents of occupied areas. For nearly two months the Nazis, largely through the Schwarte Kette, have been threatening an underground reign of terror against all those assisting Allied forces. Now it is announced that the terror has begun.

A German Forces broadcast (8 December) announces that "The Diplomkaufmann Fritz ROEHL was found in the neighborhood of AACHEN with his head riddled with bullets. A hand-written label attached to the corpse said: 'Let this be a warning to all! This is the fate of traitors who have dealings with the enemy. We shall get them all! The Avengers of German Honor!'. This was followed by the Zeitung, reported by a radio paper to have been circulated by the Koelnische Zeitung up to December, that a secret police court of German "patriots" had sentenced to death and executed four burgomasters from the AACHEN area for "collaboration". On 11 December, a German Home broadcast cited the murder, again by "Avengers of German Honor", of several people who have cooperated with the Allies. This DHB release is the first in nation-wide propaganda and represents a deliberate decision to start publicizing the murder of "collaborators" as widely as possible. None of these reported murders has as yet been confirmed by Civil Affairs or Counter-Intelligence officers, but the spread of such rumors may be equally effective in causing terror among the Germans in occupied areas. In this connection, it is reported that as of Wednesday morning AACHEN had not heard of the counter-attack, nor had MIERSELN by Wednesday afternoon. The absence of reliable news, due to lack of electric power, leaves many towns prey to rumor.

Whether the combination of military events and terrorist propaganda will be able completely to disrupt life in town throughout the Allied Zone remains to be seen. Field reports dispatched just before the counter-attack jumped off gave ample evidence of increasing successes for A.G. administrators in many places. AACHEN, for example, continued to astound observers by the speed of its recovery. The same reporters who saw a dead city short weeks ago now compared it to Washington D.C. as a center of furious activity. With a present population estimated at something over 11,000 (estimates up to 15,000 have been received), the city has begun to rebuild homes and reorganize the structure of community life.

A considerable amount of glass located in a nearby dump gave impetus to the repair of shattered windows. The food situation was under control; AACHEN being the center of a large agricultural community, with the supply of potatoes, unthreshed wheat, and vegetables apparently assured for the winter. These items were unrationed, while a weekly ration of a half-pound of meat and three pounds of bread per person had been established. A considerable number of retail stores were functioning as distributing points - 20 groceries, 20 bakeries, 17 butcheries. The newly-opened Deutsche Bank met with spectacular success; within three days of its opening as a Savings Bank some 200,000 Marks had been deposited by about 1,000 individuals. These deposits are to be used by the city until tax returns are sufficient to meet the Municipal payroll and repay the loan. The taxes planned are of income tax on earnings over 100 Marks, 5% on retail sales, 2% on wholesale transactions. While such a scale of taxes may cause an American or Briton to scratch his ear and wonder, it should be remembered that this is only a local tax designed to cover the needs of Municipal operations.

The city is in good shape for medical assistance. There are now 20 doctors, 7 dentists, and 23 practicing in AACHEN. The town hospital has 500 beds, which contained only four cases of contagious diseases. Many children have been born during the occupation; the first one was named after the American doctor who delivered it. Field interrogators remark that AACHEN civilians are very friendly and eager to talk. Since the non-fraternization rule is strictly enforced by M.P.s, P.W. interrogators are usually the first Americans that the residents have been able to meet and talk with. They find that Americans enjoy an extraordinary prestige among the Germans. For some it is the prestige of the conqueror; for others it is the prestige of a nation powerful enough to represent the ideal of democracy and to better overwhelming military might at the same time. So proud are Germans of working for the Americans that many have hand-lettered signs for their doors, which read: "THIS HOUSE IS INHABITED BY ---, COLLABORATOR WITH THE AMERICANS".

The Agitations recorded by one interrogator are worthy of notice: "The city has, amidst its ruins, a curious kind of vitality and a strange existence. One lawyer has received permission to practice. Ten men are restoring the court records. Some two dozen musicians are waiting to open up an orchestra. A professor of the history of culture and art is contemplating the mystic beauty of the preserved cathedral and reads into it Charlemagne's character of 'power and spirit'. An old Social Democrat, who refused to have anything to do with the Nazis for 11 years, now escapes from obscurity and unlimply uncovers the Americans, when he reads, that the whole experience of the siege and the fighting and the bombardment was something that he was glad to have gone through because he would not want 'to miss anything in life'. A middle-aged Socialist woman, who was bounded by the Gestapo and spent years in concentration camp for underground political activity, comes forward and offers to help the Americans 'to fight Fascism'. A homosexual stage and movie actor, all unmyth and perfumed, wants to sing American songs for the American troops. And a rat-exterminator, the only one in town, tells that he is worried about the increase in the rat population which feeds on unburied corpses. As we walked through the streets of AACHEN in his company, he was telling us how he is searching for chemicals to make poisons to kill the pests."

"Life goes on quietly in the houses. One must get off the streets at 5.30 and stay indoors until 7 in the evening. Those who have no candles search for bits to make candles. What they do during the long nights is a mystery. Many go to bed early, as early as 7, for there is nothing to do and the one candle that a person can afford to use is not sufficient for prolonged reading. But the people in the city are neither depressed nor discouraged. On the contrary, they give the impression of high spirits, of energy, and of willingness to start anew. Americans are held in high esteem, and if there is any grumbling, it is not directed against them. M.C. MACHES lies largely in ruins. But the people who live there, the people who remained behind largely because they were non-Nazi or anti-Nazi, are intent upon rebuilding and upon cheerful cooperation with the Americans whom many Germans consider their liberators. 'We don't care what kind of government we have, or who rules us', one intelligent woman said, 'so long as we are rid of Nazis and have some freedom'."

In STOLBERG, the Wohlfahrtsamt (Welfare Agency) has set up a scale of subsidies. For each soldier's wives and others who have lost their means of support through the war are eligible. A single person receives 20 RM per month and a married couple 30 RM, with an additional 10 RM for each additional member of the family. This scale is calculated to be just enough to buy the daily food rations, which are 0.20 RM for soup and 0.10 RM for half a pound of bread. It is interesting that the money, which is advanced as a loan, will be repaid when possible at a future date. The food situation has not improved, distribution being hampered by 10 soup-kitchens which are supplied by 5 warehouses and the lack of transport constituting a bottleneck in the flow. The energetic Deputy Mayor, however, has taken steps to improve the situation by setting up a food commission which supervises the gathering and distribution of food by charging individual wholesalers with the procurement of specific types of produce.

The political imbalance in STOLBERG has been somewhat retrieved by the personality of the Deputy Mayor. The Bürgermeister is a Center Party man and he surrounded himself with a "clique" of men with a "right" political orientation. Since STOLBERG is an industrial town, there was a considerable amount of complaint heard from the representatives of the working class concerning this situation, aggravated by the fact that the Mayor's personality and past were not entirely pleasing to the "leftish" elements of the population. More recently, a Social-Democratic Deputy Mayor has been taking hold in the administration and bringing in his own men. This has brought about a temporary balance in the representation of actual political forces within the administration. As a general rule, such uneasy equilibria do not long endure unless they have a genuine working arrangement on policy questions. The *modus vivendi* in STOLBERG seems to be that the Bürgermeister takes primary administrative responsibility to the American V.C. officials, while the Deputy Bürgermeister holds him responsible for implementing arrangements to ease the daily life of the population (e.g., food procurement and distribution, etc.).

Other informants in STOLBERG agree that workers were exploited by the Nazis through the imposition of long hours under extremely difficult conditions. Industrial espionage was common, in one case through the agency of plant fire wardens. Foreign workers in this area passed a "brown belt", receiving discrimination in the allotment of food and clothing. They were not allowed to withdraw from it as earlier in 1944 until the "dinner workday" claim was signalled. Another plant was praised, however, for its good treatment of foreign workers, who received the same consideration as German workers. According to one extremely well-informed resident, the *Heimwehr* organization in STOLBERG was disbanded in March of this year after an HQ leader was shot at DUEREN and several operations were taken place. The organization recruited its members among Catholics as well as the local P.C., and is said to have been connected with the attempts to overthrow the Nazis.

* One observer points out that "clique" is now the standard term for the governing body, a semantic residue of the abuse of Nazi politics.

Three P.W. interrogators with the Third U.S. Army who moved into SAARLUEBING with an advance company of Combat Engineers confined the old slogan of German Landsern : "Kanonnen schliessen keine Erdbeepfoll". Over 1000 German civilians emerged from a bunker in the LISBORT section which had been built to hold 600. Immediately after taking over the bunker the U.S.A. read General HISENBERG's proclamation, whereupon twelve men in civilian clothes came forward to surrender the bunker as capturers. When questioned about national preferences, most people claimed to be born in the above all else. The German spoken is good; only the older people are bilingual. Anti-Nazi sentiments are frequently heard, but a 10-year old boy referred to German troops as "winners" (ours) until surreptitious prompting by his elders encouraged him to change to "die Deutschen". The informant told of the arrest and imprisonment in July of Pastor STRUPP of SAARLUEBING, for having said from his pulpit : "Wenn ihr jetzt einsteckt, geht ihr nur den Krieg verlengern". (If you join the ranks now you will just lengthen the war). STRUPP was sent to RUZBECK and thence to DACHAU which, according to the same informant, has become the chief concentration camp for clergy, political prisoners having been transferred to other camps in order to make room.

B. FIFTH AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

The present air offensive, particularly in Western Germany, is regarded as different in kind from the earlier catastrophes. GEBELIS, paying his third visit to the area in two months, has again admitted that the air war dominates people's minds, and that the policy of silence is resented. LEY continues to write of "large towns without food, light or gas, without a single undamaged house". The effects of bombing of transport is admitted on all sides to be particularly disastrous. In addition that present raids seem to be carried out "without difficulty or risk", GEBELIS stated that "heavy bombs are destroying our traffic arteries" and that the sun would not shine again for German railroads until "the Luftwaffe again soars powerfully above German soil". It is clear that his recent promises of relief by the Luftwaffe had some basis by the re-emergence of the Luftwaffe in strength during the past week. It is not clear, however, that the tactical use of the Luftwaffe over Allied lines will afford any considerable respite to the German population west of the RHINE. The attitude in these areas toward the resurgent Wehrmacht is, indeed, problematical. During the recent past evacuation has drawn from the towns threatened by Allied advances a considerable portion of the population, mainly the Nazi portion. Those who remained were either anti-Nazi or non-Nazi to such a degree that they preferred life under the Allies to life under the Nazis. In nearly all cases, those who remained were chiefly concerned that for them the war should soon be over, and advancing Allied troops were their best hope that this might soon come to pass. Many people within this area, in addition, had been outraged by looting, mishandling, and other overt acts against the civilian population committed by members of the Wehrmacht. Although these people are not of insignificant influence, if any, upon actual military operations, their prevailing desire to see the war over and done with may become a factor of consequence.

One channel through which discontent may reveal itself is the Volksturm. This body has been reported in contact by air troops twice; once fighting well, once fighting very badly indeed. But in both cases the action was defensive. There is no evidence of any intention to use the Volksturm in offensive action during the present counter-attack, but even where it is used in holding or other actions in support of the attack, the problem of morale will be brought sharply into focus. For there is considerable evidence that men called into the Volksturm are not being used as mere untrained cannon-fodder. The following sentences from a correspondent in SAARLUEBING should be noted : "They are now dealing with the German Volksturm, saying that the Volksturm men were thrown into the focal points on the fighting fronts without having been trained, armed or equipped ... Clear brains must

immediately refutes the above-mentioned deliberate enemy lie, because an untrained and unarmed Volksturm man would only be a hindrance at the fighting front. In order to stop this criminal gossip for ever, it must be stated that only Volksturm men and units who are fully trained, equipped and armed according to the regulations are allowed to come into contact with the enemy ... It is the duty of every German Volksgenosse, and in particular of the Volksturm soldier, to rebuke resolutely and sharply those who spread this criminal enemy lie." The significance of these remarks, which are designed to assuage fears of going into battle untrained, appears when it is observed that the same paper the same day also revealed incidentally that "the WESTPHALIAN Volksturm has been mobilized for front service". Since the administration of LOHRRAINE was united with that of the WESTPHALIA, and refugees from LOHRRAINE have flocked back into the WESTPHALIA, it is likely that the debacle of the Volksturm at METZ is well-known throughout the area.

Some small hindrance of the German war effort is possible at WESSELING. A P/W, who lived in a section of the town known as OBERBILK, told interviewers that "all" of his friends there were Communists and were secretly organizing. This is the workers' section of the town and is known as "the red harbor of WESSELING". Long list fights between workers and Party members have been reported here. Among less "activist" elements, resistance takes passive forms. The P/W claims that in his favorite hang-out anyone who gives the Hitler salute will not be waited on. This is accomplished either by ignoring the customer's request for service or by telling him that the house is fresh out of whatever he has ordered. Another P/W reports a similar situation in FRANKFURT, where people whisper about the Nazis and treat them as outsiders.

From COLOGNE continued reports are received confirming the hanging of approximately twelve civilians, among them two or three women, in the EHRENFELD section in October. A new "anti-Nazi" organization is reported in COLOGNE which calls itself the MGC (short for MARIANNSCHNEIDER MÄNNER CONGREGATION). This was organized by the Jesuits; its members, who are introduced to the organization by members of good standing, are all Catholics; the emphasis is on family men with young children. The main purpose of the MGC is to influence family men to educate their children as good Catholics. One task assigned to members, the "Vertrauensmänner", is to distribute religious literature in their street blocks. Although this organization takes no active steps against the Nazis, their program is clearly designed to forestall Nazification of the youth and to combat Nazi ideology, at least among practising Catholics. A P/W states that workers groups in COLOGNE have prepared a Black List of Nazi personalities for their own use, which they apparently intend to turn over to Allied authorities as well.

The region between DUISBURG and the RUHR is said to be particularly disorganized by Allied bombings. Troops have to be transported more and more by road instead of train, which adds to the desperate scarcity of gas. Telephone and telegraph services are disorganized to such an extent that even plane-spotting service is hampered. Letters from Central Germany take more than two days to reach the RUHR, and mail is no longer delivered except in the immediate neighborhoods of the place where pouches are deposited. One informant stated that during the Russian campaign much of the German war production was transferred to the East, with the result that there is a great shortage of plant within West in Germany today. In the RUHR district, he claims, manufacture has very largely ceased and the region is now used chiefly for the exploitation of its mines. Although such reports must be read with caution, they do bear a strong confirmatory evidence of the large-scale transfer of industry from the RUHR. An article in the HOCHEN National Zeitung (23 November) reveals that people are worried about this transfer because the district, no longer a key industrial center, will not be defended at all costs and because it will be hard to recover industrial supremacy after the war. Although it admits that "it is painful to bid farewell to one's exclusive significance", the article consoles the population with the thought that: "Parts of industrial removal were accomplished and techniques invented which will exert their influence in the days of peace to come ... All the more did reasonable economic circles in the RUHR welcome that for economic reasons other parts of Germany joined in the Reich's struggle for life in good time."

Additional interviewers commented on the fact of ethnicity. KOTIKER has come in three groups of people: Russian, Jewish, Bulgarian, who were in the various parts of the field. He also stresses that the Russian were recruited from these subgroups, each of which was always referred to "ethnically" by the Russian as "Russian workers (French), Bulgarian, and Italian" - they were ethnically mixed. This Russian workers and Jewish and Bulgarian, the Russian workers in this case is large-scale, while the Bulgarian with a "T" on it. They were paid according to the letters were getting, but were also to receive a considerable amount through the device of a salary "retention". He further points out and comments that they were also to be very productive. (3) Russian and Ukrainian workers - these were of the type that were in a "factory", recruited by the Russian for the "special" work. They were also in the "factory" and a little specialized work, but that is not to much identify since they were not provided to make it, since it was of public nature. The money was used purely in clothes. There is the black and the red in the Russian workers.

[illegible]

When in question, he asked for confirmation of foreign workers very rarely from the local and from the plant. Therefore the recent period is the time of the greatest addition of foreign workers of both nationality and ethnicity. There is a high number of individuals whose foreign workers were treated mainly by Soviet police organs as by wild imported criminals, particularly among the women, namely with their children in tow. In most cases, they were arrested and immediately freed, as immediately releasing a foreign worker was being out, though normally pardoned was discovered. One POW had complained bitterly that in small villages where white ones have been found, Russian workers were not welcomed, while, particularly in places where the headquarters of stations or towns are, they are treated as guests. The attitude of the Russian police is based mainly on the fact that they are afraid that the foreign workers, especially those of Polish or Ukrainian origin, might demand the same status that Soviet workers had in the case of those who had been in the labor camps.

[illegible][illegible]

PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE

1. Morale adequate for counterattack.

It is still too early to report in detail on the morale of soldiers engaged in the present offensive, or on the effect of the [redacted] of the counter-attack on German troops in other sectors. Faced with an unfavourable strategic situation, German troops have launched their counter thrust with apparently the same determination with which they have recently been resisting Allied attacks. It seems clear that the German High Command felt certain that the strong points in German morale which make the German soldier a formidable defensive fighter could even at this stage of the war be successfully employed in offensive fighting.

One of the most important factors on which the Wehrmacht could rely is the still unbroken faith of majority of the landers in at least [redacted] aspect of the German Wehrmacht (leadership). Judging by numerous examples among prisoners, over half the German soldiers still express some strong measure of faith in Hitler as a political and social leader. Although a note of disapproval of the German High Command has been encountered ever since the fall of France and the 20th July revolt, the traditionally deep German sense of military discipline and unquestioning obedience of superior orders still remains intact. Unreserved confidence in junior officers still predominates. Orders to counterattack can be expected, under these circumstances, to be honoured and executed vigorously and without question.

Those who believe (as many have been shown to do) that Hitler loves the German people too much for him to prolong a lost war unnecessarily or permit a useless counterattack will argue that the [redacted] fact of the present attack being launched proves that it must be for the ultimate benefit of the German people. For this reason, they will support it with all the more enthusiasm. Others less devoted who have doubts about the possibility of a decisive German victory still hope that Hitler, or [redacted] other German leader, will be able to bring [redacted] a political conclusion to the war which will be more advantageous than unconditional surrender. A major counterattack to achieve such a goal would [redacted] tirely reasonable to them.

The impression of such German propaganda, as is likely to have reached the troops, will probably be that credit for the offensive [redacted] to be attributed [redacted] the leadership generally, no clear cut claims having been made for the military or Party aspects. But as the drive begins to spend its force or fail, the problem of attributing responsibility will become more acute. The obvious alternatives will be to claim that the political repercussions have been such as to outweigh military losses - or alternatively, to find a scapegoat. It is also possible although, of course, too early to predict, that an unsuccessful counterattack which [redacted] more takes the German Armies outside the borders of the Fatherland, may seriously undermine confidence in both Army and Party leadership. In this connection it should also be possible to judge the importance of the claims of some sources that German morale, as manifested by determined "house to house resistance" is largely dependant [redacted] the fact that the German armies [redacted] actually demanding German soil.

The strange belief that time is on the side of Germany, over the short [redacted] tends to make for strong morale, and obviously contributes to a spirit of counterattack for this is clearly intended to win for Germany the necessary breathing space and delay the Allied advance until such time as the complete effects of total mobilization can be felt. This myth is supported by the frequently encountered belief in the Wehrmacht that the United Nations [redacted] so split that one day soon they will be fighting among themselves. The Balkan area had been cited by some P.W. even before the disturbances broke out in Greece as the location where the first armed conflict will take place. In this respect Germany has merely to hold out to that time in order to escape the effects of complete defeat.

Offensively to hasten the day of political cleavage and war-weariness [redacted] the Allies, attrition of the enemy forces is necessary. To a considerable extent

the belief is still encountered currently among Fe/W that German character and skill can overcome the numerical superiority of the Allied armaments and bring about attrition. Most important to achieve this goal is renewed growth of faith in secret weapons.

As yet no startling new devices are being reported in the counterattack. Flying bombs have been used tactically, and jet propelled planes, previously encountered, were met during the first day's aerial combat in large numbers. However, reports indicate that the German troops engaged in the counterattack are extremely well armed with extremely effective weapons. For some intelligent believers, especially officers, faith in new weapons hinges not on the belief of the devastating potency of a single weapon but rather on the efficiency of new and perfected weapons. Should the character of the present encounter bear out the belief that the weapons with which the German soldier is equipped are individually good, faith would be considerably strengthened, the only limiting factors being the numerical superiority which the Allies can bring to bear.

On the other hand, it does not seem likely that such weapons will be interpreted by the average German soldier as the decisive employment of new secret weapons of the devastation producing variety. Failure of Nazi propaganda to make any claim for secret weapons in this counter-attack, bears out this point. Those soldiers who had some general and vague expectation about such secret weapons will begin once more to doubt their arrival or effectiveness — was the case after the failure of V-1. Yet, it should be remembered that among many completely nazified soldiers the faith is in some unknown miracle rather than in the specific potency of new secret weapons. Such soldiers are unlikely to be dismayed by the failure of secret weapons to appear in this particular battle.

The present counterattack represents a decisive psychological commitment as well as a military one. The German leadership has decided that the appropriate time has arrived for a full-scale counter blow. The results of this military operation may well generate new attitudes towards German leadership. Moreover, the skill with which the present operation is portrayed to the troops as a successful achievement in defense of the Reich will have a powerful effect in fashioning morale during the final phases of the Allied drive into Germany. Future Wehrmacht morale reports will attempt to follow these points closely.

2. Wehrmacht Morale on 21 August.

Interrogation reports recently received from the British 21 A.C. indicate that morale of the Wehrmacht in this sector is similar to that encountered elsewhere on the front. Isolated desertions occur, but as on the US front, only where, because of some peculiar background factor, the individual soldier is willing to face the hazards of breaking his ties with the Wehrmacht. Police reserves appear to have been encountered who offer poor resistance, but generally morale remains firm and unchanged.

Listening to Allied broadcasts by troops in the line remains limited, lack of facilities is most often cited as the reason. Most Fe/W have had some contact with our leaflets; and as elsewhere the "Safe Conduct" pass is the best known.

3. Rumours in the Wehrmacht.

Armies are traditionally plagued by waves of rumours. The Wehrmacht, beset by a lack of hard information, is particularly fertile in this respect. The degree to which German soldiers become carriers of rumours, both optimistic and pessimistic, is seen by the fact that recently soldiers in Allied Fe/W camps were reporting that Germany had launched attacks against England. The problem has developed to the point where Nazi authorities are frequently calling for disciplinary action against chronic rumormongers and are with elaborate arguments offering denials to demoralizing rumours. On the other hand, they are attempting to exploit the tendency to spread rumours by introducing through the activities of NSR officers, "oral propaganda" beneficial to the Nazi point of view.

A captured order dated October, "Garrison Netz", issued by a NSR officer reveals clearly some of the rumours which the Nazis consider dangerous enough to issue directions for denial. (1) Idle chatter about military setbacks since 20th July having been caused by treason, has not ceased. The facts are, according to the directive: The responsible criminals have found retribution. On the other hand, 61 generals have been killed and another sixty have been wounded during the last few years. The leaders of our troops stand unflinchingly behind Adolf Hitler.

(2) Rumour mongering about the behaviour of the civilian population in the Rhineland, in part based on actual fact, can be inferred from the statement that the conduct of the German population in those areas has been exemplary and soldiers should be told of this. (3) To counter expressions of pro-American occupation sentiment the imminent publication of American decrees for the administration of occupied German territory must be exploited. "The administration of Germany will be entrusted to emigrants who are to act as stool pigeons in the midst of the National Socialist population. The reading of Mass on German soil by 'Roosevelt's' propaganda bishop" is pointed out as further evidence of American political tactics.

More positive use of rumours is directed in a captured order dated November and addressed to all NSR officers. The following lines of attack are laid out: (1) Soviet occupation of the Balkans, to protect its supply lines and put down anti-Soviet partisans, is resulting in a reduction of Soviet tactical reserves. Nevertheless the Soviet cannot dispense with this occupation of the Balkan countries, for otherwise the British would regain their influence in that region. (2) Nationalist partisan groups in the Ukraine are seriously interfering with the Soviet supply system. (3) German garrisons in the Atlantic coast bases have the task of preventing the Anglo-Americans from using larger ports as long as possible and they thereby disrupting the supply of badly needed stores. Furthermore, advantage of the time thus gained has been taken to complete additional U-boats. (4) Old U-boats are constantly cruising the Atlantic Ocean, tying down hundreds of Anglo-American warships and a great number of heavy bombers. New U-boats will be employed shortly which will seriously imperil the invasion troops.

The order also contains a rumour concerning (5) the use of Belgian and French gangsters as civilian police by the Anglo-Americans in the occupied German border regions. General Eisenhower is reported as having asked for 150,000 such terrorists to supervise the German population in those territories. The Parisian Communist newspaper *L'Humanité* of 18 October is quoted as having said that Eisenhower can depend on those people to know how to deal with the German vermin. They spend the sight of blood, they have frequently proven to the entire satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief in France.

Protection of the soldier against the effects of rumours spread by civilians requires special directives. A recent Luftwaffe order tells soldiers to leave how to deal with this problem. He is warned that all wild rumours at home stem from enemy propaganda, and that he should give notice of the criminality of such insidious agitation. Moreover, he is supplied with answers to some of the questions he is almost certain to meet. The reply to the question: "When will the end?" is: "When Germany is victorious." He should tell people who say that they fed up with the war that if "we had talked this way in the winters of 1941-42 or 1943-44, the Bolsheviks would now be in Germany." An outlet for the grievances which he is likely to accumulate while on leave is supplied by the suggestion that if he believes his relatives are harshly or unjustly handled, he should withhold criticism, examine the case and report it to a Party official or his squadron leader upon return to camp.

Front und Heimg (German telegraph service for Army newspapers) went further in advising soldiers on the problem of resisting rumours circulated by the few ungrateful civilians. It is not enough for the soldier to personally disbelieve the facts. "The man who spreads the lie must have his ears boxed so that he does not do it again."

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**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCISE COMMAND FORCE
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
CONFIDENTIAL

30 December 1944

SUBJECT: ARGENTINE ON TREATMENT OF THE VOLKSSTUR.
J-2 and J-3 Sec, 1944.

With reference to the above, please amend paragraph 1.b. by eliminating the last sentence, which is not in accord with existing G-2 policy.

Charles G. V. Chism
Colonel, USA
Chief, Plans and Directives Section.



091412/3
30 DEC
(5)

Report, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters AEF

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCISE COMMAND FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division**

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. PW 000.77

16 December 1944

GUIDANCE FOR OUTPUT BY GERMAN FOR 7 WEEKS DECEMBER 18 - 25

(Note: While the material in this paper is primarily for German output, it should also be given thorough coverage in the languages spoken by the important groups of foreign workers in the Reich. All material not marked with a sideline is for use in output.)

APPRECIATION:

There has already been a certain amount of open reaction by the Nazis to the curbing of action on Military Government. For example, "Front und Heimat" carried a warning on December 14th against efforts by Jewish agitators in Ghettos to pay to attract the people in Western Germany with sweet-smelling promises, and the paper drew attention again to the "no fraternization" order.

It can be assumed that every effort is being made by the Nazis to counter the depression created by the Military Government talks, by special briefing of the political officers attached to Wehrmacht units and of local Nazi leaders in civilian areas.


A document which is typical of the material issued to the Wehrmacht Officers in the Army is now in our hands. It contains directives for hate propaganda concerning Allied measures in occupied Germany. These are the main points:

1. The Morgenthau Plan and the support for it in the Allied Press.
2. General Eisenhower's proclamation that "we come as conquerors".
3. Starvation of the German people.
4. Deportation of German workers.
5. Rule by Jews.
6. Subtle terrorism of Germans.
7. Military mark swindle.

ACTION INDICATED:

Obviously there is the utmost necessity for us to hasten the effect of this propaganda by devoting as much time to rubbing in repeatedly the Military Government statements and all which shows that we practise what we preach. (END-REDEF will provide a flow of news and commentary material in addition to recordings obtained in the field for BBC, ARBE and Radio Luxembourg).

At the same time, we should show that it is really in Hitler's Germany that there is the intention to destroy German industrial areas attributed to Morgenthau, the treatment by the on capture of the Germans as a conquered people, rule by thugs (if not by Jews), threat of starvation through transport chaos, deportation by forced evacuation and a financial swindle.



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16 DEC

arising from the worthlessness of a Reichsmark with which there is nothing to buy.

We should redouble our efforts to show by factual reporting that, with Hitler in the background (in spite of the recent efforts to trot him out to the fore) Himmler is the real ruler of that part of Germany not yet fortunate enough to be under the comparatively benevolent rule of General Mackeow.

HIMMLER AND THE GERMAN

We should continue to encourage solidarity between soldiers, Volksturm and civilians against the Party.

From all sources, military and civilian, evidence accumulates that Himmler's unpopularity is growing; is rapidly at his grip is strengthening -- every department of the German State.

Both Wehrmacht and Volksturm prisoners of war express bitter indignation that last war veterans, untrained for modern war, ill-armed and often in ill-health, should be sent to the front. Their anger is directed primarily against Himmler.

The resentment felt by the Volksturm at their treatment, which influences the attitude of the soldiers to Himmler when the Volksturm come into contact with them at the front, is also profoundly affecting civilians with whom they are, of course, in constant touch before going forward.

The Volkischer Beobachter recently had to publish a leading article advising the Nazi officers of the Volksturm to remember that their ■■■ are not recruits or cadets in the Russian meaning of the term but citizens with families and jobs, still linked with the everyday life of civilians and, in many cases, men with serious physical disabilities. The article reveals that criticism of their leaders by the Volksturm is open and pungent and claims that it exceeds the renowned freedom of speech of the democracies. It concludes by asking the Volksturm and their civilian friends to make allowances for their leaders.

Reprisals ordered by Himmler against the families of soldiers and Volksturm who surrender to the Allies ■■■ causing great bitterness. One officer in Allied hands stated that he gave himself up in spite of this threat because he had heard from the Allied radio that all relatives of deserters who had been thrown into concentration camps by Himmler would be set free by the ■■■ and retribution meted out to the Nazis responsible for such victimization.

It is ■■■ learnt that Himmler is in command of all troops on German soil, irrespective of whether they are Feldheer ■■■ Ersatzheer troops. He is now known as Befehlshaber des Heeresgebietes, instead of Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres and Chef der Heeres Rüstung. ■■■ then virtually replaces Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.

Himmler's unpopularity has been further increased by widespread rumors concerning the habits of the Altieta which surrounds him and has its headquarters at his Castle of Westphalia, near Bad Bentheim in Westphalia. Frequent wild parties are said to take place there at which SS General Tanneberg, SS Colonel Bartels, SS Lt. Frank, adjutant to General Tanneberg and SS Lt. Wipperfurth are leading figures.

These orgies are contrasted indignantly by Germans with their extremely hard conditions.

Many reports have been received recently indicating the growth of a strong opposition to Hitler in influential quarters. Not only many Wehrmacht generals said to be involved but also of the veteran SS generals who resent the that Hitler who has never fought at the front and has no military training should be in command of the army on German soil. officers' clubs there is said to be constant talk of a move to get rid of him.

Army officers are getting very angry at the increased political pressure exercised upon them by the Party. News the Party is releasing from its own stores equipment supplies for Volksturm which it withholds from the Wehrmacht has added their indignation. Army say is shortage of supplies which leads to the looting and unauthorized requisitioning by officers and men alike which is making the Army unpopular with the people. This friction between soldiers and civilians is deplored by the Army officers, who realize that the Party deliberately seems to encourage it for its own ends and even sponsors broadcasts the troops egging them to action against civilians who do treat them as they feel they deserve. is learnt that many officers have begun to divert to their own use supplies of all kinds, but especially arms and ammunition, intended the VS.

SOLDIERS RAILWAYMEN.

That the Party is not succeeding in its attempts to drive a wedge between soldiers and civilians is indicated by a report to the Bishop of Berlin found in the possession of a captured Army chaplain. The chaplain wrote that soldiers' loyalty to regime deteriorates in big cities, where they are much influenced by civilians. This tendency was particularly marked, he said, in units working closely with civilian railroad workers.

It is learnt that the generally disaffected attitude of the German railwaymen is still causing Hitler great anxiety. A great propaganda effort has been made to rally them behind the Party. The great number of foreign railway workers is a source of greater anxiety to Hitler, particularly after recent events in Alsace, where, when the railwaymen were ordered to to the right bank of the Rhine, all the Alsatian personnel deserted the Reich railway service en masse and stayed behind.

The Party is well aware that the railways in Germany be without foreign workers and that the latter cannot therefore be evacuated far behind the line. It is feared that at the critical moment, foreign and even German railwaymen working near the front will go on strike, leaving their locomotives and rolling stock to fall into Allied hands, and themselves go into hiding until the arrival of the Allied forces.

UNDERGROUND.

Everything is to be gained now by giving wide publicity to the existence of a German anti-Nazi underground movement which has certainly not been liquidated by the terror which followed the July putch but has increased its forces and contains elements from all spheres of life from generals to private soldiers, from devout Catholics to Communist workers.

indicating widespread character
anti-Nazi movement:

Latest information from inside Germany reveals that very far from succeeded in liquidating the movement to the regime, in spite of the terror which followed the unsuccessful first attempt in July 20. It is reported that General Seiffert, Commander of the Training Centre at Doberitz, near Berlin, who collaborated in the putsch, is still at large and that several high officers who were involved in the plot at Paris and Vienna, as well as Berlin, are safe.

A surgeon in the German Army who was captured at Metz, he was serving "front probation" after being reprieved from a sentence of death for treason, states that while under sentence at the Armed Forces Penitentiary at Burgau, and that there were many high German officers imprisoned there for subversive activities. Among them were General of Artillery Becker and three other generals whom he did not know, and Col. Bruchmann, Waldenfels, Lt. Col. Stengel, Lt. Col. Moeller, Geronzy and Kaiser and 1st. Lt. Korn, a leader of the Black Front Strasser Movement, had succeeded for a time in holding the position of Nazi indoctrination officer in Army. These officers made no secret of the fact that, though they themselves had been caught, many of their secret confederates still at large, some of them in important positions.

YOUTH AND THE

Recent information leaves no possibility of doubt that large numbers of boys, and a good number of girls, are active in anti-Nazi underground. The time has certainly come to give discreet publicity, and thus encouragement, to these youngsters who are showing very considerable fortitude and daring in hampering the Party machine, which has made itself detestable to them, it appears, by its excessive regimentation and petty tyranny.

While it is uncertain what real political significance the revolt of youth against Nazism may have, there can be no doubt that it has an ideological basis in the desire for greater freedom that is in a position to foster, stimulate and it for immediate military purposes and perhaps our ultimate political aims.

Special material on this theme will be made available shortly. In the meantime, here are a few items:

Reliable reports coming into Allied hands from different sources reveal that the revolt against Nazism by boys and girls is becoming more widespread and more active in Germany with the approach of the Allied armies.

A German soldier from Munich states that the number of boys organized in militarist groups, calling themselves "Blasen", to fight the Hitler Jugend totalled thousands until large numbers were drafted into the Army - where they retain their anti-Nazi faith. There are still several hundreds in such groups - the Spitzblasen, Ankerblasen, and Hakenkreuzblasen, to name only a few. Although the leader of the Spitzblasen, the largest, a 23-year old youth named Spitz, caught and beheaded, the group carried on. The aim of the rebellious youth is to regain their freedom to organize their own clubs as they see fit and to be quit of the compulsory Hitler Jugend, whose leaders are often badly beaten up.

Another German prisoner confirms that there are many anti-Nazi youth organizations which have as a common aim the restoration of

personal freedom. ■ Essen there is a group called ■ ■ ■ ■ ■, which takes American cowboys ■ its model - with the ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ as Red Indians. Its leader was executed after shooting a Gestapo man but ■ group carries ■. Other groups in the Ruhr are ■ ■ ■ ■ ■, composed of boys who prefer hiding on their ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ to Hitler Jugend regimented activities, the "Kanall Pannu", which is composed of boys keen on water-sports, and the "Pfennig Club", which is identified by a penny worn under the coat lapel. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ the boys are armed. There are girl members also.

In Bremen there is a group known as "Drei Eisene Pfeile" (Three iron arrows). ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ specialises in listening to foreign broadcasts, reading foreign leaflets and spreading the news.

In Halle, there is an organisation called the "Apker", which is affiliated with the Edelweiss movement, by far the biggest and most important anti-Nazi youth organisation.

Very frequent reports are coming in now about the Edelweiss. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ branches all over the Rhineland and the Ruhr and in many parts of Bavaria and Saxony. It has thoroughly infiltrated into the Hitler Jugend and the Party is showing great anxiety about ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ influence in labour camps, among Air Force auxiliaries and even in ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ army. A report by the Party Chancery quoted in an order by the Reich Labour Service, leader of Labour Service Gau XVI refers to the high school boys in the Labour Camp at Monfeld as "no longer conforming to ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ conception of what is meant by faith". Another Party report refers to lads among the Air Force auxiliaries ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ avoiding joining the Party, and to boys released from labour camps to join the army as having openly declared that they did not ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ to play at soldiers for the Nazis benefit.

There is evidence that the Edelweiss is active in encouraging boys detailed for trench-digging to avoid the round-up, go slow at work and return home without leave as soon as possible. Threats of punishment for them have been issued by the Party.

Edelweiss is believed responsible for notices appearing ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Cologne lamp-posts which read "Capacity - 2.32 men."

In Cologne, Edelweiss members are joining the Volksturm ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ order to obtain arms.

Five girls and two boys recently interviewed in Allied occupied Germany revealed themselves as strongly anti-Nazi. All were either Pimpfe, Jungmaedels or BDM. They said that they took their views from their parents, who ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ staunch Catholics, and not from the Party, which had given up trying to indoctrinate them. The girls expressed disgust at the Nazi idea of sexual promiscuity. All declared that Nazi oppressions and restrictions were intolerable and that they wanted to be free to organize a decent orderly existence.

YOUNG WOMEN AND THE NAZIS.

It is probable that the influence of young ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ and girls on the anti-Nazi youth revolt is, in view of the susceptibilities of adolescent boys, very considerable and something of which we should take note. It should be a main concern of Allied programs to German women. Combined with recalcitrance in the matter of war work, the natural aspirations of adolescent girls and young women for a freer, purer, more romantic existence and of all women for ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ family life and orderly conditions can be a very potent factor in undermining the authority of the regime.

Now that large numbers of young women have been called up to serve as auxiliaries with the Wehrmacht, the release of the front, their attitude assumes even greater importance - as is recognised by the Nazis - are to give them a course of political education organised by Bormann and Goebbels.

Publicity should be given to this in some such form as the following:

The Zurich Press reports that members of the female labour service throughout Germany are now to be used to operate anti-aircraft searchlights. Fourteen or fifteen girls, only 14 or 15 years old, are needed to man each searchlight position. The view of the fact that sentiments hostile to the regime are very strong and widespread among young German girls - many of whom are members of the Edelweiss and other anti-Nazi youth movements - Bormann and Goebbels are organising intensive courses of political indoctrination for them.

Not only are girls to be used for AA defence but it is reported that they are also to be given military training in a new organisation, the Wehrmachthelferinnen Korps. They are to learn the use of the rifle and the Panzer-faust. The recruiting is done by the Party, which has always made the traditional position of women one of the main planks of its platform.

While there is a growing number of actively anti-Nazi girls organised in groups, even the typical girl members of the Hitler Jugend are becoming far from reliable Party members. One girl recently interrogated by an Allied officer at Kassel, near Lachen, had the standard Nazi picture of the outside world and appeared completely indoctrinated. She was, however, profoundly indignant at the Nazis' cruelty to the Jews - many of whom, she said, were her friends - and at the close of the interview burst out with a violent denunciation of the Party for having started and started the war. The Party leaders, she said, ought to be shot. Asked what future she looked forward to, this Hitler Youth girl said: "We want to be free - free from compulsion, free to do what we like and never to be afraid."

EVACUATION.

German soldiers in Italy are writing to their families in Western Germany, telling them not to obey the evacuation orders but to stay at home and await the arrival of the Allies. They are anxious that their wives and children shall not have disappeared to unknown places in the Reich, when they return from the front.

Many letters to this effect have been written by soldiers - and, of course, held up by the Party officials and never delivered - that a guidance has been issued to political officers with many in Italy for lectures on the subject to the troops.

The guidance document, now in Allied hands, says this:

"Many letters from soldiers have been showing anxiety over the fate of relatives in districts West of the Rhine. These include a number of absolutely ridiculous and contradictory suggestions, e.g. removal of money from banks and burial of money and valuables.

"The soldier needs guidance and encouragement. One thing above all must be brought to the troops' attention: The Fuehrer has specifically desired that no German shall be left in the enemy's hands. The responsibility for this lies with the Party leadership. They deserve full confidence. The troops are, therefore, to be taught that it is their duty to urge relatives to comply with the arrangements made by the Party."

Members of the SS, however anxious to carry out the Party's evacuation orders at the expense of other men's families, are in many cases advising their own families to evade them. The wife of one SS man, whose home was near Aachen told the Allied authorities that her husband came home a few days before the Americans arrived and urged her to stay at home whatever happened and on no account to evacuate into the Reich.

Soldiers of the Wehrmacht are actively helping German civilians to evade evacuation. This has compelled General of Infantry Knoechling to issue an order to all divisions and Army Groups of the 61st Army Corps as follows:

"The NSDAP, which is the organization entrusted with the evacuation of personnel, has repeatedly reported that individual soldiers are encouraging parts of the population who are unwilling to evacuate to remain in the Reich. Evacuation is an order of the 'Fuehrer'. Instructions contrary to this order are acts of sabotage against the Fuehrer's measures."

FOREIGN WORKERS.

It is most important to stop any publicity for the anti-Nazi activities or potential activities of the foreign workers, who have been over-neglected of late. Their importance as a disruptive factor in Nazi resistance in the West is great and it is essential to prepare the way for a new campaign directed to stop by giving news items which keep them in the picture.

The degree to which production in German small arms factories, which have become dependent on foreign labour, has fallen has aroused anxiety in the OKW which has issued an order to the Munitionswerke A.G. of Oberndorf calling for increased production at all costs. The Munitionswerke sent a copy to Gustav Wagner with a covering letter stating that, since the loss of the Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre in Liege, the Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre in Rueil-la-Petite, was the principal source for spare parts of the 98 k rifle. Of the several hundred workers employed by this firm, only 8 per cent were German, as nearly all Germans had been taken for compulsory labour in the West. Any further fall in production would have consequences which could not be covered for, the letter stated, and conscripted German workers must be returned to the factory as soon as possible.

In the 61st Army Corps area, General Knoechling has issued an order that all foreigners engaged on trench-laying must be closely watched and all foreigners without identification papers must be arrested in view of the danger of espionage and desertion.

A Western German paper reports that at railway stations and in crowded trains at Erfurt, soldiers have had their pistols stolen from the holsters on their belts. Men who carry pistols are warned to be careful "in view of the obvious danger to public security now".

Other reports state that many soldiers are conniving at such thefts by foreign workers and German anti-fascists, since they know that the arms will be used against the SS and Gestapo, for whom they have no love.

In handling foreign workers now, it is essential not to make the ordinary German feel that the foreign workers are a threat to anti-Nazi solidarity between Germans and foreign workers and not to drive a wedge between them.

POLICE.

We ought to give adequate publicity to the fact that the Nazis are very short of police and that not all the police they have

reliable.

example:

A Polizeimeister at [redacted] now in Allied hands refused [redacted] obey [redacted] superior's order to retreat before the Americans to [redacted] defensive positions and arranged for the surrender of his 200 men without firing a shot.

The tendency towards surrender of whole units of [redacted] well as VS and police is growing and should be encouraged in every possible way.

A German official who has escaped into neutral territory reports that, in view of the demands of the armed forces, the number of police available for home security work is very scanty. Women have replaced men as post office, telephone and telegraph officials, at railway stations and on trains but they cannot be used as police. [redacted] policemen now have only one eye or even one hand.

It [redacted] often possible [redacted] to put in a telephone call without having [redacted] tapped, [redacted] great [redacted] the shortage of wire-tappers.

In [redacted] the security personnel for watching foreign workers have [redacted] cut down by half.

[redacted] short are the shortages of staff that they are spreading stories of disaffected elements and foreign workers being overheard expressing treasonable views of plain clothes men, [redacted] do not in fact exist. [redacted] is hoped thus to make up for manpower shortages by intimidation.

HEALTH

Latest information from the areas of Germany affected by the serious influenza epidemic is that many people are dying who could have been saved by adequate medical attention. The shortage of doctors is acute as nearly all of them are called up for military service. In many places, there is no medical attention at all for the civilians. It has been decreed that military doctors [redacted] must take care of civilians but this sporadic medical service [redacted] useless to cope with epidemic conditions.

There are not enough doctors to cope with air raid casualties either. Swiss medical experts express the view that, in view of the shortage and the difficulty of providing even proper shelter for sick people owing to bomb damage, this winter will [redacted] terrible epidemic mortality in the Reich. Only immediate release of many doctors from the Army would [redacted] adequate medical service, but while the war goes on, this is impossible [redacted] the Army itself [redacted] short of doctors that troops are not allowed to report sick since all the doctors' time is needed for the wounded. Nevertheless, in many cases doctors are being forced by Nazi officers to fight in the front line.

FOUR

A German prisoner of war, asked his views about Hitler's present whereabouts and activities, said that most of his comrades believed that he was [redacted] completely in the background and that

-2-

Hitler had taken the opportunity of the Fuehrer's recent illness to usurp his position. Hitler, he said, was believed to have retired to his mountain retreat to write his second book, which will be entitled "Mein Irrtum" (My Error).

Another prisoner said that Goering was believed to be under house arrest at Karlshagen, where SS men look after his health, happiness and hypodermic syringes.

ROBERT A. MCOWEN
Brigadier General U. S. A.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Distribution:

P & D, 1.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

I.S.280.

16 December 1944

TO : Chief of Division.

FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

PWP/2900-13

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 12

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The sectors of Germany most recently occupied by Allied troops present ■ and suffering face. Destruction to towns and villages is now more ■ than during the first stages of the battle on German soil - BEGENDORF and SIESSDORF are estimated to be 90 per cent destroyed, for example, and G-5 reports destruction in BOVERICH and FLOVERICH at 50 per cent. One important effect of this destruction, which is heaviest in the 9 U.S. Army area and seems largely due to ground action, ■ been to increase the tempo of evacuation, particularly in the smaller towns where bunkers and civilian shelters are inadequate or lacking. From this area, G-5 reports that the town of MUEBOSLAH was "completely evacuated when occupied" and that "almost all the population had disappeared" from ■ other towns (all very small towns, with the exception of GEILENKIRCHEN).


Although the hardships due to battle proximity were undoubtedly a factor encouraging people to evacuate in this area, it is quite clear that the Party brought pressure to bear at all points to make sure of clearing the area. An order issued by 81 Army Corps which has been directing the defense of this area, reveals both the opposition to evacuation among landers and the pressure exercised by the Party to bring the Wehrmacht into line. The blunt wording of this order, which was signed by KUECHLING and distributed to all subordinate formations, is noteworthy:

"The NSDAP, which is the organization entrusted with the evacuation of personnel, has repeatedly reported that individual soldiers ■ encouraging parts of the population who are unwilling to evacuate to remain in the neighborhood. Evacuation is an order of the Fuehrer! Utterances counter to this order are acts of sabotage against the Fuehrer's measures. I refer once more to the orders issued by the Commander of the 7th Army and by me".

It is a moot point whether a town empty of Germans simplifies or complicates the life of a Town Major. But "complete" evacuation, on the basis of past experience, does not seem to last very long. Large cities, particularly, can hardly be completely evacuated (note that only one fair-sized town is included among the seven mentioned above). There are numerous examples to hand, particularly AACHEN, where what seemed a "ghost town" to the first occupying forces soon began to take on flesh and bones. It is now reported that AACHEN has reached the "saturation point" and that the influx of population has been halted temporarily by officials who do not know where to put them all. Even in smaller towns, many people escape evacuation orders by taking to the woods or to a nearby community where they have friends or relatives, and there hiding out until the storm has passed over, at which time they return to their homes. The devotion of these people to the "old familiar places", even when these have been reduced nearly to rubble, has been noted by many interrogators. This sentiment has been of help for M.O. officials. It has kept many people from leaving, impelled others who had evacuated a considerable distance from home to return, and has ■ "self-help" in reconstruction which is now evident in the ■ Government.

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The vigor with which the "self-help" program has recently gone forward is clear from the report of the Food Conference held at BRAND on the 28th of November. The Conference, which dealt with the food problems of the Landkreis AACHEN, was attended by the eight mayors of the area and their assistants. The M.G. officer who opened the Conference informed all present that they could not expect any supplies of food from the U.S. Army. They could expect, however, support in the form of transportation and permits necessary for the distribution of food to the population. The Conference then set up a permanent Food Commission, with German officials, to supervise food distribution according to the basic policy of equal rations for all inhabitants of the Landkreis. In accordance with this policy, certain very specific commitments were made in the pooling and allocation of both labor and resources among the towns of the Landkreis. In AACHEN, a similar program seems to have been followed in the taking over of retail stores for community use as distribution centers. This was followed in Landkreis WENSCHAU by a conference called by the local M.G. officer to consider ways and means for improving control of the distribution of existing supplies of food, fuel and civilian clothing. The conference was attended by the Landrat of the Kreis, together with the acting Burgermeisters of ZWEIFALL, RUTT and ROETTER. The outcome of this meeting has not yet been reported, but it is clear that these conferences speak well for the settled condition of these towns and the start made toward efficient self-administration.

That all is not yet sweetness and light in the occupied area is of course to be expected. Many violations of M.G. regulations are due to ignorance rather than intentional misconduct. The dissemination of information has been an extremely difficult problem, since the start of occupation, but a start toward its solution has been made by the use of local clergy, town criers, and publication of *Die Neue Zeitung* (now called *Mitteilungen*)—first Allied newspaper for Occupied Germany, published by P & PW of 12 Army Group (initial issue was dated 27 November 1944). But a number of violations have indicated that part of the population, at least, does not look to the Allied forces as "liberators". In KORNWIMMERSTADT a woman who was convicted of destroying Party records and trying to conceal others has been sentenced to six years' imprisonment. At EILENDORF Nazi Party members are required to report daily. It is still found necessary to remove certain German officials from their posts on grounds of security. The acting Burgermeister of HEND, for example, has recently been removed for this reason and is being held in a P/W cage. G-5 reports that M.G. officers are assisting in the security screening of the population of ESCHWEILER. Political seeping has not yet revealed itself as a pressing problem, but interrogations make it quite clear that the estimates of Nazification made by Germans themselves are not necessarily reliable. The Burgermeister of SCHERPENSEL, to cite one instance, maintains that there were only about 50 Party members, prior to American occupation, out of a total population of 1,274. Any small town could be atypical, of course, but this estimate must be considered skeptically, for it is quite disproportionate to the ratio of Nazis for all Germany, which is roughly 1 Party Member : 3 Adult Males. On the same basis, the ratio for SCHERPENSEL would be roughly 1 Member : 3 Adult Males. To which unusual estimate, the Burgermeister appends the observation that of the 50 Party members, only 12 were "real Nazis".

This distinction between Party members and "real Nazis" is frequently heard in the Rhineland, and the usual explanation offered is that the population of this area is predominantly Catholic. A number of field interrogators have rejected the validity of this self-applied title to non-Nazi and even anti-Nazi views. While it is clear that in some places the Church has been lukewarm or even hostile toward the Party, in most cases this has not led to any concerted anti-Nazi opposition on the basis of Church support. In some cases, where Church property and officials were not disturbed by the Party, there appears to have been no friction at all. It is quite clear, at any rate, that individual Catholics, excepting those who were deeply imbued with basic theological and ethical concepts, had been little affected in their relation to the Party by their membership in the Church. Several Germans in the occupied area, usually vigorous anti-Nazis who are themselves Catholics, have protested any distinction between Catholic and Evangelical Churches, on the ground that political behavior in Nazi Germany has not been a function of religious affiliation.

B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

In towns taken earlier by Allied forces the Nazis had relied largely on physical coercion to effect the evacuation of recalcitrant individuals. The success of this method was limited by the comparatively small number of trusty Nazi bodies available to move the comparatively large number of non-Nazi bodies who had no desire to move. Women kicked, screamed, and bit; men hid away. In some cases, local police were too soft to force their friends and neighbors to "get out of town" - they were replaced by police officials from other parts of Germany who had no such sentimental bonds. In other cases, Wehrmacht units were called in to support evacuation decrees. The women told them to stop being idiots and hide with them instead of continuing an interminable war. Many soldiers did; others advised the women to stay (see Section A of this Summary). Where the soldiers followed orders, they got cursed as roundly as the SA, the police, or the "Goldfasanen" (Party officials) who tried to drive them out. The result had been an endless confusion, and considerable failure, of evacuation measures.

The Party, cognizant of the causes of failure, has recently started its evacuation drives earlier in cities not yet directly threatened by Allied advances. Compulsory evacuation of surplus population has been announced for cities as far behind the lines as ESSEN and GELSENKIRCHEN, but coercive measures have not yet been taken. It is known that ESSEN police were used in the evacuation of AACHEN. It is likely that these officials are still being used in areas more immediately endangered and that few reserves are available from the already understaffed police forces of BERLIN and other large cities in the interior.

The Party seems, therefore, to be relying upon more subtle means of persuasion in these areas, at least for the present. One such means is withholding the special food ration cards of those whom it is desired to evacuate. In ESCHWEILER the original issue of special pink cards was cancelled by the subsequent issue of a much smaller number of green cards. Since holders of green cards only were permitted to draw official rations, all others had to choose among the alternatives of evacuating, starving or procuring an illegal food supply. This device has been used without great success in the past, because the time-lapse between specific orders for evacuation and the arrival of Allied troops was shorter. People who had decided to stay were able to accumulate sufficient secret stocks of food to carry them over until the Allied occupation, at which point their German ration cards were no longer necessary. When ration cards were withheld further back in the Combat Zone, and the prospects of early Allied occupation are doubtful, this may prove to be an extremely effective device for enforcing evacuation orders. The prospect of a long period without food coupons, plus a period of being pushed around by the various coercive agencies of evacuation, followed by a period of bitter combat all about one's home, may be sufficiently unattractive to persuade all but the most hardy to leave. The success of evacuation in this rear area would seem therefore to depend very largely upon the rate of the Allied advance, which thus far has been slow enough to give the Party a good head start.

The first impression that registered with a P/W passing through battered COLOGNE was: "Man ist crstaunt, wo die Leute alle wohnen" (One wonders where all these people live). The answer seems to be that the majority live in bunkers. In addition to smaller bunkers scattered about the outskirts, there are three enormous bunkers in the heart of the city called "Dombunker", "Hochhausbunker", and "Severinbunker" (the names indicate location). Each is estimated to have a capacity of 12,000-15,000 people, and all are said to be filled to capacity. This would give a population of about 40,000 for the bunkers alone. On the other hand another P/W, who was born and raised in COLOGNE, estimates destruction in the city at 75 per cent and population now remaining at 20,000 (of a normal population approaching 800,000). One of these extremely wide variations in estimating the population left in COLOGNE is the system of suburbs, for the suburban population was normally about three times as large as the "City" population. It is not clear which estimates, if any, take all or part of this population into account.

The most effective force for evacuation is said to have been the bombing of 30 October, prior to which some 250,000 people were reported still living in the city. The morning after this air raid, which destroyed the still habitable parts of the city and several shelters, the final exodus began. It lasted eight days, during which people are said to have gathered by thousands at the Rhine bridges and all available army vehicles loaded to capacity with refugees. The riots which were reported in the KEMFELD section of the city throughout October were led, according to reports, by workers who panicked Party evacuation measures. The SA was called upon to do the job, but is said to have refused. Finally, the SS was brought in to suppress the riots, and is reported to have done so with characteristic "efficiency". The fate of these instigators is not known. But there are several reports of the public hanging on 22 October of 15 men and 1 woman in the KEMFELD section for the killing of four local Party officials. There are further reports that stragglers and deserters are hiding underground, even that these can have established contact with foreign workers and operate small secret arsenals. The Gestapo occasionally catches some of these men and hangs them, whereupon the deserters, who are supposed to be fairly well organized, retaliate by killing Gestapo men. Although Party bring these stories across to our lines fairly often, they must be treated with some skepticism.

The industrial installations of SAARBRÜCKEN and the main railroad line have been severely hit. To relieve the housing shortage caused by bombing, the government undertook to build "Notstandsbauern" (Emergency apartments), with the purpose of keeping its industrial workers content and on the job. Probably for the same reasons, evacuation was not started in SAARBRÜCKEN until considerably later than in other cities of this area, and a strict system of control has kept prices low. Despite these measures, however, the government has been unable completely to prevent friction. Since the food rations are too small, many workers followed a system of bartering manufactured goods for farm produce. The Party tried hard to stamp this out, thereby causing considerable bitterness among the working classes - who seem everywhere to share the view that Parteibossen (Party Bosses) manage to eat very well, no matter how the workers may fare. Some light is thrown on the difficult manpower in SAARBRÜCKEN by a recently returned French worker, who reports that his factory there employed an unusually large number of 12-14 year old children.

Hits of information continue to come in from other parts of the Combat Zone. Gauleiter GROHE, whose death has been rumored since the newspapers announced the death of his brother two months ago, is now said to have moved his administration to GIESSEN, previously reported in this Summary as a favorite hideout for Party "big shots". SCHALLER, who has been designated by rumor as his successor, is now reported to be Assistant Gauleiter. In KOBLENZ the Volksturm has been organized into fighting units, issued rifles and ammunition (but no uniforms), and assigned to guarding the bridges over the famous confluence of the RHINE and the MOSEL. One report estimates that 2,800 people were killed in the 14 October raid on DUISBURG, and that corpses are distributed equally upon the SA and the Allies. The police force of TRIER sacrificed to the "needs" of the front, where the rather confused police bungled the bunker defenses and executed short "disguising movements" whenever Allied bullets came close. Exasperated Army authorities finally informed them that they would be more useful guarding rear areas were not really needed at the front at all.

(2) The Interior

Some interesting data concerning the increased pressure upon industrial workers has come to light. Earlier Stakhanovite measures, together with indications of workers' protest against piecework pay rates, have been reported in this Summary. The order withdrawing extra food cards as punishment for "substandard" performance, has recently been supplemented by informal agreement upon 85 per cent of normal output as the minimum requirement for additional rations. No heavy or very heavy workers, whether German or foreign, who work less than the normal day have been given additional ration cards. With

foreign workers the method is to grant additional food against control cards which are stamped only if performance is good. As punishment for absenteeism, additional ration cards may be withdrawn one week for each day of absence. Some success is reported for these measures, particularly the device used among eastern workers of transferring regular rations from those whose output is subnormal to those whose output is above normal. But food rationing is a very sore point among workers, as indicated in the discussion of SAARBECKEN above, and discontent is sure to arise among hungry "substandard" workers.

The new role of foreign workers as diggers is a departure from the previously stated policy of the Reich. The *GOETTER* Economic Institute of 12 December estimates that a total number of 1.7 to 1.8 million people are at present working on fortifications. Their rough breakdown by groups is as follows:

Foreigners	1,000,000
German adults	400,000
Rail & OT workers	125,000
German Youth	105,000
"Leaders" (i.e., supervisors)	47,000
	<u>1,677,000</u>

With nearly two-thirds of *Schanzarbeiten* being done by foreigners, — this accounting, GOEBBELS must part company with his former line of reassurance to worried Germans — that foreign workers could not constitute a Trojan Horse because they were not used in positions of military importance. He cannot, after loudly boasting the value of digging, now claim that it has no military value.

Instead Dr GOEBBELS has recently taken up another favorite theme, disunity among the Allies as a supplement to German strength. For many this old war-horse had been put under wraps and allowed to rest in the stable, while the GOEBBELS jockeys rode riot on every available incident as evidence that Churchill had agreed to the Bolshevization of Europe. The Western Allies were charged with bending the knee to Stalin, with an undercurrent of resentment against this "treason" against another "Kulturvolk" under pressure of the Bolshevik hordes. Recent events, starting with the chaos smitten at Dunbarton Oaks upon the request of the Soviet, have been slanted the other way — as proof that a falling-out among the Allies, "in the long run" at least, is inevitable. The divergence of British and American policy in relation to recent events in GREECE has provided Nazi propagandists with fresh material on this point. GOEBBELS, in his weekly *Das Reich* article of 8 December, announced: "We could defeat every one of our enemies if we could face them singly ... but instead, we have to defend ourselves against a united mass coalition". Germany was entering the decisive phase of the war with her defenses strengthened and her war potential fully ready to meet all developments. The main German hope for victory is now a cleavage in the Allied camp, through which an alert German leadership will be able to strike with its mobilized might.

In the interim, while awaiting the Allied split, the German population is informed once again by the Reich Food Minister and Propaganda Leader BAUME of the difficulties which are to be expected this winter. "Altogether", says SHAEF economic summary, "the German farmer must have found this discourse not a little depressing". BAUME mentioned as outstanding hardships the cessation of imports of food and feeding stuffs, the serious lack of nitrogen fertilizers. Yet again, he emphasized the serious transportation situation, and noted as a key determinant of the farm program for this year the need to reduce the rail — internal road, rail and water transport. The widespread dissatisfaction among rail workers which has been reported in several places during recent weeks apparently was seriously regarded by officialdom. A Day of German Railwaymen was instituted, and on the first celebration of this festive occasion Dr GOEBBELS, according to *DDP* (7 December), "made the historic statement that to be a railwayman today means more than just to ply any sort of trade". With many references to "the railway front" and "the battle of

transport", GOEBBELS informed the assembled workers that they were being "honored with the highest orders in the name of the Fuehrer". It is not clear whether the men were impressed.

A somewhat more substantial sop was thrown to the populace of BERLIN last week, but in this case it seems clear that these highly-favored were not impressed. A Swedish correspondent's comment ought to be noted: "The extra food rations are hardly likely to create a festive atmosphere. The longed-for and expected coffee is conspicuous by its absence. The bottle of wine and half a bottle of spirits are only an unconfirmed rumor as yet. The toys made by the HI are not particularly good nor are there enough of them. Otherwise only the remnants of formerly loved degradable picture books are obtainable and some games which are either too difficult or too dull for children. In order to console people some special clothing coupons will be valid. Women will be able to buy one pair of stockings or one brassiere, one scarf or three handkerchiefs and men, three handkerchiefs or one pair of braces, one pair of socks or one pair of sock suspenders".

his sacrifices had been worthwhile. Now, he believes the fortifications are sufficiently well defended to make it impossible for the Allies to attempt a crossing of the Rhine in this sector. When asked whether he really believed in the existence of the necessary reserve troops, he answered that he was better with well informed staff officers who told him that the Wehrmacht was training new shock troops, young fanatics who were ready to give their all for the cause. These men would not be brought into the line before spring. They would be supported by countless new weapons, not secret ones, but perfected ones. The strength of his morale position was finally defended by his conviction that, "of course, I am not so foolish as to pretend that Germany will win the war. But a total Allied victory, such as you conceive it, is impossible."

Another consideration to be kept in mind is that many a career officer professes openly that he will keep on fighting until ordered to stop, regardless of the chances of victory and regardless of political considerations. They insist that career soldiers they are afraid that once the war is over there will be no place for them and that they find themselves incapable of resuming a civilian position.

3. Officers' Opinion of Allied Propaganda

Most officers admit having read some of our leaflets. It is known, for example, from enlisted P/W, that officers who give orders to destroy all leaflets, read them themselves. However, either because of security consciousness or soldierly pride, they deny that their men were influenced by our propaganda. They claim, in addition, that they and their comrade officers show very little interest in the contents of Allied leaflets.

Although these "high morale" junior officers may genuinely believe that our leaflets have little influence on German troops (captured documents indicate higher commands think otherwise) further interrogation usually reveals that their off-hand statements about their own personal lack of concern about our leaflets are largely unreliable.

They are amazingly well informed about our main appeals and frequently offer elaborate counter-arguments to interrogators. They comment that the unreasonable claims in our leaflets about German losses and prisoners captured clearly shows their propaganda nature. They try to relate our propaganda to our military intentions. One P/W, for example, stated that a leaflet, allegedly pointing out that the war will end before winter, was discussed among battalion staff officers and was interpreted by the commanding officer as indicating that the Americans were afraid of the winter. Therefore, if the German army could hold out through the winter, Germany would be able to drive the Allies out.

4. Officer Training

The relatively intact position of the officer is seen in a study, by Second British Army, based on P/W information which concludes that during recent months the German army has not felt it necessary to introduce an emergency procedure for building up officer strength rapidly. Company commanders continue to recommend promising candidates and occasional appeals for volunteers have been issued.

P/W opinion was unanimous that influence of any sort, whether through high placed friends or through the Party, has no effect on a candidate's chances of selection if he does not possess the necessary qualifications. (From captured documents it is known that pressure has been exerted to get all former Hitler Youth leaders to become officers.) A clean conduct sheet is essential and an unblemished civilian record. Every candidate must have normal infantry basic training and a minimum of two months front line experience. University training to make a man almost automatically a prospective candidate, provided his military record is satisfactory. Men have, however, been selected with an elementary school education.

The officer candidate usually goes to a NCO course in their own area for a period of three to six months. He then normally returns to regimental duty after

serving ■ ■ Paschurich (officer candidate, junior grade), and ■ ■ Oberpaschurich (officer candidate, senior grade) receives his commission. ■ ■ special ■ ■ the procedure ■ ■ shortened.

■ ■ appears that the majority ■ ■ officers come from the lower ■ ■ Senior NCOs are not generally anxious, although ambition and the ■ ■ for prestige does motivate some. They do not desire to exchange their kingdoms for a lieutenantancy. In the light of the foregoing it seems reasonable to assume that in the near future the morale and training of German junior officers will remain ■ ■ than adequate. Even without drawing heavily from the ranks of the trained senior NCOs, this will probably be the case.

5. German Counter-Propaganda.

More and more PW report having had to listen to the speeches by NFO officers. ■ ■ of the main subjects seems to be German weapons; attempts are made to explain the absence of the Luftwaffe while the arrival in the ■ ■ future of new and better weapons is guaranteed in no slight fashion. PW profess, although it is probably not entirely correct, that they usually sleep through these sessions, or at least pay little attention, until the closing STEG HEIL ■ ■ sounded.

New German leaflets include a replica of ■ ■ red Passierschein which carries the following message in both German and English above General Eisenhower's signature:

"The ■ ■ soldier who carries this safe conduct ■ ■ using it as a sign of his genuine wish to go into captivity for the next ten years, to betray his fatherland, to return ■ ■ a broken old man and very probably never to see his parents, wife and children again."

Guidance for political discussion, as revealed by a captured ■ ■ order, indicates that the Nazi Party, ■ ■ early as the first part of October, ■ ■ special steps to counter anxiety among German troops about the fate of their relatives in the districts west of the Rhine. The order points out that "the Fuehrer has specifically desired that no German shall be left in ■ ■ hands of the enemy. The responsibility for this lies with the Party leadership. They have gained sufficient experience and deserve full confidence. The Party's role in bringing about the successful defense of the West Prussian line is cited as evidence. Therefore, the troops are to be taught that ■ ■ is their duty to urge relatives to comply with the arrangements and the directions given ■ ■ Party centres.

The difficulties encountered in obtaining suitable material ■ ■ implement directives pointing out the terror conditions in German ■ ■ occupied by ■ ■ Allies, ■ ■ be seen in the relative absence of this theme in broadly disseminated ■ ■ items. However, for propaganda lectures within the Wehrmacht more ■ ■ such material seems to ■ ■ forthcoming. ■ ■ NCO reports while attending a military course, that they were told ■ ■ occupied Germany civilians are not permitted to leave their houses. A young girl ■ ■ stopped into her garden to get ■ ■ potatoes for dinner. American soldiers beat her mercilessly until she staggered ■ ■ back into the house and fell bleeding to the floor.

6. Volksturm in Action.

First mission assigned to Volksturm units in the Saarlautern-Merzig ■ ■ to ■ ■ up the cattle in the combat zone. The units in this ■ ■ were called up on 8 November and completed their training within one week. ■ ■ was even no time for political indoctrination and they were not informed as to ■ ■ their military status. They were equipped with antiquated weapons. Nevertheless, these recruits supplied considerable resistance in house-to-house fighting in Saarlautern, according to G-2 sources. They were under the general command of the local divisional commander, but still were fighting ■ ■ with their ■ ■ officers.

The results of Schanzarbeiten (trench digging) by [redacted] young and the old civilians have not caused satisfaction among Pz/W. They claim, according to a report from one sector only, that these entrenchments are not wide and deep enough. Also, these prepared trenches are reported to having proved [redacted] suited for the tactical situation when the attack came from the side and [redacted] enabled the Americans to put enfilading fire on Pz/W platoon.

Distribution:

General McClure
Colonel Keha
Mr. Jackson
Mr. Crossman
Lt. Col. Garfein
Major Minary
Intelligence (3)
Plans & Directives (2)
Leaflets
Capt. Herz
Lt. Magary
Radio

Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF (Main)
Political Advisers, SHAEF (2)
Political Officers, SHAEF (2)
SHAEF (Main) G-2
" " G-2, C.I., Civil Security Section
" " G-3
" " G-4
" " G-5 (5)
P&PW, 6 A.C. (6)
P&PW, 12 A.C. (4)
P&PW, 21 A.C. (6)
OSS, Mr. Schlesinger (2)
Radio Luxembourg (2)
Major O'Brien, PWD, Intelligence, Rear - for further
distribution in London.

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CONFIDENTIAL
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

Handwritten: 12/14/44

RWP 001.1

12 December, 1944

Statements by Sackennor of Military Government.

1. The revised set of thirteen military government broadcasts issued on 25 November, 1944 were further amended. Texts of the amended talks are appended hereto. (Numbers 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12). There are no changes in the broadcast text of Talks numbers 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 13.


2. Subject to the following exceptions, the talks as broadcast constitute policy guidance.

- a. In Talk No. 1, for policy purposes the last sentence in para. 5 should read: "No punishment will be ordered by a Military Government court without a fair trial".
- b. In Talk No. 2, the last two sentences in para. 5 do not constitute a policy precedent, and there should be no further reference to these statements beyond the single repetition which will occur when the initial broadcast is repeated once in toto by BBC, ARIFF and Radio Luxembourg, unless further guidance is forthcoming.
- c. In Talk No. 6, in para. 1, the first word in the second line should be "re-established". In line 10, the words "an appeal" should be replaced by the words "a petition". In para. 2, the first part of second sentence should read: "Violation of German laws not repeated by Military Government by Germans and foreigners, etc."
- d. In Talk No. 8 para. 1, line 4, strike the word "made". In para. 6, substitute the word "controlled" for the word "regulated" in the first sentence.

3. It is requested that the entire series of talks be not repeated complete, as envisaged in para. 4 of the covering memorandum of 25 November, 1944. The amended texts (including the amendments in para. 2 above) should nevertheless be used freely in excerpt form, woven into news reporting, commentary, and leaflets, if propaganda conditions require it, any of the talks may be broadcast in toto in their amended form, with the exception of Talk No. 2.

4. The broadcast order of the talks is as follows:

1, 2, 3, 7, 6, 8, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.



Robert A. LeClerc
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

P&D - 1

b 246

(A)

SECRETS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
607.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Germany and the world are to be rid of National Socialism once and for all. The Party and all its organizations will be dissolved. Party leaders, the Gestapo and all others suspected of complicity in war crimes and atrocities committed on the instigation of the Party will be arrested and put on trial. If found guilty after a fair trial they will be subjected to severe penalties including the death sentence, 1944.
2. Germans will be required to assist in the apprehension of these criminals and their delivery into the hands of the Military Government.
3. The Military Government will abolish all organizations established by the National Socialists in order to keep the individual citizen, all business enterprises and the State itself under the Party's control.
4. The funds and other property of all these organizations will be impounded and allocated for such use in Germany as the Military Government may decide. Attempts to evade this measure in any way, by concealment or secret disposal, will be severely punished.
5. All civil servants and judicial authorities, and all officials and all functionaries of public utilities must remain at their posts and carry on their duties until instructed to do otherwise. These are earnest enemies of the National Socialist Party, or active supporters of it, and they have admitted no crime have nothing to fear if they perform their functions efficiently.
6. National Socialists will be ruthlessly purged from key positions in public service, and placed by Administrative Courts according to their competence.
7. The Military Government's civilian administrative appointments will not be open competition for religious groups. General political records of all persons considered for appointment will be taken into consideration.

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

Book

(Open and close with last formula, as in Book I)

1. Your first duty will be to receive peacefully and orderly. You should continue your daily occupation if you are engaged in a lawful pursuit. Do nothing to interfere with the operations of the occupying forces or of the Military Government.
2. Those found after their trial to be law breakers will be punished as the severity of their crime demands.
3. Subject to Military Government, your right to your own property will be respected, but you will not be permitted to retain that rightfully belongs to others.
4. These privileges will not, however, be enjoyed by those who have participated actively in the work of the Nazi Party or any of its agencies. The Nazi Party and all of its works will be destroyed.
5. You must aid the Military Government in rooting out active Nazi individuals.
6. You must avoid any suggestion of complicity with secret Nazi efforts to obstruct the Military Government. Any aid rendered by you to any person who offers such obstruction will be severely punished. Any Nazi agents who intimidate or threaten reprisals will be severely punished.
7. Above all, you must refuse to take part in any effort, whether organized or unorganized, to commit any act against the occupying forces or the Military Government.

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY.
1945.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Beware of joining or encouraging others to join paramilitary organizations. Any effort to join, either by such means the Military which must be stopped out in Germany will meet with severe punishment by the Military Government.
2. You will be required by proclamations and ordinances of the Military Government to surrender and deliver up to the authorities certain articles which have military significance. These include weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitters, and other equipment. You must acquaint yourselves with all regulations governing illicit possessions and obey them scrupulously, on pain of severe punishment.
3. Your cooperation with Military Government in these necessary procedures for the de-militarization of your country will facilitate the task of Military Government in the necessary performance of its duties in maintaining order in your country.

ORDERS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 9.

(Open and close with net formula as in No. 1)

1. The Allied Military Government proposes to block all property of the Reich, except the property of officials and supporters. The property of the Reich, except the property of officials and supporters, will be protected and preserved for the Reich's interests.
2. Present holders of such blocked property are required to hold and preserve same, subject to the instructions of Military Government.
3. At no time shall any person, directly or indirectly, hinder the Military Government in its operations or the administration of its affairs, with respect to any such property being blocked upon all persons who violate in such instructions.
4. The blocking controls will provision for normal business operations, personal living expenses and the payment of taxes.
5. It is the duty of Military Government to preserve and protect that so that questions of criminal liability and proper use of property held or required by the Reich, by or persons and organizations affiliated with it, may be settled and determined in an orderly manner and in accordance with equity and justice.

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 10.

(Open and close with next formula, as in No. 1)

1. Nazi concentration camps will be taken over at once, and used for the detention of arrested Nazis after the release of their innocent victims.
2. The Military Government will set up committees to consider as rapidly as possible the cases of persons detained in every prison who has been or was being detained by the Nazis and shall be released.
3. While these inquiries are in progress the camps will be controlled by Allied troops.
4. The Military Government will take over control of all prisons and remove all Nazi and other non-Aryan prison officials.
5. In general, the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Germany will belong to the local German police under the supervision of the Military Government.
6. The SS police and the Gestapo will be liquidated at once and all Nazi principles and methods will be eliminated from the direction of police operations.
7. Nonmilitary training will be allowed to the German police force, which will be disbanded except in special cases of emergency when certain detachments will be permitted small arms and strictly limited ammunition.
8. The police force will be decentralized and reorganized on a neighborhood and local basis.
9. The decentralized local police forces will be under executive chiefs approved by the Military Government and the general responsibility for the administration of the local police will be vested in the German Civil Head of each town or city or in the Regional President.
10. The criminal police will be organized as a separate branch of the National Police and will be organized with the local units of primary police. The formerly named detachments of the Schutzpolizei will be dissolved. Recruiting for the police will be open to all citizens without preference for past military or other State service.
11. The Landwehr and the Stadtwacht will be disbanded.
12. Military Government officers and the Allied Military Police will ensure that the German police procedure conforms with the policy of the Supreme Commander.

(Open the above file and insert)

STATION OF INTEREST FOR RAILROADS
1912

NEW FOLDER

BEGINS

091. 412/3

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

AGAINST GERMANY

VOL: 1

Page 1-2-68-18

SUPPLEMENTARY JUDICIAL
ALLIED CREDITORS FORCES
Psychological Warfare Division

GSM/JIS.

10. Weisberg, 1944.

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE ON GOVERNMENT OF THE VOLASTUEN

17. $\frac{1}{2} \log_2 16 = 2$

$$E_{\text{eff}} = \frac{\sigma}{\epsilon_0} = \frac{Q}{A}$$

"It is referred to the above, third and paragraph 1-1-1 (1) by authority from item 1 and 2 the words "the information and other" adding "during the Yellowknife".

W. E. B. DUBOIS

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RECEIVED

Bureau of Census
U.S. Department of Commerce

Date **F6 AUG 1945**

W. B. Sullivan

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

Date 10⁵ DEC. 1944.

TO:

2. General MORGAN:

1. General SMITH;

For information.

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/s/ W.B. Smith
10/12/44
No 0-3.

T. L. M. H.
Lieutenant General, G.O. Army
Chief of Staff.

Alc Bluff
4 Dec
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For the Supreme Command

The timing of the scheme will, of course, require coordination with our operational plans. It is requested that this Headquarters be consulted on the question of timing should the scheme be adopted. It is suggested that the scheme be adopted as soon as possible. The timing of the scheme will, of course, require coordination with our operational plans. It is requested that this Headquarters be consulted on the question of timing should the scheme be adopted. It is suggested that the scheme be adopted as soon as possible.

This alternative plan has been examined at this Headquarters and it is considered that it provides an acceptable solution, but by no means the only one. This alternative plan has been examined at this Headquarters and it is considered that it provides an acceptable solution, but by no means the only one.

A general staff requirement (Appendix A) is put to Brig General Macleod, Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division for examination. After consultation with the Psychological Warfare Division, General Macleod is to report to the Headquarters on the use of the scheme.

TO : Secretary
British Chiefs of Staff Committee

SUBJECT : ■■■ of "ASPIDOTIA" technique to break down G.P.W. resistance

SECRET/17249/7/001(0)
SECRET/051-412-9/001(0)

10 December, 1944

14 Dec 45

TOP SECRET

201 B-2f
201 B-2f
201 B-2f
201 B-2f

9 [redacted] 1944.

TO : Chief of Staff

1. On 2nd November 1944, the [] of Staff approved a recommendation that Psychological Warfare Division should prepare a detailed plan for [] use of the "ASCIDISTRA" technique in faking a capitulation broadcast either putting "PRIMER" on [] air [] broadcasting an official communique. (TAB A)

2. The Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, has now submitted a memorandum stating that a fake HITLER broadcast is technically impossible. (TAB) It is understood that this is because he finds that there is no one who can satisfactorily imitate HITLER's voice.

3. As an alternative with, he admits, lesser results he submitted an outline plan which has as its object the breaking down of the resistance of the GERMAN Army in the WEST at the decisive moment of an Allied breakthrough:-

a. By suggesting to the GERMANS through a counterfeit GERMAN special announcement that the GERMAN Command in the WEST has sent emissaries to ask for an Armistice and that organized GERMAN resistance in the WEST is in its last hours.

b. By paralyzing the GERMAN Command in the WEST by enrolling RUMELT and his staff with NEW JER., and causing NEW JER. to take steps to remove them.

4. Plan emphasizes the use of

- a. The highest level deception channels
- b. Black propaganda
- c. "AS-DISTRA"

5. It [redacted] therefore that [redacted] such ASHMOUSRA plan [redacted] this will provide a decisive culmination to the plans and procedure envisaged in SIAT 134 (TAB C) and British Chiefs of Staff cable at TAB D. It is logical, therefore, that this 'ASHMOUSRA' plan should be referred to the body with which [redacted] set up in LONDON to consider such planning.

6. It is concluded that this plan should be referred to the British Chiefs of Staff as a possible scheme. We must, however, reserve the right to be consulted on the question of timing.

7. That the letter at HQS T-4 be signed. 10 Dec. '64

8. G-2 Division

/s/ W.B. Smith
10-12-44
To G-3.

H. R. BULL,
Major General, OSC,
W of S, '0-5.

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weeks of STOLBERG have not yet been completely solved nor, in the nature of the case, are they likely to be. The need to use all available manpower for industrial production, agriculture, digging, and Volksturm is complicated by at least three major factors - Allied bombing, transport shortages, and evacuation.

The effect of bombing is indicated by a report from 2 British Army, which includes the following P/W account: In the village of KEMNED, children from the age of 10 were required to participate in the digging, along with their elders. While working near the railway tracks, these people came under a strong Allied attack upon the railroad line. When the smoke had cleared, three of the younger children were found dead. This incident caused great excitement in the village and the people cursed the Party for ordering little children to work on military installations. The next morning families refused to send their children to the community digging, whereupon the Nazis sent armed guards to collect them. On the following day, according to P/W, the Ortsgruppenleiter of the village found a pile of discarded Nazi insignias, banners, armbands and uniforms in front of his door.

But the effect of Allied bombing, by itself, is not the greatest problem the Nazis have to face. Inadequate transportation and evacuation are, for them, even graver problems. For here the Nazis are faced with a dilemma which cannot be solved by slipping between the horns. Among the reasons why the Party insists upon evacuation, particularly in the Ruhr, is the impossibility of supplying the requirements of a large population with the inadequate transport facilities available. But the very same transport shortage is the chief reason for the failures of evacuation to date. It has not been possible to organize an efficient evacuation with the number of trains available for this purpose, and since the Parteisozgen have usually grabbed the available transport for their families and belongings, the others have had to go by foot (occasionally by truck) with an allowance of 30 lbs. for personal belongings. With the prospect of being stranded on the road and starved, or reaching a strange and hostile town where the hungry stomach rumbles in tune with the Allied bombers (these are the alternatives presented by any who actually evaded evacuation for these reasons), it is natural that many are reluctant to follow the inspirational orders of Gauleiter Goebbels. The result has been conflict, and tales have been legion of SS men forcing people out at the point of a gun, of SS men dragging kicking women by the hair out of evacuation trucks, of soldiers fighting for or against the civilian population (according to their personal views of evacuation, for the most part).

The outcome has been, in most cases to date, at least partial failure of evacuation. There has even been an unconfirmed report that in the town of GANGLY, near the Dutch border, the failure of evacuation was complete. The Party is cognizant of, and clearly concerned about, its failure adequately to cope with the situation. Its solution seems to be the forced evacuation of surplus population in areas behind the lines before they are directly threatened by the Allied advance. This summary described last week the first such order in Western Germany, issued at ESSEN. The National Zeitung for DEISENROICHEN indicated preparation for a similar order in that town. The paper writes (23 November) that "it cannot be tolerated any longer" that women and children should crowd workers out of shelters and "the authorities have decided to clear the town" of all non-workers. In spite of this decision, however, the authorities did not order evacuation. Non-workers were "advised" not to wait till compulsory measures are taken, but to take advantage of the "twenty extra trains with luggage vans" scheduled to leave in the next week. However, if there were extra trains to take evacuees out, these same trains could bring in enough food and supplies to permit them to remain where they are. The Party's hesitation to order compulsory evacuation is probably based, in consideration of the powerful resistance factors, upon doubt of its ability to make the order stick, plus doubt of just what exactly would be gained if it did succeed in evacuating the aged, the infirm, and women with children.

An illustration of evacuation difficulties, which throws additional light on the general hostility toward the Army among civilians in Western Germany, comes from KREIBITZ (near Gittelshausen). It is reported that evacuation of that town was enforced by a Luftwaffe ground unit acting in cooperation with an ex-Mayor of a neighboring town. Whether the unit acted upon its own initiative or upon request from the civil authority is not clear. The party obviously was responsible for the order, but it was the uniformed soldier whom the civilian felt pushing him about. The Obersturmbannführer who commanded the unit is said to have threatened to shoot hostages and to have allowed each soldier 33 lbs. of loot, including shoes taken off the feet of civilians. Although such an incident must be considered very unusual if true, it does tally with numerous civilian accounts of looting and "lynchings" on the part of military personnel and indicates the basis of the fairly widespread reaction against the Wehrmacht.

ESSEN continues its loud protest against the failure of the Reich authorities to provide adequate post-raid assistance. The subject this time is shortage of motor transport and fuel, and the line adopted by the National Zeitung has a "radical Nazi" flavor, which may be part of the present campaign to re-emphasize the "socialist" aspect of the NS program for the benefit of industrial workers in the West. It is claimed that the fuel allocation based on pre-war consumption is unfair, because ESSEN as a workers' town had relatively few motor vehicles. This is responsible for the shortage of essential foods. The fact that the new local Traffic Commissioner is also the local Reichsbanner Frontwart will not help the town get needed vehicles, which alone can "find their way through the rubble". On the other hand, the paper claims, the middle-class merchant seems to have no trouble - and notices many trucks transporting beer instead of bricks.

A German officer I/A who visited BIELEFELD and KOELENZ during November described them both as ghost towns, almost completely destroyed. In BIELEFELD, his home town, the main railroad station has been knocked out; there are no bridges, theaters, or hotels; electricity is not available at all; water is secured from pyramids. Everything is a shambles and the people there everyone indiscriminately. And yet large portions of the population still remain, living and trading in cellars. In KOELENZ, except that some bridges are believed to be still standing and more of the population has left, people are in identical straits.

From the Southern sector of the German combat zone comes fairly impressive evidence of applied "scorched-earth" and "last-ditch" tactics. From 3 US Army comes a report on Volkssturm groups, wearing red and yellow armbands, encountered in house-to-house fighting in SARRLAGEHILL. During the retreat through this zone, the Wehrmacht is said to have burned a small built-up area as part of its delaying action. An intelligence summary from 6 A.G. (26 November) reports "definite indications that systematic destructions have been ordered and carried out in the GIESSEN area. It is not known, as yet, whether the orders emanated from Divisional Commanders or from higher echelons". These incidents constitute the first serious application of formerly much-advertised Nazi plans to make every city a Stalingrad. It may well be that the Party wishes to test the effectiveness of a scorched-earth policy here before applying it to more highly-industrialized and densely-populated areas.

(2) The Interior

From an excellent source comes confirmation of earlier evidence that Hitler's Children are not all docile little birds. In one aircraft factory (RECKFELDE) staffed by 850 apprentices, mainly Hitlerjugend members, it was impossible to maintain "proper NS discipline". Morality was practically non-existent. The youngsters stole with complete abandon - even opening government mail and removing all contents of value. Their sexual appetites seemed abnormal to a Nazi official who held a supervisory position over them. His objection was perhaps less to the immorality than to its lack of proper organization, for this anarchic irresponsibility frequently took the form of

political "indiscipline". The official complains that windows were forever being chalked up with slogans like "Kill Stalin!" and "Up with Bolshevism!".

The same tendency is prominent in the youth movement called "Edelweiss-Piraten" and similar oppositional groups. The movement seems to have drawn its inspiration largely from the romantic lore of Karl May and American Wild West stories, and in the beginning devoted itself largely to the romantic tradition of *Wanderlust* which German youth is heir to (recall, in this connection, the lines of the favorite song of the miller's apprentice "Des Wandern ist des Mullers Lust ... Des muss ein schlechter Muller sein, dem niemals fiel das Wandern ein"). This attracted the unfavorable attention of the Party, which frowned upon "the wild camping and hiking of juveniles outside the RJ", and insisted that "special importance must be attached to the supervision of associations of juveniles under 18 in cliques". Party caution was indeed justified in this case, for recently these groups have taken a slightly more serious political turn. Although the numerous tales of following sabotage and street-fighting and armed groups must be heavily discounted, there is no reason to doubt that some such incidents have occurred. The greater danger to the Party is that this primitive anarchism, expressed in such forms as desertion from trench-digging, undermines the habit of automatic obedience which is fundamental to the moraic structure of the Nazi state. A Party Chancery order (8 September) takes cognizance of this situation in a report on one Youth Labor Camp whose members "no longer conform to our conception of what is meant by faith". On the basis of present information it is not clear what use these groups may have for the Allies. In some cases the leadership is reported to be Communist; in others the dominant tone is set by former Catholic Youth leaders. It is highly probable that the Nazis have already begun to infiltrate their own agents among these groups. In the absence of convincing evidence, final judgment should be suspended until the fall, or imminent fall, of COLOGNE or DUESSELDORF, two cities which seem to be centers of the movement in Western Germany. (See F.R.E. special report on "Edelweiss" of 4 December).

The problem of foreign workers is again an extremely complex dilemma for which the Nazis have found no completely satisfactory solution. The position at present dictates an attitude of dignified benevolence toward the foreign workers. Orders have been issued instructing the population on how to conduct itself "properly" in relation to the foreigners. But this does not answer the basic problem, which appears most acutely wherever Allied troops approach. Here the problem of how to make full use of manpower is complicated by the fear that the foreign workers will slow down, sabotage, create disturbances, or take off for our lines. In some cases, as our troops come nearer, the Germans have tried to keep the workers content by adding an occasional bit of marmalade and margarine to the meager diet, particularly of Russian laborers. The lack of subtlety is said to have provoked much laughter, and in the end the workers have taken off anyway when the opportunity presented itself. In most cases, therefore, the Party has been forced to order priority evacuation for foreign workers (for details see special report of P & W, 12 A.G. 4 December). This has reduced the already inadequate evacuation facilities available for the indigenous population and has deprived the Reich of an important source of manpower in places where it was badly needed.

Nazi pressure upon the Officers Corps continues, as in the past, to encourage speculation about "Where will it all lead?" The Party revealed this week that it is releasing equipment from its own stores for the Volksturm, but apparently not for the Army. This must be regarded as a serious blow to unit commanders, who have been short all types of essential equipment for months. The failure of supplies has led to unauthorized looting, requisition and purchase by officers and men in Reich territory. In these circumstances Army officers are likely to take a dim view of special Party supplies for the VS, and considerable credence attaches to stories that officers have been actively diverting supplies (particularly arms and ammunition) intended for the VS to their own use. Overt pressure on officers to prefer their services, and the services of their wives, to the Party suggests that those who fail to comply

* "The miller's lad burst with wanderlust ... he'd be a sorry sort indeed never to have felt the wanderlust".

will be held suspect. It is not altogether certain that such pressure will create a warmer feeling toward the Party among recalcitrant officers.

The main Nazi propaganda efforts indicate that the following currents of feeling are strong among the civilian population by continued attempts to disprove (a) that the Mongol invasion and other great catastrophes of the past are "small by comparison" with the "Borb terror" and losses at the fronts (b) that the question "Is it all worth while?" is now too insistent to be silenced by attributing it to enemy propaganda (c) that feelings of "guilt" (and specifically of Nazi war-guilt) are justified by the facts. A special effort is being made to prevent the "alienation of workers from the Party", mainly in the West, by stressing the "socialist" face of the NS program. It is also clear that manpower difficulties and the oil shortage are subjects of common gossip, though not of official propaganda.

PART II - Wehrmacht Morale

I. Stiff Resistance

Morale reports of German troops captured in the Belfort-Bulhausen drive by the First French Army indicate, on the basis of the examination of several thousand cases, that in practically every instance, the Germans fought as long as resistance was physically possible. There were practically no desertions, according to Divisional G-3 reports. Only one case was found where a unit surrounded by the French gave up after having been told of the situation by a P/W sent back to the German pocket as an emissary.

When ordered to launch the main counter-attack designed to sever French communications, they did so without ever questioning the order, for faith in the "Fuehrung" was strong. In fact, most of the command officers interrogated felt that the German counter-attack was well planned.

Many of these PWs stated that they now realized that their efforts were in vain and that they would not have fought with such determination, had they been aware of the overwhelming superiority of Allied equipment. The circumstances of capture reveal the effects of Allied superiority of material. PWs confessed that no matter how often they may have heard about Allied strength, they never believed it until they saw for themselves. As on other sectors of the front, they were particularly impressed by the number of tanks employed and the concentrated power of artillery fire. (It is not unlikely that these German troops believed the French units facing them would not be as heavily armed as British and American units.)

This general tone of stiffer morale is reported from other sectors. The 10th A.C., PWs, stated that a "higher proportion of P/W than ever before in the last 12 months are expressing belief in victory." Their optimism is based on secret weapons yet to be employed, and on a frequently expressed fear that defeat ultimately means destruction of their homeland. The 39th Infantry Division and the 10 SS Division are two cases in point. Despite the heavy losses incurred by both units, their morale is unusually high. This is partly due to the fact that these units contain many seasoned troops who refuse to admit defeat. Few complaints about shortages of food, clothing or ammunition were encountered.

2. Trained Waffen SS Replacements.

The ability of the Wehrmacht to maintain its fighting effectiveness is seen, in one respect, in the continued functioning of the Waffen SS training program for new recruits. Despite the fact that an important sector of German youth are disaffected, production of fanatical Waffen SS replacements up to a recent date is reported.

The training program, according to a Canadian Intelligence Report, begins with a series of pep talks by veteran Waffen SS fighters to members of the Hitler Youth, after which they were given an opportunity to volunteer. They were told that every Hitler boy who claims to be faithful to his Fuehrer and fatherland would naturally sign. After two or three weeks they were called up not for military service but for patrol duties after dark in the streets of the town in which they were stationed. At the age of 17 1/2 they were introduced into military training in an atmosphere which was more a Hitler Youth one than a military one. No contact with civilians was allowed. After this preliminary course they joined a regular Waffen SS unit and received

their final military training including manoeuvres up to the regimental scale and many route marches with heavy packs.

Political indoctrination was as thorough as military training. Two or three times per week indoctrination meetings were held. The young SS man was trained also to speak in public and to enable him to do so, he had to address the men of his squad or platoon on political subjects. As a result, such recruitment and training produced young soldiers who believe unwaveringly in Hitler and victory and who fight with great determination.

3. Looting and Plundering:

Captured orders and statements by Pa/W clearly establish that looting and plundering by German soldiers have become a problem of concern to German divisional and higher commanders. The fact that the battle line has been on German soil for some time has hardly affected the situation. Moreover, officers frequently seem to have failed to take steps to prevent their men from looting and even at times themselves indulged in such practices. Field Marshal Keitel took cognizance of the situation in a statement quoted by an order of the 589 Volks Grenadier Division, dated 16 November 1944, in which he says that "superior officers, far from interfering, themselves took part in these outrages." The purely military basis for opposition is seen in the reasons given for condemning looting: (1) it removes goods needed for war, (2) it undermines discipline, (3) it shatters confidence of the people in the Army.

As a result, elaborate rules have been issued to prevent looting, including in some units imposition of the death penalty. For example, one captured order announces that all unit leaders will search through the quarters and baggage of their men of all ranks for plundered articles, particularly in the cases of those returning from leave or official trips. Men suspected of dishonest acquisitions will be court-martialed. Troops are to be instructed once a month that the penalty for plundering will be death. "The present condition of soldiers entering every house and taking the articles left behind which are not nailed down, has to be stopped immediately."

In this connection, the absence of a scorched earth policy continues in general except for certain military installations. The High Command and the Nazis both seem reluctant to undertake the responsibility for using such defensive measures. However, definite indications are reported of systematic destruction being ordered and carried out in the Gorardner area on the First French Army Front. It is not known as yet whether the orders emanated from divisional commanders or higher echelons. On the other hand, an interesting document was captured, signed by General Knies, Commanding 85th Army Corps (Belfort area) and distributed during the beginning of November. In the course of this, Knies says: "The French population must be shown by our conduct that although we are in our sixth year of war, the German soldier does not harm civilian lives or property. "...We must leave to the civilian population, whose help is still indispensable to us, all food reserves available..." The General's overpowering soldierly pride in even the retreat is seen in the statement "the poorer we are, the more we want to fight properly and not like pick-pockets."

4. Causes for Desertion:

The continued depressing effects caused by the hardships of frontline duty and the dim hope of victory seem to have failed to increase active desertions to any great extent. As in the past, some strong longstanding ideological or personal reason for opposing Nazism is needed to induce a soldier to face the

risks involved in deserting. (Conscript soldiers and Austrians are more prone to accept these risks.) The reluctant soldier, who is just fed up with the whole business, fails to find the strength to desert. While his soldier's oath is of some importance, more significant is his simple feeling of loyalty to other Germans. The danger of crossing the battleground, the elaborate system of German controls, and the fear of reprisals against his family, make the task seem to him all but impossible.

Officer desertions until recently were almost unknown in the German Army. Recently some cases have been reported. Among senior NCO's the reluctance to desert is hardly less strong than among officers. A strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of the men directly under their command does, however, weigh heavily on these men. As a result, cases continue to occur where NCO's took the initiative to save their men from carrying out pointless orders by leading them into active desertion.

Desertion by the ordinary soldier is often the result of clever tricks, great imagination and ingenuity. Soldiers desert while on furlough. Those who reside in towns near the combat zone return to their homes to hide in civilian clothes and await the arrival of Allied troops. Desertions from hospitals are reported. Other popular techniques include: volunteering for patrol, getting lost — purpose, remaining behind during a retreat etc. But the colourfulness of the individual stories of desertion should not lead to any overstatement of their frequency.

Reports of undetermined reliability speak of the desertion inward toward the centre of Germany where deserters live underground in cities. Cologne is said to be a centre of such activity. One source even claims that the EDLWEISS in this city is protecting and assisting deserters. It is likely that such activities are extremely limited and of no real consequence. Desertion to his home town, where the soldier has his personal contacts, seems more likely to be expected.

5. Volksturm.

Little evidence has been received on actual Volksturm fighting since the battle of Metz. Volksturm men have been encountered in the attack on Saarbrücken. A P/W reports units of the Volksturm as having been seen in the forest east of Düren where they were organized on a regimental basis, with SS and SA personnel as officers. (This had previously been reported on the Eastern Front. Captured documents from the offices of the Nazi Party at Strasbourg throw some light on the organization of the Volksturm in that area. The Kreisstaßamt reported to the Gauleiter, Deutscher Volksturm Aufnahmungsstab, Straßburg, on the formation of Volksturm battalions in their districts (Villingen and Weßheim). Both battalions numbered about 400 each, made up of 3 companies. Each company was drawn from one or several Ortsgruppen. The Stadt- and Landwehr of the district Villingen were absorbed by the Volksturm. One company was equipped as a ski company.

The general feeling of the usefulness of the Volksturm as a military force still continues among nearly all captured P/W except the most fanatic Nazis. There is no evidence to indicate that these last ditch tactics have generated in the minds of most German soldiers any new antagonism against the Nazi Party. It is received as another defense measure which was to be expected, but which will produce few military results. Allied claims that the formation of the Volksturm is a device for extending Nazi Party control over an important part of the civilian population do not seem to have occurred to the ordinary soldier. The thought that Volksturm will strengthen the Nazi Party's hold over the home-front and thereby prolong the war, is almost completely absent.

Distribution:

General McClure
Colonel Kehm
Mr. Jackson
Mr. Crossman
Lt. Col. Gurfein
Major Minary
Intelligence (3)
Plans & Directives (2)
Lefflate
Capt. Herz
Lt. Nagary
Radio

Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAFF (Main)
Political Advisors, SHAFF (2)
PAPW, G.A.C. (6)
PAPW, I.C.G. (6)
PAPW, E.C.G. (6)
Political Officers, SHAFF (2)
SHAFF (Main) G-2
" " G-2, C.I., Civil Security
Section
SHAFF (Main) G-3
" " G-4
" " G-5 (3)
OSS, Mr. Schlesinger (2)
Radio Luxembourg (3)
Major G. L. L. P. D. Intelligence, Rear
for further distribution in
London.

RESTRICTED

REPORT CONCERNING LEAFLETS AIRDROPPED AT THE BRWAY

FIRST BRANCH ARMY
First Armored Div.
Mes. 621
No 109/10. P

Several prisoners carried on their persons leaflets disseminated by the Allies, in particular "Safe-Guards" on red paper (see attached sample). A number of men held this leaflet in their hand when they surrendered.

German Officers' comments on these leaflets:

(a) Personal opinion: Lt. Hesse, of the 6/11/76 Gren. Bgt. (Gren.) said that this leaflet gives "food for thought", politically speaking as well as from the standpoint of treatment of prisoners. "It is very well written, very true and contains no exaggerated statements."

(b) Effect on the troops: Lt. Wessner, a convinced Nazi, decided to break during interrogation but later stated that "unhappily, these leaflets have a great influence on the men and constitute a serious threat to their morale."

Treatment of Prisoners:

The paragraph dealing with treatment of prisoners prompts many of the men to surrender. Some of the troops fighting against us is seriously shaken. The men are convinced that they are encircled and they know that it is futile to fight tank with guns. And they are afraid to surrender because they have been briefed on bad treatment. They believe that they will be shot by "de Gaulle's troops". These leaflets give them confidence - they have only one wish: to surrender.

Recommendations:

If possible, increase the distribution of leaflets.

Classed: Le General de Vermejan
Commandant L. 50. P.P.

Addressed to: C.G. First Army Corps.

Countersigned: Le General Bontouard,
C. G. First Army Corps.

6 888

Forwarded to: General de Latre de Tassigny.

RESTRICTED



Passierschein

Der deutsche Soldat, der diesen Passierschein ausweist, bewirkt ihn als Zeichen seines wahren Willens, sich zu ergeben. Er ist zu empfangen, er wird gut behandelt werden. Er wird Nahrung und Verpflegung nach dem militärischen Bedarf erhalten. Er wird so bald wie möglich dem Verfehrungsweg übergeben.

August Thiermann
Oberstleutnant
des kaiserlichen Expeditionskorps

Englische Übersetzung nachstehend. Sie dient als Anweisung an die alliierten Vorgesetzten.

SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be admitted, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

August Thiermann
Oberstleutnant
des kaiserlichen Expeditionskorps

Grundsätze des

Kriegsgefangenenrechts

(Rotes Kreuz Konvention 1907, Genfer Konvention 1929)

1. Vom Augenblick der Übergabe angetreten, werden Soldaten als Kriegsgefangene und unterliegen dem Schutz des Kriegsgefangenenrechts. Demgemäß wird ihre Soldatenrechte vollstens respektiert.

2. Kriegsgefangene werden so wie möglich in Sammelstellen gebracht zu werden, die weit genug von der Kampfzone entfernt sind, um ihre persönliche Sicherheit zu gewährleisten.

3. Die Verpflegung, die Pflege in Qualität und Quantität wie Angehörige der alliierten Armee und werden, falls krank oder verwundet, in denselben Verhältnissen behandelt wie alliierte Truppen.

4. Ehrenzeichen und Wertgegenstände der Kriegsgefangenen zu behalten. Geld kann nur von Offizieren der Sammelstellen abgenommen werden, wobei eine Empfangsbekundung ausgestellt wird.

5. In den Kriegsgefangenenlagern haben Schlafstätten, Anweisung der Unterkunft, Verpflegung und sonstige Anlagen denen der alliierten Garnisonstruppen gleichmäßig zu sein.

6. Laut Genfer Konvention dürfen Kriegsgefangene weder Gegenstand von Repressalien, noch der öffentlichen Feindschaft preisgegeben werden. Nach Kriegsende werden sie so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeführt.

Die untenstehende Übersetzung dient als Anweisung an fremdliche Vorgesetzten:

SAUF-CONDUIT. Ce soldat allemand porte ce sauf-conduit en signe de son désir sincère de se rendre. On doit le désarmer et s'occuper de lui comme il convient. Il doit recevoir la nourriture et l'attention médicale dont il aurait besoin et doit être éloigné de la zone dangereuse sitôt possible.

SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
SUPREME COMMANDER,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Revised

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDINGPRISONERS OF WAR

(According to the Convention of The Hague, 1907,
and the Geneva Convention, 1929)

1. From the moment of surrender, German soldiers are regarded as prisoners of war and come under the protection of the Geneva Convention. Accordingly, their military honour is fully respected.
2. Prisoners of war must as soon as possible be taken to assembly points, which are far enough from the danger zone to safeguard their personal security.
3. Prisoners of war receive the same rations, qualitatively and quantitatively, as members of the Allied armies, and, if sick or wounded, are treated in the same hospitals as Allied troops.
4. Decorations and valuables are to be left with the prisoners of war. Money may be taken only by officers of the assembly points and receipts must be given.
5. Sleeping quarters, accommodation, bunks and other installations in prisoner of war camps must be equal to those of Allied garrison troops.
6. According to the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war must not become subject to reprisals nor be exposed to public curiosity. After the end of the war they must be sent home as soon as possible.

X Soldiers in the meaning of the Hague Convention (IV, 1907) are: All armed persons, who wear uniforms or any insignia which can be recognised from a distance.

Rules for Surrender

To prevent misunderstanding when surrendering, the following procedure is advisable: lay down arms, take off helmet and gait, raise your hands and wave a handkerchief or the flag.

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33-3747-116

071740Z
 TOR 071715A DEC
 bj 071740A DEC

bj 071740A DEC

~~SECRET~~
~~OF ORIGINALLY~~

FROM : TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAG FROM FITZGERALD
FROM POWELL SIGNED BRADLEY

TO : SHAFT MAIN PW FOR MOCLURE

REF NO : 030626 07 DECEMBER 1944

1212 carried exclusive new breach of Westwall at BILLINGEN and location of tank battle Southern SAAR. Also stated HITLER Jugend Division expected in SAAR to bolster Panzer Lehr. "Built up threat to envelope SAARGRUEDEN and likelihood of further American drive to COLLEGE plain. Continued hints of disaster to 9 Divisions in ALSACE. Still no jamming.

Production and presentation working smoothly. G-2 and G-3 cooperating. Interestedly with personal approval SIGMET.

ACTION : FWD
INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
AG RECORDS

SGS Dir			DCS FAO	DCS AIR	SGS COOK			
					5			✓

SAC IN 2347 7 DEC 44 1800A AGD/daw REP NO: Q-30626

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COPY NO.

9

Deputy Chief of Staff,

Deputy Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

~~SECRET~~

PWP/2459-12

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

WAF 014

3 December, 1944.

DIRECTIVE ON TREATMENT OF THE VOLKSTURM

1. To the civilian population of Germany:

- a. We should avoid appeals and confine ourselves to the following lines of instructions:

(1) Use all feasible means to avoid going underground, avoid registration, change your addresses or go underground among friends or sympathizers.

If you cannot avoid the call-up comply with it.

(2) Make no resistance when you are driven into action but seek the best available cover and wait quietly.

(4) When the Allied attack put up your hands and surrender.

- b. It can be stated categorically that members of the Volksturm taken prisoner in action will be treated strictly according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Laws of War. After the war ends they will be returned home.

2. To the Wehrmacht, do not for the present go beyond the experience it has as recounted in Leaflet WC 27, but use available material which shows:

- a. The hasty formation, training, and obsolete equipment of Volksturm units;
- b. The irresponsible actions of the Party bosses in sending their units to death in battle only to save their own skins when the war is irretrievably lost;
- c. The sensible action of Volksturm in refusing to fight, taking cover and surrendering themselves to Allied troops at the earliest safe moment.

CAUTION:

Until more evidence is in, we cannot yet safely take the position that all Volksturm elements are ill-trained and poorly armed.

ROBERT A. MCGUIRE
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

6 973

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303-SIAEF File No. 094-414/3

5 DEC

TOP SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1.

4th December, 1944.

SUBJECT : Use of Aspidistra in final phase of military operations.

TO : Major General Whitsley.

1. I have examined the paper on Aspidistra submitted by G.3. It is the view of this Division, after consultation with Mr. Sefton Dalmer, that the suggested fake Hitler broadcast is technically impossible.

2. At TOP A will be found an alternative plan for a "black" Aspidistra operation to coincide with an Allied break-through.

3. It is the view of this Division that, though this plan could not have the sensational effects of the operation proposed by G.3., it would, if successful, be of decisive influence in breaking German fighting morale in a critical phase of the battle.

ACTION REQUIRED

4. Approval in principle of the Aspidistra plan.

5. Selection of a code name for the plan if agreed.

6. Directive from the Chief of Staff to P.W.D. to work out a detailed plan in collaboration with Mr. Sefton Dalmer for submission to the combined Chiefs of Staff.

/s/ ROBERT A. MCCLINT
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Copies: Major General Strong.

b 974

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USE OF ASPIDISTRA IN FINAL PHASE
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

OBJECTIVE

To break down the resistance of the German Army in the West at the decisive moment of an Allied break-through:

1. By suggesting to them through a counterfeit German special announcement that the German Command in the West has sent emissaries to ask for an armistice and that organized German resistance in the West is in its last hours;
2. By paralysing the German Command in the West by embroiling Rundstedt and his staff with Himmler and causing Himmler to take steps to remove them.

METHOD

The operation falls into two stages.

In Stage I, highest level channels of deception will suggest to Himmler that Rundstedt and certain members of his staff are in contact with the Allies in the West and that the Allies in their turn are encouraging Rundstedt.

To assist this operation it is proposed that the "black" station which will shortly be broadcasting in English and German apparently on behalf of a high level group in Germany anxious for immediate peace, should be linked by rumours with the Rundstedt party. Himmler's information will be that this "black" station is operated from England by Rundstedt's envoys. (The general public, enemy and Allied, will be led to believe it is situated in Germany, and they will be encouraged to form their own opinion concerning its possible sponsors - no explicit statement implicating Rundstedt will be made on the station.)

Stage II will be reached when an Allied break-through takes place east of the Rhine. Aspidistra, using its follow-on technique on the frequency of a station in the West German radio network, will broadcast a counterfeit announcement pretending to emanate from O.B. West. The announcement will say:

1. In view of the hopelessness of the situation, O.B. West has sent emissaries to S.C.A.E.F. to ask for terms.
2. Soldiers must, however, fight on for the present.
3. A report which has got round that "cease fire" orders have already been given is untrue; units which have ceased fire on the strength of this report must resume fighting.

After this announcement the ordinary Reichssender programme will be resumed. Four minutes later the programme will again be interrupted and the previous announcement will be officially withdrawn - but without actual denial. This withdrawal is intended to take the sting out of any German denial that may come later.

The announcement from O.B. West and the official withdrawal of it a few minutes later will be reported in full by the Allied radios. Shortly afterwards an official statement will be released from S.C.A.E.F. concerning the German announcement. This will be followed by an Order of the Day by S.C.A.E.F. to his troops; and, in German language broadcasts, a series of instructions to German soldiers and German civilians.

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The Order of the Day will call on the Allied Armies to exploit the faltering resistance of the enemy with the greatest determination and offensive energy. The instructions to the German soldiers will be for orderly surrender to the German people for a general stand-still to await the arrival of the Allied armies.

EFFECT

The operation will thus have two effects:

- a) It will create deep uncertainty in the German Army and so lessen its resistance;
- b) It will provide Himmler with the final proof of Rundstedt's treason.

This — be reinforced by information supplied to Himmler through deception channels indicating that this broadcast — which Himmler is bound to realise originated from Britain — is a kind of pump-priming operation to get the pre-arranged Rundstedt surrender started.

OBJECTIONS

The objections to the operation are three-fold:

1. The number of listeners who hear the actual Rundstedt announcement and its withdrawal will be too small for it to be effective.
2. The impact on the Germans may be nullified if effective denials and other counter-measures were speedily taken by both O.B. West and Berlin.
3. The announcement of an imminent end to the — might have a demoralising effect on Allied troops and the Allied public.

Objection 1

The Rundstedt announcement and its withdrawal will be heard only by the limited audience who happen to have tuned in to this German frequency at the time of our broadcast. On the other hand, the entire Allied radio network will repeat the announcement of the German radio and its mysterious withdrawal and give it full publicity, thus adding many millions of listeners to those who heard the original broadcast.

Objection 2

If the Germans put out an official denial stating that O.B. West has — no announcement and that no endiesaries are — their way to the Allied line, this may even help the operation by further spreading the original report in the form of a denial. The kind of denial that would spoil the operation would be an accurate description of the Aspidistre trick. It is considered probable that in the confusion caused by the Aspidistre operation in the particular military situation in which it is intended to use it, it would take the Germans some considerable time to obtain the necessary authority for the denial and to frame it effectively.

Objection 3

This should be sufficiently met by the S.C.A.E.F. Order of the Day referred to above.

MILITARY APPRECIATION

In order to decide whether the operation, with all the risks involved, is worth undertaking, the following questions need to be answered:

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-3-

1. Objective 2 of the Plan is based on the assumption that the removal of Rundstedt and his staff would be welcomed by S.C.A.E.F. Is this assumption correct?

2. What are the probable consequences in the military field of the proposed bogus announcement and bogus "official" withdrawal followed by real German denials?

3. Would the consequences be different if no bogus "official" withdrawal were made but the announcement were followed only by the real German denials?

4. What is the likely course of events in the HQ of O.B. West and the O.K.W.?

5. What action could be taken by the German authorities to counteract such effects as the announcement may have on the German troops? What authorities would have to be consulted and how long would that take?

6. What air operations would be required to put the selected German transmitter effectively out of action?

7. Could the Y service assist by putting out bogus orders on German communications channels in support of the operation?

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22

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Auth: SC, AEF
Initials: [Signature]
27 November 1944

AG 091,412-1 GCT-AGM


APG 757 (Main)
27 November 1944

SUBJECT: Psychological warfare Operations against
German Army Commanders to Induce Surrender

TO : Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

1. Reference is made to your PWP 385, dated 13 November 1944.
2. The Commanding Generals of Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups and the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group are being advised of your preliminary study on the issuance of ultimatums to German Commanders to induce surrender to the Allies. They have been given a brief of your paper and have been advised that officers of your Division having pertinent knowledge and language qualifications are available for temporary duty at their headquarters.
3. The subject of ultimatums to induce surrender would seem to require deeper and more detailed psychological study. You will therefore investigate the psychological aspects in detail so that Commanders of Army Groups can be more fully informed on this subject.

By command of General EISENHOWER:



See reverse side.

T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

6 878

~~SECRET~~

- 2 - Addressee
 DISTRIBUTION:
 1 - Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, (SHARP),
 1 - First Allied Airborne Army,
 1 - UNITED STATES Strategic Air Forces,
 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force:
 1 - G-1 Division
 1 - G-2 Division
 2 - G-3 Division
 1 - G-4 Division
 1 - G-5 Division
 1 - Public Relations Division
 1 - Air Staff, A-3
 1 - G-1 War Diary
 1 - AG Records

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COPY NO

830 9

1. SUPREME COMMANDER
2. CHIEF OF STAFF
3. RUC-RUC
4. RUC-RUC
- 5.

INFORMATION

(Signature)

(Signature)

FROM : SUPREME COMMANDER SHAEF ADV C

TO FOR ACTION : THE PRIME MINISTER LONDON

FOR INFO : SHAEF STAFF

REF NO : CFA-90358, 27 NOVEMBER 1944

SECRET

NOV 27 1944

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EYES ONLY

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

SACF

NOV 27 1944

SHAEF 1 26/27

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NOV 27 1944

SECRET

URGENT

FROM : SUPREME COMMANDER SHAEF ADV C

TO FOR ACTION : THE PRIME MINISTER LONDON

FOR INFO : SHAEF STAFF

REF NO : CFA-90358, 27 NOVEMBER 1944

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO SECRET

By G.W. Galt of CALA

27 Nov 1945

I should have placed a designation "Personal and Confidential" on my telegram to you yesterday inasmuch as I expressed a personal opinion concerning timing of any future proclamations. Naturally my opinion was for your information only.

Starting tomorrow morning I am to make a visit to both armies in 21 Army Group. This will complete a rapid survey of the entire front and at the end of the week I will probably submit a short personal appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Attention is invited to CFA-90351 which is SMC in 9420.

26 Nov 1944 SCS

ACTION : ☐

INFORMATION : GENERAL BULL

GENERAL MCCLURE

SMC IN 9422 27 Nov 1944 1220A DWR/jes REF NO: CFA-90358

831

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

201 Eisenhower
201 Churchill
321

TO: 261445A NOV

SHAEF X85/26
TOR 261730A NOV
TAP 261948A NOV

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
SECRET
TO
By authority of CALA
By *G.W. Butler*
G.W. BUTLER
Captain, A.C.D.
Date 26 Nov 1944

~~SECRET~~
URGENT

1005
20 NOV 1944
emj

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER LONDON

FOR INFO: SHAEF MAIN

INFO NO: GDM-90357

26 NOVEMBER 1944

See 20
1 CA 90359
2 HLT 127

(ATTACHED)
Reference paragraph 2 of your telegram to me, I find myself in general agreement with your attitude toward resolutions at this juncture. With respect to the desirability of current battles, it appears to me that wars are won in successive stages and until we get firmly established on the RHINE we are not in position to make the attack which we hope will be fatal to the other fellow.

I have just spent some time on the Southern front and found both armies in marvellous spirits.

The French were still talking about your visit, which they very deeply appreciated.

Both EISENHOWER and I are fine and send our warm and respectful regards.

(signed) EISENHOWER

See CFA 90358
27 Nov.

ACTION

SFS

INFORMATION: (General McCLURE + General BARK)

INFO TH 9220 26 Nov 1944 2025A JUB/gmp Ref No: CFA-90357

SGS Dist	SC	DEC	CS	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR	SGS COOK						
Copy No.	3											4	

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882

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL IS PROHIBITED

201

1/5
my dear
my dear
my dear

6 Feb/1303

CARTER L. BURGESS
 Lt. Col., U.S.C.
 Army, New Orleans

For the Secretary, General Staff:

10. 2000

WCS - I must say that in principle [redacted] the P.M.

For your information, the Supreme Foreworder made the following note on his copy of Wild House Cable No. 127, dated 25 November:

PD
 26 Nov
 1967

26 November 1977

White House Code No. 227

SECRETARIAT FILE COPY

File No 091-167-13

►



~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

TAB "C"
Rush
26 NOV.
Washing DC 15.
X file
X 201 White
X 200 Mc. Eburne
X 200-77

SRAMP/17249/11/Ops(C)
GCE/091.412-11/Ops(C)

26 November, 1944


SUBJECT : Plan for covert operation on Radio LUXEMBOURG

TO : Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,
Supreme Headquarters, AEF

1. The covert wireless operation against enemy morale in support of current military operations forwarded by the Psychological Warfare Section, Twelfth Army Group with the approval of its Commanding General, is hereby approved. Psychological Warfare Division is authorized to begin operation not later than 28th November, 1944.

2. I note that the proposed operation will be of limited duration and will be carried out under a directive from your Division.

J. F. M. WHITELY,
Major General, GS,
DAG of S, G-3



b 884

UNITED STATES ARMY
ALBANY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

SECRET/17249/11/00a(2)
SECRET/091.112-11/00a(2)

26 November, 1944

SUBJECT : Plan for covert operation on Radio LUXEMBOURG
TO : Chief of Staff

I DISCUSSION

1. The Psychological Warfare Division has forwarded a project proposed by Psychological Warfare Section, Twelfth Army Group, for covert wireless operation against enemy morale in support of the Twelfth Army Group (TAB A). The operation is to be of limited duration.

2. The proposed operation, carried out under directive of the Psychological Warfare Division would conform to Supreme Headquarters, ARF, approved directive for Psychological Warfare.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Division, has submitted his report on this covert operation (TAB B).

II RECOMMENDATION

4. That the Psychological Warfare Division's proposed project for Twelfth Army Group be approved and that the Division be authorized to begin operation not later than 28th November, 1944. The Chief, Psychological Warfare Division will be notified by letter (TAB C).

III CONCLUSIONS

5. G-2 Division. WNB

26 November 44

Approved

J. F. WOKORW

b 885

CONFIDENTIAL

J. H. WHITLEY,
Major General, GS,
DAG of S. G-3.

Date 11/15/44

SEE BRIEF

21 Nov.

McClure

CJS

305-51411 File No. 091.112-11/00a(2)

TAB "H"

PROPOSED COVERT TACTICAL BROADCAST TO TROOPS AND
CIVILIANS IN THE RHINELAND

1. a. It is assumed that military operations now in progress will result in a break-through of our troops which should throw the enemy's military and administrative communications and machinery into a state of confusion. There will be among soldiers and civilians alike in the whole Rhineland area eagerness to hear the latest news of the whereabouts of our troops, of the action being taken by German authorities to meet the situation and of the prospects of being cut off, bombed or involved in the fighting. Rumors will be rife and in such situations rumors lead to irresponsible action by individuals. It is the task of psychological warfare to ensure as far as possible that the rumors current lead to the kind of behavior by German soldiers and civilians that will help our own operations.

b. Experience has shown that rumors can be spread among the enemy most successfully by agencies that have a reputation for veracity or inside information. If the agency is covert, anonymous and unpretentious, the disposition of the individual listener to pass on what he has heard as exclusive and sensational news is increased. The military news put out by the proposed program each morning would be fresher, more detailed and more interesting to large numbers of fighting men and civilians in the Rhineland than that available on Allied programs going out on the same day. Likewise the civilian news to be given, some of which would come (for cover purposes) from official German sources, would be relevant to the problems of thousands of Rhinelanders wondering what the immediate future holds for them and what action they are to take. Once the program is thought to be well informed and relevant to military operations, it has the power to mislead and confuse.

c. The military news, which would form the main feature of the proposed program, would be built up on material specially provided by G-2 and G-3 of 12 Army Group and Armed Forces in Italy in consultation with the officers in charge of the wireless operation. This material would include not only accurate, reliable information about the front situation; it would also include carefully chosen misleading items similar to those put out by Allied covert propaganda during the advance of Third Army to the Harne. These items would be designed not to deceive the enemy's intelligence, but alarm and confuse officers, soldiers, officials and civilians driven to rely on radio, owing to the breakdown of their communications following a break-through by our troops.

d. Civilian news items would be chosen to bring before the German listener authentic and invented cases of civilians behaving, not in the way of the Party wishes, but in the way of self-interest and operational plans.

e. The news broadcast would be picked up by other covert agencies working from England and used to support the effect of this station.

f. It is believed that the enemy would find it impossible to issue denials of the news put out by the station and that he would refrain from public warnings against it for fear of giving it publicity to Rhinelanders with radio sets.

g. The Luxembourg transmitter would be used on a different frequency from its normal one and with reduced power, so that transmission would not normally be heard beyond the target area of the Rhineland.

6 886

6. B. B. B.
Capt. A. G.
Deu. Adj. 11/11/45

C

SECRET

TAB "B"

~~SECRET~~

TAB "B"

PROPOSED COVERT TACTICAL BROADCAST TO TROOPS AND
CIVILIANS IN THE RHINELAND

1. The program would begin at 0200 daily and would be repeated hourly until 0600. It would last approximately fifteen minutes. It would give no music, features, talks or other material which would associate the transmission with regular Luxembourg programs, or with a big organization. Its character would suggest a small group of well informed persons keeping the Rhineland informed. It would be identified by an announcement saying "1212 meters; Front News for Rhineland".
2. The program would consist of:
 - a) Latest news from the Army Group front, in the greatest possible topographical detail, making use where possible of enemy order of battle. Provided by G-2 and G-3, 12 A.C. and Armies.
 - b) Short, late news from the rest of the Western front and from official Allied sources.
 - c) Extracts from the G.F.R. communique of the same afternoon, for cover.
 - d) Straight news of a civilian character from the Rhineland drawn from German broadcasts, newspapers, official Allied sources, air reconnaissance and prisoners of war.
 - e) News stories, true or founded on fact, illustrating the individual's success and evasion of enemy orders; news of conditions in German territory occupied by the Allies; proclamations of the Allied Commander-in-Chief affecting the Rhineland civilian; news from inside Germany of special interest to the target area.
3. The program would be written by native Germans under supervision of officers with good German knowledge. Copies and translations of scripts would be available for information and scrutiny by G-2 and G-3.
4. Both in the technique of transmission and in the presentation of news, care would be taken that the listener would detect no association with the normal, official transmissions in the wartime from Radio Luxembourg.
5. The Radio Luxembourg transmitter would operate on a different frequency from its normal one and with reduced power. Its signal should not extend beyond the immediate neighborhood of the Rhineland and the Ruhr.
6. The program would carry no musical program material or other entertainment; no set talks other than military commentary; no prisoners of war statements; no explicitly "opposition" statements or arguments. It would refrain from use of the techniques employed in other covert transmissions to Germany.

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- 2 -

7. The intention is to present a well informed, interesting, lively and persuasive news bulletin to a limited audience for a limited period, in which only the German Intelligence Corps at Major Headquarters will be able to detect the falsehoods among the truths.

8. The operation would cease at the time when it was considered by the Commanding General, 1st A.C., that such subversive activity was no longer necessary to support military operations.

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~~SECRET~~

REF ID: A62147-14

7007/2147-14
X 7.0.0
X 20/11/44

**SUPREME HEAD QUARTERS
ALLIED EXERCISE FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division**

PWP 091.1

28 November, 1944.

565-SHAEF File No. 091.412/3

Statements by Spokesman of Military Government.

1. Appendix A to Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.M.A. Policy and Information Memorandum No. 5, dated 9 November, 1944, contained texts of eleven out of a series of fourteen statements to be broadcast by a spokesman of Military Government. These were circulated to give guidance supplementing directives already issued on Military Government, and it was further stated that the remaining three would be circulated when authorized.
2. On 16 November recipients of Policy and Information Memorandum No. 5 were notified that it had been distributed in error and were requested to return it.
3. Attached to this letter is a revised set of thirteen broadcasts on Military Government. This is the complete series, and completely supersedes Appendix A to Policy and Information Memorandum No. 5.
4. This series of statements will be broadcast by BBC, ABSIE and Radio Luxembourg, one every day beginning 4 December, 1944, and then repeated. They should be used as guidance as soon as monitored, but not beforehand.

Robert H. Clark

COLONEL R. CLARK,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.


DISTRIBUTION

For action:

- G.P. P.W. 21 A.G. (3)
- P.W.O., 2nd British Army. (3)
- P.W.O., 1st Canadian Army. (3)
- Chief, P & P.W. 12 A.G. (1)
- P & P.W. Section 12 A.G. (5)
- P.W.B. 1st US Army. (1)
- P.W.B. (G-2) 3rd US Army (1)
- P.W.B. 7th US Army (1)
- P.W.B. (G-2) 9 US Army. (1)
- P.W.B. (Donkies Bureau) (1)
- H.Q. 1st French Army. (1)
- P.W.B. (G-2) 6 Army Gr. (5)
- Radio Luxembourg. (1)
- O.S.G. Signal Base South. (3)
- P.W.D. Rear (1)

For information:

- Deputy Chief of Staff, S.H.A.E.F. (1)
- Political Adviser (U.S.) (1)
- " " (Br.) (1)
- G-1, S.H.A.E.F. (1)
- G-2, S.H.A.E.F. (1)
- G-3, S.H.A.E.F. (3: 2 to Lt. McNary, for Col. Ford)
- G-4, S.H.A.E.F. (1)
- G-5, S.H.A.E.F. (1)
- FED, S.H.A.E.F. (2: 1 to Planning Branch)
- S & P Military Mission to BR. (1)
- " " " BEGIUM (1)
- " " " NETHERLANDS (1)



6 883

25 Nov.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 1

ANNOUNCER: You will now hear a message about the military government of Germany. This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander.

VOICE: Germans: This is the voice of the Military Government. This message comes to you from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

Your armed forces will be defeated, and more and more of your territory will be occupied by the Allied forces until eventually your government and its armed forces finally surrender or are overrun.

You will be under a military occupation, your country will be governed by a military government. Already there are Germans living under this Military Government.

In this series of thirteen broadcasts, you will be told how military government will affect you and how the Supreme Commander will conduct it. You will be told how you should conduct yourselves under military occupation and Military Government.

1. Under the law of nations, the commander of the occupying forces is clothed with supreme executive, legislative and judicial power in the occupied area. This power, vested in the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force as Military Governor, will be exercised by him in accordance with the dictates of humanity, justice and civilized standards.

2. The Military Government of Occupied Germany will be firm and strict, and just. Its aim will be the destruction of the Nazi system and the militaristic system of armed aggression.

3. The Military Government will be conducted by soldiers, who will be guided by written rules of law. In the military government you will be spared from the corruption, personal greed, falsehood and barbarity of your present rulers.

4. The laws of the Military Government will be promulgated and published so that all will know what is the law. Except what is in conflict with these new laws, your existing laws will remain in effect. The laws of the Military Government will be strictly enforced. Their meaning will be plain and you must observe them obediently at once.

5. The courts of the Military Government will be conducted with fairness and promptness. Punishment for violations of the law will be orderly and swift. Punishment will be ordered without a fair trial.

Listen carefully to the next of these broadcasts at this time. You will be told the principles of the Military Government of Germany and you will be told how you must conduct yourselves under military occupation.

This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in his capacity as Military Governor of Germany occupied by the forces under his command.

This is the voice of the Military Government.

STATUS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

He 2

(Open and close with set formula as in No.1)

1. The German people's hopes of avoiding economic breakdown after defeat depend to a great extent on their will to resist the Nazis' plans to destroy German property and resources in the path of the advancing Allied armies. The policy of "scorched earth" cannot harm the Allies, who will bring their own supplies with them, but it must cause great suffering to the German people.
2. Military government will not replace utilities, buildings, stocks of materials or mining and industrial equipment destroyed by Germans under the policy of "scorched earth".
3. The Allied air and land forces will inevitably cause great damage so long as the German Government continues to carry out the Nazis' orders for useless resistance. The hardships caused by this must be increased manifold if Nazi plans to make Germany into a desert are fulfilled by the action of the German people themselves.
4. In particular, stocks of food, seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery must be preserved in danger is not to follow defeat. Farmers must take every possible step to prevent their livestock from being driven away by the Nazis as the Allied armies approach. They must do all they can to keep their farms in order so that they will be capable of the maximum production. The German people must not expect the Military Government to provide food, fuel or clothing. They must rely on their own resources.
5. While hoarding of foodstuffs and support for the Black Market is undesirable under Nazi rule and may help to weaken the food war machine and so accelerate the end of bloodshed, this must stop under Allied Occupation. The Military Government will confiscate hidden surpluses of food and other goods and have them distributed to those in need. Farmers will, therefore, be able to bring supplies, which they have hidden, to the markets established by Military Government and sell them there at the fixed prices, that all may obtain a fair ration.
6. The Allied Forces will import the bulk of their own needed supplies, but any aid which they can give to the people in Europe will be given first to the people of the countries devastated and plundered by the German armies. Germany will have to stand on her own resources, and it is essential that these shall not be destroyed by the Nazi policy of "scorched earth".

SMILES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 2.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Germany and the world are to be rid of National Socialism once and for all. The Party and all its organizations will be dissolved. Party leaders, the Gestapo and all others suspected of complicity in war crimes and atrocities committed on the instigation of the Party will be arrested and put on trial. If found guilty after a fair trial they will be subjected to severe penalties including, in the worst cases, death.
2. Germans will be required to assist in the apprehension of these criminals and their delivery into the hands of the Military Government.
3. The Military Government will abolish all organizations established by the National Socialists in order to keep the individual citizen, all business enterprises and the State itself under the Party's control.
4. The funds and other property of all these organizations will be impounded and allocated for such use in Germany as the Military Government may decide. All property wrongfully acquired by members of the National Socialist Party, whether in Germany or abroad, will also be taken possession of by Military Government and disposed of at the discretion of the Supreme Commander. Attempts to evade this measure in any way, by concealment or secret disposal, will be severely punished.
5. All civil servants and judicial authorities, and all officials and all functionaries of public utilities must remain at their posts and carry on their duties until instructed to do otherwise. Those who are not members of the National Socialist Party, active supporters of it, and who have committed no crime have nothing to fear if they perform their functions efficiently.
6. National Socialists will be ruthlessly purged from key positions in public services and replaced by administrators chosen according to their competence.
7. The Military Government when making administrative appointments will not favour any political or religious group. General political records of all persons considered for appointment will be taken into consideration.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 4.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Your first duty will be to remain peaceable and orderly. You should continue your daily occupation if you are engaged in a lawful pursuit. Do nothing to interfere with the operations of the occupying forces of the Military Government.
2. The liberty of the law-abiding citizen will be guaranteed. Such searches, seizures and arrests as may be necessary will not be done arbitrarily, but will be in accordance with the rules of warfare, and for just cause. Those found after fair trial to be law breakers will be punished as the severity of their offense demands.
3. Subject to Military Government your right to your own property will be respected, but you will not be permitted to retain what rightfully belongs to others.
4. These privileges will not, however, be enjoyed by those who have participated actively in the work of the Nazi Party or any of its agencies. The Nazi Party and all of its works will be destroyed.
5. You must aid the Military Government in rooting out active Nazi individuals.
6. You must avoid any suspicion of compliance with secret Nazi efforts to obstruct the Military Government. Any aid rendered by you to any person who offers such obstruction will be severely punished. You will be protected from intimidation by Nazi agents if you report such efforts to the authorities.
7. Above all, you must refuse to take part in any effort, whether organized or unorganized, to combat any act against the occupying forces or the Military Government.

November 18th.

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 5.

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Beware of joining or encouraging others to join paramilitary organizations. Any effort to perpetuate by such means the militarism which must be stamped out in Germany will meet with severe punishment by the Military Government.
2. You will be required by proclamations and ordinances of the Military Government to surrender and deliver up to the authorities certain articles which have military significance. These include weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitters, and other equipment. You must acquaint yourselves with all regulations governing illicit possessions and obey them scrupulously, on pain of severe penalties.
3. Your cooperation with Military Government in these necessary procedures for the de-militarization of your country will ensure just treatment by Military Government in the necessary performance of its duties in maintaining order and decency in your country.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 6

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. The rule of justice and equality before the law is to be established in Germany. In the Military Government courts established to enforce legislation enacted by Military Government and to punish offences against the interests of the Allied Forces and the United Nations, the accused person will be entitled to have in advance of trial a copy of the charges against him, to give evidence and cross-examine any witness, to consult a lawyer before trial and to choose an advocate to defend him, to call his own witnesses and, if convicted, to lodge appeal to a Military Government reviewing authority. No death sentence will be carried out without written confirmation by the Supreme Commander or a representative nominated by him.

2. The criminal and civil court systems of Germany when purged of Nazi and otherwise undesirable elements, will be permitted to reopen in due time under supervision and control. Violation of approved German laws by Germans and foreigners, other than members of the Allied Forces and United Nations displaced persons, will normally be tried in German courts.

3. Special courts associated with the Nazi regime, such as the People's Court and S.G. Police Courts, will be abolished.

4. All laws aimed at enforcing Nazi doctrines and practices will be null and void. All sentences of death or corporal punishment imposed by German courts shall be suspended pending review by the Military Government. Other existing German laws will be recognised where they do not conflict with the policies or legislation of the Military Government.

5. Every German judge, prosecutor, notary or lawyer, will be required to take the following oath:-

"I swear by Almighty God that I will at all times apply and administer the law without fear or favour and with justice and equity to all persons of whatever creed, race or political opinion they may be, that I will obey the laws of Germany and all enactments of the Military Government in spirit as well as in letter, and will constantly endeavour to establish equal justice under the law for all persons. So help me God."

6. The Military Government is empowered to attend the hearings of any German court, to nullify, suspend, commute or otherwise modify any finding, sentence or judgment, to dismiss or suspend any judge or official and to transfer any case to the jurisdiction of the Military Government courts.

7. No sentence of death passed by a German court will be executed without previous confirmation by the Military Government.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 7.

(Open and close with next formula, as in No. 1)

1. For over 10 years, you have been existing under a regime which made unjust discrimination against innocent people into a system of law. Such laws are abhorrent to every sense of justice. They will not be tolerated by the Military Government.
2. The Military Government will strike down and abolish all Nazi-made laws which discriminate against and penalise any person or group on the ground of religion, race, nationality, language or political opinion.
3. Freedom to follow your own religious beliefs is returned to you by Military Government. Places of religious worship will be reopened and may remain open. It is for you to preserve the sanctity of religious worship by preventing the abuse of this natural right. You will forfeit it if you allow religious gatherings to be misused for political purposes.
4. Military Government will recognize the just claims of religious organisations for the restoration of property stolen by Nazi organisations or persons either under the colour of law or otherwise.
5. Nazis who have penetrated into positions of authority in any church organisation will be removed and the churches purged of Nazi influence. Freedom of religion will be given to you, free of hidden terror and restraints.
6. Not only the laws but also the agencies and the many devices which the Nazis have created to carry out their policies of unjust discrimination — the grounds of race or religion, or nationality or political opinion, will be wiped out.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 8

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Under Allied Military Government existing legal tender German currency will be continued to the extent allowed by German law. In addition, Allied Military Marks will be made legal tender and must be accepted on the same basis as Reichsmarks. It will be an offence to discriminate between Allied Military Marks and German legal tender. British sterling currency and United States dollars will not be legal tender.
2. Financial laws, regulations and practices discriminating against any person on account of race, religious belief or political opinion, will be abrogated and all will be treated with equal justice under the law.
3. German public authorities will continue to collect taxes and to pay for lawful public expenses which do not prejudice the Military Government or its policies.
4. German officials will be instructed to continue German measures against inflation such as rationing, price control, prohibition of dealings in black markets and so forth. The effectiveness of such measures always depends upon the spirit in which they are carried out and it will be for the German people to show whether they can and wish to prevent an inflation which can only bring ruin upon the German people themselves.
5. The Military Government does not propose to close financial institutions. Banks will be closed only if absolutely necessary and in that event only long enough to introduce satisfactory controls, to provide adequate facilities for military needs and to ensure that Military Government instructions and regulations are observed.
6. As under German administration, so too under Military Government, foreign exchange transactions will be regulated. It is the intention of Military Government to preserve the status quo of all properties which may be the subject of disputes concerning ownership or possession, until those matters can be properly determined. Persons who seek to evade such provisions will find that the measures which they take are unavailing and will be subject to punishment by Military Government Courts. This includes persons who deal with or receive such properties.
7. In other words, the aim of the Allied Military Government in the financial field is to establish financial order and to protect the rightful owners of property and assets.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 9

(OPEN AND CLOSE WITH SET FORMULA, AS IN NO. 1)

1. The Allied Military Government proposes to preserve and freeze all property of the Nazi Party, its leading officials and functionaries. Since it will be a serious offence to use any property or assets or to take any action to assist in the survival or renewal of Nazi activities, the use of financial institutions or measures for these purposes will be forbidden.

2. Attempts to conceal such blocked property or to hinder the Military Government in preserving it for determination of its future use, will result in severe penalties being imposed upon all persons who take part in such transactions.

3. Normal business activities, however, will not be interfered with.

4. The property of the United Nations or nationals thereof will be protected and preserved for the rightful owners.

5. In short, as respects property and property rights, it is the aim of Military Government to preserve and protect them so that questions of rightful ownership and proper use of property raised by the Nazi Party or persons and organisations affiliated with it, may be settled and determined in an orderly manner and in accordance with equity and justice.

SRILS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 10.

[Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1]

1. Nazi concentration camps will be taken over at once, and used for the detention of arrested Nazis after the release of their innocent victims.
2. The Military Government will set up committees to consider as rapidly as possible the cases of all detainees so that every person who has been wrongfully detained by the Nazis shall be released.
3. While these inquiries are in progress the camps will be controlled by Allied troops.
4. The Military Government will take over control of all prisons and remove all local and other undesirable prison officials.
5. In general, the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Germany will belong to the local German police under the supervision of the Military Government.
6. The SS police and SA Sturmpolizei will be liquidated at once and all local police forces which will be eliminated and the creation of police organizations.
7. Voluntary training shall be allowed in the German police forces, which will be disbanded except in special cases of emergency when certain detachments will be permitted small arms and strictly limited ammunition.
8. The police forces will be decentralized and reorganized on a regional and local basis so that all those national law enforcement could not be delegated efficiently to local German authorities.
9. The decentralized local police forces will be under executive chiefs approved by the Military Government and the general responsibility for the administration of the local police will be vested in the German Civil Head of each town or city or in the Regional President.
10. The criminal police will be abolished as a separate branch of the National Police and will be merged with the local units of ordinary police. The heavily armed detachments of the Schutzpolizei will be disbanded. Recruiting for the police will be open to all citizens without preference for past military or other State service.
11. The Landrecht and the Stadtrecht will be disbanded.
12. Military Government officers and the Allied Military Police will ensure that the German police procedure conforms with the policy of the Supreme Commander and, in particular, that it does not infringe the accepted rights and liberties of any citizen.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 11

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Works of art and objects of scientific or historical importance which have been looted by Germany from Allied countries will be recovered and restored to their rightful owners and it is the responsibility of every German who wishes to make restitution for the wrongs done by his country to assist in their location and delivery to the Military Government.
2. All sales and movements of such objects will be forbidden and destruction or concealment of them will be severely punished.
3. Every effort will be made to avoid, as far as military necessity allows damage to any building, monument, document or other object of cultural, artistic, archaeological or historical value, which rightfully belongs to Germans.
4. The Military Government has compiled a list of monuments which must not be used for military purposes unless military necessity requires the Commander on the spot to make an exception. Commanders will, in general, put these buildings out of bounds for Allied troops.
5. Steps will be taken to preserve in safe keeping all German records, documents and archives of value.
6. It is the responsibility of Germans to refuse to take part in the policy of "scorched earth", which the Nazis plan to carry out. "Scorched earth" implies a policy in connection with "retreat". Where are the Germans retreating to?

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 12

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. When circumstances permit German workers will be allowed to form democratic trade unions to replace the Nazi-controlled Labour Front and other Nazi organisations, which will be abolished at once. All forms of free economic association and combination among workers will be permitted, provided that they do not assume any political or militaristic complexion.

2. The restoration of this fundamental right which the Nazis abrogated will enable workers to embark upon collective bargaining with employers but strikes threatening military security, directly or indirectly, will be prohibited. So will lock-outs.

3. For the time being, you will maintain your limits on wages under the most recent German regulations.

4. All deductions of pay at the source or collections from workers for the benefit of the RMKP or any of its affiliated dissolved organisations will cease. Deductions of payments for social insurance, unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation or normal Reich taxes will be continued.

5. Existing laws, decrees and regulations regarding the registration of labour will continue otherwise as emergency measures. That is to say, workers must have their employment status examined and recorded, and their work books verified and re-registered. All workers, male or female, in employment or unemployed, must report to the labour office in the area where they are living for registration or re-registration.

6. The civilised labour requirements of the Military Forces will be given the first priority but due recognition will be given to the retention of key civilians in public services, utilities or essential industries. Any surplus labour will be used for work on such tasks as are approved by the Military Government.

7. It is the policy of the Supreme Commander to ensure fair and reasonable working conditions for Germans who are willing to play a full part in meeting the requirements of the occupation authorities.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF

No. 13

(Open and close with set formula, ■ in No.1)


1. ■ is the policy of the Supreme Commander to eradicate Nazism and German militarism in all their aspects from the German educational system. All active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers and militarists will be removed from educational positions and all educational institutions (except boarding schools and orphanages) will be closed until Nazism has been eliminated.
 2. Elementary schools will first be reopened. School supplies and facilities must be furnished from your own resources. The existing German educational system, subject to Military Government control, will be employed as far as possible after purging of Nazi and militaristic elements. No appointment or reinstatement made to any position in the German educational system will be considered permanent.
 3. Steps to reopen secondary schools and higher German educational institutions will be taken as soon as practicable. You will be directed to make emergency repairs to school buildings.
 4. All Nazi Party organizations and their affiliates in schools, all special Nazi schools (including Adolf Hitler Schulen, Napolas and Ordensburgen), all Nazi Youth organizations (including Jungvolk, Hitler-Jugend, Jungmadel, and Bund Deutscher Madel) and the Nazi adult education organization (Deutsche Volkshilfsgesellschaft) will be abolished. New organizations may not be founded without permission of Military Government.
 5. German teachers will be instructed to eliminate from their teaching anything which -
 - a. Glorifies militarism, expounds the practice of war or of mobilization and preparation for war, whether in the scientific, economic or industrial fields or the study of military geography.
 - b. Seeks to propagate, revive or justify the doctrines of Nazism or to extoll the achievements of Nazi leaders.
 - c. Favors a policy of discrimination on grounds of race or religion.
 - d. Is hostile to, or seeks to disturb the relations between any of the United Nations.
- Any infringement of these provisions will be cause for immediate dismissal and punishment.
6. Military Government will not intervene in questions of denominational control of German schools or religious instruction in German schools except insofar as may be necessary to insure that religious instruction and the administration of such schools conform to such regulations as are or may be established for all subjects and all schools.

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DISTRIBUTION

Relayed to [redacted] and SIXTH ARMY GROUP

(Re: [redacted] Stationed by [redacted] 408 1 PM 10/10/45)

REF NO. [redacted] WHITE HOUSE NO. 127, 25 November 1944

TO [redacted] TO GENERAL [redacted] FOR [redacted] EYES ONLY

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

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PRIORITY

250254Z November

251800A November

SHAF 153/25

NAB

INCOMING MESSAGE

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL


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EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET

WMO OUT 1254 25 OCT 1954 WMO NO: 3-68298
WMO : 251330



ORIGINATOR : WMO
INFORMATION : WMO

3-68298 TO WMO TO WMO 25 OCT 1954

number 0002. This copy is to have previous message reference
will be my representative and this matter is being
General [unclear], [unclear] Division

FROM : WMO
TO : WMO
SUBJECT : WMO
REFERENCE : WMO

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

SHAFF

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHAFF File No. 251330

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Time 16 AUG 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

T.J. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, GSO,
Adjutant-General.

100 200

By Command of General EISSMANN:

2. The subject of ultimate to induce surrender would be fully informed on this subject. psychological aspects in detail that commanders of Army Groups can be

1. The Commanding Generals of Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups and the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group are being advised of your preliminary study of ultimate to induce surrender. They have been given a brief of your paper and have been advised that officers of your Division having pertinent knowledge and language qualifications are available for temporary duty at their Headquarters.

Reference your RFP 385 of 13th November.

- Chief, Psychological Warfare Division
- Psychological Warfare Operations against Army Commanders to Surrender

SHAW/17249/3/2/004(4)
607/091.412-3/004(4)

25 November, 1944

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

Tab 10
to be
3.4.11/44

CONFIDENTIAL

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)**

**SHAW/17249/2/1/Dna(C)
GCI/921.112-3/Cpi(C)**

25 November, 1944

**SUBJECT : Psychological Warfare Operations against
German Army Commanders to Induce Surrender**

**TO : Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group,
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group,
Commanding General, Sixth Army Group.**

1. The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, a preliminary analysis of Allied experiences in the issuance of ultimatums to German Commanders to induce rapid surrender, suggests a technique for handling ultimatums for surrender as special operations. The Psychological Warfare Division is prepared to attach certain of its officers having special knowledge and language qualifications for temporary duty with an Army Group when an ultimatum to induce surrender is being considered.

2. The Psychological Warfare Division in its study concludes that its operations against beleaguered German forces or garrisons have been directed either against the German Commanders in person or devised, directly or indirectly, against the main body of troops. The German Commander's desire to fight on or to surrender has been influenced by the following calculable factors:-

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SECRET

DATE 26 AUG 1945

REASON: Willingness to surrender after token pressure has been applied.

DATE 26 AUG 1945

REASON: The quality and background of his Staff Officers.

3. Furthermore the suggestion is made that in any negotiations for surrender it is necessary to:-

a. Make every effort to establish and maintain contact with the enemy commander.

b. Refrain from giving the enemy commander special mention in propaganda as in the build up of Colonel Auloch at ST MALO.

c. Make no mention that previous commanders surrendered after proclaiming their will to resist to the end, thereby creating the impression that they surrendered earlier than necessary.

4. A good deal more psychological investigation is needed relative to the psychological implications in the issuance of ultimatums to induce surrender of beleaguered enemy commanders. More detailed information is available it will be forwarded to you. Should you in the interim desire the services on temporary duty of officers of the Psychological Warfare Division having special knowledge and language qualifications, they will be assigned to your Headquarters.

By Command of General RISETHOWER:

b 906

**T.J. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, GSC,**

87-6
x 201 A-line

SHAW/17249/11/OpC) 002/091.412-11/OpC(0)

Plan for covert operation - Radio LUXEMBOURG 24th 1944

1 G-3 Div C-2 24 Nov
Ops C Div 1944

1. The Psychological Warfare Division has submitted a proposed project for a covert wireless operation against enemy morale in support of Twelfth Army Group military operations.

2. This proposal, which is agreed to by Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group would be of limited duration and would cease upon the order of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.

3. Request that you study the attached proposal of the Psychological Warfare Division, stating:-

a. Whether you consider that the proposed project will accomplish its object causing confusion, alarm and disobedience to the Nazi party and the Wehrmacht civilians in the area of GERMANY ahead of Twelfth Army Group operations.

b. Whether the junior commanders and the rank and file of the German military forces in those areas are likely to be misled by the covert wireless operation.

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W Butler
6 AUG 1945

J.H. ALLE,
Colonel, GS,
Chief, Ops C Sub-Section.

2/11/45

2 G-3 Div C-2
Ops C Div

considered that the proposed project will be of considerable assistance in achieving the object stated in Para. 3 a above; also that a sufficiently large proportion of junior commanders and rank & file will be misled to amplify justify this position

2/11/45

Major General, G-3,
Hq. 1st AF, APO
San Francisco, Calif.

Approved
#3 Major
2005
25/11/44

24 NOV

6. G-3 Division,
2d Division.

II - RECOMMENDATION

5. That the letters at TAB B and C be approved.

25 NOV 44

Recommendation should be forwarded to the Commander of 2d AF Group.

4. Further investigation of this subject is needed but, in the meantime,

the psychological aspects of the Allied Commanders concerned.

3. The Psychological Warfare Division's analysis of German military

operations shows the role of the German Commanders and their troops but of necessity

does not cover the psychological aspects of the Allied Commanders concerned.

2. Psychological Warfare operations have sometimes been undertaken with

the aim of inducing surrender to the Allies.

1. Enclosure at TAB A is a good preliminary analysis by the Psychological

Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, APO, of the results of the use of

psychological warfare operations against the enemy.

III - DISCUSSION

10 Chief of Staff

Psychological Warfare Operations against
Enemy Commanders to Induce Surrender

November, 1944

NAVJAG/1725/2/1/000(1)
02/09/44-12-2/000(1)

ATTACHED EXHIBITS
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
(C-3) DIVISION (Main)

885
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10/20/44

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SHAEF

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ARMY

TOO 241800Z NOV

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OF PRIORITY

FROM : AMSSO FROM ISMAX
TO : SHAEF MAIN PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BEDRIEL SMITH
REF NO : 6893 24 November, 1944

Reference paragraph 4 of COS(W)457, ■ much hope
that you will send representative and that he will arrive early
as possible.

Would you instruct him to report to me on arrival.

NOTE: This message must be thoroughly paraphrased if its text
is to be published or communicated outside British or American
services ■ departments. If retransmitted unparaphrased other
than through holders of Chief of Staff cipher settings, the
originator must mark the message 'To be sent in OTP.'

QOS(W)457, ■ No. 6849, 1. SMO ■ 7766, 23/11/44, G-3

ACTION : G-3 PWD

SGC 8-68298
as Nov.

INFORMATION : SCS

TO	BY	DATE	TIME	NO.	SC	J.C.	CS	DES	DAO	AIR	IG	CDOR							
By authority of CAL	W. BUTLER	24 Nov 44	2115A	DWR/1p															
Date 24 AUG 1945																			

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SGS - SHAEF File No. 24 Nov 44

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SHAEF

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : AMSSO, FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO FOR ACTION : JSM WASHINGTON

TO ■ INFO : SHARE MAIN

REF NO : 6845

COB (W) 457.

Reference SCAR 134.

1. We assume that US Chiefs of Staff would us to make arrangements for the preparation of the plan in question (see para 3 of SCAP 134). We are, therefore, taking action accordingly.

2. We are setting up a committee representative of all the departments or interests which are concerned or can make a contribution to the preparation of this plan, namely, Foreign Office, PWE, LONDON Controlling Section, SOE, JFC, JIC.

3. Their terms of reference will be to prepare the plan desired by SHARP in the shortest possible time.

6 910 4. We are asking SHARF if they would wish to be represented, and if so, by whom.

5. Would UNITED STATES Chiefs of Staff wish in addition to nominate American representative or representatives on this committee? If so, will you communicate their wishes.

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W. W. BUTLER

6 AUG 1941

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AGWAR

TOO 222250Z November

SHAEF X19/23

FOR 230230A November

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URGENT

FROM : AGWAR, FROM GENERAL MARSHALL
TO : SHAEF MAIN, FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER FOR HIS EYES ONLY
REF NO : W-66936, 22 November 1944

Text of proposed joint statement by President and Prime Minister
re Germany

DISTRIBUTION:

1. SUPREME [REDACTED]
2. CHIEF [REDACTED]
3. ⁴⁴ General Bull, personal-only
4. General W. Aire -
- 5.

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G.W. Butler
G.W. BUTLER
Captain, A.C.P.

Adm AUG 10 45

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JOINT HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

21 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Plan for covert operation on Radio Luxembourg.

TO : Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF.

DISCUSSION

The Commanding General, 12 Army Group, has given his approval to a proposal Psychological Warfare Section, 12 Army Group, to conduct a covert wireless operation against enemy morale, in support of current military operations. This operation would be of limited duration.

The object of this proposed operation is to cause confusion, alarm, and disobedience to the Nazi Party and military orders, among civilians in Germany ahead of 12 Army Group operations, and to mislead junior commanders and the rank and file of the German forces in Germany. It is the view of the Commanding General, 12 Army Group, that military operations would be assisted thereby. Details of the proposed operation are given in TAB A. *See Brief 26 Nov.*

Up-to-the-minute and exclusive of the advance of the troops, together with details of happenings among civilians and officials in threatened Germany, would be given by an anonymous broadcast to a limited area of Western Germany. Details of proposed program are given in TAB B. *See Brief 26 Nov.*

The proposed operation would be carried out under the supervision of this Division and under the supervision of an experienced officer. Likewise, military information and intelligence about the enemy would be provided by the Division used under the supervision of officers of G-2 and G-3, 12 Army Group. *See Brief 26 Nov.*

RECOMMENDATION

That this project be approved and this Division authorized to conduct the operation not later than 25 November 1944.

CONCURRENCES

C/S, 12 Army Group (Gen. Allen).

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

COPIES: Central files
Gen. McClure
Cmdr. McLachlan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G. W. BUTLER
Colonel, G.S.C.

16 AUG 48

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SEE BRIEF
26 Nov.
Whitely
to CAS

21 Nov 44

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SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR INFO : CENTRAL DISTRICT UN [] FOR ACOS

FROM : SHAFF MAIN, SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : 3-67648 CITE: SEECT

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO ~~SECRET~~

By *G.W. BUTLER* CALA

Date *12/1/44*

SCAF No. 134

German morale [] this front shows no sign []
solid resistance is a main factor postponing final victory which,
in present circumstances, can only be achieved by prolonged
bitter fighting.

2. Factors which are compelling [] enemy to
continue strong resistance appear to be:

A. Overall iron discipline of the []
and stranglehold by the NAZI party.

B. Successful NAZI propaganda [] is con-
vincing every GERMAN that unconditional surrender [] com-
plete devastation of GERMANY and her elimination [] nation

3. Consider it is of vital importance that []
should redouble our efforts to find a solution to the problem of
reducing the German will to resist and then to bring every approp-
riate weapon to bear to achieve this end. I have [] par-
ticularly the employment of deception methods in addition to
propaganda and other possible means.

4. Since any plan which aims at reducing the
enemy's will to resist must affect the German Army in all
Theatres, this is not a subject which can be dealt with by
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, which []
possession of the relevant information and does not control []
the weapons to put such plan into effect.

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BE HAVING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS REQUIRED

335-SHAFF File No.

12/1/44

20 NOV



S E C R E T

-2-

REF NO: 2-67648 20 November 1944 (continued)

5. This matter has been discussed with the controlling officer, who has had the subject under review. I now request that it be taken up in LONDON as a matter of urgency.

ORIGINATOR: G-3 AUTHENTICATION: EARL M. JONES,
Colonel, GSC
INFORMATION: GCS
G-2
COM ZONE
PWD COORDINATED WITH: CHIEF OF STAFF
AG RECORDS
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**SUPREME HEAD PARTERS
ALLIED PROPAGANDA BUREAU
Psychological Warfare Division**

REF 001.412

19 November, 1944.


Summary of previous Psychological Warfare Directives
and Instructions for their use.

1. INSTRUCTIONS AND ADVICE TO ARMY CIVILIANS BEHIND ENEMY LINES

- a. In order to achieve maximum effect, there will be issued by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., either in a "Voice of SHAEF" or "Voice of Military Government", or in a leaflet. Army Groups and Armies should not issue such instructions on their own authority unless they are of a strictly tactical nature and of limited local significance; and then only by leaflet and public address. All instructions issued over Radio must be approved by the Psychological Warfare Division.
- b. Appendix 'A' gives the current list of instructions in current SHAEF leaflets, and current BBC and A.E.F. output.
- c. In order to improve and enlarge these instructions, Army Groups should send in suggestions to SHAEF based on intelligence at their disposal.
- d. There is now sufficient evidence available to state that, of the German population who disobeyed the Nazi evacuation orders and remained behind, a considerable number were influenced by the SHAEF instructions, and associated them with the name of General Eisenhower. It is important to exploit this to the full by associating General Eisenhower's name as often as possible with such instructions as are issued. Leaflets dealing with life under Military Government. The name of the Supreme Commander should be used as often as possible in propaganda. Prints are being sent to each Army Group and Army of the standard photograph of the Supreme Commander. No other photograph should be used.

2. FOREIGN PRISONERS AND PRISONERS OF WAR

- a. Appendix 'B' contains a list "Voice of SHAEF". This supersedes all current instructions. These should not be used in future.
- b. G-1 has ruled that in all propaganda directed to foreign workers it should be carefully clear that prisoners of war are not to be used.



For the above reasons, whenever possible prisoners of war should be specifically excluded from propaganda addressed to foreign workers.

3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPAGANDA

- a. The question has been raised as to the responsibility as between SHAEF on the one hand, and the Army Groups and Armies on the other, for strategic and tactical matters. The Division of responsibility is as follows:

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(1) SHARP has the main responsibility for strategic leaflets addressed both to soldiers and to civilians. If SHARP undertakes to do a tactical leaflet specifically addressed to a German Unit or related to a tactical operation, it only does so in coordination with the Army Group in question.

(2) Army Groups have the main responsibility for tactical propaganda. Circumstances, however, frequently arise where it is tactically necessary to produce leaflets on strategic themes. When Armies and Army Groups, however, produce leaflets on strategic themes, these leaflets must be strictly confined within the limits of SHARP's directives and should, where possible, follow the lines set in the SHARP leaflets.

3. It is clearly desirable that the greatest interchange of ideas possible should take place between SHARP, Army Groups and Armies. There is no copyright in leaflets.

4. NEWS OF ALLIED CIVILIANS ASSISTING THE ALLIES.

In view of the German fear of reprisals against those who assist the Allies, it is absolutely essential that we should not use the names of such persons either in leaflet or radio propaganda. In particular, when photographs of life under Military Government are used, the captions should NEVER contain the names of the persons photographed, if the photograph in any way suggests that they are assisting the Allies.

5. NEGRO AND COLORED TROOPS.

There is evidence that on some sectors of the front German soldiers are scared of African Negro and French Colonial troops, and that German propaganda is using this fear to stimulate a fight to the end.

In general, it is useless to try to counter this fear. Leaflets and broadcasts which attempt to bring German soldiers on this score are likely merely to stimulate consciousness of the problem. Unless there are overwhelming tactical reasons to the contrary, this subject must be left completely alone.

6. VICTORY OF SICILY.

a. Reports from first army indicate that this is the slogan of a new propaganda campaign to raise German fighting morale. It is also claimed that, if this slogan is used, it will be a signal that there is a new offensive on the way. On this subject, however, SHARP is not making any propaganda of any sort on this subject in leaflets or broadcasts. A new point is made in the leaflet of the German soldier.

b. SHARP is undertaking a thorough new attack to discover how widespread the belief is that the fall of Sicily is a sign of an imminent German attack.

7. NO SHIPMENTS OF WAR MATERIAL TO THE ALLIES.

Some time ago it was pointed out that standard prisoners of war leaflets with a statement that prisoners of war are no longer shipped overseas.

Interrogations at several sectors have shown that this over-print has not achieved the result intended. It has also been used by Italian propagandists as evidence that the Germans are. Moreover, a large

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number of prisoners have expressed disappointment at missing the opportunity of visiting the war world.

All such over-points should in future be omitted. On the other hand, the theme of life in camps in the U.S.A. and Canada, which was allowed to lapse, should not be resuscitated, since the older German soldiers are afraid this will delay their return home.

6. 'V' W.L.O.S.

- a. Several suggestions have been received that counter-propaganda should be carried out against the German 'V' propaganda. It is the view of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF that such propaganda, which is purely defensive, is unnecessary at this stage of the war. However, any references to 'V' weapons in overt propaganda must be limited to the broad line that they cannot affect decision in the war, or be of assistance to the German fighting soldier.
- b. Although it is not possible to give the Germans some facts about V-1, such facts will be completely ineffective now that their hopes are staged on V-2.

For the above reasons, Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF advises that, unless there are special local tactical reasons to the contrary, no effort should be wasted on countering German 'V' propaganda. No facts are admitted to be given on V-2 as all other than those given in official British statements.

7. RUSSIAN DISCLOSURE OFFICE.

Re most the immediate requirements of 6 Army Group, 25-27 has been reprinted. However, the official statement of the Russian government gives us the text for a far better leaflet. The Russian leaflet is currently in preparation by Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF in close cooperation with the Psychological Representative of the Government of the Soviet Union at the Red Army High Command for the Repatriation of Soviet Citizens in Western Europe. The text will be supplied to Army Groups and Armies as soon as it is available.

10. SEVERE INFORMATION OFFICE, 2001 OUR OWN TROOPS.

A report by Captain Brown on an inquiry into the surrender of German troops as seen by the American Infantry has been circulated by the 200 Intelligence Section to Army Groups and Armies. This report should be carefully studied by radio and leaflet writers. Where possible, radio and leaflet writers themselves should conduct similar investigations and send back their results to Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF.

Robert A. McCall

ROBERT A. MCCALL,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION - See serials.

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DISTRIBUTION:

For action:

21. 247. 21. Army Group (3).
3 copies to B.I.O. 2nd Br. Army.
3 copies to B.I.O. 1st Can. Army.
21. 247. 19. Army Group (6).
3 copies to B.I.O. 1st U.S. Army.
3 copies to B.I.O. 2nd U.S. Army.
3 copies to B.I.O. 9th U.S. Army.
21. 247. 6. Army Group (3).
3 copies to 2nd French Army.
3 copies to B.I.O. 7th U.S. Army.
21. 247. 1. 1st Army Group (5) copies to Air. Hq. and
K.O. (1st Div.)
O.S.S. 3rd. Spec. Section (3) Attention: Mr. Howard Baldwin
Air. Hq. (1): copy to Air. Country, 1st. Division)

Net Information

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, USAF (1)
Political Advisors (2)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
G-5 (1)
HQ (2; 1 to Planning Branch).
USAF Military Mission to Mexico (1)
" " " " SACRAM (1)
" " " " AIR NEWS (1)

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS TO GERMAN CIVILIANS

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL GERMAN CIVILIANS.

- (a) Talk to soldiers going to the front, coming home on leave or billeted in your house and tell them that you do not want to continue a lost war.
- (b) Counteract the Nazi lies about alleged British and American brutality, - lies which are merely intended to induce you to fight on.
- (c) Prepare black lists of Nazi war criminals and of all those who have been responsible for atrocities against non-Germans or Germans.
- (d) Assist foreign workers, German soldiers who are deserting and all victims of Nazi oppression. Give them shelter. Directly the Allies arrive, hand them over to Military Government officials.
- (e) Receive and follow the instruction given to German civilians in the name of General Eisenhower by radio (BBC, ABBE and Radio Luxemburg) and by means of leaflets.

2. RESISTANCE TO COMPULSORY EVACUATION.

- (a) Evade compulsory evacuation by all possible ways of hiding (in houses, cellars, near-by woods etc.), and of collective or individual resistance.
- (b) Protect your property against the Nazi scorched earth policy.
- (c) Organise fellow-citizens in order to protect your property against looting by retreating German armies or fleeing Nazis.

3. ACTION ON APPROACH OF ALLIED ARMS.

- (a) At the right moment organise fellow-citizens to enforce your will on the local Wehrmacht commander in favour of a surrender of your town or village and against Party orders to sacrifice all in a last-ditch-battle.
- (b) Actively resist any attempts to strip your home district of food and other essentials.

Appendix A Continued

-2-

- NOTE: 1. In broadcasts as well as leaflets these instructions should be implemented wherever possible by concrete and detailed accounts of successful action on these lines.
2. The instruction on taking cover against bombing is superseded. No instructions should be given on this subject until further notice.

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APPENDIX B

Voice of SHARP to Foreign Workers
in the RUHR, RHENISH-WESTPHALIA and RHINELAND

1. The subjoined text, authorized for issue, is mainly designed to prevent the mass self-evacuation of workers.
2. It should serve as general guidance for all broadcasts and leaflets to foreign workers.
3. The offer of employment applies chiefly to workers whose homes are in Eastern Europe.
4. To French, Belgian and Dutch workers, therefore, stress should be laid on the reasons against self-evacuation.
5. TEXT

*This is a member of the staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The following message, dated _____ 1944, is issued at the order of the Supreme Commander. It is addressed to workers in Germany whose countries are at war with Germany and who work in the Ruhr, the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area and the Rhineland.

The time has come to give you precise instructions what to do when the Allied Armies expel the German Army from the area where you work. Listen very carefully to what follows:

First, here are your instructions on what to do before the Allied Armies arrive:

1. As the battle approaches, go into hiding if you have not been able to do so before. Hide at all costs the Nazi efforts to drag you deeper into Germany with the retreating armies.
2. Get away, if possible, from the town or village where you live. But in doing so, be sure to keep off the roads. On the roads you will be in deadly danger.
3. If you cannot get away from your town or village, go to an air raid shelter. Do not leave your shelter till you are quite sure that the Germans have been driven right out.

These are your instructions on what to do before the Allied armies arrive. Now listen to your instructions on what to do when the Allied Armies arrive:

1. If you have managed to get away from your town or village and taken refuge in the country nearby wait there quietly until the mopping up is over. On no account hurry back to your living quarters. For some time after the first Allied troops enter it is likely to be dangerous to return to your town or village.

2. If you have taken refuge in an air raid shelter in your town or village, remain quietly there until the mopping up is completed. Do not bother the fighting soldiers; they have plenty to do.

3. Once the battle has passed by it will be more than ever necessary for you to keep clear of all roads and areas by which Allied troops and supplies are coming forward. Military Government officers will follow quickly behind the leading troops and will set up offices in towns and villages at which you will receive instructions as to how you will be looked after and fed. But do not all go to these offices -- send only your group leader, who should if possible, speak English. The rest of you should remain in your groups and await his return.

4. Your representative should report that his group awaits instructions. He will be told by the Military Government official precisely what the group should do.

5. When the time comes, each of you will be interviewed by a Military Government official designated to look after you and begin the arrangements for your return home. Have your papers and credentials ready if possible. You will understand that the Allied Armies will have to take security measures to prevent German agents slipping through the lines disguised as Allied nationals. It will, therefore, save time if you have your papers and credentials ready. But even if you have no papers you will be looked after.

6. When you are interviewed by the Military Government official, you will be given a postcard which you can send to your relations telling them that you are safe under the protection of the Allied Armies. These postcards will be sent off immediately after you have filled them in. When possible, if you desire it, the message on the postcard will also be transmitted to your relations by radio.

These are your instructions on what to do when the Allied Armies arrive.

Now, here are your instructions on what to do after the Allied Armies have advanced beyond your town or village.

1. If you are ready to volunteer to work for the Allied Armies while you are waiting to be sent home, there will be work of the very greatest importance to be done. Every volunteer from among you will be needed.

2. Once their credentials have been checked, volunteers will be given work as soon as possible. They will be paid at the highest current German wage for the category of workers to which they belong. Their rations will be assured by the military authorities.

3. Remember that those who volunteer to work for the Allied Armies will not be thereby prevented from returning home. It will be clearly recognized by the military authorities that they have only volunteered to work during the time when the arrangements are being made for their return home.

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4. If you are not fit or able to work you will be looked after by the military authorities until it is possible to move you back into your home country. When you reach the frontiers of your home country, your national authorities will then arrange for your journey home.

5. Do not, therefore, attempt to make your own way back home. If foreign workers in unorganized masses stream along the lines of communication of the Allied Armies they will hinder the Allied advance and also expose themselves to the gravest danger. Moreover, you will be stopped by the military authorities. The confusion created will only postpone your organized repatriation, which the military authorities are now planning in consultation with your own national authorities.

Let me sum up these instructions in brief:

1. Before the Allied Armies arrive, go into hiding, take shelter and stay quiet till the final mopping up has been completed.

2. When the Allied Armies arrive, report to the Military Government officials.

3. While you are waiting to return home, be ready, if possible, to volunteer for urgent emergency work to help the Allied Armies.

4. On no account try to make your own way home along the Allied lines of communication.

The Supreme Commander instructs me to say that he is confident that you will carry out these instructions faithfully. Thereby your will accelerate both the defeat of Germany and your own return home.

The above instructions do not in any way alter the orders you are receiving and will continue to receive regarding the action you are to take against your enemy, Germany. These orders come to you by other and secret means.

Lastly, the Supreme Commander orders me to say that these instructions apply only to Foreign Workers and not to Allied prisoners of war.

That is the end of these special instructions issued at the order of the Supreme Commander and addressed to workers in Germany whose countries are at war with Germany and who work in the Ruhr, the Rheinisch-Westphalian industrial area and the Reichland.

These instructions are transmitted to you by radio and also by leaflet. The Supreme Commander will be issuing further instructions to you. So listen regularly to the radio and look out for leaflets addressed to you in your own language.

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SECRET
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 DIVISION (MAIN)

SECRET

SECRET/NOVA/Sec(S)
REF 122-600/Sec(S)

19 November, 1944

SUBJECT : Measures to reduce enemy morale

TO : Chief of Staff

I. DISCUSSION

1. We have been re-examining various ways of reducing enemy morale. Whenever we approach this from the psychological warfare point of view, we are stilled by the fact that the propaganda which we put across to the enemy must be restricted by what is palatable to our own people. This means psychological warfare is a comparatively weak weapon.

2. We then examined the possibility of using deception methods. This was discussed with Colonel BEVAN, who indicated certain [redacted] It is understood that he feels that deception methods coupled with "black" propaganda might lead to results.

3. In conjunction with Colonel BEVAN, we came to the conclusion that this is a matter for LONDON rather than for Supreme Headquarters, AEF, because this Headquarters is not in possession of sufficient information.

II. RECOMMENDATION

That cable at REF 122 to British Chiefs of Staff be despatched.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By *gfw Butler*
Date 16 AUG 1945
H. R. BULL,
Major-General, GSO,
AF of S G-3

Approved 20/11
by C/S

TOP SECRET

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19 Nov 44
(21)

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
SHAW/1902/002(B)
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TO : AFHQ for COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM : Supreme Headquarters, AMF from EISENHOWER.



1. GERMAN morale on this front shows no sign of breaking at present. I am of the opinion that enemy's continued stolid resistance is a main factor postponing final victory which, in present circumstances, can only be achieved by prolonged and bitter fighting.
2. Factors which are compelling the enemy to continue strong resistance appear to be:-
 - a. Overall iron discipline of the Wehrmacht and stranglehold by the Nazi party.
 - b. Successful Nazi propaganda which is convincing every German that unconditional surrender means the complete devastation of GERMANY and her elimination as a nation.
3. Consider it is of vital importance that we should redouble our efforts to find a solution to the problem of reducing the GERMAN will to resist and then bring every appropriate weapon to bear to achieve this end. I have in mind particularly the employment of deception methods in addition to propaganda and other possible means.
4. Since any plan which aims at reducing the enemy's will to resist must affect the GERMAN Army in all theatres, this is not a subject which can be dealt with by Supreme Headquarters, AMF, who is not in possession of the relevant information and does not control all the weapons to put such plan into effect.
5. Request that this be examined in as a matter of urgency.

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1. 1945 (72)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEAD Q. RT. HQ
ARMY INFORMATION CENTER
Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

REF 335.18

18 November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Statements by Spokesman of Military Government.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
" " " " G-2, " "
" " " " G-3, " "
Political Adviser (U.S.).
" " (S.C.).

1. Attached at Tab 'A' are drafts of thirteen proposed statements by a spokesman of Military Government, which it is intended to disseminate by radio to the population of Germany.

2. These statements have been prepared in accordance with Chief of Staff Directive AGO.51.412-1 dated 20 October, entitled "Propaganda Treatment of Military Government", and implement the policy contained in AGOER W455779 dated 3 November, which has now received concurrence from Foreign Office and Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. Further, these statements have been jointly prepared by this Division and G-3 Division.

3. Your comments are requested on or before 1300 hours, Tuesday, 21 November; lack of comment will be taken as indicating your concurrence.

Robert A. Neuman
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Enc: TAB 'A'.

18 NOV.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 527

November 18th

November 18th

STATEMENTS ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 1

ANNOUNCER: You will now hear a message about the military government of Germany. This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander.

VOICE: Germans: This is the voice of the Military Government. This message comes to you from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

Your armed forces will be defeated, and more and more of your territory will be occupied by the Allied forces until eventually your government and its armed forces finally surrender or are overrun.

You will be under a military occupation, and your country will be governed by a military government. Already there are Germans living under this Military Government.

In this series of thirteen broadcasts, you will be told how military government will affect you and how the Supreme Commander will conduct it. You will be told how you should conduct yourselves under military occupation and Military Government.

1. Under the law of nations, the commander of the occupying forces is clothed with supreme executive, legislative and judicial power in the occupied area. This power, vested in the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force as Military Governor, will be exercised by him in accordance with the dictates of humanity, justice and civilized standards.

2. The Military Government of Occupied Germany will be firm and strict, and just. Its aim will be not the destruction of the Nazi system and the militaristic system of armed aggression.

3. The Military Government will be conducted by soldiers, who will be guided by written rules of law. In the military government you will be spared from the corruption, personal greed, falsehood and barbarity of your present rulers.

4. The laws of the Military Government will be promulgated and published so that all will know what is the law. Except when in conflict with these new laws, your existing laws will remain in effect. The laws of the Military Government will be strictly enforced. Their meaning will be plain and you must observe them obediently and at once.

5. The courts of the Military Government will be conducted with fairness and promptness. Punishment for violations of the law will be orderly and swift. No punishment will be ordered without a fair trial.

Listen carefully to the next of these broadcasts tomorrow at this time. You will be told the principles of the Military Government of Germany and you will be told how you must conduct yourselves under military occupation.

This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in his capacity as Military Governor of the areas of Germany occupied by the forces under his command.

This is the Voice of the Military Government.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

No. 2

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Germany and the world are to be rid of National Socialism once and for all. The Party and all its organizations will be dissolved. Party leaders, the Gestapo and all others suspected of complicity in war crimes and atrocities committed in the investigation of the Party will be arrested and put on trial. If found guilty after a fair trial they will be subjected to severe penalties including in the worst cases, death.
2. Germans will be required to assist in the apprehension of those criminals and their delivery into the hands of the Military Government.
3. The Military Government will abolish all organizations established by the National Socialists in order to keep the individual citizen, all business enterprises and the State itself under the Party's control.
4. The funds and other property of all these organizations will be impounded and allocated for such use in Germany as the Military Government may decide. All property wrongfully acquired by members of the National Socialist Party, whether in Germany or abroad, will also be taken possession of by Military Government and disposed of at the discretion of the Supreme Commander. Attempts to evade this measure in any way, by concealment or secret disposal, will be severely punished.
5. All documents and records belonging to the Party and its subsidiary organizations must be preserved intact and handed over to the Military Government in pain of grave penalties.
6. All civil servants and judicial authorities, all officials and all functionaries of public utilities must remain at their posts and carry out their duties until instructed to do otherwise. Those who are not members of the National Socialist Party, or active supporters of it, and who have committed no crimes have nothing to fear if they perform their functions efficiently.
7. National Socialists will be ruthlessly purged from key positions in public services and replaced by non-Nazis chosen according to their competence.
8. The Military Government when making administrative appointments will not favour any political or religious group. General political records of all persons considered for appointment will be taken into consideration.

November 18th.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 3

(Open — close with set formula, as in No. 2)

1. Your first duty will be to remain peaceable and orderly. You should continue your daily occupation if you — engaged in a lawful pursuit. Do nothing to interfere with the operations of the occupying forces — the Military Government.
2. The liberty of the law-abiding citizen will be guaranteed. Such searches, seizures and arrests as may be necessary will not be done arbitrarily, but will be in accordance with the rules of warfare, and for just cause. Those found after fair trial to be law breakers will be punished as the severity of their offence demands.
3. Subject to Military Government your right to your own property will be respected, but you will not be permitted to retain what rightfully belongs to others.
4. These privileges will not, however, be enjoyed by those who have participated actively in the work of the Nazi Party or any of its agencies. The Nazi Party and all of its works will be destroyed.
5. You must aid the Military Government in rooting out active Nazi individuals.
6. You must avoid any suspicion of compliance with secret Nazi efforts to obstruct the Military Government. Any aid rendered by you to any person who offers such obstruction will be severely punished. You will be protected from intimidation by Nazi agents if you report such efforts to the authorities.
7. Above all, you must refuse to take part in any effort, whether organized or unorganized, to commit any act against the occupying forces or the Military Government.

November 18th.

13 November, 1944

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

No. 5

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Refrains of joining or encouraging others to join para-military organizations. Any effort to perpetuate by such means the militarism which must be stamped out in Germany will meet with severe punishment by the Military Government.
2. You will be required by precise regulations and ordinances of the Military Government to surrender and deliver up to the authorities certain articles which have military significance. You must comply with all regulations governing illicit possessions and obey them scrupulously. These include weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio-transmitters, and other equipment. You will be allowed to retain radio receiving sets and to listen to any broadcasts which you may choose. Failure to obey them will render you subject to severe penalties.
3. Your cooperation with Military Government in these necessary procedures for the de-militarization of your country will facilitate generous treatment by Military Government in the necessary performance of its duties in maintaining order and decency in your country.

16 November, 1944

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
NO. 5

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. The rule of justice and equality before the law is to be established in Germany. In the Military Government courts established to enforce legislation enacted by Military Government and to punish offences against the interests of the Allied forces and the United Nations, the accused person will be entitled, so far in advance of trial a copy of the charges against him, to give evidence and cross-examine any witness, to consult a lawyer before trial and to choose an advocate to defend him, to call his own witnesses and, if convicted, to lodge an appeal to a Military Government reviewing authority. No death sentence will be carried out without written confirmation by the Supreme Commander or a representative nominated by him.

2. The criminal and civil court systems of Germany when purged of Nazi and otherwise undesirable elements, will be permitted to reopen in due time under supervision and control. Violation of approved German laws by Germans and foreigners, other than members of the Allied forces and United Nations displaced persons, will normally be tried in German courts.

3. Special courts associated with the Nazi régime, such as the People's Court and S.S. Police Courts, will be abolished.

4. All laws aimed at enforcing Nazi doctrines and practices will be null and void. All sentences of death or corporal punishment imposed by German courts shall be suspended pending review by the Military Government. Other existing German laws will be recognised where they do not conflict with the policies or legislation of the Military Government.

5. Every German judge, prosecutor, notary or lawyer, will be required to take the following oath:-

"I swear by Almighty God that I will at all times apply and administer the law without fear or favour and with justice and equity to all persons of whatever creed, race or political opinion they may be, that I will obey the laws of Germany and all enactments of the Military Government in spirit as well as in letter, and will constantly endeavour to establish equal justice under the law for all persons. So help me God."

6. The Military Government is empowered to attend the hearings of any German court, to nullify, suspend, commute or otherwise modify any finding, sentence or judgment, to dismiss or suspend any judge or official and to transfer any case to the jurisdiction of the Military Government courts.

7. No sentence of death passed by a German court will be executed without previous confirmation by the Military Government.

18 November, 1944

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
FO-6

(Open and close with set formula, as in F-1)

1. For over 10 years, you have been existing under a regime which made unjust discrimination against innocent people into a system of law. Such laws are abhorrent to every sense of justice. They will not be tolerated by the Military Government.
2. The Military Government will strike down and abolish all Nazi-made laws which discriminate against and penalise any person or group on the ground of religion, race, nationality, language or political opinion.
3. Freedom to follow your own religious beliefs is returned to you by Military Government. Places of religious worship will be reopened and may remain open. It is for you to preserve the sanctity of religious worship by preventing the abuse of this natural right. You will forfeit it if you allow religious gatherings to be misused for political purposes.
4. Military Government will recognise the just claims of religious organisations for the restoration of property stolen by Nazi organisations or persons either under the colour of law or otherwise.
5. Nazis who have penetrated into positions of authority in any church organisation will be removed and the churches purged of Nazi influence. Freedom of religion will be given to you, free of hidden terror and restraints.
6. Not only the laws but also the agencies and the many devices which the Nazis have created to carry out their policies of unjust discrimination on the grounds of race or religion, or nationality or political opinion, will be wiped out.

November 18th

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

No. 1

(Open and close with set formula as in No. 1)

1. The German people's hopes of avoiding economic breakdown after defeat depend to a great extent on their will to resist the Nazis' plans to destroy German property and resources in the path of the advancing Allied armies. The policy of "scorched earth" cannot harm the Allies, who will bring all their own supplies with them, but it must cause great suffering to the German people.
2. Military government will not replace utilities, buildings, stocks of materials or mining and industrial equipment destroyed by Germans under the policy of "scorched earth".
3. The Allied air and land forces will inevitably cause great damage so long as the German Wehrmacht continues to carry out the Nazis' orders for useless resistance. The hardships caused by this must be increased manifold if Nazi plans to make Germany into a desert are fulfilled by the action of the German people themselves.
4. In particular, stocks of food, seeds, fertilisers, and agricultural machinery must be preserved if hunger is not to follow defeat. Farmers must take every possible step to prevent their livestock from being driven away by the Nazis as the Allied armies approach. They must do all they can to keep their farms in order so that they will be capable of the maximum production. The German people must not expect the Military Government to provide food, fuel or clothing. They must rely on their own resources.
5. While hoarding of foodstuffs and support for the Black Market is understandable under Nazi rule and may help to weaken the Nazi war machine and so accelerate the end of bloodshed, this must stop under Allied Occupation. The Military Government will confiscate hidden surpluses of food and other goods and have them distributed to those in need. Farmers will, therefore, be wise to bring supplies, which they have hidden, to the markets established by Military Government and sell them there at the fixed prices, that all may obtain a fair ration.
6. The Allied Forces will import the bulk of their own needed supplies, but any aid which they can give to the people in Europe will be given first to the people of the countries devastated and plundered by the German armies. Germany will have to stand on her own resources, and it is essential that these shall not be destroyed by the Nazi policy of "scorched earth".

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

No. 8

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Under Allied Military Government existing legal tender German currency will be continued to the extent allowed by German law. In addition, Allied Military Marks will be made legal tender and must be accepted on the same basis as Reichsmarks. It will be an offence to discriminate between Allied Military Marks and German legal tender. British sterling currency and United States dollars will not be legal tender.
2. Financial laws, regulations and practices discriminating against any person on account of race, religious belief or political opinion, will be abrogated and all will be treated with equal justice under the law.
3. German public authorities will continue to collect taxes and to pay for lawful public expenses which do not prejudice the Military Government or its policies.
4. German officials will be instructed to continue German measures against inflation such as rationing, price control, prohibition of dealings in black markets and so forth. The effectiveness of such measures always depends upon the spirit in which they are carried out and it will be for the German people to show whether they can and wish to prevent an inflation which can only bring ruin upon the German people themselves.
5. The Military Government does not propose to close financial institutions. Banks will be closed only if absolutely necessary and in that event only long enough to introduce satisfactory controls, to provide adequate facilities for military needs and to ensure that Military Government instructions and regulations are observed.
6. As under German administration, so too under Military Government, foreign exchange transactions will be regulated. It is the intention of Military Government to preserve the status quo of all properties which may be the subject of disputes concerning ownership or possession, until these matters can be properly determined. Persons who seek to evade such provisions will find that the measures which they take are unavailing and will be subject to punishment by Military Government Courts. This includes persons who deal with or receive such properties.
7. In other words, the aim of the Allied Military Government in the financial field is to establish financial order and to protect the rightful owners of property and assets.

18 November, 1944

SERIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 2

(OPEN AND CLOSE WITH SEE FORMULA, AS IN NO. 1)

1. The Allied Military Government proposes to preserve and freeze all property of the Nazi Party, its leading officials and functionaries. Since it will be a serious offence to use any property or assets or to take any action to assist in the survival or renewal of Nazi activities, the use of financial institutions or measures for these purposes will be forbidden.
2. Attempts to conceal such blocked property or to hinder the Military Government in preserving it for determination of its future use, will result in severe penalties being imposed upon all persons who take part in such transactions.
3. Normal business activities, however, will not be interfered with.
4. The property of the United Nations -- nationals thereof will be protected and preserved for the rightful owners.
5. In short, as respects property and property rights, it is the aim of Military Government to preserve and protect them so that questions of rightful ownership and proper use of property seized or acquired by the Nazi Party or persons and organisations affiliated with it, may be settled and determined in an orderly manner and in accordance with equity and justice.

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
No. 10

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Nazi concentration camps are to be abolished at the earliest possible moment. All the Nazi guards and camp staffs will be immediately arrested and urgent steps will be taken to ameliorate the living conditions of the people detained in the camps.
2. The Military Government will set up committees to consider as rapidly as possible the cases of all detainees so that every person who has been wrongfully detained by the Nazis shall be released.
3. While these inquiries are in progress the camps will be controlled by Allied troops.
4. The Military Government will take over control of all prisons and remove all Nazi and other undesirable prison officials.
5. In general, the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Germany will belong to the local German police under the supervision of the Military Government.
6. The SS police and the Gestapo will be liquidated at once and all Nazi principles and methods will be eliminated from the direction of police operations.
7. No military training will be allowed in the German police forces, which will be disbanded except in special cases of emergency when certain detachments will be permitted small arms and strictly limited ammunition.
8. The police force will be decentralized and reorganized on a regional and local basis to deal with those national laws whose enforcement could not be delegated efficiently to local authorities.
9. The decentralized local police forces will have executive chiefs approved by the Military Government. The general responsibility for the administration of the local police will be vested in the German Civil Head of each town or city or in the Regional President.
10. The criminal police will be abolished as a separate branch of the National Police and will be merged with the local units of ordinary police. The heavily armed detachments of the Schutzpolizei will be dissolved. Recruiting for the police will be open to all citizens without preference for past military or other State service.
11. The Landmacht and the Stadtwacht will be disbanded.
12. Military Government officers and the Allied Military Police will ensure that the German police procedure conforms with the policy of the Supreme Commander and, in particular, that it does not infringe the accepted rights and liberties of any citizen.

18 November, [REDACTED]

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF [REDACTED]
NO. 12

(Open and close with set formula, as in No. 1)

1. Works of art and objects of scientific or historical importance which have been looted by Germany from Allied countries will be recovered and restored to their rightful owners and it is the responsibility of every German who wishes to make restitution for the wrongs done by his country to assist in their location and delivery to the Military Government.
2. All sales and movements of such objects will be forbidden and destruction or concealment of them will be severely punished.
3. Inquiry efforts will be made to locate, as far as military necessity allows, houses, buildings, monuments, documents or other object of cultural, artistic, archaeological or historical value, which rightfully belongs to Germans.
4. The Military Government has compiled a list of monuments which must not be used for military purposes unless military necessity requires the Commander on the spot to [REDACTED] exception. Commanders will, in general, put these buildings out of bounds for Allied troops.
5. Steps will be taken to preserve in safe keeping all German records, documents and archives of value.
6. It is the responsibility of Germans to refuse to take part in the policy of "scorched earth", which the Nazis plan to carry out. "Scorched earth" implies a policy in connection with "retreat". There are the Germans retreating to!

■ November, 1944

SERIES ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF ■■■■■
NO. 12

(Open and close with set formula, as in p. 1)

1. When circumstances permit German workers will be allowed to form democratic trade unions to replace the Nazi-controlled Labour Front and other Party organisations, which will be abolished at once. All forms of free economic association ■■■■ combination among workers will be permitted, provided that they do not assume any political ■■■■ militaristic complexion.
2. The restoration of this fundamental right which the Nazis abrogated will enable workers to embark upon collective bargaining with employers but strikes threatening military security, directly or indirectly, will be prohibited. So will lock-outs.
3. For the time being, you will maintain your limits ■■■■ wages under the most recent German regulations.
4. All ■■■■ deductions of pay at the source or collections from workers for the benefit of the NSDAP or any of its affiliated dissolved organisations will cease. Deductions of payments for social insurance, unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation or normal Reich taxes will be continued.
5. Existing laws, decrees and regulations regarding the registration of labour will continue otherwise as emergency measures. That is to say, workers must have their employment status examined and recorded, and their work books verified and re-registered. All workers, male or female, in employment or unemployed, must report to the Labour Office in the ■■■■ where they are living for registration or re-registration.
6. The civilial labour requirements of the Military Forces will be given the first priority but due recognition will be given to the retention of key civilians in public services, utilities or essential industries. Any surplus labour will be used for work on such tasks as are approved by the Military Government.
7. It is the policy of the Supreme Commander to ■■■■ fair and reasonable working conditions for Germans who are willing to play ■■■■ full part in meeting the requirements of ■■■■ occupation authorities.

(Open and close with set formula. ■ in No.1)

1. It is the policy of the Supreme Commander ■ eradicate Nazism and German militarism in all their aspects from the German educational system. All active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers and militarists will be removed from educational positions and all educational institutions (except boarding schools and orphanages) will be closed until Nazism has been eliminated.

2. Elementary schools will first be reopened. School supplies and facilities must be furnished from your own resources. The existing German educational system, subject to Military Government control, will be employed as ■ possible after purging of Nazi and militaristic elements. No appointment or reinstatement made to any position in the German educational system will be considered permanent.

3. Steps to reopen secondary schools and higher educational institutions will be taken as soon ■ practicable. You will be directed to make emergency repairs to school buildings.

4. All Nazi Party organizations and their affiliates in schools, all special Nazi schools (including Adolph Schulen, Napolas and Ordensburgen), all Nazi Youth organizations (including Jungvolk, Hitler-Jugend, Jungmadel, and Bund Deutscher Madel) and the Nazi adult education organization (Deutsche Volkshilfsgemeinschaft) will be abolished. New organizations may not be founded without permission of Military Government.

5. German teachers will be instructed to eliminate from their teaching anything which -

a. Glorifies militarism, expounds the practice ■ war or of mobilization and preparation for war, whether in the scientific, economic or industrial fields ■ the study of military geography.

b. Seeks ■ propagate, revive ■ justify the doctrines of Nazism or to extoll the achievements of Nazi leaders.

c. Favors a policy of discrimination ■ grounds of race or religion.

d. Is hostile to, or seeks to disturb the relations between any of the United Nations.

Any infringement of these provisions will be ■ immediate dismissal and punishment.

6. Military Government will not intervene in questions of denominational control of German schools ■ religious instruction in German schools except insofar ■ may be necessary to insure that religious instruction and the administration of such schools conform to such regulations as are or may be established for all subjects and all schools.

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PWP/1753-6

Supreme Allied Command
European Theater of Operations
European Division

10/25/44

Ref: ZOO.6

15 November, 1944.

Archaeological, Literary, Historical and Administrative
Research - Europe

1. Policy.

The following directive represents the attitude of the British and other Allied Governments toward the German people and hereforward will govern all propaganda output concerning the future of Germany, whether addressed to German or non-German audiences. It applies the Supreme Commander's directive given in A.L.A. No. 2, of 25 October, 1944.

a. General Principles.

This must follow the line set by President Roosevelt's speech on 22 October, 1944, in which he made clear the following points:

- (1) No bargaining or parley with the Nazis, the last shred of which control - open or secret - of governmental institutions will be destroyed. Stern punishment for all those responsible for the war and its brutal conduct.
- (2) Germany to be deprived of every element of military power or potential military power.
- (3) Allied faith that, rid of her Nazi regime, the German people will turn to love truth, justice and peace and will earn their way back into the fellowship of law-abiding nations.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
By authority of CALA
By *W. G. R.*
Date **16-AUG-1945 (5)**

Nothing is charged against the German race. God cannot have eternally condemned any race: witness the many loyal U.S. citizens, lovers of peace and freedom, who are of German ancestry.
The enslavement of the German people - human slavery being against all the principles of the United Nations.

b. Propaganda Principles.

On the basis of the above points, Allied propaganda should emphasize these facts:

- (1) Germany's post-war condition and hopes of recovery depend not so much on the Allied policy towards an occupied Reich as on the degree of destruction of Germany's resources resulting from the prolongation or curtailment of the war, i.e. total capitulation, but continued resistance heightens the prostration or even destruction of the German nation.
- (2) The Nazis, who started the war to gratify their lust for power and are continuing it to postpone their own punishment, are responsible for all that Germany has already suffered, is suffering and will suffer in the war and after it.

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SGS-SHAFF File No. 091414

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- (3) The Germans themselves can curtail their ordeal, avert national prostration or destruction, shorten the period of acute distress and exhaustion and accelerate the entry of Germany into a respected place among the family of nations by refusing to fight and work to prolong the Nazis' war, refusing to be accomplices in the Nazis' crimes against foreign workers and prisoners in the Reich, refusing to destroy their own manpower, property and resources as the Nazis demand, refusing to take part in guerrilla operations or underground resistance and by obeying the Military Government established in occupied Germany by the Allies.
- (4) Military Government will root out all Nazi and militarist elements and organizations and punish severely all guilty of war-crimes, of carrying out or aiding resistance to the occupation forces. Law-abiding German citizens and their families will be assured conditions in which they will be able to live and work without molestation and by keeping going or restarting essential services and key consumer goods industries (notably agriculture) to defeat the Nazis' attempt to plunge a defeated Germany into chaos.
- (5) Military Government will end political persecution, spying and informing, arbitrary and illegal acts of repression, regimentation and all other Nazi practices. It will protect all administrative officials who cooperate with the Allied authorities in the true interest of Germany. It will give every assistance to law-abiding Germans in combating and destroying Nazi outlaws.

c. METHODS OF PROPAGANDA OR.

- (1) Not overt propaganda, but authoritative announcement of our intentions should be the basis of our output. There must be no appeals and it must be made clear that German cooperation or non-cooperation with military Government is a question on which depends the well-being and future prospects of the Germans themselves and is a matter of relatively incidental importance to the Allies. All propaganda points should be put across factually, in the form of statements of policy, news, announcements, and objective commentaries and explanations.
- (2) Full publicity should be given to Military Government proclamations and decrees as these are released, news of the punishment of criminals and hostile elements, clashes between law-abiding Germans and Nazi outlaws, the restoration of order and the fair administration of justice, economic and financial rehabilitation, restitutive cooperation by Germans, the return of religious freedom, the preservation of cultural and historical objects, the restoration of secure family life, etc. In reports of this kind colourful, descriptive material is desirable, provided no sentimentality creeps in.

d. NATURAL AVAILINGS.

- (1) The implementation of this Directive should start without delay. Material is already available in shape of fourteen short statements by a spokesman of

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-3-

the Military Government, setting out the facts about Military Government in all its aspects, education, law, finance, etc. These are to be broadcast by BBC and ARIA and repeated by Radio Luxembourg each day for a fortnight, after which the series will be run through for another fortnight.

- (2) They should be followed up by radio commentaries on the subject of a less official and more explanatory kind.
- (3) Special radio reporters are being sent to occupied German territory to secure documentary material on the Military Government in practice.
- (4) This material, in common with the series of fourteen statements will be available for all media. The fullest use should be made of it in order to fulfill the above directive.
- (5) With the onset of winter and the mounting force of the air offensive the alternative to material destruction at the hands of the Nazis, as presented in the official Allied attitude to the German people, should prove a highly effective factor in undermining Germany's will to resist.

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. McCLURE

Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

For Action:

P & P.W., 21 Army Group (6)
P & P.W., 12 Army Group (6)
C of G., 6 Army Group, for P & P.W. (6)
P.W.D., S.M.A.M.F., Luxembourg (6:1 for E.C.R.D. Det.)
O.S.C. Seine Base Section (3: 1 to Mr. Howard Baldwin).
P.W.D. Rear (15: 1 to MID Country, Mr. Deimer).

For Information:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. (1) ✓
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-5 (1)
AFD (2: 1 to Planning Branch).
Army Military Division to HQ USA (2: 1 to G-5 Ops B.
Col. Wilder).
" " " " " " (1)
" " " " " " (1)

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SECRET

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ARMED RESISTANCE DIVISION
Psychological Warfare Division

OROC/IS

FWP 200.6

14 November, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Division, Information
WFO 200.6 - 200.6.

1. POLICY.

Western Front Operations.

The following Directive has been issued by the Supreme Commander:

1. The treatment of Western Front operations in propaganda will be guided by the following overall Directive:

a. AG-OROC 2. (Not for use in propaganda).

Propaganda should be based on the assumptions:

- (1) That the advance to the RHINE will be slow.
- (2) That a major breakthrough will not occur until after the RHINE has been crossed.

Since these assumptions may be belied by events, they should not be made explicit in propaganda. But they should be used as the basis for the treatment of war news until further notice.

b. DIRECTIVE.

(1) Operations.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
BY *W. B. Butler*
BY *W. B. Butler*
C-100, 1-1-45
Date *1-1-45*

a. Treat the news of advances factually. Do not blow up minor operations or give tactical successes strategic significance.

b. Treat the prolongation of the war into a sixth winter as the final crime of the Nazis against their own people.

c. Stress the effect of the combined strategic and tactical air war in the sixth war winter.

(2) German Civilians.

a. German civilians should be urged to prevent the destruction of their homes by disobeying 'searched' and 'earth' orders. Special attention should be paid to the industrial workers of the RUHR and the RHINE-ROD.

b. Key German civilians in Western Germany should be advised to evade anti-evacuation plans.

c. Every chance of favourably contrasting the occupied with the unoccupied area of Germany should be exploited.

(3) Foreign Workers in Germany.

a. The campaign to organize foreign workers throughout Germany for passive resistance should continue unchanged.

SECRET

1-1-45

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-2-

- b. Instructions to foreign workers on their tasks when the psychological warfare approach should be carefully considered. They will be tested, as the case arises, by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

James H. McCreck
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

P & P.W., 21 Army Group (6)
P & P.W., 12 Army Group (6)
G.O.F. S., 6 Army Group, for P.W.O. (6)
Radio Luxembourg (6; 1 for H.O., P.W. Det.)
O.S.S. Signal Base Section (3; Attention Mr. Howard Baldwin)
P.W.D. Rear (1; 1 to A.D. Country, Mr. Bolmer).

For Information:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. (1)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
G-5 (1)
P.W. (2; 1 to Germany, France)
S.O.P. Liaison Section to G-2, G-3 (1)
" " " " G-2, G-3 (1)
" " " " G-2, G-3 (1)

~~SECRET~~

██████████ HEADQUARTERS
██████████ EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

2001 Mr. Chow
 2001 Bull
 2001 file No.
 Tab. "A" to
 2001 Bull.
 2001 Bull. 2001

144 985

13 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Operations Against German Army Commanders
to Induce Surrender.

1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
By authority of CALA
By *W. B. B. B.*
C. C. C. C. C. C.
Date **15 AUG 1945**

DISCUSSION

1. Issue of ultimatums to German commanders to induce rapid surrender to the Allies has, in some instances, been effective, and in others, has merely resulted in stiffened resistance. This Division has been primarily concerned with Psychological Warfare operations sometimes prior to delivery of the ultimatum, and, invariably, after the ultimatum has been rejected. Experience in these operations tends to show that, if certain psychological factors inherent in the personnel as well as the military situation of the German are taken into account prior to the issue of an ultimatum and if Psychological Warfare operations are phased according to a deliberate plan, based partly on general and partly on tactical considerations, there is a greater likelihood of the ultimatum being accepted at an early stage. This paper discusses some of the principles involved, and proposes a procedure to be adopted by Army Groups and similar operations.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

2. Psychological Warfare operations against beleaguered German forces or garrisons are of two distinct types:

- a. Operations directed against the German commander [REDACTED] person.
- b. Operations devised, directly or indirectly, against the main body of troops.

3. These two types often conflict with each other. Psychological Warfare leaflets and special radio broadcasts directed against the troops and designed to [redacted] or desertion invariably [redacted] to the attention of [redacted] German commander [redacted] his staff officers. Any conciliatory action by [redacted] German [redacted] leader which appears to be the direct result of propaganda pressure places [redacted] in an impossible position with his [redacted] staff. If it is remembered that only [redacted] commander [redacted] himself can effect the surrender of the German force [redacted] as a whole, it [redacted] that [redacted] a leaflet which, for example, discloses to his troops confidential discussions of the commander with Allied representatives may well infuriate the former [redacted] ordering continuing resistance, although it may simultaneously have [redacted] excellent effect in undermining the morale of the troops [redacted] accelerating desertions.

4. Important by-product of the two above-mentioned types of action, especially in the case of a completely surrounded garrison, is the effect produced by the surrender, or the continuation of the battle, on other German troops and the German public. Likewise, if German propaganda builds up the garrison as an "epic" figure, as at Brest, this must be borne in mind in propaganda. The widespread Allied publicity given to the Aachen ultimatum probably had an adverse effect on the strictly tactical position. On the other hand, the strategic advantages of creating "a lesson of Aachen" probably outweighed the tactical disadvantages, although it would appear wiser not to attempt to create strategic propaganda effects from a local situation, but to concentrate exclusively on the tactical task.

1. The number of days in a year is 365.

COPY

FACTORS AFFECTING GERMAN COMMANDER'S WILL TO RESIST

5. The German commander's desire to fight or — surrender — influenced by the following calculable factors:

- a. Directive from his superiors. In only — case — say, that of General ELSTON's command south of the Loire, (which by its nature, being amorphous and exposed, — not a surrounded garrison proper) did a commander surrender without even — appearance of resistance. In all other cases, at least the letter, if not always the spirit, of the order to resist — obeyed.
- b. Military Pressure. In an extreme case, such as that of CONCARNEAU, the commander was in the end willing to surrender after token pressure had been applied. At CHEBOURG, after reduction of most of the port, token shelling by smoke shells produced the surrender of one junior German commander.
- c. Staff Officers. Their quality and background is an important element. In at least one instance, surrender was decided upon after a round-table discussion. The general attitude of the staff, as well — that of the commander, is therefore important.
- d. Threats against the commander's family. This has of late become an increasingly important factor. Colonel WILCE (commander at AACHEM), prompted by fear of reprisals against his family, inserted in the surrender document a clause to the effect that the — and ammunition of his command were exhausted, in order to help justify his surrender.
- e. The Tactical Situation, per se, and the tactical and supply situation as reported in the German home press. The surrender or desertion of small groups of German soldiers may sometimes influence the tactical situation, but, where this is the case, it does not greatly influence or exercise much moral pressure on the commander.

6. Extensive prisoner interrogation has established the fact that, in the view of the German soldier, "holding out to the last man" is an order which is not considered to apply to the commander, or even to the residual force, in a tactically impossible situation. In no case was the ultimate surrender of the garrison thought dishonourable or contrary to the hold-out order. To hold out to the last man is never held to apply to hopeless ("pistols against tanks") local situations such — prevailed in the last days of the CROZON Peninsula (BREST) campaign.

ACTION PRIOR TO ISSUE OF ULTIMATUM

7. It is essential that Psychological Warfare against the German commander and his troops be conducted in such — way that — early surrender will appear "honourable" to his troops, the home public and the home leadership. Thus, it is important that contact — made as soon — possible through parlementaries with the commander, under conditions of secrecy — privacy, and especially without publicity, before the propaganda operation has gathered momentum. The object of the first discussion should not necessarily be to induce an immediate surrender, which in any event is unlikely, but to ascertain the degree of resistance which the commander intends to put up, and the extent to which he — be influenced by token actions of the Allies and by "a good press". The agreements reached with Admiral SCHIRLITZ at LA PALICE (La Rochelle) relative to non-destruction of the port provided there was no Allied air action — a good example of — successful parley.

COPY

8. If explicit or implicit arrangement for an early surrender made at the first parley, nevertheless the subsequent propaganda directed to the troops should be essentially quiet in tone informative substance until the first major Allied attack has taken place and given the commander a new reason to discuss cessation of hostilities. If the first major attack achieves no remarkable tactical success, little can probably be gained by renewing contact with the German commander. On the other hand, a distinct tactical success, appropriately reported by Allied press and wireless, so as to emphasize the hopelessness of the German commander's position, would be a strong inducement to him to re-open negotiations.

SUGGESTED SEQUENCE OF PROCEDURE

9. The following procedure, both in negotiations and in the conduct of Psychological Warfare operations, is therefore suggested:

- a. Every effort should be made at the earliest to establish and maintain some sort of contact, via parlementaires or agents, with the enemy commander, and utmost secrecy maintained.
- b. Firmness, determination, correctness, and lack of compromise must be shown in all dealings with the commander. But, to carry determination to the extent of issuing an ultimatum without attempt at a parley is clearly unprofitable, and it is especially unprofitable to publicize its rejection, this only to commit the commander to an uncompromising position. fact arbitrary ultimatums undesirable clearly brought the BREST operation. The successful operations against LE HAVRE and were conducted without ultimatums. AACHEN ultimatum a long-range propaganda asset, but tactically unproductive. The German commander who in a position to accept an in more likely to arrange his surrender at a parley.
- c. It is likewise unprofitable to vilify the enemy commander, to give him special mention in propaganda. Experience with Colonel AULOCK (who commanded St. Malo and was extensively interrogated later) showed that the publicity he received was a factor in prolonging his resistance; in fact, this commander believed that decorations, and his promotion to Major General, the direct outcome of Allied publicity.
- d. Propaganda should not take the line that previous commanders surrendered after first proclaiming their will to resist to the end. This creates the impression that they surrendered earlier than necessary and may deter future surrender, since:
 - (1) Neither the German commander nor his troops willing to believe this. RANCKE, AULOCK, etc. have very high prestige.
 - (2) It creates a competing situation in which each commander tries to hold out longer than another.
 - (3) It attaches a negative note to surrender, implying we despise the Germans for surrendering after first proclaiming they would not.

CONCLUSIONS

10. It would appear, from the facts cited in paragraphs 2 to 8 inclusive, that a definite agreed technique could profitably be developed induce quicker surrenders and minimize expenditure of effort by Allied forces. Adoption of a definite procedure would entail the following action:

a. ■ steps leading up to ■ including the delivery of suggestions of surrender should be planned ■ specialised operations requiring expert information and advice. The local Commanders on ■ ground should be made ■ of this, and a simple system for supplying the specialised information and advice should be instituted ■ all concerned informed.

b. Army Groups should be informed of a. above for dissemination to lower commanders, and should be asked to direct them to call ■ the following specialised information ■ personnel, as required:

- (1) Detailed biographies, and other pertinent information, ■ German commander and ■ senior staff officers which are available in Psychological Warfare Division records, ■ as to give ■ understanding of the commander's psychology and the best methods of approach for purposes of parley.
- (2) General information from Psychological Warfare ■ to the best methods of handling the commander, both before and during surrender negotiations, and ■ assuring ■ propaganda carried on during the negotiations shall not jeopardize their success.
- (3) The attachment, for temporary duty, of Psychological Warfare Division officers having special knowledge and language qualifications.

RECOMMENDATION

11. That the conclusions above be considered by G-3 Division, and, if approved, steps taken to inform Army Groups of the decision and method ■ future implementation.

/s/ ROBERT A. McCLORE,

/t/ ROBERT A. McCLORE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1014
X 1014 inc. Chm
X 1014 3 muth. PWD
X 1014 101 PWD
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Directive on Treatment in Psychological Warfare of Western Front Operations.
TO: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

11 Nov.

1. The treatment of Western Front operations in propaganda will be guided by the following overall Directive:

a. BACKGROUND. (Not for use in propaganda).

Propaganda should be based on the assumptions:

- (1) That the advance to the RHINE will be slow.
- (2) That a major breakthrough will not occur until after the RHINE has been crossed.

Since these assumptions may be belied by events, they should not be made explicit in propaganda. But they should be used as the basis for the treatment of war until further notice.

b. DIRECTIVE.

(1) Operations.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of SALA
By *[Signature]*
Date *[Signature]*

Present the news of advances factually. Do not blow up minor operations or give tactical successes strategic significance.

Treat the prolongation of the war into a sixth winter as the final crisis of the Nazis against their own people.

2. Stress the effect of the combined strategic and tactical air war in the sixth war winter.

(2) German Civilians.

a. German civilians should be urged to prevent the destruction of their homes by displaying 'anchored earth' orders. Special attention should be paid to the industrial workers of the Ruhr and the NETHERLANDS.

b. Key German civilians in Western Germany should be advised to evade Nazi evacuation plans.

c. Every chance of favourably contrasting the occupied with the unoccupied areas of Germany should be exploited.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Sub. A # 20

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(3) Foreign Workers in Germany.

- a. The campaign to organize foreign workers throughout Germany for passive resistance should continue unchanged.
- b. Instructions to foreign workers on their tasks when the Allied Armies approach should be carefully geared to our advance. They will be issued, as the need arises, by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

by [unclear]
W.B. Smith,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

RWP-75-142

Pw-15348

~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED
Psychological Division

Copy No. 11
1. Col. Burgess
10 November 1944
X. 201 m. 11/44

TO : G-3, S.H.A.E.F.

SUBJECT : POLICY AND METHODS OF BLACK PROPAGANDA AGAINST GERMANY.

A. DEFINITIONS.

1. The essential feature of black propaganda is the effort to conceal its source. "Black" does not merely mean dirty, underhand, secret, pornographic or unofficial, although all these epithets apply to it in some way or another. Black propaganda is that the German mind is approached through a deception through elaborately sustained fictions, calculated to throw it off its guard and to appeal to selfish, disloyal, individualist motives in the individual.
2. The second outstanding feature of black propaganda is that it is secret and therefore is, and is, discovered. When the Minister complained to the Foreign Office that the German Minister was being encouraged to desert to his country by the propaganda of SOLDATENKINDER CALAIS, the Foreign Office were obliged to disavow responsibility for this pirate programme.
3. The main difference between the black technique and white, official, truth-telling technique is best illustrated as follows: White propaganda can achieve results by saying to the Germans: "We, the S.B.C. in London or S.H.A.E.F. in Luxembourg, tell you not to obey the Nazi evacuation orders". Black propaganda also achieves results by reporting that numerous persons have refused to evacuate and have successfully got away with their disobedience by this or that ruse. White presents an official view on behalf of the "enemy" and sticks to the ascertained facts; Black invents the facts, spreads rumours through news and tries to rationalise all the furtive misgivings and remnants of individualism in the "dirty dog" inside every German. Black can even mobilise patriotic motives against the evacuation order.
4. Black propaganda can also stage stunts. At any time, given the intelligence, psychological moment and the technical facilities black propaganda can put out a wireless programme, or a leaflet or a series of rumours or a single sensational broadcast, in which the first intention is to deceive. Alarmed and confused behaviour will be caused in the enemy not only by the nature of the news but also by the fact that it appears to come from authoritative sources. The deception, and therefore also the security surrounding the operation, are of the first importance.
5. For a successful, bold and comprehensive black operation, such as has never yet been attempted, it is necessary to deceive foe and friend alike. This must be allowed to work on official propaganda and Allied newspapers, without any indication that they are being fooled. For example, if by an intruder operation it is announced on an official German wireless channel that Hitler is dead, it is necessary for the success of the deception that the world press and our white propaganda carry the news as from a German source. German denials must be disregarded and many important persons left in the dark.
6. The effort of skill and organisation needed to maintain such a deception for any time is great. Slight mistakes in details and current language, careless handling, technical hitch-ups will give away eventually a sustained programme or a series of leaflets. But it is possible to do covert, unofficial propaganda in which a serious attempt is made to maintain the pretence of "inside Germany" though every effort is made to maintain a German approach

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to the news and comment, to maintain perfection of technique and the illusion of "being German" in the mind of the listener or reader. This type of propaganda has been christened "gray" and it is to the gray category belong SA "TENDER GALAIS" the daily newspaper for the troops. run by a unit responsible for genuine black output.

2. Generally speaking, the pure black technique has been kept up our sleeves, so far as wireless is concerned. But a large number of forged documents, subversive leaflets of ostensibly German origin have been distributed with success. These have been "swallowed" by the neutral press and by Allied press quoting it. There are important possibilities of black propaganda or "stunts" by wireless left open to us, and even greater possibilities by leaflet, forged papers. In the latter type of work the propaganda agencies operate with and through S.O.E. and O.S.S. with whom plans production and distribution are drawn up.

3. An important reminder must be given before passing a description of the media, methods of black and gray propaganda. It is advisable only to a limited extent to say black things that cannot be said white. Both types of propaganda work under the P.W.D. directive for policy as far as operations against Germany are concerned. Moreover, the Russian and French Governments are able to D/F black stations and to identify their country of origin. Any political line on black, diverging sharply from the white line, would be noted by our Allies. On the other hand, a quick, sensational operation by wireless could not be detected by them unless repeated at regular intervals.

OBJECT.

To assist military operations by softening the spirit of resistance among German fighting men and civilians, by encouraging motives of local and individual self-interest at the expense of national and Party loyalties, and by stimulating action in conflict with German military interests.

MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA.

1. WIRELESS.

- a) SOLDATENSENDER WEST (formerly SOLDATENSENDER GALAIS/ATLANTIC) broadcasts nightly for 12 hours a continuous programme of news from the war fronts and from inside Germany, with talks and special news for the Services and records of jazz and light music. The programme goes out on the medium-wave transmitter ASPIDISTRA of exceptional power and also on short wave transmitters. It has a widespread and established audience in the German fighting services and among German civilians. Accurate and exclusive news, inside information based on intelligence, half-truths and fictions are used in combination to achieve subversive effect.
- b) OPPOSITION S.S. STATION. This broadcasts intermittently on short wave. It purports to present the point of view of an opposition movement within the Wehrmacht S.S. which is active in Germany.
- c) CHRIST THE KING STATION broadcasts nightly four half-hour programmes of serious music, interspersed with prayers, sermons, readings from the Bible and reflections. The station presents a priest expressing an Austrian Catholic point of view, opposed to German National Socialism, with the object of rationalising on religious grounds non-cooperation with the German war effort.
- d) other programmes in preparation.

2. NEWSPAPER

With [] and comment adapted from the material provided for SOLDATENFUNKER WEST, a four-page illustrated newspaper for the German troops (NACHRICHTEN FÜR DIE TRUPPE) is produced nightly between midnight and 0600. This is dropped within the next [] hours in special leaflet bombs over selected targets in and behind the German lines. Whenever possible, the newspaper is also dropped in daylight over targets inside Germany or behind the German lines. The daily distribution aimed at in coming weeks is two million. Targets are selected in consultation with S.H.A.E.F. and the Army Groups.

3. LEAFLETS.

hitherto

- a) Balloons despatched from the United Kingdom (but shortly to be despatched from Belgium) and agents operating behind the enemy lines [] used to distribute in the German front line and inside German/subversive leaflets of ostensibly German origin, counterfeit documents, stickers with agitatory slogans and handbooks giving instructions [] malingering, desertion [] other forms of defeatist behaviour. Some black leaflets now in preparation [] distribution are described briefly below.
- b) The latest black leaflet operation is to counterfeit "SCORPION" leaflets which have been dropped by German aircraft to their [] troops in the West. These leaflets purport to answer questions asked by front soldiers. The answers are given in a forceful, dramatic style, calling [] the men to show a do-or-die spirit. The counterfeit leaflets being distributed by Allied aircraft are written in the same style but include subversive suggestions that desertion has become easier, that soldiers [] N.G.O.'s are shooting their officers and getting away with it, [] it is [] High Command's intention to search every foot of German earth.
- c) Small leaflets bearing defeatist slogans which look like the [] of organised movements inside Germany have been stuck up [] walls and hoardings behind the German lines.
- d) In various pocket disguises such as Protestant hymn books, diaries [] the soldier, military handbooks [] song books, expert [] detailed instructions on malingering and desertion have been widely distributed.
- e) In envelopes made [] to resemble Party propaganda handouts we disseminate among the troops in the West Wall area desertion kits consisting [] forged passes, discharge sheets and travel vouchers enabling soldiers to travel home.
- f) [] Norway and in parts of the Western Front instructions [] desertion have been distributed. These bear a small red circle suggesting the existence of [] organisation to help deserters.

4. COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS.

Forged ration cards, leave passes and other material likely to strain and confuse the German police and administrative machinery are distributed in Germany. Counterfeits of German publications for the troops similar to our [] have been circulated. Further posters, stickers [] handbills are in preparation.

5. RUMOURS.

All the media mentioned carry rumours of an operational kind. They will increasingly be circulated by agents and civilians.

■ INTELLIGENCE.

- i) Naval, military and air intelligence for [] in black operations [] obtained through liaison officers or through direct contact with Service Departments, S.H.A.E.F. and Army Groups. The method and form of use are discussed with officers of Operations and Intelligence Divisions.

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ii) Political and economic intelligence is collected from the secret agencies, the press and by intelligent deduction from German news and propaganda.

iii) Friendly German Pz/W collaborators as members of the propaganda units providing guidance in language, procedure, local background, personalities.

F. POLICY.

i) During and since operation Barbarossa the main task of black propaganda has been to concentrate the attention of the German soldier on the enemy within (Party authorities) rather than on the enemy without. It has emphasized throughout the military disasters in the East; the growing production under stress of bombing, blockade and unnecessary call-up; the impotence of the German Air Force over the battlefield and homeland, the breakdown of authority, in particular police authority, and the consequently increasing anarchy with which the law can safely be defied.

ii) Policy may be divided into long-term and short-term policies.

a) Long-term planning is based on fundamental assumptions about the behaviour which it is wished to stimulate in German fighting civilians of both sides. The directive is applied through a number of themes which appear persistently in the handling of day-to-day comment. Through these themes and stories there is a constant suggestion that the enemy in authority at the front in Germany behave in selfish, defeatist and inefficient ways and get away with it. Through these themes and comment in talks and articles there is a constant effort to present excuses for inefficiency, inactivity, alarmist talk, evasion of discipline and responsibility, substitution of personal and family loyalties for devotion to Party and State. Inequality of sacrifice as between the ordinary man and the privileged Party bureaucracy is a leading theme.

The military situation of the last two months, with a German army standing on its frontier in proximity to civilian influences has enabled particular attention to be given to the interplay of civilian and military factors.

b) Short-term planning aims firstly at supporting current and impending military operations; secondly, at stimulating and exploiting crises inside Germany (Army v. Party, Army v. SS); thirdly at preparing a state of mind in the German public likely to enhance the demoralising effect of an operation of which we have advance knowledge. Thus when we were told that the enemy was shortly to be bombing Germany from Russian bases we had a campaign showing German industry was being moved to "safe" Eastern areas.

iii) Deception and confusion in the German General Staff can be created because of the unique status of SOLDATENKEMMER WEST, which is known by the enemy to be exceptionally well-informed and at the same time misleading. Moreover, as an unofficial station, disowned by His Majesty's Government, it is not subject to military and political statements the authenticity of which can be judged by the Germans only with great difficulty. For example, if our wireless programmes suggest that the Super-Fortress B. 29 is to be used against Germany, German intelligence has the choice of two interpretations; either there is no intention to use these aircraft against Germany and our propaganda is bluffing; or it is intended to use them and our propaganda has been instructed to create preliminary anxiety in the German public.

iv) In consultation with G.2 and G.3 S.H.A.E.F. plans have been made to exploit imminent military operations in the West. Quick and extensive changes in these operations would offer to black propaganda the opportunity to spread alarming military news, and confusing instructions to thickly populated districts of Germany in the path of an Allied advance. If F.W.D. is advised that a winter campaign is to be expected, propaganda will be directed as before according to the principles described in Para. F (ii) above.

2. FUTURE OPERATIONS.

1. The main effort of black propaganda will be devoted to presenting, distorting and interpreting day to day news from the fronts and from inside Germany, following the general directives given by S.M.S. and other divisions of S.M.S. According to the opportunities offered by military operations, special leaflet and wireless projects will be advanced in cooperation with S.M.S. and A.S.S. Possible methods and objectives are outlined below.

a. Objectives will be:

- to stimulate across Germany fighting and special occupational groups of civilians ways of thinking and working which would assist the work of S.M.S. and A.S.S. as the allied advance into Germany moves forward. Special targets are the masses of the Ruhr, farmers, petty officials, priests, and towns with facilities.
- to discourage evacuation, conversion of a scorched earth policy and the movement of supplies away from the threatened areas of western Germany.
- to encourage contact and cooperation between fighting men and civilians now fronted on by the military authorities for such purposes as location residence to Party orders, housing and other defeatist activities.
- to combat various collaborationist movements and mass German official resistance propaganda to troops and civilians e.g. the German soldiers are being dropped on their own troops.
- to provide bogus evidence through agents and by use of balloons of the existence of secretive groups within Germany.
- to increase the strain on the German police system by supporting such special operations as sabotage, and the propaganda campaign on foreign resistance.
- to support any military or special operations with knowledge of devices by creating responsibility by capitalizing their initial efforts through rumors.

b. CONCLUSION

Black propaganda operates above all by presenting and interpreting the daily news in a subversive manner. It can obtain the effect of important military operations by increasing their supposed surprise effect on the German public. By the use of leaflets and agents, and by joint operations with S.M.S. and A.S.S. it can help to spread subversion, chaos and rebellion. It can support the operations of the armed forces and special agencies in the north and in the west in the early stages of planning. For black propaganda must be its own catalyst and its effect must be in some way connected with the operation against the enemy in which it is agreed that first and foremost shall be decided.

By Air Marshal, C.S.M.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

DISTRIBUTION:

ALL S.M.S. F.S.
Brigade, Medium
New Division
German Section

COPY No.

1. Strategic Section
2. S.M.S. Wellington
3. P.I.C. Psychological
4. Various
5. Tiler

COPY No.

5 & 6
7
8
9 & 10

By Air Marshal, C.S.M.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

4 November, 1944.

Subject: Psychological Warfare for the Frontal of
Frontier Operations, West for 1944.

Notes:

1. Army Group.
2. Army Group.
3. Army Group.
4. 1st Army Group.
5. 2nd Army Group.
6. 3rd Army Group.
7. 4th Army Group.
8. 5th Army Group.
9. 6th Army Group.
10. 7th Army Group.

In the event of the following operations in the 1st Army Group front, the following:

1. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

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TO
CONFIDENTIAL
By
Date

2. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

3. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

4. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

5. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

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7. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

8. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

9. Operations in the West - with effect from the section of German Frontal Operations - include from the West will list will into

7. Informing that the 1st workers in the area affected
by the contamination given them by the Supreme
Commander.

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,


H. Kelm
Colonel, USA.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: GERMAN DESERTERS
ALLIED EX-AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

~~SECRET~~
ORGL/JB

Ref: 500.6

4 November, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
Memorandum - 100-1.


1. POLICY.

Guidance Note on German Civilians Charged with Sheltering
Deserters: (see P.W.D. cable of 4 November, 1944).

A German civilian recently arrested on this charge has pleaded (1) Allied radio and leaflet instructions to shelter deserters, foreign workers and Nazi-persecuted opponents of the war; (2) his inability to inform the U.S. commander of the deserters' presence, because the battle was still in progress.

The following points require attention:

- a. G-3 Staff advises that the present propaganda line should remain unchanged - namely, to encourage German civilians to give refuge to escaping foreign workers and German deserters.
- b. In order to clear the matter up, HBC and JBBIE will immediately broadcast a set of civilian instructions including an advice to harbour foreign workers and deserters and hand them over.
- c. All leaflets on this line should be pulped which do not contain a warning to civilians that they must hand over refugees at once to the Allied military authorities, both for their own sakes and for that of the refugees.
- d. It is not advisable to use this line as a major theme so long as the battle remains static. Its main use should be reserved for a breakthrough.
- e. In general, leaflet writers drafting texts intended for German civilians behind the line should consider how the instructions they give will affect the situation when military Government is imposed.



Robert A. McCullagh
ROBERT A. McCULLAGH,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

DISTRIBUTION - See overleaf

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SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

2d Army, 2d Army Group (3)
2d Army, 12 Army Group (3)
C of S, 6 Army Group, for A.C.O. (3)
S.H.D., S.H.A.R.F., Luxembourg (3: 1 for A.C.O.,
S.H.D. Det.)
U.S. Air Base Section (3: Attention Mr.
Howard Baldwin)

Information:

S.H.D. Rear (6: 1 to S.H.D. Country, Mr. Delmer)
Deputy Chief of Staff, S.H.A.R.F.
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
G-5 (2: 1 to Planning Branch)
S.H.D. military mission to RACE (2: 1 to G-3
Ops B. Col. Wilde)
" " " " BELGIUM (1)
" " " " NETHERLANDS (1)

6 961

SECRET

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE

DES

PRISONNIERS DE

DÉPORTÉS ET RÉFUGIÉS

Paris, le 4 Novembre 1944

LE MINISTRE

LE MINISTRE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE
DÉPORTÉS ET RÉFUGIÉS

AU

GÉNÉRAL DWIGHT EISENHOWER
COMMANDE EN CHEF LES FORCES EXPÉDITIONNAIRES
ALLIÉES

Par messages radiodiffusés les 5 - 6 - 13 - 25 Septem-
bre, un porte parole s'adressant en votre nom aux ouvriers
étrangers travaillant en Allemagne, les a incitées à abandonner
déposer leur lieu de travail et à gagner la campagne; ensuite
à se préparer à la résistance active.

Dans le texte de ces messages, je relève notamment
les passages suivants :

MESSAGE DU 5 SEPTEMBRE 1944 :

"... Commencez dès maintenant à quitter vos usines
dès que l'occasion favorable se présentera. Les nazis ne
disposent pas d'assez d'hommes pour vous rechercher."

MESSAGE DU 6 SEPTEMBRE 1944 :

"... Ne vous laissez pas emmener par les allemands
en retraite vers l'intérieur de l'Allemagne... Saisissez

disseminant la plus favorable pour vous cacher dans la campagne et à l'abri de leur arrivée."

MESSAGE DU 13 SEPTEMBRE 1944 :

"..... Quittez immédiatement toutes les usines allemandes. Rappelez à la clandestinité. Cachez vous dans les villes ou les villages. Agissez immédiatement. Quittez dès maintenant les usines Les nazis n'ont pas assez d'hommes pour vous surveiller et surveiller vos mouvements."

MESSAGE DU 23 SEPTEMBRE 1944 :

"..... Les travailleurs étrangers qui ne sont pas membres de cellules organisées et qui ne se seraient pas conformés à nos instructions leur enjoignant de se cacher dans les villes ou de préférence dans les campagnes, le font immédiatement."

Je les ai déjà avertis qu'ils courent les plus grands dangers en restant dans les usines.

Le plus sûr, pour eux, est de disparaître des villes et des agglomérations et de chercher un abri et du travail à la campagne.

Dans certaines régions de l'Est allemand, les travailleurs appartenant à des cellules organisées sont en train d'être punis. Les nazis leur permettant une résistance active. Ces instruments ne produisent pas leurs effets s'ils sont utilisés inconsiderement ou sans but. Ceux d'entre vous qui les trouvent doivent immédiatement lire

les instructions qui leur sont attachées, les apprendre par cœur, les faire connaître. Cachez ces instruments en un endroit sûr. Examinez soigneusement l'endroit où leur cachez-les. C'est le plus efficace et le mode d'utilisation le meilleur. Établissez votre plan d'action. Lorsque ce plan sera fixé dans ses détails - et alors seulement - employez les instruments pour l'usage auquel ils sont destinés.

Le Gouvernement Français ne peut bien croire que ces consignes ont été établies au point où les opérations des Armées Alliées en France promettaient au Commandement Suprême d'entrevoir une avance rapide en territoire allemand.

Il comprend également le souci de S.H.A.S.F. d'utiliser au bénéfice des Armées Alliées les services que la masse immense des étrangers en Allemagne peuvent être en mesure de rendre dans la bataille en cours.

Il ne doute pas même que S.H.A.S.F. n'ait également été guidé par le souci de protéger des vies humaines mises en danger tant par les bombardements alliés que par les activités nazies clandestines.

Cependant le Gouvernement Français se voit contraint de protester contre de telles mesures ordonnées à ses propres instructions, par le seul motif qu'il est sûr que ni lui, ni

Il s'écoupera pas au Général Commandant en Chef que
et s'écoupera pas au Général Commandant en Chef que
les ordres et les ordres pour les Commandements par le Gouverne-
ment qui les lui-même; elle ne s'étend en aucune manière aux
dispositions prises en 1914-15 en Allemagne et non en 1914.

Si la Commission des Français de la ba-
taille de la Somme était en France, elle ne pourrait
l'être qu'après avoir obtenu le accord du principe du Gouver-
nement Français et avoir étudié et arrêté les me-
sures en France par les Français compétents.

Le Gouvernement Français a le regret de constater
que les Commandements en Allemagne ont reçu des ordres d'ac-
tion du S.H.A.F. sans qu'aucun de ces deux conditions aient
été préalablement remplies.

Il est à regretter que les Commandements de laisser
au Général Commandant en Chef la responsabilité des mo-
dèles qu'il a choisis et qu'il ne reçoit pas
de satisfaction.

En outre, l'ordre de quitter les usines pour gagner
la campagne et de laisser les usines sur la bataille. Gouver-
nement n'a aucun intérêt à laisser les ressortissants fran-
çais qui ont été à son service dans une situation périlleuse
qui s'écoupera pas au Général Commandant en Chef. A l'appro-

choix de l'Etat, et les difficultés.
On ne peut pas leur offrir leur subsistance et leur hébergement,
mais on ne peut pas leur offrir une situation illégale
qui leur donnerait une situation de vie insupportable.

On ne peut pas leur offrir la possibilité entre les
réseaux de la résistance de l'Etat - MASSON et les réseaux
liés par le Commandant Supérieur de la Résistance. S'il s'agit en outre
des réseaux de la résistance, elles ont pu bénéficier de certains
MASSON et de la répression des activités des étrangers en Allemagne
interdites de l'Etat et de l'Etat intérieur allemand.

On ne peut pas leur offrir la possibilité de leur faire
valoir l'Etat et de leur offrir qu'il a exercé en France contre
les forces armées de l'Etat, en ne peut être que pro-
hibé, et on ne peut pas leur offrir qu'il a été réservé aux rés-
sistances de l'Etat et de l'Etat sur lesquels son activité
peut s'exercer.

La conclusion de ce document français responsable
vis-à-vis de la Résistance est réservée à ses fins, élève une
prohibition relative contre ce qu'il est obligé de considé-
rer comme une violation de la Résistance à sa souverai-
nité. Il s'agit de la Résistance à la Résistance et de la Résistance
puisque par là on s'agit de la Résistance en ait été
révisé.

Il se tient prêt, à tout moment, à l'aide de toutes cir-
constances, à l'ordonner. Le Chef avec le Général Commandant en
Chef, a le droit de donner des ordres à tous les Fran-
çais. Il peut également contrôler le rythme des opérations et
l'ordre de marche de l'armée sur le III^e Reich.



HANS FRANK

MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES GÉNÉRALES DE L'ALLEMAGNE
NACHREICHUNG

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

DRLS

T00.031550Z [REDACTED]

SHAEP 234/4
TOR 041728A NOV
041905A

THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF AN INCOMING COM-ZONE MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R O U T I N E

FROM : AGWAR FROM MCCLOY

TO FOR ACTION 01 ETOUSA [REDACTED] SMITH

FOR INFO: ■ BASE SECTION TO PRABODY ■ MURPHY

PASSED TO : SHARP ACTION

REF ID: A66779, 3 1941

Views with respect to immediate policy for propaganda addressed to the German people ☐ been approved by State and War Departments and OWI.

Statement as follows:

Propaganda policy for GERMANY
follow the general tone stated by President ROOSEVELT
his address of October 22, 1944. follows:

"As for GERMANY, that tragic nation which has sown the wind and is now reaping the whirlwind - we and our Allies are entirely agreed that we shall not bargain with the Nazi conspirators, we leave them a free hand to control - open or secret - or instruments of Government.

DOI: 10.1002/anie.200300011

[illegible]

6 968

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1-12 MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO: WK 56779 3 Nov 1944

SHAFF 234/4

We shall not leave [redacted] single element of military power or of potential military power.

But I should [redacted] false to [redacted] very foundations of my religious and political convictions, if I should [redacted] relinquish the hope - and even the faith - [redacted] in [redacted] peoples, without exception, there live [redacted] instinct for truth, [redacted] attraction toward justice, [redacted] passion for peace, [redacted] buried as they may be in the [redacted] under [redacted] brutal regime.

We bring [redacted] charge against [redacted] German race, as such, for [redacted] cannot believe that God [redacted] eternally [redacted] any [redacted] of humanity. For we [redacted] in our own [redacted] many good men and women of German ancestry have proved loyal, freedom-loving, peace-loving citizens.

There [redacted] going to [redacted] stern punishment for all those in GERMANY directly responsible for this agony of mankind.

The German people are [redacted] going to be enslaved - because the United Nations [redacted] not traffic [redacted] human slavery. But it will be necessary for [redacted] to earn their way back into the fellowship of peace-loving and law-abiding nations. And, in their [redacted] that steep road, we shall certainly see [redacted] that they [redacted] not [redacted] by having [redacted] carry guns. They will be relieved of that burden - [redacted] hope, forever."

The following specific points might form [redacted] basis of [redacted] proper directive:

Aims:

a. [redacted] German civilians that it [redacted] to their interest to obey Allied orders.

b. To [redacted] that [redacted] they [redacted] to prevent the chaos which the Nazis [redacted] fostering, [redacted] save themselves from starvation [redacted] want, they will keep essential services [redacted] key [redacted] goods industries, particularly agriculture (but not necessarily "key industries") going.

SNC IN 1451

6 969

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO : WX 56779 3 Nov 1944

234/4

c. To make clear to minor administrative officials that it is to their and [redacted]'s interest for them to cooperate with Allied authorities.

d. To demonstrate to [redacted] Germans the foolhardiness of harboring [redacted] assisting Nazi guerrillas.

e. To counteract [redacted] propaganda and [redacted] resistance by showing [redacted] Allied Military Government functions.

f. To hold forth to the Germans that Allied occupation will bring [redacted] end to the spying, ruthless vengences and other excesses of [redacted] Gestapo, the [redacted] and other Nazi agents and bring about a release from regimentation [redacted] political persecutions.

g. To [redacted] clear that the responsibility for German suffering rests squarely [redacted] the Nazi Government [redacted] on the Allies.

The tone of all Allied output should reflect [redacted] feeling that [redacted] degree [redacted] cooperation given Allied authorities by the Germans is a matter [redacted] complete indifference to us; that we [redacted] our ways of dealing [redacted] non-cooperation, and [redacted] any [redacted] prefer this course, [redacted] will [redacted] they and not the Allies [redacted] will suffer. We should [redacted] clear that we intend to establish firm and orderly administration in each area but the well-being of each community will depend largely [redacted] German's behavior.

[redacted] to the average German is undoubtedly [redacted] order. However, this should not go beyond the following:

[redacted] completely determined [redacted] eliminate the Gestapo, the SS, the Nazi Party [redacted] militarists. We are determined to punish severely all those guilty of war crimes. At [redacted] time, the average German and [redacted] family will [redacted] opportunity to live [redacted] work peacefully [redacted] without molestation if they [redacted] by Allied regulations, [redacted] they have committed [redacted] crimes and if they demonstrate willingness to work their way back into the family of Nations.

6 970

SMC IN 1451

NO. 270, LIT. DIV. 244 MAR. 21/5008

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO : WX 50779 3 Nov 1944

SECRET 244/2

Allied output should make clear that it is the Nazi leaders who are responsible for whatever chaos exists in GERMANY. It should seek to establish in the German mind the concept that any guerilla activity is a conflict between law-abiding Germans and Nazi outlaws rather than between Germans and Allies.

Emphasis should be put on the promise that every day the Nazi leaders to prolong the war will merely result in further destruction of German industrial and all other facilities thus increase the suffering of the German people through an increasing which will be needed when the war ends. It should be clear that responsibility for the bad conditions which are to exist at the close of the war will rest squarely upon Nazi leaders who, solely in frantic efforts to save their own skins, deliberately wasting German resources. The point here is it is so much a question of what policy Allies will pursue once they get but how much destruction of GERMANY's resources will result meanwhile.

Methods:

There should be no appeals whatever by Allied authorities. In all we should use the technique of issuing only news, and objective commentaries. These may be skillfully to across propaganda points (largely through selection and emphasis) but they be handled as statements of fact and not as attempts to persuade. In this output, Allies should particularly emphasize:

1. Announcements and warnings from Allied Military Authorities.
2. punishment of war and recalcitrant Germans generally.

SMC 1451

6 971

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

-5-

CONFIDENTIAL

NO : WX 56779, 3 1944

SHAEF 234/4

3. Any that can be found
occasional clashes between law-abiding Germans Nazi
outlaws.

4. Factual and colorful of orderly
life in Allied occupied enemy territory (both German and
non-German). This should orderly appearance
the towns. justice of Allied authorities, cooperation
of local sub-officials, number of babies born, the fact
that women still hang the wash.

ACTION

INFORMATION

0-1

0-2

0-3

POLITICAL OFFICERS

MR MURPHY

0-5

SUMMARY

AG RECORDS

END IN 1451

4 Nov 44

2112A

DWB/lp

REF NO: WX-56779

6 972

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

SECRET

P R I O R I T Y

TO : AGWAR PERSONAL FOR MUCLOY
FROM : SHARP MAIN FROM GENERAL SMITH SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : 3-64199 CITE : SHCOS

Reference W-52734.

In formulating their program of propaganda to GERMANY Psychological Warfare Division has used as a basis the interim directive proposed by the UNITED STATES Chiefs of Staff, which we assume represents the viewpoint of the UNITED STATES with regard to post war treatment of GERMANY. However, we will be very glad to have the proposals of the War and State Departments hope that they will reach us promptly.

W-52734 is [REDACTED] FN 6982, 27/10/44, PWD.

ORIGINATOR : CHIEF OF STAFF AUTHENTICATION: FORD TRIMBLE, COL.

INFORMATION : SCS
POLITICAL OFFICERS
MR MURPHY
FWD
G-3
G-2
AG RECORDS

SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
GAL
GAL
G.W. BULLER
Date AUG 1976

24 Oct.

SNC OUT 3129 27 Oct 44 1250A WDR/al REF NO: 3-64199
TOO: 271130A

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

4

1072 72

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

1091 Hermann
X Smith
X McCloy

WARZ

TOO 2622082 OCT

SHAEF 4/97

FOR 270130A OCT

FM 270135A OCT

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED	
TO	SECRET
By authority of CALA	
By	W.B. Smith
Date	16 AUG 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

AGWAR FROM WDCLOY

STAFF BAIN, FOR EXISTENCE FOR GENERAL W.B. SMITH

REF NO

: W-52734, 16 October 1944 Copy of this in HQ

AG 5-40000 ATD 27 Oct

We are informed that proposals by PW have been made recently for a new program of propaganda to GERMANY somewhat re-defining the objectives of Allied occupation of GERMANY. Inasmuch as there is so much close scrutiny being given to any pronouncement to GERMANY at this time and since our policy in this regard has been dictated after consideration at highest levels, it would be desirable that you make certain whatever program is adopted by SCAEF is consistent with US views.

At this moment, proposals outlining a treatment of propaganda to GERMANY are in preparation by the War and State Departments and the Office of War Information. These will be forwarded to you promptly and it is hoped they will assist to accomplish military objectives as well as keep within the bounds of our political policy toward GERMANY.

ACTION : FWD

GEN McCloy informed that
C/S answered this date

INFORMATION : SGS
POLITICAL OFFICERS
MR MURPHY
AG RECORDS

G-3
G-2
22

SMC IN 6982

27 Oct 44

0413A

DNR/lp

REF NO: W-52734

6 974 ~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MARKS OF AN APPROVED COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FURNISHED

SGS-SHAEF File No.

26 OCT.

~~SECRET~~

COPY. 18.11.44.

FWP 300.6

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

GRG/JS

24 October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
Memorandum - No. 3.

TO: P & P.W., 21 Army Group.
P & P.W., 12 Army Group.
G. of S., 6 Army Group, for P.W.O.
P.W.O., S.M.A.M.P., Luxembourg.
O.S.S., Signal Base Section (Attention Mr. Howard Baldwin).
P.W.O. Rear.
G-1, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
G-2 " " "
G-3 " " "
G-5 " " "
WD " " "
S.M.A.M.P. Military Mission to FRANCE.
" " " " BELGIUM.
" " " " NETHERLANDS.

1. The Supreme Commander's Directive on Propaganda Treatment of Military Government, which is contained in the attached Psychological Warfare Policy and Information Memorandum, No. 3., provides an overall policy framework within which current propaganda on military government should be shaped. It is not intended that the directive should be quoted in output, either partly or as a whole, nor that it should be made the occasion for a propaganda programme covering simultaneously all the points in the Directive.

2. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force still reserves the initiative on this subject, and Psychological Warfare Division in conjunction with G-5 S.M.A.M.P. is preparing a series of talks by a spokesman of Military Government which will indicate how each point is to be treated in detail. Meanwhile, leaflet and radio writers should use the Directive as a guide to treatment of current stories relating to conditions in Military Government areas.



(SGD) ROBERT A. MCCHURCH
Brigadier General, E.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

~~SECRET~~

24 Oct

COPY, 10.11.44.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

0222/38

24 October, 1944.

Psychological Warfare Policy and Information
Memorandum - No. 3.

1. POLICY.

Guidance to Army Groups.

- a. The following directive has been issued by Supreme Military Government in propaganda to Germany. It provides the standard instructions for the treatment of first-rate importance and all those concerned with radio and leaflet work should be fully informed of its contents and should observe it strictly. If there are any points of doubt or any points not covered, they should be referred immediately:

"1. The treatment of military government in propaganda to Germany will be guided by the following overall directive:

(a) The Germans should be told that how they fare under Military Government depends very largely on their own behaviour both before and after occupation; e.g. if they destroy or permit to be destroyed vital transport and communications facilities, installations and mines, they will suffer accordingly. It should be made quite clear that economically they will have to fend for themselves.

(b) No promises should be made of material help or assistance. The activities of the Allied armies in Germany and of Military Government will be motivated strictly by military requirements. Once the surge of the Nazis has been completed in every area, and military requirements have been met, Military Government will permit the Germans, if they do as they are told and behave sensibly, to benefit from their own resources. Consequently the individual German's standard of life this winter in occupied territory depends directly upon the preservation of existing resources.

(c) In particular no promise of any sort should be given that food will be imported into Germany.

(d) No attention that could possibly be construed as political recognition should be given in propaganda to any party or group.

2. Strictly within the above overall Directive, propaganda may discuss the following aspects of Military Government and illustrate them, where possible, by concrete illustrations from areas under Military Government:

(a) Military Government destroys Nazi and Gestapo rule. It abolishes all laws and institutions discriminating on a basis of party, race or creed: it restores to the individual justice, law and order.

(b) Military Government eradicates (annihilates) Nazism from every position of authority and influence. Subject to its own absolute control, it authorises responsible Germans to replace the purged Nazis in administrative posts.

(c) Military Government will purge German schools, and all other institutions, of Nazi influence.

■ soon as circumstances permit, schools will be reopened.

(d) Military Government restores freedom of religion and will recognize the legitimate claims of the German churches to the restoration of Church property seized by the Nazis.

(e) Military Government destroys the Nazi labour front ■ it destroys all other Nazi organizations and authorizes the reestablishment of Trade Unions as conditions will permit. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden.

(f) Military Government gives an absolute priority to the food requirements of the liberated peoples.

(g) The Allied armies will import the bulk of their own food supplies.

(h) Military Government requires measures to be taken by the German authorities and by German courts:

(i) to stamp out food hoarding and black market activity,

(ii) to maintain German food production at the highest possible level,

(iii) to assure efficient distribution of German food stocks by rationing and price control."

b. The following letter has been addressed by Chief of Staff to Public Relations Division in order to ensure their cooperation:

"1. Attached to this letter is a copy of a directive to Psychological Warfare Division covering the propaganda treatment of Military Government.

2. This directive is designed to initiate action which will:

a. soften enemy resistance.

b. prevent the destruction of important installations and resources in Germany.

3. It is most important that press correspondents should not make use of material put out by P.W.D. as the result of this directive to suggest that we are being unnecessarily humane about Germany. Such action would inevitably nullify the propaganda campaign and might lead to friction with Allied Nations.

4. In particular, press correspondents should be impressed that:

a. Human treatment of the Germans should not be featured as "Allied Humanity" but reported straight and closely linked to military requirements,

b. Anti-Nazi activity among Germans should not be overplayed,

c. if Military Government should find it necessary to import food into a given locality this should be reported factually and without generalization,

d. if owing to military requirements a village has to be destroyed this should be reported factually and not generalized, (See also A.L.H. No. 1 1).

Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28(1)

Psychological: Defense Policy and Information
Major: - 10.2.

11 (100-581,194)
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
REF ID: A66018
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
By authority of
Dr. G. W. Butler
Captain, A.G.O.
Date: 10 MAR 1945
no promise of food for
no seized German stocks

Date: 16 MAR 1945

- These men are apathetic and require not orders to surrender but instructions on how to do it. Stress, too, that unfitness, lack of training and shortage of weapons will continue to raise casualty rate to murder level.

F. N. D. Lutz (See MICHAEL F.)

- F.I.D. and 12 Army Group liaisons on military government are not yet started owing to lack of high-level direction for which we are pressing.

b 979

01

b. Dissemination. From England: Nachrichten, 2361 (Safe Contact), 2362 (Prisoner presentation), 2371 (Secret War), 2374 (Prisoner story). From France: 2372K ("Save yourselves"), 2373K (New version of "One Minute"). Chief coverages: Litch salient, LACROIX, DURAND-SCHNEIDER area and from METZ southward.

c. In Production and Preparation:

- (1) 2374K on "How to Surrender during Attack", is attached.
- (2) Is filled with analogous quotations of "How to Surrender during Counter-Attack" is projected.
- (3) A.I. 2374 "Ask the Soldier - Ask the Civilian" is projected. One side exhorts the returning soldier to ask the home population whether it is worth continuing the war and breaking Germany; the other side the civilian ask the returning soldier how the towns and villages in FRANCE looked.
- (4) A series of civilian leaflets clarifying propaganda coming is in production for COLOGNE, DUSSELDORF, DUISBURG and KREFELD, and similar ones written up daily for RUHR and RHEIN workers.

W. A. McLaughlin
 WALTER A. McLAUGHLIN
 Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
 Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

F.I.P.W., 2d Army Group (3),
 P.I.P.W., 1st Army Group (3),
 C.I.P.W., 6 Army Group, for F.I.P.W. (3),
 F.I.P.W., G.I.P.W., Luxembourg (3: 1 for H.Q., P.I.P.W. Det.
 G.S.C. Signal Section (3: attention H.Q. Howard
 Fielding).
 F.I.P.W. Det. (4: 2 to P.I.P.W. Center, Mrs. DeLozier).


For Information:

G-1 (1)
 G-2 (1)
 G-3 (1)
 G-4 (1)
 G-5 (1)
 W.D. (1)
 SHAW Military Division to FRANCE (2: 1 to G-3, Ops F.,
 G-1, H.I.D.).
 " " " " BELGIUM (1)
 " " " " NETHERLANDS (1)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Office of the Chief of Staff

X 1000 PWD
X 200 Smith

30 October 1944



Propaganda Treatment of Military Government.
Psychological Warfare Division.

1000
1000

1. The treatment of Military Government in propaganda to Germany will be guided by the following over-all directive.

a. The Germans should be told that how they fare under Military Government depends very largely on their own behaviour both before and after occupation, e.g., if they destroy or permit to be destroyed vital transport and communication facilities, installations and cities, they will suffer accordingly. It should be made quite clear that economically they will have to fend for themselves.

b. No promises should be made of material help or assistance. The activities of the Allied armies in Germany and of Military Government will be motivated strictly by military requirements. Once the purge of the Nazis has been completed in any area, and military requirements have been met, Military Government will permit the Germans, if they do as they are told and behave sensibly, to benefit from their own resources. Consequently the individual German's standard of life this winter in occupied territory depends directly upon the preservation of existing resources.

c. In particular, no promise of any sort should be given that food will be imported into Germany.

d. No attention that could possibly be construed as political recognition should be given in propaganda to any Party or Group.

2. Strictly within the above over-all directive, propaganda may discuss the following aspects of Military Government and illustrate them, where possible, by concrete illustrations from areas under Military Government:

a. Military Government destroys Nazi and Gestapo rule: it abolishes all laws and institutions discriminating on a basis of party, race or creed; it restores to the individual justice, law and order.

b. Military Government eradicates (exterminates) Nazi-ism from every position of authority and influence. Subject to its own absolute control, it authorizes responsible Germans to replace the purged Nazis in essential administrative posts.

c. Military Government will purge German schools, etc. of Nazi doctrines, racialism and militarism. As soon as circumstances permit, schools will be re-opened.

d. Military Government restores freedom of religion and will recognize the legitimate claims of the German churches to the restoration of church property seized by the Nazis.

e. Military Government destroys the Nazi Labour Front as it destroys all other Nazi organizations and authorizes the re-establishment of Trade Unions as conditions will permit. Strikes and lock-outs are forbidden.

f. Military Government gives an absolute priority to the food requirements of the liberated peoples.

2000

W.H.

8 981

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C/

~~SECRET~~

g. The Allied armies will import the bulk of their food supplies.

h. Military Government requires measures to be taken by the German authorities and by German courts:

- (i) to stamp out food hoarding and black market activity,
- (ii) to maintain German food production at the highest possible level,
- (iii) to assure efficient distribution of German food stocks by rationing and price control.

5/
W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

Copies to: G-1 Division
G-2 "
G-3 "
G-4 "
G-5 "
Psychological Warfare Division
Public Relations Division
Engineer Division
Political Officer (Br)
Political Officer (US)
SGS
AG Records

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

JOINT HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED INFORMATION FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

34

AM 001.107-1

20 October 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda Treatment of Military Government.

TO : Public Relations Division

File
1-01 Smith

1. Attached to this letter is a copy of a directive to Psychological Warfare Division covering the propaganda treatment of Military Government.
2. This directive is designed to initiate action which will:
 - a. soften enemy resistance
 - b. prevent the destruction of important installations and resources in Germany.
3. It is most important that press correspondents should not make use of material put out by PWs as the result of this directive to suggest that we are being unnecessarily lenient about Germany. Such action would inevitably nullify the propaganda campaign and might lead to friction with Allied Nations.
4. In particular press correspondents should be impressed that:
 - a. lenient treatment of the Germans should not be portrayed as "Allied leniency" but reported straight and closely linked to military requirements,
 - b. Anti-Nazi activity among Germans should not be over-played,
 - c. If Military Government should find it necessary to impact food into a given locality this should be reported factually and without generalization,
 - d. If owing to military requirements a village has to be destroyed this should be reported factually and not generalized,
 - e. If use is made of a particular section in any one locality this should not be interpreted to represent general recognition of the section in question,
 - f. If military necessity results in the employment of an official who has been a member of the Nazi party this is exceptional and purely temporary in character.

094412 Germany

6 983

Order to:

- 2-1 Division
- 2-2 "
- 2-3 "
- 2-4 "
- 2-5 "
- Psychological Warfare Division
- Public Relations Division
- Engineering Division
- Political Officer (Br)
- Political Officer (US)

J. A. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

AG Record

~~SECRET~~

20 OCT

(11)

54

~~SECRET~~
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
 Office of the Chief of Staff

AM 091.1.12-1

20 October 1954

SUBJECT: Propaganda Treatment of Military Government.

TO : Psychological Warfare Division.

1. The treatment of Military Government in propaganda to Germany will be guided by the following over-all directive.

a. The Germans should be told that how they fare under Military Government depends very largely on their own behavior both before and after occupation, e.g., if they destroy or permit to be destroyed vital transport and communication facilities, installations and mines, they will suffer accordingly. It should be made quite clear that eventually they will have to feed for themselves.

b. No promises should be made of material help or assistance. The activities of the Allied armies in Germany and of Military Government will be motivated strictly by military requirements. Once the purge of the Nazis has been completed in any area, and military requirements have been met, Military Government will permit the Germans, if they do as they are told and behave sensibly, to benefit from their own resources. Consequently the individual German's standard of life this winter in occupied territory depends directly upon the preservation of existing resources.

c. In particular, no promise of any sort should be given that food will be imported into Germany.

d. No attention that could possibly be construed as political recognition should be given in propaganda to any Party or Group.

2. Strictly within the above over-all directive, propaganda may discuss the following aspects of Military Government and illustrate them, where possible, by concrete illustrations from areas under Military Government:

a. Military Government destroys Nazi and Gestapo rule: it abolishes all laws and institutions discriminating on a basis of party, race or creed, it restores to the individual justice, law and order.

b. Military Government eradicates (annihilates) Nazism from every position of authority and influence. Subject to its own absolute control, it authorizes responsible Germans to replace the purged Nazis in essential administrative posts.

c. Military Government will purge German schools, etc. of Nazi doctrine, racialism and militarism. As soon as circumstances permit, schools will be re-opened.

d. Military Government restores freedom of religion and will recognize the legitimate claims of the German churches to the restoration of church property seized by the Nazis.

e. Military Government destroys the Nazi Labor Front as it destroys all other Nazi organizations and authorizes the re-establishment of Trade Unions as conditions will permit. Strikes and lock-outs are forbidden.

f. Military Government gives an absolute priority to the post requirements of the liberated peoples.

- 1 -

b 994

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 TO CONFIDENTIAL
 BY G. W. BUTLER
 Captain, A.C.D.
 Date 16 AUG 64

Copies to: G-1 Division
 G-2
 G-3
 G-4
 G-5
 Psychological Warfare Division
 Public Relations Division
 Intelligence Division
 Political Officer (Mr.)
 Political Officer (Mr.)
 Mr. Records

W. D. SMITH,
 Lieutenant General, US Army,
 Chief of Staff.

- (1) to stamp out food hoarding and black market activity.
 - (2) to maintain German food production at the highest possible level.
 - (3) to ensure efficient distribution of German food stocks by rationing and price control.
- The Allied forces will report the bulk of their own food supplies.
 Military Government requires measures to be taken by the German authorities and by German courts:

~~SECRET~~

SUPRAME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

30001 PRD
4201 Smith
10 October 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda Treatment of Military Government.

TO : Public Relations Division

1. Attached to this letter is a copy of a directive to Psychological Warfare Division covering the propaganda treatment of Military Government.

2. This directive is designed to initiate action which will:

- a. soften enemy resistance
- b. prevent the destruction of important installations and resources in Germany.

3. It is most important that press correspondents should not make use of material put out by P.W.D. as the result of this directive to suggest that we are being unnecessarily humane about Germany. Such action would inevitably nullify the propaganda campaign and might lead to friction with Allied Nations.

4. In particular press correspondents should be impressed that:

a. humane treatment of the Germans should not be featured as "Allied Humanity" but reported straight and closely linked to military requirements,

b. Anti-Nazi activity among Germans should not be played,

c. if Military Government should find it necessary to import food into a given locality this should be reported factually and without generalization,

d. if owing to military requirements a village has to be destroyed this should be reported factually and not generalized,

e. if use is made of a particular faction in any one locality this should not be interpreted to represent general recognition of the faction in question,

f. if military necessity results in the employment of an official who has been a member of the Nazi party this is exceptional and purely temporary.

~~TO CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY *W. B. SMITH*
6 AUG 1945

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

Copies to: G-1 Division

G-2 "
G-3 "
G-4 "
G-5 "

Psychological Warfare Division
Public Relations Division
Engineer Division
Political Officer (Br)

Political Officer (US)
SGS
AG Records

986

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X
63
COPY

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 DIVISION

SHAZW/05/0ps/1202/2

18 October 1944.

MEMORANDUM:


TO : D/Chief of Staff.

1. Attached is a memorandum to Chief of Staff covering a directive to P.V.D. on the propaganda treatment of Military Government. This is the first product of the sub-committee set up the result of the meeting you held on 13th October.

2. The line taken in the Directive is that agreed at the meeting in my room last Sunday.

1/s/ A. E. GRASSETT

1/t/ A. E. GRASSETT
Lt. General
Asst. Chief of Staff G-5



Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

SOS - SHAEF File No. 061791-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

Subject: Record of Meeting held at SHAEF on 13th October, 1944
at 1430 hours, to consider a Paper submitted by P.W.D.

Present:

Lt. General Sir FREDERICK E. MORGAN (in the Chair)
Lt. General A. E. GRASETT
Major General R. W. BARNES
Major General K. W. D. STRONG
Brig General R. A. McCLARE
Brig. General A. S. HEWINS
Brigadier W. R. REDDINGTON
Colonel T. R. HENNE

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. F. C. Oechsner
Mr. Charles Peake

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
CONFIDENTIAL
PROPERTY OF CALA
BY *J. W. Butler*
J. W. BUTLER
Copyright, A.G.D.
Date *10 AUG 1945*

1. New Directive to P.H.D.

Fast planning has been conducted on the assumption that surrender would precede occupation and a point has now been reached when a new directive is needed.

2. German Handbook.

The German Handbook of 1st September, to which CCAC in WASHINGTON had taken exception in certain respects, has already been distributed with a cautionary sheet inserted. The "objectionable" points are under revision.

3. Enemy Propaganda.

The German radio is using very effectively what is known as the "Morgenthau scheme" and is making great play with the alleged ruthlessness of Allied intentions towards GERMANY. All this needs -- immediate and effective answer by P.W.

4. Resolutions of the Meeting.

(e) All Divisions of SHAEF have interest in the P.W. plan for GERMANY and will wish their requirements known.

(b) The new policy must be positive and not negative. The responsibility for its production rests solely with SHAEP and needs no reference to the C.C.S.

(c) The ■■■ policy should be ■ framed ■ to harmonise closely with post-surrender policy ■ that the latter should evolve smoothly and consistently.

(d) A small standing committee, on which all Divisions concerned should be represented, will be set up for steering purposes and an executive body, provided by G-5, will begin work at once to revise the P.W. paper and to prepare a positive plan.

K. K. Morrice
A. K. S. MORRICE,
Major, Guards,
Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff.

988

SECRET

12

copy

~~SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division

SHAFF/G5/Op/1202/2

16 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Propaganda Treatment of Military Government.

TO : Chief of Staff.

DISCUSSION.

1. It has been represented by Psychological Warfare Division that there is an urgent requirement for a psychological offensive to educate the individual German as to the intentions and scope of Military Government. P.W.D. are of the opinion that, although a large proportion of the German soldiers and civilians are convinced that the war cannot now be won, enemy propaganda is succeeding in making them continue to resist by painting "horror" pictures of their fate at Allied hands if they should surrender. Army Groups have asked for guidance in countering this enemy propaganda.

2. The most effective counter-measure would be for a British-US-Russian Public announcement containing a definition of "unconditional surrender". It is most unlikely, however, that an agreed statement between the three parties could be negotiated in time to have a sufficiently early effect.

3. P.W.D. require a minimum of three weeks in which to put across a propaganda theme. If the psychological offensive is to assist forthcoming military operations it must start soon.

4. It is felt that the best method of approach is to address our propaganda to the individual German with the object of convincing him:

a. that his lot under Military Government will be at the worst no harder than it is at present;

b. that his fate rests in his own hands, i.e. if he destroys facilities and resources it will be he who suffers.

5. With this object in view a directive to P.W.D. has been drafted and is attached as TAB A to this letter. The directive is short term in nature and has been drafted to cover only the pre-surrender period. It is believed to conform with such policies as the Supreme Commander has received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. If successful, the psychological offensive which will follow on the issue of the directive would:

a. reduce enemy resistance;

b. prevent the destruction of some important facilities and resources in Germany.

7. P.W.D. also stress the need for a "Military Government Spokesman" to put out on the air from time to time talks and instructions covering Military Government matters. This Military Government spokesman would correspond at a lower level to the "Voice of SHAFF".



b 989

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(28)

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COPY

8. It is felt that Public Relations Division also require guidance as to our Military Government intentions in order that they can restrain the press from representing our psychological activities as "softness" in dealing with Germany.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

9. It is recommended that:

- a. the directive to P.V.D. at TAB A be authorized and issued;
- b. the use on the air of a "Military Government spokesman" be authorized;
- c. a copy of the directive be forwarded to P.R.D. under cover of the letter at TAB II.

CONCURRENCES.

G-2
G-3
PMD
PRD

/s/ A. E. GRASSETT,

/t/ A. E. GRASSETT,
Lieutenant General
ACOS, G-5 Division

Pen Note:

Approved.

Directive signed by C.C.S.

/s/ F.E. MORGAN

D/COS

20/10

b 950

~~SECRET~~

END

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

241 McHenry
32201 DWD

3-22-2019 PM 1:15

✓

WORKS

P R I O R I T Y

TO : AGWAR FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION OF MCNARNEY
FROM : SHARP MAIN, SIGNED RISENHOWKA
REF NO : 3-62195 CITE: [REDACTED] 1034

Reference your W-44931.

We have no objection to issuing a similar to that urged by the Executive Director War Refugee Board provided the words "or religious faith" are for "whether they Jewish or otherwise".

Psychological Warfare Division believes [] original wording would give Germans powerful propaganda line. If [] are to [] instructed to issue [] a Directive it should come from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Serial DW-44931 18 SMC 1788 12/10/44, PWD

ORIGINATOR: CHIEF OF [REDACTED]

AUTHENTICATION: C. L. BURGESS
Lt. Colonel

INFORMATION:

SQS

FWD

G-1

Q-5

POLITICAL OFFICERS

MR. MURPHY
A. J. MURPHY

AG RECORDS

[illegible]

SMO OFF 1103 14 Oct. 1944 1720A HK/rob Ref. No: S-62195
FOO: 141630A

SECRET

29

SECRET

COPY NO. 4

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

Date _____

TO:

Suggested Distribution:-

~~etc~~

~~etc~~

~~etc~~ CAG

SES (6) (to transmittal to s/c D/S/c
D/S/c)

✓ 6-1 (3) 2-

✓ 6-2 (3) 2-

6-3 (4) 2-

6-4 (3) 2-

✓ 6-5 (2) 2-

PWD (6) 2-

PRD (3) 2-

Political Advisers (4) 2-

4- Records (4) 2- 993

201 Peaker
201 Morgan
091.412 Summary

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

24th October, 1944.

TO: D/COS.

I submit a record of yesterday's meeting. I have cut very great deal, since a good deal of the discussion tho' very valuable hardly needed recording. If you should wish any record made of the discussion about German economic life, and the German press, I will expand accordingly.

Charles Peake

CHARLES PEAKE
Political Officer ER

SSC

would you please
distribute this record to
participants and to any
other thought suitable.

RESTRICTED

14/10

993

G.W. Butler
P.W. Butler
P.W. Butler

R

(10)

34-40000
44-40000
1/10
SECRET
1021 Machine
1201 Monogram

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

14 October 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda guidance.

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF
Political Adviser, As.
Political Adviser, Br.
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
G-5

1. Attached is the draft of the cable to Combined Chiefs of Staff which I mentioned at the conference yesterday as being in the nature of the policy paper which could be drawn up within this Headquarters and issued as propaganda guidance for the civil agencies as well as the Army Groups.

2. In accordance with instructions of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the original of this paper is furnished G-5 and it is presumed that they will consult other staff divisions concerning it.

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

1 Incl.
Draft cable.

6 994

17 October

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT CABLE

TO: The Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. Evidence from forces engaged continues to indicate that:

a. German soldiers and civilians in Western Germany are almost universally convinced that [] is lost. Only exception fanatical youthful Nazi minority who still pin faith on Hitler personally and secret weapon.

b. Realization of hopelessness of military situation has not however greatly affected resistance since to the average soldier the political situation seems equally hopeless, leaving no alternative to fighting. [] German morale largely characterized by listlessness and mechanical obedience.

c. There is increasing volume and effectiveness of German propaganda designed to show horrors of American occupation. This propaganda concentrates [] present on American and not British occupation. Civilians naturally are more fearful than soldiers since unprotected by Geneva Convention. Absence of specific information about conditions in Allied occupied Germany has made German propaganda on the subject [] effective. On the other hand considerable number of civilians have disobeyed evacuation order and preferred to await Allied arrival.

2. Based [] this intelligence propaganda authorized by this headquarters is along the following lines:

a. Priority is [] longer given to propaganda showing that Germany has lost the []

b. Incidents such as Aachen ultimatum demonstrating the choice between surrender and destruction [] highlighted.

c. Fanatical Party and SS minority [] presented as prolonging [] against the interest of the German people.

3. These themes [] purely negative. Since it [] important to seize and maintain propaganda initiative, they are coupled with the following positive themes:

a. The existing organization of Military Government in the occupied part of Germany is evidence of what treatment is in store for the parts of Germany yet to be occupied by the AEF. This is illustrated by concrete details stressing law and order and elementary safeguards of life, property and human rights for the peace-loving and law-abiding German.

b. The principles of Military Government [] announced in terms which [] the statements intelligible to the simplest soldier and civilian:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(1) Military Government destroys Party and Gestapo rule and restores law, order and civilized justice. It is ruthless against the criminal; it is humane to the peace-loving.

(2) Military Government begins the destruction of Nazi education. When circumstances allow, it reopens the schools purged of Nazism, racialism and militarism.

(3) Military Government respects freedom of religion and restores to the churches the property plundered by the Nazis.

(4) Military Government destroys the Nazi labour front and permits free trade unions. It maintains social services purged of Nazi taint.

(5) On the instructions of British and American governments Military Government gives absolute priority to supplying food to the liberated peoples plundered by Nazi Germany. The Germans who have for so long lived on the food of others, must now fend for themselves and in their interest maximize food production. However, to prevent starvation and disease, Military Government will, in exceptional circumstances and in special areas, import food and medical necessities.

These principles are being reinforced by key quotations from the President and the Prime Minister.

4. Propaganda is also employed to

a. Give warnings and advice to German civilians behind the lines on evacuation and self-help.

b. Advise Germans to associate themselves with foreign workers in active resistance designed to shorten the war. Appeals to specific political groups are avoided.

5. Surrender propaganda to soldiers continues along usual lines. When a major break-through occurs it will add to propaganda advocating surrender propaganda advising the retreating soldier to take the opportunity to return home.

~~SECRET~~


SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Record of Meeting held at SHAWT on 11th October, 1944
at 1430 hours, to consider a Paper submitted by P.W.D.

Present:

Lt. General Sir FREDERICK E. MORGAN (in the Chair)
Lt. General A. E. GRIFFITH
Major General R. W. BAINBRIDGE
Major General K. F. D. STRONG
Brig. General R. A. McCLINE
Brig. General A. S. NEWIPS
Brigadier W. R. HEDDERLEY
Colonel T. N. HENN

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. F. G. Ochsner
Mr. Charles Peake



SGS - SHAEF File No. 51.411

1. General MORGAN said that a point had not been raised, where P.W.D. were without effective direction as to the action which they must take in order to play their part in securing final victory, and the various steps which must be taken thereafter. While it was true that our present directives were framed on the assumption that surrender had not taken place, and the Allied armies were fighting their way into GERMANY, past planning had been conducted on the assumption that surrender would precede occupation. A new directive was not needed, since it was essential that commanders in the field, and the troops themselves should understand what was expected of them. The orders we gave to our troops depended entirely upon that we meant to say to the Germans, both now and in the future. It was essential to show our whole staff this and then produce a P.W. plan. We had received a number of directives. These needed adequate digestion and then instructions could be issued accordingly.

2. General GRIFFITH pointed out that the German Handbook of 1st September, to which the F.C.C. in WESTPHALIA had taken exception in certain respects, had already been distributed with a cautioner sheet inserted. Those points which were thought objectionable in WESTPHALIA were not under revision.

3. Colonel HENN described how the Handbook came to be prepared and the reasons why some variations had been received with disfavor. The only points not outstanding were those dealing with law and order, the prevention of disease and unrest, the internment of the people, steps leading to economic rehabilitation, and the employment of Nazis.

4. General McCLINE observed that the Handbook was not intended for publication, but that the policies which it enjoined must be made known. It was essential that P.W.D. should have a settled policy as to what they were to say to the Germans, and it was not practicable to delay any longer in letting the Germans know what our policy was. The German radio was using very effectively what was known as the "Meinungen schmeich" and was making great play with the alleged ruthlessness of Allied intentions towards GERMANY. All this needed an immediate and effective answer by P.W.

997

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(9)

~~SECRET~~

5. In the course of the discussion which then took place, the following points were made:

a. All Divisions of SHARP had some interest in the P.V. plan for GERMANY and would wish to make their requirements known so that due account could be taken of them.

b. It was also agreed that the policy to be decided must be positive and not negative and that the responsibility for its production rested solely with SHARP and needed no reference to the G.C.S.

c. The policy to be followed during the pre-surrender period was an operational question, but it should be so framed as to harmonise closely with post-surrender policy, and to serve as a fitting preliminary to the latter so that post-surrender policy should evolve smoothly and consistently from pre-surrender policy as the occasion arose.

d. It was finally agreed that a small standing committee on which all Divisions concerned should be represented, "could" be set up for steering purposes, and that an executive body working under this committee would revise the P.V. paper and prepare a positive plan. This executive would be provided by G-5 and would begin work at once.

Distribution:

Those Present:

AGS (5) - For transmission to
SC, DCC, C/S, DC/S (10)
DR/S (10)

G-1 (2)

G-2 (2)

G-3 (3)

G-4 (2)

G-5 (4)

PMO (5)

PD (3)

Mr. Rober

18 Records

8 929

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

Registry
No:

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Record of Meeting held at SHARP on 13th October, 1944
at 14.30 hours, to consider a Paper submitted by
P. W. D.

Present:

Lt. [redacted] Morgan (in the Chair.)

Lt. [redacted] Grassett.

Major-General [redacted]

Major-General Strong.

Brigadier-General McClure.

Brigadier-General [redacted]

Brigadier Beddington.

Colonel Hann.

Mr. Robert Murphy.

Mr. P. C. [redacted]

Mr. Charles [redacted]

General Morgan said [redacted] a point [redacted] now
been reached, where P.W.D. were [redacted] effective
direction [redacted] to the action which they [redacted] take
with the German people, in order to play [redacted] part
in securing [redacted] final victory, [redacted] the [redacted]
steps [redacted] must be taken thereafter. While it [redacted]
true that [redacted] present directives were [redacted] on [redacted]
assumption that surrender had not taken place, and
the [redacted] armies [redacted] fighting their way into
Germany, past planning had been conducted [redacted]
assumption that surrender would precede occupation.
A new directive was now needed, since it [redacted] essential
that commanders in the field, [redacted] the troops them-
selves should understand what was expected of them.
[redacted] orders [redacted] to [redacted] troops depended entirely
upon what we meant to say to the Germans, both were
inseparably connected. It was essential to clear

/over

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By [redacted] CALA
By [redacted] W. BULLER
[redacted] A.G.D.
[redacted] [redacted]

6 993

1000

3

1

Registry
No:

- 2 -

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

our minds this produce a P.W. plan. We had received a number of directives. These adequate digestion and then instructions could be accordingly.

General Grasett pointed out that German Handbook of 1st September, to which the C.G.A.O. in Washington had taken exception in respects had already been distributed a cautionary inserted. Those points which thought objectionable in Washington were now under revision.

Colonel Henn described how the Handbook came to be prepared and the why certain portions been received with disfavour. The only points now outstanding were those dealing with law and order, the prevention of disease unrest, the interpretation of the words "steps leading to economic rehabilitation", the employment of Nazis.

General McClure observed that the Handbook not intended for publication, the policies which it enjoined must be known. It was essential P.W.D. should have a set policy as to what they were to say to the Germans, it was not practical to delay any longer in letting policy. The German radio using very effectively what known as the Morgenthau scheme and was making great play with alleged ruthlessness of Allied intentions towards Germany. this an immediate and effective by P.W.

the of the discussion which then took place the following points were made.

All divisions of S.M.A.E.F. had interest in the P.W. plan for Germany and would wish to make their requirements known that due account could be taken of them. It was also agreed that policy to

/Decided

u 1000

Registry
No:

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

- 1 -

decided must be positive not negative that the responsibility for its production rested solely S.H.A.E.F. reference to the G.C.S. The policy to be followed during the pre-surrender period was an operational question, but it should be so to harmonise closely with post-surrender policy, and to serve as a fitting preliminary to the latter so that post-surrender policy should evolve smoothly and consistently pre-surrender policy when the occasion arose.

It was finally agreed that a small standing on which all divisions concerned should be represented would be set up for steering purposes, and that an executive body ^{working under} would be provided by this committee to revise the P.W. paper and prepare a positive plan. This executive would be by G-5 would begin work once.

CHARLES FRANK

1001

6-1003
Q/S has dispatched cable which
he has written.
To: RWD, Attn: Col. KEM.
(Handwritten)
12/1 P.T.

COPY

General KEMERER placed the
following notation on copy of
the attached cablegram:
"Q/S: I have no objections,
but it was to be instructed to
issue a directive, orders should
come from Staff, D.E."

For approval.

General KEMERER:

To:

Date: 12 October 1944

Office of the Secretary General Staff
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

COPY

COPY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

207 Kehm
201 Smith
091.412
12 October 1944

SUBJECT : Message No. W-44931 from AGWAR.
TO : Chief of Staff, Supreme Hq A.E.F.

DISCUSSION

Message W-44931 requests views reference to issuing the contained (A).

From a propaganda point of inclusion of "and they
Jewish or otherwise" would give Germans powerful propaganda line.
Otherwise is suitable for "Voice of SHAEF".

1. Authorize Chief of Division to reply suggesting that
"or religious faith" substituted for "and whether they are
otherwise", and a Directive for issuing the statement from
Combined of Staff (TAB B) 000

2. Authorize Chief of PW Division when reply is received
War Dept to the statement finally agreed a "Voice of SHAEF"
by leaflet and through Public Relations Division.

CONCURRENCES

Political Officer (Br)

/s/ For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

/s/ H. B. KEM,
Colonel, P.A.

DATE 15 1944

APPROVED

/s/ W. B. Smith

W. B.

1st. U.S. Army,
of Staff.

COPY

1003

SGS SHAEF File No.

091.412/3

12 October

COPY

DRAFT OF CABLE

(TAB B)

TO: AGWAR

FROM: (DRAFT SIGNED BY [REDACTED])

(IN LONG HAND) NOT USED

Except that "or religious faith" should be substituted
for "and whether they are Jewish or otherwise" there
is no objection to issuing the statement contained in
W-44931 of 11 October 1944. Since such statement would
[REDACTED] from Allied Commander instructions for its [REDACTED]
should come from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(IN LONG HAND) NOT USED

(IN LONG HAND)

Copy of cable transmitted by C/S will be furnished by [REDACTED]

/s/ CLS

12/10/44 [unclear]

COPY

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WABZ

TOO. 112106Z OCT

TOR NTOR OCT
 PW 120047A OCT

~~SECRET~~

U R G E N T

FROM : AGMAR FROM MCNARNEY
TO : SHAEF PERSONAL ATTN: EISENHOWER
REF NO : W-44931, 11 October 1944

Executive Director, War Refugee Board, [redacted]
urges that the following statement, which has been approved by
Department of State, be issued by you.

Statement: " Germans: There are within your midst large numbers of persons in forced-labor Battalions in concentration camps. Without regard to their nationality and whether they are Jewish or otherwise, Germans, these my orders: You shall disregard any order from whatever source, to molest, otherwise harm or persecute any of these people. As the Allied Armies, already firmly on German soil, advance, we shall expect to find these persons alive and unharmed. Severe penalties will be inflicted upon anyone who is responsible, directly or indirectly, in large measure or in small, for their mistreatment. Those now exercising authority, heed."

Request your views as urgent matter.

ACTION : P&D
INFORMATION : G-5
G-1
SGS SUSPENSE

SAC IN 1783 12 Oct 44 6220A AGD/al REF NO: W-44931

6 1005 S E C R E T

SECRET

COPY NO. 16

THE MARKING OF THE LAST COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FURNISHED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED [REDACTED] FORCE
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Policy to German civilians.

: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Ass ██████ Chief of Staff, G-4
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5


I enclose a paper, Copy No. 1 by the Psychological Warfare Division, which is, in my view, of considerable importance.

Would you kindly study this paper, and be prepared to discuss it with a meeting to be held in my room on Friday, 13th October at 1430 hours.

7c/ F. E. NOBMAN

/s/ F.E.MORGAN,
Lieutenant General
Deputy [redacted] of [redacted]

Copy to: Psychological Warfare Division



6 1006

0

Since recalled

SECRET

17/7/64

SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
DATE 10/10/2010 BY 60322

2 Oct 2010, 10:40

Excluded from automatic declassification
SECRET - 10/10/2010

1. Case

At 10:00 AM on 10/10/2010, a copy of
fourteen business cards was delivered to the Director of Military
Intelligence. These cards were received by the Director of Military
Intelligence from a source who provided the following information:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

2. Analysis

The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

3. Conclusion


The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

The following information was provided by the source:

For the Chief, Directorate of Military Intelligence,

SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
DATE 10/10/2010 BY 60322

SECRET



6 1007

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Case

The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

Analysis

The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:
The following information was provided by the source:

6 1008

SECRET

SECRET

SERIES BROADCASTS/NO. 1 043 H. H. H. 3.1

OPENING: This is the Voice of the Military Government. This message comes to you from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.

Your armed forces will be defeated, and more and more of your territory will be occupied by the Allied forces until your government and its armed forces surrender or are overrun.

You will be under a military occupation, and your country will be governed by a military government. Already there are Germans living under this Military Government.

In this series of fourteen broadcasts, you will be told the principles by which the Supreme Commander conducts the Military Government of your country. You will be told how you should conduct yourselves under military occupation and Military Government.

1. Under the law of nations the commander of the occupying forces is clothed with supreme executive, legislative and judicial power in the occupied area. This power, vested in the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces as Military Governor, will be exercised by him in accordance with the dictates of humanity, justice and the civilized standards of Britain and the United States.

2. The Military Government of Occupied Germany will be firm and strict, but just. Its aim will be not the destruction of Germany, but the destruction of the Nazi system of rule by terror and the militaristic system of armed aggression. The establishment of military government over you to accomplish this aim is necessary because you have permitted the Nazi Party and militarists to seize control of your country and lead you into a ruthless war against humanity.

3. The Military Government will be conducted by soldiers, but they will be guided by written rules of law. They will not willfully distort and destroy the fair meaning of law. In the Military Government you will be spared from corruption, personal greed, falsehood and hatred.

4. The laws of the Military Government will be promulgated and published so that all will know what is the law. Except to the extent required by these laws, your existing laws will remain in effect. The laws of the Military Government will be strictly enforced. Their meaning will be plain and you must observe them obediently and at once.

5. The courts of the Military Government will be conducted with fairness and promptness. Punishment for violations of the law will be orderly and swift. No punishment will be ordered without a fair trial. No barbarous punishment will be inflicted, but the death sentence will be imposed when necessary.

Listen carefully to the next of these broadcasts tomorrow at this time. You will be told the principles of the Military Government of Germany and you will be told how you must conduct yourselves under military occupation.

This message is authorized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in his capacity as Military Governor of the areas of Germany occupied by the forces under his command.

This is the Voice of the Military

6 1000

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF CALA
J. W. Butler
J. W. Butler
J. W. Butler



(Gibson and colleagues' article on the "Pain Management of the Elderly")

- 6 1010

CONFIDENTIAL
J. W. Butler
J. W. BUTLER,
ESQ. AUG 1948

SECRET

SECRET, INFORMATION, CONFIDENTIAL, NO DISCLOSURE, 3.3.

(Open and close with no formal, no in, etc.)

1. Your first duty will be to remain peaceable and orderly. You should continue your daily occupation if you are engaged in a lawful pursuit. Do nothing to interfere with the operations of the occupying forces or of the Military Government.
2. You will receive the benefits of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberty of the individual. Such searches, seizures and arrests as may be necessary will not be done arbitrarily, but will be in accordance with the rules of warfare, and for just cause. Those found after fair trial to be lawbreakers will be punished as the merits of their offenses demand.
3. Subject to license, Government owns right to your own property will be respected, but you will not be permitted to retain that rightfully belongs to others.
4. Those privileges will not, however, be enjoyed by those who have participated actively in the work of the Axis Party or any of its agencies. The Axis Party and all of its assets will be destroyed and exterminated forever.
5. You must aid the Military Government in rooting out active Axis individuals and training locs.
6. You must avoid any suspicion of complicity with secret Axis efforts to obstruct the Military Government. Any aid rendered by you to any person who attempts such obstruction will be severely punished. You will be protected from intimidation by Axis agents if you report such efforts to the authorities.
7. Above all, you must refuse to take part in any effort, of any kind or unorganized, to commit any act against the occupying forces or the Military Government.

b 1011

REC'D
JUL 16 1945
G. W. Butler
JUL 16 1945

SECRET

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

1. The Department will be furnished as promptly as it can be, with a copy of the report of the Secretary of Defense, for all radio sets and equipment in your inventory.

2. You will submit a copy of the report of the Secretary of Defense, for all radio sets and equipment in your inventory, to the Department of Defense, for all radio sets and equipment in your inventory.

3. The Department will be furnished as promptly as it can be, with a copy of the report of the Secretary of Defense, for all radio sets and equipment in your inventory, to the Department of Defense, for all radio sets and equipment in your inventory.

4. You will be required to provide information and instructions of the military government to command and deliver up to the authorities certain articles which have military significance. These include weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitters, and other equipment. You will be allowed to retain radio receiving sets and to listen to any broadcasts which you may choose. You must acquaint yourself with such regulations and obey them scrupulously. Failure to obey them will render you subject to severe penalties.

5. When necessary, the military government in their necessary procedures for the defense of their area of your country will facilitate numerous violations of military government in the necessary performance of the duties of a first infantry order and defense of your country.

b 1012

SECRET

1. *G. W. B. Smith*
G. W. B. Smith
Copies: 4, 1, 3
Adm. 1
18 AUG 1947

SECRET

6. RULES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S.A.

(Open and close with next formula as in Para. 1)

1. The rule of justice and equality before the law is to be established in Germany. In the Military Government courts established in accordance with the provisions of the Military Government Act to punish offenses against the interests of the Allied Forces in the United Nations, the accused person will be entitled to have in advance of trial a copy of the charges against him, to give evidence and cross-examine any witness, to request a lawyer before trial and to choose an advocate to defend him, to call his own witnesses and, if convicted, to lodge an appeal to a Military Government reviewing authority. No court sentence will be carried out without written confirmation by the Supreme Commander or a representative designated by him.

2. The criminal and civil court systems of Germany which purged of Nazi and otherwise undesirable elements, will be permitted to reopen in accordance with supervision and control. Violation of German laws by Germans and foreigners, other than members of the Allied Forces and United Nations displaced persons, will normally be tried in German courts.

3. Special courts associated with the Nazi regime, such as the People's Court and S.S. Justice Courts, will be abolished.

4. All laws aimed at enforcing Nazi doctrines and practices will be null and void. All sentences of death or corporal punishment imposed by German courts shall be suspended pending review by the Military Government. Other judicial sentences will be recognized where they do not conflict with the policies or legislation of the Military Government.

5. Every German will, prosecutor, lawyer, or lawyer, will be required to take the following oath:

"I swear by God to do as I shall see fit. I will apply and administer the law where there is no favour and with justice and equity to all persons of that war-crime, race or political persuasion. I will keep the laws of Germany and the decisions of the Military Government in strictest observance of duty, and will constantly endeavor to extend the legal justice under the law for all persons. So I swear."

6. The Military Government is empowered to attend the hearings of any German court, to nullify, suspend, commute or otherwise modify any finding, sentence or judgment, to dismiss or suspend any judge or official and to transfer any case to the jurisdiction of the Military Government courts.

7. No sentence of death passed by a German court will be executed without previous confirmation by the Military Government.

TC
By
J. W. G. G. G.
A.G.O.
1013

6 1013

4-

Using the above notation, Proposition 4.10 can be restated as follows:

2. The Higher Government, will strictly keep and observe all conditions and high character to conduct and shall give any person or group on the ground of religious, race, nationality, language or political opinion. No person shall be subjected to be arrested to punishment. Freedom of religion will be guaranteed to the extent that may be necessary partly to be treated with this principle privilege of liberty.

4. Military Government will protect the just claims of religious organizations for the restoration of property stolen by banding leaders or persons similar under the color of law or otherwise.

6. To carry out the above the Committee has the very serious wish that the United States should be represented in the position of unjust discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, or nationality or political or ethnic origin in the United States. There will be no more a free press, a free market, a free economy, and a free state of race, religion, or ethnicity.

G. W. Butler
G. W. BUTLER,
Captain A. G. O.
Adjutant.

6 1014.3

~~SECRET~~

Medical and Sanitary Measures

(Open and Close - 11:00 AM - 11:30 AM)

1. Every effort will be made to control infectious diseases and prevent epidemics among the prisoners and thus to protect the health of the Axis prisoners. The conditions of housing in Germany.
2. If possible, medical care for the health of Allied nationals will be provided and the medical and public health resources will be used to the best advantage in Germany.
3. Medical supplies for the use of German soldiers will be provided by the Axis Government. Supplies of soap will also be provided to the Axis Government to prevent disease.
4. The German Government will supply medical supplies and military supplies for the Axis Government and provide a pool of personnel for the Axis Government, which will be responsible for the Axis Government's health.
5. It will be the duty of the Axis Government to maintain the health of the Axis Government and provide the Axis Government with the necessary medical supplies and personnel. It will also be the duty of the Axis Government to maintain the health of the Axis Government and provide the Axis Government with the necessary medical supplies and personnel. It will also be the duty of the Axis Government to maintain the health of the Axis Government and provide the Axis Government with the necessary medical supplies and personnel.

By *G. W. Butler*
G. W. BUTLER
Captain, U.S.A.
Adjutant

6 1015

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

SECTION ONE: POINTS OF INTEREST.

(Open and Close with the formula, as in 0.1.)

1. Your own well-being and survival rest in your own hands. You must protect your country's resources and facilities if you expect to enjoy them under Military Government. If you find yourselves destroying or changing them in accordance to the insane policies of your Nazi leaders you will be the worst sufferers from the consequences.
2. These things you are doing or destroying your own utilities, your buildings, your stocks of food or materials, your mines or your equipment are only increasing hardships for all of you. Military Government will supply all material things for your comfort.
3. Certain damage must be done to your country by your own and our forces as long as your armed forces continue their useless resistance. This is the thing hardest, which you will only increase if you obey Nazi orders to destroy German property.
4. Under Military Government you will not be fed or clothed by the Military Government. You must search for your own resources, so it is to your own interest to continue and increase them.
5. The power of the Military Government is the power of action. Orders and promises which your own authorities will be ordered to enforce.
6. Do not attempt to sell or support the black market. It will not avail you to obtain supplies of goods or food. These will be taken from the market and will be rationed by your own authorities.
7. The Allied forces will report the bulk of their own material supplies if possible. But they will give to people in Germany all the goods that the people of the countries devastated by your armies, and not to you. We will attempt to preserve and increase your own resources on which you will have to depend for your standard of living under Military Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

W. Butler
W. BUTLER

SECRET

6 101b

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SECRET

(Open and close with the formula, as in No. 1)

1. All concentration camps are to be abolished at the earliest possible moment. All the camp guards and camp staffs will be immediately arrested and all camps will be taken to ameliorate the living conditions of the people detained in the camps.
2. The Military Government will get up committees to consider as rapidly as possible the cases of all detainees so that every person who has been wrongfully detained by the Axis shall be released.
3. As to those detainees who in regard to the camps will be controlled by Allied troops.
4. The Military Government will take over control of all prisons and remove all Nazi and other undesirable prison officials.
5. In general, the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Germany will belong to the local German police under the supervision of the Military Government.
6. The SA police and the Gestapo will be liquidated at once and all Nazi principles and objects will be eliminated from the direction of police operations.
7. The duties of the police will be reduced to the simple police force, which will be liquidated as an independent organ of emergency when national and domestic order is established and a new, planned, limited institution.
8. The police force will be decentralized and reorganized on a regional and local basis but certain central police agencies will be retained on a national basis to handle those official investigations, administration could be delegated officially to local German authorities.
9. The decentralized local police forces will be under executive chiefs approved by the Military Government and the general responsibility for the administration of the local police will be vested in the Civil Lord of each town or city or in the Regional President.
10. The criminal police will be eliminated as a separate branch of the National Police and will be merged with the local units of ordinary police. The heavily armed detachments of the Schutzpolizei will be dissolved. Eligible men in the dissolved branches will be eligible for employment in local police forces. Recruiting for the police will be open to all citizens without preference for past military or other state service.
11. The Landwehr and the Sturmabteilung will be disbanded as soon as possible.
12. Military Government officers and the Allied Military Police will ensure that the German police procedure conforms with the policy of the Supreme Commander and, in particular, that it does not infringe the accepted rights and liberties of any citizen.

6 101 CONFIDENTIAL

G. B. Miller
3. 11. 44
A.C.U.
1. 1. 44
A.C.U.

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
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1. War of art and science of any article or historical importance which has been looted by Germany from allied countries shall be preserved and returned to their rightful owners and it is the responsibility of every German who knows of the participation of his countrymen in this crime, to assist in their location and delivery to the military authorities.
2. The sale or exhibition of such objects will be forbidden and destruction or concealment of them will be severely punished.
3. Every effort will be made to avoid, as far as military necessities allow, damage to buildings, monuments, furniture or other objects of cultural, artistic, scientific or historical value, and to limit the use of such buildings.
4. Orders will be given to the allied troops to refrain from any action destructive of buildings. The military government has designated a list of buildings which must not be destroyed. Military personnel without military necessity require the permission of the military government to enter them. Cultural staff, in general, put themselves under the command of the allied troops.
5. Looted, stolen and other cultural objects will be reported to a special office.
6. Objects of cultural value found in any German, ally German records, documents or elsewhere will be.
7. It is the responsibility of Germans to take part in the policy of "cultural work" with the allied plan to carry out. "Cultural work" in the policy in connection with the allied plan is the German plan to do.

p 1016



SECTION THREE - THE LABOR MARKET

(This section shall be read in conjunction with Section I.)

1. In a short transition period German workers will be allowed to continue the trade unions to exist on the basis of controlled labour front organizations. Unions will be abolished at once. All forms of trade union membership and organization among workers will be prohibited, provided that they do not assume any political or military character.
2. The restoration of this time-limited right which the Nazis adopted will be given workers to the degree collective bargaining with employers and strikes throughout the Reich, directly or indirectly, will be prohibited. So will lock-outs.
3. For the time being, you will remain in your limits according to the national German regulations.
4. All deductions of pay of the workers or collections from workers for the benefit of the Reich or any of its affiliated dissolved organizations will cease. Deductions of pay for social insurance, unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation or normal Reich taxes will be continued.
5. Military laws, decrees and regulations regarding the registration of labour will be taken over as emergency measures. That is to say, workers must have their employment status confirmed and recorded, and their work books verified and re-registered. All workers, male or female, in employment or unemployed, must report to the Labour Office in the month they are living for registration or re-registration.
6. Information in the form of work of any kind will be given to workers and their families and persons if they desire work.
7. The civilian labour rights of the military forces will be given the first priority but the recognition will be given to the retention of the rights in public services, military or essential occupations. Any surplus labour will be used for work on such tasks as approved by the military Government.
8. It is the policy of the German Government to ensure fair and reasonable working conditions for workers who are willing to play a full part in meeting the requirements of the occupation authorities.

CONFIDENTIAL

J. A. Butler
Date 10/10/44
SECRET

6 1019

SECRET

Reference: 100-1000000000
Approved: 100-1000000000
Approved: 100-1000000000

7/24/42

SECRET

100-1000000000

Subject: 100-1000000000
Reference: 100-1000000000
Approved: 100-1000000000

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There are, therefore, very special reasons why the policy of Military Government in Germany should be carefully prepared in advance and should be maintained rigorously along pre-arranged lines. Governments elsewhere may succeed in "muddling through": governments which muddle through in Germany fail.

In the second place, in order to impose an effective control it is essential to approach to the limits of control. These limits are very largely dictated by the amount of troops and administrators available. Given the required number of troops and administrators, a decision can be made as to practically anything you choose. But in a situation in which the troops are needed for active fighting, and Military Government is not prepared actually to take over and run local administration, transport and production, the public opinion even of a defeated country is an important factor. This is all the more so when only a portion of the country is occupied and a government still exists in another portion and exercises its influence in the occupied area. In such a situation it may well be inexpedient merely to assist either publicly or privately that all opposition will be crushed or that the Germans will either work or starve: instead, it may be more effective to consider the steps by which, without violating high policy or jeopardizing principles, the population may be induced to accept Military Government as at least a tolerable alternative to the Nazi regime. Such measures, if arranged in advance and consistently carried into effect may, at very small cost, very largely facilitate military operations and accelerate the defeat of the enemy.

(b) Food. The Economic policy of Military Government will almost certainly be the most important factor in inducing either practical resistance to our armies or in breaking the will to fight on. We can expect to find in the built-up areas of western Germany widespread destitution, miserable housing conditions, (rendered still worse by the bottling) and, since certain industrial areas will be at least temporarily cut-off from their food supplies, acute food shortages. Nazi propaganda has been so effective in blackening the name of the British and Americans, that relatively minor acts of relief, motivated by the strictest Military expediency, will be accepted by the Germans both in the occupied areas and behind the enemy lines as noble acts of humanity.

It is, of course, appreciated that no policy of relief as such can be adopted by us. The present directive however permits such imports of food and measures of economic rehabilitation are demanded by military considerations. This is a very wide directive and can be interpreted, broadly speaking, in two entirely different ways: (a) The narrow interpretation (curative): - Unless and until starvation has been proved, or industrial unrest already caused, no food will be imported. No mines will be worked or factories opened except those mines and factories directly necessary for military operations. (b) The broad interpretation (prophylactic): - An economic policy designed to maintain tolerable living conditions throughout the occupied area, and thereby to reduce the garrison troops necessary and to maintain essential output.

If the first policy is attempted; if no preparations are now made for import of food, medicines, soap and other small necessities of life; if no attempt is made to maintain work in factories and mines other than a few immediately needed by the armies; if to take a small instance, no roads are cleared of rubble except those needed by the armies, then the population will find life under military Government infinitely worse than life under the Nazis. If their stomachs are empty and their houses cold under military Government, they will forget the atrocities of the Gestapo and think of food and a paradise lost. Very soon we shall be compelled to use considerable bodies of troops to maintain work in essential industries, to guard our lines of communication and to hunt out the guerrillas harbored by a desperate population. Then, after the use of force and threats, and after the population has been driven into an attitude of resistance, we shall probably be compelled to introduce widespread relief measures. These measures, however, which if carried out at the beginning of the occupation could have won us widespread support, will now be regarded as concessions to resistance, and a victory for the Nazis in Berlin.

We should not underestimate, moreover, the effect of such a development behind the enemy lines and on the morale of the German soldier. They will confirm in the German mind Hitler's picture of the British and Americans as both venodious and weak.

By adopting the second policy and making the preparations now for carrying it into effect we should in the first place achieve that continuity of policy which is essential to impress Germans; in the second place, we should achieve widespread and spontaneous acceptance of our regime; and in the third place we should do all this at no greater long-run cost than that involved in the first narrow policy. In brief, the prophylactic will be cheaper and more effective than the cure.

(c) Black Market. Military Government, to maintain its authority, will have to take measures against the Black Market, at least as drastic as those of the Nazis. Nothing will strengthen its position, especially in hungry industrial areas, more than such a campaign, provided it is thoroughly well publicized and strikes at the high-level black marketeer.

It should be observed, however, that this campaign will have to be extremely efficient if it is to stand comparison with Nazi measures. A foreign administration has notoriously much greater difficulties in suppressing a black market than an indigenous government.

(d) Employment. Military considerations alone will compel us to maintain employment at as high a level as possible in order to prevent unrest. A German industrial population at work will be manageable: hundreds of thousands of unemployed Germans may well prove unmanageable, and provide, as they did in 1933, a source of subversion.

Here again the question is whether we should not make a virtue of expediency. Since we want to keep the Germans at work in order to keep them quiet, should we not direct the unemployed into forms of work, such as road clearance, which bring immediate relief of distress. If we do so, we sacrifice nothing and do much to induce obedience to Military Government.

(a) Displaced Allied Workers. It is an intention to ensure that displaced allied persons receive larger rations than Germans and to put the responsibility of providing these rations upon the German officials. In considering this policy, it should be borne in mind that the degree of fraternization between German and Allied workers is large. Many of the Allied workers, particularly from the east, are probably living under better physical conditions than that to which they were accustomed in their countries. A policy of deliberate discrimination in industrial areas where the workers work alongside each other is bound to have serious effects upon output. It is not inconceivable that one by-product among miners, whose solidarity is notorious, is that the Allied worker would share his extra ration with the German.

Here again, it should be noted that continuity of policy is important. If we start by giving the Germans lower rations and then find that we have to raise the rations to prevent a decrease in output, then this will be hailed as a concession to organized resistance to our rule. The appearance of a concession would be very much worse from the point of view of Allied prestige than the decision from the start to give the Germans equal rations.

(b) Replacement of Nazi Personnel. If the policy is accepted that competence shall be the criterion in selecting personnel to replace purged Nazis, a very important conclusion follows. Competence is a proper criterion for selecting officials: it is not the sole criterion for selecting anything above the level of an official. We are imposing Military Government upon a German administration. It is essential that the Germans should recognize this fact and look on those Germans who replace Nazis merely as officials working under an Allied Government. They should not be given the feeling in any way that any German who works under us is a member or part of a German government. It is questionable for instance whether it is wise to replace a Nazi Burgomeister by a non-Nazi Burgomeister, since a Burgomeister is both an official and in a sense a representative of the government. It might be better in a town like Cologne to make it clear that an Allied officer has replaced the Burgomeister and that the German who replaces the Nazi Burgomeister is merely the senior official under the Allied government. This may seem a mere technicality but it is of immense importance in defining our attitude to the German population. They have got to realize that when we say Military Government, we mean it.

If this principle is accepted, a serious problem arises with regard to the German press. German editors now are virtually 'officials', since in a totalitarian country there is no independent press. If we purge all Nazi editors and replace them by writers, selected on grounds of competence, to work under our control, we shall substitute (at least in German eyes) the Allied propaganda machine for the Nazi propaganda machine. We shall not have restored a 'German press'.

It must therefore be decided in principle whether our intention is (a) to substitute Allied power for a German government or (b) to restore a German government and to control it. If (a) is chosen, then Germany should be the ally from the moment of liberation. If (b) is chosen, then the military must do away with all political conditions and character and subordinate to us.

The solution probably is to be found here, in the first instance and before we are required with final conditions, we should establish a 'march-movement' which is openly and bravely an allied protest. When and if it becomes clear that there are Germans fit to run a newspaper, or to run an industry, or to run a factory, then they should be permitted to do so. But in this case not merely competence but also 'democratic conviction' must be the criterion in selecting personnel.

(c) Relations of military power to public and civil population. It has been already stated that, to institute an efficient control, one must recognize the limits of control. The replacement of German officials by competent non-German officials does not solve the problem of the relations between the military Government and the population. The non-Germanization order means that the contacts between the occupying forces and even the officers in military Government and the civil controls of information services on the one side and the population on the other will be extremely slight. The military Government, whose only connections will be with subordinate officials, will find itself completely cut off from the population it is ruling. This sense of remoteness will not be removed by intelligence reports however detailed they may be. No government, not even a Military Government, can maintain efficiency for long in such a condition. It must be considered, therefore, what steps are necessary to bring military Government into contact with the people. One obvious measure would be a directive suggesting that at the earliest possible date in industrial or agricultural production committees should be set up for the advice of the Military Government, consisting of representative people from management and labour. Such committees should be informed and without power. They should be concerned solely with the day-to-day problems of the factory and the mine. It would be the function of the military Government officers concerned, exactly how they function. They might well not be called committees at all. They might not meet very regularly. But at least the official should be directed to make contact with representative men from both sides and bring them to other in joint conference. In this way one might achieve an embryonic representation of public opinion and so would enable Military Government to check on the activity of its German officials and to prevent isolated officials suddenly coming up with their own knowledge.

7. 3. 47

In selecting advisors from amongst the German civilian population, the official of military headquarters would be well advised explicitly to choose men whose character and past record were necessarily in keeping with the military situation. In this way he would demonstrate to the German population our preference for the German civilian without committing military government to the support of any political party, or group. Here again it must be stressed that continuity of policy will compel recourse sooner or later to some such form of advisory committee.

1. BACKGROUND

1. (With reference to (2) above). That a directive be issued re-defining the objects of our occupation, with special reference to the post-war period; and re-grading the priority of these objects in the light of military requirements.

A directive priority list is: (1) to induce in the German civilian in occupied territories acceptance and obedience to our orders; (2) thereby to reduce the number of German troops necessary; (3) to assist in the output of key industries and essential services; (4) to establish the puppet German administration at least that degree of efficiency which will prevent immediate civil disorder; (5) to assist the civilian population at least that degree of efficiency which will enable them standing to support the puppet administration; (6) by the use of the puppet administration to conduct the effect of anti-propaganda in the German army in its weakened spirit of resistance.

2. (With reference to 4 (a) (i) (b) (c) above). That a directive be issued to establish that military requirements supersede economic policy in occupied areas, directed (a) to prevent full industrial output and industrial efficiency by enabling military operations; (b) to prevent unrest and sabotage by maintaining as far as possible employment in industrial areas.

3. (With reference to 4 (d) above). That a directive be issued to the puppet administration to assist in the output of key industries and essential services.

4. (With reference to 4 (e) above). That 2-5 and 6-10 be instructed to prepare special guidance on the methods of selecting personnel to replace units.

5. (With reference to 4 (f) above). That 2-5 and 6-10 be instructed to prepare jointly a special guidance on the methods of selecting personnel to replace units. The German population will be instructed to prepare special guidance on the methods of selecting personnel to replace units. The German population will be instructed to prepare special guidance on the methods of selecting personnel to replace units. The German population will be instructed to prepare special guidance on the methods of selecting personnel to replace units.

B.

6. (With reference to 4 (g) above). That a directive be issued indicating the methods to be employed by Military Government for keeping in contact with representative German public opinion, and thus enabling itself to anticipate and prevent unrest and disorder.

Robert A. McCune
ROBERT A. MCCUNE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

DISTRIBUTION

Deputy Chief of Staff (5)

6 4047

SECRET

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

4 October, 1944.

SUBJECT: P.W. Policy and Information Memorandum No. 1.

TO: P & P.I., 1st Army Group (1)
P & P.I., 2nd Army Group (2)
G-2, 1st Army Group, 1st P.W. (3)
P.W. Division, Headquarters, 1st P.W. (4)
P.W. Division (5): copy to P.W. Division, 1st P.W. (6)

1. POLICY.

Guidance to 1st Army Group.

- a. The phrase "Military Government" will only become appropriate when full control of Germany is established. Until then, the Government of occupied Germany should be known simply as "Military Government".
- b. German troops should be encouraged to surrender, not to put on civilian clothes or dispersed to their homes.
- c. Steps should be taken to prevent Germans offering military information.
- d. No promise of economic assistance must be made to the Germans. On the other hand, we should not exclude the possibility of such assistance, if it is rendered necessary by military requirements.
- e. Propaganda should conform to our policy of non-fraternization with the German people.
- f. Propaganda must make no special appeal to any German group, religious or political. That, of course, does not exclude propaganda addressed to industrial workers and peasants.
- g. In selecting German personnel for the Information Services the only criticism beyond opposition to Nazism is competence. Although no anti-Nazi group as such must receive recognition or privilege, it must be possible to select suitable persons on the basis of their competence.
- h. German civilians should be advised that in the event of bombing they should take to their shelters or go out temporarily into the streets, but not evacuate the district.
- i. Steps taken against civilian enemy snipers should be described in all publicity media as strictly military operations, not as reprisals.

2. Information

Nil

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
J. W. Butler
16 Aug 1945
Lt. General, G-2
Chief, Psychological Warfare Div.

4 OCT

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO:

Date 30 Sept 44

Chief, Psychological Warfare

Please note chief of Staff
comment on the attached
report:

"I hope these PW people
are busy at Calais."

H. G. H. P.
For F.T.

6 1029

SG-SHAF File No 091.412/3

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO:

Date 29 Sept 1944

- (1) General Morgan F.E.M. 30/9
- (1) General Smith W.B.S.

For information

H. F.T.

I hope these P.W. people
are busy at Calais

6 1030 H. W.B.S.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

27 September 1944

SUBJECT: Extracts 21 Army Group Report on operations for
period 14 Sept. - 24 Sept. 1944.

TO : Chief of Staff

1. The following extracts from the subject report for your
information:

"Combat Propaganda"

"LE HAVRE"

"(a)

"(b) Activities Loudspeaker Team

September the loudspeaker assigned to brigade locality and a suitable broadcasting site was found. At 2100 hrs a broadcast was made and repeated four times. As a direct result of these broadcasts 18 of enemy surrendered during the night. The following extract from 1 Corps Intelligence Summary refers to this: "The only information to add to our knowledge of the garrison LE HAVRE prisoners, who, convinced by our amplifier unit, to desert." That the broadcasts of 6 September had a more far-reaching than surrender of 18 prisoners proved after the fall of garrison by documents showing that they compelled the enemy commander to all doubtful elements outpost positions and replace them with the garrison. Consequently, when our assault overran the enemy's forward positions there no staunch troops left the defenses in the city itself. Group interrogations of the 18 prisoners who surrendered on 6/7 September showed that the broadcasts had been heard at a 2,000 metres.

1031 "(c) of Results of PW Operations.

"When LE HAVRE fell September, 11,300 of garrison approximately 12,000 surrendered good health spirits. is clear beyond doubt that the garrison did NOT fight until its capabilities were exhausted. The Corps which undertook the investment acknowledged the notable part played by Psychological Warfare in achieving this result and the GSO PW was personally thanked by the Corps Commander.

While it is impossible to assess the relative credit of leaflets and broadcasts in this success, it is clear that the broadcasts of 6 September, which resulted in committing the garrison reserve to forward positions, contributed greatly as of the final assault, while the early surrender of the garrison when it was still physically capable of fighting show that general softening effect of PW operations as a whole have been considerable."

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, Major,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

SUS CHIEF File No.

041412/13

27 Sept

NO. 1000-1-1000

ORIGINATORS FILE No. _____

SHAFF MESSAGE FORM

CALL CIRCUIT No. PRIORITY TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

NR

SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM (A) **PWD** ORIGINATOR DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN **SEP 1 121500Z**

TO FOR ACTION **ADWAR** MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS **GR**

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO) (REF NO.) **7WD N173** (CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET EYES ONLY**

E.O. Out No. 207

SECRET

PWD activity in May of Marshall

*1015.26
1021.17*

EYES ONLY

SHAFFSGS File No. 091412/3

DISTRIBUTION: NCMB 6 1031	COORDINATED WITH: THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION	Procedure	SE 1000-1-1000 30	Opr.
	INITIALS THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS	PRIORITY ORIGINATING DIVISION Chief of Staff NAME AND RANK TYPED TEL NO. LT COL G. L. BURGESS 29 AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE	TIME CLEARED	23 SEP.

NAVAL

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- 2 -

6 1034

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- 2 - no inventory, dependent on 1
- 5 - CG, Pacific Army Group
- 20 - Psychological Warfare Division, CG, Pacific Army Group
- 5 - Hq. 21 Army Group
- 1 - Canadian Military Headquarters
- 1 - Supreme Allied Command, Mediterranean
- 1 - Allied Naval Command, Mediterranean Force
- 1 - Jt. C. in C. Allied Expeditionary Force
- 1 - CG, European Theater of Operations
- 1 - Hqs, Pan European
- 3 - War Office
- 20 - Addressee (Sixth Army Group)

ATTENTION:
War Office

NO 001, 112-1, 112-102, and 21 September 1945

APPENDIX A to
AG OJL 412-1 FID-404
dtd 21 September 1944
For Sixth Army Group

COMBAT PROPAGANDA

COMBAT PROPAGANDA

1. Combat propaganda comprises:
 - a. In accordance with Supreme Headquarters A. E. F. Directives, military and disciplinary, by various means, except as described in paragraph 7, below, limited reference to:
 - (1) Enemy forces generally within the zone of operations of Sixth Army Group.
 - (2) Specific enemy formations including NON-GERMAN units.
 - (3) The civil population behind the enemy lines.
 - b. Oral propaganda by loudspeakers.
 - c. The obtaining of psychological warfare intelligence by interrogation of prisoners of war and civilians. High priority will be accorded to:
 - (1) The supply of special psychological warfare intelligence to our propaganda.
 - (2) Examining prisoners of war for special interrogation by this headquarters.
 - (3) Marking prisoners of war for broadcasting purposes.
 - d. Radio broadcasts of a tactical nature to enemy forces.
2. The dissemination of A. E. F. Directives by aircraft operating from bases forward of army rear boundaries will be a Sixth Army Group responsibility.
3. Sixth Army Group will provide liaison with this headquarters for coordinating tactical leaflet plans during all phases.

COORDINATION ACTIVITIES

4. Sixth Army Group responsibility for these activities comprises:
 - a. The obtaining of intelligence on civilian morale. This will be accorded high priority.

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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
BY [Signature]
DATE 16 APR 45
[Signature]

C/

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

b. Dissemination of notices and news-objects, including the dissemination of information required in the conduct of civil affairs activities.

c. Oral address by loudspeakers.

d. Monitoring of Supreme Headquarters A. I. I. news file and British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts for further dissemination.

e. Reconnaissance of facilities for the production of news-papers by local officials and in conjunction with the National Authorities, furnishing assistance for initial publication and distribution of selected newspapers. Such publications will be subject to field press censorship until such time as this responsibility is assigned to the National Authorities.

f. Reconnaissance of cinema facilities and film requirements for Supreme Headquarters A. I. I. information.

g. Assistance of forward distribution of publications supplied by this headquarters.

5. The following services will be performed by this headquarters:

a. Special intelligence and guidance.

b. Provision of technical assistance teams to inspect and report to this headquarters on the conduct of fixed broadcasting trans-mitters in liberated areas of the combat zone.

c. Radio broadcasts from base or from fixed or mobile radio broadcasting transmitters operating in the areas to the rear of the rear boundary of action.

d. Leaflets loaded in U. K. or from trains enroute in areas to the rear of enemy headquarters.

e. Psychological warfare agents (any agents recruited in the theater will be cleared by Counter Intelligence before being put to work).

f. Rumors.

h. News Service. This will consist of a News File, broadcast at operation speed. At such times as frequencies become available, this

headquarters will broadcast an additional News File in Morse, and a monitored digest of enemy broadcasts, including communications.

i. Local Press: provision of personnel to assist in conjunction with the National Authorities, the publication of local newspapers. Such publications will be subject to field press censorship until such time as

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

this responsibility has been assigned to the National Authorities.

1. Publications and display material.

6. If, in the area forward of the rear boundaries of armies, facilities exist for operating fixed broadcasting transmitters, or opportunities arise for the employment of mobile broadcasting transmitters, and if tactical emergencies arise calling for the employment of such transmitters by Sixth Army Group, special care will be taken to insure that such broadcasts fall within the limits of Supreme Headquarters A. E. F. directives. Any use of such transmitters for strategic broadcasting or broadcasting regular programs will be the responsibility of this headquarters.

7. Psychological Warfare Division, this headquarters, will disseminate leaflets addressed to the German armed forces and to the civil population behind the lines as the situation requires and in consonance with existing directives. Leaflets will be addressed to specific enemy units or on specific tactical situations in the zone of action of your command only with your approval.

8. G/1 (I.b) Staffs will be consulted in special cases on the security aspect of press and broadcasting materials.

● **RESTRICTED** ●

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

21 September 1944

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff

I would appreciate it if you would take the time to read the attached report.

Read.

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

1 Incl.
Report on PWD/AIS
Operations

6 1036

RESTRICTED

SOS-SHAFF File No. 091.412/3

21 Sept

RESTRICTED

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED INFORMATION SERVICE

POSTAL ADDRESS:
Hq. 6805th Allied Information
Service Gp Hq (Prov)
APO 887-1

SUBJECT: Report on PWD/AIS Operations in Paris

TO : Commanding General
SHAEP Military Mission to France

FROM : Chief, PWD/AIS, SHAEP

Selected PWD/SHAEP and 12 Army Group PW personnel were placed on temporary duty orders, 20 August, under the P & PW Section of the Special T Force designed for Paris. This group entered Paris on 25 August, completed its temporary duty on 3rd September when the personnel was reassigned to Central Group of Armies and to PWD/SHAEP. The PWD/SHAEP personnel remaining in Paris and other liberated French territory are called the Allied Information Service (AIS).

The PW mission of the T Force, and subsequently PWD/AIS, had two main objectives:

1. To utilize available facilities and information in Paris for SHAEP psychological warfare against the enemy.
2. To assist French authorities in reestablishing the French information services, and in so doing, to safeguard the interests of the SCAEP.

To accomplish this mission a small, specially trained and experienced staff has established good working relations with the appropriate French authorities, particularly the French Ministry of Information. It has truthfully stated that PWD/AIS has obtained the respect, understanding and cooperation of the French authorities despite difficulties created by several changes in the French Ministry of Information. Since French Government control of the French information services is centered in Paris, it has been necessary for the PWD/AIS personnel located here to direct AIS personnel throughout liberated France. A detailed report on the personnel, space and other administrative problems of PWD/AIS, SHAEP is being forwarded separately in reply to the request of the Commanding General, Seine Section, Com Z.

In order to acquaint you with our operations, following is a brief description of PWD/AIS, SHAEP activities in the Paris area:

1. Press

PWD/AIS has:

- (a) assisted the French press to get on its own feet and, at the same time, assisted the Allied military authorities in presenting their views to the French population. This has

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involved working with the press authorities under the Minister of Information, the French press agency, "Agence Francaise de Presse", and 15 daily Paris newspapers and 5 Paris weeklies;

(b) surveyed the newsprint facilities and stocks of French publications; and through G-5 requested newsprint from the UK and USA to keep the French press going;

(c) supplied the French press with the information required by the Allied military authorities; for example, statements on food, travel and the Allied armies and the war effort. It is noteworthy that the French press makes some 20 to 25 requests daily to us on material concerning the Allied war effort;

(d) established a news clipping service from Allied sources and furnished to the French press which has requested it.

2. Radio PWD/AIS has:

(a) performed a double radio service: i. to the BBC European Service and ABSIE for propaganda material against the enemy, and ii. to the Radiodiffusion Nationale Francaise, the French radio authority. The service to BBC and ABSIE has consisted of material of strategic propaganda value rather than ordinary current news handled by accredited commercial war correspondents;

(b) serviced BBC and ABSIE thus far by transmitting to them: 16 program periods in French, German, Danish, English, and 16 recorded program periods

(c) serviced Radiodiffusion Nationale Francaise by: i. assisting the French to clear their radio transmitter frequencies in accordance with the SCAEF plan; ii. surveying the French studio and transmitter facilities and thereafter arranging for the shipment from the UK of urgently needed equipment and providing technical engineering advice to reestablish French radio. iii. servicing the French radio with two reporters, British and American, speaking French on Allied civil and military matters; iv. arranging a radio exchange program series between BBC, ABSIE and French radio.

(d) arranged for the broadcasting of announcements required by Civil Affairs and Seine Base Section.

3. Films

Since the French Provisional Government has banned the films of the German occupation, the French at this time are nearly entirely dependent upon the Allies for films.

PWD/SHAEP has:

(a) prepared stocks of selected films with French titles for liberated territories with the approval of the French authorities.

(b) opened a film exchange for servicing some 365 theatres in the Paris area.

(c) arranged, with the approval of the French authorities, for the opening of two theatres, the Normandie █ Gaumont, with a total seating capacity of 8,000, in which █ reels █ currently being shown.

4. Publications █ Display

PWD/AIS has:

(a) entered into a contract, through the French Ministry of Information, with the Rachette and Maison du Livre agencies, French distribution agencies, for the distribution of Allied █ French publications in the Paris area, █ the rest of France.

(b) supplied the above distribution agencies with a considerable amount of Allied publications in French prepared in the UK █ USA. █ of September 15, 400,000 copies of Allied publications have been sold in France.

(c) begun to prepare a large display room █ 23 Rue █ la Paix, first floor, as an Allied information center, in which Parisians may find information regarding the Allies.

5. Intelligence

(a) a specially trained Intelligence Section which obtains political █ economic information for the Political Advisors to the SCAEP, Civil Affairs, the Seine Base Section, Com 2, █ wall as PWD/SCAEP Main Headquarters. By directive PWD/AIS furnishes Civil Affairs with its civil intelligence.

(b) conducted a special survey of food in Paris, the black █ and tested the results of Allied propaganda.

(c) upon first arriving in Paris, searched about 100 specially selected places for enemy documents. Although the enemy █ destroyed most of its important documents, █ found thousands of books, pamphlets, posters, letters and other documents of the enemy which █ still being examined. Among the important documents obtained were lists of French collaborationists, which █ over to CIC █ the French Secret Service. In searching the chief █ propaganda office for France, █ found examples of every single █ of propaganda publication which Germany has utilized in occupied France. A copy of each █ sent to SCAEP, the British Museum █ the Library of Congress.

6. Photo █ News Coverage

PWD/AIS has:

(a) been the only picture agency bringing pictures into █ from the outside world. These pictures have been distributed

RESTRICTED

to French press which heretofore has had practically no photographic service. In addition they have been distributed to Stars and Stripes, the U. S. Army troop newspaper, which has been issued in our propaganda output to the enemy.

(c) distributed to French newspapers plastic plates as a substitute for engravings which many French newspapers do not have for photographs.

(d) served as the official releasing agency in France for official U. S. and British Army pictures. We are already receiving more than 90 photographs from London each day for distribution in France.

(e) a small number of photographers whose duties are to take photographs of particular PW interest as distinguished from those of the ordinary photographers. They have taken picture story documentations of 23 stories which have been widely used in France and in strategic propaganda from London.

(f) a few correspondents who have covered the Paris news particularly from the point of view of PW. This was found necessary because the Allied war correspondents do not angle their reports for distribution in liberated or occupied or enemy territory, but rather to their home constituencies in the UK and USA.

7. Service to Allied Military Authorities in Paris

PWD/ALS has:

(a) been the channel for bringing to the French population the statements and requirements of the Allied military authorities in Paris. In this capacity we have been functioning as public relations officers, specializing in French relations, most particularly for Civil Affairs and the Seine Section, Com. Z.

(b) arranged for a series of Civil Affairs statements to the French Public.

(c) arranged for Gen. Rogers statement on V.I., food, travel, and American troop participation in the black market.

(d) assisted both Civil Affairs and the Seine Section, which have called upon our Intelligence Section for their special problems, particularly in connection with the food situation in Paris, relationship between the French and American troops, disputes between French and American agencies over property.

8. German Language Propaganda

Taking advantage of the excellent German print and press facilities available in Paris, a regular leaflet newspaper to troops called "Frontpost", has been published by personnel stationed

5.

with PWD/AIS by the Central Group of Armies. This leaflet newspaper carries the SHAEF propaganda line to the German troops, is published 3 times per week in a total number of 300,000 copies, and distributed by fighter bomber to the German troops.

(b) A few million leaflets in German addressed to the German army and population have been published in Paris [redacted] then distributed over their targets.

C. D. Jackson
Chief, PWD/AIS, [redacted]

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

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FROM : [REDACTED] FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF

■ FOR ACTION. JSM WASHINGTON

FOR INFO : SHAEN

NO : 02-4793, 28 1944

cos(W) 284.

Reference JBM-200. *As of 12/1/77*

We agree with US view that present time not appropriate for issue of statement proposed in SCAP 58-174 (W 86575 [redacted] refers) [redacted] have informed SHAEP and Foreign Office.

Ref-JSM-200 is not identified in SHAFF █ files
W-86575 is █ IN 4811, 26/8/44. PWD
SCAF 55 Ref S-55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7 /44. PWD

ACTION

INFORMATION

P7D

SGS

9-23

PEAK

4218 WILKINSON

AND PHILLIPS

SHAEP FND

RECORDS

6 1045

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ENC IN 5506

29 Aug 45

132

VAN, J.

FBI NO: 02-4793

COPY NO

The work of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* is published by the American Statistical Association, 1000 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

b 26

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAEF File No. 691,412/3

CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
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A.G.D.
Date 28 AUG 1975

6 1045

Date _____

TO:

Cap: 1000000

16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256, 258, 260, 262, 264, 266, 268, 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, 282, 284, 286, 288, 290, 292, 294, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 312, 314, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 326, 328, 330, 332, 334, 336, 338, 340, 342, 344, 346, 348, 350, 352, 354, 356, 358, 360, 362, 364, 366, 368, 370, 372, 374, 376, 378, 380, 382, 384, 386, 388, 390, 392, 394, 396, 398, 400, 402, 404, 406, 408, 410, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422, 424, 426, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442, 444, 446, 448, 450, 452, 454, 456, 458, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 474, 476, 478, 480, 482, 484, 486, 488, 490, 492, 494, 496, 498, 500, 502, 504, 506, 508, 510, 512, 514, 516, 518, 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 530, 532, 534, 536, 538, 540, 542, 544, 546, 548, 550, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560, 562, 564, 566, 568, 570, 572, 574, 576, 578, 580, 582, 584, 586, 588, 590, 592, 594, 596, 598, 600, 602, 604, 606, 608, 610, 612, 614, 616, 618, 620, 622, 624, 626, 628, 630, 632, 634, 636, 638, 640, 642, 644, 646, 648, 650, 652, 654, 656, 658, 660, 662, 664, 666, 668, 670, 672, 674, 676, 678, 680, 682, 684, 686, 688, 690, 692, 694, 696, 698, 700, 702, 704, 706, 708, 710, 712, 714, 716, 718, 720, 722, 724, 726, 728, 730, 732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 748, 750, 752, 754, 756, 758, 760, 762, 764, 766, 768, 770, 772, 774, 776, 778, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790, 792, 794, 796, 798, 800, 802, 804, 806, 808, 810, 812, 814, 816, 818, 820, 822, 824, 826, 828, 830, 832, 834, 836, 838, 840, 842, 844, 846, 848, 850, 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 862, 864, 866, 868, 870, 872, 874, 876, 878, 880, 882, 884, 886, 888, 890, 892, 894, 896, 898, 900, 902, 904, 906, 908, 910, 912, 914, 916, 918, 920, 922, 924, 926, 928, 930, 932, 934, 936, 938, 940, 942, 944, 946, 948, 950, 952, 954, 956, 958, 960, 962, 964, 966, 968, 970, 972, 974, 976, 978, 980, 982, 984, 986, 988, 990, 992, 994, 996, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1012, 1014, 1016, 1018, 1020, 1022, 1024, 1026, 1028, 1030, 1032, 1034, 1036, 1038, 1040, 1042, 1044, 1046, 1048, 1050, 1052, 1054, 1056, 1058, 1060, 1062, 1064, 1066, 1068, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1078, 1080, 1082, 1084, 1086, 1088, 1090, 1092, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1100, 1102, 1104, 1106, 1108, 1110, 1112, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1120, 1122, 1124, 1126, 1128, 1130, 1132, 1134, 1136, 1138, 1140, 1142, 1144, 1146, 1148, 1150, 1152, 1154, 1156, 1158, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1166, 1168, 1170, 1172, 1174, 1176, 1178, 1180, 1182, 1184, 1186, 1188, 1190, 1192, 1194, 1196, 1198, 1200, 1202, 1204, 1206, 1208, 1210, 1212, 1214, 1216, 1218, 1220, 1222, 1224, 1226, 1228, 1230, 1232, 1234, 1236, 1238, 1240, 1242, 1244, 1246, 1248, 1250, 1252, 1254, 1256, 1258, 1260, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1272, 1274, 1276, 1278, 1280, 1282, 1284, 1286, 1288, 1290, 1292, 1294, 1296, 1298, 1300, 1302, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1312, 1314, 1316, 1318, 1320, 1322, 1324, 1326, 1328, 1330, 1332, 1334, 1336, 1338, 1340, 1342, 1344, 1346, 1348, 1350, 1352, 1354, 1356, 1358, 1360, 1362, 1364, 1366, 1368, 1370, 1372, 1374, 1376, 1378, 1380, 1382, 1384, 1386, 1388, 1390, 1392, 1394, 1396, 1398, 1400, 1402, 1404, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1412, 1414, 1416, 1418, 1420, 1422, 1424, 1426, 1428, 1430, 1432, 1434, 1436, 1438, 1440, 1442, 1444, 1446, 1448, 1450, 1452, 1454, 1456, 1458, 1460, 1462, 1464, 1466, 1468, 1470, 1472, 1474, 1476, 1478, 1480, 1482, 1484, 1486, 1488, 1490, 1492, 1494, 1496, 1498, 1500, 1502, 1504, 1506, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1514, 1516, 1518, 1520, 1522, 1524, 1526, 1528, 1530, 1532, 1534, 1536, 1538, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546, 1548, 1550, 1552, 1554, 1556, 15

Wx 8/7/01 (FAC 157)

17 (5559)

A. R. HARRIS

AVANCE

b 1050

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

WAR

TGC - 1722006 August

SACF 67/18
TOR - 180455 August
ed - 180645B

S E C R E T

P R I O R I T Y

FROM : AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : SHAEF FOR EISENHOWER
REF NO : W-82374, 17 August, 1944.

1. $\frac{1}{2} \times 10 = 5$

THIS FILE 10JUN68
PAGE 55

Your SCAP 55 has been studied, and because of the political implications in your proposal it has been referred to the State Department and the Foreign Office.

ACTION : FWD

INFORMATION : SGS #4
G-2
G-3
S C/S BRIG JACOB
EMBASSADOR PHILLIPS
MR PEAKE
AMBASSADOR WINANT
AG RECORDS

AG RECORDS								
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FB IN 2083 18 AUG '44 0700H HFK/RS REF NO: W-52374

S E C R E T

SGS ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secretariat file copy

Draft of Proclamation for ■■■

30 July 1944

SGS-SHAEF File No. 071412

1 SGS
FWD

FWD

30 July
1944

For necessary action.

FORD TRIMBLE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary, General Staff.
1 Incl.
Ltr fr H.F. Hensley to
SG dtd 20 July '44, ■■■ draft of
proclamation.
JWA/sna

FH 531

DATE SIGNED: 30 July
DATE MAILED: 30 July

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SGS DISTRIBUTION

SHAEF

X 691.412 ✓

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

Col. Trimble
Exec Control O
Ops Group ✓
Admin Group
Misc Group
SMC
Stats Sec
Hist Sec

INCOMING MESSAGE

SHAEF 200/26
FOR 261620B JULY
UA 261624B JULY

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : ADVANCE P AND PW AGP
TO : SHAEF PWD
REF NO : PPW-27, 26 JULY 1944

Mr. H. ...
Col. Brewster
Smith

Your 221705B.

1. Steps taken secure compliance previous instructions supply PW material. Details follow by mail.
2. Have spoken C-in-C about leaflets. These now cleared - regards 2 BR Army.

Suggest you advise me when there is major policy change concerning leaflets dropped - 21 Army Gp front so that I can inform C-in-C.

221705B is SMC-OUT-2371, 23/7/44, PWD

ACTION: PWD
INFORMATION: SCS
G-2
G-3
SHAEF FWD
AG RECORDS

SMC-IN-9433 26 July 44 1815B JGB/t Ref No: PPW-27

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SGS-SHAFF file No. 091.412/3

THE MARKING OF AN ENCLAVE OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORWARDED

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DATE

FILED 212133Z JULY

SHAEF 169/82

TOR 221159 JULY

VLS - 221238Z JULY

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : JSM WASHINGTON
 TO : AMSSO
 PASSED TO : SHAEF FOR INFORMATION.
 REF NO : 12 5297 21 JULY 1944
 JSM 150.

Reference COS (W) 185.

Proposals contained in SCAP 55 are being considered by Combined Staff Planners in collaboration with PW experts in WASHINGTON. Results of meetings so far have already been communicated to LONDON on a planning level. If views of LONDON P.W. experts are returned on a similar level they can be incorporated in Planners report to CGS.

COS(W) 185 Ref OZ 3872 is SMC IN 8708, 22/7/44. JSM
 SCAP 55 Ref S-55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, PWD

ACTION : AMSSO

INFORMATION : SGS
 G-2
 G-3
 PWD
 MR PEASE
 AMB. PHILLIPS
 AMB. WIRANT
 SHAEF PWD
 **
 AG RECORDS

SMC IN 8707 22 July 44 1401B ENL/lp REF NO: JSM 150

b 1055

SECRET

SHAEF File No. 09410/3 21 JULY 1944

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SHAEP

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DELS

FILED 221530Z JULY


SHAEP 161/22

FOR 221159 JULY

VLS - 221240Z JULY

~~TOP SECRET~~
ROUTINE

FROM : AMSSO
TO : JSM WASHINGTON
PASSED TO : SHAEP FOR INFORMATION
REF NO : OZ 3872 21 JULY 1944



CCS (K) 185 - 522 12 July 44

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference CCS (K) 159 and ZO.170.

Please invite U.S. G.O.S. to agree that proposals contained in SCAF 52 should be referred to psychological warfare experts in WASHINGTON and LONDON for examination, and for the drafting of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CCS (W) 159 is SMC IN 7022, 12/7/44, JSM WASHINGTON.
ZO 170 not identified in SHAEP SMC files.
SCAF 52 Ref 8-55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, PWD.

ACTION : JSM WASHINGTON

INFORMATION : SCS PWD
G-2 MR PEAKE
G-3 ANB. PHILLIPS
AF RECORDS

AMB. WINANT
SHAEP PWD
**

SMC IN 8708 22 July 44 1400B FNL/des REF NO: OZ-3872

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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File No. 21502-1

21502-1

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BY 535 of

COS (44) 230 NAC (0), item 10
dated n *June*
COS (44) (0)
dated

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

~~G-1~~

G-2

G-3

~~G-4~~

G-4 (Inv. & In)

~~G-5~~

Public Relations Div.

AMCOR

AMAR (Direct Distribution)

EAC

Political Advisors

Px/D.

6 1057

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible][illegible]

1990

100% 100% 100%

(c) - The report of the Joint Staff Mission
indicating that both the British and the
United States had learned Electrophone's
location in March of last year.

(b) $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$ the probability of getting heads in two successive tosses.

4-2000 95 2 5026 00 000(00) 425

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DRLS

POC 1175328 JMLN

SHAEF 126/23
TOR 230329Z JULY
BT 230840B

S E C R E T

P R E O R I T Y

FROM : JSM WASHINGTON
TO : AMESO
PASSED TO : SHAEF FOR INFO
REF NO : ZO 17C, 11 July 1944

May we please have your views on SCAR? 5

SCAF 55 1: SMC OUT 1749 10/7/44, PWD
Attention invited to OZ 3872 SMC IN 6708, 22/7/44, JSM WASH

ACTION : ANSSO

INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3
FWD
MR FRANK
AMS PHILLIPS
AMS WILKINSON
STAFF FWD
AG RECORDS

SNC IN 8861 23 July 1944 0845B DWR/jes REF NO: 20-170

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COPY NO 23

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DRIS

200 111955Z JULY

SHAEF 166/12
TOR 121813 JULY
RJB 121830 JULY

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : A.M.S. S.O. FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF.
TO : J.S.M., WASHINGTON.
PASSED TO : SHAEF FOR INFO.
REF NO : 02 3651 11 JULY 1944.

COS(W) 159

Reference SCAP 55.

We do not think that the time has yet
arrived for the proposal contained in above telegram
to be implemented.

SCAP-55 REF 55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44. FWD

ACTION : JSM WASHINGTON

INFORMATION: SGS
G-3
FWD
G-2
MR PEAKE
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WINANT
SHAEF FWD
AG RECORDS
**

SMC IN 7022 12 JULY 44 19163 VAN/daw REF NO: 02-3651

SECRET

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SGS-SHAEF File No. 291411/3

11 JULY

SECRET

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SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL/1201

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FROM : UNITY, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-55312

SCAF 55

It is considered that we are approaching the psychological climax of the war and a decisive demonstration of military unity between the Western, Southern and Eastern Fronts may well turn flagging GERMAN morale into rapid demoralization. This is likely to be true NOT only of the GERMAN home front but of the GERMAN troops, whose relatively high fighting morale recently shows significant slackening.

It is proposed therefore that on a date to be synchronized by the three Headquarters, Orders of the Day be issued by General EISENHOWER, Marshal STALIN and General MONTGOMERY to their armies. These orders would NOT be identical but would contain the following points:

- (A) Allied successes on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts.
- (B) In face of this combined attack GERMANY is finished as a military power and the GERMAN High Command knows it.
- (C) Let the Allied fighting men make a great combined effort to finish the job.
- (D) Into that combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm of the industrial workers.
- (E) The final battle has begun.

These orders should, ideally, be issued at the same hour but, short of that, on the same day so that the unity of intention will be manifest. This would be immediately followed

SMC OUT 1779

11 JUL 47

SECRET

28 AUG 47

COPY NO.

21 JUL 47

28

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SECRET
SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

REF NO: S-55312 (C) 10 July 1944

OUTGOING MESSAGE

by a concerted psychological warfare campaign on the basis that "the war is lost, all is up."

Orders would, on release, be broadcast in GERMAN on all available transmissions from RUSSIA, the MEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED KINGDOM to impress on the GERMAN mind the idea of concerted and concentric action.

With the fall of CHERBOURG and continuing successes in ITALY, ideal timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has been gained in the West such as a break out from the bridgehead area. Also if the release of these orders should occur several days before the surrender of FINLAND or ROUMANIA, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and the occupation of GERMANY from all sides is seen to follow.

If the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve this proposal it is requested they secure concurrence of the Russians and advise SACMED of the approved proposal.

Upon approval, the exact timing of the publication of the three Orders of the Day would be recommended by SHAEF directly to the Russians through the Military Missions and to SACMED through British Chiefs of Staff.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: R.A. McCLEURE,
BRIG. GENERAL

INFORMATION : SGS
G-3
EC/S BRIG JACOB
G-2
MR PEAKE
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WINANT
SHAEF FWD
AG RECORDS

COORDINATED : G-3, Mr. Peake,
AMB Winant, C/S

SMC-OUT 1779 10 July 44 1810B VAN/lp REF NO: S-55312
700, 101200B

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

PW0/1163

IN THE CLEAR

ROUTINE

TO : AFHQ
FROM : SHAEF
REF TO : NONE

today.

This is the text referred to in OUT cable of

Soldier!

If you come over to the Allied side, you will be recently and fairly treated.

You will receive excellent food - the same which the Allied soldiers receive.

Remember that the Allies are your friends. Don't believe what the Germans are telling, they are lying to you.

Whether you come over to us or are captured in honest battle, the treatment will be good and generous.

Only make it clear to our soldiers that you are surrendering. Raise your arms when approaching. Take off your helmets.

Keep this leaflet. Show it to the Allied soldiers to whom you are surrendering.

ATTENTION DRAWN TO S-55227, SMC OUT 1698, 9/7/44 PWD

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: E.B. JORDAN, LT, COL.

INFORMATION: SGS D-2 SHAEF PWD NG RECORDS

SMC OUT 1699 JULY 1944 OC07B JOB/jc Ref No: NONE
FOO : 081630B

b 10C IN THE CLEAR

COPY 1

305-SHAEF File No. 0914123

9 JULY

SECRET

COORDINATING NUMBER SLIP
(STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL)

(CLASSIFICATION)

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: IN Directive

DATE: 7 JULY 1944

REMARKS: This slip is to be used for the purpose of coordinating the message with all concerned.

NO.	From	To	Date	REMARKS
1	PWD SHAEP	Secy.G/S SHAEP	7 July 1944	Has this paper been coordinated with all concerned? For the personal attention of Gen. Smith, please. <i>R. J. McChesney</i> ROBERT J. McCHESNEY Brigadier General, G.S.C., USA Chief, Psychological Warfare Division
				Too late for full value to C/S File <i>JMM</i> Acc. 322-2000

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305-SHAEF File No. 0914123

SECRET

COPY No. 1

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION.

DIRECTIVE No. 4.
(Week beginning Thursday, 6th July, 1944)

NOTE: THIS DIRECTIVE IS PERSONAL TO THE INDIVIDUAL WHOSE NUMBER IT BEARS AND HE OR SHE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SAFE CUSTODY. IT MUST NOT BE SHOWN TO ANYONE ELSE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE SECURITY OFFICER.

I. WEHRMACHT.

A. THE WEEK'S PRINCIPAL TASK.

While the battle of Caen is being fought out this week, our main task is to bring to a peak those feelings and attitudes in the German soldier and officer which will produce large scale surrenders. We have two targets - the troops in the Caen area and the troops below the Cotentin Peninsula.

B. GUIDANCE - GENERAL.

1. Use the fall of Minsk to show that the way is open for a double Soviet attack across Poland to Germany itself. (One development may be directed at Brest-Litovsk, in which case it would serve as the right of a pincer in conjunction with a new attack from the South, or alternatively it might be aimed straight for Koenigsberg and would thus effectively cut off all German forces in the Baltic States.) Mark up daily the diminishing distance between the Russian armies and the traditional frontiers of the Reich.
2. Build up significance of the battle of Caen as of decisive importance in the destruction of the Wehrmacht.
3. Maintain in news and commentary the threat to the Pas de Calais.
4. Keep General Bradley's attack well up in the news, capitalising any progress made but refraining from speculation as to the development of the operation.
5. Keep Cherbourg in the news. Stress its potential value. The American expert, Commodore Sullivan, who restored the Italian ports is already at work.
6. Make clear that we have complete tactical initiative, and this among other things is responsible for the ~~our~~ wasteful use of tanks, and their piecemeal attacks dictated by our initiative are resulting in great losses.
7. Maintain all appeals to transport workers for sabotage of communications, both rail and road. As far as possible, specific operations should be mentioned in leaflets.
8. Link the battle with our air attacks on oil plants throughout Europe.
9. There should be wide and constant cross reporting of the ~~the~~ phase in FID/CMI propaganda to foreign workers in Germany.

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NO LONGER CHANGED

CONFIDENTIAL

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1 AUG 1944

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C. GUIDANCE FOR POTENTIAL PRISONERS.

10. Report constantly the cumulative daily totals of the prisoners captured on each of the three fronts, East, West and Italy. (From the opening of the United Nations' summer offensives (May 11th) to July 3rd they totalled almost 150,000). The basic theme should be that Germans are being captured at a higher rate than the average of the last 100 days of 1918.

11. Encourage the recruits of 17-18 to turn to the older enlisted men for advice and example.

12. Point out the realism which has led many senior officers to bow to superior force. Our propaganda should enable German troops to rationalise their capture in terms of our overwhelming force.

13. Point out that it is primarily the junior officers with their arrogance and inexperience who are insisting on futile suicidal resistance.

14. Use constantly such material as was in the leaflet 'Propaganda und Wirklichkeit' to contrast propaganda boasts with military failures.

15. Continue to point out the inadequacy of the Luftwaffe in the battle area.

16. The strength and effectiveness of our fire power, naval, land, and air should be constantly emphasised. (e.g. von Schlieffen's statement)

17. Report all evidence of qualitative deficiencies in weapons and munitions and quantitative deficiencies in weapons, munitions, and manpower. The explanations offered by the OKW itself for these qualitative deficiencies were:

- a. The rapid expansion of output by mass production methods coincidentally with widespread use of substitute materials;
- b. The introduction of new types of ammunition without adequate trials in the field;
- c. The transfer of manufacturing facilities to new areas;
- d. Lack of skilled workmen.

18. Constantly link events on the three fronts together, e.g. by relating prisoner figures.

19. Round-ups of the battles on the European resistance front should be given constantly to the Wehrmacht with an analysis of their effect upon German communications and the mobilisation of supplies and reserves.

20. Continue our appeals to Polish, Russian and Czech members of the Wehrmacht and report their surrenders in German. Austrians should be appealed to on the same lines. Recall the Moscow Declaration.

21. Indicate the conflict in the German leadership between the fanatics who are determined on a 'Getterdämmerung', and the so-called realists who would like to save what is left of the German army for the next war. We must make it unequivocally clear that we have no use for either school.

II. OCCUPIED EUROPE.

A. GUIDANCE.

1. Further appeals should be made to organized resistance and to transport workers to continue their sabotage of communications.
2. Report the good work of French troops in action in Italy.
3. Special guidance will be issued on the treatment of the forthcoming SELET declaration on the shooting of FFI prisoners by the Germans.

III. LIBERATED FRANCE.

A. GUIDANCE.

1. Report the success of the Anglo-French discussions and report de Gaulle's visit to Washington.
2. Show our appreciation of the good work done by French local government authorities.
3. As far as possible stick to news items, particularly about France and minimize editorials, features, etc.
4. No reference of any sort should be made to the planning, policies or missions of the Fiscal, Legal or Public Health Branches of SHAF.
5. Specific instructions will be issued by these in due time. The guidance to displaced persons and refugees to stand fast is unchanged.

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

ANNEX I.

THE TREATMENT OF UNRRA IN PROPAGANDA.

1. UNRRA is the first test of international post-war co-operation, and the implications of the success or failure of the experiment are likely to influence national and international policies in the years ahead. In view of the supply situation, international co-operation in meeting relief need is quite inevitable. If a scramble for available supplies were allowed to take place, not only would some areas of the world be left absolutely destitute, but disastrous price movements would ensue with chaotic results everywhere.

In the successful accomplishment of its task UNRRA will depend above all on the continued will to co-operate of the member States, whether they are supplying or receiving countries, or in a position to pay for supplies or not. There are self-evident handicaps which face any international administration, and it is our task to secure the goodwill with which they can best be surmounted.

2. The technical character of UNRRA should be stressed. It is an administration and its function is administrative. This emerges clearly from the wording of the Agreement, wherein UNRRA is established to "plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of" measures in implementation of the determination expressed by the 44 member nations that immediately after liberation the population of occupied territories shall receive aid and relief in the various forms defined.

3. UNRRA is not a permanent institution. It has an ad hoc mandate to deal with an emergency which can only be dealt with expeditiously by international cooperation.

4. Make clear the distinction between UNRRA, Civil Affairs and AMG. UNRRA cannot begin to function till the military authorities agree.

5. Avoid any suggestion that UNRRA is, or sets out to be, a supra-national authority, expects to interfere with national policies or impinge on national sovereignty, except in so far as the member nations have themselves appointed UNRRA as a referee to safeguard relief standards. General policy has to be settled by Council and Committees on which all the governments are represented detailed arrangements in each liberated territory have to be agreed between UNRRA and the Government concerned.

6. Avoid giving the impression that the Great Powers dominate the policies of UNRRA. Constitutionally they do not, but the fact that virtually all supplies are under the control of the Anglo-American Combined Boards, for the effective prosecution of the war, inevitably gives the impression of Anglo-American preponderance.

7. Stress the greatly preponderant part that the production of the liberated countries themselves will have to play in providing relief goods at the earliest possible moment. One of the tasks of UNRRA is to organize national and international action to secure the maximum production and interchange of such goods.

8. Avoid any suggestion that relief goods will be in plentiful supply. UNRRA is working in a background of world shortage. There would be little need for it were it not so. UNRRA operations include the Far Eastern theatre.

9. The role of UNRRA depends on the funds placed at its disposal. These are small compared with needs. Avoid any suggestion that UNRRA disposes of unlimited funds.

10. Keep clear the distinction between Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. (See Atlantic City Resolution I, Part II).

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO:

Date: 8 July 1944

TO: PWD

BBM

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

V 225-18
V SOLE EN EN HOWER
V GAI WILSON
V STALIN
300.6
25 June 1944

SUBJECT: PROPOSED ORDERS OF THE DAY TO BE ISSUED BY SCAP,
MARSHALL STALIN AND GENERAL MANTLAND-WILSON

TO : CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. DISCUSSION:

All available evidence from Italy and Normandy suggests that the morale of the German soldier is beginning to flag. Up to now, in view of the relatively high fighting morale of German troops, propaganda to the enemy, except in certain tactical situations such as Cherbourg, has avoided direct incitement to surrender, and limited itself to a sober statement of facts on which the German has been left to judge for himself. The time has come for an all-out Psychological Warfare campaign designed to turn a flagging German morale into actual demoralization. This necessitates a much more direct attack on German troop morale, which would, while continuing to state the facts soberly, contain appeals to surrender and all-out attacks on German leadership.

It is proposed that on a day, to be synchronized by the three headquarters, Orders of the Day be issued by General EISENHOWER, Marshall STALIN, and General MANTLAND-WILSON to their armies. These Orders would not be identical but would include the following points: (a) Allied successes on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts, (b) in face of this combined attack Germany is finished as a military power and the German High Command knows it, (c) let the Allied fighting men make a great continued effort to finish the job, (d) into that combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm of the industrial workers, and (e) the final battle has begun.

By arrangement with the Russians and AFHQ the Orders would, on release, be broadcast in German on all available transmissions in Russia, the Mediterranean and the U.K. All orders should be released on the same day to impress on the German mind the idea of concerted and concentric action, and so that the unity of intention will be manifest. This would be immediately followed by a concerted psychological warfare campaign on the basis that, "the war is lost, all is up, save yourselves by surrender".

With the fall of Cherbourg and continuing successes in Italy, ideal timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has been taken in the West. Also if the release of these Orders occurred several days before the surrender of Finland or Roumania, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and that the occupation of Germany from all sides is soon to follow.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Chief of Staff approve this proposal.
2. That the cable (TAB A) be approved for dispatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6 1070

(Written in pen)

Approved

/s/ W.B.S.

/s/ ROBERT A. MCCLURE
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

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Mr.
Mr.
By
By
By

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SGS-SHAEF File No. 091412/3

25 JUL 1944

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TO: ASWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SGD: EISENHOWER

SECRET

It is considered that we are approaching the psychological climax of the war and a decisive demonstration of military unity between the Western, Southern and Eastern fronts may well turn flagging German morale into rapid demoralization. This is likely to be true not only of the German home front but of the [redacted] troops, whose relatively high fighting morale recently shows significant slackening.

It is proposed, therefore, that on a date to be synchronized by the three Headquarters, Orders of the Day be issued by General EISENHOWER, Marshal STALIN and General MANTLAND-WILSON to their armies. These Orders would not be identical but would contain the following points: (a) Allied successes — the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts, (b) in face of this combined attack Germany is finished as a military power and the German High Command knows it, (c) let the Allied fighting men make a great combined effort to finish the job, (d) into that combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm of the industrial workers, and (e) the final battle has begun.

These Orders should, ideally, be issued at the same hour but, short of that, on the same day so that the unity of intention will be manifest. This would be immediately followed by a concerted psychological warfare campaign on the basis that "the [redacted] is lost, all is up".

Orders would, on release, be broadcast in German on all available transmissions from Russia, the Mediterranean and the U.K. to impress on the German mind the idea of concerted and concentric action.

With the fall of Cherbourg and continuing successes in Italy, ideal timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has been gained in the West such as a break out from the bridgehead area. Also if the release of these Orders occurred several days before the surrender of Finland or Roumania, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and the occupation of Germany from all sides is soon to follow.

If CCS approve this proposal it is requested they secure concurrence of the Russians and advise SACMED of the approved proposal.

Upon approval, the exact timing of the publication of the three orders of the day would be recommended by SCAEF directly to the Russians through the Military Missions and to SACMED through British Chiefs of Staff.


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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



Auth: SC, AG
Initials: *[Signature]*
16 June 1944

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*File 401
K 0915
1001 Evolution
16 June 1944*

AG 091.112-1 PWD-ACM

SUBJECT: Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare Against Members of the German Armed Forces.

TO : Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.

Attached is a copy of directive, this headquarters, "Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare against Members of the German Armed Forces," dated June 1944.

By command of General EISENHOWER:


1 Incl:
As listed above.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - 50 C-in-C 21 Army Gp
- 51 Chief of Staff, SHAEF
- 52 Deputy C of S, SHAEF
- 53- 54 AC of S, G-2, SHAEF
- 55- 56 AC of S, G-3, SHAEF
- 57- 58 AC of S, G-5, SHAEF
- 59 Mr. Phillips
- 60 Mr. Reake
- 61- 66 CG, FUSAG
- 67- 72 SMC
- 73 AG Records

[Signature]
E. C. BOEHKE
Colonel, AG
Adjutant General

6 1072



~~SECRET~~

Indexed

SGS-SHAEF File No. 094.4173

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Copy No. 51

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

June 1944.

STANDING DIRECTIVE — PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST MEMBERS
OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

AND PURPOSE — THIS DIRECTIVE

1. This Standing Directive lays down the general lines to be followed in all forms of white propaganda directed to German armed forces in the West. It is intended as a Standing Directive, valid both before and after D day. It will be supplemented from time to time by special directives, as well as by the weekly Central Directive prepared by PW/CWI in collaboration with PW/SHAEE. Unless expressly stated, however, these directives should be regarded as supplementary to and not as cancelling the present Standing Directive, which has the approval of PW/CWI.

2. The Moscow Declaration laid down the principle that the individual would be held responsible for his war crimes. This applies equally to the soldier and to the civilian; a uniform neither aggravates nor mitigates the guilt of the individual, thus the Declaration ruled out the suggestion of mass reprisals.

3. But it has also been made clear by our Governments that they are determined to destroy not only the Nazi system, but the concept of the Wehrmacht, which has been both the initiator and the willing instrument of recurring German attempts to dominate other peoples. Nothing in the implementation of this directive must compromise that issue.

4. It is recognized that in the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonize the audience. Direct denunciation or direct offences against known susceptibilities will therefore be avoided in all Psychological Warfare against the enemy armed forces. On the other hand nothing will be done to encourage or condone the concept of German militarism and the attitudes of mind behind it, both of which we are pledged to destroy.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. Psychological Warfare is not a ~~main~~ ^{subordinate} auxiliary for physical battle, but an auxiliary to it. By attacking the fighting morale of the enemy, it aims at (a) reducing the cost of the physical battle and (b) rendering the enemy easier to handle after surrender.

6. The conduct of Psychological Warfare therefore forms part of the conduct of military operations, and must be co-ordinated with that of other arms of war. It is the task of Psychological Warfare to assist the Supreme Commander in fulfilling his mission against the enemy with the most economical use of troops and equipment.

7. The use of Psychological Warfare in military operations must however be strictly subordinated to the long-term policy of our Governments, in the sense that nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the war. To this end, this Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare during operations is preceded by a summary of standing high policy directives.

8. These high policy directives define not the strategy of the campaign which Psychological Warfare will conduct against German fighting morale, but the limits within which it must, for policy reasons, be confined.

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Indexed 2

STANDING HIGH POLICY DIRECTIVES

9. No specific promises will be made concerning the treatment of Germany after the war, other than those expressly made by Government spokesmen. In particular there must be no suggestion that the Atlantic Charter applies to Germany by right.

10. ■ ■ ■ account must there be any suggestion or implication:-

- (i) that we recognise any claim of the German Army to be absolved from its full share of responsibility for German aggression on the grounds that its part is merely professional and non-political and that it does no more than obey orders;
- (ii) that we recognise the possibility of divorcing the "fighting war" from the atrocities which the German soldier has committed or condoned, e.g., the taking and shooting of hostages and the murder of prisoners;
- (iii) that we would be prepared to allow German militarism to survive in any form.

11. The following are the points on which our Governments have committed themselves:

- (a) Demilitarisation of Germany.
- (b) Punishment of war criminals.
- (c) Liberation of territories overrun by Nazi-Germany, including Austria.
- (d) Occupation of Germany.
- (e) Destruction of Nazism and German Militarism.
- (f) Prevention of such economic distress in Germany as will be detrimental to the rest of the world.
- (g) Ultimate restoration of Germany to a place "in the world family of democratic nations".

The key quotations on these points are given in Annex I. Note that (d), (f) and (g) are only general commitments, and may not be elaborated in Psychological Warfare unless and until specific Government statements are forthcoming on these points.

APPRECIATION OF STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF GERMAN FIGHTING MORALE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

(NOTE: Except where specifically stated the following generalisations apply to the German Army; not to the Air Force or Navy)

12. Strong Points

- (1) The Habit of Discipline. The habit of uncritical obedience to authority, rather than any ruthless enforcement of discipline from above, remains the strongest factor in German morale today. This factor may not decrease sharply until the German Army as a whole is broken on the battlefield, since the retreats and defensive battles to which the Wehrmacht is now committed automatically place greater reliance on higher authority than offensive campaigns of the 1940 type.

(ii) Comradeship. The ideal of comradeship has been keenly cultivated in the German Army, particularly since 1933. The German NCO forms a transitional stage between soldier status and officer status, a fact which strengthens this sense of comradeship. It has furthermore been immensely deepened by the Russian campaign.

(iii) Professional Pride. The average German's conviction that the best life is the soldier's life, plus the social fact that the highest calling in Germany is the soldier's calling, constitutes a great source of strength.

Added to this the German soldier, and often the non-German soldier serving in the Wehrmacht, is convinced:-

- (a) that he is privileged to be serving in the finest Army in the world, permeated with a code of soldierly honour which rules him and his officers alike;
- (b) that the Wehrmacht is the embodiment of the highest physical and spiritual attainments of German culture;
- (c) that the Wehrmacht is therefore ^{the} non-political guardian of the future of the German race;
- (d) that as a fighting machine German "quality" can probably succeed in throwing back both Anglo-American and Russian "quantity".

(iv) Material Interests. The German Army represents, for the reasons stated in sub-para. (iii) above, an honored career with considerable material benefits. (Pay allowances and especially food are good compared with civilian standards in Germany). Thousands of officers (especially those of junior and field rank) and tens of thousands of NCOs (particularly in specialist trades) have signed on not simply for the duration, but for periods varying from 7 - 14 years, or longer, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood.

(v) The Bolshevik Bogey. The guilty fear of Russian vengeance, linked with the Teuton dislike of the Slav and general fear of Bolshevism, has convinced the average German soldier that "anything is better than defeat in the East".

German propaganda has deliberately enlarged and intensified this fear, in the following ways:-

- (a) It has largely succeeded in persuading the soldier that the Anglo-Americans are so dominated by the Bolshevik Colossus that they would be powerless to save Germany.
- (b) It has filled the gap created by the absence of specific United Nations policy to Germany with atrocious stories of forced labour in Russia, castration, deportation, etc.

(vi) The Rewards of Victory in the West. Learning from Mr. Churchill in 1940, the High Command has deliberately capitalized the threat of invasion from the West. It has,

- (a) argued that, if the Anglo-American threat can be frustrated or confined, the German Army can be switched to the East. This argument has been used to justify the retreats in the East.

- (b) argued that a defensive victory in the West will form the basis for the speedy conclusion of a "compromise peace" either with the West or with the East, which would in fact be a German victory.
- (c) exploited the bombing of Germany to persuade the soldier that his only hope of regaining what he has lost lies in a German victory in the West.
- (d) succeeded in convincing the German soldier that for these reasons one last tremendous effort must and can be made.

(vii) Summary.

- (a) Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918, i.e. Bolshevik propaganda, leading to soldiers' and workers' councils; and democratic propaganda, leading to a revolt of the civilian under arms against the professional soldier.

We should assume that the German Army in the West, like von Arnim's Army in Tunisia, fight on as a whole until it collapses as a whole. Indeed defection is more widespread at the top than at bottom.

- (b) The High Command has succeeded in actually raising fighting morale during the winter, by deliberately (tensioning it up for a final effort in the West. This procedure has the obvious danger that an Anglo-American success in the West may be followed by a sudden and dangerous slump in morale.
- (c) For the reasons outlined in sub-para. (i) above, no propaganda directed at the frontline German soldier is likely to be effective unless it sounds and looks more positive and authoritative than his own Army Order forbidding him to listen to it.
- (d) For the reasons outlined in sub-para. (ii) and (iii) above, there is little prospect of dividing the German Army internally - i.e. by setting men against officers. Furthermore, no propaganda aiming at inducing the surrender of German troops is likely to succeed unless it meets the fundamental objection that by surrender the individual is letting down his comrades.

13. Weak Points.

(1) The Shaken Myth of Invincibility.

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The long series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean and in Russia have shaken - but by no means shattered - the German soldier's faith in the mystic invincibility of German arms which carried his fighting morale up to a high tide of fanaticism in June, 1940. Within this general uneasiness are other specific doubts:

- (a) Doubts about the Führer. (As opposed to Führer - see special note immediately below). Allied propaganda that disasters such as Stalingrad, Tunisia,

the Ukraine battle, and therefore, were largely due to the practice policy of hesitating too long to too much, has gone lower. Many German soldiers today feel that military operations are being dictated by political and often party considerations. The persecution of the OKW, and of the General Staff, with party generals, (notably the C. of S. Zeitzler) is largely blamed for this.

Notes: At present, the average soldier, despite an awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. Hitler is still his lucky talisman. Goering is also to some extent shielded. Of the German leaders, Himmler, Goebbels and Loh are the most unpopular. Generally speaking, "The System" or the "Party bosses" are the commonest scapegoats.

- (b) Doubts about Equipment. German Army Equipment is good, and the German soldier knows it. But his battle experience since 1941 has given him painful proof that, in some respects at least, Allied equipment is not only more plentiful, but better. (Allied MT in Africa, Russian P.A.K., Russian medium tanks, in the East and Allied fighter planes on all fronts are examples).

The present "Minderwaffe" rogue is in part a wishful thinking reaction to this.

- (c) Doubts about the Nazi. Despite intense efforts by the High Command, it has not succeeded in making the German soldier accept unquestioningly its interpretation of events. Most German soldiers, when they get the opportunity, read or listen to Anglo-American propaganda and try to find a truth halfway between their own communications and ours. They assume that "everything is propaganda" and that they, as intelligent people, can read between the lines. Without knowing it, they are of course steeped in Nazi propaganda. They regard as "propaganda lies" such facts as that Germany invaded Poland, or that England has some highly developed social services. They have the useful faculty of forgetting any facts inconvenient to their superiority and believing they were invented by Anglo-American propaganda. Their outlook is formed however not by the direct output of the Propaganda Ministry, but by the educational and propaganda activities of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless they are open to any propaganda which does not sound or read like "propaganda", and does not offend their "soldierly honour". Unconsciously still, but actively, the German soldier craves for an excuse to stop the useless slaughter which leaves his honour as a German soldier unscathed, and puts the blame on someone or something outside the Wehrmacht. He needs in brief (1) facts, which seem to him to be objective, showing that despite the courage of the Wehrmacht, someone at home has lost the war for Germany; (2) a picture of the future which portrays death and destruction for "the betrayers of Germany" and survival for the German people.

Evidence for the above analysis is provided by the growing success of (a) Free German Committee broadcasts from Moscow, headed by General Seydlitz, and (b) Radio Galia. Both these transmissions

There is evidence that the GW had great trouble, during 1943, in converting officers and men to the technique of the defensive battle which their previous training had largely neglected.

The fear of isolation, a feature of what the Germans used to ridicule as "Magginot mindedness" is likely to be at its strongest among coastal formations in the West. They are particularly liable to the anxiety lest they be sacrificed as "human landmines".

(iv) Loss of Honour.

An increasing number of soldiers are aware of, and uncomfortable about:

- (a) Atrocities, especially in Russia. They naturally want to push the blame on to the SS, or simply "those in authority".
- (b) the hostility of the occupied territories, including "Gentile" countries like Norway. The German wants to be liked, and the German soldier is puzzled why, despite the correctness of the Wehrmacht, he is so coldly received. He wants to have an explanation which blames someone outside the Army for this failure of the "New Order".

(v) Respect for Western Powers.

The German has a sense of inferiority to both Britain and America. Many Nazis, for instance, regard National Socialism as the method of making Germany a ruling race "like the British". The German feelings for Britain are a confused mixture of envy, respect and contempt for the old-fashioned. Their feeling for America is different, since they do not feel it to be a racial unity like Britain or Germany, and are suspicious of its "capitalist imperialism". They profoundly respect its riches, production capacity and "scientific" and regard it as the continent of unlimited possibilities.

Intensive propaganda has failed to modify these traditional feelings. In particular nearly all German soldiers are confident that they will be treated well as prisoners of war and repatriated (if they do not expect) an Anglo-American occupation if the worst comes to the worst. Furthermore, they are feverishly anxious for Anglo-American appreciation of "The Chivalry" of the Wehrmacht.

(vi) The Shadow of the Two Front-War.

It is improbable that German fighting morale in the West will be seriously undermined before a successful Anglo-American landing, provided there is no great German disaster in the East. But the moment we can announce a decisive break-through will be a moment of profound psychological crisis, greater even than the shock of Mussolini's collapse last year.

Meanwhile, the advance of the Russian troops into Europe must reduce the persuasiveness of the argument

to analysis fighting morale similar to that above.

- (d) Doubts about the Luftwaffe. Moreover, the Air War brings with it a cause of friction between the Air Force and the Army. German soldiers are beginning to talk like many British soldiers in 1940. This friction, and the resulting blame on "the authorities" is a real if minor chink in German fighting morale.

All these factors are important in that they provide the soldier with scapegoats for his decline in fortune, and when things go wrong the Germans' natural reaction is, "I have been betrayed".

(ii) Man-Power

This is perhaps the main operational worry of the soldier. He is disturbed by the enormous losses in men and material which he knows the battles in Russia and the Wehrmacht. This uneasiness is heightened by the Allied propaganda barrage on this theme, contrasted with the silence of his own authorities, a silence all the more significant when it persists even under the new GOW policy of simulating complete frankness on operational matters. This general man-power worry breaks down into other specific ones:

- (a) The worry that, because of man power troubles, the ranks of the Wehrmacht are being increasingly filled with foreigners of twenty nationalities, and that the quality of the army is therefore in danger of "pollution".
- (b) The worry that, with almost every one of its field divisions committed already to actual or potential battle-fields, the German Army has no effective central reserve to sustain it in a many front war.

Both (a) and (b) above apply with particular force to the target of this paper - the German forces in the West. These troops have in their own formations large numbers of foreigners, and most of these divisions have had proof, by their own experience, of being switched from West to East and back, that no uncommitted central reserve exists. The great volume of German counter propaganda on this point is further evidence of its importance.

(iii) A War Gone Wrong.

In building up the picture of the chivalrous Wehrmacht in deadly battle against Bolshevism, the High Command inevitably raises in the German soldier's mind the question why Germany is fighting Britain and America, especially since Hitler denounced in Mein Kampf the fatal mistake of the two front war. The High Command seeks to answer this question by denouncing Anglo-American impotence and arguing that the Jews of Wall Street and the City of London are in conspiracy with the Kremlin. But this argument does not quell a deep uneasiness.

There is also a feeling in the German soldier's mind that the defensive battles which he is now forced to fight are not the battles for which he was trained, nor the battles for which his equipment was designed.

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that Hitler is deliberately yielding space in the East to ensure victory in the West. Gradually the German soldier begins to ask whether Hitler's strategy is not precisely what United Nations strategy desires, and whether the Second Front is not having its effects even before it starts.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

14. The foregoing analysis suggests that, provided there is catastrophe in the East, the weak points in German morale, enumerated above, will begin to counteract the strong points only when the Anglo-American forces have demonstrated that they can use their quantitative superiority.

15. It is impossible to predict at what phase of the operations this change in German morale will come. On this point Psychological Warfare will be guided by G-2. Already, however, it is possible to lay down two phases in the psychological warfare campaign:

- (a) The phase before and after D-day up to the change in German morale. (referred to as Phase A)
- (b) The phase after the change. (referred to as Phase B)

The present Directive deals with Phase A.

16. Phase A all psychological warfare against German troops be regarded as preparatory. This must be a period not of direct assault or of open appeals for surrender; but of steady unemphatic repetition of the facts, full recognition of which will bear sudden fruit in Phase B.

Even after D-day this unemphatic repetition of facts should be continued until evidence from G-2 indicates that it is time to move into Phase B.

17. During this phase psychological warfare will concentrate on the following tasks:

(i) Long-term tasks.

- (a) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word, and of unity between Russians and ourselves.
- (b) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

(ii) Short-term tasks, pre D-day.

- (a) Stimulation of defection through a sense of Anglo-American superiority in men and materials; combatting the fear of Bolshevism by a cautious build up of Anglo-American strength.
- (b) Exploitation of German confidence in the good treatment of prisoners of war so as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarisation of the German soldier with official Allied statements on the peace of Germany in Post-War Europe.

- (a) Exploitation of the Russian offensive — exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat in a two front war.
- (d) Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.
- (e) Exploitation of a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.
- (f) Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.

(iii) Short-term tasks Post D-day.

After D-day the following tasks should be added to those in (ii) above:

- (a) Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German army by open incitement of these foreigners.
- (b) Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting. Since these troops will not be actually engaged, they will probably form the best target for propaganda. In this campaign emphasize the failure of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy to prevent the landings.

METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED IN CARRYING OUT THE ABOVE CAMPAIGN.

16. Long-term tasks.

- (1) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word and in unity between the Russians and ourselves.
 - (a) Throughout this phase all psychological warfare — all media, whether tactical or strategic, will remain factual and objective, avoiding terms, phrases or pictures which the German soldier will dismiss as "propaganda". In particular, all boasting and sneering will be scrupulously avoided; there will be no direct appeals to the soldier's self-interest. There will be no attempts at a clumsy or intimate style. All psychological warfare will give the impression of Anglo-American reliability, reticence, soldierly dignity and decency.
 - (b) Use every opportunity to demonstrate practical collaboration between ourselves and the Russians. This is preferable to ideological assertions on United Nations unity.
- (ii) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

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Do not assume that the German soldier is yet convinced that defeat is certain. He is keyed-up and may maintain a relatively high morale for some time after D-day.

There are open appeals to the authorities. Similarly, there are open appeals to fear, especially in the air campaign. That the GERMANY soldier is a hapless, if openly lashed by the enemy to cowardice, will do the opposite.

SACV was responsible for the creation of Germany's position in the world and the gradual weakening and disintegration of the coalition; the increasing satisfaction being reached by Germany by the Germans, and the efforts required by her German allies.

19. Short-time teacher pay-day

- (1) stimulation of deformation through a series of single
and two step tests in air and nitrogen
containing the tot. of deformation by a constant
load and of deformation strength.

Do not try to highlight this feature by a boldface
face of across the page. The feature will not
thereby be highlighted in the copy. But
provide all material available, especially
the material relating to the leadership, organization,
equipment and training of the Anglo-American students.

CONCLUDE TO PROVIDE FEEDS SHOWING THE FOLLOWING
OF THE LATTER.

SHOW that the lead-mining fronts are draining
GARY GUSTAFSON FRONTIER LEADER FOR THE SW. UNITED
FRONTS.

- (15) Exploitation of German confidence in the good intentions of prisoners of war as to discharge German military aims and understand German fear of defeat.
Unusually, ignoring role of the German soldier when official German statements on the need of Germany in post-war Europe.

Communism and Marxism are the standard illustrations of the treatment of Soviet influences of war. Malenkov, especially in America, is "misquoting" which looks like communist publicity. In radio propaganda in America it is far from possible to broadcast about, and by, German communists of war.

It is probable that many German soldiers are not familiar with even the few statements available on United Nations institutions with regard to post-war Germany. These statements should also be played in lectures and films. Equally, the first should be emphasized that the Germans are deliberately concealing from the German people the real intentions of the United Nations.

- (11) Expectation: The English offensive is aimed at winning
the annihilation of a German defeat in a two-front war.

Destroy the illusion that the Cuban retreat in the East is deliberately planned 'to showing the intimate scenarios in between Russian and Anglo-American'.

11.

strategy. Hitler is no longer the master of his own strategy. He is forced to live by the economic rhythms of the United Nations.

That the Multitermian and the other in which we have compiled the German to further the first class narrow; and ~~the~~ was widely needed ~~the~~ the design, 2014, 40 on the two major fronts.

- (iv) Exploitation of the Guyanese form of outcrops and
minerals by occupied peoples, including former
workers.

Never Appeal Directly to Current Fear of Sabotage and Redbaiting. Confine yourself to plain facts. Do not spell things out by headlines such as "Masters of Castled Terror".

Behind us the impression that resistance in occupied Europe, up to a lesser extent in Germany, is an organized part of the anti-fascist strategy.

Stress was made on facts indicating the decline of effective police control in Germany and the occupied Europe. It was again not interpreted these facts in the German, but more than speak for the subject. Take up yesterday before 3-40 p.m. for German press in the German Embassy in the United States.

- (v) Regulation of degree of insulation through the
alluvial tract to ground, groundwater, etc.

While the German soldiers (especially in the combat divisions) feel he is a "Nigger Lord" also, by stressing the significance of citizens in Germany was undiminished.

Stress that the Atlantic Wall is 1000 miles long and that the German High Command can only meet a thrust at one point by stripping resources from other points. The Command hopes that there will be some sort of landing. - 1041440 -

- (vi) Facilitated the use of the new framework to stimulate dialogue between the two sides and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.

YOUR MEMORANDUM CLAIMED TO INTENSIFY THE EFFECTS OF BOMBING AND TO INCREASE IMMUNITY TO THE BOMBING OF CITIES. IN MAKING THIS STATEMENT, YOU WERE IN CONTACT WITH A PERSON WHOSE SIGNIFICANCE TO US IS ESSENTIAL BUT OF WHOSE IDENTIFICATION, NAME AND ADDRESS I AM NOT AWARE. IN ORDER TO TRY TO REACH GERMAN AGENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO REVEAL THE FIRST NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON MENTIONED IN YOUR MEMORANDUM, WHO HAS BEEN A MAJOR SPYMASTER FOR THE GERMANS. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF CITIES IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO US AND WE WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN IT FROM THE PERSON WHOSE NAME YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR MEMORANDUM.

Remember that production figures = unrelated to battle figures = an integer increase the urban soldier. Not the number of weapons produced, but the effects of the superiority figures line. This applies also to all forms of mass terror and selected superiority.

16. Short-term tasks post D-day.

- (1) Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German army by open incitement of these foreigners.

■ ■ ■ after D-day a special campaign will be launched of direct incitement to desertion addressed to foreigners in the German army of the West. It will have two objects. (i) to influence the foreigners, (ii) indirectly ■ ■ ■ influence the German troops. A special directive will be issued on this subject.

- (11) Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting.

During the actual fighting we cannot expect that ■ ■ ■ German troops engaged will be receptive to anything but combat propaganda.

Strategic radio and leaflets should in this period be directed chiefly to the German troops on the flanks, as well as to foreigners throughout the German Army. The treatment should remain factual and objective and avoid boasting or creating an atmosphere of undue excitement. Every effort should be made to obtain 'hot' statements from prisoners of war for use by radio and leaflet.

Every effort should be made to demonstrate to these troops the influence of sea power on the operation. In particular the following themes should be used:

- (a) Allied command of the sea and of the air over ■ ■ ■ gives us the power to launch attacks with the ■ ■ ■ of surprise ■ ■ ■ a very wide range.
- (b) Allied command of the sea excludes the free use of ■ ■ ■ communications along the Atlantic Wall, communications which would be invaluable if ■ ■ ■ communications are destroyed or hampered.
- (c) The German Navy cannot both cope with the ■ ■ ■ and its follow up and with the trans-atlantic ■ ■ ■ bringing more and more men, weapons and supplies.
- (d) To the troops on the flanks of the breach in the Atlantic Wall, emphasizing the power and effectiveness of naval bombardment.
- (e) Complete Allied control of the Mediterranean offers freedom of action for further attacks ■ ■ ■ Continent.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Copy No. 51

ANNEX I to
Standing Directive for Psychological
Warfare against Members of the German
Armed Forces.

KEY QUOTATIONS RELATING TO ALLIED WAR AIMS TOWARDS GERMANY.

The following are the main quotations illustrating Allied War Aims towards Germany which are likely to be of use in propaganda to the enemy. They are arranged under main themes, but often one quotation can be used to illustrate more than one of these main themes. Quotations have, therefore, been repeated where necessary.

The main headings correspond to those listed in para. 11 of the Standing Directive.

The standard German translations are appended for convenience of reference.

Translation.

I. DEMILITARISATION OF GERMANY.

1. Mr. Eden - 29.7.41.

We are determined upon the destruction of Hitler, his regime and all it stands for. In the military sphere it is our bounden duty to ensure that Germany is not again in another twenty years in a position to plunge the world into misery and horror of total war. It would be criminal to neglect any precaution to ensure this.

Wir sind entschlossen, Hitler, sein Regime und alles, was es vertritt, zu vernichten. Auf militärischem Gebiet ist es unsere unabwiesbare Pflicht, dafür zu sorgen, dass Deutschland in absehbarer Zeit nicht wieder in der Lage ist, die Welt in das Elend und die Schrecken eines totalen Krieges zu stürzen. Es wäre ein Verbrechen, wollten wir irgendeine Sicherungsmaßnahme in dieser Richtung außer Acht lassen.

2. The Atlantic Charter, Clause 8 14.8.41.

They believe all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burdens of armaments.

Sie glauben, dass alle Nationen der Welt aus Wirklichkeitssinn sowohl wie aus geistigen Gründen dazu kommen müssen von der Anwendung von Gewalt abzusehen. Kein künftiger Friede kann aufrecht erhalten werden, wenn Nationen, die mit Angriffen über ihre Grenzen hinaus drohen oder drohen könnten, weiterhin über eine Land-See- oder Luftstreitmacht verfügen. Deshalb ist bis zur Schaffung eines umfassenderen und dauernden Systems allgemeiner Sicherheit nach ihrer Ansicht die Entwaffnung solcher Nationen unerlässlich. Ebenso werden sie alle anderen durchführbaren Maßnahmen unterstützen und fördern, die friedliebenden Völkern die drückenden Rüstungslasten erleichtern.

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Translation.

3. Mr. Churchill. 24.8.41.

The United States and Great Britain do not now think that there will never be any more war again. On the contrary we intend to take ample precautions to prevent its renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarming the guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves.

Die Vereinigten Staaten und Grossbritannien nehmen nicht an, dass es niemals wieder Krieg geben wird. In Gegenteil, wir beabsichtigen, umfassende Vorkehrungen zu treffen, um seine Wiederholung für absehbare Zeit zu verhindern, indem wir die schuldigen Völker entwaffnen und selbst entsprechend gerüstet bleiben.

4. Mr. Roosevelt. 12.10.42.

The objective of today is clear and realistic. It is to destroy completely the military power of Germany, Italy and Japan to such good purpose that their threat against us and all the other United Nations cannot be revived a generation hence.

Unser jetziges Ziel ist klar und realistisch. Es heisst: völlige Zerstörung der militärischen Macht Deutschlands, Italiens und Japans, sodass sie uns und die anderen Vereinten Nationen nicht wieder nach einer Generation bedrohen können.

5. Mr. Roosevelt. Address to Seventy-eighth Congress. 7.1.43.

It is clear to me that if Germany and Italy and Japan - or any one of them - remain armed at the end of this war or are permitted to rearm, they will again and inevitably embark upon an ambitious career of world conquest. They must be disarmed and kept disarmed - they must abandon the philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world.

Wir sind uns darüber klar, dass Deutschland, Italien und Japan - oder einer dieser Staaten - wenn sie nach Ende dieses Krieges gerüstet bleiben oder wenn ihnen eine Wiederaufrüstung gestattet werden sollte, unweigerlich wieder darauf ausgehen werden, ihre ehrgeizigen Welt Eroberungspläne zu verwirklichen. Sie müssen daher entwaffnet werden und entwaffnet bleiben und ihrer Weltanschauung entsagen, die so viel Leid über die Welt gebracht hat.

II. PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS.

6. M. Stalin. 23.2.43.

It is very likely that the war for the liberation of the Soviet land will result in ousting or destroying Hitler's clique. We should welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German State. History shows that Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German State remain.

Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass der Krieg für die Befreiung des Sowjetgebietes mit der Vertreibung oder Vernichtung der Hitler-Clique enden wird. Wir werden solch ein Ergebnis begreifen, aber es wäre töricht, die Hitler-Clique mit dem deutschen Volk und dem deutschen Staat gleichzusetzen; die Geschichte lehrt, dass die Hitlers kommen und gehen, der deutsche Staat aber und das deutsche Volk bleiben.

7. M. Molotov. 27.4.42.

The Hitler Government and its accomplices will not escape the stern responsibility and deserved punishment for all their unheard-of crimes committed against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and against all freedom-loving peoples.

Die Hitlerregierung und ihre Mitthelfer werden der schweren Verantwortung und der verdienten Bestrafung für all ihre unerhörten Verbrechen gegen die Völker der Sowjetunion und alle freiheitsliebenden Völker nicht entgehen.

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Translation.

8. Mr. Roosevelt. 21.8.42.

The time will come when they will have to stand trial in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts.

Die Zeit wird kommen, da sie in den Ländern, die jetzt von ihnen unterdrückt werden, vor Gericht gestellt werden, um sich wegen ihrer Untaten zu verantworten.

9. Mr. Eden. 26.9.42.

We are not animated by a spirit of revenge, natural though such a spirit must be to so many in Europe today, but by the conviction that civilised justice will only be restored to its rightful place in the affairs of men when the criminals who have sought to destroy it are made to answer for their deeds. Retribution must be swift, sure and complete.

Wir sind nicht besesselt vom Geist der Rache, so natürlich auch solch ein Geist für viele Menschen in Europa heutzutage sein muss. Wir sind vielmehr der Überzeugung, dass die Gerechtigkeit erst dann wieder auf ihren rechtmässigen Thron eingesetzt werden wird, wenn die Verbrechen, die sie zu zerstören suchten, sich für ihr Tun verantworten müssen. Und die Vergeltung muss schnell, gründlich und umfassend sein.

10. Mr. Roosevelt. 12.10.42.

We have made it entirely clear that the United Nations seek no reprisals against the populations of Germany or Italy or Japan, but the ringleaders and their brutal henchmen must be named, and apprehended and tried in accordance with the judicial processes of criminal law.

Wir haben es vollkommen klargemacht, dass die Vereinten Nationen keine Massenvergeltung an der Bevölkerung Deutschlands, Italiens oder Japans anstreben. Aber die Rädelsführer und ihre verrohten Helfer müssen namentlich genannt, festgenommen und in einem gerichtlichen Strafverfahren abgeurteilt werden.

11. Lord Simon. 10.3.43.

Like our Soviet ally we firmly believe, and we shall continue to believe, that before the foundations of an enduring peace can be laid, the Nazi regime must be destroyed for ever, and all those war criminals who have inspired its evil deed must be suitably and severely dealt with. I now say in plain terms on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we agree with Premier Stalin, first that the Hitlerite State should be destroyed, and secondly that the whole German people is not (as Dr. Goebbels has been trying to persuade them) thereby doomed to destruction. I put these two propositions with equal prominence and equal firmness.

Wie unsere russischen Verbündeten sind wir jetzt und in Zukunft davon überzeugt, dass das Fundament eines dauernden Friedens erst gelegt werden kann, wenn das Nazi-Regime für immer zerstört ist und alle Kriegsverbrecher, die seine Missetaten angestiftet haben, getötet und schwer bestraft sind. Ich erkläre nunmehr in Namen der britischen Regierung: Wir sind mit Stalin darin einig, dass erstens der Hitlerstaat zerstört werden muss und dass zweitens das ganze deutsche Volk dadurch nicht, wie Goebbels es glauben machen will, zum Untergang verurteilt ist. Ich gebe diesen beiden Feststellungen das gleiche Gewicht, die gleiche Festigkeit.

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12. Moscow Declaration, 1.11.43.

As the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liberated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled from all those countries.

Welche Regierung auch immer in Deutschland bestanden wird an dem Tage, an dem ihm ein Waffenstillstand gewährt wird - alle deutschen Offiziere, Soldaten und Mitglieder der NSDAP, die für diese Gräueltaten, Massenerschießungen und Hinrichtungen verantwortlich sind oder dabei mitgeholfen haben, werden in das Land verbracht werden, wo sie ihre verabscheuungswürdigen Verbrechen begangen haben. Dies wird geschehen, damit sie nach den Gesetzen der befreiten Länder und der freien Regierungen, die in diesen Ländern gebildet sein werden, abgeurteilt und bestraft werden. Namenslisten der Täter werden in all Ländern zusammengestellt werden.

III. LIBERATION OF TERRITORIES OVERRUN BY NAZI GERMANY, INCLUDING AUSTRIA.

13. Mr. Churchill, 5.9.40.

We have not at any time adopted, since the war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned.

Hiernach seit Ausbruch dieses Krieges haben wir uns den Grundsatz zu eigen gemacht, dass in dem Gebietsbestand der verschiedenen Länder nichts geändert werden könne. Auf der anderen Seite beabsichtigen wir nicht, irgendwelche während des Krieges eintretende Gebietsveränderungen anzuerkennen, wenn sie nicht mit der freien Zustimmung und dem guten Willen der beteiligten Parteien zustande kommen.

14. Mr. Churchill, 9.11.40.

Let me remind you that in spite of all the blows we have endured and under all the burdens we bear and amidst many deadly threats, we have not abandoned our lot of any of our obligations or undertakings towards the captive or enslaved countries of Europe or towards any of these countries which still act with us. On the contrary, since we have been left alone in this world struggle we have affirmed or defined more precisely all the causes of all countries with whom or for whom we drew the sword - Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, greatest of all, France; latest of all Greece. For all these we will toil and strive and our victory will supply the liberation of them all.

Ich möchte daran erinnern, dass wir trotz all der Schläge, die wir auszuhalten haben, trotz all der Lasten, die wir tragen, inmitten der vielen tödlichen Drohungen dennoch nicht ein Jota unserer Verpflichtungen gegenüber den unterworfenen oder versklavten Ländern Europas oder gegenüber den Ländern, die noch mit uns kämpfen, preisgegeben haben. Im Gegenteil, seitdem wir in diesem Weltkampf allein übrig geblieben sind, haben wir die Sache aller Länder, mit denen oder für die wir das Schwert gezogen haben, uns erneut zu eigen gemacht oder genauer umschrieben: Österreich, Tschechoslowakei, Polen, Norwegen, Holland, Belgien, Frankreich, das grösste, und Griechenland, das letzte von allen. Für sie alle werden wir arbeiten und kämpfen, und unser Sieg wird die Befreiung aller bringen.

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15. Moscow Declaration. (Austria) 1.11.43.

...have agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim of Nazi aggression shall be liberated from German domination.... They declare they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well as those neighbouring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Oesterreich, das erste freie Land, das dem Zugriff der Nazis zum Opfer fiel, soll von der deutschen Herrschaft befreit werden... Die Regierungen Gross-Britanniens, der Sowjet-Union und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika wünschen die Wiederherstellung eines freien und unabhängigen Oesterreichs. Hierdurch soll den österreichischen Völkern selbst, ebenso wie auch seinen Nachbarstaaten, die sich ähnlichen Problemen gegenübersehen, die Bahn freigemacht werden zu politischer und wirtschaftlicher Sicherheit-dieser einzigen Grundlage dauernden Friedens.

IV. OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

16. Mr. Churchill, 22.3.43.

There will certainly be large numbers of men... who will have to be brought back to their families and to their jobs. For all these, after full provision has been made for garrisoning of the guilty countries, return to something like home and freedom will be their heart's desire.

erst nachdem die Besetzung der schuldigen Länder voll in Rechnung gestellt worden ist, wird sich der Herabsetzung aller Soldaten nach be etwa wie Heim und Freiheit erfüllen lassen.

17. Moscow Declaration. 1.11.43.

The Governments of U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China jointly declare that their united action pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.... that those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy... that after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

Die Regierungen der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, die Regierungen von Grossbritannien, der Sowjetunion und China geben folgende gemeinsame Erklärung ab: Die Einheit des Handelns, zu der sie sich für die Föhrung des Krieges gegen ihre Feinde verpflichtet haben, soll auch — Organisation und Föhrung von Frieden und Sicherheit beibehalten werden. Die Mächte, die gemeinsam gegen einen gemeinsamen Feind Krieg föhren, werden in allen mit seiner Kapitulation und Entwaffnung zusammenhängenden Fragen gemeinsam handeln. Die vier Mächte werden, nach Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten, ihre militärischen Kräfte in Gebiet anderer Staaten nur für die in dieser Erklärung vorgesehenen Zwecke und nach gemeinsamer Beratung einsetzen.

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V. DESTRUCTION OF NAZISM AND PRUSSIAN MILITARISM

18. M. Stalin, 21.2.43.

It is very likely that the war for the liberation of the Soviet land will result in ousting or destroying Hitler's clique. We should welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. History shows that Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German state remain.

Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass der Krieg für die Befreiung des Sowjetgebietes mit der Vertreibung oder Vernichtung der Hitler-Clique enden wird; wir würden solch ein Ergebnis begrüßen. Aber es wäre töricht, die Hitler-Clique mit dem deutschen Volk und dem deutschen Staat gleichzusetzen; die Geschichte lehrt, dass die Hitlers kommen und gehen, das deutsche Staatsvolk und das deutsche Volk bleiben.

19. M. Stalin, 6.11.42.

We have no such aim as to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed and our first task in fact is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers.

Unser Ziel ist nicht die Zerstörung Deutschlands, denn es ist ebenso unmöglich, Deutschland zu zerstören wie Russland. Aber der Hitlerstaat kann und sollte zerstört werden. ■ ist unsere vornehmlichste Aufgabe, den Hitlerstaat und seine Träger zu zerstören.

20. Mr. Roosevelt, 7.1.43.

Our own objectives are clear: the objective of ending the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved people - the objective of liberating the subjugated nations....

Unsere Ziele sind klar; Zerstörung des Militarismus, der den verklavten Völkern von ihren kriegslustigen Führern aufgedrungen wurde; Befreiung der unterdrückten Nationen.

21. Mr. Churchill, 21.2.43.

We and our allies will have accomplished one great task. Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism which threatened to engulf the whole world and against which we stood alone for a fearful year, - these curses will have been swept from the face of the earth.

Wir und unsere Alliierten werden die eine große Aufgabe erfüllt haben: Nazi Tyrannei und preussischer Militarismus, welche die ganze Welt zu verschlingen drohten und gegen die wir ein schicksalsschweres Jahr lang allein standen, diese Flagen werden von der Erde weggekehrt sein.

22. Mr. Roosevelt, 24.12.43.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we must emphatically emphasize that word "respectable" - for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute a "master race".

Die Vereinten Nationen beabsichtigen nicht, das deutsche Volk zu versklaven. Wir wünschen, ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich in Frieden zu einem nützlichen und achtbaren Mitglied der europäischen Völkerfamilie zu entwickeln. Aber wir ■ mit Nachdruck ■ Wort "achtbar" betonen. ■ wir beabsichtigen, das deutsche Volk ■ ein für allemal von Nationalsozialismus und von preussischem Militarismus zu befreien und von der phantastischen und unheilvollen Idee, es sei eine Herrenrasse.

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VI. PROVISION OF SUCH ECONOMIC DISTRESS IN COUNTRIES WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE INTEREST OF THE WORLD.

23. Mr. Eden, 29.7.41.

It is not our intention to cause the economic collapse of Germany or of any other country. I do not say this out of any special love of Germany, but because a hungry and bankrupt Germany in the midst of Europe would poison all of us who are her neighbours.

Es ist nicht unsere Absicht, den wirtschaftlichen Zusammenbruch Deutschlands oder irgend eines anderen Landes herbeizuführen. Ich sage das nicht aus besonderer Neigung zu Deutschland, sondern einfach deshalb, weil ein hungriges und bankrott Deutschland in der Mitte Europas uns alle, die wir seine Nachbarn sind, vergiften würde.

24. Mr. Eden, 6.8.41.

It would be to our disadvantage and to Europe's disadvantage that Germany should be economically ruined after the war.

Es wäre für uns und Europa abträglich, wenn Deutschland nach dem Krieg wirtschaftlich ruiniert würde.

25. Atlantic Charter, Clause 4, 11.8.41.

They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment of all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Sie werden unter Achtung ihrer bestehenden Verpflichtungen darauf hinarbeiten, dass alle Staaten, gross oder klein, Sieger oder Besiegte, zu gleichen Bedingungen Zugang zum Handel und zu den für ihr wirtschaftliches Gedeihen notwendigen Rohstoffen der Welt erhalten.

26. Mr. Churchill, 24.8.41.

Instead of trying to ruin German trade by all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances, as was the mood of 1917, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by its industry and enterprise.

Anstatt zu versuchen, Deutschland durch alle Arten zusätzlicher Handelsbeschränkungen und andere Hindernisse zu ruinieren, wie es 1917 die Stimmung war, sind wir endgültig zu dem Entschluss gekommen, dass es nicht im Interesse der Welt und unserer beiden Länder (England und Amerika) liegt, wenn irgend ein grosses Volk verarmt oder von der Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen sein sollte, für sich und seine Angehörigen durch seinen Fleiss und Unternehmungsgeist ein anständiges Auskommen zu finden.

27. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Article V, 26.8.41.

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration for the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Die Vertragschliessenden Teile stimmen überein, zur Förderung der Sicherheitsinteressen jedes einzelnen von ihnen in engen und freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeiten für die Wiederherstellung des Friedens und für die Schaffung allgemeiner Sicherheit und wirtschaftlichen Wohlfahrts in Europa miteinander zu arbeiten. Sie werden hierbei die Interessen der Vereinten Nationen berücksichtigen und im Einklang mit den zwei Grundsätzen handeln, für sich keine Gebietsvergrößerung zu erstreben und sich nicht in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten einzumischen.

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VII. THE RESTORATION OF CITIZENRY TO A PLACE IN EUROPEAN
FAMILY OF NATIONS.

28. Mr. Roosevelt, 24.12.43.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most emphatically emphasize that word "respectable" for we intend to rid them once for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute a "master race".

Die Vereinten Nationen beabsichtigen nicht, das deutsche Volk zu versklaven. Wir wünschen ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich in Frieden zu einem nützlichen und zeitbaren Mitglied der europäischen Völkerfamilie zu entwickeln. Aber wir müssen mit allem Nachdruck das Wort "achtbar" betonen. Denn wir beabsichtigen, das deutsche Volk ein für alle Mal vom Nationalsozialismus und vom preussischen Militarismus zu befreien und von der phantastischen und unheilvollen Idee, es sein eine Herrenrasse.

29. Tehran Conference, 1.12.43.

We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations - large and small - whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated as are our own peoples to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into a world family of democratic nations.

Wir werden uns bemühen um die aktive Mitarbeit aller Länder, ob gross oder klein, deren Völker - so wie unsere Völker - sich mit Leib und Seele der Aufgabe verschrieben haben, Tyrannie und Sklaverei, Unterdrückung und Intoleranz aus der Welt zu schaffen. Wir werden alle Völker willkommen heissen, die bereit sind, sich einer Weltfamilie der demokratischen Nationen anzuschliessen.

The following are the main quotations on unconditional surrender:

30. Mr. Churchill, 1.7.43.

We, the United Nations, demand from the Nazi, Fascist and Japanese tyrannies unconditional surrender. By that we mean that their will to resist must be completely broken and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy. It also means that we must take all those far-sighted measures which are necessary to prevent the world from being again convulsed and wrecked and blackened by their calculated plots and ferocious aggression. It does not mean and it never can mean that we are to stain our victorious arms by infamy or by mere lust of vengeance, or that we do not plan a world in which all branches of the human family may look forward to what the American Constitution calls "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Wir, die Vereinten Nationen, fordern von den Nazi-faschistischen und japanischen Tyrannen bedingungslose Kapitulation. Damit meinen wir, dass ihr Widerstandswille völlig gebrochen werden muss und dass sie sich ganz und gar unserer Gerechtigkeit und Gnade ausliefern müssen. Es bedeutet auch, dass wir weitblickend alle erforderlichen Massnahmen treffen müssen, um zu verhindern, dass die Welt erneut durch ihre vorbereiteten Anschläge und ihre heuchlerische Angriffslust zerrissen und zerstört und verheert wird. Es heisst nicht und kann niemals heissen, dass wir unsere siegreichen Waffen durch Grausamkeit oder blosse Rachgier beflecken oder dass wir nicht eine Welt planen, in der alle Zweige der menschlichen Familie das erwarten können, was die amerikanische Verfassung "Leben, Freiheit und Streben nach Glück" nennt.

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31. Mr. Churchill, 22.8.44.

The term "unconditional surrender" does not mean that the German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means, however, that the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation. Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave in a barbarous manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe.

Der Ausdruck 'bedingungslose Kapitulation' bedeutet nicht dass das deutsche Volk versklavt oder vernichtet werden soll. Er bedeutet aber, dass die Alliierten ihnen gegenüber in Zeitpunkt der Kapitulation nicht durch irgendein Abkommen oder irgendeine Verpflichtung gebunden sind. Bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet, dass die Sieger freie Hand haben, aber nicht, dass sie das Recht haben, sich wie Barbaren zu benehmen oder dass sie Deutschland von der karteisierten Europas verdrängen wollen.

32. Mr. Churchill, 24.8.44.

The Atlantic Charter in no way binds us about the future of Germany. It is not a bargain or contract with our enemies. It had no quality of an offer to our enemy. But the principle of unconditional surrender will be adhered to so far as Nazi Germany and Japan are concerned, and that principle itself wipes away the danger of anything like Mr. Wilson's fourteen points being brought up by the Germans after their defeat, claiming that they surrendered in consideration of those points. I have repeatedly said that unconditional surrender gives the enemy no rights but relieves us from no duties. Justice will have to be done and retribution will fall upon the wicked and the cruel. The future towards which we are marching across bloody fields and frightful manifestations of destruction must surely be based upon the broad and simple virtues and upon the nobility of mankind. It must be based upon the basis of law which upholds the principles of justice and fair play, which protects the weak against the strong if the weak have justice on their side. There must be an end to predatory exploration and nationalistic ambition. No nation should not be admitted to rejoice in their traditions and achievements, but they will not be allowed by armed force to satisfy appetites of aggression at the expense of other countries merely because they are smaller or weaker or less well prepared, and measures will be taken

Die Atlantik-Charta legt uns bezüglich der Zukunft Deutschlands keinerlei Bedingungen auf. Sie ist keine Zusage und keine Vertragspflicht gegenüber unseren Feinden. Sie ist auch kein Angebot an unsere Feinde. Vielmehr gilt für Deutschland und Japan noch wie vor der Grundsatze der bedingungslosen Kapitulation, und dieser Grundsatz wischt auch mit der Zeit ab, dass Deutschland nach seiner Niederlage sich auf irgendetwas - wie etwa damals auf Wilsons 14 Punkte - berufen und dann behauptet, es habe nur auf dieser Grundlage kapituliert. Ich habe wiederholt erklärt, dass bedingungslose Kapitulation unseren Feinden keinerlei Rechte gibt, aber auch uns nicht von unseren Pflichten befreit. Der Gerechtigkeit muss Gerechtigkeit getan, die Verbrecher und Komplizen müssen bestraft werden. Die Zukunft, der wir über blutige Felder Schlachtfelder und vorbei an den furchtbaren Schrecken der Zerstörung entgegenmarschieren, kann nur auf den lautersten Grundtugenden und der Unsterblichkeit der gesamten Menschheit errichtet werden. Sie muss sich stützen auf die Herrschaft des Gesetzes, das den Grundsatz des Rechts und der Gerechtigkeit aufrechterhält und das den Schwachen gegen den Starken schützt, wenn der Schwache das Recht auf seiner Seite hat. Der übertriebene Ausbeutung und der national-istischen Ehrgeiz muss ein Ende bereitet werden. Das heisst nicht dass ein Volk nicht das Recht haben sollen, auf ihre Überlieferungen und Leistungen stolz zu sein. Aber es wird nicht zugelassen werden, dass sie ihren Appetit nach Macht mit befeindeten Völkern auf Kosten anderer Völker befriedigen, nur weil diese anderen kleiner oder schwächer oder

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to have ample armies, fleets, and air forces available to prevent anything like that coming about. We must respect the rights and opinion of others while holding firmly to our own faith and convictions. There must be room in this great new structure of the world for the happiness and prosperity of all and in the end it must be capable of bringing happiness and prosperity even to the guilty and vanquished nations.

schlechter gerüstet sind. Massnahmen werden getroffen werden, um starke Heere, Flotten und Luftwaffen zur Verfügung zu haben, die dazwischen verhindern können. Wir müssen das Recht und die Meinung anderer respektieren, auch wenn wir selbst an unseren eigenen Glaubenssätzen und Überzeugungen festhalten. In dem Aufbau der Welt muss Raum genug sein für das Glück und das Wohlergehen aller. Dennoch, wenn wir am Ende diese Neuordnung auch den Schuldigen und geschlagenen Völkern Glück und Wohlergehen bringen.

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COPIES HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

13 June 1944

SUBJECT: Standing Directive Psychological Warfare Against Germans the
German Armed Forces

TO : Staff.

1. A standing directive for P.W. against members of the German
forces has been drafted in collaboration with P.W. and Army Group. It
is intended that this directive, valid both before and during, follow
of white propaganda directed to German forces in the West.

2. This directive is divided into three sections, namely:

(a) Standing Policy Directive which defines the strategy
of the P.W. campaign, but the limits within which it must, for High Policy

(b) Appraisal of strength and weakness German fighting morale
with special reference to P.W. (Tab B) summarizes the specific points on
German leadership and the influence, and of the truthfulness of Ger-

man's attitude due to shortages and the shadow of a mill-front
and a feeling that the has wrong and inherent respect the Western
world. (Tab C) sets down the broad themes

(c) The strategy of P.W. (Tab D) the weak and counteract in

fighting morale.

3. It is intended that this document be issued by AGF in P.W. Division
directive to all Army Group, P.W. and OWI will issue it joint P.W./OWI Dis-
positive to operational agencies under their control.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

the Chief of Staff approves the attached directive for issue in P.W. Division
directive to all Army Group.

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0-2 Draft
0-3 Review
0-5 Holmes

Approved is June 1944
W. B. Smith
Gen. Melburn P.W.
16/6/44 1200
By hand of Capt. Colman

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO
CONFIDENTIAL
10/10/45

Gen. Mortimer
C.E.M.
- or -
C.E.M.

SCS - SHAEF File No.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXHIBITIONARY FORCE

June 1944

SUBJECT: STANDING DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST
OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

TO: 21 ARMY GROUP

Attached is copy of STANDING DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

By Command of General EISENHOWER


W. B. SMITH
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
U. S. A.

E. C. BOSHKE
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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


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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

June 1944.

FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST MEMBERS
OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE - THIS DIRECTIVE

1. This Standing Directive lays down the general lines to be followed in all forms of white propaganda directed to German armed forces in the West. It is intended as a Standing Directive, valid both before and after 1 May. It will be supplemented from time to time by special directives, as well as by the weekly Central Directive prepared by PW/OWI in collaboration with PW/SHAEP. Unless expressly stated, however, these directives should be regarded as supplementary to and not as cancelling the present Standing Directive, which has the approval of PW/OWI.
2. The Moscow Declaration laid down the principle that the individual would be held responsible for his war crimes. This applies equally to the soldier as to the civilian; a uniform neither aggravates nor mitigates the guilt of the individual, thus the Declaration ruled out the suggestion of reprisals.
3. It has also been made clear by our Governments that they are determined to destroy not only the Nazi system, but the concept of the Wehrmacht, which has been both the initiator and the willing instrument of recurring German attempts to dominate other peoples. Nothing in the implementation of this directive must compromise that issue.
4. It is recognised that in the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonise the audience. Direct denunciation or direct offence against known susceptibilities will therefore be avoided in all Psychological Warfare against the enemy armed forces. On the other hand nothing will be done to encourage or condone the concept of German militarism and the attitudes of mind behind it, both of which we are pledged to destroy.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. Psychological Warfare is not a magic substitute for physical battle, but an auxiliary to it. It is intended to (a) reducing the cost of the physical battle and (b) rendering the enemy easier to handle after surrender.
6. The conduct of Psychological Warfare therefore forms part of the conduct of military operations, and must be co-ordinated with that of other arms of war. It is the task of Psychological Warfare to assist the Supreme Commander in fulfilling his mission against the enemy with the most economical use of troops and equipment.
7. The conduct of Psychological Warfare in military operations must however be strictly subordinated to the long-term policy of our Governments, in the sense that nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the war. To this end, this Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare during operations is preceded by a summary of standing high policy directives.
8. These high policy directives define not the strategy of the campaign which Psychological Warfare will conduct against German fighting morale, but the limits within which it must, for policy reasons, be confined.

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STANDARD HIGH POLICY DIRECTIVES

9. ■ specific promises will ■ made concerning the treatment ■ Germany after ■ war, other than those expressly made by Government spokesmen. In particular there must be no suggestion that the Atlantic Charter applies ■ Germany by right.

10. ■ no account must there be any suggestion or implication:-

- (i) that ■ recognise any claim of the German Army to be absolved from its full share of responsibility for German aggression on the grounds that its part is merely professional and non-political and that it does ■ more than obey orders;
- (ii) that ■ recognise the possibility of divorcing ■ "fighting war" from the atrocities which the German soldier has committed or condoned, e.g. the taking and shooting of hostages and the murder of prisoners;
- (iii) that ■ would be prepared to allow German militarism to survive in any form.

11. The following are the points on which our Governments have committed themselves:

- (a) Demilitarisation of Germany.
- (b) Punishment of war criminals.
- (c) Liberation of territories overrun by Nazi-Germany, including Austria.
- (d) Occupation of Germany.
- (e) Destruction of Nazism and German Militarism.
- (f) Prevention of such economic distress in Germany as will be detrimental to the rest of the world.
- (g) Ultimate restoration of Germany to a place "in the world family of democratic nations".

The key quotations on these points are given in Annex A. Note that (d), (f) ■ (g) are only general commitments, and may not be elaborated in Psychological Warfare unless and until specific Government statements are forthcoming on these points.

APPRECIATION OF STRENGTH AND ■ OF GERMAN FIGHTING MORALE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE ■ PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

(NOTE: Except where specifically stated the following generalisations apply to the German Army; not to the Air Force or Navy)

12. ■ Points

- (1) The Habit of Discipline. The habit of uncritical obedience to authority, rather than any ruthless enforcement of discipline from above, remains the strongest factor in German morale today. This factor may not decrease sharply until the German Army as a whole is broken on the battlefield, since the retreats and defensive battles to which the Wehrmacht is now committed automatically place greater reliance on higher authority than offensive campaigns of the 1940 type.

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(ii) Comradeship. The ideal of comradeship has been keenly cultivated in the German Army, particularly since 1933. The German NCO forms a transitional stage between soldier status and officer status, a fact which strengthens this sense of comradeship. It has furthermore been immensely deepened by the Russian campaign.

(iii) Professional Pride. The average German's conviction that the best life is the soldier's life, plus the social fact that the highest calling in Germany is the soldier's calling, constitutes a great source of strength.

Added to this the German soldier, and often the non-German soldier serving in the Wehrmacht, is convinced:-

- (a) that he is privileged to be serving in the finest Army in the world, permeated with a code of soldierly honour which rules him and his officers alike;
- (b) that the Wehrmacht is the embodiment of the highest physical and spiritual attainments of German culture;
- (c) that the Wehrmacht is therefore ^{the} non-political guardian of the future of the German race;
- (d) that as a fighting machine German "quality" can probably succeed in throwing back both Anglo-American and Russian "quantity".

(iv) Material Interests. The German Army represents, for the reasons stated in sub-para. (iii) above, an honoured career with considerable material benefits. (Pay allowances and especially food are good compared with civilian standards in Germany). Thousands of officers (especially those of junior and field rank) and tens of thousands of NCOs (particularly in specialist trades) have signed on not simply for the duration, but for periods varying from 7 - 14 years, or longer, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood.

(v) The Bolshevik Bogey. The guilty fear of Russian vengeance, linked with the Russian dislike of the Slav and general fear of Bolshevism, has convinced the average German soldier that "anything is better than defeat in the East".

German propaganda has deliberately enlarged and intensified this fear, in the following ways:-

- (a) It has largely succeeded in persuading the soldier that the Anglo-Americans are so dominated by the Bolshevik Colossus that they would be powerless to save Germany.
- (b) It has filled the gap created by the absence of specific United Nations policy to Germany with atrocity stories of forced labour in Russia, castration, deportation, etc.

(vi) The Rewards of Victory in the West. Learning from Mr. Churchill in 1940, the High Command has deliberately capitalized the threat of invasion from the West. It has,

- (a) argued that, if the Anglo-American threat can be frustrated or confined, the German Armies can be switched to the East. This argument has been used to justify the policy of the West.

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- (b) argued that a defensive victory in the West will form the basis for the speedy conclusion of a "comprehensive peace" either with the West or with the East, which would in fact be a German victory.
- (c) exploited the bombing of Germany to persuade the soldier that his only hope of regaining what he has lost lies in a German victory in the West.
- (d) succeeded in convincing the German soldier that these reasons are the last tremendous effort must and can be made.

(vii) Summary.

- (a) Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918, i.e. Bolshevik propaganda, leading to soldiers' and workers' councils; and democratic propaganda, leading to the revolt of the civilian under the professional soldier.
- should assume that the German Army in the West will, like von Arnim's Army in Tunisia, fight ■ as a whole until it collapses as a whole. Indeed defeatism is more widespread at the top than at the bottom.
- (b) The High Command has succeeded in actually raising fighting morale during the winter, by deliberately weakening it up for a final effort in ■. This procedure has the obvious danger that an Anglo-American success in the West may be followed by a sudden and dangerous slump in morale.
- (c) For the reason outlined in sub-para. (i) above, no propaganda directed at the frontline German soldier is likely to be effective unless it sounds and looks more positive and authoritative than his own Army Order forbidding him to listen to it.
- (d) For the reasons outlined in sub-para. (ii) and (iii) above, there is little prospect of dividing the German Army internally - i.e. by setting men against officers. Furthermore, no propaganda aiming at inducing the surrender of German troops is likely to succeed unless it meets the fundamental objection that by surrender the individual is letting down his comrades.

13. Weak Points.

(1) The Shaken Myth of Invincibility.

The long series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean and in Russia have shaken - but by no means shattered - the German soldier's faith in the mystic invincibility of German arms which carried his fighting morale up to a high tide of fanaticism in June, 1940. Within ■ general uncertainties and other specific doubts,

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Doubts about the Führer. (As opposed to Führer - see special note immediately below). Allied propaganda that disasters such as Stalingrad, Tunisia,

the Ukraine battle, and the Crimea, largely due to the prestige policy of hanging on too long — too much; has gone home. Many German soldiers today feel that military operations are being dictated by political and often party considerations. The promotion of the [redacted], and of the General Staff, with party generals, (notably the C. of S. Zeitzler) is largely blamed for this.

Note: At present, the average soldier, despite an awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. Hitler is still his lucky talisman. Goering is also to some extent shielded. Of the German leaders, Himmler, Goebbels and Ley are the most unpopular. Generally speaking, "The System" or the "Party bosses" are the scapegoats.

- (b) Doubts about Equipment. German Army Equipment is good, and the German soldier knows it. But his battle experience since 1941 has given him painful proof that, in [redacted] respects at least, Allied equipment is not only more plentiful, but better. (Allied M7 in Africa, Russian P.A.K., Russian medium tanks in the [redacted] and Allied fighter planes on all fronts are examples).

The present "Munderwaffe" vogue is in part a wishful thinking reaction to this.

- (c) Doubts about the News. Despite intense efforts by the High Command, it has not succeeded in making the German soldier accept unquestioningly its interpretation of events. Most German soldiers, when they get the opportunity, read or listen to Anglo-American propaganda and try to find a truth halfway between their [redacted] communications and ours. They [redacted] that "everything is propaganda" and that they, [redacted] intelligent people, can read between the lines. Without knowing it, they are of course steeped in Nazi propaganda. They regard as "propaganda lies" such facts as that Germany invaded Poland, or that England has some highly developed social services. They have the useful faculty of forgetting any facts inconvenient to their superiority and believing they were invented by Anglo-American propaganda. Their outlook is formed however not by the direct output of the Propaganda Ministry, but by the educational and propaganda activities of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless they are open to any propaganda which does not [redacted] read like "propaganda", and does not offend their sense of "soldierly honour". Unconsciously still, [redacted] actively, the German soldier craves for an excuse to stop the useless slaughter which leaves his honour as a German soldier unscathed, and puts the blame on someone or something outside the Wehrmacht. [redacted] needs in brief (i) facts, which seem to him to be objective, showing [redacted] despite the courage of the Wehrmacht, someone [redacted] has lost the war for Germany; (ii) a picture of the future which portrays death and destruction for "the betrayers of Germany" and survival for the German people.

Evidence for the above analysis is provided by the growing success of (a) Free German Committee broadcasts from Moscow, headed by General Seyditz, and (b) Radio Calais. Both these transmissions

seems to be an analysis of German fighting morale similar to that above.

- (4) Doubts about the Luftwaffe. Moreover, the Air ~~is~~ brings with it a cause of friction between the Air Force and the Army. German soldiers are beginning to talk like many British soldiers in 1940. This friction, and the resulting blame on "authorities" is a weak if minor shock in German fighting morale.

All these factors are important in that they provide the soldier with scapegoats for his decline in fortune, and when things go wrong the German's natural reaction is, "I have been betrayed".

(ii) Man-Power

This is perhaps the main operational worry of the soldier. He is disturbed by the losses of men and material which he knows the battles in the West cost the Wehrmacht. This uneasiness is heightened by Allied propaganda barrage on this theme, contrasted with the silence of his own authorities, a silence all the more significant when it persists even under the new GDF policy of simulating complete frankness on operational matters. This general Man-power worry breaks down into other specific ones:

- (a) The worry that, because of power troubles, the ranks of the Wehrmacht are being increasingly filled with foreigners of some twenty nationalities, that the quality of the army is therefore in danger of "pollution".
- (b) The worry that, with almost every one of its field divisions committed already to actual potential battle-fields, the German Army has no effective central reserve to sustain it in a many front war.

Both (a) and (b) above apply with particular force to the target of this paper - the German forces in the West. These troops have in their own formations large numbers of foreigners; and many of these divisions have had proof, by their own experience, of being switched from one front to another, with no uncommitted central reserve exists. The great volume of German counter propaganda on this point is further evidence of its importance.

(iii) A War Gone Wrong.

In building up the picture of the chivalrous Wehrmacht in deadly battle against Bolshevism, the High Command inevitably raises in the German soldier's mind the question why Germany is fighting Britain and America, especially since Hitler denounced in Mein Kampf the fatal mistake of the two front war. The High Command seeks to answer this question by denouncing Anglo-American impotence and arguing that the City of Wall Street and the City of London are in conspiracy with the Kremlin. But this argument does not quell a deep uneasiness.

There is also a feeling in the German soldier's mind that the defensive battles which he is forced to fight are not the battles for which he is trained, nor the battles for which his equipment was designed.

There is evidence that the GSV had great trouble, during 1943, in converting officers and men to the technique of the defensive battle which their previous training had largely neglected.

The fear of isolation, a feature of what the Germans used to ridicule as "Anglo-Saxon mindlessness" is likely to be at its strongest among coastal formations in the West. They are particularly liable to the anxiety lest they be sacrificed as "human landmines".

(iv) Loss of Honour.

An increasing number of soldiers are aware of, and uncomfortable about,

- (a) atrocities, especially in Russia. They naturally want to push the blame on to the SS, or simply "those in authority".
- (b) the hostility of the occupied territories, including "Nordic" countries like Norway. The German wants to be liked, and the German soldier is puzzled why, despite the correctness of the Wehrmacht, he is so coldly received. He wants to have an explanation which blames someone outside the Army for this failure of the "New Order".

(v) Respect for Western Powers.

The German has a sense of inferiority to both Britain and America. Many Nazis, for instance, regard National Socialism as the method of making Germany a ruling race "like the British". The German feelings for Britain are a confused mixture of envy, respect and contempt for the old-fashioned. Their feeling for America is different, since they do not feel it to be a racial unity like Britain or Germany, and are suspicious of its "capitalist imperialism". They profoundly respect its riches, production capacity and "scarceness" and regard it as the continent of unlimited possibilities.

Intensive propaganda has failed to modify these traditional feelings. In particular nearly all German soldiers are confident that they will be treated well as prisoners of war and hope for (if they do not expect) an Anglo-American occupation if the worst comes to the worst. Furthermore, they are feverishly anxious for Anglo-American appreciation of "the chivalry" of the Wehrmacht.

(vi) The Shadow of the Two Front War.

It is improbable that German fighting morale in the West will be seriously undermined before a successful Anglo-American landing, provided there is no great German disaster in the East. But the moment we can announce a decisive break-through will be a moment of profound psychological crisis, greater even than the shock of Mussolini's collapse last year.

Notwithstanding, the advance of the Russian troops into Europe must reduce the persuasiveness of the argument

that Hitler is deliberately yielding space in the East to ensure victory in the West. Gradually the German soldier begins to ask whether Hitler's strategy is not precisely what United Nations strategy desires, and whether the Second Front is not having its effect before it starts.

THE STRATEGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

14. The foregoing analysis suggests that, provided there is a catastrophe in the East, the weak points in German morale, enumerated above, will begin to counteract the strong points only when the Anglo-American forces have demonstrated that they can use their quantitative superiority.

15. It is impossible to predict at what phase of the operations this change in German morale will come. On this point Psychological Warfare will be guided by G-2. Already, however, it is possible to lay out two phases in the psychological warfare campaign:

- (a) The phase before and after D-day up to the change in German morale. (referred to as Phase A)
- (b) The phase after the change. (referred to as Phase B)

The present Directive deals with Phase A.

16. In Phase A all psychological warfare against German troops must be regarded as preparatory. This must be a period not of direct assault but of open appeals for surrender; but of steady unemphatic repetition of facts, full recognition of which will bear sudden fruit in Phase B.

Even after D-day this unemphatic reiteration of facts will be continued until evidence from G-2 indicates that it is time to enter Phase B.

17. During this phase psychological warfare will concentrate on the following tasks:

(i) Long-term tasks.

- (a) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word, and of unity between the Russians and ourselves.
- (b) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is now inevitable, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and now has the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

(ii) Short-term tasks, pre D-day.

- (a) Stimulation of defeatism through a sense of Anglo-American superiority in men and materials, combatting the fear of Bolshevism by a cautious build up of Anglo-American strength.
- (b) Exploitation of German confidence in the good treatment of prisoners of war so as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarization of the German soldier with official Allied statements on the peace of Germany in Post-War Europe.

- (e) Exploitation of the Russian offensive — exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat in a two front war.
 - (d) Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.
 - (c) Exploitation of a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.
 - (f) Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.
- (iii) Short-term tasks Post D-day.

After D-day the following tasks should be added to [redacted] in (ii) above:

- (a) Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German army by open incitement of these foreigners.
- (b) Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting. Since these troops will not be actually engaged, they will probably form the best target for propaganda. In this campaign emphasize the failure of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy to prevent the landings.

METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED IN CARRYING OUT THE ABOVE CAMPAIGN.

18. Long-term tasks.

- (i) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word and in unity between the Russians and ourselves.
 - (a) Throughout this phase all psychological warfare [redacted] all media, whether tactical or strategic, will remain factual and objective, avoiding terms, phrases or pictures which the German soldier will dismiss as "propaganda". In particular, all boasting and sneering will be scrupulously avoided; there will be no direct appeals to the soldier's self-interest. There will be no attempts at a chummy or intimate style. All psychological [redacted] fare will give the impression of Anglo-American reliability, reticence, soldierly dignity [redacted] docency.
 - (b) Use every opportunity to demonstrate practical collaboration between ourselves and [redacted] Russians. This is preferable to ideological assertions on United Nations unity.
- (ii) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German [redacted] in Tunisia.

Do not [redacted] that the German soldier is yet [redacted] vinced that defeat is certain. He is keyed-up and may maintain a relatively high morale for some time after D-day.

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Concentrate therefore on facts which German soldier can accept as facts, illustrating the inevitability of ultimate defeat.

Make no open appeals for desertion. Similarly, make no open appeals to fear, e.g. of the air offensive. Treat the German soldier as a man if openly incited by the enemy to cowardice, do the opposite.

Show the increasing isolation of Germany's position in the world and the gradual weakening and disintegration of the satellites, the increasing restrictions being imposed on Germany by the neutrals, and the defeats suffered by her Japanese allies.

19. Short-term tasks pre-D-day

- (i) Stimulation of defection through of American superiority in men and materials; correlating the fact of Bolshevik strength build-up of Anglo-American strength.

Do not try to heighten the tension by a war of campaign. The will see through and dismiss it as propaganda. But provide all material available, especially technical material, the leadership, organization, equipment and training of the Anglo-American armies.

Continue to provide facts showing the failure of U-boats.

Show that the Mediterranean fronts draining away German reserves needed for two essential fronts.

- (ii) of German confidence in the treatment of prisoners of war as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarization of the soldier with official Allied statements the place of Germany in post-war Europe.

Continue and increase the campaign illustrating treatment of German prisoners of war. But avoid, especially in leaflets, a "display" looks like counter-pla publicity. In radio propaganda increase as far as possible broadcasts about, and by, German prisoners of war.

It is probable that many German soldiers are not familiar with even the few statements available on United Nations intentions with regard to post-war Germany. These statements should not be plugged in leaflets and radio. Equally, the be emphasized that the Nazis are deliberately cooling from the German soldier the real intentions of the United Nations.

- (iii) Exploitation of the Russian offensive as exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat a two-front

Destroy the illusion that the German retreat the East is deliberately planned by showing the connection between Russian and Anglo-American

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strategy. [redacted] is no longer [redacted] of [redacted] own strategy. [redacted] is dictated to him by the two-front strategy of [redacted] United Nations.

Treat [redacted] Mediterranean as a theater [redacted] which [redacted] have compelled the [redacted] to fritter [redacted] first class manpower and [redacted] vitally [redacted] the decisive battle [redacted] on the two major [redacted].

(iv) Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.

Never appeal directly to German fear of sabotage and resistance. Confine yourself to plain facts. Do not spoil these facts by headlines such as "Martyrs of Gestapo Terror".

Build up the impression [redacted] resistance in occupied Europe, [redacted] to a lesser [redacted] in Germany, is an organized part of [redacted] Anglo-American strategy.

[redacted] possible facts indicating [redacted] decline [redacted] effective police control [redacted] Germany and [redacted] occupied Europe. [redacted] again do not interpret these facts to the Germans, but let [redacted] speak for themselves. Make no references before D-day to foreigners serving [redacted] the German Army [redacted] the West.

(v) Exploitation [redacted] a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.

[redacted] the German soldier (especially in the coastal divisions) feel [redacted] is a "human land mine", by stressing the significance of attacks on German communications.

Stress that the Atlantic Wall [redacted] 1000 [redacted] [redacted] that the German High Command [redacted] only [redacted] threat at one point by stripping reserves [redacted] [redacted] points. [redacted] German assumes that [redacted] will be several landings: so should we.

(vi) Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force [redacted] the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility [redacted] successful resistance.

"Fear propaganda" designed to intensify the effect of bombs has been rendered unnecessary by [redacted] bombs themselves. In treating the [redacted] [redacted] concentrate [redacted] its strictly military [redacted] as an essential part of [redacted] invasion strategy. Avoid giving [redacted] impression [redacted] we [redacted] trying to break German morale. Seek indirectly to arouse resentment against the fact that air power, which [redacted] [redacted] claimed as their invention, has now [redacted] [redacted] against Germany. Give the impression that [redacted] efforts of the Luftwaffe cannot make up for Anglo-American production superiority and for the mistakes of the [redacted] leadership.

Remember that production figures - [redacted] [redacted] battle figures - [redacted] no longer impress the German soldier. Not the number of aircraft produced, but [redacted] effects [redacted] air superiority impress him. This applies also to all forms of man power and material superiority.

16. Short-term tasks post D-day.(1) stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German army by open incitement of these foreigners.

On [] after D-day a special campaign will [] direct incitement to desertion addressed to foreigners in the German army of the West. It will have two objects. (i) to influence the foreigners, (ii) indirectly to influence the German troops. A special directive will be issued on this subject.

(11) Special attacks on the morale [] troops [] the flanks [] fighting.

During the actual fighting we [] expect that [] troops engaged will be receptive to anything [] propaganda.

Strategic radio and leaflets should in this period be directed chiefly to the German troops on the flanks, [] as to foreigners throughout [] German Army. treatment should remain factual and objective and [] boasting or creating an atmosphere of undue excitement. Every effort should [] made to obtain "hot" statements [] prisoners of war for use by radio and leaflet.

[] effort should be made to demonstrate to [] troops the influence of sea power on [] operation. In particular the following themes should [] used:

- (a) Allied command of the sea and of the air [] gives [] the power [] attacks with the maximum of surprise over a very wide range.
- (b) Allied command of the sea excludes the [] use of [] communications along the Atlantic Wall, communications which would be invaluable if [] communications are destroyed or hampered.
- (c) The German Navy cannot both cope with the assault and its follow up and with the trans-atlantic [] bringing more and more men, [] supplies.
- (d) To the troops [] the flanks of [] in [] Atlantic Wall, emphasise the power [] effectiveness [] naval bombardment.
- (e) Complete Allied control of the [] freedom of action for further attacks [] the Continent.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ANNEXE I to
Standing Directive for Psychological
Warfare against Members of the German
Armed Forces.

QUOTATIONS RELATING TO ALLIED WAR AIMS TOWARDS GERMANY.

The following are the main quotations illustrating Allied War Aims towards Germany which are likely to be of use in propaganda to the enemy. They are arranged under main themes, but often one quotation can be used to illustrate more than one of these main themes. Quotations have, therefore, been repeated where necessary.

The main headings correspond to those listed in para. 11 of the Standing Directive.

The standard German translations are appended for convenience of reference.

Translation.

I. DEMILITARISATION OF GERMANY.

1. MR. Eden - 29.7.41.

We are determined upon the destruction of Hitler, his regime and all it stands for. In the military sphere it is our bounden duty to ensure that Germany is not again in another twenty years in a position to plunge the world into misery and horror of total war. It would be criminal to neglect any precaution to ensure this.

Wir sind entschlossen, Hitler, sein Regime und alles, was es vertritt, zu vernichten. Auf militärischem Gebiet ist es unsere unabweisbare Pflicht, dafür zu sorgen, dass Deutschland in absehbarer Zukunft nicht wieder in der Lage ist, die Welt in das Elend und die Schrecken eines totalen Krieges zu stürzen. Es wäre ein Verbrechen, wollten wir irgendeine Sicherungsmaßnahme in dieser Richtung ausser Acht lassen.

2. The Atlantic Charter. Clause 8 14.8.41.

They believe all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burdens of armaments.

Sie glauben, dass alle Nationen der Welt aus Wirklichkeitssinn sowohl wie aus geistlichen Gründen dazu kommen müssen, von der Anwendung von Gewalt abzusehen. Kein künftiger Friede kann aufrecht erhalten werden, wenn Nationen, die mit Angriffen über ihre Grenzen hinaus drohen oder drohen könnten, weiterhin über eine Land-See- oder Luftstreitmacht verfügen. Deshalb ist bis zur Schaffung eines umfassenderen und dauernden Systems allgemeiner Sicherheit nach ihrer Ansicht die Enttaffung solcher Nationen unerlässlich. Ebenso werden sie alle anderen durchführbaren Massnahmen unterstützen und fördern, die friedliebenden Völkern die drückenden Lasten der Bewaffnung erleichtern.

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Translation.

3. Mr. Churchill. 24.8.41.

The United States and Great Britain do not now think that there will never be any more war again. On the contrary we intend to take ample precautions to prevent its renewal in any part of the world by effectively disarming the guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves.

Die Vereinigten Staaten und Grossbritannien nehmen nicht an, dass es niemals wieder Krieg geben wird. Im Gegenteil, wir beabsichtigen, umfassende Vorkehrungen zu treffen, seine Wiederholung für absehbare Zeit zu verhindern, indem wir die schuldigen Völker entwaffnen und selbst entsprechend gerüstet bleiben.

4. Mr. Roosevelt. 12.10.42.

The objective of today is clear and realistic. It is to destroy completely the military power of Germany, Italy and Japan to such good purpose that their threat against us and all the other United Nations cannot be revived in generation hence.

Unser jetziges Ziel ist klar und realistisch. Es heisst: völlige Zerstörung der militärischen Macht Deutschlands, Italiens und Japans, sodass sie uns und die anderen Vereinten Nationen nicht wieder nach einer Generation bedrohen können.

5. Mr. Roosevelt. Address to Seventy-eighth Congress. 7.1.43.

It is clear to me that if Germany and Italy and Japan - or any one of them - remain armed at the end of this war or are permitted to reform, they will again inevitably embark upon an ambitious career of world conquest. They must be disarmed and kept disarmed and they must abandon the philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world.

Wir sind uns darüber klar, dass Deutschland, Italien und Japan - oder einer dieser Staaten - wenn sie nach Ende dieses Krieges gerüstet bleiben oder sich neu bewaffnen, wiederum auf einen ehrgeizigen Welt Eroberungsplan zu verwickeln werden. Sie müssen daher entwaffnet werden und entwaffnet bleiben und ihrer Weltanschauung entsagen, die so viel Leid über die Welt gebracht hat.

II. PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS.

6. M. Stalin. 23.2.43.

It is very likely that the war for the liberation of the Soviet land will result in ousting or destroying Hitler's clique. We should welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German State. History shows that Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German State remain.

Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass der Krieg für die Befreiung des Sowjetlandes mit der Vertreibung oder Vernichtung der Hitler-Clique enden wird. Wir werden solch ein Ergebnis begrüssen, aber es wäre töricht, die Hitler-Clique mit dem deutschen Volk und dem deutschen Staat gleichzusetzen; die Geschichte lehrt, dass die Hitlers kommen und gehen, der deutsche Staat aber und das deutsche Volk bleiben.

7. M. Molotov. 27.2.42.

The Hitler Government and its accomplices will not escape the stern responsibility and deserved punishment for all their unheard-of crimes committed against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and against all freedom-loving peoples.

Die Hitlerregierung und ihre Mitthelfer werden der schweren Verantwortung und der verdienten Bestrafung für all ihre unerhörten Verbrechen gegen die Völker der Sowjetunion und alle freiheitsliebenden Völker nicht entgehen.

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Translation.

8. Mr. Roosevelt. 21.9.42.

The time will come when they will have to stand trial in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts.

Die Zeit wird kommen, da sie in den Ländern, die jetzt von ihnen unterdrückt werden, vor Gericht gestellt werden, um sich wegen ihrer Untaten verantworten.

9. Mr. Eichen. 26.9.42.

We are not animated by a spirit of revenge, natural though such a spirit must be to so many in Europe today, but by the conviction that civilized justice will only be restored to its rightful place in the affairs of men when the criminals who have sought to destroy it are made to answer for their deeds. Retribution must be swift, sure and complete.

Wir sind nicht besesselt vom Geist der Rache, so natürlich auch solche ein Geist für viele Menschen in Europa heutzutage sein muss. Wir sind vielmehr der Überzeugung, dass die Gerechtigkeit erst dann wieder auf ihrem rechtmässigen Thron eingesetzt werden wird, wenn die Verbrecher, die sie zu zerstören suchten, sich für ihr Tun verantworten müssen. Und die Vergeltung muss schnell, gründlich und umfassend sein.

10. Mr. Roosevelt. 12.10.42.

We have made it entirely clear that the United Nations seek no reprisals against the populations of Germany or Italy or Japan, but the ringleaders and their brutal henchmen must be named, and apprehended and tried in accordance with the judicial processes of criminal law.

Wir haben es vollkommen klargemacht, dass die Völkervereinigten Nationen keine Vergeltung an der Bevölkerung Deutschlands, Italiens oder Japans anstreben. Aber die Rädelsführer und ihre verrohten Helfer müssen namentlich genannt, festgenommen und in einem gerichtlichen Strafverfahren abgeurteilt werden.

11. Lord Simon. 10.1.43.

Like our Soviet Ally we firmly believe, and we shall continue to believe, that before the foundations of a enduring peace can be laid, the Nazi regime must be destroyed for ever, and all those war criminals who have inspired its evil deeds must be suitably and severely dealt with. I now say in plain terms on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we agree with Premier Stalin, first that the Hitlerite State should be destroyed, and secondly that the whole German people is not (as Dr. Goebbels has been trying to persuade them) thereby doomed to destruction. I put these two propositions with equal prominence and equal firmness.

Wie unsere russischen Verbündeten sind wir jetzt und in Zukunft davon überzeugt, dass das Fundament eines dauernden Friedens erst gelegt werden kann, wenn das Nazi-Regime für immer zerstört ist und alle Kriegsverbrecher, die seine Missetaten angestiftet haben, gebührend und schwer bestraft sind. Ich erkläre nunmehr in Namen der britischen Regierung: Wir sind mit Stalin darin einig, dass erstens der Hitlerstaat zerstört werden muss, dass zweitens das ganze deutsche Volk dadurch nicht, wie Goebbels es glauben machen will, zum Untergang verurteilt ist. Ich gebe diesen beiden Feststellungen das gleiche Gewicht, die gleiche Festigkeit.

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12. Moscow Declaration, 1.11.43.

As the time of the granting of any amnesties to any Government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liberated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled from all these countries.

Welche Regierung auch immer in Deutschland bestehen wird an dem Tage,

an den ihn ein Waffenstillstand gewährt wird - alle deutschen Offiziere, Soldaten und Mitglieder der NSDAP, die für diese Gräueltaten, Massensterbe und Hinrichtungen verantwortlich sind oder dabei mitgeholfen haben, werden in das Land verbracht werden, wo sie ihre Verbrechen begangen haben. Dies wird geschehen, damit sie nach den Gesetzen der befreiten Länder und der freien Regierungen, die in diesen Ländern gebildet sein werden, abgeurteilt und bestraft werden. Namenslisten der Täter werden in all Ländern zusammengestellt werden.

III. LIBERATION OF TERRITORIES OVERRUN BY NAZI GERMANY, INCLUDING AUSTRIA.

13. Mr. Churchill, 5.9.40.

We have not at any time adopted, since the war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned.

Niemals seit Ausbruch dieses Krieges haben wir uns den Grundsatz eingeprägt, dass in dem Gebietsbestand der verschiedenen Länder nichts geändert werden könne. Auf der anderen Seite beabsichtigen wir nicht, irgendwelche während des Krieges eintretende Gebietsveränderungen anzuerkennen, sie nicht mit der freien Zustimmung der guten Willen der beteiligten Parteien zustande kommen.

14. Mr. Churchill, 9.11.40.

Let me remind you that in spite of all the blows we have endured and under all the burdens we bear and amidst many deadly threats, we have not abandoned out jot of any of our obligations or undertakings towards the captive or unlabeled countries of Europe or towards any of these countries which still act with us. On the contrary, since we have been left alone in this world struggle we have affirmed or defined more precisely all the causes of all countries with whom or for whom we drew the sword - Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, greatest of all, France; latest of all Greece. For all these we will toil and strive and our victory will supply the liberation of them all.

Ich möchte daran erinnern, dass wir trotz all der Schläge, die wir auszuhalten haben, trotz all der Lasten, die wir tragen, inmitten der vielen tödlichen Drohungen dennoch nicht ein Jota unserer Verpflichtungen gegenüber den unterworfenen oder versklavten Ländern Europas oder gegenüber den Ländern, die noch mit uns kämpfen, preisgegeben haben. Im Gegenteil, seitdem wir in diesem Weltkampf allein übrig geblieben sind, haben wir die Sache aller Länder, mit denen oder für die wir das Schwert gezogen haben, uns erneut zu eigen gemacht oder genauer umschrieben: Österreich, Tschechoslowakei, Polen, Norwegen, Holland, Belgien, Frankreich, das grösste, und Griechenland, das letzte von allen. Für sie alle werden wir arbeiten und kämpfen, und unser Sieg wird die Befreiung aller bringen.

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15. Moscow Declaration. (Austria) 1.11.43.

...have agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim of Nazi aggression shall be liberated from German domination... They declare they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well as those neighbouring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Oesterreich, das erste freie Land, das dem Angriff der Nazis Opfer fiel, soll von der deutschen Herrschaft befreit werden... Die Regierungen Gross-Britanniens, der Sowjet-Union und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika wünschen die Wiederherstellung eines freien und unabhängigen Oesterreichs. Hierdurch soll den Oesterreichischen Völkern selbst, ebenso wie auch seinen Nachbarstaaten, die sich ähnlichen Problemen gegenübersehen, die Bahn freigeschafft werden zu politischer und wirtschaftlicher Sicherheit - dieser einzigen Grundlage dauernden Friedens.

IV. OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

16. Mr. Churchill, 22.3.41.

There will certainly be large numbers of men... who will have to be brought back to their families and to their jobs. For all these, after full provision has been made for garrisoning of the guilty countries, return to something like home and freedom will be their heart's desire.

Trotz nachdem die Besetzung der schuldigen Länder voll in Rechnung gestellt worden ist, wird sich der Herzenswunsch aller Soldaten nach so etwas wie Heim und Freiheit erfüllen lassen.

17. Moscow Declaration. 1.11.43.

The Governments of U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China jointly declare that their united action pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organisation and maintenance of peace and security... that those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy... that after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

Die Regierungen der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, die Regierungen von Grossbritannien, der Sowjetunion und China geben folgende gemeinsame Erklärung ab: Die Einheit des Handelns, in der sie sich für die Führung des Krieges gegen ihre Feinde verpflichtet haben, soll auch zur Organisation und Führung des Friedens und Sicherheit beibehalten werden. Die Mächte, die gemeinsam gegen einen gemeinsamen Feind Krieg führen, werden in allen mit seiner Kapitulation und Entwaffnung zusammenhängenden Fragen gemeinsam handeln. Die vier Mächte werden, nach Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten, ihre militärischen Kräfte im Gebiet anderer Staaten nur für die in dieser Erklärung vorgesehenen Zwecke und nach gemeinsamer Beratung einsetzen.

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V. DESTRUCTION OF NAZISM AND PRUSSIAN MILITARISM.

18. M. Stalin, 23.2.43.

It is very likely that the war for the liberation of the Soviet land will result in ousting or destroying Hitler's clique. We should welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. History shows that Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German state remain.

Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass der Krieg für die Befreiung des Sowjetgebietes mit der Vertreibung oder Vernichtung der Hitler-Clique enden wird; wir würden solch ein Ergebnis begrüßen. Aber es wäre töricht, die Hitler-Clique mit dem deutschen Volk und dem deutschen Staat gleichzusetzen; die Geschichte lehrt, dass die Hitlers kommen und gehen, der deutsche Staat aber und das deutsche Volk bleiben.

19. M. Stalin, 6.11.42.

We have no such aim as to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed and our first task in fact is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers.

Unser Ziel ist nicht die Zerstörung Deutschlands, denn es ist ebenso unmöglich, Deutschland zu zerstören wie Russland. Aber der Hitlerstaat kann und sollte zerstört werden. Es ist unsere vornehmlichste Aufgabe, den Hitlerstaat und seine Träger zu zerstören.

20. Mr. Roosevelt, 7.1.43.

Our own objectives are clear: the objective of smashing the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved people - the objective of liberating the subjugated nations....

Unsere Ziele sind klar; Zerstörung des Militarismus, der den versklavten Völkern von ihren kriegslustigen Herren aufgezwungen wurde; Befreiung der unterdrückten Nationen.

21. Mr. Churchill, 21.3.43.

We and our allies will have accomplished one great task. Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism which threatened to engulf the whole world and against which we stood alone for a fearful year, - these evils will have been swept from the face of the earth.

Wir und unsere Alliierten werden die eine grosse Aufgabe erfüllt haben: Nazi Tyrannie und preussischer Militarismus, welche die ganze Welt zu verschlingen drohten und gegen die wir ein schicksalreiches Jahr lang allein standen; diese Plagen werden von der Erde verjagt sein.

22. Mr. Roosevelt, 24.12.43.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we must emphatically emphasize that word "respectable" - for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute a "master race".

Die Vereinten Nationen beabsichtigen nicht, das deutsche Volk zu versklaven. Wir wünschen, ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich in Frieden zu einer lichen und achtbaren Mitglied der europäischen Völkerfamilie zu entwickeln. Aber wir müssen mit allem Nachdruck das Wort "achtbar" betonen. Denn wir beabsichtigen, das deutsche Volk ein alermal vom Nationalsozialismus und vom preussischen Militarismus zu befreien und von der phantastischen und unheilvollen Idee, es sei eine Herrenrasse.

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VI. PREVENTION OF SUCH ECONOMIC DISTRESS IN GERMANY AS WILL BE NECESSARY TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

23. Mr. Eden, 29.7.41.

It is not our intention to cause the economic collapse of Germany or of any other country. I do not say this out of any special love of Germany, but because a hungry and bankrupt Germany in the midst of Europe would poison all of us who are her neighbours.

Es ist nicht unsere Absicht, den wirtschaftlichen Zusammenbruch Deutschlands oder irgend eines anderen Landes herbeizuführen. Ich sage das nicht aus besonderer Neigung zu Deutschland, sondern einfach deshalb, weil ein hungriges und bankrottes Deutschland in der Mitte Europas uns alle, die wir seine Nachbarn sind, vergiften würde.

24. Mr. Eden, 6.8.41.

It would be to our disadvantage and to Europe's disadvantage that Germany should be economically ruined after the war.

Es wäre für uns und Europa abträglich, wenn Deutschland nach dem Krieg wirtschaftlich ruiniert würde.

25. Atlantic Charter, Clause 4, 14.8.41.

They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment of all States great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Sie werden unter Achtung ihrer bestehenden Verpflichtungen darauf hinarbeiten, dass alle Staaten, gross oder klein, Sieger oder Besiegte, zu gleichen Bedingungen Zugang zum Handel und zu den für ihr wirtschaftliches Gedeihen notwendigen Rohstoffen der Welt erhalten.

26. Mr. Churchill, 24.8.41.

Instead of trying to ruin German trade by all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrance, as was the mood of 1917, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by its industry and enterprise.

Anstatt zu versuchen, Deutschland durch alle Arten zusätzlicher Handelsbeschränkungen und andere Hindernisse zu ruinieren, wie es 1917 die Stimmung war, sind wir endgültig zu dem Entschluss gekommen, dass es nicht im Interesse der Welt und unserer beiden Länder (England und Amerika) liegt, wenn irgend ein grosses Volk verarmt oder von Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen sein sollte, für sich und seine Angehörigen durch seinen Fleiss und Unternehmungsgeist ein anständiges Auskommen zu finden.

6. 11.41

27. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Article V, 26.5.42.

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration for the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Die Vertragschliessenden Teile stimmen überein, zur Wahrung der Sicherheitsinteressen jedes einzelnen von ihnen in enger und freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit für die Wiederherstellung des Friedens und für die Schaffung allgemeiner Sicherheit und wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands in Europa miteinander zu arbeiten. Sie werden hierbei die Interessen der Vereinten Nationen berücksichtigen und in Einklang mit den zwei Grundsätzen handeln, für sich keine Gebietsvergrößerung erstreben und sich nicht in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten einzumischen.

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VII. UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF CONSENT TO A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT UNITED NATIONS

28. Mr. Roosevelt, 24.12.43.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people, no wish that to have a moral chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most emphatically emphasize that we do not intend to rid them once for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute a "master race".

Die Vereinten Nationen beabsichtigen nicht, das deutsche Volk zu versklaven. Wir wünschen ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich in Frieden zu einem nützlichen und achtbaren Mitglied der europäischen Völkerfamilie zu entwickeln. Aber wir müssen mit allen Nachdruck das Wort "achtbar" betonen. Denn wir beabsichtigen, das deutsche Volk ein für alle Mal vom Nationalsozialismus und vom preussischen Militarismus zu befreien und von der phantastischen und unheilvollen Idee, es sein eine Herrenrasse.

29. Tehran Communiqué, 1.12.43.

We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations - large and small - whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated as are our own peoples to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into a world, freely of democratic nations.

Wir werden uns bemühen um die aktive Mitarbeit aller Völker, ob gross oder klein, deren Völker - so wie unsere Völker - sich mit Geist und Seele der Aufgabe verschrieben haben, Tyrannei und Sklaverei, Unterdrückung und Intoleranz aus der Welt zu schaffen. Wir werden alle Völker willkommen heissen, die bereit sind, sich einer Weltfamilie der demokratischen Nationen anzuschliessen.

The following are the main quotations on unconditional surrender:-

30. Mr. Churchill, 1.7.43.

To the United Nations, demand from the Nazi, Fascist and Japanese tyrannies unconditional surrender. By that we mean that their will to resist must be completely broken and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy. It also means that we must take all those far-sighted measures which are necessary to prevent the world from being again convulsed and wrecked and blackened by their calculated plots and ferocious aggression. It does not mean and it never can mean that we are to stain our victorious arms by inhumanity, or by mere lust of vengeance, or that we do not plan a world in which all branches of the human family may look forward to what the American Constitution calls "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Wir, die Vereinten Nationen, fordern von den Nazi-faschistischen und japanischen Tyrannen bedingungslose Kapitulation. Damit meinen wir, dass ihr Widerstandswille völlig gebrochen werden muss und dass sie sich ganz und gar unserer Gerechtigkeit und Gnade ausliefern müssen. Es bedeutet auch, dass wir weitblickend alle erforderlichen Massnahmen treffen müssen, um zu verhindern, dass die Welt erneut durch ihre vorbedachten Anschläge und ihre heuchlerische Aggressionslust zerrissen und zerstört und verdüstert wird. Es heisst nicht und kann niemals heissen, dass wir unsere siegreichen Waffen durch Unmenschlichkeit oder blosse Spätgier beflecken oder dass wir nicht eine Welt planen, in der alle Zweige der menschlichen Familie das anerkennen können, was die amerikanische Verfassung "Leben, Freiheit und Streben nach Glück" nennt.

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31. Mr. Churchill, 22.2.44.

The term "unconditional surrender" does not mean that the German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means, however, that the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation. Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave in a barbarous manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe.

32. Mr. Churchill, 24.5.44.

The Atlantic Charter in no way binds us about the future of Germany. It is not a bargain or contract with our enemies. It had no quality of an offer to our enemy. But the principle of unconditional surrender will be adhered to so far as Nazi Germany and Japan are concerned, and that principle itself wipes away the danger of anything like Mr. Wilson's fourteen points being brought up by the Germans after their defeat, claiming that they surrendered in consideration of these points. I have repeatedly said that unconditional surrender gives the enemy no rights but relieves us from no duties. Justice will have to be done and retribution will fall upon the wicked and the cruel. The future towards which we are marching across bloody fields and frightful manifestations of destruction must surely be based upon the broad and simple virtues and upon the nobility of mankind. It must be based upon the reign of law which upholds the principles of justice and fair play, which protects the weak against the strong; if the weak have justice on their side. There must be an end to predatory exploration and nationalistic ambitions. This does not mean that nations should not be entitled to rejoice in their traditions and achievements. But they will not be allowed by armed force to gratify appetites of aggression and at the expense of other countries simply because they are taller or weaker or less well prepared, and measure will be taken

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Der Ausdruck 'bedingungslose Kapitulation' bedeutet nicht dass das deutsche Volk versklavt oder vernichtet werden soll. Er bedeutet aber, dass die Alliierten ihnen gegenüber im Zeitpunkt der Kapitulation nicht durch irgendeine Abmachung oder irgendeine Verpflichtung gebunden sind. Bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet, dass die Sieger freie Hand haben, aber nicht, dass sie das Recht haben, sich wie Barbaren zu benehmen oder dass sie Deutschland von der Landkarte Europas verwischen wollen.

Die Atlantik-Charta legt uns bezüglich der Zukunft Deutschlands keinerlei Bedingungen auf. Sie ist keine Zusage. Keine Vertragspflicht gegenüber unseren Feinden. Sie ist auch kein Angebot an unsere Feinde. Vielmehr gilt nur Deutschland. Japan nach wie vor der Grundsatz der bedingungslosen Kapitulation, und dieser Grundsatz steht auch mit der Gefahr auf, dass Deutschland nach seiner Niederlage sich auf irgendeine - wie etwa damals auf Wilsons 14 Punkte - beruft und dann behauptet, er habe nur auf dieser Grundlage kapituliert. Ich habe wiederholt erklärt, dass bedingungslose Kapitulation unseren Feinden keinerlei Rechte gibt, aber auch uns nicht von unseren Pflichten befreit. Der Gerechtigkeit muss Genüge getan, die Verbrechen und Gewalttaten müssen bestraft werden. Die Zukunft, der wir über blutgetränkte Schlachtfelder und vorbei an den furchtbaren Manifestationen der Zerstörung entgegenmarschieren, kann nur auf den lautersten Grundtugenden und der Anständigkeit der gesamten Menschheit errichtet werden. Sie muss sich stützen auf die Herrschaft des Gesetzes, das den Grundsatz des Rechts und der Gerechtigkeit aufrechterhält und das den Schwachen gegen den Stärken schützt, wenn der Schwache das Recht auf seiner Seite hat. Der räuberischen Ausbeutung und der national-istischen Rhetorik muss ein Ende bereitet werden. Das heisst nicht dass die Völker nicht das Recht haben sollen, auf ihre Überlieferungen und Leistungen stolz zu sein. Aber es wird nicht zugelassen werden, dass sie ihren Prahl noch immer mit bewaffneter Gewalt auf Kosten anderer Völker befriedigen, nur weil diese anderen kleiner oder schwächer oder

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to have ample armies, fleets, and air forces available to prevent anything like that coming about. We must respect the rights and opinion of others while holding firmly to our own faith and convictions. There must be room in this great new structure of the world for the happiness and prosperity of all and in the end it must be capable of bringing happiness and prosperity even to the guilty and vanquished nations.

schlechter gemacht sind, Massenarmeen
werden aufgestellt werden, um starke Heere,
Flotten und Luftwaffen zur Verfügung zu
haben, die dergleichen verhindern können.
Wir müssen die Rechte und die Meinung
anderer respektieren, auch wenn wir
selbst an unseren eigenen Glaubenssätzen
und Überzeugungen festhalten. In dem
Neuen der Welt muss Raum genug sein für
das Glück und das Wohlergehen aller
Menschen. Denn wird am Ende diese
Neuordnung auch den schuldigen und
geschlagenen Völkern Glück und
Wohlergehen bringen.

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Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

TO:

Date 29 May 1944

GENERAL STAFF:

For information.

Mr. Phillips - 1/1 P.S.
P. T.

Subject: I will say P. T. in message
represented very unusual stage of
planning.

1/1 P.S.

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Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff



29 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

Subject: Draft Statement To The German People.

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X 387 *Germany*
X 300.6
X 201 *Confidence*
X 000.11
X 091 *Germany*
A 201 *McClure*
A 201 *McClure*

I. DISCUSSION

A statement to the German people (TAB A), drafted by General MacLURE, took shape by Mr. SHERWOOD and Mr. PHILLIPS, was revised by Chief of Staff to Mr. PHILLIPS with the suggestion that the British are objecting to it (TAB B).

II. MR. PEAKE'S COMMENTS (TAB C)

Mr. PEAKE points out that the British Government is strongly opposed to the issue in the near future of any such statement to the German people.

III. ACTION BEING TAKEN

Mr. PHILLIPS is conveying to Mr. STERNBERG notice of the British Government's opposition to the statement.

/s/ EUGENE P. COCHRAN,
EUGENE P. COCHRAN,
Captain, G. S. C.,
Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff.

587 Germany
89/4/2/3

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COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

COPY

(CLASSIFICATION)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Statement

DATE:

Number each page or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, sign at bottom, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
3.	Mr. Peake	1. Mr. Phillips. 2. COS	29.5.44	<p>Yes Sir! This is exactly what the Prime Minister meant. The British Government are very strongly opposed to the issue in the near future of any statement to the German people and will not even consider the preparation of one. I have pegged away at the subject for some weeks and have now given it up. The reasons why, I can explain to you orally if you so desire.</p> <p>Meanwhile if the attached draft is to go back to Mr. Stettinius, I think it would be right to inform him of the above.</p> <p>I would hazard as a purely personal guess that should our forthcoming operations meet with a large measure of success the British Government's view will undergo a change and the idea of a statement may gain an element of charm and novelty which it does not at present possess.</p> <p>In all the circumstances might it not be better to leave the question over for the time being and wait upon events?</p> <p>/s/ CHARLES PEAKE</p> <p><u>Political Officer BRITISH</u></p>
4.	Mr. Phillips	C of S	29/5/44	<p>I am following Peake's suggestion and I am conveying to Stettinius the fact that the British Government are opposed to the issuance in the near future of any statement to the German people.</p> <p>/s/ NICHOLAS PHILLIPS NICHOLAS PHILLIPS, Political Officer, AEF.</p>
		6	1129	

Germany

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MEMORANDUM

29th 1944

The Prime Minister's thought (which also that the British Government) can be follows.

A declaration to the German people, however, unexceptionable. (as this one is), on subject of unconditional surrender destruction Nazism might be gravely misleading and indeed damaging if make no mention of German crimes, the treatment of Jews, the Poles, the Greeks, the Yugoslavs, the Norwegians, etc. virtual enslavement of 25,000,000 foreign in Germany the fact that retribution is going be secured the German people.

if mention of all this in declaration it terrify the into behaving all the more like rats?

If on other of to be made in a document of such importance this would be, might not the omission expose afterwards to a charge of bad faith in that we had made a summons to the people to surrender and concealed gloomed grimmest items in our account?

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DRAFT STATEMENT OF UPHOLDING POLICY OF UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER

TAB # 29 MAY
Brief
This file

Germans, your armies are on the eve of an overwhelming defeat. The war between justice and tyranny - between good and evil - is ending in a total victory for the just cause for which the forces of Freedom have been arrayed against the Forces of Oppression.

As early as 1920 Hitler based the appeal of the Nazi party on the legend that the German Army had not been defeated in the field but had been betrayed on the home front.

You know, of course, that this is a lie. But it is on this lie, more than on any other single piece of propaganda, that Hitler relied in 1933 to win the support of the German people. He relied on it in 1944 to keep Germany fighting for a lost cause. Even today, the average German soldier believes that, though the Allies are obviously winning on all fronts, Germany can still avoid total defeat because the German Army is invincible.

We are resolved this time to leave no shadow of doubt that the German Army has been defeated. We are determined to impress on your minds the lesson that militarism does not pay. Therefore, the High Command must surrender on our terms.

This war cannot be ended by a surrender signed by some puppet representatives of a makeshift German Government, pushed into power by the German High Command and by the Nazis in order to lull the world into the belief that Germany has suddenly repented. It can end only with the disintegration of the Nazi regime and the unconditional surrender of each and every German Commander in the field. Only if we enforce this end to the war can we hope to purge the Nation of Nazism and prove to you that wars of aggression against the free peoples of this earth are doomed to failure.

In more than ten years of Nazi rule, Hitler has shattered those forces in Germany which stood for sanity, decency and respect for law.

We, on our part, intend to replace the Nazi regime by a British-Russian-American military control and this we shall do in order that the decent elements in Germany may be able to come forward and begin the work of self-government based on the Four Freedoms (here state 4 freedoms). In no other way can Germany regain the respect and confidence of peace-loving people.

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Thus the Allied Governments and Armies not alone demand the surrender of the German Armed Forces - Civilization itself, demands it in order to insure that the peoples of the world shall never again be exposed to the misery, devastation and injustice from which they are suffering now.

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17 May

following is text of a telegram from American Legation at Stockholm to the Department of State (dated May 17):

Communist domination has increased emphasis by Soviet moves in Italy, Finland, Rumania, Poland and Norway, emphasis has been offset by reaction to American aerial warfare, the long proinvasion nerve war, and their anti-neutral diplomatic offensive. Attempts to arouse hatred United States and Britain are still by German propaganda machine.

387

real reaction of German population to this propaganda campaign, to the air war, remains difficult to determine. Conflicting opinions are advanced by first-hand observers; both neutral German, who report growing respect for the distant Russians while hatred for Anglo-Americans mounts. There has also been reported emergence of a "home-grown" form of Communism has been brought about by loss of possessions through air attack and the resultant necessity for sharing. Recent evidences in German of assurances which the Nazis have had to give of the sanctity of private property to contradict the foregoing report of communistic tendencies. Germans are, in any event, well aware that while they have Red Communism, they have long had Brown Communism which closely akin. An officer of the Legation reported a conversation which a Hungarian author quoted a German manufacturer as praying an English victory for then his factory would be restored to him. There many instances in the Nazi press itself pointing the fact that many Germans refuse to adopt hysterical attitude toward Allied bombing attacks. Several officials, for example, have felt themselves

forced to criticize publicly those [redacted] who [redacted] that they "started [redacted] war". There are still [redacted] who [redacted] the Germans react to [redacted] in a manner free from all personal or political animosity but in a spirit of weary resignation.

[redacted] Legation remains convinced that, in short, although [redacted] might be logical to suppose [redacted] any nation would display sharp emotional reaction to the horror of continued air attack, there [redacted] no convincing evidence that the [redacted] have reacted in that way, and there is basis for the belief that such reports might be deliberate propaganda attempting to discourage us.

German propaganda apparently continues to have [redacted] in respect of persuading German people that their fate is sealed if they lose [redacted] war. [redacted] British and American statements [redacted] discussion [redacted] postwar treatment of Germany encourages the above propaganda, even more basically it is fed on [redacted] official silence on [redacted] plans maintained [redacted] the [redacted], [redacted] and Soviet Governments. Anti-Nazi Swedes [redacted] Germans alike privately and publicly [redacted] to [redacted] unanimous opinion [redacted] the failure of [redacted] Allies to give some official indication of the fate of a defeated Germany, however grimly painted or however generally phrased, [redacted] the [redacted] single factor producing passive and negative, although dogged, cohesion, [redacted] Germans, inspiring them either [redacted] resist to the [redacted] or [redacted] least [redacted] avoidance of obstructionism of a serious nature. They despair [redacted] of the most elementary bases for national existence or personal existence. They have not yet been given anything positive to revolt for.

[redacted] extraordinary weakness of German reaction to unfavorable diplomatic economic developments among neutral states has been [redacted] of the [redacted] notable aspects of recent German picture. The occupation of

Hungary and [redacted] strengthening of forces [redacted] Rumania, both of which were military moves of an absolutely categorical nature, have failed to do [redacted] than elicit promises of "continued watchfulness" [redacted] "forthcoming statement". The negative [redacted] which they have [redacted] in Finland [redacted] been only moderately exploited. [redacted] is noteworthy, in [redacted] and pending military developments, that military [redacted] been given all publicity for activities in connection with defense. The possible explanation of Hitler's complete disappearance from the military scene may be the Nazis' desire to throw the responsibility [redacted] subsequent debacle on the army and not on them. There are no available signs which the legation could interpret as indicative of any stirrings of military revolt or unrest. Hitler is still firmly in the saddle as regards any major political upheaval although the daily bombing of Berlin has weakened Nazi administrative system considerably, [redacted] grip of [redacted] ordinary policy [redacted] everyday life also appears weaker.

It is not possible herein to submit a telegraphic synthesis [redacted] to attempt to analyze current [redacted] economic conditions, other than [redacted] mention that evidence [redacted] that the worries have multiplied regarding raw materials, food, production, [redacted] distribution, due to [redacted] war [redacted] loss of territory. Unless it be [redacted] Central Italy railroads, there [redacted] no present sign of insurmountable transport breakdowns, [redacted] any indications presently of decisive imminent shortage, [redacted] hunger, or complete production failure in any line, although cumulative effect may ultimately be disastrous.

6 The Germans, [redacted] summary, have undoubtedly suffered severely [redacted] effects of the air war. However, there [redacted] no [redacted] that these effects will, in the immediate future, cause either political or economic collapse, although such a possibility cannot be excluded [redacted] transpiring [redacted]. The preinvasion nerve war is proceeding with good effect.

According to the best judgment, it is considered that, aside from
capitulation of satellites, the only factor which could have considerable
political impact presently would be some joint political statement
from highest sources within the United Nations, calculated to have great
propaganda appeal, although it is becoming increasingly late to counteract
well established German scare propaganda effectively. Until activated
by catalytic agent of Western invasion the situation will otherwise
probably remain static in present state of dogged resistance.

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Supreme

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

Gen McCure took it
to Gen Smith & Gen Morgan.
Subject wound up.

refer: Cable,
S-50325

6 124

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-6 Division

SECRET

1 April, 1944

SUBJECT: Policy Requirements for Psychological Warfare.

TO : The Chief of Staff

I. Discussion.

1. Evidence indicates that German fighting morale in the West and in the Mediterranean has not declined. (Attached at 1254 are intelligence reports supporting this conclusion.)
2. German propaganda has convinced the ordinary German that defeat can still be avoided through the repulse of an Anglo-American invasion. Propaganda has also strengthened resistance by increasing the German fear of defeat. Whether this mood of "desperate resistance" will continue after a successful landing on the Continent depends to a considerable extent on the possibility of offering an alternative to resistance to the bitter end.
3. It is believed that our terms of "unconditional surrender" should be clarified by an announcement of the principles on which treatment of a defeated Germany will be based. The objectives of our propaganda could then be (a) to create a mood of acceptance of unconditional surrender in the German army and (b) to create a mood in the German General Staff in which a German "adoglio" would undertake the necessary political steps.
4. It is proposed that the following statements be made as far as possible in advance of D-Day: (a) An Anglo-American-Russian statement announcing that a combined Allied military government has been decided upon for the maintenance of law and order in a defeated Germany. This should be accompanied by a definition of the areas to be occupied by each of the Allies. (b) An Anglo-American summary of the principles according to which the Anglo-American military government will be conducted. (c) When a bridgehead is established, a statement should be made by the Commander-in-Chief calling for surrender and recapitulating the terms of the other declarations. (See attached for detailed explanation of the three statements which are proposed.)

II. Action Recommended.

It is recommended: (a) that the Political Liaison Officers be authorized to advise the Foreign Office and the State Department that the Commander-in-Chief recommends governmental approval and implementation of the plan outlined in Paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (b) above.

(b) that G-6 Division be authorized to draft the statement envisaged in Paragraph 1 (c) above and issue it, when approved, at the moment a successful bridgehead is established.

III. Concurrences.

British Political Liaison Officer

U.S. Political Liaison Officer

ROBERT A. MCGUIRE
Brigadier General, GSC
A.C. of S., G-6

OW 4/13

4 APR

3 April, 1964


TO : The Secretary,
Chiefs of [REDACTED] Committee,
Office of [REDACTED] War [REDACTED]

8. With respect to the [redacted] by 'C' [redacted] [redacted] COS (44) 17a(c), [redacted] requested to the attached copy of [redacted] which [redacted] from 'C' indicating his satisfaction [redacted] the results of the cooperation which [redacted] been achieved [redacted] the safeguarding [redacted] organization [redacted] the implementation of [redacted] plan.

5. With respect to the comment by the Foreign Office that the section of the plan dealing with FRANCE is not acceptable as it stands, all reference to the Conseil de la Resistance has been changed to "such provisional authority as the Supreme Commander may be authorized ☐ may decide to deal with".

4. The further comments by the Foreign Office appear to be of no particular importance, and the changes recommended are acceptable to us. Accordingly, as time is running short, the plan is being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Arrangements are being made to implement it as far as can be done in the absence of a directive indicating the degree of recognition to be afforded the FOREIGN Committee of National Liberation. Until this is received ~~no~~ limitations will, of necessity, be imposed upon the implementation of the FOREIGN ~~plan~~ the plan.

For the Supreme Commander:



DATE SIGNED 3 APR 77
DATE MAILED 3 APR 77

COS (44) 159 Mtr. (O) 1st 1.

1. Directive ■ Senior Officer Co-ordinating ■ British Military Sections (C.O.M.S.)
of ■ Control Machinery for Germany.

C.O.S. (44) 86 (revise)

Previous Reference, 137 Mtr.(O), Min.8.

■ Committee considered ■ letter from Major-General sent forwarding ■ draft
directive ■ had ■ approval of the A.C.A. (O) Committee.

Major-General Kennedy suggested that ■ was undesirable at ■ present stage to
give details of particular ■ on which information would ■ required, ■ that
lines 5 ■ 7 of paragraph 4 of ■ draft ■ should ■ by deleting:
" ■ acquisition of informationdesign ■ development" ■ substituting:
" ■ acquisition of such information desired by ■ three ■ ■ a Control
■ instructed by ■ appropriate ■ ■ to obtain". He
suggested that line 2 of paragraph 8 should be ■ by ■ substitution of ■
likely to be confined" ■ "will ■ confined".

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved ■ terms ■ the draft directive subject ■ ■ suggested
above. ■

■ Subsequently circulated as C.O.S. (44) 91.

091.410/3

**NEW FOLDER
BEGINS**

091.412/4

**PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO
NON GERMANS SERVING IN THE
WEHRMACHT**

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGESECRET
PRIORITY

TO : CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, SHAEP
FROM : SHAEP FWD, SIGNED SCAEP CITE:
REF NO : FWD-18083 T00: 221940A

1. Proposed action contained your letter to Chief of Staff on subject: "Voice of SHAEP" to members of the SS in contact with Allied airborne or parachute troops, dated 15th March, has been approved.

2. Reference timing for launching propaganda campaign, the campaign can be initiated after you have been notified that airborne troops have landed in operation "Varsity". The G-3 Division will transmit this notification to you promptly.

ORIGINATOR : G-3 AUTHENTICATION: A. S. NEVINS
BRIG GENERAL

INFORMATION : SGS
G-2
G-3 WAR DIARY
FWD
AG RECORDS

PS OUT 919 22 Mar 45 2012A HFK/lf REF NO: FWD-18083
T00 : 221940A

1135

SECRET
SECRET

COPY NO. 11

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

copy

copy

19 March 45

TO: 1. General MORGAN S/D F.E.M. 19/3
2. General SMITH/

For information.

The attached brief is the action taken by PWD ~~■~~ directed by the Chief of Staff in a letter (TAB A) dated 5 March. A copy of this brief has been forwarded to G-3 by PWD.

filed 101.5


J.B.M. S/D
C.L.B.

handwritten:

Gen McCURE, PWD

Please note approval by Deputy Chief of Staff.

K.A.S.M. S/D



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6 1134

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Written on Memo: Approved F.E.Morgan/D/COS/ 22/3

HEADQUARTERS
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division


201 McLaughlin
201 Smith
213 cos. Varsity
sw. 100-101
11/19/45

15 March, 1945.

SUBJECT: "Voice of SHAEF" to [redacted] of the Wehrmacht and [redacted]
[redacted] Allied Airborne or Parachute Troops.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

1. In compliance with your instruction dated 6 March, at [redacted] 'A' is the proposed "Voice of SHAEF" which has been agreed between this Division and G-1 Division.
2. If and when it is desired to initiate this special campaign, [redacted] procedure would be as follows:
 - a. Initial statement by [redacted] "Voice of SHAEF".
 - b. Cross-reporting and [redacted] by British Broadcasting Corporation, [redacted] Broadcasting Station in Europe.
 - c. Special [redacted] strategic leaflets, as required.
 - d. If, and when, an Allied official Government protest is made to the German Government, the content will be widely publicized by all media.
3. The timing for the launching of the above campaign will be agreed between this Division and G-3 Division, but should take place on the same day, or the day following, an important airborne operation.



ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

Enc: Annex 'A'.

See 4/5- 5 March
German treatment of airborne troops
captured outside the limits of Wehrmacht combat
Filed 100-5



HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

VOICE OF SHAME TO MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT
ALLIED AIRBORNE PARACHUTE

Officers and Soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the

The Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, having knowledge of HQ of 18 October, 1942, category GEMEINS KOMMANDOSACHE, and its supplement issued in October, 1944, ordering the execution of Allied Airborne and Parachute troops, addresses you solemn warning:

1. The development of the battle on German soil may bring you contact with Allied Airborne or Parachute troops, large or small units. They may be or dropped deep behind your lines.
2. You are solemnly reminded that such troops, landed or dropped in behind your lines, are terrorists carrying legitimate military tasks.
3. Execution of Airborne or operating in uniform is entirely contrary to the accepted rules and practices of
4. All persons - officers, other or civilians - implicated in the issuing or the carrying out of the Fuhrer HQ orders above mentioned or any other similar subsequently issued or to be will be held to strictest account and will be punished according to their deserts. excuse having carried out orders received above will not be considered valid.
5. Such punitive action will be not but at conclusion of hostilities.

Officers and Soldiers of the Wehrmacht the solemn warning applies to every one of you; to those who might carry out orders against Allied Airborne or Parachute troops; to who might such orders; to those who might issue them. During this last phase of a lost war you will as well be doubly scrupulous. You will be judged according to your conduct, with strict justice but without

Enc. to 6



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2016 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
EXPEDITIONARY
G-3 Division (FWD)

March

SUBJECT: Propaganda to German Civilians Foreign Workers
Germany concerning Evacuation

TO : Chief of Staff

I - DISCUSSION

1. The Psychological Warfare Division has transmitted to the G-3 Division a copy of a staff study addressed to Chief of Staff on above subject, (TAB 8). The undersigned informed that this study will be discussed at the next regular meeting of Committee Psychological Warfare.

2. Psychological Warfare Division requested orally G-3 give advance concurrence to TAB 6 of the study. TAB 6 is a proposed "Voice of SHAEF" Germans in the RUHR which directs wholesale civilian evacuation.

3. G-3 considers that as written TAB 8 points clearly to a ground attack the RUHR is therefore disadvantageous from the and deception viewpoint. Portions of the proposed broadcast considered objectionable have been lined out the copy of TAB 6 in Psychological Warfare Division's study. It is also considered the FRANKFURT should be included in this "Voice of SHAEF" instruction in order that the instruction will not be applicable a single German.

II - RECOMMENDATIONS

4. That the Chief of Staff approve TAB 6 Psychological Warfare Division's study with the deletions indicated, provide that the inhabitants of the FRANKFURT area will be included in the broadcast warning.

Approved
/s/ F. E. Morgan
10-3-45
To G-3

M. R. SULL
Major General, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S, G-3

SHAFT 565 File No. 291.412/4

10 MAR

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of C.A.L.A.
By
46 AUG 1945



SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
Plans & Directives Section

8337

DATE: 12 March, 1945

TO: Office of the Secretary, General Staff,
S.H.A.F.P.

FROM: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
LT. COL. C.A.R. THOMSON.

REMARKS

Attached paper PWP 091.412, 9 Mar. 1945
Subject: Propaganda to German Civilians
Foreign Workers in Germany concerning
Evacuation, is forwarded in accordance with
your request of 10 March, 1945.

b 1136 98

for 157.6 (Anthony)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

PWP 091.412

9 March, 1945.

SUBJECT: Propaganda to German Civilians and Foreign Workers
in Germany concerning Evacuation.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

I. DISCUSSION.

1. The previous propaganda policy of Supreme Headquarters of stimulating German civilians to resistance to evacuation has been changed so as to induce maximum panic, confusion and movement east of the Rhine. The new policy is stated in T.B. 'A'.

2. To implement this new policy requires a complete reversal of the 'white' and 'black' propaganda lines which have been consistently advocated during the past six months. Available evidence shows that Allied propaganda has been thoroughly identified with the anti-evacuation theme, and a sudden and complete reversal of theme would consequently tend to undermine the future credibility and output of 'white'. Thus, the major burden of achieving the new objectives must be carried by 'black' propaganda which, unlike 'white' or 'gray' (i.e. 'BLACKBURN' and 'SOMER FLEET WEST') can change its line abruptly.

3. A T.B. 'A' is a study which considers the above problem in detail and, in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, considers such specific action as can be taken by 'white' media. The action proposed is:

- Ending formal approval of the new policy, 'white' media will taper off the anti-evacuation theme and will advocate non-chaotism.
- At T.B. 'B' is a proposed "Voice of SHARP" which instructs Germans to move away from factories and transport targets; to get out of towns and hide; to avoid being called up in the Volksturm.
- At T.B. 'C' is a proposed "Voice of SHARP" to Germans in the Ruhr, ordering wholesale evacuation since this and other nearby areas are about to come under heavy Allied attack.
- At T.B. 'D' is a proposed "Voice of SHARP" to Foreign Workers to remain away from factories and other targets, to seek shelter and await the arrival of the Allies.

These "Voices of SHARP" would initiate special campaigns in all available media and would be geared to operational requirements.

II. ACTION REQUIRED.


- That the Chief of Staff approve T.B. 'A', 'C', 'D' and 'E'.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

6 1136-1 Div.

8-3

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John H. Williams
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

4/14/45 160

(14)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'A'

9 March, 1945.

TO CIVILIANS AND FOREIGN
WORKERS IN GERMANY CONCERNING EVACUATION.

OBJECT.

1. To set forth propaganda policy and plans to govern output concerning evacuation to German civilians and foreign workers in Germany, which will cover the requirements of psychological warfare until the inception of 'ECLIPSE' conditions.

DISCUSSION.

2. It is understood that Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. policy has been changed from the stimulation of resistance to evacuation the part of German civilians to a policy designed to create foster maximum panic, confusion and movement among the German civilian population East of the Rhine, in order to meet operational requirements.

3. Propaganda implementation of this policy means a reversal propaganda line. 'white' 'black' propaganda media have for six months been following a policy of causing administrative confusion and conflict by advising Germans and foreign workers resist Nazi evacuation. Radio and leaflet output has been systematically geared to this operational requirement, e.g. news of life under Military Government has been angled to show the wisdom of staying behind. This policy has been periodically re-examined at Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. since September, 1944, and has been consistently reaffirmed. Both Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. instructions and indirect means have been used for this purpose. News of the German experience in evacuating areas about to be overrun by the Russians was given specially heavy play, to point the lesson that anyone who orders evacuation is a coward. The figures of those who did stay put in Munster Gladbach and Krefeld indicate that this propaganda has had some effect.

4. Since Allied 'white' propaganda has been so thoroughly identified with an anti-evacuation line, an abrupt shift would seriously undermine the credibility and influence of our 'white' output. Furthermore, political difficulties make it undesirable to apply panic propaganda to foreign workers. Nor can evacuation be urged upon peasants and farm workers, since the long-term effects upon the food position would outweigh any immediate advantages to be gained by getting this class of workers to evacuate. It therefore appears that 'white' propaganda can act to stimulate evacuation only in special and limited ways.

5. Pending approval of the policy outlined in para 6, the following line is being taken in 'white' propaganda:

a. Gradual tapering off of the anti-evacuation theme in all 'white' media.

6 1140
b. Tapering off of news of life under Military Government to indicate inevitable hardships in newly occupied areas.
CLASSIFICATION (ECLIPSE)
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By *W. B. Miller*
Date *16 AUG 1945*

- c. Increased stress on theme that the only way is the stopping of the war that nowhere in Germany is safe.
- d. A new campaign against 'work-compulsion' danger areas, ordered by Nazi officials who get out in good time.
- e. Generally, increased effort to panic Germans into 'mass desertion'.

SPECIFIC ACTION PROPOSED.

6. The major burden of achieving the objectives of an evacuation policy must therefore be carried by 'black' propaganda, which can make the necessary abrupt shift in line without great loss in influence and without compromising credibility. This operations on 'ASPIDOTER' and 'LIEGE', since our 'gray' propaganda media, 'H. [redacted]' and 'SOLDATENKREIS WEST', are subject to severe disabilities as our 'white' outlets.

7. The following action by 'white' is, however, considered feasible:

- a. 'White' should immediately drop all overt instructions to German civilians to stay put, and taper off emphasis on news calculated indirectly to persuade German civilians to stay where they are.
- b. To cover this shift in themes, 'white' should increase stress on related themes:
 - (1) Germans should get away from factories, transport targets and military installations, to increase their chance for survival and to deprive the war-prolongers of the assistance they need to continue the struggle. There will be special concentration on industrial and railway workers.
 - (2) Germans should take care not to get killed in the last weeks of the war and possible get out of the [redacted] and hide.
 - (3) Germans should avoid being called up the Volksturm. To do so they must get away in time.

T-3 'B' gives a draft embodying these themes, to be issued as "Voice of SHARP" at the conclusion of Phase II of the Psychological Warfare Division plan to exploit the attack against Germany from the West (ref. BW 385 3 February, 1945 approved at Supreme Headquarters, J.E.F. policy meeting, 4 February, 1945).

- c. 'White' should also carry out a campaign addressed specifically to German civilians in the [redacted] (and in whatever other areas may be designated for [redacted] and deception) to get them to evacuate. The campaign would be inaugurated by a "Voice of SHARP" (draft text at T-3 'C') and kept going by constant reiteration of news of our air and ground attack on the areas

in question, and of Supreme Headquarters, A.S.P. instructions to get out of the defined areas. The specific areas addressed and the timing of the campaign would be coordinated with G-3, Supreme Headquarters, A.S.P. and with Army Groups affected.

8. In view of the political difficulties and objections involved, 'white' should not attempt to panic foreign workers. Foreign workers should be told to get away from factories, military objectives, etc. to places of safety. These instructions should be inaugurated by a "Voice of Silence" (draft text at T.3 'D') and kept going by appropriate instructions from spokesmen for the appropriate foreign governments, together with news showing the advisability and necessity of seeking shelter. Direct appeals and instructions to foreign workers of any particular nationality originated by Supreme Headquarters, A.S.P. agencies or Allied propaganda services, would be coordinated and cleared with the appropriate foreign governments. Only in the case of the special target areas referred to in 7 c. above, would foreign workers be instructed to evacuate an area totally.

9. Where local operational conditions require it, "keep off the roads" and "stay in your house" instructions of limited local application may be authorized by Army Groups in areas actually being overrun.

10. Overall timing and selection of special strategic targets for instructions will be coordinated by Psychological Warfare Division with G-3, as before.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB B

■ March, 1945

VOICE OF SHEEP TO THE CIVIL POPULATION OF WESTERN
GERMANY TO INAUGURATE PHASE II

The Allied Armies are across the Rhine. The areas in which you live are today targets for our aircraft. Tomorrow they will be battlefields, raked by the artillery of our batteries and by our armour. The battle is approaching.

The Nazis are determined, at whatever cost of human life, to keep the factories and railroads working until the last moment before the German armies retreat. They want you to work in a combat area until the last. While the Party leaders are early withdrawn to areas of relative safety, essential workers and Volksturm are submitted to deadly peril.

The Nazi party also ruthlessly turn every village into a fortress, to be defended to the hopeless end, regardless of the resulting sacrifice in human life and human homes. This murderous Nazi policy means ruin for every town and village in your area.

The Allied Armies will smash this type of Nazi resistance as they have every other. The results of the inhuman Nazi strategy will be unparalleled destruction. Everything that has happened West of the Rhine will be multiplied hundredfold in your region.

In order to avoid losing your life in this last hopeless struggle imposed by the Nazis, you must carry out the instructions which the Supreme Allied Commander issues to all inhabitants of Western Germany.

These are your instructions:

1. Cease working as you can. Take refuge with your family in the safest place you can find. The factories, mines and rail centers are death-traps. You must take your decision at once. Delay may mean death.

2. Avoid at all costs being enrolled into the Volksturm. Untrained and ill armed, for you the Volksturm will mean a useless last minute death.

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/page

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TO	CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of C.I.A.	
By	G. W. BUTLER
C.I.A. A.O.O.	
Date	10 APR 1945

C
3A

3. When the Allied Armies approach, follow carefully the instructions which will be given to you then by the Supreme Allied Commander and officers of Allied Military Government.

Civilians of Western Germany! Your execution of those orders will mean the difference between life and death. The Nazi Party are deliberately planning to sacrifice you in a hopeless, useless effort to prolong the war. You must take your decision now. Stop the machines, get away from the death traps, flee the Volksturm. Get out of the war and save your lives.

* * * * *

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB C

March

VOICE OF SHARP TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE

People of the Ruhr! You live in Germany's greatest area of war-industry. For years, your factories, foundries and workshops fashioned the weapons of conquest; now they merely delay the final collapse.

Therefore, to prevent the futile prolongation of a lost war, the whole armament-industry of the Ruhr, until it is captured by our armies, will be subjected to a merciless bombardment from the ground as well as from the air.

But the Allies are determined to destroy not the German people but the German war-machine. For this reason the Supreme Commander has issued the following instructions to you.

1. These instructions apply to the following districts:

DUISBURG
MULHEIM
OBERHAUSEN
ESSEN
HAMBOHN
GELSENKIRCHEN
BOITROP
GLADBECK
RECKLINGHAUSEN
WATTENSCHIED
WANNE EICKEL
HERNE
CASTROP RAUXEL
BOCHUM
WITTEN
DORTMUND
LUNEN
HAGEN



These districts are now combat areas.

2. Every inhabitant of the above named districts is hereby warned to remove himself and his family immediately to a safe place outside the Ruhr area.
3. You are specifically advised that, in view of the bombardment and of the character of the fighting which will follow the bombardment, no shelter or refuge within the above named districts of the Ruhr can be considered safe.

Inhabitants of the Ruhr! Your execution of these orders will mean the difference for you between life and death; for your country between a futile prolongation of a lost war and its speedy end. Act now. Out of the Ruhr! Out of the war!


SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB 'D'

9 March, 1945.

VOICE OF SHEEP TO FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE RUHR AND
RUHR-LEIST OF THE RHINE.

1. The Allied armies have smashed through the West Wall and are clearing the area west of the Rhine. Soon wide stretches of the areas where the Germans have placed you will be under fire from the ground as well as from the air.
2. The Nazi authorities are determined, at whatever cost in you in life and blood, to keep you operating the factories and mines until the last moment before the German Army retreats. Obedience to these orders will expose you by day and by night, not only to air attack, but also to artillery fire.
3. Then, at the last moment, immediately before the retreat of the German armies, the Nazi authorities will attempt a forced evacuation and will try to round you up and transfer you, under the worst possible conditions, to points deep within Germany.
4. As in the East, such last minute attempts can only result in disastrous panic evacuation. Convoys - rail or road - on their way back into Germany will be subjected to the incessant attacks of our aircraft.
5. Therefore, to avoid both the murderous order to continue to work in what has now become an area of battle, and the equally murderous order for last minute evacuation, you are advised in your personal interest to follow these instructions:
 - a. Keep away now from all targets: factories, railroads, marshalling yards and bridges. If it is at all possible, refuse to work in or near such danger spots, in which no one has the right to compel anyone to work.
 - b. When Allied armies approach, leave your billets and your place of work and seek out the safest spot you can find in the neighbourhood. Take refuge away from all military installations, away from factories and railroads and, insofar as possible, away from roads, particularly main highroads.
 - c. Stay in these refuges until the Allied armies arrive and mopping up of the German units has been completed. Then report to Allied Military Government officials who will put you in touch as soon as possible with your own (as required French, Czech, etc.) Liaison officer. When possible send a spokesman for a group.
6. Many of your comrades in the areas liberated by the victorious Russian armies owe their freedom to the fact that they were able to put into practice instructions such as we have just given you. The same is true of the Western front and this will increase as the momentum of our advance gathers way.
7. The Supreme Allied Commander realizes that your most urgent and most legitimate desire is to return home as soon as possible. By following the above instructions, you will be speeding up your return to your family, which will be arranged as soon as humanly possible.



~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

Tab 'E'

POLICY OF PROPAGANDA TO GERMAN CIVILIANS AND FOREIGN WORKERS EAST OF THE RHINE CONCERNING EVACUATION.

1. It is the policy of the Supreme Commander that propaganda agencies gear their output to German civilians in Germany so as to induce nervousness, confusion, and movement East of the Rhine, without undermining the credibility of their propaganda.
2. Propaganda will seek to achieve this end by:
 - a. Tapering off the anti-evacuation theme and advocating mass absenteeism.
 - b. Instruct Germans to move away from factories and transport targets, get out of towns.
 - c. In specific areas such as the Ruhr (in close coordination with G-3 as to selection of areas and timing) ordering wholesale evacuation.
3. Propaganda to foreign workers will continue, as in the past, to instruct them to remain away from factories and other targets, to seek shelter and to await the arrival of the Allies.

SECRET

AG M & D

17-20(39-70)

No.

SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED RESISTANCE FORCE

AG 383-1 GCT-AGN

SUBJECT: Policy for Foreign workers in Germany

TO : See distribution

PO 757 (Forward)
27 February 1945

1. Object. To insure that foreign workers are of maximum assistance to our operations, including those taking place after the collapse of organized German resistance.

2. General. There are about eight million foreign workers in Germany, of whom three million are French, Belgian and Dutch. With exceptions, they are all in the main, inclined to apathy and resignation as to their fate, and are unlikely to be responsive to propaganda while Germany maintains its present degree of internal control.

3. The German attitude towards foreign workers appears to be heavily sympathetic, backed by veiled threats. In all probability the Germans have infiltrated a large number of Gestapo agents among the foreign workers which constricts the scope of our activities.

4. The foreign workers are recognized as being relatively unorganized, with little inter-communication among themselves and with the outside world. There is no immediate prospect of their taking overt action against German war industry, since their existence depends on their continuing at work, and it is impossible to supply them either with food or weapons in sufficient quantities. Our actual clandestine objective must at present be limited to the gradual establishment of communications with these foreign workers, and their organization into disciplined bodies. Their present operational role is thus restricted to committing undetectable sabotage and presenting a constant threat of organized overt action.

5. Threat of Organized Overt Action. This is mainly carried out by Psychological Warfare Division broadcasts. The Propaganda line at present is one of open advocacy of the commission of undetectable sabotage by foreign workers and active subversion of the German worker by the foreign worker. Propaganda on sabotage is not to be unduly stressed at present.

6. 1348 In the development of a propaganda threat, no prison camps will be named nor items used which would directly militate against our clandestine activities.

6. Special Operations can best assist the threat by:

1. Carrying out and encouraging such clandestine sabotage as may be possible with the limited means available.

2. Conducting intelligence activities not covered by secret intelligence.

3. Capt. A. G. D.

SECRET

TAB C' to (2)

641.412/4
27 FEB

(3)

(Distribution for ltr. Supreme
Hq, AF, AG 283-1 GGT-MGT,
dtd 27 February 1945)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - War Office
- 2 - Admiralty
- 2 - Air Ministry
- 2 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division,
War Department, Washington 25, D.C.
- 2 - Command Chiefs of Staff, Washington 25, D.C.
- 2 - Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
- 2 - Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, France
- 2 - Air Officer Commanding, Bomber Command
- 2 - Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
Offices of War Cabinet
- 2 - Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.
- 2 - Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
of Operations
- 2 - CG, Sixth Army Group, APO 23
- 2 - CG, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655
- 2 - Headquarters, 21 Army Group
- 2 - Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force
- 2 - CG, First Allied Airborne Army (Main), APO 740
- 2 - CG, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633
- 2 - CG, Communications Zone, APO 687
- Supreme Headquarters, AF:
- 2 - Secretary General Staff
- 2 - G-1 Division
- 2 - G-2 Division
- 2 - G-3 Division
- 2 - G-4 Division
- 2 - G-5 Division
- 2 - Air Staff
- Political Officers:
- 2 - Ambassador Murphy
- 2 - Mr. Steel
- 2 - Public Relations Division
- 2 - Psychological Warfare Division
- 2 - Signal Division
- 2 - Supreme Hq, AF Mission (France)
- 2 - Supreme Hq, AF Mission (Belgium)
- 2 - Supreme Hq, AF Mission (Netherlands)
- 2 - Supreme Hq, AF Mission (Denmark)
- 2 - Supreme Hq, AF Mission (Norway)
- 2 - IG records

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 (Forward)

TOP SECRET

SHAW/17249/1/0/0/0
G-3/0/1.112-5/0/0/0/1

23 February, 1945

SUBJECT: Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY

TO: Chief of Staff

X full
X Smith
X Bull
X 091 Germany

I. DISCUSSION

1. A proposed "Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY", concurred by all Supreme Headquarters Staff Divisions, was forwarded to the French authorities on 7th January, 1945, for approval or comment. (TAB A)
2. General [redacted] expressed his approval of the proposed policy on 16th February, 1945. (TAB B) - Not Required per DFC.
3. The above paper should now be approved so that it can be disseminated as Supreme Headquarters' policy.

II. ACTION REQUIRED

4. That the policy at TAB B be approved for distribution by the Adjutant General.

III. CONCURRENCES

5. None required.

Approved F.E. Morgan
24-2-45.

H.R. BULL,
Major General, G-3,
AO of G, G-3.

091 10/1/45

23 Feb

TOP SECRET

ref. no.

TOP SECRET

SHAWNE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED AIRBORNE FORCES
G-3 Division (main)

9

7th January, 1945

SHAWNE 17249/3/Ops(C)
GCT/091.412-6/Ops(C)

SUBJECT : Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY

TO : Head, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

1. At an informal meeting for an exchange of views held on 23rd November with French officials of the DMR and Ministry for Prisoners and Deportees, it was found that there was some difference of opinion between the French and Allied points of view as to the policy for foreign workers in GERMANY.

2. The French objected to the employment of Allied propaganda exaggerating the organisation of foreign workers. They expressed a desire to infiltrate agents among prisoners of war, without full regard to the possibility of exposing all Allied prisoners to reprisal. Furthermore the French indicated that they were very anxious to begin preparations to train teams to be dropped in GERMANY to protect special objectives such as foreign workers' camps, under conditions of collapse or massacre.

3. On 18th December we stated our agreement with Mr. Scustelle's letter of 20th November relative the use of certain types of prisoners of war for clandestine activities in GERMANY. The reply stated that prisoners of war who had been released from that status and were not now under guard either day or night were considered to be displaced civilian persons. We intend to infiltrate agents among them and to utilise them for all possible action.

4. You should inform the French authorities that we are quite willing to slacken the propaganda threat which leaves the impression that foreign workers in GERMANY are better organised than is the case, but maintain that we must still retain the discretion in the matter. We should be quite willing to inform the French that we will issue instructions that neither actual prison camps will be named nor the organisation of foreign workers exaggerated.

5. The project for dropping specially trained teams into GERMANY to protect special objectives under conditions of collapse has been referred to Army Groups. This matter is under urgent consideration and we hope to have a more concrete program to discuss with the French in the near future. We are now studying General Juin's letter of 19th December.

6. It is therefore requested that you present the enclosed "Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY" to the proper French authorities, and obtain their approval or comments.

for the King
J. L. MURPHY,
Major General, GS,
DAG of 8, G-3

Copies to:-

- The Under Secretary of State, The War Office (Ad6).
- OSS, Com = AFHQ, (2)
- OSS, UK Base, (2)
- SOE, LONDON, (2)
- Supreme Headquarters, AEF:-
- GCS,
- G-1 Division,
- G-2 Division,
- G-3 Division, (Plans),
- G-3 Division, (Ops),
- G-4 Division,
- G-5 Division,
- EW Division,
- US Liaison Officer,
- US Liaison Officer,
- G-3 War Diary (3).

TAB A
to (2)

6 1152

555-37467 File No. 04111114

1 Jan

①

SECRET
ALLIED ZOOLOGICAL SERVICE
G-3 Division (Liaison)

TOP SECRET

SW/17247/1/One(0)
207 291-17247/1(0)

7th January, 1945.

POLICY FOR FOREIGN WORKERS IN GERMANY

OBJECTS

1. To ensure that foreign workers are of maximum assistance to our operations, including those taking place after the collapse of organized German resistance.

Outline

2. There are about eight million foreign workers in GERMANY, of whom three million are French, Belgian and Dutch. With exceptions, they are all in the main, inclined to spare and resignation as to their fate, and are unlikely to be so responsive to propaganda while GERMANY maintains its present degree of internal control.

3. The German attitude towards foreign workers appears to be heavily sympathetic, backed by violent threats. It is probable that the Germans have infiltrated a large number of German workers among the foreign workers which constitutes the scope of our activities.

4. The foreign workers are motivated as being relatively unorganized, with little inter-communication among themselves and with the outside world. There is no immediate prospect of their taking overt action against German war industry, since their resistance depends on their obtaining as much food, and it is impossible to supply them with food or weapons in sufficient quantities. Our normal clandestine objectives must be limited to the gradual establishment of a wide dispersion of these foreign workers, and their organization into disciplined bodies. Their present operational role is thus restricted to constituting a counterweight against and preventing a constant threat of organized enemy action.

THE PROPAGANDA THREAT

5. This is mainly carried out by Psychological Warfare Division broadcasts. The Propaganda line at present is one of open hostility of the American and British propaganda by foreign workers and active subversion of the German economy by the foreign workers. Propaganda on every possible line is to be prepared at present.

In the development of a propaganda threat, no action steps will be taken for those which would directly violate against our clandestine activities.

6. Special Operations can best assist the three types

a. Carrying out all underground work in accordance with the policy to be possible with the limited means available.

b. Intelligence activities.

These activities should be carried out over as wide an area as possible in order to induce the maximum spread of German internal security troops.

7. There must be no doubt as to foreign workers to leave their own area, although they may be encouraged to leave industrial occupations for agricultural work in the vicinity.

8. 1153

THE THREAT

CLandestine Activities

8. While the technical facilities available for organizing the foreign workers are known to be extremely limited, every effort should be made to attain some degree of control over the foreign workers, and particularly to arrange reception facilities for agents, radio etc.

9. While the role which the foreign workers may eventually be called upon to undertake cannot be finally left until it is known that this process of organization has been completed, the ultimate aim will be for the foreign workers to carry out the following tasks:

a. To provide a disciplined and organized body which will assist the Allies in the final stages of the military operations. For this purpose, their assistance may take the form of immediate discipline on such matters as foreign workers and have not previously been mentioned, and ensuring their readiness to act in concert.

b. As an exception, if the organization of any particular group develops to such an extent that it appears capable of undertaking some active work, it should be actively encouraged and supplied with the resources to support its efforts, etc.

STRICTLY TO BE KEPT OUT OF HANDS OF GERMANS, JAPANESE

10. As the foreign workers become better organized we can prepare for actual assistance under conditions of collapse in GERMANY when they may be in danger of capture. All possible thought of giving aid to foreign workers are being considered.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

Secretariat file only

~~SECRET~~

Secretariat file copy

*10, Burying
3/10/1*

Cooperation in Propaganda to Foreign Warblers
in [redacted]

27 December 1944


Political Officers 27 1944

attached letter forwarded herewith
for information has [redacted] to a letter which
[redacted] by General Morgan on 22 December 1944

This matter is being handled by Psychological Warfare Division.

CARTER L. MORGAN,
Lt. Col., U. S. A.,
Acting Secretary General Staff.

Incl.
Copy of ltr dtd Dec. 144 - this file
fr Col. Middle to G/S [redacted]
one enclosure.
JMK/spa this file 25 Dec



~~SECRET~~

b 1155

~~SECRET~~

Secretariat file copy

~~SECRET~~

Secretariat file copy

X-101, Bureau
K347-01 P14B

SGS - SHAF File No. 61214

Cooperation in Propaganda to Foreign Workers
in Germany.

27 December 1944

1 808 753 27 Dec.
1944.

The attached letters forwarded for
your information refer to a letter signed
by General Morgan on 15 December 1944, sub-
ject, "Cooperation with the Soviet Govern-
ment in Propaganda to Foreign Workers in
Germany."

GARTER L. WOODMAN,
Lt. Col., U. S. A.,
Acting Secretary General Staff.

1 Incl.
Copy of ltr dtd 15 Dec. 44. This file
fr Col. Middle to C/S with
one enclosure.
JBM/spe This file 25 Dec.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **CONFIDENTIAL**
BY authority of CALA
J. W. Smith
Date 16 AUG 1945

~~SECRET~~

6 146

27 Dec

~~SECRET~~

1151 9

[Handwritten signature]

For Information

MYRON TYMARD

TO:

Date 27 December 1944

Office of the Secretary General Staff
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Supreme Headquarters

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Handwritten notes: 101 Division, 1st Air Corps, 1st Army, 1st AF, 1st AF, 1st AF]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
FORCE
European Allied Contact Section Main

SH/13/EAC/7/525

26 December 1944

TO: Lt. General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff, [redacted] Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force, Main.

I have the honor to transmit herewith the attached letter
from Major General V. N. Dragun, Representative of [redacted] Plenipoten-
tiary of the Council of the People's Commissars of [redacted] USSR for the
Repatriation of Soviet Citizens in Western Europe, which we have
just received in reply to your recent inquiry, reference SH/2966 - 091. [redacted]
of 19 December, 1944.
[redacted]

[Handwritten signature: Anthony Biddle]
Colonel, AUS
EACS Main

1 Incl.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: [redacted]
By: *[Handwritten signature]*
Date: [redacted]

6 1158

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REPRESENTATION PLÉNIPOTENTIAIRE
du Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S.
pour les affaires de rapatriement
des citoyens soviétiques dans l'Ouest
de l'Europe.

4, rue du Général Appert, PARIS XVI^e
Métro: PAS. 4379

25 December 1944.


Subject: Cooperation in Propaganda to Foreign
----- workers in Germany.

To: European Allied Contact Section, Supreme Headquarters
A E F Main.

I have the honour to inform you that your sugges-
tions concerning broadcast of programs to foreign workers
behind the enemy lines of Western and Eastern Fronts had been
submitted to the Soviet Government. On receiving the answer I
immediately let you know.

Sincerely,

W.K. DRAGON, Major General,
representative of the Plenipotentiary
of the Council of the People's
Commissars of the USSR for the Repat-
riation of Soviet Citizens in
Western Europe.



6 1159

Secretariat file copy

Secretariat file copy

X 201 Bingham
X 377-01/5

to Foreign in Germany.


24 December 1944

SECRET 24 Dec.
Mission 1944.
France

Please note the concurrence of the
Political Officers to the dispatch of the
letter to M. Ricci.

CARTER L. BURROWS,
Lt. Col., U. S. A.,
Acting Secretary General Staff.

- 2 Incls.
Incl 1 - Copy of ltr dtd 20 Dec. *This file*
for Gen. Rodman to SC re: above subject.
Incl 2 - reply to M. Ricci - *M. Ricci*
KASH/spa



Secretariat File Copy KASH/jt

131.01 PA
CBI Bureau

File

Broadcasts to Foreign Workers in Germany.

21 December 1944

SHAF Mission
091.4114

1. SSS Political 21 Dec
Officers 1944

1. On 8 December a letter addressed to the SHAF Mission (France) from the Ministry of Prisoners of War, Displaced Persons and Refugees, was forwarded to you for necessary action. Copy of this letter is attached for easy reference.

2. On 13 December, your comments on this letter received and were passed to the SHAF Mission (France).

3. A further letter has now been received from the SHAF Mission signed by General Rodman, copy attached, suggesting the despatch of a letter to M. de Ricci, draft of which is also attached.

4. In accordance with General Rodman's request your comments, concurrences or otherwise to the despatch of this draft letter is requested for forwarding to the SHAF Mission (France).

5. This matter has not been brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff.

CARL L. BURGESS,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

3 Incls:

- 1 - Copy ltr fr M. de Ricci dtd 6 Dec 44.
- 2 - Copy ltr fr SHAF Mission (France) dtd 44.
- 3 - Draft ltr fr SHAF Mission (France) to M. de Ricci.

KASM/jt

1 POL.OFF SSS 22 Dec.
1944.

Pen Note: Concur in proposed letter to M. Ricci.
/s/ S. REBER.

I concur.
/s/ C. PEAKE

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO
SECRET
G. W. S.
Date

6

116
CALA

W. B. Butler

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Mission ■ France
Office of the Deputy Head of Mission

APC 757
20 December 1944

■ 505.77-1

SUBJECT: Broadcasts to Foreign Workers in Germany.


TO : Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,
(Main), APC 757.
(for the attention of 505)

1. With reference to correspondence ■ the above subject, ending with your minute to Supreme Headquarters Mission (France), dated 13th December, ■ have been in close touch with FWD ■ this matter, and still feel that some ■ should be sent to ■ French. In accordance with normal procedure, an interim reply ■ sent to the letter from the Minister of Prisoners of War, Displaced Persons and Refugees dated the 4th November, in which a further reply was promised.

2. M. de Ricci of the same Ministry, in his letter of the 6th December, asks for the reply which had been promised. ■ far as ■ be ascertained, although certain discussions took place between General McClure and the French, no actual answer has been given to the original letter of the 4th November.

3. In fact, it would seem that a great deal of progress has been made by ■ with the French in this matter. There would seem good reason for a reply to be sent to M. Ricci on the lines of the attached draft, which has the concurrence of General McClure.

4. Concurrence in the despatch of this draft is requested in view of the advice of the political officers that a reply should be made.



H. REDMAN,
Major-General,
Deputy Head of Mission.

In Under Secy 21/12/44

X file No
X 201 Redman
X 201 285

20 DEC

C

HEADQUARTERS
EXPEDITIONARY
Mission (France)

X-101
X-101
X-101

AG 283.7.1 JWD

APC

1944.

Broadcasts to foreign workers in Germany.

TO : Monsieur R. Ricci, Ministere des Prisonniers, Gens, Déportés et Réfugiés.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated 5 November 1944 wherein you request a reply to a letter from Monsieur Francy to the Supreme Command dated 3 November 1944 relating to the above subject. It is regretted that no reply has so far been given to you.

2. On 12 December 1944 a meeting was held at the Présidence du at the McClure, Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., with Monsieur Jaxo the whole problem of co-operation with the French in with psychological warfare.

3. It was suggested by General McClure that a group should be formed with representatives of all the French Ministries concerned. This group would be able to formulate policy on matters of propaganda and would be a representative body with the Psychological Warfare Division could co-operate. Jaxo French authorities on this subject his reply

4. It is hoped the arrangements will lead to perfect understanding and co-operation between the Psychological Warfare Division.

Head of Mission:

RASLEY, JR.
Colonel,
ADJUTANT

19 Dec

6 1100

5. 8/5. 24 Dec

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

PNP 3966

18. December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Cooperation with the Soviet Government in
Propaganda to Foreign Workers in Germany.

TO: The Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet
Government in Western Europe for the Repatriation
of Soviet Citizens. (Through: European Allied
Contact Section, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.)

1. It is proposed by Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. to intensify propaganda to Foreign Workers located behind the enemy lines in the West to a depth of 50 to 100 miles. This is taken as roughly covering the [redacted] which the behaviour of foreign workers can directly affect military operations.
2. This campaign will be based mainly on Radio Luxembourg, [redacted] will be supported by leaflets.
3. The presence of many Soviet workers in the [redacted] concerned would seem to make it most desirable that the Soviet Government should cooperate by arranging:
 - a. The relay by Radio Luxembourg of Moscow broadcasts addressed to Soviet workers in Germany.
 - b. The attaching to Psychological Warfare Detachment, [redacted] Luxembourg, of a Soviet officer authorised to [redacted] policy decisions, and, possibly, at a later date, [redacted] Soviet script writers and speakers.
4. It would be of great advantage if the campaign could be supported by a corresponding broadcast of programmes from Moscow to foreign workers of Western origin located behind the enemy lines on the Eastern front.
5. It is hoped that you may be able to implement the proposal made in sub-para. b. of para. 3 above, and that you will be good enough to lay before the Soviet Government the suggestions made in sub-para a. of para. 3 and in para. 4.

W.B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

Signed
F.J. Morgan
18/12/44

6 1184

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
CONFIDENTIAL
Date 16 AUG 1975

Copy.

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY
Psychological Warfare Division

091.412.

13 December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Cooperation with the Soviet Government in Propaganda
to Foreign Workers in Germany.

TO: Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

I. DISCUSSION.

This Division proposes to intensify propaganda to foreign workers located behind the enemy lines in the West to a depth of 50 miles. This is taken as roughly covering the area in which the behaviour of foreign workers can directly affect military operations.

This campaign will be based on Radio Luxembourg mainly and be supported by leaflets.

The cooperation of the French Provisional Government and of the Dutch, Belgian and Czech Governments has been secured. The views of very many Russian workers in the area concerned make it most important to invite the Soviet to cooperate by arranging for:

- a. The relay by Radio Luxembourg of broadcasts to Russian workers in Germany.
- b. The attaching to Psychological Warfare Detachment, Luxembourg, of a Soviet officer authorised to make policy decisions and, possibly, at a later date, of Soviet script writers and speakers.

It would further be of great advantage if the Soviet Government could arrange a corresponding broadcast by Moscow of programmes of foreign workers of Western origin located behind the enemy lines on the Eastern front.

Since the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet Government in France for the Repatriation of Soviet Citizens has recently authorised the text of a leaflet exhorting Russians impressed into the German Army on patriotic lines, Soviet cooperation should not be difficult to obtain.

II. RECOMMENDATION.

That the Chief of Staff sign the letter at TAB 'A'.

Signed
F.S. Morgan
12/12/44

ROBERT A. MCCLURE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

To: FWD.

CONCURRENCES.

Political Adviser (U.S.) _____

Political Adviser (Br.) _____

Tab: TAB 'A'

6 1165

13 Dec 44
X-101 New Church
1001 Street
1001 Street

091.412

THIS FILE
12 Dec 44

13 DEC

CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
G. W. Smith
13 DEC 1945

FWD Broadcasts to Foreign [redacted] in Germany

13 December 1944

1. MGS
[redacted] 13 Dec
Mission 1944
(France)
Attn: MGS

1. With reference to your letter of the 6th December enclosing a letter to the Mission from the Minister [redacted] of War, Displaced Persons and Refugees. This letter is now returned herewith together with the comments [redacted] Officers [redacted] were invited.

2. This correspondence has also been [redacted] personally [redacted] McCLURE, [redacted] that [redacted] are [redacted] constant [redacted] with the relevant French [redacted] and that two French officers are in fact on his Staff [redacted] determine matters of this nature.

3. [redacted] view of [redacted] it [redacted] suggested that should you require any further information on this subject you contact [redacted] direct.

[redacted] L. MURPHY,
Lt. Colonel, U.S.G.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

2 Incls: [redacted]
KASB/jt

6 1166

See memo 20/2/45
Haw file

13 Dec

①

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

(CLASSIFICATION)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Letter from the Ministry of Prisoners of War, Dis- DATE 13 December 1944

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, aligned legibly, from a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS BEEN WITH ALL CONCERNED:
2	Mr. Peake	SCS (Main)	13 Dec 1944	<p>1. At a meeting we had at least a fortnight ago with General McClure, Mr. Deber and I both expressed the view that owing to the change in status of the French Government, and particularly owing to their accession as a full member with the US and British Governments of the EAC, that it would be necessary to take the French Government into our confidence and consult them over future broadcasts to foreign workers. Our understanding was that General McClure agreed with this, but it does not look as if there had been any consultation in the meantime.</p> <p>2. We do not see any advantage in engaging in further polemics on paper with M. de Ricci on this subject. The milk has been spilt, and it is inexpedient to waste further tears on it. If discussions with the French Government on future broadcasts to foreign workers could be begun, we think their grievances would disappear, or could be argued out across the table. Our advice would be not to reply in writing to M. de Ricci, but to suggest that he come and talk to the proper Division.</p> <p><i>Samuel Reber</i> SAMUEL REBER, Political Officer US</p> <p><i>Charles Peake</i> CHARLES PEAKE, Political Officer US</p> <p>Encls - n/c. CP/ra</p>

6 1167

13 DEC

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

(CLASSIFICATION)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO: Letter from the Ministry of Prisoners of War, Dis-
placed Persons and Refugees.

DATE 9 December 1944

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet, use entire width of sheet for long memoranda)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	MAS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED ALL CONCERNED?
1	SGS (Main)	The Political Officers	9 Dec 44	<p>1. The attached letter addressed to the SHAEF Mission (France) from the Ministry of Prisoners of War, Displaced Persons and Refugees is forwarded for [redacted] sary action.</p> <p>2. This letter refers to a previous letter, also attached for easy reference, concerning broadcasts [redacted] foreign workers in Germany.</p> <p>3. It will be recalled that no action [redacted] taken [redacted] M. Freney's letter by this Headquarters and [redacted] Mission (France) have now requested [redacted] a proposed reply to M. [redacted] Ricci's letter be forwarded to them for onward transmission.</p> <p>4. [redacted] de Ricci's letter has not been brought [redacted] the attention of the Chief of Staff.</p> <p>For the Secretary, General Staff:</p> <p><i>Carroll L. Burgess</i> CARROLL L. BURGESS, Lt. Col., G.S.C., Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff.</p> <p>2 Incls. Cpy ltr dtd 6 Dec 44 fr M. [redacted] Ricci to SHAEF Mission. Cpy ltr dtd 4 Nov 44 fr M. Freney to S/C. KASH/rts</p> <p>THIS FILE</p> <p>THIS FILE</p> <p>THIS FILE</p>
				<p>Min. 2 13 Dec. PeaKe - 558</p> <p>21 Dec</p> <p>SGS - Political Off.</p>

6 1168

Copy of H. de Brier's letter has been sent to the Political Office for action.

File

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
MISSION (FRANCE)
Office of ■ Secretary General Staff

*x file ✓
x 201. Baker
x 091-212*

AG 000.77-1 SCS

8 December, 1944

SUBJECT: ■ Broadcasts to Foreign ■ in Germany

TO : Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(Attention: Secretary General Staff)

1. Attached herewith is a letter to this Mission ■
Minister of Prisoners of War, Displaced Persons ■ Refugees, ■
6th December, 1944.

2. ■ letter refers to a matter concerning broadcasts ■
foreign workers in Germany. Secretary, General Staff, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (this) informed Secretary,
General Staff, this Mission, that the matter ■ being handled on
a 'political level' ■ that no further action was necessary ■ the
part of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, ■ Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Mission (France).

3. Request proposed reply to ■ Risci's letter ■
this Mission.

Robert E. Baker,
ROBERT E. BAKER
Major, GSC
Secretary General ■

Incl 1 - Ltr dtd 6 Dec 44
sgd. R. ■ Risci

disposal

see ① Vol II

COPY

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

MINISTRE
DES
PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE
ET REFUGIES

6th December 1944.

Cabinet du Ministre

Le Brigadier Lee,
Commanding General
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Forces in France.

On November 6th receipt was acknowledged of a letter from this Ministry, dated November 4th concerning broadcasts to foreign workers in Germany.

It was stated that this letter had been forwarded to the Supreme Commander A.E.F., whose reply would be transmitted in due course.

As an answer has not yet been forthcoming, I should be most grateful if you would consider it possible and advisable to breach the matter again with a view to the possibility of obtaining a reply.

/s/ A. de RICCI

/s/ A. de RICCI

Acc B/S

13 Dec 1944

SGS to General
Vandenberg

Acc B/S - Release
9 Dec.

6 1170

COPY

19/12/44

24 November

G-3

No action should be taken until we are clear as regards the French one, comprehensive evidence should go out.

/s/ F.R.M.
DC/M

6 1171

24 Nov

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Main)

SHAEF/17249/3/OPS(0)
GFT/101.412.4/OPS(0)

24 November, 1944

SUBJECT: Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY

TO: Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force,
Headquarters, 21st Army Group, (G Ops 2) (5)
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, (5)
Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, (5)
Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command,
Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, Communications
Zone, FROTHA,
Special Operations Executive,
Supreme Headquarters, AEF Mission (FRANCE),
Supreme Headquarters, AEF Mission (BELGIUM),
Supreme Headquarters, AEF Mission (HOLLAND),
Supreme Headquarters, AEF Mission (DENMARK).

1. A policy paper on "Foreign Workers in GERMANY" (SHAEF/17249/3/OPS(0) November, 1944), is forwarded herewith for your guidance and information.

2. It must be borne in mind that this policy has not yet been presented to the French Government for agreement. It cannot, therefore, be considered operable for French Foreign Workers, although it is not anticipated that serious objections will be raised. With regard to the Foreign Workers of other nationalities, it will be considered as being fully operable. When the French have been received, supplementary guidance will be issued.

By Command of General EISENHOWER.

W.B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

H.R. BULL,
Major General, GSC,
of S, G-3

Copy 101-

6 1172

See Reg - 20 1177
Bull - 215

24 NOV

TOP SECRET

-2-

Copy to:-

Supreme Headquarters, AEF;
Secretary General Staff,
Adjutant General Division,
G-1 Division, (2)
G-2 Division, (5)
G-3 Division, (4)
G-4 Division,
G-5 Division, (2)
Psychological Warfare Division, (2)
Political Officer (NR),
Political Officer (US),
European Allied Contact Section,
Air Staff,
G-3 War Diary, (3)
Special Force Headquarters.

6 1173

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SHAW/1722/1/0/2(C)
001 001 422-5/0/2(C)

TOP SECRET

(Final)

24 November, 1944

POLICY FOR FOREIGN WORKERS - GERMANY

OBJECT

1. To ensure that foreign workers are of maximum assistance to our operations, including those taking place after the collapse of organized German resistance.

GENERAL

2. There are about 8 million foreign workers in GERMANY, of whom 3 million are French, Belgian and Dutch. With exceptions, they are all in the main, inclined to apathy and resignation in their fate, and are unlikely to be responsive to propaganda while GERMANY maintains its present degree of internal control.

3. The German attitude towards foreign workers appears to be heavily sympathetic, backed by veiled threats. In all probability the Germans have infiltrated a large number of Gestapo agents among the foreign workers which constricts the scope of our activities.

4. The foreign workers are recognized as being relatively unorganized, with little inter-communication among themselves and with the outside world. There is no immediate prospect of their taking direct action against German war industry, since their existence depends on their continuing at work, and owing to the impossibility of supplying them either with food or weapons in sufficient quantities. Their present operational role is thus mainly restricted to that of a threat. The maintenance and development of this threat, in order to cause maximum dispersion of German security troops, is the immediate propaganda aim of this Headquarters; this entails propaganda addressing the foreign workers if they were already organized and able to assist considerably by their action in the event of a breakthrough. Our clandestine objective has to be more closely related to the facts, and must at present be limited to the gradual establishment of communications with these foreign workers, and their organization into disciplined bodies. These objectives are to be carried on concurrently.

PROPAGANDA THREAT

5. This is mainly carried out by Psychological Warfare Division broadcasts. Propaganda lines to be stressed at present are:-

a. Foreign workers are to be given instructions, etc., as if they were a disciplined force.

b. Open advocacy of the commission of undetectable sabotage by foreign workers and active subversion of the German worker by the foreign worker. Propaganda on active subversion is not to be stressed at present.

6. Special Operations can best assist the threat by:-

a. Distributing propaganda coordinated with the psychological Warfare policy, thereby giving the enemy the impression that in fact a high degree of organization does exist among the foreign workers in GERMANY.

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6. Carrying out and encouraging such clandestine sabotage as may be possible with the limited means available.

c. Intelligence activities.

These activities should be carried out over as much area as possible in order to induce the maximum dispersion of German internal security troops.

7. There must be no encouragement to foreign workers to leave their own area, although they may be encouraged to leave industrial occupations for agricultural work in the vicinity.

CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

8. While the technical facilities available for organizing the foreign workers are known to be extremely limited, during the winter every effort should be made to attain some degree of control over the foreign workers, and particularly to arrange reception facilities for agents, radios, etc.

9. While the role which the foreign workers may eventually be called upon to undertake cannot be finally laid down until it is known that this process of organization has had some success, the ultimate aim will be for the foreign workers to carry out the following roles:-

a. To provide disciplined and organized bodies which will assist the Allies in the initial stages of the military occupation. For this purpose, their assistance may take the form of imposing discipline on such bodies of foreign workers who have not previously been organized, ensuring their obedience to Allied orders.

b. As an exception, if the organization of any particular group develops to such an extent that it appears capable of undertaking more active work, it should be suitably encouraged and supplied after due reference to C.I.C.

ACTION IN EVENT OF MASSACRE OF FOREIGN WORKERS

10. There is a possibility that, when their period of usefulness is over, foreign workers may be massacred by the Germans. In such circumstances there are only two ways in which we can help them:-

a. By our land forces arriving quickly.

b. By strong Psychological Warfare action against the Germans.

11. There is no possibility of bringing help to them by air supply, and therefore no preparation or provision will be made for this purpose.

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42

Major-General, GSO,
Lt. Col. WILL.

6 1176

Approved
E. M. Morgan
24.11.40

Political Officer (us).
Political Officer (us).
GSO
G-1 Division
G-2 Division
G-3 Division
G-4 Division
G-5 Division
Special Agent, Foreign Division.

III. CONCLUSIONS

1. That the Chief of Staff approves the letter at GAB B forwarding this policy to all concerned.

II. RECOMMENDATION

2. The paper at GAB A has accordingly been drawn up in consultation with GSO, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and all interested Divisions. Supreme Headquarters, Army.
24 Nov
1. GSO and G-1 (30) have recommended that a line policy paper be submitted to the Headquarters of the subject of foreign workers in GERMANY.

I. DISCUSSION

20 Chief of Staff

Subject: Policy for Foreign Workers in GERMANY

1176/11769/1/0001(9)
1176/11769/1/0001(9)

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
G-1 Division (Main)

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7/4/41 160

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

1945 30 JUNE 1945
TAMMERS UNIVERSITY
HONOR 'T' 1

1. The receipt of Appendix "A", which has been submitted to the communication with all stations concerned as requested. The object is to make clear to foreign forces in the area, the MINIMUM INFORMATION required for the MINIMUM.

Responsible to Foreign Workers.
Psychological Warfare Division.

[illegible]

7761 2000-04-01

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

SECRET

October 1944


VOICE OF SHEPHERD TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN GERMANY

This is a member of the staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The following message, dated October 1944, is [redacted] of the Supreme Commander. It is addressed to workers in Germany [redacted] countries are at war with Germany and who work in the Ruhr, the Rhenish-Westphalia industrial area and the Rhineland.

The time has come to give you precise instructions what to [redacted] when the Allied Armies expel the German Army from the [redacted] where you work. Listen very carefully to what follows.

First, here are your instructions on what to do before [redacted] Allied



1. In battle approaches, go into hiding if you have not been [redacted] to do so before. Avoid at all costs the Nazi efforts to drag you deeper into Germany with the retreating armies.

2. Get away, if possible, from the town or village where you live. But in doing so, be sure to keep off the roads. On the roads you will [redacted] in deadly danger.

3. If you cannot get away from your town or village, go to an air-raid shelter. Do not leave your shelter till you [redacted] quite sure that [redacted] Germans have been driven right out.

These are your instructions on what to do before the Allied [redacted] arrive. Now listen to your instructions on what to do when the [redacted] Armies arrive:

4. If you have managed to get away from your town or village and taken refuge in the country nearby wait there quietly until [redacted] mapping up [redacted] in your living quarters. For some time

~~SECRET~~
after the first Allied troops enter it is likely to be dangerous to return to your town or village.

■ If you have taken refuge in an air raid shelter in your town or village, remain quietly there until the mopping up is completed. Do not bother the fighting soldiers; they have plenty to do.

3. Once the battle has passed by it will be more than ever necessary for you to keep clear of all roads and areas by which Allied troops and supplies are coming forward. Military Government officials will follow quickly behind the leading troops and will set up offices in towns and villages at which you will receive instructions as to how you will be looked after and fed. But do not all go to these offices — send only your group leader, who should if possible, speak English. The rest of you should remain in your groups and await his return.

4. Your representative should report that his group awaits instruction. He will be told by the Military Government official precisely what the group should do.

5. When the time comes, each of you will be interviewed by a Military Government official designated to look after you and begin the arrangements for your return home. Have your papers and credentials ready if possible. You will understand that the Allied Armies will have to take security measures to prevent German agents slipping through the lines disguised as Allied nationals. It will, therefore, save time if you have your papers and credentials ready. But even if you have no papers you will be looked after.

6. When you are interviewed by the Military Government official, you will be given a postcard which you can send to your relations telling them that you are safe under the protection of the Allied Armies. These postcards will be sent off immediately after you have filled them in. If possible, if you desire it, the message on the postcard will also be transmitted to your relations by radio.

your instructions on [redacted] [redacted] when the Allied [redacted] arrive.

Now, here [redacted] your instructions on what to do after the [redacted] Armies have advanced beyond your town or village.

1. [redacted] you are ready to [redacted] to work for the Allied Armies while you are waiting to be sent home, there will be work of the very greatest importance to be done. Every volunteer from among you will [redacted] needed.

2. [redacted] their credentials [redacted] been checked, [redacted] will be given work as soon as possible. They will be paid at the highest current German wage for [redacted] category [redacted] to which they belong. Their rations will be assured by the military authorities.

3. Remember that [redacted] who volunteer to work for [redacted] [redacted] will not be thereby prevented from returning home. [redacted] will [redacted] clearly recognized by the military authorities that they have only [redacted] [redacted] work during the time when the arrangements [redacted] being made for [redacted] [redacted]

4. If you [redacted] not fit or able to work you will be looked after by the military authorities until it is possible to move you back into your home country. When you reach the frontiers of your home country, your own national authorities will then arrange for your journey home.

5. Do not, therefore, attempt to make your own way back home. If foreign workers in unorganized masses stream along the lines of command [redacted] of the Allied Armies they will [redacted] the Allied advance [redacted] also [redacted] themselves to the gravest danger. Moreover, you will be stopped [redacted] the military authorities. The confusion created will only postpone [redacted] organized repatriation, which the military authorities are now planning in consultation with your own national authorities.

Let me [redacted] up these instructions in brief:

1. Before the Allied Armies arrive, [redacted] into hiding, [redacted] and stay quiet till the final mopping up [redacted] been completed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

■ When the Allied Armies arrive, report to the Military Government officials.

3. While you are waiting to return home, be ready, if possible, to volunteer for urgent emergency work to help the Allied Armies.

■ On no account try to make your own way home along the Allied lines of communication.

The Supreme Commander instructs us to say that he is confident that you will carry out these instructions faithfully. Thereby you will accelerate both the defeat of Germany and your own return home.

The above instructions do not in any way alter the orders you are receiving and will continue to receive regarding the action you are to take against your enemy, Germany. These orders come to you by other and secret means.

That is the end of these special instructions issued at the order of the Supreme Commander and addressed to workers in Germany whose countries are at war with Germany and who work in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area and the Rhineland.

These instructions are transmitted to you by radio and also by leaflet. The Supreme Commander will be issuing further instructions to you. ■ listen regularly to the radio and look out for leaflets addressed to you in your own language.

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAFF MINUTE SHEET)

(CLASSIFICATION)

SUPREME EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: SHAEF broadcasts to Foreign Workers in Germany

DATE 10 Nov 1944

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda)

No.	From	Page To	Date	THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH
1	PWD SHAEF	S/CS SHAEF	10 Nov 1944	<p>1. On 7 November 1944 we returned to you copy of M. Frenay's letter on the above subject, along with a memorandum containing points for conversation should the matter be brought up again.</p> <p>2. To that memorandum I would like to add following excerpts from SHAEF/17502/1/2/ops(C) GCF 092.711-11(France), Bi-monthly Report from Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (France) dated 6 November 1944, Appendix I:</p> <p>"1. October 18 conference with Monsieur Coulet to discuss French participation in the preparation of broadcasts to displaced persons in Germany, attended by representatives of PWD/SHAEF, PWD Mission, PWA G-1 SHAEF, G-5 SHAEF, French PDR, French M. of I. Agreement made for Working Committee. G-5 Mission DP Section informed.</p> <p>"2. October 24 conference of Working Committee at M. Coulet's office for preparation of a PWD/SHAEF broadcast to displaced persons, attended by representatives as at previous meeting. G-5 Mission DP Section informed."</p>
		6	1182	

Robert A. McClure
ROBERT A. MCCLURE
Brigadier General, G.A.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

46 * B * Hq 535 2-44/1547-5215

FILE NO. 091.712/1

10 Nov

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

7 November

Points at issue are all to be found in the concluding paragraphs of page 2 and the first paragraph of page 3 of H. Freney's memorandum. In substance, they boil down to this: the Supreme Commander has given active orders to French citizens in Germany without prior consultation to the French government.

There is no question about the fact that this has occurred. It should, however, be pointed out that the Supreme Commander has addressed French citizens who are not members of the French Army since long before D-day. Long before D-day he issued to them warnings and instructions. These warnings and instructions were in the first instance addressed to French citizens in France itself, which was then about to become an area of military operations.

Warnings and instructions to French citizens in Germany, now that Germany has become an area of military operations, are in no way different from those previously addressed to the people of France and against which no objection was raised by the French authorities.

In view of the vital importance to the Germans of the labor pool formed by the foreign workers, including the French citizens in Germany, it is impossible for the Supreme Commander to regard the giving of warnings and instructions as outside his powers. The German government increasingly depends on the output of war materials made by foreign labor, including French citizens and it is a vital interest to the Supreme Commander to reduce that output by every method within his power. One of the main purposes of the warnings and instructions he has issued has been to achieve this effect.

Furthermore, the Supreme Commander is well aware of the appalling risks to the foreign workers in Germany which the air offensive against German industries entails. He must regard it as his duty to advise foreign workers, including French citizens, in their own interest, as well as to impede German production, to leave the centers of war industry which are being subjected to this air bombardment.

Moreover, the Supreme Commander is only too well aware of the plans which the German police authorities have for killing of foreign workers if the emergency arises. It is his view that this mass massacre will be far easier to achieve if the foreign workers are concentrated in centers of war industry than if they are scattered over the country.

6 1183
The Supreme Commander has received sufficient evidence about the conditions in Germany to lead him to the conclusion that, as German police forces are mobilized for front-line service and thereby reduced in strength, the German police are unable to prevent foreign workers from going underground and successfully escaping to the country. The German peasant is urgently in need of labor.

CLASSIFIED
TO: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL

By: [illegible]
By: W. BUTLER
[illegible]

Date: [illegible]
[illegible]

and it is not impossible for a very large number of foreign workers to escape from war industry centers and either work on the land or the frontier to their own country. The best evidence of this is the constant stream of French citizens who have successfully and heroically evaded German war work and returned to France. The hardships, therefore, which Mr. Frenay refers to, of those who try to find subsistence lodging outside the centers of war industry are as nothing compared to the mortal risks of staying at those war centers and suffering first the Allied air bombardments and then the danger of by the SS.

In reply to Mr. Frenay's complaint that the French government has not been consulted about the instructions issued by the Supreme Commander, it should be pointed out that for many weeks FWD, SHAEF, has been awaiting the two French officers who it has requested should be detailed from the French government to work in FWD in full and equal collaboration with the British and American members of the division. The initial request for such close collaboration on policy matters was made to General Koenig immediately upon his appointment as the French representative to General Eisenhower's headquarters. Since then this request has been repeated several times and so far without avail.

~~SECRET~~

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(STAKE MINUTE SHEET)

P-1397
File
Cue
X 091-422
201
JAL. 61 PWD

SGS SHAEF File No. 1091422

CLASSIFICATION
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FILE NO. 201
SUBJECT: Message Broadcast to Foreign Laborers in Germany. DATE 5 November 1944

(Number past name or number consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet, and repeat width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	SGS	PWD	5 Nov. 1944	<p>There is forwarded herewith for necessary action letter and copy of translation thereof, addressed to the Supreme Commander from M. Henri Frenay, Minister of Prisoners of War, Deportees and Refugees.</p> <p>Copies have been sent to Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Information.</p> <p><i>J. B. Moore III</i> J. B. MOORE III Colonel, G. S. C., Secretary, General Staff.</p> <p>1 Incl. As indicated above. JRM/apa</p>

2	Chief PWD SHAEF	SGS SHAEF	7 Nov 1944	<p>It is understood that the original of Mr. Frenay's letter has been returned to him.</p> <p>Should there be further discussion of this subject, the attached memorandum would form a basis for conversations.</p>
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2 Incls:
1. Attached memorandum

CLASSIFICATION
TO CONFIDENTIAL
BY
JRM/apa
6 NOV 1944
JRM/apa

Robert A. McClure
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Psychological Warfare Division

~~SECRET~~

SECRET - file copy

X-289.7
201-10-10
302-10-10
303-10-10

Messages Broadcast to Foreign [redacted] Germany

5 November 1944

SGS - SHAFT File No. 00414/14

1 [redacted] 0-3 [redacted] Nov. 1944.

For information.

A copy has been forwarded to PWB for action, [redacted] to the Chief of Staff [redacted] the Deputy [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

FORD TRIMBLE,
[redacted] S. O.,
Secretary, [redacted] Staff.

1 Incl.
Copy of ltr dtd 4 Nov. '44
fr Minister of Prisoners of War,
Deportees and Refugees to S/O
re: above subject.

JBN/wpa

not in SGS files

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By [redacted]
By [redacted]
Date [redacted]
Copies [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted]

6 1186

SECRET

Secretariat file copy

~~SECRET~~

Messages broadcast to Foreign Laborers in Germany.

5 November 1944

1 225 PWD 5 Nov.
1944.

██████████ is herewith for necessary
letter and copy of translation thereof,
addressed to the Supreme Commander from K. Seuri
Frenzy, Minister of Prisoners of War, Deportees
and Refugees.


Copies ██████████ been forwarded to the Chief of
Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and G-3 for information.

FORD TRIMBLE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary, General Staff.

1 Incl.
1 indicated above.
JBM/ups

not in S.G.S. file

1187



~~SECRET~~

10/10/45

C
10/10/45

1201 Early
201 Eisenhower

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Mission to France

5 November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Letter

TO : Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force

1. There is forwarded herewith a letter from [redacted] Minister of Prisoners of War, Deportees, and Refugees, addressed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 4 November, 1944.

2. The original signed copy is being forwarded without translation in order to avoid delay. An accurate translation of the letter, together with the comments [redacted] this Mission and a statement of completed or [redacted] action will follow shortly.

3. The matter referred to herein [redacted] of primary interest to the Psychological Warfare Division.

For the [redacted] of Mission:

Bruce Early Jr
BRUCE [redacted] JR
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

Incl. 1.
Letter dated 4.11.44.
from Minister of Prisoners of
War, Deportees, and Refugees.

6 1188

15 NOV 44

Pte

TRANSLATION
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

MINISTRE DES
PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE
DEPORTES ET REFUGIES

PARIS, 4 November 1944.

Ministry of Prisoners of War, Deportees
and Refugees

LE MINISTRE.

TO

General Dwight EISENHOWER
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Force.

See letter dated
9/12/44
SAS & S. 9/14
SAS to POWs

On 5 - 13 and 28 September, messages were
broadcast to your country to foreign labourers in GERMANY,
inciting them to leave their place of work and go to the country;
secondly to prepare themselves for active resistance.

I am particularly like to see the following
messages, from the text of these messages:

Message of 5 September 1944:

".... Start from now to leave your factories and
the most favourable opportunity presents itself. The
sufficient manpower to look for you."

Message of the 11 September 1944:

".... Do not allow yourselves to be carried off
by the German police into the interior of Germany.... Seize
the most favourable opportunity to leave the country and await
their arrival."

Message of the 13 September 1944:

".... All factories immediately. Go
over to the "Underground". Hide yourselves in towns and villages.
at once. Leave the factories now.... The Nazis have
sufficient manpower to look for you or supervise your movements."

Message of the 15 September 1944:

"....." All foreign workers who are not
organised "pockets of resistance" have not obeyed my
begging them to leave in towns or preferably in
the country, should do so immediately.
I have already told them that they are running
the gravest risk by remaining in the factories.
The wisest thing for them is to disappear from

gatherings to look for shelter and work in the country.

In all regions of Germany, workers belonging to organized "pockets of resistance" are being supplied with the necessary measures to enable them to carry out their resistance. These instruments will be ineffective if they are used haphazardly and without a definite object in view. Those of you who receive them must immediately read the instructions attached to them, understand them by heart, then destroy them. Hide these instruments in a safe place. Destroy them carefully in place. They will be most effectively used. Establish your plan of action. Only when this plan is set in all its details, use the instruments for the purpose for which they are intended."

The French Government is aware that these orders were given at a time when the operations of the Allied Armies in France enabled the Supreme Commander to envisage a rapid advance into German territory.

The French Government fully understands SHAEF's desire to use the services of the great mass of foreign workers in Germany to the benefit of the Allied Armies and the German battle.

The French Government does not doubt that SHAEF is guided by the desire to save human lives endangered by allied bombardments as well as from the eventual Nazi activities.

However, the French Government is obliged to protest against the orders given by the Supreme Commander to French citizens, without either the French Government or its military representatives having been consulted.

The Supreme Commander is well aware that if he can exercise his authority over regular French formations placed under his command by the French Government, this authority in no way extends to French citizens actually in Germany unarmed.

If one day, the participation of these Frenchmen in the common battle, is organized, it can only be after the French Government has given its agreement, in principle, and drawn up clauses in agreement with the competent French services.

The French Government regrets to state that these French citizens in Germany have received "active" orders from SHAEF of the conditions having been fulfilled.

Consequently, the French Government is obliged to leave the Supreme Commander the entire responsibility for the measures he has decreed and to which it has not given its approbation.

6 1130 In effect, the order to leave the factories, go to the country and prepare for action (about which the Government has

not [redacted] informed) places [redacted] citizens [redacted] have obeyed this order [redacted] a dangerous position; of [redacted] the Supreme [redacted] is aware. With winter [redacted] approaching, [redacted] will [redacted] only have to [redacted] incredible difficulties to [redacted] their lodging [redacted] [redacted], but they will [redacted] find themselves unarmed and in an illegal position and [redacted] with a merciless oppression.

Unfortunately [redacted] can [redacted] the line of comparison between the [redacted] taken by HITLER- VLASSOV and the [redacted] given by the Supreme Commander. If the German communiques [redacted] [redacted] believed, full power has been conferred on VLASSOV [redacted] repress any foreign activity in Germany likely [redacted] disrupt law and order in [redacted] interior [redacted] country.

Taking into account the abominable cruelty exercised by VLASSOV, when in FRANCE, against [redacted] F.F.I., it is with a feeling of profound anxiety [redacted] one [redacted] of the measures he will take against [redacted] workers in Germany.

[redacted] conclude: [redacted] French Government, who [redacted] responsible to [redacted] Nation for the destiny of its subjects, protests [redacted] against what it [redacted] obliged [redacted] consider as an encroachment by [redacted] Military Command on the sovereignty of the French Government. [redacted] latter leaves to [redacted] Military [redacted] the entire responsibility of the measures [redacted] and of which [redacted] Government has not been informed.

[redacted] French Government [redacted] ready, [redacted] it has always been in any circumstance, to study and fix with the Supreme [redacted] the cooperation of all Frenchmen with the Allied Armies, if [redacted] action [redacted] any way hasten operations [redacted] bring about [redacted] a [redacted] victory over the Third Reich.

(Sgd) [redacted] FRENAY
MINISTRE [redacted]
DEPORTES ET REFUGIES.

TRANSLATION

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

MINISTERE DES
PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE
EXPORTES ET REFUGIES

PARIS, ■■■■■ 1944.

Ministry of Prisoners of War, Deportees
and Refugees

LE MINISTERE.

TO

General Dwight EISENHOWER
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Forces.

On 6 - 8 - 13 and 25 September, messages were
broadcast in your name to the foreign labourers in GERMANY,
inciting them to leave their place of work and go to the country;
secondly to prepare themselves for active resistance.

I would particularly like to take up the following
paragraphs from the text of these messages:

Message of 6 September 1944:

".... Start from now to leave your factories as
as a favourable occasion presents itself. The Nazis ■■■■ not
sufficient manpower to look for you."

Message of the 8 September 1944:

".... Do not allow yourselves to be carried off
by the retreating Germans into the interior of Germany.... Seize
the most favourable opportunity and hide in the country and await
their arrival."

Message of the 13 September 1944:

".... Leave all German factories immediately. Go
to the "Underground". Hide yourselves in towns and villages.
Act at once. Leave the factories from now.... The Nazis have not
sufficient manpower to look for you or supervise your movements."

Message ■ the 25 September 1944:

"....." All foreign workers who ■■■■ not members ■■■■
organised "pockets of resistance" and who have ■■■■ obeyed my
instructions begging them to hide in the towns or preferably in
the country, should do so immediately.

I have already warned them that they are running
the gravest risks by remaining in the factories.

1192

The wisest thing for ■■■■ is ■■■■ disappear from

the towns and from any gatherings and to look for shelter and [redacted] in the country.

In certain regions of Germany, workers belonging to organized "pockets of resistance" are being supplied with the necessary measures to enable them to carry out active resistance. These instruments will be ineffective if they are used [redacted] thinking and without a definite object in view. Those of you who find them should immediately read the instructions attached to them, learn them by heart, then destroy them. Hide these instruments in a safe place. Carefully choose carefully the place where they will be most effectively used. Establish your plan of action. Only when this plan is set in all its details, use the instruments for the purpose for which they are intended."

The French Government is aware that these orders were drawn up at the time when the operations of the Allied Armies in France enabled [redacted] Supreme Commander to envisage a rapid advance into German territory.

The French Government equally understands SHANF's desire to use the services of the great mass of foreign workers in Germany to the benefit of the Allied Armies and [redacted] common battle.

The French Government does not doubt that SHANF was guided by the desire to save human lives endangered by allied bombardments [redacted] well [redacted] from the eventual Nazi activities.

However, the French Government is obliged to protest against these orders given by the Supreme Allied Commander to French citizens, without either the French Government or [redacted] military representatives having been consulted.

The Supreme Commander is well aware that if he [redacted] exert his authority over the regular French formations placed under his command by the French Government, this authority in no way extends to French citizens actually in Germany and unarméd.

If one day, the participation of these Frenchmen in the common battle, is to be organized, it can only [redacted] done after [redacted] French Government has given its agreement, in principle, and studied and drawn up the clauses in agreement with the competent French services.

The French Government regrets to state that these French citizens in Germany have received "active" [redacted] from SHANF without either of the above conditions having [redacted] fulfilled beforehand.

Consequently, the French Government is obliged to leave to the Supreme Commander the entire responsibility [redacted] the measures he has decreed and to which it has not given its approbation.

In effect, the order to leave the factories, go to the country and prepare for action (about which the Government [redacted])

not been informed) places the French citizens who have obeyed this [redacted] in a dangerous position; of this the Supreme Commander is aware. With winter fast approaching, these [redacted] will [redacted] only have to surmount incredible difficulties to ensure their lodging and subsistence, but they will also find themselves unarmed and in an illegal position and faced with a merciless oppression.

Unfortunately [redacted] can but draw the [redacted] of comparison between the recent decisions taken by HITLER- VLASSOV [redacted] the orders given by the Supreme Commander. If the German communiques are to be believed, full power has been conferred on VLASSOV to [redacted] any foreign activity in Germany likely [redacted] disrupt law and order in the interior of the country.

Taking into account the abominable cruelty exercised by VLASSOV, when in FRANCE, against the F.F.I., it is with a feeling of profound anxiety that [redacted] thinks of the measures he will take against French workers in Germany.

To conclude: the French Government, who is responsible to the Nation for the destiny of its subjects, protests solemnly against what it is obliged to consider as an encroachment by [redacted] Military Command [redacted] the sovereignty of the French Government. The latter leaves to the Military Command the entire responsibility of the measures taken and of which the Government has [redacted] informed.

The French Government is ready, as it has always been in any circumstance, to study and fit with the Supreme Commander the [redacted] cooperation of all Frenchmen with the Allied Armies if their action can in any way hasten operations and bring about [redacted] a [redacted] victory over the Third Reich.

(Sgd) HENRI FERNAY
MINISTRE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE
DEPORTES ET LUTUELS.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division

SHARP/G-5(MAIN)Ops/1220

31 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda to Foreign Workers.
TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

This Division, in consultation with Psychological Division reached the conclusion there is urgent operational need to give Foreign Workers in the RUHR, REFINISH-SPITALIAN Area and the REINSLAND instructions as to what they should do when the fighting approaches these neighborhoods, and to specify

- a. How they should before the Allies arrive, and
- b. What kind of treatment they will receive after the Allies arrive.

Such instructions necessary in order that:

- a. Military operations should not be hindered by unorganized crowds of Foreign Workers the L of C and elsewhere - would immediately result in chaotic conditions.
- b. There may be supply of labour for needs.


II. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the letter to Psychological Warfare Division Tab 'A' enclosing appropriate Script be signed and issued.

III. CONCURRENCES

G-1
G-2

Documents (attached; incorporated).



JD/JA

Enclosures

A.E. GRASSETT
Lieutenant General
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

X File
X Grasset
X Smith
X 091-412
SECRET

41-412-160

C

31 Oct

CR/

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief**

TAB "A"

October 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda to Foreign Workers.

TO : Psychological Warfare Division.

1. It is considered that there is an urgent operational need to give Foreign Workers in RUHR, the RUHRISH-WESTPHALIAN Industrial Area and the RUHRLAND instructions as to what they should do when the fighting approaches these neighborhoods.

2. The Script attached at Appendix 'A' will be put into effect by you at the appropriate stage and it is designed to be used by Foreign Workers.


a. They should behave before and after the Allies arrive in the areas concerned.

b. What kind of reception they will receive when the Allies arrive.

Copy to:
Public Relations Division

not used

F. E. HODGKIN
Lieutenant General
Deputy Chief of Staff



6 1196

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

WO/566

SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

R

809

1

TO : FREEDON HALL

FROM : SHAFF FROM McCLURE SIGNED

REF NO : S-53525 CITE: SHPMD

Guidance 3 Radio Propaganda to non-Germans with attached to WHERMACHET in Western EUROPE. Excluding Russians, half non-Germans are Polish, remainder composed of Hungarians, Roumanians, Czechs. All intermingled with German formations. Few non-Germans in labor services in battle Guidance is:

Devote most effort Polish transmissions usual Polish programs. Much shorter transmissions in Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Roumanian. Trail these in all programs for several days.

Base appeals on good treatment prisoners desert because this is not their war.

Excepting trailing in German broadcasts unexploit in German presence non-Germans in

Polish, Czechoslovakian, etc broadcasts uncontain implication they carry approval governments of listener.

Surrender invitation plus promise good treatment should carry implication of pardon.

Unadvise civilian populations behavior towards deserters.

Unreport this campaign in Western European languages.

ORIGINATOR : PWD AUTHENTICATION: B JORDAN, Lt Col

INFORMATION : SCS OWI MOI

OSS, NO G-2 G-3 G-5

PRD MR PEAKE AMB PHILLIPS

AEAF (SHAFF) ETOUSA (SPECIAL SERVICES)

AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 364 9 June 1944 2151B DMR/ggh Ref : S-53525

TOO: 091000B

6 1197

SECRET

28 259

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Indexed

COPY NO.

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SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : FWE, AFHQ
FROM : SHAEF, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53405

Guidance ■ valid first 4 days operation follows not for output. Allied invasion troops also include French. Synchronised but unnecessarily simultaneous offensives planned by Russians, TITO, ALEXANDER plus air war over GERMANY. Plans include series operations ranging North Cape to BISCAY plus throughout MEDITERRANEAN.

Can expect fanatical resistance-Germans using total available resources. ROMMEL and ALASKOWITZ under RUNDSTEDT control operations anticipate German attempt crush landings soon as possible. Initially Germans will have superior supply facilities and soon numerical superiority. We have air, naval superiority plus limited area plus surprise element with Germans unable use distant reserves because constant threat other surprise landings.

Propaganda plans should assume critical phases consolidation bridgehead and German counter-attack. Assume morale Ferries good but inactive flanking troops nervous tense awaiting battle. Many non-German Todt labour in vicinity. Area native population fewer than normal mostly women children aged men have been instructed radio leaflets stay put but perhaps unable obey. Resistance groups already instructed their tasks.

Propaganda should balance our complete confidence with our recognition hazards and difficulties history's greatest amphib operation against massive defenses.

OUT 297

SECRET

6 7700

- 1 -

28 260

SECRET

COPY NO.

SHAEF File No. 094412/4

5

SECRET
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SECRET

REF NO: S-53405 (Cont'd)

■ Allied Expeditionary Force not ■ of NORTH
Liberation. Emphasize cooperation three services ■ Allied
Nation Forces stressing synchronized action United Nations on all
all fronts ■ increased vulnerability Northwest EUROPE ■
MEDITERRANEAN Coasts. Judge our progress by enemy killed and
defenses broken not by mileage. Progress against good ■
troops, defenses, numbers, material and morale achieved as ■
result our superior morale, tactics, air attacks on means ■
supply and communication plus assistance from organized ■
assistance and transport workers. Comment our strategic/tactical
■ and air superiority permitting use paratroops. ■

■ Omit mention operation ■ the invasion or second
front. Unrefer secret weapons unless officially released United
Nations. Unclaim ■ German naval efforts. Unquestion ■
happened German surface fleet. Until officially released omit
nationality strength our troops. Unspeculate rate ■ of
future objectives. Avoid claim early end war. Unmention names
military commanders until released. Unreport ■ food or relief
supplies. ■ German commanders by omit names. ■
radio time on ■ in battle ■ since unable listen. Con-
centrate ■ people and troops on flanks plight ■
and flanking troops who ■ at ■ and HITLER line ■
like "land mines" to be "runkled out". Link shortage day and
night fighters with air attacks over GERMANY. Explicit tension
ATLANTIC rail troops waiting. Play up hard news efforts
■ tremendous air, sea, land fire power. Avoid melodramatic
news handling. Propaganda to Western Occupied Countries appealing
constantly restraint and discipline. Should follow strictly
lines of EISENHOWER's statement stressing discouragement to
uprise this phase. Permissible ■ statements King HAARLEM
Dutch Prime Minister, DE GAULLE, FIERLOT. LONDON radio will
give line encouraging transport workers sabotage communications
between NANTES and ANTWERP. Follow this line strictly without
digressions outside above ■ Play down mass uprisings ■
fully report successful action transport workers related where
possible our air campaign against German communications. Treat

1199

SECRET

1200

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

achievements French Resistance Groups solely as part military operations omitting reference general uprising.

ORIGINATOR : FWD AUTHENTICATION: HOWARD E. JORDAN,
LT COL

INFORMATION : [REDACTED] ✓

OWI
PID
CSS, NO
MOI
G-2
G-3
G-5
PRD

[REDACTED] PHILLIPS
[REDACTED] FRAKE
ARAF (SNAF)
ETCUSA (SPEC SERVICE)
AG [REDACTED]

SMC OUT 297 8 June 44 1018B VAN/et Ref No: S-53405
TOO: 0718309

S E C R E T

223

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COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDDJ

Filed 061837B

SHAEF 12/07
TOR 070100B June
was 070135B

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ, TULSA, PWB SIGNED WILSON
TO : AGMAR, OMI, DAVIS, BARRETT, CARROLL,
THOMSON; SHAEF PWD, SHERWOOD,
REF NO. : P-55804 6 June 1944 CITE: PFWO

ALWAF 06977.

Have been informed personally by HENRI
BONNET that in view of directive forbidding all references
to "Provisional Government", OMI directive June 3, his ser-
vices will discontinue participation joint leaflet oper-
ation.

ACTION: PWD
INFORMATION: EGE
G-2
OMI
PRD
AG RECORDS

6 120

BMC 842 7 June 1944 0237B HFK/rob Ref. No: P-55804

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 5

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : AFHQ
FROM : SHAEF SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53173

Following is directive for D-day and post
D-day white radio (propaganda to non-Germans serving in WEHRMACHT and
auxiliary services in OVERLORD area. Request WASHINGTON OWI and
AFHQ radio propaganda conform.

1. Main effort to be concentrated on transmissions
in Polish in usual Polish programs, with much shorter transmissions
in Czech, Hungarian and Rumanian in usual programs of these
languages. Effort to be sustained until further notice.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By authority of JCSALA
E. W. Butler
Good.
Date 16 AUG 1945

2. General lines of broadcasts will be:

- (a) "This is not your war", therefore desert.
- (b) Our treatment of prisoners of war.

3. All broadcasts to be trailed very briefly on a
all German programs from D-day to D plus 3. There will be no other
attempt in German Broadcasts to exploit presence of non-Germans
WEHRMACHT.

4. Broadcasts to non-Germans will contain
implication of any amnesty, nor that they carry authority or
approval of governments of nationals addressed.

5. So as not to involve local civilian
populations, this campaign will not be reported in French, Dutch,
Belgian, Danish and Norwegian programs, and no advice will be
given civilians as to how they should behave towards deserters.

1202

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : AFHQ
FROM : SHAEF SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-53173

Following is directive for D-day and post
D-day white radio (propaganda to non-Germans serving in WEHRMACHT) and
auxiliary services in OVERLORD area. Request WASHINGTON CMI and
AFHQ radio propaganda conform.

1. Main effort to be concentrated on transmissions
in Polish in usual Polish programs, with much shorter transmissions
in Czech, Hungarian and Rumanian in usual programs of these
languages. Effort to be sustained until further notice.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By *W. Butler*
Date *16 AUG 1945*

General lines of broadcasts will be:
(a) "This is not your war", therefore
(b) Our treatment of prisoners of war
3. All broadcasts to be trailed very briefly on a
all German program from D-day to D plus 3. There will be no other
attempt in German Broadcasts to exploit presence of non-Germans
WEHRMACHT.

4. Broadcasts to non-Germans will contain
implication of any amnesty, nor that they carry authority
approval of governments of nationals addressed.

5. So as not to involve local civilian
populations, this campaign will not be reported in French, Dutch,
Belgian, Danish and Norwegian programs, and no advice will be
given civilians as to how they should behave towards deserters.

6 1202

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO 5

REPRODUCTION OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

-2-

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

REF NO: S-53173 (Continued)

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: DONALD F. FORBES
Capt,

INFORMATION : SGS

COORDINATED : Chief of Staff

C-2

C-3

C-5

PRD

AMBASSADOR PHELPS

MR PEAKE

AG RECORDS

00
SAC OUT 140 4 June 1944 19063 DMR/jea REF NO: S-53173
FOO: 041100B

~~SECRET~~ b 1203 ~~SECRET~~ SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
EXPEDITIONARY
Psychological

016
300-2
304
031.412
000.77 PWD
321.1 PWD
2 June 1944

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE FOR RADIO PROPAGANDA TO NON-GERMANS IN WEHRMACHT
AND AUXILIARY SERVICES IN OVERLORD AREA.

TO : Chief Staff.

DISCUSSION

The object of propaganda to foreign elements in the auxiliary services is (a) to encourage them to fight or desert, (b) to stimulate distrust of foreign elements among in WEST.

attached Directive (Tab. A) for radio propaganda for D-day post D-day been prepared in with PWs and OWs.

The Directive follows:

- (a) The effort to in transmissions in shorter transmissions in CZECH, HUNGARIAN, RUMANIAN, in the usual programmes of these languages. These broadcasts will until further notice.
- (b) The general lines of the broadcasts will be, (i) "This is not your war", therefore desert, (ii) Our treatment of P.O.W. is good. They will contain no implication of any amnesty, nor that they carry the authority or approval of the Governments of the nationals addressed.
- (c) The broadcasts in (a) above will be referred to on all GERMAN programmes from D-day to D+3. Apart from this there will be no attempt in GERMAN broadcasts to exploit the presence of foreigners in the Wehrmacht.
- (d) order to involving populations, no advice will be given them as to how they deserters, and campaign will be reported the FRENCH, DUTCH, BELGIAN, DANISH and programmes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That PWs be to officially PWs and the draft Directive Tab. A - 26/5/44.

That JCS (Tab. B), requesting that Mediterranean this directive, be approved for dispatch by Secretary, General Staff.

To c/s 4 June 44
approved by D/s 4/6/44
F.E. MORGAN.

A. McCLURE.

Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, Psychological

Concurrences:

b 1204

G-2 (Maj Strong)
G-3 (Brig Nevins)
G-5 (Brig Holmes)
Ambassador Phillips

CONFIDENTIAL
Indexed

~~TOP SECRET~~

CGS - SHAF File No. 096421A

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

TAB-A
to 2 June Brief

May 26, 1944

Draft Directive (white) on Propaganda to Non-Germans
in OVERLORD Area.

1. Non-Germans in Germany

(a) Non-Germans in Germany

including Russians, approximately half of whom are Poles; the other half made up of a wide variety of nationalities, chiefly Czechs, Hungarians, etc., serving closely intermingled with German formations.

(b) Non-Germans in auxiliary services - Food Organization and German Labor Service.

Very few of them remain in the area; those who do are mainly in towns and outnumbered by Germans in the same organizations.

2. Propaganda

1. The civilian agencies devote the bulk of their efforts to transmissions in Polish in usual Polish programmes.

2. should be transmissions in Czech, Hungarian, etc.

3. and these (1 + 2) should be trailed very briefly in German on German programmes for two or three days.

4. The general lines should be: -

- (a) "This is your war," therefore desert.
- (b) Our treatment of prisoners of war is good.

5. The 'don'ts' are: -

- (a) Apart from the trailing in German should be no attempt in Polish to exploit the presence of these units in Germany.
- (b) broadcasts in Polish, etc., should contain no implication that they carry the authority or approval of the Government of the nationalities addressed. (If this alters, special guidance will be issued.)
- (c) as prisoners of war should carry no suggestion or implication of amnesty. (If situation alters, special guidance will be issued.)
- (d) No advice should be given to the civilian populations as to how they should behave towards deserters.
- (e) should be no reporting of this campaign in western European languages.

6 1200

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB-B
to 2 June 1944

DRAFT CABLE

Joint Staff - AFHQ for information.

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

Following is directive D-day and post D-day
radio propaganda non-GERMANS serving in auxiliary services
OVERLORD Washington O.W.I and AFHQ propaganda

1. to be concentrated on transmissions in POLISH
usual POLISH programmes, with shorter transmissions
CZECH, HUNGARIAN and RUMANIAN in usual of these
languages. No be further notice.
2. lines of broadcasts will be:
(a) "This is your war", therefore desert
(b) of P.O.W. good.
3. All very briefly on all GERMAN
programmes from D-day to D+3. ~~Special instructions there~~
NO repeat NO other attempt in GERMAN broadcasts exploit
of non-GERMANS.
4. Broadcasts to non-GERMANS will contain NO NO implication
of any amnesty, nor that they carry authority or approval
of nationals addressed.
5. So as not to involve local civilian populations, campaign
repeat NOT be reported in FRENCH, DUTCH, BELGIAN,
and NORWEGIAN programmes. NO repeat will
civilians to how they should behave towards deserters.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

Date 28 May 1944

TO:

G-2:

FOR COMMENT

or

FOR CONCURRENCE

Please return to PW.

/s/ P.T.

1 copy to G-2
1 copy to G-2

~~SECRET~~

COPY

COPY # 6

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

1300.6
0200.77

May 26, 1944

Draft Directive (addit) on Radio Propaganda to Non-Germans
with or attached to Wehrmacht in OVERLORD Area.

1. Background

(a) Non-Germans in Wehrmacht

Excluding Russians, approximately half these non-Germans are Poles; the other half is made up of a wide variety of nationals; chiefly Czechs, Hungarians and Rumanians. All are serving closely intermingled with German formations.

(b) Non-Germans in auxiliary services - Totk Organisation and German Labor Service.

Very few of these remain in the army; those who do are mainly in garrison towns and outnumbered by Germans in the same organizations.

2. Guidance

1. The civilian agencies should devote the bulk of their efforts to transmissions in Polish in the usual Polish program.

2. There should be much shorter transmissions in Czech, Hungarian and Rumanian.

3. All these (1 & 2) should be trailed very briefly in German on all German programs for two or three days.

4. The general line should be -

- (a) "This is not your war," "Warfare doesn't."
- (b) Our treatment of prisoners of war is good.

5. The "don'ts" are -

- (a) Apart from the trailing in German there should be no attempt in German broadcasts to exploit the presence of these non-Germans in the Wehrmacht.
- (b) The broadcasts in Polish, Czech etc., should contain no indication or implication that they carry the authority or the approval of the governments of the nationals addressed. (If this situation alters, special guidance will be issued.)

(c) The invitation to surrender and the assurance of good treatment as prisoners of war should carry no suggestion or implication of any amnesty. (If this situation alters, special guidance will be issued.)

(d) No advice should be given to the local civilian populations as to how they should behave towards deserters.

(e) There should be no reporting of this campaign in Eastern European languages.

G-3 (Name)
for comment
or concurrence
Mr. Phillips
Concur
(RM)
G-2
Government
or concurrence
P.T.
P.W.O.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
Date 10/10/50
By 6160/10/50
Approved

SECRET

Indexed 2

COPY

4 1944

70 Chief of Staff

a. In order to avoid starvation or reprisals.
b. They believe they have committed [redacted] traitors.
the [redacted] of their countrymen.
c. They are affected by the prestige of serving the [redacted] Army.
d. Many [redacted] are White and anti-Communist.

main value such propaganda is its indirect effect on German morale. However, it is considered that to be effective we must be able to offer the foreign elements sort of assurance that our governments recognize that they are forced into German Army against their will and that by they will not be treated as traitors. (See 1 for detailed discussion).

It is proposed that a limited form of amnesty be granted by the respective Allied governments to nationals of Poland, France, Russia, Belgium, Holland and Czechoslovakia who are serving under compulsion with the German Army and wish to surrender, provided that they are not volunteers in divisions which have otherwise wilfully performed in a treasonable manner. Although for the purposes of "OVERLORD" the main concern would be a statement from the Polish Government, it is believed desirable for security reasons to approach all of the Allied Governments simultaneously. If any government is unwilling to commit itself in this matter, this decision need not affect action taken concerning nationals of other countries.

Gen. Morgan Governmental statements should be released at a suitable moment after a landing in Europe. G-3 desire that this plan be adopted and believe that it would be useful in spreading disaffection and that a considerable number of deserters would be obtained. G-3 also endorsed the suggestion.

To: Gen M'Closkey That [redacted] proposal outlined above be approved.

P.W.D. That the European Contact Secs authorized ■ initiate the necessary action, ■ a matter of urgency, for obtaining suitable ■ agents from the F.7. Allied Governments concerned.

8-5-44. Concurrence.

Approved by G-2
G-3 Political Advisor British
G-5 Political Advisor U.S.
Gen Smith 1209

ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General, U.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

10-CONFIDENTIAL
 BY *[signature]*
 Date *16 Nov 66*
 Containing *16* pages from the

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

Psychological Warfare to foreigners serving in the German Armed Forces in support of 'OVERLORD'.

OBJECT

1. The object of this paper is to define the nature of the propaganda campaign which Psychological Warfare should conduct against foreigners serving in the German Armed Forces, to determine what conditions must be fulfilled before such a campaign can be undertaken.

APPRECIATION

2. It is estimated provisionally that there are up to 176,000 foreigners serving in the German Army in the West, of whom the bulk are Poles. They are not organized into units on a uniform scheme, their organization and role appear to vary from sector to sector. Whilst there has been evidence that their relations with German troops are uneasy, and it may be that there is at least suspicion and mistrust amongst German soldiers as to their future behavior, experience in the Mediterranean Theater suggests that these foreigners are likely to fight well individually for as long as the German units in which they are serving fight well.

3. This willingness to fight well in the case of non-Germans is obvious in the case of those who have volunteered to serve in the German Armed Forces on ideological grounds, who are incorporated mainly in the German Waffen SS formations. In the case of foreigners who have been coerced into serving in the German Forces, however, either to avoid starvation or in order to save their families from reprisals, previous interrogations have shown that their willingness to fight derives from one or more of the following factors:

(a) They may feel that, once they have put on German uniform, however unwillingly, they have committed themselves as traitors in the eyes of their fellow countrymen and therefore have no alternative but to fight.

(b) They may desire to show their German overlords that they are not the despised and conquered peoples who fight so well, and even better, than the Herrenvolk.

(c) They may be subconsciously affected by the prestige of serving in the German Army, and thus fight as well as they can out of a peculiar feeling of solidarity with what they themselves still consider to be one of the best fighting machines in the world.

THE OBJECT OF PROPAGANDA TO FOREIGNERS IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

4. The existence of large numbers of foreigners serving in the German Armed Forces presents Psychological Warfare with a double target:

(a) Propaganda can be directed against them with a view to encouraging them to fight badly, desert, or work actively against their German comrades.

(b) By so doing, we can hope to create and develop distrust of these foreign elements amongst German soldiers and officers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

By authority of
G.W. BUTLER,
A.S.P.
6 AUG 1945
CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

In general, (a) is a long-term task for white propaganda, (b) is a short-term task for both white and black propaganda. (b) should be the object of our Psychological Warfare to the foreign elements in German Forces.

ACTION REQUIRED FOR THE CAMPAIGN CAN BE LAUNCHED

5. Bearing in mind that the main value of propaganda to foreigners in the German Forces will be its indirect effect upon German troops, it may be that the effectiveness of such propaganda to German troops will be increased in proportion as they see their foreign comrades willing to listen to it and act upon it. This however can only be achieved if we are able to offer the foreign elements some assurance that their respective Governments recognize that they were forced into the German army against their will, that surrender at the first opportunity will almost certainly bring them a free pardon. This should not take the form of a general amnesty for all foreigners serving in the German Forces, volunteers serving in the SS divisions, or persons who have otherwise wilfully performed traitorous actions, should be expressly excluded. The mere fact of their exclusion would tend to persuade those serving under compulsion to trust the statements of their governments, since it would show that the latter accept the principle of differentiation between those who were coerced into service, and those who entered it as volunteers.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY

6. On security grounds it is undesirable that any propaganda to the foreign elements be undertaken before D-day, since such propaganda might cause the Germans to tighten and improve their control over these elements, and thus improve the fighting efficiency of the unit as a whole. It will therefore be necessary to ensure that statements issued by the Allied Governments of the nature indicated in para. 5 above, are not released before D-day.

7. Although for the purposes of 'OVERLOAD' our main concern will be to obtain a statement from the Polish Government, it will be impossible on security grounds to limit our demands to the Polish authorities. This might indicate the geographical scope of 'OVERLOAD'. The demarche should therefore be a general one with the Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Czech Governments, and with the F.C.I.L. There would appear to be no necessity to make a similar demarche with the Greek and Yugoslav Governments. As regards the Russian Government, it is suggested that steps be taken to ascertain their views on the question of Russian Nationals serving in the German Forces, since the latter constitute numerically the second largest contingent of non-Germans in the German Army in the West. If the Russian Government is unwilling to commit itself on this matter, a special propaganda campaign should be directed against Russian elements. No account has been taken in this paper of suborned British Indians, as they fall within the 'volunteer' category.

CONCLUSIONS

8. Foreigners serving in the German Army in the West represent a valuable D-day target to Psychological Warfare as a means of undermining German morale by indirect approach.

9. A successful propaganda campaign to such elements can only be undertaken however on the basis of amnesties or reassuring statements to their future (excluding all persons who have served in formations) issued by the respective Allied Governments.

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3.

10. Although our main [redacted] is with the Poles, [redacted] security grounds we must approach the Belgian, Dutch and [redacted] Governments, [redacted] F.C.N.L. [redacted] as well as the Polish Government, with a view to obtaining such statements, which should [redacted] be released before D-day.

11. The views of the Russian Government should be ascertained [redacted] the question of Russians serving in the West.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12. That the Political Advisers be requested to initiate [redacted] necessary action, [redacted] a matter of urgency, for obtaining suitable statements from the Allied Governments concerned.

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NEW FOLDER

BEGINS

091. 412/5

THREE POWER ORDER

OF THE DAY

83

SHALF DISTRIBUTION
by SSS of

COS (44) 289 Xte (0). Item 5
dated 28.8.44
(44) (0)
dated

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

~~G-1~~

G-2

G-3

~~G-4~~

~~G-4~~ (Nov 8-En)

~~G-5~~

Public-Relations Div.

~~ANCH~~

ARAF (Direct Distribution)

~~SAC~~

Political Advisors

710.1

6 1213

~~TOP SECRET~~


ANNEX II

Copy of a Minute, (COS 1481/4) dated 28th August
1944 to the War Office from the Secretary
General of Staff Committee

Reference is made to Minute C.O.S. 1452/4 of 19th August
regarding proposal that operational orders of the day
should be issued by General E.H.M., General Eisenhower
and General H.M., the Chief of Staff agree with the
views of the Americans as expressed in the attached
telegram (1452/4) and have so informed the Joint
Staff Mission and General Eisenhower.

Annex II to C.O.S. (44) 28th Meeting (C),
Minute 5.

b 121



TOP SECRET

REPORT: GIBSON: FILL THE FILL PILE

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (44) 251st Meeting (c) Minute 5)

THE COMMITTEE instructed the Secretary to inform the Foreign Office, Joint Staff Mission and SOFET of their agreement with the American view that the present time was not appropriate for the issue of a statement as proposed by General Eisenhower in SOFET 25.

6 Annex II
+ SOIL OF C.C.S. (N) 284
FOLLOWING 1.36575 FROM 1947 TO 1952.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DRLS

100 231438Z

SHARP 113/29

291202B
291220B

291220B

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NOTICE

FROM : [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED]

TO FOR ACTION : WASHINGTON

FOR INFO

REF NO : 02-4793, 28 AUGUST 1944

COS(11) 284.

Reference J5N-200.

██████ agrees with OS ██████ that present ██████ was
 appropriate for issue of statement proposed in SCAP 55
 (U 86575 AGWAR SHARP refers) and ██████ so informed SHARP and
 Foreign Office.

Ref-JEM-200 is not identified in SHARP SMC files
V-86575 is SMC IN 4811, 26/8/44, FWD
SCAF 55 Ref 8-55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7 /44, FWD

ACTION : FWD

INFORMATION : 563

8-3

4-2

MR. PRATKIN

AMERICAN VINTAGE

AMS WILSON
AMS HETTER

APR 23 1964

SEARCHED **INDEXED**

6 1216

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By authority **USCALA**
of *John Butler*
Cdr
Date **16 AUG 1945**

1942 IN 5506

29 AUG 44

1320

YAN/17

NO: 02-4793

COPY NO.

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SECRET

303

INCOMING MESSAGE

SHAKF 327/25
TOR 252321B
PAJ 252355B AUG

pnj 252355B AUG

P R I O R I T Y

FROM : AGWAR [REDACTED] JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : SHAEEF FOR EISENHOWER
REF NO : W-86575 25 AUGUST 1944.

After consideration as indicated in PACS 59, it has been decided on US side that the present time is not appropriate for the issue of the statement which [redacted] 55 proposed.

PACS 49 ref W-82374 is SMC IN 3221, 18/8/44, PWD
SCAF 55 ref 555312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, PWD

RELAYED TO SHAEF FWD [REDACTED] ADV OF

ACTION : PWD
INFORMATION : SCS
G-3
BO/S BRIG JACOB
G-2
■ PEAKE
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WINANT
213

[illegible]

IN 4811 26 August 1944 0034E DWR/jss REF NO: W-86575

6 1214

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803

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR .
TOD 172200B AUGUST

SHAEF 29/18
TOR 180207B AUG
DNJ 180235B

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : SHAEF FOR J. BENHOWER
REF NO : W-82374 17 AUGUST 1944.

PA 3 59.

Your SCAP 55 has been studied, [redacted] of the political implications of your proposal it has been referred to the State Department and the Foreign Office.

SCAP 55 Ref S-55312 is SMC CT 1779, 10/7/44, PWD
RELAYED TO SHAEF PWD

ACTION : [redacted]
[redacted] : [redacted]
BC/S [redacted] JAC
G-3
G-2
MR [redacted]
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WINANT
**
AG RECORDS

6 1218

SMC IN 3221 18 Aug 44 440B VAN/1p REF NO: W-82374

SGS
Dist
Copy
P/B

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COPY NO: 6
Indexed

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TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL INCOMING MESSAGE

DRLS

FILED 211630Z JULY

SHAEF 161/22

FOR 221159 JULY

ULS - 221240Z JULY

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FROM

AMSSO

TO


JSM WASHINGTON

PASSED TO

SHAEF FOR INFORMATION

REF NO

02 3872 21 JULY 1944



COS (W) 163

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference COS (W) 159 and 20.170.

Please invite U.S. C.O.S. to agree that proposals contained in SCAF 55 should be referred to psychological warfare experts in WASHINGTON and LONDON for examination, and for the drafting of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

COS (W) 159 is SMC IN 7022, 12/7/44, JSM WASHINGTON.
20.170 not identified is SHAEF SMC Files.
SCAF 55 Ref 8-55317 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, FWD.

ACTION : JSM WASHINGTON

INFORMATION : SMC PWD AMB. WINANT
G-2 MR PEAKE SHAEF PWD
G-3 AMR. PHILLIPS
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 8708 22 July 44 1400B FWL/dag REF NO: 02-3872

6 1219

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE



UNLS

FILED 212133Z JULY

SHAEF 169/22
TOR 221159 JULY
VLA - 221238Z JULYSECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : JSM WASHINGTON
TO : AMSSO
PASSED TO : SHAEF FOR INFORMATION.
REF NO : IE 5297 21 JULY 1944
JSM 150.

Reference COS (W) 185.

Proposals contained in SCAP 55 are being considered by Combined Staff Planners in collaboration with PW experts in WASHINGTON. Results of meetings so far have already been communicated to LONDON on a planning level. If views of LONDON P.W. experts are retained on a similar level they can be incorporated in Planners report to CCS.

COS(W) 185 Ref 02 3872 to SMC IN 8708, 22/7/44, JSM
SCAP 55 Ref 3-55312 to SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, FWD

ACTION : AMSSO

INFORMATION : SCS
G-2
G-3
FWD
MR PEAKE
AMB. PHILLIPS
AMB. WIKANT
SHAEF FWD
**
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 8707 22 July 44 1401B ENL/12 REF NO: JSM 150

1220

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Indexed

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNLS

TOO 111533Z JULY

SHAEF 126/23
TOR 230828Z JULY
VLA 230840ZSECRET
PRIORITY

FROM : JSM WASHINGTON
TO : AMSSO
PASSED TO : SHAEF FOR INFO
REF NO : 20 170, 11 July 1944



May we please have your views on SCAP 55.

SCAP 55 is SMC OUT 1779 10/7/44, FWD
Attention invited to 02 3872 SMC IN 8708, 22/7/44, JSM WASH

ACTION : AMSSO

INFORMATION : SCS
G-2
G-3
FWD
MR PEAKE
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WIKANT
SHAEF FWD
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 8861 23 July 1944 0645B ENL/103 REF NO: 20-170

6 122

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Indexed

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SCS-SHAEF File No. 071/126

SHAEF File No. 071/126

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

DRLE

200 111955Z JULY

SHAF 166/12
TOR 121813 JULY
zjb 121830 JULY



SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM : A.M.S. S.O. FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF.
TO : J.S.M., WASHINGTON.
PASSED TO : SHAF FOR INFO.
REF NO : 02 3651 11 JULY 1944.

COS(W) 159

Reference SCAP 55

See 10-7-44
This file.

We do not think that the time has yet
arrived for the proposal contained in above telegram
to be implemented.

SCAP-55 REF 55312 is SMC OUT 1779, 10/7/44, FWD

ACTION : USM WASHINGTON

INFORMATION: SCGV
G-3
FWD
G-2
MR PEAKE
AMB PHILLIPS
AMB WINANT
SHAF FWD
AG RECORDS

SMC IS 7082. 12 JULY 44 19163 VAN/dav REF NO: 02-3651

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6 1222

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SCS-SHAF File No. 62142/5

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL/1201

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FROM : UNITY, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : S-56312

SCAF 55

It is considered that we are approaching the psychological climax of the war and a decisive demonstration of military unity between the Western, Southern and Eastern fronts may well flagging GERMAN morale into rapid demoralization. This is likely to be true NOT only of the GERMAN home front but of the GERMAN troops, whose relatively high fighting morale recently shows significant slackening.

It is proposed therefore that on a date to be synchronized by the three Headquarters, Orders of the Day be issued by General EISENHOWER, Marshall STALIN and General MAITLAND WILSON to their armies. These orders would NOT be identical but would contain the following points:

(A) Allied successes on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts.

(B) In face of this combined attack GERMANY is finished as a military power and the GERMAN High Command knows it.

(C) Let the Allied fighting men make a great combined effort to finish the job.

(D) Into that combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm of the industrial workers.

(E) The final battle has begun.

These orders should, ideally, be issued at the same hour but, short of that, on the same day so that the unity of intention will be manifest. This would be immediately followed

END OUT 1779

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1223

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SCS-SHAEF file No. 091.412/5 - Jan 2 Power Order 1945

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

REF NO: S-55312 OUTGOING MESSAGE 30 July 1944

by a concerted psychological warfare campaign ■ the basis that "the war is lost, all is up."

Orders would, ■ release, be broadcast in GERMAN on all available transmissions from RUSSIA, the MEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED KINGDOM to impress ■ the GERMAN mind the idea of concerted and concentric action.

With the fall of CHERBOURG and continuing successes in ITALY, ideal timing would be shortly after ■ notable ■ of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has ■ gained in the West such as a break out from the bridgehead area. Also if the release of these orders should occur several days before the surrender of FINLAND or ROMANIA, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and the occupation of GERMANY from all sides is ■ to follow.

If the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve this proposal it is requested they secure concurrence of the Russians ■ advise SACMED of the approved proposal.

Upon approval, the exact timing of the publication ■ the three Orders of the Day would be recommended by SCAEF directly to the Russians through the Military Missions and ■ SCAEF through British Chiefs of Staff.

ORIGINATOR : FWD

AUTHENTICATION: R.A. McCLURE,
BRIG. GENERAL

INFORMATION : SCS

COORDINATED : G-3, Mr. Peake,
Amb Winant, C/S

G-3

EC/S BRIG JACOB

G-2

MR PEAKE

AMB PHILLIPS

AMB WINANT

SHAEF ■

RECORDS

SAC OUT 1779

10 July 44

1810B

VAN/1p

REF ■ S-55312

FOO: 101200B

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO.

6 1224

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
of the Secretary General Staff

Date: _____

TO:

Mr. Wathams

For your files and
representation.

YH

6 1225

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division.

25 June, 1944.

SUBJECT: _____ OF THE _____ TO _____ ISSUED _____ SCARY,
MARSHAL STALIN AND _____ WATLAND-WILSON.

1 CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. DISCUSSION:

All available evidence _____ Normandy _____ Italy suggests _____ the morale of the German soldier is beginning to flag. Up to now, _____ view of the relatively high fighting morale of _____ troops, propaganda _____ the enemy, except _____ certain tactical situations such as Cherbourg, has avoided direct incitement to _____ surrender, _____ limited _____ to a sober _____ of facts on which _____ has _____ left to judge for _____ The time has now come for _____ all out Psychological Warfare campaign designed to turn the flagging German morale into actual _____ demoralisation. This necessitates a much more direct attack _____ German troop _____, which would, _____ continuing to state soberly, contain appeals to surrender _____ all-out attacks on German leadership.

It is proposed that on a day, to _____ synchronized by the three headquarters, orders of _____ day be _____ by General EISENHOWER, Marshall STALIN, and General _____ to their armies. These _____ would _____ be identical but _____ include the following points: (a) Allied _____ on the _____, Western and Southern Fronts, (b) _____ face of this combined attack Germany is finished _____ a military power and the German High Command knows it, (c) let the Allied fighting men make a great _____ effort to finish the job, (d) into that combined effort will _____ the victorious enthusiasm of _____ industrial workers, _____ (e) the final battle has begun.

By arrangement with the Russians and AFHQ the orders would, _____ release, _____ broadcast in German _____ all available transmissions in Russia, _____ Mediterranean and the UK. All orders should be _____ on the same day _____ impress on _____ German mind the idea of concerted _____ concentration, and so that _____ unity of intention will be manifest. This would _____ immediately followed by a concerted psychological warfare campaign _____ basis that, "the _____ are lost, all is up, _____ yourselves by surrender".

With the fall of Cherbourg and continuing _____ in Italy, _____ timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has been taken in the West. Also if _____ release of these orders occurred several days before _____ surrender of _____ in Roumania, it would give the impression that they had contained _____ results _____ that the occupation of Germany from all _____ is soon to follow.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Chief of Staff approve this proposal.
2. That the cable (Tab A) be approved for despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(Written in pen)

Approved

/s/ W.B.S.

Concurrence:
G-3 (Gen Bull)
Mr. Peake
Mr. Grant.

/s/ _____ M. McCLURE

ROBERT A. _____

Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

CONFIDENTIAL

6 1226

TO: AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONAL

SGD: EISENHOWER

SECRET

It is considered that we are approaching the psychological of the war and a decisive demonstration of military unity between Western, Southern and Eastern fronts may well turn flagging German morale into rapid demoralization. This is likely to be true not only of the German home front but of the German troops, whose relatively high fighting morale recently significant slackening.

It is proposed therefore, that on a date to be synchronized by three headquarters, orders of the day will be issued by General EISENHOWER, Marshall STALIN and MAITLAND-WILSON to their armies. These orders not be identical but would contain the following points: (a) Allied successes on the Eastern, Western, and Southern Fronts, (b) in the face of the combined attack Germany is finished, and the German High Command knows it, (c) the Allied fighting men make a great combined effort to finish the job, (d) into combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm of the industrial workers, (e) the final battle has begun.

These orders, should, ideally, be issued at the same hour, but, short of that, on the same day so that unity of intention will be manifest. They would be immediately followed by a concerted psychological warfare campaign that "the is lost, all is up".

Orders would, on release, be broadcast in German on all available transmissions from Russia, the Mediterranean and the to impress the German the idea of concerted and concentric action.

With the fall of Cherbourg and continuing successes in Italy, ideal timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive when an important objective has been gained in the West a break put from the bridgehead. Also if release of these orders occurred several days before the surrender of Finland or Roumania, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and the occupation of Germany from all soon to follow.

If COS approve this proposal it is requested they secure of the Russians and advice SACMED of the approval proposal.

6 1227
Upon approval, the exact timing of the publication of the three orders

SECRET

Military Missions and to SACMED through British [REDACTED] of Staff.

NEW FOLDER

BEGINS

092.1

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET
PRIORITY

TO : SIXTH ARMY [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] GENERAL
FROM : SHAEP FWD SIGNED SCAEP
REF NO : FWD-16678 CITE SHGEO

It is the consistent policy of the UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM Governments to refuse to recognize territorial changes effected by force or threatened force. ALSACE and LORRAINE should, therefore, be dealt with as an integral part of FRANCE, and German actions to bring them administratively into German system should be disregarded.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS, CWO

INFORMATION : [REDACTED]
G-3
POLITICAL OFFICERS
EACS
MR MURPHY
AB RECORDS

04: [REDACTED]
05: [REDACTED]
06: [REDACTED]

FS OUT 4222 2 Oct 44 2056A HFK/ee NO: FWD-16678
TOD: 021845A

SECRET

6 1229

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602-3146 File No.

1207

2 OCT.

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SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

5. THE

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SEP-07 PMT 20/AB
LOC 180150A SEPT
7w 180700a SEPT

SECRET

• 572 I N T E R

1994: 141

04551194 1994 024 1-0594:1442-1512 JPN J APPL PHYS 62 25 1994

ING FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

SHARP MAIN FOR LINE AND COAG/L,
COMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED KINGDOM
SASH SECTION FOR BURNING CASES OF
SHARP

33: 50

100-92291, 27. SEPTEMBER 1944, CITE: 6540
GOV-113.

Reference GOV. 105.

Policy towards French and Belgian Provinces
which GERMANY has attempted to annex.

Assumption you have made as stated in
FOG-132 is correct.

Requested you forward copy of public announcement when it is made.

GOV 105 1s Ref No W-85403, PS IN 4677, 8/9/44, 6-5
VOG 132 1s Ref No W-85430, PS OUT 2009, 10/9/44, 6-5

ACTION : 0-5

INFORMATION: SES
POLITICAL OFFICERS
6 1230
4-S
5-2

G-2
FBI
G-4
BOS
AD RECORDS

PS IN 6363 18 Sep 44 1040A N/11 REF NO: WK-32291

~~121~~ CDA DET

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THE VOLUME OF THE JOURNAL AND OF THE METHODS IS FORTHCOMING

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

FOR INFO : HILDRING AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
SHAF MAIN FOR G-5

FROM : SHAF FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : FWD-14430

VOG 132

Reference GOV 105.

1. I have assumed that the policy stated for ALSACE and LORRAINE applies equally for EUPEN and MALMEDY so far as BELGIUM is concerned. Instructions covering ALSACE, LORRAINE, EUPEN and MALMEDY have been issued.

2. It is planned to make public announcement at an early date limited to UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM policy regarding these specific provinces.

GOV 105 1s Ref No. W-26405-PS IN 4677, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS, WO. USA.
INFORMATION : SGS COORDINATED WITH: CHIEF OF STAFF
G-1 G-3
G-2 PWD
G-3
G-4
PWD
EACS
POL OFF
AG RECORDS

F'S OUT 2009

10 SEPT 1944 1700B BFK/jap

REF NO: FWD 14430
TOO: 101530B

6 1231

SECRET

COPY NO.

2

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Q U E R Y

P R E O R I T Y

TO : CG NORTHERN GROUP OF ARMIES
FOR INFO : CG CENTRAL GROUP OF ARMIES AND SHAFF ■■■■ FOR G-5
FROM : SHAFF FORWARD, SIGNED SCAMP
REF NO : FWD-14428 CITE: SHGE

1. It is the consistent policy of the UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM governments to refuse to recognize territorial changes effected by force or threatened force. SUFFEN and MALMEDY should therefore be dealt with as an integral part of BELGIUM and GERMAN actions to bring them administratively into the GERMAN system should be disregarded.

to LUXEMBOURG. 2. This principle of course applies also

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS, NO. USA.

INFORMATION 1 SGS✓
G-3
POL OFF
EACS
PWD
G-1
G-2
G-4
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

COORD WITH: CHIEF OF STAFF
G-3
PWD

3 DUT 2011 10 SEPT 1944 1656B HFK/j6p REF NO: FWD 14428
700: 101630H

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SHAFK D

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

S E C R E T

P R I O R I T Y

TO : CENTRAL GROUP OF ARMIES (COMMANDING GENERAL)
FOR INFO : COMMANDING GENERAL NORTHERN GROUP OF ARMIES
SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5
FROM : SHAEP FORWARD, SIGNED SCAEP
REF NO : FWD-14429 CITE: SHGE

1. It is the consistent policy of the UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM governments to refuse to recognize territorial changes effected by force or threatened force. ALSACE and LORRAINE should, therefore, be dealt with as an integral part of FRANCE, and GERMAN actions to bring them administratively into the GERMAN system should be disregarded.

2. In conjunction with General KOENIG we are attempting to obtain the services of 20 French officers now in NORTH AFRICA to assist in the French administration of ALSACE and LORRAINE.

3. The principles outlined in paragraph 1 above apply also to LUXEMBOURG.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS, WO. USA.

INFORMATION : SGE
G-3
POLITICAL OFFICERS
EACS
FWD
AG RECORDS

COORD WITH: CHIEF OF STAFF
G-3
FWD

PS OUT 2010 10 SEPT 1944 1658B HFK/jdp REF NO: FWD 14429
TOO: 1016308
COPY NO

SECRET

[illegible]

TAB D

TO ACTION: NORTHERN GROUP - ARMIES
TO FOR INFO: CENTRAL GROUP - ARMIES
FROM: STAFF FORWARD - EISENHOWER

SECRET PRIORITY

1. It is the consistent policy of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to refuse to recognize territorial changes effected by threatened force. EUPEN and MALSÉVY be dealt with as an integral part of Belgium. German actions to bring them administratively into the German system should be disregarded.

2. This principle of applies to LUXEMBOURG.

(T-6 DT-6)

(4)

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

Our Governments' forces are liberating
ALSACE and LORRAINE (EUREN and MALASUD) from the enemy,
declare that any claim the enemy may have made on these
territories belong to them is devoid of all foundation.

These are regarded as an integral part of
(BELGIUM).

It is a part of the mission of our armies to
drive the enemy from these provinces and restore them to
their mother country.

ST
(T-1-E-7-6)

1237

X

(3)

TO FOR ACTION: [REDACTED] OCS

FROM:

SHAWT SIGNED [REDACTED]

SECRET

PRIORITY

Reference GOV 105

4. I have assumed that the policy stated for ALSACE and LORRAINE applies equally for RUEN and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BELGIUM is concerned. Instructions covering ALSACE, LORRAINE, RUEN and BELGIUM have [REDACTED] issued.

It is planned to make public announcement [REDACTED] an early date limited to UNITED STATES-UNITED [REDACTED] policy regarding these specific provinces.

b 1236

1222

FORWARD

FORWARD

SECRET**SECRET****SHAEF**

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 062301Z Sept

SHAEF FWD 251/07
TOR 071727B Sept
hgt 080330**SECRET****PRIORITY**

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS
 TO FOR ACTION : FWD FOR SEGE
 FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN FOR SHOE AND GCAC/L
 REF : WX-26405, 06 Sept 1944, CITE:
 GOV 105

Subject is status of ALSACE

1. It has been the consistent policy of the UNITED STATES and KINGDOM to refuse to recognize territorial changes effected by force or threat of force.

2. ALSACE and therefore, be dealt with as integral parts of FRANCE, actions to bring them administratively into system should be disregarded.

3. If you deem it appropriate from a military or psychological standpoint, you public announcement embodying the above UNITED and policy with respect to and LORRAINE.

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
 G-3
 G-4
 POLITICAL OFFICERS
 G-1

SUMMARY
AD RECORDS

TS IN 4677

8 Sep 44

0409B

M/1F

REF NO: WX-26405

SECRET**SECRET**

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SECRET NO. 0524

10

See (10)
 (Tab "A" to 10)

11

NEW FOLDER

BEGINS

123

INVASION CURRENCY

VOL: 2

HEADQUARTERS C.A.J.A.

ROUTINE MESSAGE

FROM
UAGP

TO: 231900C AUG

ONLY 02/24
TOR 240439Z AUG
JAB 240500Z

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

FROM : BERCOMB FROM ROYHILL

TO : [REDACTED] G-4 [REDACTED]

REF NO : HCCC/305/00/93 23 AUGUST 1945

[REDACTED] & accounts [REDACTED] No further deficiencies. This
is final progress report.

ACTION : G-4 (U)

INFORMATION : 363

CA 15 1535 24 AUG 45 GJ/bvc 0800B REF NO: HCCC/305/00/93

12:10
UNCLASSIFIED

565-
File No. 123

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARDIZATION C.A.I.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAGE

2516000 AUG

1/2
TCE 240330 AUG
Jab 240300

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : CPA CALA BELGIUM
TO : CALA G-5 FINANCE
REF NO : 22505 25 AUGUST 1945

With great difficulty [redacted] arranged additional credit of 300,000,000 Belgian francs under old arrangement for credit for currency [redacted] which [redacted] without any immediate counterpart payment in dollars and sterling. Currency section definitely closing August 31.

You can appreciate feeling of [redacted] on [redacted] part of the Belgian Gov [redacted] which is large [redacted] UK and US when [redacted] lease was abruptly stopped Tuesday morning with no prior notice nor word [redacted] appreciation for [redacted] unproportionately large benefits that they have given through [redacted] aid [redacted] pay of troops.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : [redacted]

6 1241

GA IN 1339 24 AUG 45 GZ/bva 0800B REF NO: 2-2505

CONFIDENTIAL

23 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Nathan.

SUBJECT: Directive for Implementing the Payment of
Adjustment Funds to US Military Personnel.

1. Attached is a telegram describing the disposal of adjustment funds. Para 1 describes the cash benefits and the remaining relate to administrative matters. There is no question regarding the origin of the funds beyond the fact that the French Government will place them at the disposal of the US Government, although this (and the reference to a total amount in para 7) might refer merely to the provision of financial cash, though the tone of para 1 suggests that it is a French gift.

2. Attached also is a copy of the Stars and Stripes of 21 August which contains an article (page 1 and 8) giving particulars of the cash bonus and of the benefits to accrue to US troops. The article indicates that the matter was originated by the US Fiscal Director and then negotiated by the US Treasury. From the Statement by Colonel Phaulkner, it appears that the benefits are definitely a gift from the French Government, not repayable by the US Government nor accountable under lend/lease.

E. A. B. HENNING,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.
Secretary, General Staff.

b 1242

File No. 123

23 August

(25)

~~SECRET~~
INCOMING MESSAGE

1235
TOS 180007Z AUG

CALA 03/20
TCN 200845B AUG
sub 200900B

~~SECRET~~
ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM SSKVFS
TO : ACTION : USFET REAR
FOR INFO : USFET MAIN, CALA, BASE
REF NO : WJ-50763 August, 1945

CITE: SHFET

This is para 1 W-30364, provided for immediate establishment of working arrangements directly with Govts of FRANCE, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY and BELGIUM including LUXEMBOURG as well as written agreement with Govt of DENMARK for direct drawings of currency from and return thereof to Govt concerned by US Forces so that upon dissolution of SHAF it would be unnecessary to further combined drawings.

2. Request in W-1500 for authorization CALA to obtain 500,000,000 francs in BELGIUM to provide currency needed requirements US/British approved by War Dept re W-46158 only such drawing was apparently emergency and it appeared alternative procedure could be placed in effect within time available. It is considered undesirable however for CALA to function as medium for drawing currency and War Dept approval is limited to above specific case only.

3. Request arrangements consummated earliest with respective countries mentioned para 1 that future drawings of currency as required may be made by US Forces direct from Govts concerned. Dept should be kept advised of progress in completing such currency arrangements.

* W-30364 is not identified in CALA SEC files
W-1500 is CA OUT 458 6/8/45 G-5
* W-46158 is not identified in CALA SEC files;

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : G-6

6 1235 20 AUG 45 0930B REF NO: WJ-50763
~~SECRET~~

565-

File No

10041

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

REPORTING MESSAGE

DEFAA

TOO 121630B AUG

QALA 11/13
TOR 131545B AUG
Jab 131550B

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FROM : EXPORT
TO FOR ACTION : QALA C-5 FINANCE BRANCH
FOR INFO : EXPORT MIL GOV 9
REF NO : LAC 592 12 AUGUST 1945

Your HG-1383 ■ 311203R.

Small advances required BELGIUM and HOLLAND until approx
end of August.

Danish currency required until approx end of September.

HG-1383 is CA OUT 349 31/7/45 C-5

ACTION : C-5
INFORMATION : SGS

■ 1244

CA IN 1182

18 AUG 45

G./DVC

16453

REF NO: LAC-792

CONFIDENTIAL

SGS -

File No. 1244

1244

5
(20)

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS C.A.I.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE.

DFAA

TOO 101835B AUGUST

CALA 34/18
TOR 102100B AUGUST
Jmp 102205B

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

FROM : TSFET REAR SIGNED LEE
TO FOR INFO : CALA
REF NO : EX-77960 10 AUGUST 1945

Fiscal Director TSFET proposes to issue the following instructions to Finance Officers:

"Finance Officers may exchange old issue Danish currency (coins not effected) through 31 August 1945 inside European Theater and through 30 September 1945 outside European Theater provided the individual requesting the exchange submits a certificate stating old issue notes acquired legally prior to conversion program #3 to 30 July, giving satisfactory reason for not accomplishing the exchange during conversion period. Such old issue notes with certificates attached will be transferred without delay after redemption to the central disbursing Officer, Continent, Army Post Office 887. There is no time limitation for the notes to be redeemed by the currency section for DENMARK from Finance Officers provided Finance Officers attach a certificate stating all old notes were redeemed from individuals or before 31 August 1945 or 30 September 1945 the may be."

Please confirm by immediate reply if this directive is satisfactory as instructions must be issued promptly by the Fiscal Director to allow adequate time for

6 1245

CA IN 977

RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL

5

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

REF NO: EX-77960

CALE 31/10

dissemination of deadline dates to the field.

OPTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS



CA-17-977

10 AUG

G.S./M

2545B

REF NO: EX-77960

Copy No.

6 1246

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS U.S.A.F.

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 091100Z AUGUST

GALA 3/10
TOR 100952Z AUGUST
MFM 100952Z AUGUST

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : USFET MAIN ST. EISENHOWER
TO FOR ACTION : FOR RICHARDS
FOR INFO : FOR G-1 CENTRAL DISBURSING OFFICER, FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR, GALA, USFET BELGIUM FOR GRANT, ROOMLESS
MARKS BASE, COMNAVFOR LITSIN HALL
REF NO : S-16456 9 AUGUST 1945 CITE: EMAP

1. All day meeting 7th at BRUSSELS with DE SELLINGS, Chief De Cabinet, Belgian Ministry of Finance, and Ansiaux Director of Foreign Exchange Department Banque Nationale Belgique, resulted in following action approved by all parties concerned:

A. Belgian representative agreed to accept letter from Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, the Belgian Minister of Finance follows:

"Monsieur FRANS DE VOGHEL, the Minister of Finance
12 LAY, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM.

Dear Mr Minister:

The Ministry of Finance has, from time, made Belgian franc credits available to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and the winding up of the SHAEF Currency Section for BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, this is to suggest that any and all agreements, insofar as they Belgian currency, now current between the Belgian and LUXEMBOURG SHAEF, and/or Combined Administrative Liquidation Agency, benefit of the armed forces of the UNITED STATES, remain in full force and effect.

CA IN 962

Copy No. 5

6 1247

SECRET

303-
File No. 123

SECRET

REF NO

S-16456

9 AUGUST 1945

DATA 1/10

in a request you from 25 August 1945, forward, to place at the disposal of the armed forces of the UNITED STATES such amounts of Belgian franc currency as the Theater Fiscal Director, an officer designated by him, declares necessary for the use of the armed forces of the United States in BELGIUM and in LUXEMBOURG in such denominations, such types, and at such places as we shall request. It is further requested that the Belgian francs required by the armed forces of the UNITED STATES be placed to their credit in the Banque Nationale De Belgique in the name of Lieutenant M P PATTERSON, treasury symbol number 212-379, Central Disbursing (Continent), APO 887, United States Army. Belgian francs deemed excess the needs of the armed forces of the UNITED STATES will, from time to time, be returned to you through the account as designated above. The Belgian franc requirements of the armed forces of the UNITED STATES should be reviewed periodically by the Theater Fiscal Director and your representative.

The armed forces of the UNITED STATES will continue, through the channels heretofore been used by them, to notify the appropriate authorities of the War Department of each withdrawal and/or return to Belgian franc currency. In order to provide the Treasury Department of the UNITED STATES with a parallel advice, I should appreciate your instructing the Banque Nationale De Belgique that each withdrawal and/or return of Belgian franc currency be reported by your representative of the Treasury Department of the UNITED STATES at the American Embassy in Brussels.

Assuring you, etc."

B. During conversations the Belgian representative again raised the politically important local question of reducing outstanding bank note circulation. To accomplish this, the Belgian Ministry proposes to draw Treasury checks (Mandats De Tresor), on the Banque Nationale De Belgique in favor of PATTERSON. The Mandats De Tresor can be endorsed by PATTERSON to any Army Finance or Navy Disbursing Officer in BELGIUM and will be cashable on demand at any of the 42 branches of the Banque Nationale De Belgique. Finance Officers in BELGIUM will maintain backlogs in these checks and thereby reduce their balances in actual franc currency. The balances on hand will be reported by the Disbursing Officers separated as to actual cash currency and checks. It was made clear to Belgian representatives that no Mandats De Tresor in hands of PATTERSON Disbursing Officers will represent a claim on the United States Government for dollars. It is hoped that this procedure will reduce substantially the amount of Belgian franc balances held by United States Army and Navy Disbursing Officers in BELGIUM. The operating details have been worked out by Theater Fiscal representative with Belgian representatives. Belgian representatives have agreed that present arrangements for obtaining Belgian franc currency will continue for United States Army Navy Finance Officers outside BELGIUM through PATTERSON may be deemed necessary by Theater Fiscal.

962

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SECRET

SECRET

REF NO

: S-16456

9 AUGUST 1945

CALA 3/10

0. In view of letter from Secretary of Treasury originally requesting Belgian Government to advance Belgian franc currency to SHANP for United States Army requirements, Belgian representatives have requested letter from United States Treasury, acknowledging the United States Forces, European Theater instructions set forth in (A) above and designation of CALA as successor to SM T. MARKS, United States Treasury representative in BRUSSELS, in cabling Belgian request to United States Treasury. Belgian Ministry of Finance is requesting similar letter from British Treasury acknowledging CALA as successor to SHANP to receive advances for British Army.

1. Based on 30 June figures now available, recommend additional certification to Belgians of 6,500,000 dollars without reference to any specific period makes 30,000,000 dollars certified.

2. MARKS and FARMINGTON request contents this cable be advised United States Treasury and War Treasury directly to MARKS in BRUSSELS last sentence, last paragraph of USFST letter.

3. The letter set forth in paragraph 1 A above, has been cleared in its final form with representatives Theater Fiscal, United States Treasury, CALA, SHANP Currency Section for BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, Senior Disbursing Officer in BRUSSELS and Central Disbursing Officer (Continent). Accordingly, it is requested that War Department earliest authorize USFST (Main) attention G-1, info to USFST (Rear) for Fiscal Director and for HQAFM, to send letter to Belgian Minister of Finance.

4. Details concerning other proposals made by Belgians, turned down by US, prior to their acceptance of present arrangements, will be forwarded as a matter of record by air courier.

5. Request confirmation upon payment of certification recommended in paragraph 2 above.

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : 308

GA IN 962 10 Aug 45 1145B GWW/rt REF NO: S-16456

6 1213

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 071223Z

ON 29/08
TO: 091200Z AUG
INFO: 091210Z AUG

THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF A TEST (R&R) INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGAR ■■■ MARSHALL
TO FOR ACTION : TEST R&R
PASSED TO : CALA ■■■ INFORMATION
REF NO : 4-45317 7 AUGUST 1946

Answer to ■■■ questions follow.

Reference our ■■■ 4-50364, also reference your radio
S-74944 and teletype conversations with Col. FROZHEIMER.

1. The ■■■ reciprocal of the Danish ■■■ is .156124.
2. Treasury and War Departments are willing to leave it to Theater decision whether currency arrangements with NORWAY should be on a cash purchase or net troop pay basis. However, if cash purchasing basis is adopted, currency arrangements ■■■ Norwegian Government should include agreement for repurchase by NORWAY of excess income and should give complete protection in case of devaluation similar to that to be provided by Danish agreement.
3. Refer reports of currency withdrawals and returns from the field. The War Department does not consider it desirable that Treasury representatives ■■■ act in a reporting capacity, as recommended by you. It is felt desirable, however, to revise procedure recommended in 4-50364 so that government concerned reports withdrawals and returns directly to Theater Fiscal Director who will check this against individual Finance Officers reports ■■■ reconciled statement of withdrawal or ■■■ directly to War Department through usual channels. This will enable any necessary corrections ■■■ be made by ■■■ Fiscal Director prior to reporting such withdrawals or returns to ■■■ Department.

CA TH 906

COPY NO.

6-1070

SECRET

SECRET

REF NO: W-45317

DATE: 29/08

4. Request confirmation of procedure adapted reference paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Upon receipt of such confirmation by the Department Office of Fiscal Director, Army Service Forces, will provide Fiscal Director European Theater of Operations with instructions relative to procedure to be followed in reconciling the drawings and returns reported to him by Finance Officers and government concerned.

W-30364 is not identified in CALA Files.
E-74944 is CA OUT 382 2/8/45 G-1 COM ZONE.

ACTION : G-1 (COM ZONE).

INFORMATION :
G-1
G-5

CA IN 906 ■ AUG 45 +545B SU/aeu REF. NO. W-45317

6 1251

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SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : CALA
TO : AGWAR FOR OGS

REF NO : H3-1536

TOO: 071708B

Ref our H3-1500 dated 14 Aug. War Office
concurred. We await your reply urgently.

H3-1500 is CA OUT 458, 6/8/45, G-5.

ORIGINATOR : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS

AUTHENTICATION: C.C. WEST
Colonel

CA OUT 487 8 Aug 45 1104B GWW/ft

REF NO: H3-1536
TOO: 071708B

Copy No.

CONFIDENTIAL

1252

CONFIDENTIAL

505-

File No. 123

CONFIDENTIAL CALA G-5/FIS/3/5

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : C.A.L.A. G-5
TO : AQWAR FOR COS
FOR INFO : AMBRO FOR COS : UNREF MAIN FOR G-5 FINANCIAL
CA/G-5 MISSIONS BELGIUM
REF. NO. : HQ-1500 TCO : 061117B

Ref. UNREF Telegram S-15010 dated 1 AUGUST
our HQ-1377 dated 31 JULY not to AQWAR.

Unless further credit obtained Currency Section
Funds will be insufficient for requirements to meet AUGUST.
Request authority sought be granted earliest possible.
Belgian Finance Minister has indicated view that the next
proposed Credit of FRANKS 500,000,000 should be lost to be
granted for Currency Section and that future arrangements
should be with FISCAL/PAY Services of Armies direct.

S-15010 is not identified in CALA SEC Files.)
HQ-1377 is CA OUT 339 31/7/45 G-5.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: H.M. HINDS
INFORMATION : SGS BRIG.

CA OUT 458 6 AUG '45 1325B SU/acw REF. NO. HQ-1500
TCO: 061117B

COPT NO. 5

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

6 1253

Serial No: 4 Asst Sec

CONFIDENTIAL

505-

File No. 13

60045

(15)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS G.A.L.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

DPAA

TOO 0411408

DATA 28/5
DOB: 0514333 AUGUST
DOB: 0514108

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

FROM : USFET MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER
TO FOR ACTION : CIA FOR G-5 FOR FINANCE
FOR INFO : CG USFET REAR FOR US FINANCIAL DIRECTOR
REF NO : S-15466, 4 AUGUST 1945.

CITE: STGBO.

Reference your HQ1383.

Col CARL FROGENIMER, Jr, Chief Foreign Financial Branch
Budget Division, WD, now on TD this Theater, advises he will confer with
your office concerning further advances for Russian FPs and DPAs.

HE-1383 is CA OUT 349 31/7/45 G-5.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : S38

CA IN 827 5 AUG 15300 SU/sov REF. NO. S-15466.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SGS-

File No. 44

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS G.A.L.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

WARCP

200 031800A AUGUST

DATA 6/6
FOR 061202B AUGUST
EMB 061215B

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : WAR OFFICE
TO FOR ACTION : DATA FOR G-5 FINANCE BRANCH
FOR INFO : USFET MAIN, AMEMB
REF NO : 16/AMB/2406 P-5, 3 AUGUST 1945.

Your HQ-1377 cipher 31 July.

Agreed, if it is not yet possible for pay services to draw
direct from Belgian Government and for Currency to dissolve. Op-
erations would of be simultaneous.

HQ-1377 in CA OUT 339 31/7/45 G-5.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : 808

CA IN 841 6AUG'45 1320B GU/aw REF. NO: 16/AMB/2406 P-5.

COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING SLIP

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET
ROUTINE

THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF A USFET REAR OUTGOING

FROM : USFET REAR FROM PFORZHEIMER SIGNED EISENHOWER
TO : AGWAR FOR RICHARDS
PASSED TO : CALA FOR INFO
: E-74944 ECO: 3117362

Subject is currency relations of United States Forces in the field with France.

Reference WAR-30364, have today completed final subject arrangements with French Finance Ministry. Prior to its presentation final draft of proposed letter from HQ USFET to French Treasury cleared with Theater Fiscal, SHAFF Currency Section for FRANCE, Treasury Representative, Chief Disbursing Officer COMNAVFORFRANCE, and CALA.

Accordingly it is requested that War Department earliest authorize USFET Main, attention G-1, info to USFET Rear for Fiscal Director and Pforzheimer send letter to Ministry of Finance, Rue de Rivoli, attention M. Jacques Brunet, Director of the Treasury, as follows:

"Reference is made to paragraph 1 of memorandum No. 11, 'Relating to Currency', of 15 August 1944.

"With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and the winding up of the SHAFF Currency Section for FRANCE, this is to advise you that any and all agreements under said memorandum 11 now current between the French Government and SHAFF, and/or the Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency, for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the United States, remain in full force and effect.

"With reference to paragraph 5 of memorandum No. 11, this is to request you from 15 August 1945, forward, to place at the disposal of the Armed Forces of the United States such amounts of French franc currency as the Theater Fiscal Director declares necessary for the use of the American Armed Forces in Continental France in such denominations, such types, and at such places as we shall request. It is further requested that the French franc

CA OUT 382

SECRET

Copy No.

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1 Sec

6 1258

See (17)

REF NO: E-74944

FOO: 311736Z

required by the Armed Forces of the United States to be placed to their credit in the Bank of France in the account of Lt. Col M.P. PATTERSON, Treasury Symbol No 242-379, Central Disbursing Office, Continent, APO 887, U. S. Army French francs as needed to the needs of the Armed Forces of the United States will, from time to time, be returned to you through the account designated above.

"The Armed Forces of the United States will continue, through the same channels that have heretofore been used by them, to notify the appropriate authorities of the War Department of each withdrawal and/or return of French franc currency. In order to provide the Treasury Department of the United States with a parallel advice, it is requested that each withdrawal and/or return of French franc currency be advised by you to the Representative of the Treasury Department of the United States at the American Embassy in Paris.

Assuring you et cetera".

Mr. Bull requests Treasury be advised contents of this cable and that they furnish him directly with confirmation last sentence last paragraph of letter.

W-30364 is not identified in CALA SMO files.

ORIGINATOR : G-4 (Com Z)

INFORMATION : SGS
G-4
G-5



CA OUT 382 2 Aug 45 1145B SU/pt REF NO: E-74944
FOO: 311736Z

-2-
SECRET

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CALA/G-5/7/45

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

FROM : CALA G-5 FINANCE BRANCH
TO : USFET MAIN: EXFOR
FOR INFO : USFET REAR FOR US FISCAL DIRECTOR
REF NO : HQ-4383 TO: 311203B

1. Winding up of Currency Sections in Liberated Countries will require termination of agreement between DR/US and USSR in respect Currency Advances in those countries to liberated Soviet citizens per GOV 300 and para 4 GOV 419.

2. Kindly advise whether Russians will require further advances for their liberated POW and DP's in Liberated Countries.

3. If further advances required as in para 2 may we be advised earliest to dates for each Liberated Country when these advances to Russians per GOV 300 may cease.

GOV 3 is not identified in CALA SHC files. x
GOV 419 is CA IN 478, 28/7/45, G-5. x not SHC

ORIGINATOR : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS

AUTHENTICATION: C.O. WEST
Colonel

CA OUT 349 31 July 45 1647B GTR/26 REF NO: HQ-4383
TO: 311203B

Copy No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

6 1258

CONFIDENTIAL

See (20)

Copy No 4. Asst Sec.

SGS-
File No. 23

8/1/45
191

83

CALL G-5 11/17/10

HEADQUARTERS G-5-1-1

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : G-5 FINANCE BRANCH
TO : USFET MAIN: AMSSO FOR BCS
FOR INFO : USFET REAR
REF NO : HG-1302 TOC: 311231B

1. Request you forward following to GCS and request instructions for G-5.
2. POLISH and BELGIAN Pay Services have become Creditors of Currency Section NETHERLANDS due to making refunds in excess of total advances received from that Sec. Respective credits 5,340,143 Fls and 214,213 Fl.
3. Some suggested possible causes of excess refunds are:
 - (a) undisclosed captured or seized enemy funds.
 - (b) sales of military or captured enemy supplies.
 - (c) deposits with Paymasters of funds acquired above by soldiers.
 - (d) exchanges between currencies.
- Both Pay Services are debtors of both FRENCH and BELGIAN Currency Secs.
4. General question of desirability of incidental or deliberate creation of such credit balances referred for your consideration. Reference to Pay Services as to cause of excesses could carry implication of possible irregular acquisition and has NOT been made.
5. Currency Sections have been instructed to accept all refunds by a Pay Service and to place any credit balances in separate accounts "Reimbursement by Pay Service in Excess of Advances (Sources Undetermined)".
6. Subject your instructions G-5 proposes when ordered to wind up Currency Sections to

GA OUT 348

Copy No.

5

6 1253

SECRET

Copy 1 - Rear Sec.

File No. 123

215 245

HEADQUARTERS G.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : G.A.L.A. G-5 FINANCE BRANCH
TO : USFET MAIN: AMSSO FOR BCS
FOR INFO : USFET REAR
REF NO : HG-1582

TOO: 311231B

1. Request you forward following to CDS and request instructions for G.A.L.A.

2. POLISH and BELGIAN Pay Services have become Creditors of Currency Section NETHERLANDS due to making refunds in excess of total advances received from that Sec. Respective credits 5,340,143 Fls and 214,213 Fl.

3. Some suggested possible causes of excess refunds are:

- (a) undisclosed captured or seized enemy funds.
- (b) sales of military or captured enemy supplies.
- (c) deposits with Paymasters of funds acquired as above by soldiers.
- (d) exchanges between currencies.

Both Pay Services are debtors of both FRENCH and BELGIAN Currency Secs.

4. General question of desirability of incidental or deliberate creation of such credit balances referred for your consideration. Reference to Pay Services as to cause of excesses could carry implication of possible irregular acquisition and has NOT been made.

5. Currency Sections have been instructed to accept all refunds by a Pay Service and to place any credit balances in separate accounts "Reimbursement by Pay Service in Excess of Advances (Sources Undetermined)".

6. Subject your instructions G.A.L.A. proposes when ordered to wind up Currency Sections to

GA OUT 348

-1-

Copy No.

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6 1259

Copy no 4 and Sec.

SECRET

SOS -

File No. 23

copy 4 and Sec.

S E C R E T

REF NO: HG-1382

FOO: 311231B

- (a) Transfer any such credit balances to Liberated Government of concerned currency.
- (b) Notify Liberated Govt and Creditor Allied Pay Service that such action is without prejudice to settlement by future negotiation between Govts concerned.

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: C.C. Colonel

INFORMATION : SGS



CA OUT 348 31 July 45 1640B GWS/24 REF NO: HG-1382
FOO: 311231B

Copy No.

-2-

S E C R E T

1250

CONFIDENTIAL

C. L. G-5/PM/3/3

RE: DEPARTERS C-1-L-A.

QUAGONE MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : C.A.L. G-5 FIELD NO. 1545B
TO : WYATT BAIN: AUSSO FOR DOR
FOR INFO : C. L. G-5 MISSION BELGIUM
R P NO : HC 1377 T00: 311040B

1. In absence C.A.L. Directive request you request OOS empower Head of C.A.L. to replace SOAEP = authority for obtaining FRANC credits in BELGIUM on same basis as heretofore as needed for requirements BR/US Forces and liberated Soviet citizens.

2. Finance Minister BELGIUM has been informed as above but now desires confirmation that basis of original arrangement applies.

3. Matter urgent re Currency Section funds sufficient only to meet known requirements one week. Initial credit needs under C.A.L. authority will be 500 millions.

ORIGINATOR : G-5

ADPH REPLICATION: C. G. WEST
COL:

INFORMATION : GGS

600 (12) (14)

CA-OUT 339 31 July 45 C. L. G-5 1545B

REF NO: 13-1377
T00: 311040B

6 12 61

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to 4 to desk Rec CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 5

SGS-

File No. 123

05132004

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

SGS-

File No. 123

FROM : C.A.L.A. G-5 FINANCE BRANCH
TO : CA/G-5 MISSIONS BELGIUM FOR FINANCIAL BRANCH
FOR INFO : USPT-EATN USPT-REAR
REF : ID-1361 TOO:301610B

Reference your B-1295.

Col. FROZHEIMER of US War Dept confirms visit
planned BRUSSELS first week Aug 45 for discussions re currency
matters US Forces in BELGIUM. LT-Col DEET Office Fiscal
Director Capt. ASHLEY CALA will accompany.

B-1295 is CA IN 467 28/7/45 G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS

AUTHENTICATION: C.G. WEST
Colonel.

CA OUT 328

31 July 45

1140B

SU/mm REF:ID-1361
TOO:301610B

6 1262

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

CONFIDENTIAL

200-123

CONFIDENTIAL

READ JOURNALS C.I.A.L.A.

ROUTINE MESSAGE

JHAR

TO: 271955Z JULY

CALA 10/28

FOR: 280915Z JUNE

FOR: 280915Z JUNE

This message will not be distributed outside British or US Government Departments or Hqs, or re-transmitted even in cipher, without being paraphrased.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

TO: AGWAR

TO FOR ACTION: CALA

FOR INFO: USMPT FOR G-5 AND UK BAST SECTION FOR COAC/L. LAD. AMSSO FOR H

REF NO: WX-39460 27 JULY 1945.

GOV - 419.

French franc advances by CALA G-5 Financial Branch FRANCE to NETHERLANDS authorities.

1. In view dissolution SRA P, instructions mentioned para 2 VOG-552 approved for guidance CALA, re GOV-405.

2. According to French Govt request, CALA G-5 Financial Branch FRANCE should make no further franc advances to Liaison Officers Allied Nations other than UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM and USSR. You should notify representatives of other Governments. Latter should make arrangements for drawing francs directly with French Govt, re para 2 GOV-182 and para 2 GOV-500.

3. Policy para 2 above will also extend to currency issued by other CALA Country Financial Branches with exception of GERMANY. You should so notify representatives of governments requiring such currency.

4. In view of UNITED STATES - UNITED KINGDOM agreement with USSR to make currency advances as required to liberated Soviet citizens, procedure GOV-500 whereby vouchers evidencing such advances turned over to appropriate country Currency Section for reimbursement should be continued by G-5 Financial Branch CALA. Advice requested whether Russians will require further advances for their liberated prisoners of war and displaced persons in liberated countries.

6 1263.

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply to letter from French Treasury mentioned para 3

CA 11, 4/5

6 1264

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
-2-
COPY No.

00766-XX :ON AIR 11/00 25101 54 AIR 28 827 NI VI



APPROVED DIS: - 3085 2/8/45

925 : NOIRVHVOH

5-0 : NOHON

105-552 : you should be mailed by "registered mail"

REF NO: 19460 27 JUN 1975 0416 10/28

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS G.A.L.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

Yolande Belgium

TOO 271200 JULY

GALA 24/28
TOR 230650Z JULY
EXP 280710Z JULY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~PRIORITY~~

FROM : CA/G-5 DIV MISSIONS BELGIUM
TO : G-5 PINANON GALA
REF NO : B-1295 1945.

Belgian Ministry of Finance and National Bank desire commence currency dealings directly with armed forces at earliest convenience.

Brig GRAY last Monday for discussion and Brig LIGHTFOOT of Army Group arriving immediately. Belgian Govt would appreciate Gen COOPER coming here for discussions and if possible to be accompanied by Mr FORBES of US War Dept concerning whose visit they were cabled to by WASHINGTON over fortnight ago.

Please advise.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS

6 1285

CA IN 467 28 July 45 0845B GWA/rt REF NO: B-1295

Copy No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SGS-

File No. 123

27084

3

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

UAGP

TOC 241515B JULY

CALA 160/25
TOR 252325B JULY
mtw 252325B JULY

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FROM : EXFOR

TO FOR ACTION : ADM FIRST GEN ARMY, 1 CORPS DIST, 8 CORPS DIST,
30 CORPS DIST, L OF C, GED TFS, BRIT TFS BERLIN,
79 ARMED DIV, 4 L OF C SUB AREA, 8 BASR SUB AREA,
BRIT MIL MISSION (DENMARK), BRIT ARMY STAFF PARIS,
CONTROL COMMISSION GERMANY (BRIT ELEMENT),
SPECIAL SCHEDULE CONTROL COMMISSION

FOR INFO : B N C IN C G, ADM BATO, CALA, EPHEIVE

REF NO : A/ORG/230 24 JULY 1945

Subject: Conversion Danish Currency.

1. Commencing 23 July 1945, all denominations of Danish kroner notes are being converted by order of Danish Government.

2. Coin is not affected.

3. All Danish kroner notes incl Allied Military kroner, in possession of troops will be exchanged forthwith for new type of currency subject overriding maximum of 1000 kroner per individual and normal exchange certificate.

4. Amounts in excess of 1000 kroner will require production of satisfactory proof of origin before exchange is made.

5. Exchanges must be completed by midnight 30 July 1945.

6-1266
CA 15 367

RESTRICTED

SGS

File No. 23

23 JUL 1945

RESTRICTED

REF NO : A/ORG/230 21 JULY 1945

6. Notes tendered for exchange after midnight
30 July 1945, will require special CO's certificate explaining
reason for delay and origin.

ACTION : 0-5

INFORMATION : 668



GA 367 26 July 45 0845B GWT/ft REF NO: A/ORG/230

-2-

6 1267

RESTRICTED

GALIC/0-5/P 18/5

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FROM : C.A.L.A. 0-5
TO : CHIEF MISSION (DENMARK) 0-5
FOR INFO : AGENT FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
FOR PERSONAL DIRECTOR, EXFOR FOR PAY.
REF : ID-4191 000:231530B

Request you approach DANISH Minister of Finance.

A. Inform him the Currency Section, DENMARK, continues, until it is wound up, to be responsible for providing DANISH kroner required by Allied Armed Forces previously under command of SCAPF.

B. Heretofore a credit of 100 million kroner made available to Supreme Commander, AEF for Currency Section, DENMARK, by the DANISH Government, without prejudice to ultimate settlement which will be subject of discussion between the Governments concerned. Request arrangement whereby unused balance of above credit required the purposes indicated in para A would be authorized the Head, Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency. Agency has set up by the BRITISH/US Governments to assume responsibilities of the former Supreme Commander continuing in Liberated Countries including Currency Sections.

C. Such additional credits as approved by C.A.A. would be made available to the Allied Armed Forces by Credits with the DANISH National Bank to the Currency Section, DENMARK as in the past.

ORIGINATOR : 0-5

AUTHENTICATION: C.C. WEST
Colonel

INFORMATION : 008
CA OUT 170 24 July 45 1134B

REF: ID-4191
TOO: 231530B
Copy No.

SGS-

File No. 123

23-104

5

(3)

Copy of this to the Head of the...

Sgt. F.C.

1. Galt
1. can claim
1. Speed.

Headquarters
Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency.

MEMORANDUM TO G-4.

Reference request from the U.S. side of HMAF for a contribution of \$50 towards the erection of a tablet in the School at HMAF to commemorate the signing of the surrender. I have received the following comment from Mr Eric Speed, R.U.S. (Finance), War Office :-

" As regards your problem, I agree that the British cost of this tablet should be paid from Public Votes. I take it that the work is being carried out by the Americans and that they will pay the bill to the contractors. It will then be for them to claim a repayment of half the bill either in London or at HMAF. If they claim it in London we will pay it. If they claim it at HMAF Lightfoot can pay it from 21 Army Group. "

(Sd) H. M. GALE

18 July 1945.

Major-General,
Head of Agency.

6 1269

SGS -

File No. 22

18 July 1945

(50)

COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE
LIQUIDATING AGENCY
G-6 Division
Finance Branch

CONFIDENTIAL
17 July 1948

CALA/G-6/CIN/2/5

SUBJECT : Provision of Funds for Currency Section,
Belgium and Luxembourg.

TO : Head, CALA
Attn: SGS

1. Hitherto bank credits for the above Currency Section have been made available by the Belgian Minister of Finance under an arrangement made with the Supreme Commander, AFR. The Minister now points out that further advances cannot be made under that arrangement in view of the disappearance of SCARF. (Flag "A" refers).

2. Further funds may be required by the Currency Section before it is wound up and, subject to your approval, it is proposed to instruct the Currency Section to approach the Minister of Finance with a view to continuing the arrangement so that future provision of funds will be in the name of Head, CALA.

3. Draft cable is attached at Flag "B".

For Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6

Approved H.M. Gale 17/17208 July

CCW
LOA

C.C. #1ST
Colonel
Chief, Finance Branch

Tab A to be signed prior to
dispatch

6 1270



TO: [REDACTED] BELGIUM FOR G-5

INFO: [REDACTED] FOR CCS FOR CCAC: AMESO [REDACTED] BCS: CG USFET FOR

[REDACTED] FISCAL DIRECTOR: EXFOR PAY

Request you approach Minister [REDACTED] Finance.

A. Inform [REDACTED] the currency section, Belgium and Luxembourg continues until it is wound up to be responsible for providing Belgian [REDACTED] required by the Allied Armed Forces.

B. Heretofore the Minister of Finance has made [REDACTED] available to [REDACTED] Supreme Commander, AEF, [REDACTED] requested, by credits [REDACTED] account "A", currency section Belgium and Luxembourg. Request continuance of arrangement by which future credits required by the currency section for purposes indicated in para "A" would be authorized by the Head of the Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency. This agency has been set up by [REDACTED] BR/US Govts to assume responsibilities of the former Supreme Commander continuing in [REDACTED] Countries including currency sections.

C. Such additional credits as are approved by CALA would be made available to the Allied Armed Forces by credits to the current account "A", currency section, Belgium and Luxembourg with the Banque Nationale in the same manner as in the past.

D. We have conveyed to the BR/US per services the Belgian Govts request that surplus Belgian Poin be returned and we have been assured [REDACTED] is being done to the utmost extent possible.

TAR (8) IV (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS C.A.L.A.

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 151000Z JULY

CALA 10/16
TCR 151607Z JULY
00Z, 161500Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : USFET MAIN [REDACTED] EISENHOWER
TO FOR ACTION : CG COM ZONE FOR CALA
FOR INFO : SHAEP MISSION BELGIUM
REF NO : S-12527 15 JUL 1945 CITE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] following cable received from SHAEP Mission BELGIUM
[REDACTED] forwarded to you:

"Ref your S-82912 dated 23 March.

The further 2 billion franc credit authorized was
not requested [REDACTED] was passed. Present position of Currency
Section APOS E [REDACTED] is approximately 750,000,000 francs.
Ministry of Finance [REDACTED] that after dissolution of SHAEP no further
credits can be granted as formerly in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] Supreme Commander
by credit to current account to Currency Section for BELGIUM [REDACTED]
LUXEMBOURG; therefore please (OK E?) proper authorization for any
additional credits which may be required.

Current demands for Belgian francs continue very
heavy and probably will continue [REDACTED] due to BELGIUM being leave centre.

Cannot Army Groups make some repayment? Please
cable."

Please take [REDACTED] matter with SHAEP Mission BELGIUM and
also ascertain [REDACTED] repayment of Belgian franc [REDACTED] be [REDACTED] from any
military echelon.

S-82912 is not identified in CALA SMO files.

ACTION : G-5

6 1272

ADDED DISTRIBUTION: 938
18/7/45

CA IN 23 16 July 1945 GRW/ft 1600B [REDACTED] NO: S-12527

CONFIDENTIAL

SHAEF

OUTGOING MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

TOO: 031000B

CONFIDENTIAL

6 1273

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO

地址：新加坡，上-1-1，路金源，日本街，自-1-1，第1°路源路

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

-2-

REF NO

: S-95095

OUT 8410

5. Request your instruction

- (a) As to [] reply [] to letter in para 3,
- (b) Whether we should now [] to make any further French franc [] except to US/British pay services,
- (c) Whether any decisions made by you in respect of 5 (b) applies also to [] currency sections.

ORIGINATOR

: G-5


AUTHENTICATION: D S VAUGHAN
MAJOR

INFORMATION

: G-1

G-4

RECORDS



SMC OUT 8410 3 July 1945 1951B EFK/geb

REF NO: S-95095
TOD: 0310008

C O N F I D E N T I A L

B 1274

SECRET

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SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR
T00 242022Z JUNE

557/24
242330Z JUNE

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : ACWAR
TO : MAID, UK BASE
REF NO : WX-21969, 24 JUNE 1945

GOV-387
Reference GOV-322. VOG-444.

Supplies of currency.

In reported increasing scarcity of Reichsmark currency, do you anticipate placing further orders US Treasury Department for production of AM mark currency notes?

GOV 322 (WX 79073) 1b FS 2378 9/5/45 G-5
VOG 444 (FWD 21237) FS OUT 4103 11/5/45 G-5

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : G-4
SGS
SUSPENSE
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 7303 25 June 1945 0031B SL/jes REF NO: WX 21969

6 1275

SECRET

COPY 140

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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

JEQT

SHAEP MAIN 515/20

TOO 201500B JUNE

TOR 202055B JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : SHAEP MISSION DENMARK FROM G-5

TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5 FINANCIAL

REF NO : CR1552, 20 JUNE 1945

Requests received from both British States Legations that their respective treasury drafts be on military rates of exchange.

In view these favourable rates granted specifically for military purposes grateful you indicate action to taken.

DENMARK's National Bank report that arriving from UK possess Allied military rates 24 Kroner to purchased military Sterling.

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13 Jun 45

General Order No. 38

ARMY ORDER

AMERICAN ARMY

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER, 15 JUN 1945, AMERICAN ARMY

By
Lieutenant Colonel J. B. COSSERES, G-2, AF

M. J. [unclear] 48
H. [unclear] ✓

21. FRENCH CURRENCY - NEW ISSUE.

1. A proclamation has been made by the French Government whereby French franc notes of denominations of 50 francs and upwards will be withdrawn from circulation and replaced by a new currency. This includes Allied Military franc notes. Notes and coins of denominations less than 50 francs will remain in circulation.
2. The process of exchange of the old type notes for the new currency in respect of the civil population commences on 4 Jun 45 and ends on 15 Jun 45. Thereafter old type notes value 50 francs and upwards will cease to be legal tender in France.
3. For the purpose of the Allied Expeditionary Force the sterling value of the old and new currency is identical, viz, 200 = £ 1.
4. The exchange of old type notes value 50 francs and over will be effected through the medium of Army Cashiers at the earliest opportunity after the date of the commencement of the change over. No accounting entries are required except that individual exchanges for Officers and OR will be handled as a bulk transaction as laid down in GRC 1049/45.
5. Exchange of notes may not be made through local banks.
6. All ranks are warned that they must on no account effect exchanges on behalf of the civil population. Speculation in exchange is a disciplinary offence and may be subject to trial by Court Martial.

(TO BE REPUBLISHED IN UNIT ORDERS).

J. B. COSSERES,
Lt. Col.
AGC.

DISTRIBUTION: List 'B'

13 June

48

SECRET

SECRET

SHAFF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR CCS
FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BCS: TWENTY FIRST ARMY GROUP REAR
CA: CG TWELFTH ARMY GROUP FOR G-5: SHAFF
G-5
FROM : FORWARD SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-24215 091600Z

VOG 502.

Reference your GOV-358.

To meet urgent requirements for pay of disbanded German troops, we have authorized Twenty One Army Group to use Allied military marks but instructed them to keep issues to minimum pending your reply to our VOG-496.

Similar requirements likely to arise in Twelfth Army Group area.

VOG-496 Ref FWD-23330 is OUT 6171, 3/6/45, G-5.
GOV-358 Ref WX-11995 is PS 1516, 5/6/45, G-5.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 G C PALMER
Captain
INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

PS OUT 7043 9 June 1945 1732Z JOB/ghp FWD-24215
TOO: 091600Z

6 1278

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COPY NO.

SGS-SHAFF File NO. 173

9 June

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SHAFF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SGS-SHAFF FILE NO. 121

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

TO : AOWAR FOR COS

FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR DCS; CO 12 ARMY GROUP; C IN C 21 ARMY GROUP; SHAFF MAIN FOR G-5

FROM : SHAFF FORWARD SIGNED [REDACTED]

REF NO : FWD-23814 TOO:071015B

This is VOG 498

Reference VOG 496, para. 3.

Amounts and date of requirements in [REDACTED] GP area are similar to those in 21 A GP area.

VOG 496 (FWD-23330) is PS OUT 6171, 3/6/45, G-5

Sc	DSR	CS	DCS	CAG	DCS	11R	SGS	WAB

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: D.S. VAUGHAN
MAJ. [REDACTED]INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

PS OUT 6651 7 June 1945 1201B AGD/kf REF NO: FWD-23814
TOO:071015B

6 1230

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SHAEP FWD 345/05
TOR 052156Z JUNE
hgt 052220Z JUNE

700 0518592

R E S T R I C T E D
P R I O R I T Y

FROM : AGWAR
TO : SHAEP FWD, SHAEP REAR
REF NO : WI-11995, 05 [REDACTED] 1945

Use of [redacted] currency found in [redacted] Mine.

You ~~are~~ not authorized to issue stocks of currencies mentioned VOG 462 pending further instructions from CCS.

VOG-462 is FWD-22856, ■ OUF 5704, 31/5/45, G-5.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

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FS IN 1516 5 June 1945 2235B JOB/gnp Ref No: WK-11995

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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

0000

100 042039B JUNE

19/05
FOR 050100B JUNE
FOR 050230B

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER
TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP MAIN FOR FRENCH MISSION
FOR INFO : ALGOM HOME
REF NO : FX-87566, 4 JUNE 1945 CITE: PHOEO

Incomplete reports received here that French Government is effecting currency conversion between 4 and 15 June.

Allied Financial Agency holds about 600,000 francs and also Allied Force paymasters have some. In addition Italian Government and Bank of ITALY have fairly large amounts exceeding 100,000,000.

Please advise urgently what provision is being made for conversion such overseas holdings above and whether conversion applies equally to supplemental francs. We hope AFA and Allied Force holdings can be reported by signal and thus obviate necessity air lift. Physical conversion could be made later.

Italian Government is raising question through its Ambassador in PARIS but any advice you can give or conversion its holdings will be appreciated.

Also advise whether personnel travelling to FRANCE under orders this Theater be supplied with francs we have on hand pending our acquisition of francs.

ACTION : SHAEP MISSION FRANCE

INFORMATION : SES SUSPENSE
6 1282 6-5 AG RECORDS

SMC IN 1114 5 June 45 0300B

SL/REF NO: FX-87566
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SHAEP FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR ■■■■■ CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BCS, TWENTY ■■■■ ARMY GROUP
 REAR FOR CA, CG TWELFTH ARMY ■■■■ FOR
 G-5, SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5

FROM : SHAEP FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : FWD-23330 TCO: 031630B

VOG 496

1. Reference VOG 426, Twenty First Army Group report that they estimate payments to ■■■■ Armed Forces on disbandment to be made very shortly amount to 200,000,000 marks, which they cannot provide from bank stocks available in Twenty First Army Group area. Unless, therefore, ■■■■ can use the bulk stock discovered in the Merkers mine, it will be necessary for Twenty First Army Group to pay out Allied military marks, which we should prefer to avoid.

2. In addition, Twenty First Army Group estimate that they will require a further 300 million ■■■■ as a reserve for normal bank cash.

3. Estimates from Twelfth Army Group not yet received, but out-payments on disbandment may be greater than in Twenty First Army Group area and requirements for civil reserve at least as great.

4. In view above, request permission most urgently to use above stocks ■■■■ requested in VOG 462. Understand Twenty First Army Group will have to ■■■■ Allied military marks for disbandment payments unless ■■■■ are in ■■■■ position ■■■■ release by 7 June. Should, therefore, be grateful for reply by that date.

PS OUT 6171

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REF NO: FWD-23330 (Continued)

VOG 426 not identified in SHAEF FWD SMC files *
VOG 462 is FWD-22856, OUT 5704, 31/5/45, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: D ■ VAUGHAN,
Major

INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

FS OUT 6171

3 JUNE 1945

1731B

JOB/18 REF NO: FWD23330
0001 031630B

SECRET

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SHAEP FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET
PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS [REDACTED]
FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, [REDACTED]
MAIN FOR G-5
FROM : SHAEP FWD, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-22856 T00: 311515B

SCS-SHAEP File No. 130

VOG 462

1. Request authority to [REDACTED] stock of [REDACTED] and rentenmarks discovered in MERKERS mine to supplement reichsmark stocks for civil use as required.

2. At present local shortages of lower denomination notes have been reported locally but such shortages [REDACTED] so far been overcome. However, [REDACTED] anticipate [REDACTED] will be urgent demands for small change fairly soon.

3. If you agree paragraph 1 above, [REDACTED] would lodge whole amount with Reichsbank at FRANKFURT under [REDACTED] subject to our orders to be distributed thence to Reichsbank branches if and when required for use in banking system.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: D.E. [REDACTED]
INFORMATION : SGS MAJOR
AG RECORDS

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PS OUT 5704 31 May 45 16238 HFK/1f REF NO: FWD-22856
T00 : 311515B

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THIS MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

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SHAEP FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR ■ COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5, CG TWELFTH ARMY GROUP,
■ SIXTH ARMY GROUP, G-IN-C 21 ARMY GROUP,
AMSSO FOR BRITISH ■ OF STAFF, ■ KTOUSA
FOR FISCAL DIRECTOR
FROM : SHAEP FWD, SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-22847 TOO: 3115008

VOG 461

Reference VOG 457. (38)

1. Investigation discloses reports from US Army Finance Officers referred to in VOG 457 are without foundation. Only very small amounts of Russian Allied Military Marks have been received in American ■ by Finance Department officers.

2. All Allied Military Marks of Russian origin appear to be paid to troops at the rate of two ■ for one ruble and only in accordance with rates of pay of various ranks. Strict accountability and records are kept. All Russian printed Allied Military Marks have a dash in front of the serial number.

3. Russians have issued Allied Military Marks in denominations of 1,000, 100, 50, 20 and 1 but ■ not issued ½ reichsmark notes.

4. No counterfeiting of Allied Military ■ has yet ■ to light.

SECRET

PS OUT 5695

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1286

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COPY NO 9

IF USE 1 COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FOR...

S E C R E T

REF NO: FWD-22847

(Continued)

3115008

VOG-457 is FWD-22319, FS OUT 5178, 24/5/45, G-5

ORIGINATOR

: G-5

AUTHENTICATION: D. S. VAUGHAN
MAJOR

: SGB

G-1

MR

MR STEEL

AG RECORDS



FS OUT 5695

31 May 45

15398

HFK/lr

REF

FWD-22847

TOO

: 3115008

S E C R E T

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6 1287

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JEAR

TOO 241531B MAY

SHAEF 151/25
TON 251546B MAY
amb 251715B

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : ETOUSA SIGNED EISENHOWER
TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR
FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN
EX-48775 24th May, 1945

your W-81923.

Assigned to temporary duty with G-1 Headquarters
ETOUSA's Colonel PROXSEIMER.

Part 1. Present emphasis complete
statement and centers. SCRIED presents many
problems requiring careful study.

Part 11. lootings subsiding with
combat operations ended. Controversy stems from army fiscal
operating problem of not redeeming illegally acquired reichsmarks
versus G-5 problem of maintaining parity between
AM mark and reichsmark for psychological effect upon
German population. Suggest proposed amendment to War Department
circular 364/1944 relative redemption deferred until
arrival there this Colonel BERNSTEIN G-5 SHAEF and
receipt by air courier communication from fiscal outlining
their views. New problem Russians, using their
printings of identical AM marks, are giving same to United
States troops in gifts. Checking amounts involved.
It is reported Russians are issuing their troops
large quantities with rations and they place little value on
them.

NOTES

SAC IN 7993

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SECRET

6 1288

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S E C R E T

REF: ■■■ EX-48775 24th May, 1945

SHAEP 151/25

Part III. Field negotiations with Czechs
resulted temporary military rate 100 _____ equal 1 dollar.
Fiscal has acquired 250,000,000 _____ rate.

part IV. Preliminary discussions indicate
SHAPE Currency [] also endeavoring reducing Army
balances Allied currencies. French [] returns will
start after [] Suggesting advances Belgian francs
to [] steel contracts be a credit to United
States Army on [] books and [] will see [] with
Belgians [] army. Working NETHERLANDS. *

Part V. Reference W-80700 fiscal had assumed full 150,000,000 dollars being shipped. War Department authorization 50,000,000 yellow seals being shipped by United Treasury plus yellow seals available here will suffice provided States Treasury can start delivery by 20 June of fixed denomination treasury checks bearer requiring only issuer's signature time of issuance with space for issuer's countersignature when cashing check which should bear legend substantially as follows - "Negotiable outside Continental United States only at States Army Finance Offices". Fiscal sending concurrent specifying denominations and quantities required which please expedite. of these checks preferable to procedures outlined W-78112, will theater redeployment plan reduce liquid in returning troops.

X W-81923 is not identified in [REDACTED] MAIN SMC Files.
 X W-80700 " " " " " " " "
 X W-78112 " " " " " " " "

ACTION : 0-5
INFORMATION : SOS
 0-1
 42 RECORDS



SMC ■ 7993 25 MAY '45 1914 B SL/ra REF NO: EX-48775

S E C R E T

6 1283

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SHAEF FORWARD STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM : SHAEF MAIN FOR G-5; TWELFTH GROUP, G-11
TWENTY-ONE GROUP; FOR BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF

REF NO : FWD-22319 TOC: 241745B

VOG 457

1. Reports from field state:

A. Russians distribute Allied military Marks printed by them from plates furnished by U.S., to their troops without accountability, without regard to scales of troop pay and in any quantities troops request. Such AMM distributed by hand-ful with rations.

B. Difficult, if not impossible, to tell our AMM from Russian printings, although in cases paper, ink and A- printed near the serial number permit distinction.

C. Despite barrier between US/USSR Zones, our troops receiving large quantities of Russian from Russian Troops, civilians and displaced persons, for cigarettes, gratis. Where possible, attempts to dollars to U.S. have been stopped if AMM presented can be distinguished.

2. Investigations continuing. Will report further but whole monetary program endangered. Other policies threatened.

ORIGINATOR: G-5

AUTHENTICATION: L. A. Captain

INFORMATION: SGB

G-1
MR MURPHY
STEEL
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

6 1200

SECRET

PS OUT 0178

24 MAY 1945

19198

AGD/rob Ref No: FWD-22319-4

THIS MESSAGE IS AN EXACT COPY OF THE MESSAGE IN FOREIGN TOC: 241745B

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SHAEF FORWARD
STAFF CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : AGWAR FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAIN
FOR G-5
FROM : SHAEF FORWARD SIGNED EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-22298 T00 : 241000B

456.

1. Due to actual or anticipated local currency shortages, particularly in small denominations, Officials, notably in and FALLINGBOMBER, acting under orders purported to have been issued from BERLIN and with the approval of local civil officials, have printed and placed in circulation small of "NOTGELD" or emergency currency.

2. Army Groups have been instructed that additional printings of emergency currency not to be permitted. Small now in circulation will be withdrawn it flows into the banks. consider it unnecessary to effect immediate withdrawal by means of a public notice establishing a dead-line, particularly shortages of small denominations from to time reported locally. So far shortages been only temporary.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION : L A JENKINS
Captain
INFORMATION : SCS
G-4
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

OUT 5155 24 May 1945 1500B AGD/ghp Ref No: FWD-22298
T00: 241000B

6 1291

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565-514-1180

SHAEP X46/23
TOR 231956B MAY
ome 232125B MAY

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Large quantities of Russian printings of Allied military marks being received by troops from Russian soldiers as gifts. Reports indicate that currency is issued to Russian soldiers in large quantities with rations and they place no value on it.

Request decision if currency is to be accepted as legal tender. Specimens being [redacted] to Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations by courier.

ACTION : G-1
INFORMATION : SCS
G-5
SUSPENSE
RECORDS

SNC IN 7416 23 MAY 45 2236D 81/daw REF NO: 0X-21130

6 1292

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SHAFF FORWARD
STAFF CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR
TOO 221356Z MAYSHAFF FWD 180/22
TOR 221840Z MAY
RJP 221903Z MAYSECRET
ROUTINEFROM : AGWAR FROM HILLDRING SIGNED MARSHALL
TO : SHAFF FWD EISENHOWER SBOE
REF NO : W-85941, MAY 1945

This is UNITED reply to V003-445 and 454 which has referred by British to before concurrence.

Combined reply will follow when British concurrence is received.

Currency CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

1. You should inform Czechs that use of to be advanced by Czech Government for UNITED STATES Army expenditures is satisfactory in principle. Czechs have responsibility for setting dollar exchange for crowns UNITED STATES with exchange rate welfare of troops adequacy of their purchasing power under rate. Advise soonest as to rate Czechs propose to use whether your judgement rate will afford such protection to troops.

2. UNITED STATES Army will exchange marks in of troops for crowns, valuing AM marks at 10 cents. Desired that Czechs give same to marks in hands of public regardless of treatment accorded reichsmarks. This will avoid discriminating against persons who dealt with Army in good faith and will avoid speculative exchanges between troops and public.

PS 5909

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S E C R E T

REF NO: W-85941

22 MAY 1945

SHAEP FWD 180/22

3. Will amount of crown advance offered by Czechs be adequate for your needs?

4. Use of yellow seal dollars or other such practicable [redacted] should be reserved as possible solution if satisfactory arrangements cannot [redacted] made along lines indicated above.

5. Arrangements made with Czechs should [redacted] submitted to War Department for approval prior to being placed in effect. You should continue to use AM marks until [redacted] approval is given.

6. When UNITED STATES Diplomatic Mission arrives in PRAGUE it should [redacted] kept advised of all developments.

VCG-445 is FWD-21238, [redacted] OUT 4104, 11/5/45, G-5
VCG-454 is FWD-21744, [redacted] OUT 4610, 17/5/45, G-5

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS
G-1
G-4
MR. MORPHY
MR. STEEL
AG RECORDS



PS 5909 May 45 20208 HFK/des REF NO: W-85941

6 120

-2-
S E C R E T

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SHAEP FORWARD

STAFF CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

FOR INFO : CG TWELFTH ARMY FOR G-5, SHAEP MAIN
G-5 FOR FINANCIAL BRANCH, ZONE
FISCAL DIRECTOR

FROM : SHAEP FWD,

REF NO : FWD-21744 TOG: 1719008

VOG 454

1. We are informed that Czech authorities are willing to make 500,000,000 crowns available at for Allied Forces, but wish to use rate of one Allied military mark equals one and to withdraw reichsmarks.

2. We further understand, Czech authorities have published notices withdrawing reichsmarks and fixing rate given above.

3. Investigation of this matter proceeding, but urge you to make every effort to settle questions in our VOG 445 and SCAP 285.

4. view of apparent unfairness to Allied Forces of above mentioned Czech rate, we are instructing formations upon receipt of this message, not to accept the offer of Czech crowns and not to agree to the proposed rate of exchange, pending further instructions.

5. Please advise most urgent of further arrangements or instructions.

PS 4610

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6 1293

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265-SHAEP-File No. 123

17 May

Lu 35

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SECRET

NO: FWD-21744

(Continued)

T00: 171900B

VOG 445 1st FS OUT 4104, 11/5/45, G-5
SOAP 305-1st FS OUT 2292, 10/4/45, G-5
285

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: L. A. JENKINS
CAPTAIN

INFORMATION

: SOG
G-1
G-4
MR MURPHY
MR STEELE
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

OUT 4610 17 May 45 2002B AGD/lf REF NO: FWD-21744
T00 : 171900B

6 1296

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SHAFF FORWARD
STAFF CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET
PRIORITY

TO : CG TWELFTH ARMY GROUP G-5, CG COM
ZONE FOR FINANCIAL DIRECTOR

FOR INFO : SHAFF MAIN FOR G-5 FOR FINANCIAL BRANCH

FROM : FWD, SIGNED SCAFF CITE:

REF NO : FWD-21723 TOO: 171730B

1. Understand our FWD-20277 of 30 April may not have reached you. It includes the following:

a. You should not issue any order or proclamation concerning legal tender status of currency CZECHOSLOVAKIA without specific instructions of this headquarters.

b. You should keep so far as practicable separate records of amounts of Allied military marks used CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

c. You may receive reichsmarks CZECHOSLOVAKIA but may not re-issue them.

2. Inform all parties concerned of this message and VOO 454 sent for your information and compliance today.

3. Kindly acknowledge receipt hereof.

FWD-20277 is FS OUT 3140, 30/4/45, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: L.A. JENKINS
CAPTAIN

INFORMATION : SCS G-4
G-1 MR MORPHY
G-2 MR
G-3 AG RECORDS

6 1297

FS OUT 4589 17 May 45 1903B AGD/1c REF NO: FWD-21723
TOO: 171730B

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SHAFF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

JJJJ

T00 141405Z MAY

SHAFF FWD 172/14
TOR 141752Z MAY
dtk 141822Z MAY

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER
TO FOR ACTION : ALL MAT ADDRESSEES
FOR INFO : SHAFF FORWARD FOR G-5, EIGHTH ARMY MAIN FOR
MIL GOV STAFF AUSTRIA
: FK-75185, 14 MAY 1945, CITE: PHOEG

685

Currency shortage in Eighth Army area AUSTRIA reported serious with currency reserves held. VIENNA and considerable local use of REICHSKREDIT KUPFERSCHNEID and also NOTGELD issued by GAU KAERNTEN.

Feared that only way to avoid early introduction up to 100,000,000 Schillings is to obtain Reichsmarks for emergency financing.

Since VIENNA reserves inaccessible can SHAFF authorized and requested to advance Reichsmarks to Currency Section AUSTRIA AFHQ up to above amount in denominations to be advised SHAFF later. Any such advances would be repaid earliest possible.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS
G-4
MURPHY

MR STEELE
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

FS IN 3776 14 May 1945 1847B AGD/ghp Ref No: FK-75185 9

6 1236

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SHAEP FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : [REDACTED] FOR COMBINED [REDACTED] OF STAFF
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BCS; SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5

FROM : SHAEP FWD; SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : FWD-21237 T00: 111830B

VOG 444

Reference GOV 322 dated 3 May 1945.

1. An immediate need for printing additional supplies of German mark currency outside GERMANY is not anticipated. Should the need arise, we shall make allowance you indicate for the time element between order and delivery dates.

2. Fairly large amounts of Reichsmarks have been found in banks in most areas and reports indicate a substantial [REDACTED] of deposits over withdrawals in reopened banks. A few localized problems exist due to shortages of small denomination currency but correction is being effected through transfers from one area to another or automatically via increased bank deposits.

3. The only printing press discovered to date is located at ZWICKAU, [REDACTED] plates and materials not available and it produced only 50 mark notes. All Army Groups are [REDACTED] look-out for additional plants. Best information indicates plants are in the BERLIN area but their condition is unknown.

GOV-322 (VX-79073) is PS IN 2378, 9/5/45, G-5.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: L.A. JENKINS,
LT.

INFORMATION : SGS
G-4
SUMMARY AG RECORDS

6 1299

OUT 4103 11 MAY 1945 1956B DWR/vml REF NO: FWD-21237
T00: 111830B

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SHAEP FORWARD STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : AOWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR [REDACTED] CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, [REDACTED] MAIN

FROM : SHAEP FORWARD, [REDACTED] EISENHOWER

REF NO : FWD 21238 TOC: 111830B

VOG 445.

1. We [REDACTED] informed that [REDACTED] are [REDACTED] local difficulties concerning acceptability of Allied Military marks in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and that local military [REDACTED] particularly anxious to [REDACTED] that these difficulties shall not occur in [REDACTED] area which has recently been designated a rest area.

View FACS 203. para 2, -

[REDACTED] proclamation or notice [REDACTED] been issued by us but understand CZECH local authorities are issuing suitable notice.

2. We shall inform you of further developments. Meanwhile [REDACTED] would urge importance of defining the position more completely. Understand CZECHS in [REDACTED] most anxious to withdraw all Reichsmarks in circulation.

FACS 203 (WX-74395) 1: FS IN 9815, 29/4/45, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: L.A. JENKINS, LT

INFORMATION : SGS
G-1
G-4
MR MURPHY
AG RECORDS

6 1100

FS OUT 4104

11 May 45

1057R

DWR/et Ref No: FWD 21238

TOC: 111830B

SECRET

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SHAFF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JEQT

TOO 081300B

SHAFF FWD 37/9
TOR 090120B MAY
TV, 090443B MAY

SECRET

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

PRIORITY

FROM : J R KNIGHT CPA MISSION DENMARK
 TO : BRIG BABINGTON SMITH GO 5 SHAFF FORWARD
 BRIG ROCKLEIGH GO HQ TWENTY FIRST ARMY
 REF NO : NONE, 8 MAY 1945

Arrangement has been completed for credit 100,000,000 Kroner through DENMARK's National Bank for military requirements. Military Kroner may be exchanged for regular Kroner at any bank in DENMARK. Paymasters may obtain regular Kroner under this credit arrangement at any branch of DENMARK National Bank upon request to CPA Mission COPENHAGEN.

It is requested that further of military Kroner be held minimum. Paymasters having military Kroner in their possession should exchange for regular Kroner at any upon entry into Rate of 24 Kroner per pound Sterling agreed by DENMARK's National Bank for military purposes only and exchanges at own rate will be suspended. Exchanges made through Army or Navy Paymaster.

DENMARK's National Bank will accept pounds Sterling from Paymasters only for at this agreed rate. necessity exists for the of military currency in DENMARK as ample stocks of regular currency are available.

6 1301

PS IN 2383 B

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SHAFF File No. 173

forward

in attached copy 9

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SHAFF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

JSCOT

FOO 0813008

SHAFF FWD 37/9
0901208 MAY
FV, 090443B

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : J R KNIGHT CPA MISSION DENMARK
TO : BRIG DANISH SMITH 5 SHAFF FORWARD
BRIG ROCKLEY HQ TWENTY GROUP
REF : NONE, 8 MAY 1945

Arrangement has been completed for credit 100,000,000 Kroner through DENMARK's National Bank for military requirements. Military may be exchanged for regular Kroner at any bank in Denmark. Paymasters may obtain regular under this credit arrangement at any branch of DENMARK National Bank upon request to CPA Mission COPENHAGEN.

It is requested further of military Kroner be held to minimum. Paymasters having military Kroner in possession should exchange same for regular Kroner at any bank upon entry into DENMARK. of exchange 24 Kroner per pound Sterling agreed by DENMARK's National Bank for military purposes only and exchanges at own will be suspended. Exchanges made through. (Groups missing) masters.

DENMARK's National Bank will accept pounds Sterling from Paymasters only for at this agreed rate. No necessity exists for the use of military currency in DENMARK ample stock of regular cu (Groups missing)*.

NOTE : * Missing groups being serviced.

FS 2383

6 1302

SECRET

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505-204111-116 NO. 722

8 MAY


see Supplemental
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-2-

Ref No: NONE

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : 
G-4
AG RECORDS

FB IN 2383 9 May 1945 05258 JOR/gbp  No: NONE

SECRET

6 1303

SECRET**SECRET****SHAEF FORWARD**
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL**INCOMING MESSAGE**

WARZ

TOO 082208Z MAY

SHAEF FWD 91/09
TOR 080409Z MAY
Rfm 090437Z MAY**SECRET**
ROUTINEFROM : AGWAR
TO : SHAEF FWD, ETOUSA LONDON
REF NO : WX-79073, 8 MAY 1945GOV 322SUPPLIES GERMAN MARK CURRENCY

1. In view tight situation relative currency production facilities your estimate needs if [] for additional supplies AM mark currency requested well in advance date required. Allowance should be made for period approximately 4 months between date your orders placed for additional AM mark currency and first delivery to you.

2. Your views requested likelihood early [] for production outside GERMANY mark currency. Have you ascertained whether currency printing plants in GERMANY intact? Are materials available production mark currency by Germans?

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
G-4
SUSPENSE
[]
SUMMARY

PS IN 2378

9 MAY 1945

05108

JOB/12

REF NO: WX 79073

6 1304

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CONFIDENTIAL **CONFIDENTIAL**
SHAEF FORWARD
STAFF CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

T00 051554Z

SHAEF FWD 284/05
 TOR 052027B MAY
 hmo 052037B MAY

SGS-SHAFF File No. 7

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR
 TO : FWD, BASE SEC
 REF NO : WX-77659, 5 MAY 1945

GOV-315.

Advances mark currency to BELGIUM other Allied troops in GERMANY.

Assumption Paragraph 3 VOG-397 confirmed.

For accounting purposes, advances mark currency should be recorded on books of Currency Section for GERMANY as debit to government to whose representatives such advances are made.

VOG-397, FWD-19567, is OUT 2411,20/4/45, G-5

ACTION : G-5
 INFORMATION : SGS
 G-1
 G-3
 G-4
 MR MURPHY
 MR STEELE
 AG RECORDS

FS IN 1427 05 May 45 2100B HFR/1P REF NO: WX-77659

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RESTRICTED

SHAFF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

YEAR

TOO 041221E

SHAFF 191/04
TOR 0417358 MAY
MOB - 0419358

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FROM

ETCUSA SIGNED EISENHOWER

TO

: SHAFF AND ADDRESSEES CONCERNED

REF NO

: EX-40548 MAY 1945

To the provisions of Para 4, letter this HQ.
FILE AG-123 OPGA, subject "possession by military personnel
of German indigenous currency in any denomination or of other
Continental currency notes which exceed certain denominations
19 April 1945, reference is made.

The authority granted therein to General Officers
does not apply to German indigenous currency received by recovered
Allied military personnel while interned by the enemy.

The exchange of such currency is prohibited by
the War Department.

Inform all concerned.

ACTION

: G-1

INFORMATION

: SGS
G-5
G-4
AG
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 1310 4 MAY 45 2107E SL/dew REF NO: EX-40548

6 1306

RESTRICTED

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTINE

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS ■ STAFF, FOR
COMBINED CIVIL ■ COMMITTEE; SHARP REAR
■ COAC/L; ■ FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF;
WAR OFFICE F ■

FROM : SHARP MAIL, SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : S-86615

TOO: 3015458

FOG 410

1. Numerous counterfeit supplemental ■ franc notes, especially in 500 and 1000 denominations, ■ been discovered in Finance Officers and paymasters ■ despite exercise of all reasonable precautions. At present these notes are charged to responsible finance or pay officers with reimbursement in case of US officers possible only by special approval of Secretary of War or Act of Congress.

2. US Fiscal Director, ETOUSA, ■ requested ■ to ■ authority for Currency Section FRANCE to be authorized to redeem such ■ upon certification by the Chief within ■ European Theater of ■ pay service concerned ■ to full circumstances surrounding ■ acquisition. "A special counterfeit redemption ■ would be established by Currency Section FRANCE for this purpose.

3. If ■ proposal is approved, request you instructions ■ to whether this special account should ■ as a charge against the French Government or merely carried ■ ■ suspense basis according to ■ nationality of pay service concerned.

4. It ■ thought you may wish to authorize a similar procedure for redemption by the Currency Section concerned of counterfeit notes in other currencies ■ Theater, i.e. Belgian counterfeits by Currency Section BELGIUM, German counterfeits by Currency Section GERMANY, etc. Some Belgian counterfeits are now in accounts of Finance ■ and counterfeiting of German Allied Military ■ or ■ currencies may develop.

SNC OUT 5962

6 1307

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S E C R E T

REF NO : S-86615 30 APR '45 (CONTINUED)

5. This request is based on a similar procedure requested by AFHQ in cable FX-37231, dated 11 October 1944 and authorized by CCS in cable WX-63260 dated 15 November 1944.

X FX-37231 is no longer in SHAET MAIN SEC Files. *ect*
X FX-63260 is no longer in SHAET MAIN SEC Files. *no*

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS,
INTEGRATION : COM 2 WFO, USA
G-2
SGS
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS



SEC. OUT 5962 30 APR '45 18578 SL/ra REF NO: S-86615
TOO: 301545B

S E C R E T

6 1308

-2-

SECRET

SECRET ✓

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : 12 ARMY GROUP FOR G-5
 FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN FOR G-5; CG [] FOR FISCAT
 DIRECTOR
 FROM : SHAEF FWD, SIGNED SCARF CITE: []
 REF NO : FWD-20277 TOO: 301800B

Reference FWD-19498 of 19 April 1945 and
 014.1-1 (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) GE-AGM of 19 April 1945, para 11.

1. No order or proclamation concerning legal
 tender status of currency will be issued without specific
 approval of this Headquarters.

2. Separate records will be kept so far
 practicable of amount of Allied military marks used in CZECH-
 OSLOVAKIA.

3. Reichsmarks may be accepted by you in
 payment but should not be reissued in CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

FWD-19498 is PS OUT 2348, 19/4/45, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: L A JENKINS,
 LT.
 INFORMATION : SOS
 G-1
 G-2
 G-3
 G-4
 MR. MURPHY
 MR. STIELE
 SUMMARY
 AG RECORDS

OUT 3140 30 April 45 1926B AGD/ges REF NO: FWD-20277
 TOO : 301800B

6 1309

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10/123

30 APR

21

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : CG SIXTH ARMY GROUP FOR G-5, CG TWELFTH
GROUP FOR G-5

FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN, [] [] ZONE FOR FISCAL DIRECTOR

FROM : SHAEF FWD, [] [] CITE: []

REF NO : FWD-20226 TOC: 291830B

in AUSTRIA.

The subject is use of Allied Military []

1. During the initial phase of [] operation in [] it is probable that troops will be in possession of Allied military marks only, [] will not have had time to convert their holdings into Allied military schillings. To [] this temporary situation, the following notice should be published in the areas concerned and [] following letter should be handed to banks in the area:

2. Notice to be published to and by local authorities:

"Military Government - AUSTRIA

Area of Control - Supreme Commander, AEF

NOTICE

1. As a temporary measure, Allied military marks will be accepted from members of the Allied forces in payment for purchases at a rate of one Allied military [] to one Reichsmark.

2. Allied military marks received from [] of the Allied forces must be taken to the nearest bank which will exchange them for Reichsmarks. They must not, in any circumstances, be returned to circulation.

By order of Military Government - AUSTRIA.

OUT 3084
6 1310

SECRET

SECRET

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1014-1 Austria
CGS SHAEF Main 10/23

29 APR

S E C R E T

REF NO: FWD-20226

(Continued)

T00: 2918308

b. Letter to the banks:

"Military Government - AUSTRIA

Area of Control - Supreme Commander, AEF

All Banks in AUSTRIA:

1. As a temporary measure, Allied military marks will be accepted by the civil population from members of the Allied military forces at a rate of one Allied military mark equals one Reichsmark.

2. You will exchange all Allied military marks tendered to you by the civil population for Reichsmarks at the rate of one Allied military mark for one Reichsmark. You will retain all Allied military marks acquired until further instructions received from Military Government. You will display this order in your office in a position where it can be easily seen by the civil population.

By order of Military Government - AUSTRIA:

2. Every effort should be made to ensure that troops hold schillings only at earliest possible time and that temporary arrangement should then be cancelled and population warned that Allied military marks are not to be accepted.

ORIGINATOR: G-5
INFORMATION: G-1
G-4
MR MURPHY
MR STEELE
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: W. A. GOULSTOCK
Major

FS OUT 3084 29 Apr 45 1918B HFK/rob Ref No: FWD-20226
T00: 2918308

S E C R E T

6 1311

-2-



FOUO BECF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

423

9NAEP 296/28
TOR 28234BB APR
rfs 290025B APR

TOO 282033Z APR

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM 1 AGWAR FROM COMBINED [REDACTED] OF STAFF

■ FOR ACTION : SHAEF FORWARD FOR EISENHOWER

FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

NO : WK-74395. 28 APRIL 1945

BOOK MESSAGE

FACS-203

1. Use of Allied military marks for out payments by Allied Forces in CZECHOSLOVAKIA ■ ■ temporary measure is approved, reference paragraph 5, SCAP-285. Reichsmarks may be accepted ■ ■ respect of in payments but should not be reissued in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. You should keep separate records of the amount of Allied military marks ■ ■ in (?) CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

2. No currency proclamation should be issued by you in CZECHOSLOVAKIA at this time.

3. UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM Governments will consult with the Czechoslovak Government regarding currency questions raised in SCAF-285, including [] of and rate of exchange for crowns. You will be kept informed.

4. Prefer use of yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes should be avoided, pending outcome of discussions with Czechoslovak Government.

PS IN 9815

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By authority of CALA
By *[Signature]*

6 1312

~~TOP SECRET~~

13

GARY L. COOPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF NO:WX-74395

28 April 1945

SHAEP PWD 296/28

SCAF 285 (FWD-19443) 1s FS OUT 2292 18/4/45 G-5

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
MR. MURPHY
MR. STEELE
PWD
SUSPENSE
**
AG RECORDS

FS IN-9815 29 April 1945 0145B DMR/kt NO:WX-74395

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 1313

CONFIDENTIAL **CONFIDENTIAL**
SHAEF FORWARD
 STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

JEBZ
 TOO 251745B APRIL

SHAEF FWD 234/25
 TOR 252105B APRIL
 dpr 252317B APRIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L
P R I O R I T Y

FROM : [REDACTED] MISSION BELGIUM
 TO : SHAEF FORWARD, SHAEF MAIN
 REF NO : B-2965, 25 APRIL 1945

Our 2445 dated 13 April is repeated for your information.

*Reference FWD-18923.

1. Banque Nationale [REDACTED] that number of Belgian displaced persons is fairly accurately known and therefore extent of their obligation can [REDACTED] reasonably estimated as limit of exchange is the equivalent of 2000 Belgian francs.

2. They feel there must be some misunderstanding regarding 1 Reichsmark or Rentenmark equals 1 Belgian franc in that this is not a real rate of exchange and is merely an arrangement between Belgian Government and its nationals also that exchange will [REDACTED] place within Belgian territory.

3. Each [REDACTED] will [REDACTED] investigated and [REDACTED] found to be genuine the 4.40 rate will [REDACTED] applied. In other words it is a deposit of [REDACTED] with a temporary settlement subject to investigation and adjustment."

FWD-18923 is FS OUT 1776, 11/4/45, 0-5

ACTION : 0-5

INFORMATION : SGS
 AG RECORDS

FS IN 9033 25 Apr 45 2335B JOB/1f REF [REDACTED] B-2965

6 1314

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3000 MAIL FILE NO

128

3 APR 45

FILE UNDER NO.

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

EXTRACT

CCS 891/2
22 April 1945

Currency Use by Forces

(EXTRACTED 129 - file)

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

21 25 June 1945

6 1311

INSTRUCTIONS.—Under "Synopsis" brief entry showing of communication and whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

G. M. C. Form 101 Form 400
Revised 1 1944

INDEX SHEET 101 (101)

22 Apr 45

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO **SECRET**
By authority of CALA
By *[Signature]*
Date 16 APR 1961
FOR INFO

REF NO

: SHAEF REAR FOR G-5 FOR SHAEF MISSION
DENMARK; C-IN-C TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP
AND PAY
: TROOPERS F-5; SHAEF FOR G-5
: FORWARD, EISENHOWER CITE: 5005
: FWD-19617 T00: 211430B

1. Currency section for [redacted] present forming part of your G-5 Financial Branch, is forthwith placed under [redacted] or Twenty-one Army Group, where it will come under control of the D(F)/CFA. Twenty-one Army Group will call forward [redacted] make transport arrangements for personnel and equipment [redacted] currency section and also the following:

A. Initial currency requirements [redacted] denominations for troop pay [redacted] 23rd April [redacted] million Kroner. [redacted] Mission (DENMARK) will supply convoy officer.

B. [redacted] bulk currency movement [redacted] days time. At [redacted] 25 million Kroner should be left in War Office custody for present, to [redacted] possible requirements [redacted] UK.

2. For information Twenty-one Army Group, Total stocks.

A. Allied Military Kroner - [redacted] Million.
B. Normal current Kroner - 250,000.

3. Rates of exchange which will be used in DENMARK will be:

24 [redacted] Kroner equal 1 pound Sterling,
5.9480 Danish Kroner equal 1 dollar.

[redacted] rates will not be published until confirmation by this Headquarters.

ORIGINATOR: G-5

AUTHENTICATION: W. A. COULSTOCK
Major NO

INFORMATION: 1316

SGA
AG RECORDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

PS OUT 2400 21 APR 1961 15198 HFK/ROB Ref No: FWD-19617 (b)

SECRET

T00: 211430B

SECRET

69. Belgium

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF; SHAFF MISSION
TO BELGIUM
FROM : SHAFF FWD, [REDACTED] EISENHOWER
REF NO : FWD-19567 T00: 2018308

This is VOG 397.

1. Belgian Minister of Finance has agreed in principle that Belgian troops in GERMANY will be paid in Allied military marks in order to conform with practice in US/British Forces.

2. He has asked for assurance, however, that Belgian Government will not be expected to credit [redacted] Allied Military authorities or the Allied Governments either in Belgian [redacted] or in foreign currency for the Allied military [redacted] put at their disposal, neither will Allied military marks qualify as mutual aid or reciprocal aid under lease lend or mutual aid agreements.

3. We ██████ that you agree paragraph 1 ████ respect of all Allied countries, but before replying should ████ grateful for your confirmation.

SCR DATE	LUPEY No.
6-6	
7-10	
8-5	
9-2	7
10-1	8
11-5	9

ORIGINATOR : G-5
INFORMATION : SSS
G-1
G-3
G-4
POL OFF
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: M.C. BAUER,
LT. COLONEL

see (26)

PS 2471 20 APRIL 1945 1902E DWR/wml REF NO: FWD-19567
T00: 201830B

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02/24/2010 BY 60324 BLD/2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTINE

TO : CG EFOUSA FOR FISCAL DIRECTOR
FOR INFO : CG SIXTH [REDACTED]
FROM : SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] : FWD-19497

TOO: 191845B

1. For your information the exchange rate to be used exclusively for [REDACTED] of troops and military accounting purposes in AUSTRIA will [REDACTED] ten Allied Military Schillings to 1 US dollar and 40 Allied Military Schillings to 1 Pound Sterling. This rate should not be [REDACTED] public.

2. Allied Military Schilling [REDACTED] will circulate in AUSTRIA at the rate of 1 Schilling equals [REDACTED] Reichsmark, which is understood to [REDACTED] the rate at present being used by RUSSIA in the part of the territory that is occupied. It is also understood that the Rouble/Schilling rate is 50 Kopecks [REDACTED] 1 Schilling.

ORIGINATOR: G-5

AUTHENTICATION: L. A. JENKINS,
Lt.

INFORMATION: SGS

G-1


G-2

G-3

G-4

POL OFFICERS

RECORDS



FS OUT 2345

11 April 1945

1853B

JOB/rob Ref NO: FWD-19497

TOO: 191845B

6 1316

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTINE

TO : COM ZONE FOR FISCAL DIRECTOR
INFO : SHAEF MAIN FOR G-5; CG TWELFTH GROUP FOR G-5,
FROM : SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED SCARF CITE: SHOF
NO : FWD-19498 TOO: 191800B

1. Twelfth Army Group have been informed that Allied Military Marks will be used in CZECHOSLOVAKIA until other arrangements can be made.

2. As in GERMANY, rate used for pay of troops will be 10 to the dollar and 40 marks to pound-with similar parity of 1 Allied Military equals 1 Reichsmark.

3. Our information is that Marks are only legal tender and circulating medium in SUDETENLAND.

In BOHEMIA-MORAVIA Coruny are circulating medium and are legal tender alongside at the rate of 10 Coruny equals 1 Mark. This local rate will not be changed without instructions from this Headquarters.

Believe slightly different monetary provisions in SLOVAKIA which are investigating.

4. We are enquiring whether currency be available to us and will inform you.

ORIGINATOR: G-5

INFORMATION: SOS

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

POL OPERATIONS

AG HEADQUARTERS

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED	
TO	SECRET
By	SCARF
Date	16 AUG 1945

L. A. JENKINS, Lt.

COPY NO. 9

FS OUT 2308 19 April 1945 18538 DWR/pol Ref: FWD-19498 TOO: 191800B

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF FORWARD

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR [REDACTED] CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR COMBINED
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

INFO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH [REDACTED] STAFF; [REDACTED] FOR
SACMED; COM [REDACTED] FISCAL DIRECTOR; SHAEF MAIN

FROM : SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : FWD-19253 TOO: 151745B

This is VOG 388.

We request directions urgently [REDACTED] of
exchange [REDACTED] to be used between Austrian schillings and pounds
sterling and dollars.

ORIGINATOR : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS
G-1
AG RECORDS

AUTHENTICATION: L.A. JENKINS.
TO [REDACTED] SECRET
By [REDACTED]
Date 10 AUG 1945

PN OUT 2101 15 APRIL 1945 1858B DWR/vml REF NO: FWD-19253
TOO: 151745B

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 1320

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(16)

1-800-4-A-RENTAL

SHARP FWD 216/13
1320135 APR
jbb 132111B APR

132015B APR
jhb 132111B APR

R O U T I N E

REF NO 1 2445 APRIL 1945

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REF NO: 6015

REF NO: c445c

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13 APR 45 2140B HFK
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF FORWARD
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : SHAEF MISSION TO BELGIUM
FOR INFO : HQ TWENTY FIRST ARMY GROUP
FROM : SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED SCAEF CITE:
NO : FWD-18923 TGO:111000B

1. Twenty First Army Group Financial Report
No.27 states that Belgian Government is advancing Belgian
francs to repatriated Belgian displaced persons at following
rates:

1 Reichsmark or Rentenmark	equals	1 Belgian franc
1 Allied military mark	equals	4.40 Belgian francs
1 Lager Mark	equals	10 Belgian francs

2. You should represent to the Belgian
Government that military government law No.51 prohibits
discrimination within GERMANY between Reichsmarks
Allied military marks and that it is most undesirable that
any discrimination should be made in the manner quoted above,
especially as there is no prima facie evidence to suggest
that holdings of Allied military marks are being acquired
in any different way from holdings of Reichsmarks. You should
request the Belgian Government to adjust the rates to prevent
discrimination, pointing out that there is no objection to
their placing such limits as they think fit the total
amounts to be advanced.

FS OUT 1776

6 1322

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO.

6

105-51111000B
105-51111000B

X091 Belgium
1382-7

11 April

See 15/19

SECRET
(Continued)

REF NO: FWD-18923

3. As regards Lager marks, which are not legal tender, the same objections do not exist against discrimination in favour of holders of such currency. You should, however, draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the fact that when the advantageous [redacted] known Belgian displaced persons will tend to change their Allied military marks and Reichsmarks for Lager marks and [redacted] undue burden will [redacted] thrown on the Belgian Government.

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: L. A. JENKINS,
Lt

INFORMATION : SOS
SHAEP MAIN
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS



F3 OUT 1776

11 APR 1945

1057B

JOB/jg

NO: FWD18923
FOO: 1110008

SECRET

-2-


6 1323

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

3

AG 014.1-1 (Germany) 016-1043



AmCh SC, AG
Initials: *AmCh*
1 April 1945
X-11
del. Memo
APO 757 (Main)
1 April 1945

SUBJECT: Foreign Exchange Control - Germany

TO : Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655
(attention: AGOS, G-5)
Headquarters, 21 Army Group (attention: Civil Affairs)
Commanding General, 6th Army Group, APO 83
(attention: AGOS, G-5)

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 24 March 1945.

2. The portion of sub-paragraph e. of letter referred to above that reads "persons accompanying the armed forces" refers to civilians in uniform who are serving with the armed forces and not civilian labor employed by them.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:


H. H. Horman
H. H. HORMAN
Colonel, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION.

See reverse side

*destroyed
copy in file in AGC*

6 1324



SECRET

Copy

C/

(13)

- Supreme Headquarters, AEF:
 DISTRIBUTION:
 1 - Secretary General Staff
 5 - G-1 Division
 5 - G-2 Division
 5 - G-3 Division
 12 - G-3 Post Headquarters (Major Ballou)
 5 - G-4 Division
 5 - G-5 Division
 20 - G-5 Division (Rear)
 3 - Adjutant General Division
 2 - Air Defense Division
 2 - Engineer Division
 1 - Medical Division
 2 - Public Relations Division
 5 - Psychological Warfare Division
 3 - Signal Division
 2 - European Allied Contact Section
 2 - Political Officer (AF)
 2 - Political Officer (A.S.)
 5 - Liaison Staff
 1 - APO
 2 - Liaison (Belgium)
 4 - Liaison (France)
 2 - Liaison (Netherlands)
 2 - Liaison (Denmark)
 Forces, Army Groups:
 25 - 6th Army Group
 25 - 12th Army Group
 25 - 21 Army Group
 5 - First Allied Airborne Army
 5 - Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations
 5 - Allied Naval Command, European Theater of Operations
 3 - U.S. Section, "MOCX", U.S. Navy
 2 - Tactical Air Force
 10 - Ninth Air Force
 5 - U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
 Other Headquarters:
 5 - Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington
 2 - Liaison Assistant to U.S. Representative, European Advisory Commission, London
 10 - Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, Washington
 10 - War Office (MOCX)
 15 - Control Commission for Germany (British Element)
 15 - U.S. Group Control Council (Germany)
 5 - Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations Command (for 1/19/45, 1945)

SECRET **SECRET**

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WANT

200 302125Z MAR

SHAM 285/30
TOR 302314A NAR
mae 302326A

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM : AGWAN FROM HILDRING SIGNED MARSHALL
TO : SHAEF MAIN FOR EISENHOWER FOR SGRS
REF NO : NONE, 30 MARCH 1945

Request copy air mail proclamation signed
by General EISENHOWER decreeing Allied military work legal
tender and exchange rate relative thereto.

Required by 5 April for report to Congress.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS
SUSPENSE
AG RECORDS
SHAW FORWARD

[illegible]

SNC IN 10596 31 Mar 1945 0607A EBRghp Ref: 10 10000

SECRET

6 1326

THE MAKING OF EXACT COPY OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Auth: SC, AEP
Initials: *meb*
24 March 1945

STAFF AGM & D

RM 374(1-7)

AFD 757 (Main)
24 March 1945

AG 014.1-1 (Germany) GE-AGM

SUBJECT: Foreign Exchange Control, Germany

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, AFD 695
(Attention: AGOS, G-5)
Headquarters, 21 Army Group (Attention: Civil Affairs)
Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, AFD 23
(Attention: AGOS, G-5)

In fulfillment of paragraph 8, Section VII, Annex III, AG 014.1-1
(Germany) GE-AGM, Directive for Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat
or Surrender, dated 9 November 1944:

a. Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has not delegated
and will not delegate the power to fix any rate of exchange. Under no cir-
cumstances will you permit any instruction to be issued or action to be taken
which directly or indirectly fixes a rate of exchange without the specific
authority of this headquarters.

b. No license will be granted under Military Government Law No. 53,
Foreign Exchange Control, except under specific authority of this headquarters.

c. No conversion of foreign currency into Reichsmarks, Rentenmarks
or Allied Military Marks, nor of Reichsmarks, Rentenmarks or Allied Military
Marks into foreign currencies will be made without the specific authority of
this headquarters.

d. No transactions will be entered into which permit or contain direct
or indirect reference to any exchange rate involving Reichsmarks, Rentenmarks
or Allied Military Marks.

e. The foregoing do not affect normal operations of the Military pay
services undertaken in accordance with their own regulations for military
personnel or to persons accompanying the armed forces.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: **CONFIDENTIAL**
BY: *R. H. J. [illegible]*
DATE: **16 AUG 1945**

(See next page)
6 1327

SECRET

H. H. J. [illegible]
W. H. J. [illegible]
Colonel, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

SECRET

- Supreme Headquarters, AEF:
1 - Secretary General Staff
5 - G-1 Division
5 - G-2 Division
5 - G-3 Division
12 - G-3 Post Hostilities (Major Hutson)
5 - G-4 Division
260 - G-5 Division
20 - G-5 Division (Rear)
3 - Adjutant General's Division
2 - Air Defense Division
2 - Engineer Division
1 - Medical Division
2 - Public Relations Division
5 - Psychological Warfare Division
3 - Signal Division
2 - European Allied Contact Section
2 - Political Officer (Br)
2 - Political Officer (U.S.)
5 - Air Staff
1 - AHCX
2 - Mission (Belgium)
4 - Mission (France)
2 - Mission (Netherlands)
2 - Mission (Germany)
Forces, Army Groups
25 - Sixth Army Group
25 - Seventh Army Group
25 - First Allied Airborne Army
5 - Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations
5 - Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force
3 - U.S. Section, AHCX, U.S. Navy
5 - 2 Tactical Air Force
10 - Ninth Air Force
5 - U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Other Headquarters
5 - Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington
2 - Military Assistant to U.S. Representative, European Advisory Commission, London
10 - Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, Washington
10 - War Office (D.O.A.)
15 - Central Commission for Germany (British Element)
15 - U.S. Group Control Council (Germany)
5 - Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
2 - Scottish Command (For 2/19 C.A. Unit)

DISTRIBUTION:

9 13231

SECRET

SECRET

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

291318

R O U T I N E

--- FILE NO. 123

Confirmation by letter follows. Request we be furnished copies of documents exchanged in respect of this credit.

ORIGINATOR : C-5 AUTHENTICATION: A GOINGS
INFO : SSS CWO USA
: SHAF FWD
: AG RECORDS

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SAC CUF 2294 23 March 1945 2155A ENL/jes REF NO: S 62912
TOO: 231930A

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STAFF CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

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FOO 101806Z MAR

233/10
TOR 102013A MAR
ag -102100A MAR

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ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM HILLDRING SIGNED MARSHALL
 TO : SHAEP MAIN FOR EISENHOWER FOR MCSBERRY
 REF NO : W-50890 10 MARCH 1945

Effect of franc exchange rate on United States
 Troops in FRANCE is Subject.

1. Special interest in effect franc exchange rate
 of United States troops in FRANCE evidenced by members Congress,
 military personnel and Press. War Department concerned with effect
 on purchasing power of American soldiers in FRANCE. For information
 following action taken.

2. Appropriate United States Government Agencies
 agreed 31 January, UNITED STATES would negotiate with French author-
 ities to alleviate situation. Negotiations would consider measures
 whereby French authorities would furnish wholesale at cost to
 United States Military Post Exchanges certain luxury and semi luxury
 goods, and French would subsidize restaurants and recreational clubs
 for exclusive use of United States military personnel and their
 guests, with United States Authorities furnishing food for such
 restaurants and clubs, and whereby such arrangements would be in-
 corporated in prospective reverse lend lease agreement for Metropol-
 itan FRANCE. Identical letters dated 20 February from Secretary War
 to Secretary Treasury and Secretary State confirmed agreement reach-
 ed.

3. Letter of 24 February from Secretary Treasury to
 Secretary War, stated Treasury had initiated discussions with French
 relative proposals in paragraph 2 and it was understood by Treas-
 ury Department proposals were being considered by French Government
 in PARIS.

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REF NO: W-50890

10 MARCH 1945

SHAEP 233/10

4. Letter of 2 March from Acting Secretary State to Secretary War advised that State Department expected to associate itself with discussions on subject with MONNET, before he returns to PARIS; also that inclusion of proposals in reverse lend lease agreements with French would have further delayed signing these agreements which would not have been to the best interests of UNITED STATES. War Department reply will stress importance of subject and urge negotiations with French be vigorously pursued.

5. You will be kept informed of developments.

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
G-4
G-1
SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE)
COM ZONE
[REDACTED]
SHAEP FWD
AQ RECORDS

SMC IN 3561 10 March 1945 2327A MM/jes REF NO: W-50890

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222nd ROBERTSON

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RESTRICTED
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AFQ 757
7 March 1945

ADMINISTRATIVE (CLASSIC)
NUMBER 49

DISPOSITION OF CURRENCY AND OTHER FINANCIAL ASSETS
SEIZED FROM ENEMY FORCES OR FOUND ABANDONED

1. Definitions. For the purpose of this administrative Memorandum:

a. Liberated territory means the territory of any of the United Nations in the European Theater of Operations.

b. Enemy territory means the territory of the German Reich and Austria prior to 31 December 1937.

c. Financial assets, excludes currency but includes, inter-alia, uncancelled stamps of all kinds, cheques, securities of all kinds including certificates of deposit or receipts therefor, foreign exchange assets, gold (in bullion or coin), silver or platinum in bullion form, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, commercial paper, bank books, postal, giro or other money orders, letters of credit and jewels.

2. Currency Seized from Enemy Forces. All currency, except that taken from Prisoners of War or agents or suspects taken into custody, seized by the Allied Forces from enemy forces, whether in Allied or enemy territory, will be handed over against receipt, to the nearest Finance Officer/Paymaster, or Civil Affairs/Military Government Sub-accountant with a detailed report of the circumstances in which the currency was found. Currency so turned over will be treated as follows:

a. If still legal tender in the country of issue, it will be brought on to the books of the Finance Officer/Paymaster or Civil Affairs/Military Government Sub-accountant as captured funds and used for requirements in the territory in which the currency is legal tender. The Finance Officer/Paymaster will send in duplicate, to the Controller of Finance and Accounts G-5/Civil Affairs of the appropriate Army Group, details of the amounts thus taken on to his books.

b. If no longer legal tender in the country of issue, the Finance Officer/Paymaster or Civil Affairs/Military Government Sub-accountant will accept the money on a hand receipt and will not enter it into his accounts. Finance Officers/Paymasters will turn over the currency, securing hand receipt, to the Controller of Finance and Accounts, G-5/Civil Affairs of the appropriate Army Group.

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(1A)

THESE THESIS
BY
JAMES H. HARRIS

1. There is no evidence that the defendant is a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America.

0. In all cases, the above information should be provided in the same way and placed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5, above.

Continued on next page

6. Currency and Financial Assets Found Abandoned or Discarded.

[illegible]

3. If taken in known territory, they will be turned over, against receipt, with full details of the circumstances in which they were discovered to the nearest United States Government Officer to be retained as evidence; properly indexed; filed.

3. The articles have been found.

3. Financial Assets Seized from Enemy Forces. Financial assets taken from enemy forces, other than livestock or cash or property of suspects taken into custody, will be treated as follows:

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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THIS IS A REPRODUCTION OF A COM INCOMING MESSAGE.

S E C R E T

F R I O R I T Y

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER
TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR █ CCS FOR CCAC
FOR INFO : ETOUSA, AMSSO █ ECE, HQ ALCOM
PASSED TO : SHAEP MAIN FOR █
REF █ : PX-36444, 2 MARCH 1945

MAT-568.

Summaries of statement by Secretary of Treasury MORGENTHAU before Congressional Committee on 27 February on subject of invasion currencies, have [] reported in Italian press. His reported disclosure that Italian Government has assumed responsibility for [] lire under armistice, has called forth headlined comment in ITALY, including [] by Finance Minister SOLERI, to effect that it would be "unjust" to expect ITALY to be responsible for [] lire. This reaction [] not unexpected, in view of Italian Government's memorandum of 9 January demanding complete dollar/sterling reimbursement for all lire expended by or on account of Allied Forces, which memorandum [] forwarded to you by this Hqs on 28 February by air mail with [] comments. [] Italian Government has gone far to connect stability of lire with such reimbursement in minds of public.

In connection with our study of paragraphs 1B of TAW-445, as mentioned MAP-554, it would be helpful have official summary of Secretary MORGENTHAU's statement. any additional information subject which you consider relevant.

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SMC IN 891

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(CONTINUED)

ACTION
INFORMATION

AGWAR

G-1
G-5
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SHAFF
AG RECORDS

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- 2 -

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT -- DECEMBER

SUPREMACY OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

ARTICLE I

GENERAL

ARTICLE II

Allied Military Marks.

1. Allied Military Mark Notes of the denominations specified in the Schedule hereto shall be legal tender in the occupied territory of Germany for the payment of any Mark debt.
2. Allied Military Mark Notes will in all respects be equivalent to any other legal tender Mark currency of the same face value.
3. No person shall discriminate between Allied Military Marks and any other legal tender Mark currency of equal face value.

ARTICLE III

Prohibited Transactions.

4. Except as authorized by Military Government, no person shall make or enter, or offer to enter, into any arrangement or transaction providing for payment in or delivery of a currency other than Marks.

ARTICLE IV

Penalties.

5. Any person violating any provision of this Law shall, upon conviction by a Military Government Court, be liable to any lawful punishment other than death, as the Court may determine.

ARTICLE V

Enactment Date.

6. This Law shall become effective upon the date of its first promulgation.

BY ORDER OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

SCHEDULE

Denominations of Allied Military Mark Notes (Marks)	Size (in cm.)	Words and Figures indicating amount and printed in
0.20	6.7 x 7.6	Green
1	6.7 x 7.6	Dark Blue
5	6.7 x 7.6	Reddish Purple
10	6.7 x 11.2	Dark Blue
20	6.7 x 15.6	Red
50	6.7 x 15.6	Dark Blue
100	6.7 x 15.6	Reddish Purple
1,000	6.7 x 15.6	Green

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(K)

On the face of all notes are printed :

- (a) The amount in words-Ruhs : "Mafzig Pfennig, ■■■ Mark, etc." Also the amount in figures-Ruhs : "1/2" (on the Pf.50 note) 1 (on the M.1 note), etc.
- (b) The words "Wilhelm Heilbrunn" at the top ■ the note.
- (c) The words "In Umlauf gesetzt in Deutschland", "Serie 1944", and the serial number of the note. On the notes for Pf.20, 50, 100 and 1,000 all of these appear twice.

The basic colour of the field on the face of all the notes is light blue; on the back it is reddish brown.

INCOMING MESSAGE

FOO 091409Z FEB

SHAFF 232/09
TOR 091820A FEB
bj 092030A FEB

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

FROM : AGMAR FROM CCS
TO FOR ACTION : SHAFF [REDACTED] FOR SBGE
FOR INFO : CCAC/L, UK BASE SECTION, SHAFF REAR, BJSB
BCS
REF NO : WX-34327 09 FEBRUARY 1945 CITE: CCAC

GQV - 218

Dissemination of information to Belgian Government

1. The United States Treasury Department states, that it has been informed by the Belgian Embassy in WASHINGTON, that the Belgian Government would like to obtain the following information:

A. The total advances of Belgian franc currency made by the SHAEF Currency Section for BELGIUM to United States Forces, up to 31 December 1944, and the breakdown of these advances according to denomination

B. A monthly statement providing information comparable to that in sub-paragraph A. above for each month, subsequent to 31 December 1944, each monthly statement to be furnished as soon as the information is available.

C. If the information in sub-paragraph A above, is not available at this time for the period up to 31 December 1944, the Belgian Government desires to be provided with such information up to the most recent date, for which the information is available.

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CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO: WX-34327 09 FEBRUARY 1945

SHAEF 232/09

2. Subject to your comments, you are requested to provide the information outlined in paragraph 1 above, to the Belgian Government. It is considered that the Belgian Government is entitled to have such information and that the information will be of considerable value to that Government in connection with the currency reconversion program in BELGIUM. Comparable information as to advances made to Allied Forces, other than United States Forces should, subject to your comments, and subject to concurrence to be obtained by you from the individual Government, to whose forces the advances were made, also be made available if requested by the Belgian Government.

3. The United States Treasury Department, states that the request from the Belgian Government did not ask for information, which might be utilized to determine net amounts of Belgian franc currency, used for pay and allowances of troops, of the various national armies in BELGIUM. Records at SHAEF, do not contain the details necessary to determine finally net amounts of Belgian franc currency used for pay and allowances of troops of the respective Allied Governments.

If the Belgian Government indicates to you, that such information is also desired, it is advisable for you to inform the Belgian Government, that such information is not available at SHAEF in full detail; also, to suggest that BJCB data be obtained unilaterally from the respective Allied Governments and that insofar as STATES is concerned, the Belgian authorities will be advised through the United States Treasury Department in WASHINGTON.

ACTION

: G-5

INFORMATION

: SGS

G-1

G-4

AMERICAN [REDACTED] PARIS
BRITISH EMBASSY PARIS
POLITICAL OFF

SUMMARY
AG RECORDS



9 Feb 45

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HPK/11

REF NO: WX-34327

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

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FOR 021245A
8h 021257A

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

D E F E R R E D

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS.
TO : ACTION : ALLIED FORCE HQ TO ALEXANDER : PHIB.
FOR INFO : RFOUSA, BJSN TO FUS.
PASSED TO : SHARP MAIN FOR INFO.
REF NO : WX-30628, 1 FEB 1945, CITE:OC30

TAM-445

Proposals for Modification of United States/United
Kingdom Financial Relations with Italian Government.

Reference: MAP-953.

1. The following proposals for the modification of United States/United Kingdom relations with the Italian Government in the financial field are under consideration:

A. All functions performed by the Allied Financial Agency with reference to territory which [] been returned to the Italian Government should be promptly terminated. This will involve, amongst others, the cessation by Allied Financial Agency of its present practices of making lire available for [] payment of remittances from Allied countries and for the purpose of procuring goods for export. It will also involve [] cessation of collection by Allied Financial Agency of payment in lire for civilian supplies turned [] to the Italians, except as such

5.

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REF ■ WX-30628,

1 FEB 1945,

SHAEP 136/2

collection may be necessary in AMG territory.

B. The controls exercised by AFA over Italian external financial transactions, such as payments out of the post-liberation accounts in the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM, should be terminated. The Italian Government should be required, in place of these controls, to keep the Allied Commission informed of its external financial transactions. This will enable the Commission to recommend to CCS the reimposition of controls under the Armistice should it regard such action as necessary.

C. The remaining functions of AFA would then be concerned solely with the financial operations of the Allied Military Forces and of AMG in forward areas. These should be performed under the direct supervision and control of AFHQ, to which AFA should be transferred as promptly as possible.

D. Full information should be made available to the Italian Government concerning those activities of AFA which will hereafter be the responsibility of the Italian Government. However, books and other records of AFA must not be released by AFA except as specifically authorized by CCS.

E. Negotiations through diplomatic channels should be undertaken with the Italian Government with a view to bringing about the centralization of all currency issues in the Italian Government or such agencies as it may designate, and the recognition that the Italian Government, or such agency thereof as it may designate, is the issuing authority for the Allied Military lire now in circulation in Italy. The arrangements made with the Italian Government should include provision for the supply of an adequate volume of lira currency and credits to meet the operational needs of the Allied Forces and to supplement the requisition procedures of the Italian authorities in purchasing supplies and services for the Allied Military Forces in Italy; also provision for meeting the requests of the Italian Government for the printing and supplying of the necessary quantities of lira currency for all Italian needs. Should adequate quantities of lira currency not be available to the Military Forces at any time, the right would be reserved to AFHQ to use any other currency it deemed desirable.

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REF NO WX-30628,

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2. The clause in Paragraph 1E above which reads "to supplement the requisition procedures of the Italian authorities in purchasing supplies and services for Allied Military Forces in Italy" is intended to provide for the establishment of a lira account as proposed in MAT-353.

3. Before any final decision is taken on whether discussions should be opened with the Italian Government along the general lines of the foregoing proposals, it is considered necessary that your views relative thereto should first be obtained. The detailed working out of these proposals will require time and careful negotiation but your immediate comments are requested on the main heads of these proposals as are also your views with regard to the desirability of putting them to the Italian Government at this time. Your reply earliest will be appreciated.

ACTION

COM ZONE

INFORMATION

SGS

G-1

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G-4

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AG RECORDS

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2 Feb 45

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

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TOO 260143Z

JAN 26/26
FOR 261340A JAN
MID 262026A JAN

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ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR COMBINED CHIEFS OF
 TO FOR ACTION : AFHQ FOR ALEXANDER
 FOR INFO : SHAEF MAIN FOR EISENHOWER, BRITISH JOINT STAFF
 MISSION FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
 REF NO : WX-26925, 26 JANUARY 1945

BOOK MESSAGE.

FAN 485.

Financial Guide-AUSTRIA is Subject.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 1 of FAN-411 advising you that the Financial Guide on AUSTRIA transmitted separately.

2. For planning purposes you should that adequate supplies of Allied Military schillings are available and that Allied Forces within AUSTRIA will use Allied Military schillings (hereinafter called A. M. schillings). Records should be kept of the amounts of all A.M. schillings used by the Forces of each Nation. The following provisions should apply for the use of A.M. schillings:

A. A.M. schillings will be declared to be legal tender in AUSTRIA. Such currency will circulate in AUSTRIA interchangeably with reichsmarks at a rate of blank A.M. schillings for blank reichsmarks. Reichskreditkassenscheine and other German Military currency will not be legal tender in AUSTRIA.

See 48-044.1 and 4

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26 JANUARY 1945,

SHARP 130/26

B. [] rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of Troops and Military accounting purposes will [] blank A.M. schillings to the [] States dollar and blank A.M. schillings [] the pound sterling. A general rate of exchange may be furnished [] you later. Holders, other than Allied Military personnel, of schilling and reichsmark currency [] deposits will not [] entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars [] pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.

3. In the event that adequate supplies of A.M. schillings are not available, US Forces should plan to use United States yellow seal dollars and regular United States coin and British Forces should plan to use British Military authority notes and regular British coin. Records should be kept of the amount of such currencies used. The following provisions should apply for [] use of United States yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes:

A. The rate of exchange between the United States yellow seal dollar and the British Military Authority notes will be 4.035 dollars to 1 pound, and the 2 currencies will be inter-changeable at [] rate. [] United States Treasury will [] the necessary arrangement with the British Treasury.

B. If necessary, [] proclamation should be issued requiring all persons to accept United States yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes [] the decided rates. Transactions at any other rates should be prohibited.

C. The issuance of United [] yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes will cease and A.M. schilling currency will be used in their place [] soon as available.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET 130/26

D. United States yellow seal dollars. British Military Authority notes should be withdrawn from circulation as such withdrawal be satisfactorily accomplished.

4. A Financial Division should be established within the Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA. It should include in its functions the control of A.M. schillings to be used by the Allied Military Forces within the [redacted] including receipt, storage, issue, exchange, and shipment of such currency. It should maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of such currency, as well as financial data which may be useful in the determination of expenditures arising out of operations. Activities involving participation of Allied Military Forces.

A. In so far as operations relate to the provision of A.M. schillings for the pay and other cash requirements of Military operations of Allied Forces, the Financial Division should draw the necessary [redacted] from the currency reserve of the Allied Military Forces and should record the debit against the Army concerned.

B. In so far as operations relate to the provision of A.M. schillings for civil administration, the Financial Division should draw the currency reserve of the Allied Military Forces and should record the debit against the Allied Military Government.

C. If found practicable and desirable, the VIENNA Branch of the Reichsbank, or any branch of the Reichsbank, may be designated under direct Military Control and supervision, as that for the Financial Division of the Allied Military Government. If for any reason it proves impracticable to use the Reichsbank for this purpose, any other [redacted] satisfactory to the Allied Military Government may be used. When satisfied [redacted] designated bank is under adequate control, such bank may [redacted] for official business of the Allied Military Government, and, if necessary, by making credits available, the Allied Military Government may place such bank in a position to finance other banks and branches thereof for the conduct of their business approved by the Allied Military Government.

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REF : VX-26925 JANUARY 1945 130/26

Simultaneously, steps should be taken to sever all connections between designated bank and GERMANY to issue such instructions as will enable the designated bank to perform the central bank functions deemed necessary by Allied Military Government.

D. records of Financial Division of the Allied Military Government for AUSTRIA should indicate in all cases what currency receipts disbursements made by the Financial Division.

5. In your planning you will that, further advised, the Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA will take only the following steps relative to financial mentioned below except further measures may strictly necessary from a Military standpoint:

A. A general limited moratorium will be declared if necessary. particular, it prove desirable to prevent foreclosures of mortgages and the exercise of similar remedies by creditors against individuals small business enterprises.

B. Banks should be placed under control necessary order that adequate facilities for Military needs may provided and to insure instructions and regulations issued by the Military Authorities will fully complied with. closed temporarily in order to facilitate the introduction of satisfactory control. As soon as practicable, should required file reports listing assets and liabilities, all accounts in excess of 25,000 marks or the equivalent in schillings.

C. Regulations should issued prescribing the purposes for which credit may extended and terms and conditions governing the extension of credit.

D. All stock exchanges similar financial institutions should be closed.

E. Pending determination of future disposition, all gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers all similar

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

NO: WX-26925.

26 JANUARY 1945

130/26

assets held by or on behalf of [redacted] forgoing, [redacted] be impounded or blocked and should be used or otherwise dealt with only [redacted] permitted [redacted] licenses or other instructions issued by the Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA.

(1) Enemy Governments, the agencies, and instrumentalities thereof;

(2) Owners [redacted] holders, including neutral and United Nations Governments or National Authorities, absent from the areas under the control of [redacted] Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA.

(3) [redacted] Party Organizations, including the Party formations, affiliates, and supervised associations, and the Officials, leading members, and supporters thereof.

(4) Persons under detention or other types of custody by Allied Military Authorities.

F. No Governmental or private bank [redacted] agency should be allowed to issue any notes or currency.

G. [redacted] proclamation should [redacted] issued immediately prohibiting all transfers of other dealings in real estate and securities except under license.

6. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange [redacted] all foreign financial [redacted] foreign trade transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency, should be prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as may be issued by the Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA. Immediately upon occupying the country, arrangements should [redacted] made for policing [redacted] Austrian borders [redacted] order especially to prevent the importation of Reichsmark currency [redacted] securities. Except [redacted] otherwise authorized by the Allied Military Government, local [redacted] should be permitted to open and operate only schilling and mark accounts; but, if yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes [redacted] legal tender, they may [redacted] accepted at the decreed rate of exchange and should be turned [redacted] as directed by the Military Authorities in exchange for schilling (or mark) currency at the decreed rate of exchange.

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ND: WX-26925.

26 JANUARY 1945

SHAEP 130/26

7. yellow seal United States dollar notes regular pound notes will not be legal. No person, agency or bank engaged in exchange of money should be allowed to acquire or otherwise deal in notes except as the military authorities may authorize. US Army Navy Finance Officers British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept yellow seal 50 dollar notes and regular British pound notes from States and British Military or authorized personnel conversion into local currency at the decreed of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to of the notes.

8. All Government pensions, allowances, social security payments, should continue be paid, steps should be taken as soon as practicable for a study of pensioners records with a view to nullifying all and undesirable pensions inception.

9. The Railways, Postal, Telegraph, Telephone Services, radio and all Government monopolies should be placed under the control of the Military Authorities and these revenues made available to the Military Government.

10. You will, consistent with international custom and usage, maintain existing tax laws, except discriminatory taxes introduced the Nazi Regime should be abolished. Prompt action be taken to the inflow of at the highest possible level. You will resume service on the public debt as soon as Military financial conditions permit, after consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

11. In the administration of financial matters, Allied Military Government of AUSTRIA may at its discretion, accept the service of any Austrian Nationals may place themselves at its disposal and who are deemed to be acceptable after appropriate investigation.

12. In planning you should in mind that it is intended to conduct a general conversion into A.M. schillings of the Reichsmark Rentenmark currency circulation in

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

REF NO: WX-26925. 26 JANUARY 1945 SHAEF 130/26

AUSTRIA as soon as practicable after complete occupation.
You will receive further instructions on this matter but
in the meantime you should not make plans which would
conflict with this objective.

PAN 411 ■ longer in SHAEF SMC files.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS
AG RECORDS

SMC IN 9890 27 Jan 45 0545A JCB/ppm Ref No: WX 26925

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ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division

X file No 1
X 101 Smith
X 101 Bannett

SHAM/0-5(Exec)/17/5

30 December 1944

Counterfeit Supplemental

TO: Chief

I.

1. While I was away recently, I came up with Division the question of forged supplemental notes.

will be the forgeries of 500 franc and 1,000 franc that at the request of the French Treasury, the Allied had already discontinued of 500 franc and 1,000 franc supplemental notes.

The of has some 5,200 forgeries the public and they are still in - but at a reduced rate.

The value of supplemental notes returned to the of France exceeds 5,000,000,000 francs which exceeds 50% of the amount issued. The 500 franc and 1,000 franc supplemental note is therefore rapidly disappearing circulation.

42 persons, suspected of being implicated in the have been the French the forgery presses.

Up to present no forgeries of the note have appeared and it is unlikely that forgeries of denominated than will be attempted any dangerous.

2. regards specific points you mentioned, action is being as follows:-

(a) of 100 supplemental -

(i) US Army. The Fiscal Director has upwards of 300 Finance Officers holding of 100 franc. He has called for returns of the amounts they will require to replace their stocks with Bank of France notes. As soon as he knows quantities required, he will arrange, the French Treasury agree, for the discontinuation of 100 franc supplemental as and when the Bank of France notes can be provided in their place.

(ii) British Army. The discontinues the issue of supplemental notes as the Fiscal Director is in position to.

(b) notes presented the Allied Forces -

(i) US Army. Some 362 forgeries have been presented by troops value say 196,000 francs (\$4,000). The names and particulars of presenting being.

(ii) British Army. Only forgeries have been reported.

1950, by Governments forged notes unusual.

Although there have been large scale forgeries in US and UK of dollar and sterling notes, no case is known where reimbursement has been made officially.

Approved
14/10 B. Smith

To G-5.
Gen. G. G. G.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
CONFIDENTIAL
Date 6 AUG 1945

50 DEC

The Fiscal Director states that he has no appropriation which could be used for the purpose.

If reimbursement were contemplated, investigations would have to be made into the circumstances in which certain forged notes were acquired.

II. Action Recommended.

4. ■ is recommended that the Fiscal Director continue to keep records but that any question of reimbursement by the US/UK Governments or by the French Government, should in no event be raised until it is clear that the forgeries put into circulation have substantially disappeared.

A.E. GRABET,

1st. General,

Chief of Staff, G-5.

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOD 242040Z DEC

SHAEP 17/25
FOR 250030A DEC
dg -250202A DEC

SECRET

AQUINA

FROM : AQWAR FROM CCS

TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP MAIN FOR SHOE

FOR INFO : CCAC/L, HQ BASE SECTION FOR BCS, SHAEP REAR,
COMMUNICATION ZONE, SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE)

REF NO : WX-82028 24 DECEMBER 1944 CITE: CCAC

GOV.179

Rights of French Authorities under Currency Agreement.

1. In connection with determination of dollar credits accruing to provisional French Government on account of United States Army net spending in FRANCE, M GUINDEY of French Treasury in WASHINGTON has complained to War Department that, contrary to provisions of present agreement between French and SCAMP relating to administration of Civil Affairs in FRANCE, the French Authorities in PARIS are not permitted to inspect the financial records of SCAMP.

2. Subject to your comments, which are requested earliest, it is proposed that M GUINDEY be informed by chairman of CCAC substantially as follows:

A. SCAMP is desirous of complying with provisions of above mentioned agreement and is considered to be so doing. It is believed that such misunderstanding as may exist in this regard arises, as indicated below, from the fact that SCAMP does not keep the records specifically referred to by M GUINDEY, namely, records indicating the dollar equivalent of the net pay and allowances of United States Army personnel spent in FRANCE.

3MC IN 8622

6 1352

SECRET

COPY NO

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SECRET

Ref File No 723

24/12/44

SECRET

REF NO: WX-82028

24 DECEMBER 1944

17/25

B. According to the provisions of above mentioned agreement, French Authorities are to be kept fully informed, and regularly as practical, of all expenditures in French franc notes specified in the agreement relating to currency. It is further stipulated therein that the Tresor Central Francais will appoint a representative especially for this purpose. However as implied above records SCAEF do not contain the details necessary to determine net of French franc currency used for pay and allowances of United States Troops in FRANCE. This data is only obtainable unilaterally from respective Allied Government, insofar as STATES is concerned the French Authorities will be advised through the United States Treasury Department in WASHINGTON.

ACTION

G-5

INFORMATION

SCS

G-4

SHAEF MISSION (FRANCE)

POL OFF

AG RECORDS



IN 8622

25 Dec 1944

0525A

DWR/jes

REF NO: WX-82028

6 1953

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF

STAFF [REDACTED] CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WATZ

200 2018242 DEC

SHAFER 95/21
TOR 211000A DBO
VIB 211105A DBO

ADDRESS

RELIFE

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS

TO FOR ACTION : SHARE MAIN FOR SHOE

FOR INFO : CCAC/L, UK BASE SECTION FOR SCS, SMC
REAR, COMMUNICATION ZONE, SHAEP MISSION
FRANCE

REF ID: A66587
 INT. NO. : HK-79881 20 DEC 1944 CITE CCAC

GOV 177

Delivers of provisional non-military French franc currency.

Reference V04 242.

1. Prior to arrival of French cruiser for purpose mentioned in VOG 235, approximately 5,343 boxes of subject currency has been taken under military control at port of embarkation in NEW YORK. These boxes are being put on board army transports as rapidly as possible in conformity with authorization contained in VOG 221. You will be notified as to boat numbers and number of boxes on each boat as soon as such information is available.

2. In addition to the boxes mentioned in paragraph 1 above, there are available in NEW YORK under control of the United States Treasury Department approximately 11,600 boxes plus unspecified amounts being currently produced. The number of boxes which French cruiser can transport is estimated at approximately 10,000. Thus the amount mentioned in this paragraph will exceed her capacity.

SAC IN 7147

6 1354

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~

REF NO: WX-79881

20 DEC 1944

SHAEP 95/21

12/17

Reference VOG 235, if such proves to be the case, after French cruiser is fully loaded, it is anticipated that at the request of the United States Treasury Department shipments of this currency to you will be resumed through military channels, reference VOG 221, in accordance with presently established procedure. With further reference to VOG 236, shipments have been made to you on 2 boats since 1 November 1944, amounts being respectively 797 boxes, said to contain 25,504,000 notes of 100 franc denomination. And 195 boxes, said to contain 6,240,000 notes of 500 franc denomination.

3. Paragraph 2 of VOG 221 is not understood. Shipments are under custody and control of Cargo Security Officer until delivered to you and it is supposed that you will give instructions regarding containers to the officers who receive the above mentioned currency when the shipments arrive at ports in your Theater.

4. Reference paragraph 3 of VOG 233, United States Treasury Department advises that boxes of subject currency for shipment on GLOIRE will be delivered direct by United States Treasury Department to French authorities without War Department intermediary.

5. Relative to release by you of boxes of subject currency to French Treasury, authorization requested in VOG 193 and paragraph 3, VOG 221, has been transmitted in GOV 175 to you. 12/17

VOG-242, Ref No. 371235 is SMC OUT 2246, 17/12/44, G-5
VOG-233, Ref No. 3-70250 is SMC OUT 1238, 10/12/44, G-5
VOG-221, Ref No. 3-69145 is SMC OUT 115, 1/12/44, G-5
VOG-236, Ref No. 3-76440 is SMC OUT 1434, 11/12/44, G-5
VOG-193, Ref No. 3-67651 is SMC OUT 6589, 20/11/44, G-5
GOV 175, Ref No. WX-76817 is SMC IN 6438, 19/12/44, G-5

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE)
G-4
POLITICAL OFFICERS
G-1

ANGLIP (SHAEP)
G-2
AG RECORDS

6 1355

SMC IN 7147

21 Dec 44 1337A

DWR/1p

REF NO: WX-79881

-2-

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR
TOO 161705Z DEC

SHAEP 90/19
TOR 190930A
vrb 191115A DEC

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS
TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP MAIN FOR SHOE
FOR INFO : CCAC/L, UK BASE SECTION FOR BCS, SHAEP
HEAR, COMMUNICATION ZONE, SHAEP MISSION
FRANCE
REF NO : WX-78817 18 DEC 1944 CITE: [REDACTED]

DOV 175.

Delivery of Provisionary Non Military
French Franc Currency.

Reference para 4 GOV 133.

1. Reference VOG 193 and para 3 of VOG
221, you are authorized to release to French treasury,
against receipt, stocks of provisional Military French
Franc currency now held by you. You are also authorized
to release in the same manner additional amounts of this
currency which may as heretofore come into your possession
from shipments of such currency to you through Military
channels.

2. Reply to other points mentioned in
VOG 221 and to VOGS 235 and 236 will follow earliest.
VOG 233 ref no S-70250 is 1238 10/12/44 G-5
GOV 133 ref no W-50098 is IN 5374 20/10/44 G-5
VOG 193 ref no S-67651 OUT 6589 20/11/44 G-5
VOG 201 ref S-69145 is SMC OUT 115 1/12/44 G-5
VOG 236 ref S-70440 is SMC OUT 1433 11/12/44 G-5
ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGG SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE) POL OFFICERS
G-4 G-1 SUMMARY AG RECORDS
BMD IN 6438 19 Dec 1944 12104 WKS/jes REF NO: WX-78817
COPY NO.

SECRET

1358

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DOV 177 20/12/44

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 181707Z DEC

SHAEP 73/19
TOR 190820A DEC
1jt 191208A DEC

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS
FOR ACTION : MAIN FOR
FOR INFO : CCAC/L, COMMUNICATION ZONE, UK
SECTION FOR BCS, SHAEP REAR
REF NO : VK-78818, 18 1944. CITE: CCAC

GOV-176.

1. Exchange of AM marks withdrawn from circulation in EUPEN, MALMEDY and LUXEMBURG.

1. Since War and Navy Departments no authority to process vouchers at other than official rates of exchange, it is necessary that AM marks withdrawn from population in EUPEN, MALMEDY and LUXEMBURG and presented to you for exchange by Belgian and Luxembourg Governments, under circumstances set forth in VOG-177, be exchanged by United States Army Finance Officers and by United States Navy Disbursing Officers for Belgian francs at the rate of 4.37732 Belgian francs equals 1 AM mark.

2. Exchange rates referred to in paragraph 1 above will apply as regards United States Forces. If British Forces are involved, you should refer matter again to CCS for decision as to rate to be used by British Forces.

3. Any AM marks which come into the hands of the population subsequent to the completion of currency

IN 6441

6 1357

SECRET

COPY NO. 8

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SECRET

SHAEP 505 file No.

123

18 DEC

NO: WI-78818, 18 DECEMBER 1944.

SHAEF 73/19

SECRET

conversion program in above mentioned and which
may be regarded as eligible for exchange by the Belgian
Authorities should be exchanged at the rate of 4.37732
Belgian francs equals 1

VOG 177-ref no S-65253 is OUT 4174 3/11/44 G-5

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SCS
G-1
G-4
EACS
POL OFFICERS
MR MURPHY
RECORDS

SMC IN 6441 19 Dec 1944 1237A DWR/jes REFNO: WI 78818



6 1358

-2-

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR [REDACTED] CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR COMBINED
CIVIL AFFAIRS [REDACTED]

FOR INFO : HILDRING, CENTRAL [REDACTED] JK [REDACTED] FOR BCS;
TROOPERS FOR F-5; COMINCH; SHAEP [REDACTED] TO
FRANCE FOR MEQEC

FROM : SHAEP MAIN [REDACTED] EISENHOWER

REFNO : 872235

VOG 242

We [REDACTED] informed by French Treasury Officials
here that letter required by you under para 1 of Gov 163 [REDACTED]
been provided and that release to French was approved by you.

If this is correct, your confirmation to us
would be appreciated.

Also early receipt of information requested in
VOG 236 would facilitate decisions here regarding distribution
of currency throughout FRANCE.

X Gov 153 ref WK-71208 is SMC IN 505 2/12/44 G-5
122 VOG 236 ref no S-70440 is SMC OUT 1433 11/12/44 G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: W. M. CURTIN JR
Major GSC

INFORMATION : 1 SGS
G-1
G-4
POL OFFICERS
SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE)
ANCF (SHAEP)
COM ZONE
AG RECORDS

COORDINATED : G-4 (MOV & TR)

SMC OUT 2246 17 Dec 1944 1631A DWR/jes REF NO: S-71235
TOD: 171630A

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO.

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SHAEP SCS File No. 133

17 DEC

6 1353

~~SECRET~~

SUPREME [REDACTED]
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Supply & Economics Branch
G-5 Division

15 December 1944

x 201.5 Snowden
x 201.5 Smith
x 0141 Fr.

SHAERSSG File No. 123

[REDACTED] Chief of Staff

Immediately following [REDACTED] meeting with you this afternoon [REDACTED] the subject of counterfeit money, Brigadier Babington-Smith and I conferred with General Cobb, Fiscal Director, E.T.O.

General [REDACTED] will interview the [REDACTED] authorities [REDACTED] the proposition [REDACTED] removing all supplementary currency from circulation, especially the [REDACTED] hundred franc notes. Immediate solution of the problem may [REDACTED] delayed by [REDACTED] fact that the French [REDACTED] presently [REDACTED] Banque of [REDACTED] notes for replacement.

The counterfeit notes which have come into the possession of the Fiscal Director to date amount to 178; 10 one thousand franc notes and 168 five hundred franc notes. The names and addresses of personnel affected are of record. A study will be made of the best means to make reimbursement.

[REDACTED] Fiscal Director is alive [REDACTED] the seriousness of the problem and will do everything possible in cooperation [REDACTED] the French officials to carry out your instructions.

The British Fiscal Director is being contacted [REDACTED] ascertain [REDACTED] situation in the British area.

[REDACTED] will keep you informed of developments.

FFS/re

T. F. [REDACTED]

P. F. [REDACTED]
Major General, [REDACTED]

File
9/11/44
16 DEC 1944
JWS

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO CONFIDENTIAL
By authority of CALA
By [REDACTED]
Date 16 AUG 1945

6 1360

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR [REDACTED] OF STAFF [REDACTED] COMBINED
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEEFOR INFO : MILDERING, CENTRAL DISTRICT [REDACTED] BASE FOR BRITISH
OUTPOST OF STAFF, PROCEEDING FOR P.S. CONTINUED
SHARP MISSION TO FRANCE FOR MIREU

FROM : [REDACTED] MAIN SIGNED [REDACTED]

REF NO. : 5-70514

VOG 237

Correction of reference [REDACTED] VOG 233.

VOG 211 should [REDACTED] VOG 221.

VOG 233 ref 5-70250 [REDACTED] SMC OUT 1230 10/12/44 G-5
VOG 211 ref 5-68463 1a SMC OUT 7404 26/11/44 G-2

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: A GOINGS
CWO USA

INFORMATION

: SGS
SHAEP [REDACTED]
G-4
POL OFF
MR MURPHY
COM [REDACTED]
G-1
ANCKF (SHAEP)
AG RECORDSSMC OUT 1504 12 Dec 1944 1343A RK/jee REF NO: 5-70514
2001 121415A

SGS	SC	DAC	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
SGS	SC	DAC	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

6 1891

SECRET

COPY NO. 9

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500-SHAEP File No.

12 Dec

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR INFO : CENTRAL DISTRICT [REDACTED] FOR BGS, TROOPERS
FOR F-5, COMENCH, SHARP MISSION TO FRANCE
FOR MEGEC [REDACTED]

FROM : SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED

REF NO S-70440

٧٠٩ ٢٣٦

Reference VOG 233. - 105

GLOIRE has sailed ETA [REDACTED] YORK 16 December for purpose described VOG 233.

SHANK did not concur awaiting your reply to
VOG 233.

In present circumstances we have no objection to shipment being made **■ GLOIRE** if you consider desirable provided French have full responsibility for security of currency after loading.

Understand very short time available for turn-
round. All arrangements must therefore be made by you at
your end if shipment is desired.

Please inform earliest.

A. What has been shipped since November 1.

B. What arrangements you [redacted] concerning GLOIRE or any further shipments. App. Gov'ts. 18 Dec

SMC ■ 1433

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

ALL YOU GET
179X
COST NO
CIVILIAN

DOI: 10.1002/anie.200701070

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

REF NO: S-70440 (Cont'd)

VOG 233 Ref No S-70250 is SMO OUT 1238, 10/12/44, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOLWOS, CMO, USA

INFORMATION : SGS ✓ COORD WITH: G-4
G-4

SHAEP MISSION (FRANCE)

MR MURPHY

POLITICAL OFFICERS

COM ZONE

■-1

ANCKY (SHAEP)

G-2

AG RECORDS



SMO OUT 1433

11 Dec 44

1931A

DWR/et

Ref No: S-70440

100-111845A

SECRET

- 2 -

6 1353

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 112259Z DEC

SHAEF 55/12
TOR 120405A
120512A

SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : AGWAR [REDACTED] HILLDRING, SIGNED MARSHALL
 TO : [REDACTED] MAIN TO EISENHOWER FOR SHOE
 REF NO : W-75682, 11 [REDACTED] 1944

Exchange of [REDACTED] withdrawn from
 circulation in EUPEN, MALMEDY and LUXEMBOURG.

Following is proposed answer to VOG 177
 as agreed upon by interested [REDACTED] STATES authorities
 but which has been referred to LONDON by British Treasury
 Delegation before giving [REDACTED] concurrence:

"Since War [REDACTED] Navy departments have
 no authority to process vouchers at other [REDACTED] official
 rates of exchange, it is necessary that AM marks withdrawn
 from population in EUPEN, MALMEDY [REDACTED] LUXEMBOURG [REDACTED]
 presented to you for exchange by Belgian and Luxembourg
 Governments, under circumstances set forth in VOG 177,
 be exchanged by UNITED STATES Army Finance Officers and
 by UNITED STATES Navy Disbursing Officers for Belgian
 francs at the rate of 4.37732 Belgian francs equals 1 [REDACTED]
 mark."

Reply from LONDON has not yet been received.

Combined answer will be dispatched as soon
 as possible following receipt of British views.

VOG 177 is S 65253, SMC OUT 4174, 3/11/44, G-5

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS 4-1 COM ZONE AG RECORDS

SMC IN 3962 12 Dec 44 0538a 108/ppm Ref No: W 75682

6 1364

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF [REDACTED] MESSAGE [REDACTED] FORBIDDEN

SHAEF File No: 11 Dec

11 Dec

8

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : ADMAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR COMBINED
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE INFORMATION

FOR INFO : CENTRAL DISTRICT UK BASE FOR BRITISH OF
STAFF: TROOPERS FOR F-5: COMINCH:
TO FRANCE FOR MEGEC:

FROM : SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED

REF NO : S-70250

VOG 233

1. Reference VOG 199 and VOG 211 concerning shipment of French currency, COMINCH telegram 071930Z of 7th December requests SHAEF's agreement to use of French cruiser GLOIRE for this purpose. Since first priority shipment already been arranged we are of opinion that difficulties resulting from alterations in shipping programme may result in delivery dates not being advanced sufficiently to justify use of special vessel.

2. It is, however, appreciated that in so far as French no doubt made the proposal to our may raise political points. Your advice the question is, therefore, requested.

3. In view of paragraph 2 of GOV 163, if the GLOIRE transports currency consider essential control be transferred to French on loading.

SNC OUT 1238

SECRET

SGS	Dist	SC	DSC	CS	DCS	BCI	DCS	CAO	AIR	SGS	COOR								

6 1365

SECRET

COPY NO.

SGS SHAEF File No. 123

107 EC

ALL
GOV 175-10 Dec.
ALL VOG 236
11 Dec.
GOV 177 30/12/44

IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF THIS MESSAGE IN TRANSMISSION

SECRET

REF NO : S-70250

10 DECEMBER 1944

311-7
311-7
XV06-199 is Ref No S-68196, SMC OUT 7145, 24/11/44, G-5
V06-211 is Ref S-68463, OUT 7404, 26/11/44, G-5
071930Z is IN 2566, 8/12/44, G-4
X007-163 is Ref WX-71208, 505, 2/12/44, G-5

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: W. A. CURTIN, JR. MAJOR

INFORMATION : SCS COORD WITH: G-4 (MOV TH)
SHAEP MISSION FRANCE
G-4
POLITICAL OFFICERS
MURPHY
ZONE
G-1
SHAEP
AG RECORDS

SMC OUT 1238

10 DEC 1944 1255A

BFX/jdp

REF NO: S-70250

FOO: 101115A

SECRET

- 2 -

6 1366



SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

APO 757 (Main)
10 December 1944

COPIES FILED NO. 13

- 104

TH. H. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

6 1367

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR
COMBINED CIVIL COMMITTEE: BILLBOARDING

FOR INFO : CENTRAL DISTRICT BASE FOR BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF: SHAEF FOR G-5 FOR

FROM : SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED

REF NO : 8-69761

VOG 229

1. During past three increasing numbers forgeries of supplemental notes, denominations 1000 francs and 500 francs have been appearing. The 1000 franc forgery is not very good appears originate MARSEILLES. The 500 franc forgery is sufficiently good to be easily passed and appears to originate from expert in PARIS or Northern FRANCE.

2. French Treasury informs

A. Banks beginning to accept of above denomination "For collection only" and that shortly public will probably be reluctant to accept these notes at all.

B. The of FRANCE can and will provide the Allied Forces with sufficient Bank of 1000 500 franc denominations.

C. They suggest that Allied should issue of supplemental notes, denomination 500 1000 francs, exchange such notes now in of Finance Officers for of FRANCE notes.

SNC 736

SECRET

- 1 -

6 1368

SECRET

COPY NO: 9

SHAEF File No.

6 Dec

SECRET

REF NO : S-69761 1944

3. French suggestion [redacted] C [redacted] been accepted subject to difficulty of carrying it out [redacted] Forward Areas.

4. French Treasury [redacted] Police are trying to track forgers but have not yet obtained any important indications.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: V.A. COULSTOCK, [redacted]
INFORMATION : SGS
G-1
SHAFF MISSION (FRANCE)
SUMMARY
AQ RECORDS

OUT 736 6 1944 2149A HFE/jdp REF NO: S-69761
T00: 061939A

SECRET

- 2 -

6 1363



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

TO : CG 21 GROUP REAR FOR DPIC DCCAO
FOR INFO : SHAEP TO FRANCE 0-5 FOR FINANCIAL;
SHAEP REAR FOR 0-5 BERNSTEIN
FROM : SHAEP MAIN SIGNED
REF NO : S-69476 CITE:

1. French Treasury inform considerable number of forgeries 500 franc franc supplemental notes are being presented. Bank are beginning to accept these denominations only "for collection" and Treasury fears that above denominations will cease to be acceptable to public.

2. have been requested as possible to issue supplemental of 500 francs and 1000 franc. We agreed understanding that this may not possible for time in combat areas.

3. of is instructing its branches to provide Bank of notes of denomination 500 1000 for paymasters finance officers exchange for supplemental notes of where necessary.

4. Please conform as possible.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: A. GOINGS,
OWO,

INFORMATION : SHAEP MISSION FRANCE

G-1
G-4
SGS
G-2
AD RECORDS

SGS	SC	DSC	CS	DCS	DCS	DCS	SGS	COOR				
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Copy							28					✓
No.												


4 DEC 44 2036A HPR/caw REF NO: S-69476
FOO: 041830A

6 1370

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO

28



SHAEP File No. 143

47 DEC.

CONFIDENTIAL **CONFIDENTIAL**
SHAEF
 STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

JEEZ

ZOO 031700A NOV

SHAEF 218/03
 031940A NOV
 - 032136

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM : SHAEF MISSION BELGIUM
 TO : SHAEF MAIN G-5 FINANCE (ATTENTION BRIG BARINGTON SMITH)
 REF NO : G-5127 :3 NOVEMBER 1944 :

Banque Nationale requests if possible that exchange of stamped reichmarks for the Forces in RUEN and MALMEDY be delayed until November 9 in order to minimize traffic with civilians. Also that special rate of exchange for Forces will not be announced until that date.

ACTION : G-5

INFORMATION : SGS
 G-1
 G-4
 AG RECORDS

SGS	DCS	CS	DCS	DCS	DCS	SGS	COORD			
Dist	SE			CAO	AIR					
Dep	Recd									

SNC IN 1079 3 Nov 44 2155A DWR/1 REF NO: G-5127

1371

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SGS-SHAFF FILE NO. 123

3 November 44

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SHAFT 213/03
TOR 031900A NOV
mwb - 032017

605 - CHAFF - Fine No. 23

P R I O R I T Y

1 Nov 44

Our G-5111 dated 1 November repeated for information

Conversion plan for EUFEN MAMEDY. Similar Belgian plan will take place November 6, 7 and 8.

Rates of exchange as follows:

For Allied Force balances 1 [redacted] equals 12.50 francs, for civilians 1 mark equals 10 [redacted] for first 100 marks. For larger amounts 1 mark equals 5 francs.

Has any agreement been reached for reimbursing Belgian Government for Allied Forces marks.

G-5111 is SMC IN 279, 1/11/44, G-5

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SCS
G-1
G-4
AG RECORDS

SGS Dist.	SC	B+C	CS	DCS CAG	DCS AIR	SGS CDOR			
C-P No.						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SNC 1056 3 Nov 44 2046A DWR/lp REF ID: A-5125

1372

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371

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XDIK, Belgium

OUTGOING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

FROM : SHAEF MAIN [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

REF NO : 8-65275 CITE: [REDACTED]

██████ your G-5111 of 1 November 1944.

No decision yet [redacted] on question of reimbursing Belgian Government [redacted] Allied Military marks.

■ await decision of governments.

G-5111 is ■ IN 279 1/11/44 G-5

: 4-5

AUTHENTICATION: A GOINGS
CWO

INFORMATION : SGS

G-1

Q-4

Q-4
AG RECORDS

SGS Dist	SC	AC	CS	DCS	DCS CAC	DCS AIR	SGS COORD						
C P							g						✓

END OUT

3 Nov 1944

1716A

DWR/jem

REF NO: S-65275

TOO: 031635A

C O N F I D E N T I A L

6 1373

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SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO FOR : FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF STAFF
FOR INFO : HILDRING, CENTRAL BASE FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF
FROM : MAIN SIGNED
REF : 8-65253

YOG-177

1. Owing to operations taking place across the AM to troops for in being spent EUPEN, MALMEDY LUXEMBOURG.

2. Belgian and Luxembourg governments are withdrawing any AM circulation at same REICH- and at the rate. They will also warn population of withdrawal that marks will in future be recognized in or LUXEMBOURG.

This has already done in will shortly done in MALMEDY.

3. Both Governments have that marks thus withdrawn from populations should exchanged by Armies for Belgian francs at redemption rate, viz. 5 Belgian francs equals 1 consequently treated as p of troops in BELGIUM or LUXEMBOURG for of dollar/sterling credit.

They urge that it may reasonably be assumed that any such AM represent expenditures by troops which would have been in Belgian francs if operational conditions had permitted and they have been accepted in good faith by civilians to assist the troops. satisfied that this is substantially we have received no reports of military procurement being made with these areas.

OUT 4174

ALL GEN 776
16 DEC

ALL W-15682
11 DEC

6 1374

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SECRET

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SGS-SHAEF File No. 123

3 November

-2-

REF ID: A65253

4. [] have replied that we will [] this matter [] appropriate authorities and [] be grateful for your instructions.

5. █ believes █ the █ involved will be small and hope to give figures for LUXEMBOURG in a few days time. █ believe █ only US Armies █ present concerned in EUPEN, MALMEY █ LUXEMBOURG but a similar point may later arise █ NETHERLANDS where US and UK Forces may be involved. When making a decision, you will █ doubt have █ mind the generous █ taken by █ governments concerned █ agreeing to redeem █ received █ change by the troops █ rate of 12½ Belgian █ equal 1 █

ORIGINATOR : G-5

AUTHENTICATION: A GOINGS
CNO : USA

INFORMATION

G-1
G-3
G-4
POL OFFICERS
MR MURPHY
EACS
CON ZONE
SUMMARY
AG RECORDS

SGS Dist.	SC	DSC	GS	DGS	DCS CAG	DCS AIR		SGS COOR				
Cap. No.								8				✓

SBC 4174 3 Nov 1944 1605A WDR/joa REP NO: 8-65253
TOD: 031500A

2. 4

6 1935



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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

SEMP 194/01
FOR 011642A OCT
FY 011720A OCT

FW 0117204 OCT

SS-SIAF File No. 44-38861-100

SHARP MISSION BELTOWN

DEAN WAIN O-S FINANCE ATTN: ERIC BARRINGTON
SMITH

Q-5111, 1 November 1944

Conversion plan for EUPEN [redacted] similar Belgian plan will take place November 6, 7 and 8th. Rates of exchange [redacted] follows:

For Allied Force balances, 1 Mark equals 12.50 Francs, for civilians 1 Mark equals 10 Francs for first 100 Marks. For larger amounts 1 Mark equals 8 Francs. Has any agreement been reached for reimbursing Belgian Government for Allied Forces Marks.

4-0-5

I 350

6-1

0-4
10

AG RECORDS

[illegible]

1 Nov 44

1822A

DWR/at Ref No: 0 5111

6 1376

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CONFIDENTIAL

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RESTRICTED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

APC 757
25 October 1944
(Revised - 7 December 1944)

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 35) REVISED

TRANSACTIONS IN CURRENCY AND FOREIGN
EXCHANGE ASSETS

1. Administrative Memorandum Number 31, this headquarters, cs, subject: Transactions in French Currencies, is rescinded.

2. Except as authorized, personnel in occupied German territory = liberated territory are prohibited from:

a. Importing, holding, transferring, exporting or in any way dealing in United States or British paper currency. Personnel arriving with such currency in their possession will exchange or otherwise dispose of it through Finance Officers/Paymasters within 24 hours of arrival.

b. Participating in transactions involving the purchase, sale or exchange of any currency against any other currency, except through authorized agencies.

c. Importing or exporting any currency through mail or parcel post facilities, except currency as souvenirs not exceeding one dollar or five shillings in value.

d. Participating in any transaction involving gold coin and bullion, or the foreign exchange assets of any person in liberated or occupied territory not belonging to the Allied Forces.

e. Participating in the transfer of any currency against any other currency on behalf of persons not belonging to the Allied Forces in liberated or occupied territory.

f. Participating in the importing or exporting of funds, securities, money or other financial assets on behalf of persons not belonging to the Allied Forces in occupied or liberated territory.

3. The following declaration will be obtained from all personnel entering liberated territory or occupied German territory from outside the Continental limits of Europe, except those entering as members of a formed body of troops:

I declare that I hold \$ _____ U.S./Canadian and £ _____ British paper currency, which I undertake to exchange or otherwise dispose of through a Finance Officer/Paymaster within 24 hours.

6 1377

RESTRICTED

25 Oct

RECEIVED

- 2 -

6 1378

DISTRIBUTION

Brigadier General, United States Army,
Adjutant General

By command of General DISBROW

6. The provisions of this order will be brought to the attention of all personnel and will be conspicuously posted in appropriate places.
5. Violations of any provision hereof will subject the offender to trial by court-martial or other appropriate disciplinary action.
4. This order applies to all personnel in occupied German territory or liberated territory who are subject to Allied military, naval or air force law, except those serving in and subject to the laws of their own country.

RECEIVED

MONEY IN GERMANY

1. German money consists of marks and pfennigs (in German, "pfennige").

1 mark equals 100 pfennigs. Your pay will be issued in marks and, for the purpose of charging the marks you draw against your account, the rate of exchange has been fixed at 40 marks to the £1: so as far as you are concerned the mark is worth sixpence.

2. Most of the German paper money is expressed in "Reichsmarks" issued by the Reichsbank, but the notes are expressed in "Rentenmarks". These two kinds of notes are of the same value and the one is as good as the other. Rentenmark notes are mainly for amounts of 1 mark or less, and Reichsmark notes are for values of 1 mark or more. Both kinds of notes show their value in marks in figures on both sides. Rentenmark notes bear the word "Reichsbanknote" in German letters and Rentenmark marks bear the word "Rentenbankschein". Both of the coins you will see are expressed in pfennigs. You may come across coins for 5, 2 or 1 Reichsmark but they are not often seen. There are no coins for any value greater than 5 marks. There are no notes for smaller amounts than 1 mark, other than the 1/2 mark note mentioned in para. 3.

3. Mark notes have also been put into circulation by the Allied Military Authorities. These are in the following denominations:—

1/2 mark (50 pfennigs)	= 2d.
1 mark	= 6d.
5 marks	= 25. 0d.
10 "	= 50. 0d.
20 "	= 100. 0d.
50 "	= £1 5s. 0d.
100 "	= £2 10s. 0d.
1,000 "	= £25.

You can recognize these easily as they all have a large M (for Military) on the back. On the front they have the value in figures and in German words.

The "Military Mark" is of the same value as the Reichsmark and Rentenmark.

4. All the notes and coins described in paragraphs 1 to 3 may be freely accepted and used by you. You should not accept other kinds of mark notes, for example, the issue called "Reichskreditkassencheine", since these cannot be used in Germany and your Paymaster is not allowed to exchange them for you.

6 1379

P.T.O.

5. You must not accept or use sterling or dollar anywhere on the Continent of Europe. Even if they are offered to you below the official rate, they will almost certainly either have been hoarded or be some of the forgeries which the Germans have put into circulation. There are large numbers of these. You cannot get your money back on a forgery, even from your own Paymaster. Your sterling should have been exchanged for you when you left home or after you landed. If you still have any left, you should ask your Commanding Officer or Paymaster to exchange it.

6. If you have brought into Germany any other money, for example, French, Belgian or Luxembourg francs, Dutch florins, Italian lire, etc., take the first opportunity of exchanging it through your Paymaster. These currencies must not be used in Germany.

7. Finally, and this is most important, you will find very little to buy. So draw as little pay as possible and don't keep a lot of money in your pockets. What you don't draw in Germany will go to your credit at home.

Authorized by the War Office, London.
October, 1944.

6 1380

(M14/616) 125000 10/11 W.O.P. 103-8

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

566/1000/cm3

AG-123 OpGa

APD 627
24 October 1944

SUBJECT: German-Issue Reichsmarks and Rentenmarks

TO: Commanding Generals:
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Twelfth Army Group
Communications Zone
Each Army
XX Corps
XVIII Corps (Airborne)
European Division, Air Transport Command
Ground Force Replacement System
United Kingdom Force, Communications Zone
Section Commanders, Communications Zone
Commanding Officers:
European Civil Affairs Division
Military Intelligence Service
Commandant, American School System
Headquarters Commandant



1. At the present time US military personnel operating in Germany are being paid only in Allied Military Authority 100 Mark notes in denominations not exceeding 100 marks. The sole marks by which German-issue "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" may be lawfully acquired by Groups is through change received from payments for commodities or services. Therefore, such military personnel should not have in their possession German-issue notes in denominations of 100 marks or more.

2. a. Until such time as German-issue "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" are placed in general circulation by finance disbursing officers, the possession by US military personnel of such German-issue currency in denominations of, or exceeding, 100 marks will be considered sufficient cause for investigation as to their source and as to the means by which they were acquired. Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken where indicated.

b. German-issue "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" in denominations of 100 marks or greater will not be accepted by disbursing officers for pay, war bonds, or other transactions, nor by postal officers for stamps, money orders, etc., except on the approval of a general officer.

By command of General BISHOP:

H. H. Cable
S. H. CABLE
Lt Colonel, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "A" and "B"

6 1381

RESTRICTED

14 Oct 44

RESTRICTED

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

UAGP

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO OCT 'HTOO

GEF 103/19
 TOR 190820A OCT
 rlp 190907A OCT

R E S T R I C T E D

R O U T I N E

FROM : EXFOR BEAR A
TO : SHARP MAIN 0-1
REF NO : A-5973, OCT 1944

Exchange of French XXXX Belgian francs in HOLLAND temporarily suspended by NETHERLANDS Government.

All banks in HOLLAND are prohibited from effecting any currency exchanges on behalf of civilians and from tendering French ■■■ Belgian francs or German ■■■s in payment for goods ■■ services. Dutch currency is the only legal tender in HOLLAND.

All informed.

ACTION : G-1
INFORMATION : SGS
G-5
G-4
POLITICAL OFFICERS
MR. MURPHY
SUMMARY
RECORDS

SNC ■ 4353 19 Oct 44 0935A DMR/1p REF ID: A-5973

SGS Dist	SC		DCS CAD	DCS AIR	SGS CODR		
Copy							

6 1382

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

WAR

T00 152145Z OCT

SHAW 57/26
TOR 160350A 00Y
CBB 160356A

~~SECRET~~

R O U T I N E

FROM : AGWAR FROM HILLDRING SIGNED MARSHALL
TO : SHAEF TO EISENHOWER FOR SHRE, SHAEF MISSION
TO FRANCE
REF NO : W-47163, OCT 1944

Subject ■ Disposition ■ Unsanitary UNITED
Currency.

UNITED [redacted] Treasury Department states that if representation by it on review board, reference NY-12345, dated 3 October 1944, would be of assistance to you, they have no objection.

✓ MF-12545 1a PS IN 10955, 4/10/44, G-5

INFORMATION : G-5
: SGS
G-1
G-4
AG RECORDS

SNO IN 3378 16 1552A DWR/ly REF NO: U-47163

SGS DIN	SC	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR	SGS CDON				
SGS DIN	SC	DCS	DCS CAO	DCS AIR	SGS CDON				

6 1383

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

GOING

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SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

WAR

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO 142305Z OCT

TUN 1603304 007
 FJD 1606354 007

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FROM

2. ADVAR FROM COS

TO FOR ACTION

1. SEARCH MAIN FOR SOURCE

FOR INFO

2 CCAO/L, UK BASE SEC FOR BCS, COM 3, BRAN
MISSION (FRANCE)

REF ID: A66089

WX-46806, 14 OCT 1944. CITE: OOAD

GOV-130

Shipment of provisional non military French franc currency.

BO-933, BO-932, and BO-924 loaded with 500 boxes each of provisional non military French franc currency. Total shipment consists of 1,500 boxes 500 franc denomination. Boxes are marked as indicated [redacted] V00-92 with shipping designator HALL T OFD OFD 86 stenciled on top side. Receipt of shipment requested via radio. Cargo Security Officer in possession of schedule by box number, denomination, and serial number with instructions to deliver to officer receiving for shipment at destination. Official schedule being forwarded by air mail in duplicate.

26 July Thurs. 1946

VOG-92 Ref No. B-56234 is [REDACTED] OUT 2483, 26/7/44, 0-5

ACTION

9-5

INFORMATION

979

Q-1

Q-4

AD RECORDS

SNC IN 3392

16 Oct 44

16084

DNR/10

REP NO: WX-46806

6

1984

S E C R E T

SECRET

HQ: 170, 1-15, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955,

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STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

San 2-10-44 Vol I

No. R-3-4

123

5

MR MURPHY
AG RECORDS

[illegible]

SGS - STAFF File No. 123

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1385

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SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

ADLS

TOO 132032A Oct

SHAEF X72/14
140952A Oct
WNS 141012A

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : [REDACTED] ZONE FROM [REDACTED]
TO FOR ACTION : FIRST ARMY, THIRD ARMY, [REDACTED] ARMY,
SEVENTH ARMY, 12TH [REDACTED] GROUP
FOR [REDACTED] : SHAEF TO G-5
REF NO : EX-54147 13 Oct 1944

Shortly, [REDACTED] authorities will announce a program for the conversion of circulating stamped Mark and Belgian Franc into [REDACTED] Belgian [REDACTED] Luxembourg Francs. The rates, terms and conditions in which the exchange will be accomplished for the public [REDACTED] comparable to those used in BELGIUM.

From the effective date of the announcement, Reichmarks, Renten Marks and Allied Military Marks will cease to be legal tender in LUXEMBOURG. Request organizational Commanders under your jurisdiction advise all personnel holding stamped Belgian francs or Reich [REDACTED] Renten [REDACTED] to deliver same immediately to Army Finance Officers who will make conversion into new Belgian or Luxembourg francs at [REDACTED] rate of [REDACTED] old stamped Belgian franc for one new Belgian or Luxembourg franc; and 1 Reichmark or Renten mark for 12.5 new Belgium francs or Luxembourg francs. Arrangements have been made with LUXEMBOURG authorities [REDACTED] exchange German marks thus obtained by Finance Officers at same rate as one equals 12.5 francs. Army personnel in

1386

SAC IN 2680

SECRET

COPY NO. 9

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LUXEMBOURG should also be encouraged to convert any Allied Military marks in their possession into Belgian - Luxembourg francs at the official rate of one Allied Military mark equal 4 francs and 38 centimes in Belgian or Luxembourg currency.

Special treatment for Army personnel with respect to German marks results from fact that they have received such marks as change in commercial transactions in very small amounts. Accordingly, exchange of German [redacted] at special rate will be limited to approximately 50 German marks per capita. Army personnel must be strictly prohibited from acquiring any German marks, any Reich or Renten marks from the public for purpose of exchange into Belgian or Luxembourg francs at special rates. Identical program is being followed by Belgian authorities in EUPEN, MALMEDY, and MORGESMST and you will follow same program there as outlined above for LUXEMBOURG.

All exchanges made for Army personnel after closing date as announced, must be supported by a certificate that the Reich or Renten marks are legally in their possession and that no opportunity for exchange was afforded them due to military operations. It is stressed that Army personnel will, under no circumstances, accept Reich or Renten marks from local population except in small amounts necessary as change in a normal commercial transaction and that, under ~~any~~ circumstances will they engage in currency transactions with the public to avoid the controls of Luxembourg and Belgian authorities. Army personnel holding Reich or Renten marks in excess of approximately 50 marks will have to explain fully how they came into possession of such amounts of marks.

ACTION : 0-5

INFORMATION : 308
G-1

AC HECRO5

SMC IN 2630 14 OCT 44 1116A HFK/daw REF 50 100-54447
6 1387

S. F. C. N. E. T.

SECRET

SECRET

SHAEF

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JRLX

700 131200

SHARP X 103/13
TOR 131312A 000
VIA 131427A

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : G-5 SHARP MISSION TO LUXEMBOURG
TO FOR ACTION : G-5 SHARP MAIN FOR ERIC BARRINGTON SMITH
FOR INFO : CENTRAL ARMY GP FOR G-5
REF NO. : LM/4 13 Oct 1944

SHARP Mission BELGIUM telegraph Belgian franc
currency due here today. Prime Minister proposes proceed
urgently with exchange programme beginning 17th October.
Plans to be announced by him by radio 14th October 1815
hours.

ACTION : G-5
INFORMATION : SGS
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START & END TARGET

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